

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

after December 3?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

Mr. Masten: Now, before the recess we referred to Document 4, Item 3(d) of Exhibit 142, and you stated that you regarded that as a genuine winds execute message under Circular 2353; is that correct?

Admiral Noyes: Assuming it was repeated again at the end of the message.

Mr. Masten: Yes. This document does not show whether or not it was repeated at the end of the message.

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Masten: But did you check at the time or was this communicated to you at the time so that you could check as to whether or not it had been repeated at the end of the message, do you remember?

Admiral Noyes: I do not remember the receipt of this specific message in detail. It occurred after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Masten: Now, then, prior to December 7 do you recall any instances when messages that were first thought to be winds execute messages were brought to you and were determined by you not to be genuine winds execute messages?

Admiral Noyes: I recall the fact that there were several but I do not recall the details.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

1
2 Mr. Masten: How many occasions were there on which
3 alleged winds execute messages were brought to you and it
4 was left for you to determine whether or not they were
5 genuine winds execute messages?

6 Admiral Noyes: I could not say. Few.

7 Mr. Masten: As many as half a dozen or a dozen?

8 Admiral Noyes: Not a dozen. Less than a half-dozen.
9 Two or three, perhaps.

10 Mr. Masten: Now, Captain Safford has testified before
11 this committee that a winds execute message was received
12 on the morning of December 4. I am going to read you his
13 testimony from his prepared statement in that regard. At
14 page 9641 of our transcript Captain Safford testified as
15 follows:

16 "The winds message broadcast was about 200 words long,
17 with the code words prescribed in Tokyo Circular 2353 appear-
18 ing in the middle of the message, whereas we had expected
19 to find the code words of Tokyo Circular 2354 in a Morse
20 broadcast. All three 'code words' were used, but the
21 expression meaning 'North Wind Cloudy' was in the negative
22 form.

23 "When I first saw the winds message, it had already
24 been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, in charge
25 of the Translation Section of the Navy Department Communications

1 Witness Noyes

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2 Intelligence Unit. Kramer had underscored all three 'code
3 phrases' on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below
4 the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon
5 in Kramer's handwriting, the following three translations:

6 "War with England (including NEI, etc.)

7 "War with the U.S.

8 "Peace with Russia.

9 "I am not sure of the order; but it was the same as
10 in the broadcast and I think England appeared first. I
11 think Kramer used 'U.S.' rather than 'United States'. It
12 is possible that the words 'no war', instead of 'peace',
13 were used to describe Japan's intentions with regard to
14 Russia."

15 Then dropping down to the bottom of page 9642 he
16 continued:

17 "I immediately sent the original of the winds message
18 up to the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral
19 Noyes) by one of the officers serving under me and told him
20 to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person, to track
21 him down and not take 'no' for an answer, and if he could
22 not find him in a reasonable time to let me know. I did
23 not explain the nature or significance of the winds message
24 to this officer. In a few minutes I received a report to
25 the effect that the message had been delivered."

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 Now, going back to the description which I have just
3 read you given by Captain Safford before this committee, do
4 you have any recollection of ever seeing such a message as
5 he described?

6 Admiral Noyes: I don't believe that his description is
7 good enough for me to answer that question. I will say,
8 however, that the message which he describes is not an
9 authentic execute of a winds message.

10 Mr. Masten: Why do you say it is not an authentic winds
11 execute message?

12 Admiral Noyes: In the first place, for the reason, in
13 my opinion, that it was not transmitted as the Japanese said
14 it would be, which he passes over.

15 Mr. Masten: What do you mean by that?

16 Admiral Noyes: It was sent in Morse code and not by
17 voice. Not on the schedule and not in the broadcast which
18 they had said they would send it. Furthermore, his de-
19 scription of the meaning of the phrases, of course, is not
20 correct. I think that has been discussed. About whether
21 it meant war or not. But actually this one had nothing
22 to do with including the Netherlands East Indies, the
23 circular that was set up, the one he says did, East Wind Rain.

24 Mr. Masten: 2353?

25 Admiral Noyes: Had no reference to Netherlands East Indies.

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Witness Noyes

questions by: Mr. Masten

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Mr. Masten: Now, what are the reasons?

Admiral Noyes: That would have been the Morse one, which merely said northeast and south. There is no such thing in Japanese, any more than there is in English of negative nouns. We don't say, the Japanese don't say "no north wind," they say what the wind is. It wasn't provided in the code for any negative expression. The only thing in connection with that I have a recollection of, which is not very distinct, is that this question did come up of someone trying to make out of a translation that it meant "Peace with Russia," which is in common with what he said here.

Mr. Masten: Was that in connection with a message that you recall having been brought to you on December 4?

Admiral Noyes: I don't recall the date.

Mr. Masten: But you do remember some incident prior to December 7 having to do with whether the peace with Russia was proper expression under the winds code?

Admiral Noyes: If I may take up another matter, it was, in another place, in a previous investigation, it was said that one of the watch officers telephone to me at my home a possible winds execute message and I replied that that was a peculiar direction from which to have the wind blowing. I didn't remember that at the first investigation.

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

h2 2 Captain Safford recalled to my recollection that that
3 is what I had agreed I would say, that if I didn't agree
4 over the telephone that the message was authentic. So if
5 that is the message that part fits together.

6 I believe that a message was present to me which in
7 some way mentioned Russia which I was unwilling to accept.

8 Mr. Masten: Let's come back to the reasons why the
9 particular message described by Captain Safford in your
10 opinion would not have met the requirements of the winds
11 code?

12 In the first place, you say you have no specific re-
13 collection of this incident?

14 Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

15 Mr. Masten: Then you say that if a message such as
16 this had been brought to you, you would not have regarded
17 it as an authentic winds execute for the reasons, first,
18 that it was a Morse broadcast where as you expected it
19 to be a voice broadcast?

20 Admiral Noyes: Because it had been stated in the
21 set-up that it would be, when these expressions were used
22 it would be in a voice broadcast. In circular 2354 there
23 was not another set-up that could have been used in the
24 Morse broadcast.

25 Mr. Masten: Your second reason was that the message

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 as written, the interpretation as written, as said to have
3 been written by Captain Kramer, at the bottom "including
4 N.E.I. etc." which do not appear in circular 2353; is
5 that correct?

6 Admiral Noyes: That is correct, and also the fact --

7 Mr. Masten: Or in 2354, for that matter?

8 Admiral Noyes: This did not agree with 2353, which
9 Captain Safford it was intended to be. Captain Kramer
10 also I believe stated that he would never have written "war"
11 because he didn't consider, and so testified before the
12 committee that that was the correct Japanese translation
13 of the set-up.

14 Mr. Masten: And your fourth reason is that the expres-
15 sion used in regard to Russia was in the negative form; is
16 that correct?

17 Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

18 Mr. Masten: Which was not provided for under the
19 circular establishing the code?

20 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir; and there is nothing positive
21 to show that it did appear in the middle of a broadcast so
22 that it was repeated twice.

23 Mr. Masten: But the phrase "including N.E.I." might
24 have been derived, might have been derived, might it not,
25 from the dispatch you had received from Admiral Hart, and

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

h4 2 which also appears in Exhibit 142, and in which he says he
3 translates the intercept receipt from Singapore, the
4 phrase "Nishi" as meaning England, including the occupation
5 of Thai or invasion of Malaya or N.E.I.

6 Admiral Noyes: That is right; that is 2354.

7 I will tell you, I think they did a poor job of a second-
8 hand translation out there. I think they got it rather mixed
9 up.

10 Mr. Masten: Do you recall whether by the morning of
11 December 4, this message from Admiral Hart had been re-
12 ceived? That is on page 1(c) of Exhibit 142.

13 Admiral Noyes: Please repeat that.

14 Mr. Masten: I just wanted to get your recollection as
15 to whether or not this message had been received in the Navy
16 Department before the morning of December 4.

17 Admiral Noyes: It had. It should have been. It was
18 transmitted on the 28th of November.

19 Mr. Masten: Now, Colonel Sedtler testified yesterday
20 before the committee that on the morning of December 5th
21 you telephoned him and said to him, "The message is in,"
22 or words to that effect, regarding a winds execute message.

23 Do you have any present recollection of having said
24 that?

25 Admiral Noyes: No, I have not. We had a private tele-

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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h5 2 phone, secret telephone, from my desk to the desk of the
3 Chief Signal Officer in the Army and we talked together
4 a number of times a day. As to any particular conversation
5 I do not identify a conversation such as he testified to,
6 although I wouldn't say it didn't occur.

7 Mr. Keefe: What was the last part?

8 Admiral Noyes: I would not say that it didn't occur
9 because I talked to him several times a day.

10 Mr. Masten: At any rate you were in communication with
11 him on matters such as this from time to time during the
12 period prior to Pearl Harbor?

13 Admiral Noyes: That is correct. I cannot see why I
14 should have said "The" message, because, to my mind this
15 was not "the" message. We had large numbers of messages
16 to discuss. If anything the note which we were waiting for
17 was more important on the date he says, the 5th, than this.
18 Incidentally, his day is not the same as the date given by
19 Captain Safford or Captain Kramer, which makes it difficult
20 for me to identify a date in answering.

21 Mr. Masten: Well, now, would it have been your practice
22 in deciding whether an alleged winds execute message was
23 authentic or not, to have discussed the matter with Admiral
24 Ingersoll or Admiral Wilkinson, or Admiral Turner before
25 making up your mind on the subject?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Admiral Noyes: Yes, particularly if I, if it met
3 some requirement, and if it was approaching the borderline,
4 I certainly would have discussed it with them.

5 Mr. Masten: Admiral Turner testified before this
6 committee that on December 5th in the afternoon you tele-
7 phoned him and told him that a winds execute message trans-
8 lated "North wind clear," or perhaps "North wind cloudy"
9 had been received in the Navy Department. Do you have
10 any recollection of that incident?

11 Admiral Noyes: He says the afternoon of the 5th?

12 Mr. Masten: He said the afternoon of the 5th.

13 Admiral Noyes: Of course Captain Safford says the
14 morning of the 4th. I would say there was only one message
15 that had a Russian slant. They are probably both talking
16 about the same false message.

17 Mr. Masten: But you have no specific recollection of
18 that particular incident?

19 Admiral Noyes: I have not, except that I have an in-
20 distinct recollection of a message of going over this
21 thing once before, that there is no such thing in Japanese
22 as a negative noun.

23 Mr. Masten: Then would it be fair to summarize your
24 testimony on this question of a winds execute message as
25 follows, that prior to December 7 in your best recollection

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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no authentic winds execute message was received in the Navy Department?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

Mr. Masten: Prior to December 7, that a number, perhaps as many as a half dozen alleged winds execute messages were brought to you and you decided, perhaps after consultation with Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Turner or Admiral Wilkinson, that the messages were not authentic winds messages?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct, except I would say that some of the ones brought to me were brought with a subordinate saying himself that he was sure it couldn't be correct.

In other words, already questioned by one of the watch officers, or Captain Safford.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Mr. Masten: Were the watch officers supposed to bring
3 them directly to you or to take them to Captain Safford if
4 an alleged message came in?

5 Admiral Noyes: They took them to him if he was there.

6 Mr. Masten: If he was there.

7 Admiral Noyes: I imagine.

8 Mr. Masten: Do you recall having had anything to do
9 after December the 7th with the preparation of a folder of
10 intercepted Japanese messages to be submitted to the Roberts
11 Commission?

12 Admiral Noyes: I received orders from the Secretary of
13 the Navy, probably via the Chief of Naval Operations, to pre-
14 pare such a folder for the Roberts Commission and I passed
15 that order on to my subordinates and checked the folder after
16 it was presented to me.

17 Mr. Masten: Did that folder include an execute message
18 under either of the codes establishing the winds code?

19 Admiral Noyes: It did not. It was supposed to contain
20 no magic or any reference to it.

21 Mr. Keefe: What was that answer?

22 AdmirallNoyes: The folder for the Roberts Commission
23 was not supposed to contain magic.

24 Mr. Keefe: And did not?

25 Admiral Noyes: It did not to the best of my recollection.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 If it did, it got by me.

3 Mr. Masten: Now, there is one other point at which
4 this winds message comes up and that is in connection with
5 the warning dispatch which Captain McCollum prepared during
6 the week prior to Pearl Harbor and which was never sent.

7 Captain Safford has testified before this committee in
8 connection with that message and he also testified before the
9 Navy Court that the message ended with a reference to the
10 receipt in the Navy Department of a winds execute message.
11 Do you recall having been shown this message proposed by
12 Captain McCollum on or about December the 5th?

13 Admiral Noyes: I recall having been shown a message
14 prepared by Captain McCollum. I am not sure of the date. In-
15 cidentally, Captain McCollum's own testimony was that it did
16 not contain any reference to the winds message; that is my
17 own recollection.

18 Mr. Masten: Do you recall whether or not the proposed
19 message contained a reference to a winds execute?

20 Admiral Noyes: I will say it did not.

21 Mr. Masten: It is your present recollection that there
22 was no reference in this message prepared by Captain McCollum
23 to any winds execute message, is that correct?

24 Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

25 Mr. Masten: Now, referring again to these dispatches

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 in exhibit 37, on pages 42 to 44, which were the messaged re-
3 garding the destruction of codes by the United States' rep-
4 resentatives in our outlying islands, will you state again, -
5 I think you touched on it briefly earlier, - will you state
6 again why those messages were prepared at that particular
7 time?

8 Admiral Noyes: To the best of my recollection, based
9 on an intercepted Japanese message, we had on the 3rd of De-
10 cember notified our outlying representatives of the fact
11 that the Japanese had destroyed their codes and papers in
12 general.

13 Mr. Masten: Now, those are the dispatches on pages 40
14 and 41, are they not?

15 Admiral Noyes: The dispatches on pages 40 and 41. On
16 the morning of the 4th of December I asked Admirals Turner and
17 Wilkinson to come to my office and proposed to them that we
18 had better destroy our own codes and ciphers in our most
19 outlying positions. They agreed and I gave instructions to
20 Captain Safford over the inter-office phone to prepare these
21 messages which you have on the exhibit.

22 Mr. Masten: And the reason, the immediate cause of send-
23 ing those out was the receipt and interception in Washington
24 of the Japanese messages instructing their representatives
25 to destroy their codes, is that correct?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Admiral Noyes: It was a natural sequence to the fact
3 that they had destroyed theirs at the places named, Tokyo,
4 Bangkok, Peiping, Shanghai. Of course, when we did it we
5 limited ourselves to any -- we cut ourselves off from any
6 further information. That is the reason it was desirable from
7 our point of view and from the operational people's point of
8 view that it had to be agreed to.

9 Mr. Masten: And the sending of those messages was not
10 caused, are we to understand, by the receipt in Washington of
11 a winds execute message prior to that time?

12 Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

13 Mr. Masten: You say that is correct?

14 Admiral Noyes: These messages were not caused by the
15 receipt of any winds code execute.

16 Mr. Masten: Now, Admiral, turning to the events of De-
17 cember the 6th and 7th, will you state briefly where you were
18 and what you did on the late afternoon and evening of December
19 the 6th if you can now recall?

20 Admiral Noyes: On the 6th, Saturday the 6th, around noon-
21 time we had another conference, to the best of my recollection,
22 to discuss authorizing the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific to de-
23 stroy more codes, which was a rather serious matter because
24 that still further cut down our communications, incoming com-
25 munications. The message was prepared and sent up to be

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

1
2 considered by the Chief of Naval Operations and eventually
3 released by him, or by Admiral Ingersoll it was.

4 Mr. Masten: Could I interrupt you and ask you if that
5 is the message on page 44 of exhibit 37?

6 Admiral Noyes: No, that is about Guam. It is the message
7 on page 45.

8 Mr. Masten: The message on page 45 is the one that was
9 discussed at this conference to which you referred?

10 Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

11 Mr. Masten: And that was in the late afternoon of De-
12 cember the 6th?

13 Admiral Noyes: You see, we had Com 16, who was the shore
14 representative of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, he had
15 been covered by the dispatch on page 42 and this covered the
16 rest of the islands.

17 Mr. Masten: Now, about what time did this conference take
18 place?

19 Admiral Noyes: I would not remember except for the re-
20 ference number on the dispatch, which is my best guide.

21 Mr. Masten: And what time does that indicate?

22 Admiral Noyes: That is around noontime.

23 Mr. Masten: Around noontime.

24 Admiral Noyes: The middle of the day.

25 Mr. Masten: Now, during the afternoon of December the 6th

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 did you know that the thirteen part message, so-called -- you
3 are familiar with what I mean when I refer to that?

4 Admiral Noyes: Yes.

5 Mr. Masten: Did you know that that had been received and
6 was being decrypted in the Navy Department?

7 Admiral Noyes: I now believe that I did. I was either
8 informed or saw the rough originals of the parts and knew they
9 were coming in and I particularly instructed Kramer to be
10 sure that the Secretary of State got his copies promptly, al-
11 though it was the Army responsibility for the delivery, because
12 I felt it very important that he should be able to study the
13 note before the Japanese representatives presented it to him.

14 Mr. Masten: And when did you first see the thirteen
15 parts as translated?

16 Admiral Noyes: As I say, I think I saw the rough. When
17 these messages come in originally they are quite full of
18 holes and they were -- I think you will notice in that message,
19 I believe, there was only forty-six words that we never did
20 get. I saw enough to get the sense of it before I left.

21 Mr. Masten: Can you be more specific as to what time it
22 was?

23 Admiral Noyes: No.

24 Mr. Masten: It would have been along in the late after-
25 noon, before six o'clock?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

1
2 Admiral Noyes: I left between seven and eight, nearer
3 eight, from my office. It could have been any time. It
4 wasn't after eight o'clock.

5 Mr. Masten: And did you return home at that time?

6 Admiral Noyes: I did.

7 Mr. Masten: And you were at home all during the evening
8 of December the 6th?

9 Admiral Noyes: I was. As I mentioned before, I might
10 have come back then to the office but nobody seems to have
11 seen me, so I guess I did not.

12 Mr. Masten: Do you have any recollection of having seen
13 on the evening of December the 6th the so-called pilot mes-
14 sage? That is the message on page 238 of exhibit 1.

15 Admiral Noyes: No, I am rather definite that I did not.

16 Mr. Masten: You did not see that in the late afternoon
17 or evening of the 6th?

18 Admiral Noyes: I don't think the Navy received it on the
19 6th.

20 Mr. Masten: Now, what time did you come to your office
21 on Sunday morning?

22 Admiral Noyes: Around nine.

23 Mr. Masten: Around nine o'clock?

24 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Masten: And what time on Sunday morning, or when did

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

1
2 you first learn of the receipt of the fourteenth part of the
3 fourteen part message?

4 Admiral Noyes: Actually I was reading my copy of the
5 note when I got the intercept of the warning of the attack on
6 Pearl Harbor -- I mean of the notice of the attack on Pearl
7 Harbor. Just when the book was brought to me I could not say.

8 Mr. Masten: Do you recall specifically what time it was
9 on Sunday when you say you first heard of the attack on Pearl
10 Harbor?

11 Admiral Noyes: Oh, the broadcast, - we intercepted the
12 broadcast from Pearl Harbor. I do not remember the exact num-
13 ber of minutes after one, but as soon as it was intercepted
14 by my people, - I was sitting at my desk reading the booklet
15 when on my inter-office phone they gave me the message, "Air
16 raid on Pearl Harbor; this is no drill."

17 Mr. Masten: Now, by "booklet" you mean the volume of
18 translated intercepts which contained the full fourteen parts
19 of the fourteen part message, is that what you mean?

20 Admiral Noyes: I think the fourteenth part was in it.

21 Mr. Masten: Was the one P.M. message in the booklet at
22 that time? Do you recall seeing it?

23 Admiral Noyes: I am sure it was not.

24 Mr. Masten: Prior to that time had you seen any of the
25 other Admirals in OPNAV during the morning of December the 7th?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

1
2 Admiral Noyes: I had been busy from nine until one. We
3 were quite involved with a Japanese convoy, which over our
4 regular systems of communication had been reported by Admiral
5 Hart.

6 Mr. Masten: Did you have any discussion with any of the
7 other Admirals that morning regarding the fourteen part and
8 one P.M. message? Are we to understand that you had seen it
9 up until just prior to the time when the radio message was
10 intercepted saying, "Air raid on Pearl Harbor; this is no
11 drill"?

12 Admiral Noyes: That is my best recollection.

13 Mr. Masten: You had not read it prior to that time and
14 had not discussed it with anyone or had heard anyone else
15 talking about it or its receipt?

16 Admiral Noyes: I might explain by saying that Kramer in
17 being caught between the White House and State Department and
18 Secretary of the Navy did not get around to cover my copies
19 of those messages, which was quite proper because I knew my
20 job was to see that the things got delivered to the ultimate
21 addressees and I would not expect him to hold up in getting
22 the copies through. I gathered from his testimony that when
23 he returned from one trip he found another and had to go
24 right back. I think that is the reason I did not have my
25 booklet sooner.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

1
2 Mr. Masten: Now, you said that on the afternoon of De-
3 cember the 6th you had seen the thirteen part message in the
4 rough.

5 Admiral Noyes: I said I think so. I had either seen
6 them or had been told about them by Kramer.

7 Mr. Masten: Did you receive any --or, rather, did you
8 leave any instructions with Captain Safford about it or with
9 Captain Kramer about it when you left the Navy Department on
10 the evening of December 6th regarding that message or any
11 other intercepts?

12 Admiral Noyes: The only specific instructions that I
13 remember were to be sure that the Secretary of State get the
14 completed copy as soon as possible. At the time it was com-
15 ing and we did not know how long it was going to take for the
16 note to be completed.

17 Mr. Masten: Did anyone get in touch with you during the
18 late evening or night of December 6th regarding those mes-
19 sages?

20 Admiral Noyes: Not to the best of my recollection.

21 Mr. Masten: Is there anything else in connection with
22 the events of those two days that you now recall that would
23 be helpful to the committee? For example, as to whether or
24 not during the morning of December the 7th you heard any
25 discussion of Pearl Harbor.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Admiral Noyes: Well, I can be very definite that I
3 heard no discussion of Pearl Harbor.

4 Mr. Masten: You heard no discussion of Pearl Harbor?

5 Admiral Noyes: I heard no discussion of Pearl Harbor.

6 Mr. Masten: Until the time of the attack?

7 Admiral Noyes: That is correct. There is only one thing.
8 A British officer came to my office shortly after nine o'clock
9 in connection with this actual sighting that we had made of
10 this Japanese convoy heading either for Thailand, Malay Pen-
11 insula or the Philippines. It was around abreast the Philip-
12 pines at that time. He had some information and I gave him
13 ours, which we were doing, and he wanted an appointment with
14 the Secretary of State. I called up the Secretary of State's
15 office and they told me that the Japanese, I believe, had
16 conflicted; that the Japanese representatives had asked for
17 an appointment at one o'clock. That is the best of my recol-
18 lection.

19 Mr. Masten: Other than that incident you have no other
20 information which you think would be helpful regarding the
21 events on the morning of December the 7th?

22 Admiral Noyes: No.

23 Mr. Masten: Now, Admiral, what steps were taken in the
24 Navy Department, in your division of the Navy Department im-
25 mediately after December the 7th to make certain that there

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Questions by: Mr. Masten

1
2 were no leaks of information from the Navy Department? I sup-
3 pose there were such steps taken.

4 Admiral Noyes: Well, I read in the paper Captain Saf-
5 ford's testimony that I directed all personal memoranda to
6 be destroyed, war having been declared. I have no recollec-
7 tion of that particular meeting.

8 We had a conference every Tuesday morning of division
9 heads, but I certainly would be perfectly willing to stand by
10 that order. I would not have allowed officers to keep per-
11 sonal memoranda on secret matters and it is now, it is at the
12 present time a standing instruction in the Navy.

13 Mr. Masten: Did you attend a particular meeting or call
14 together a particular meeting of your subordinates to issue
15 such instructions during the week after the Pearl Harbor at-
16 tack?

17 Admiral Noyes: I have no such recollection, but as I say,
18 I may very well have done that. That would have been a logical
19 thing to do.

20 Mr. Masten: Captain Safford also testified that at that
21 meeting to which he referred there was reference to stopping
22 the attack or the rumors about Admiral Kimmel and General
23 Short. Do you have any recollection of that?

24 Admiral Noyes: I have not, but the same thing applies.
25 According to what he said, I said that the Roberts Commission

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

1
2 was going to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor and that I
3 did not want any gossiping from any of my people. If they
4 had anything to say they were to say it when they were wit-
5 nesses on the stand, which is also standard Navy procedure,
6 that witnesses are not to discuss matters aside from court.

7 Mr. Masten: Did any instructions of that character which
8 you issued at that time call for the destruction of any of-
9 ficial papers of any kind?

10 Admiral Noyes: Absolutely not.

11 Mr. Masten: I think we have no further questions.

12 The Chairman: Junior counsel has covered the ground so
13 thoroughly that the chairman has no questions to ask.

14 Mr. Cooper?

15 The Vice Chairman: No questions now.

16 The Chairman: Senator George?

17 Senator George: I do not believe I have any at the pre-
18 sent time. I may want to ask some later on.

19 The Chairman: Mr. Clark? Mr. Lucas? Mr. Murphy?

20 Mr. Murphy: Admiral Noyes, there has been testimony be-
21 fore this committee that you made a call to the Army and you
22 gave them to believe that there had been some kinds of a winds
23 intercept and that the Army in their desire to find out what
24 the truth was called you on the phone and you said you were
25 too busy, you had to go to a meeting. Is that true or not true?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Admiral Noyes: I have no such recollection, Mr. Murphy.
3 I don't believe that I would have ever handled it in that way.

4 Mr. Murphy: Well, now, this committee for the last two
5 weeks have been working night and day on this matter, I think
6 largely on what your subordinate, Captain Safford said, that
7 he took it to you and he said when he brought it to you that
8 ended his responsibility and I think this committee is en-
9 titled to a definite, positive statement from you, to pick up
10 from what your subordinate stated with reference to it.

11 Captain Safford said: "There was a Winds message. It
12 meant war-- and we knew it meant war."

13 What do you have to say about that?

14 Admiral Noyes: I say that that is not a correct state-
15 ment.

16 Mr. Murphy: Also Captain Safford said:

17 "I saw the Winds message typed in page form on yel-
18 low teletype paper, with the translation written below.
19 I immediately forwarded this message to my Commanding
20 Officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN), thus fully dis-
21 charging my responsibility in the matter."

22 Is that so?

23 Admiral Noyes: I cannot say that Captain Safford did not
24 send to me a message. I will say that he sent me no message
25 which was a correct execute of the winds message or, rather,

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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that I did not receive it.

I will again read you what Captain Safford said:

"I immediately forwarded this message to my Commanding Officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN), thus fully discharging my responsibility in the matter."

He said that he forwarded this message to you personally.

Do you know whether he did or did not? Is that question clear?

Admiral Noyes: I cannot say that Captain Safford did not on the 4th of December forward some form of message on yellow teletype paper to me. If it was such message as he describes, it was not a correct execute of the winds message.

Mr. Murphy: Now, he says on page 2:

"CINCAF 281430 together with Tokyo Circular 2353 and other collateral intercept information apparently made an impression upon the Director of Naval Intelligence, for he immediately sent word to me, through the Director of Naval Communications, that he wished the Communication Intelligence Organization to make every attempt to intercept any message sent in accordance with the Winds codes."

Was it usual for Admiral Wilkinson to send messages to Captain Safford through you or would he confer with you directly?

Admiral Noyes: He would confer with me directly and in

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 my own opinion this is not correct.

3 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, he says:

4 "It would be a feather in our cap if the Navy got
5 it and our sister service didn't."

6 Were your services trying to get feathers in their caps
7 in competition with the other service that you know of?

8 Admiral Noyes: They were not and I disapproved very
9 much of his making any such statement. We were making every
10 effort to cooperate with the Army. As I told you, we had
11 the closest cooperation between General Maughborne and myself
12 and he was later succeeded by General Olmstead and Colonel
13 Sadtler was Acting at the time.

14 Mr. Murphy: Now, I would like to ask at this point, Mr.
15 Chairman, that counsel prepare for the record Tokyo to Wash-
16 ington Serial 843, dated November 27, 1941, prescribing the
17 schedule of Tokyo news broadcasts, as well as OPNAV 282301
18 and the three other messages which Captain Safford referred
19 to at the bottom of page three of his statement, so that all
20 five of them can be in the record. Are they in the record?

21 Mr. Masten: They are not in the record, Mr. Murphy.
22 Commander Baecher has furnished us with a number of the mes-
23 sages referred to in Captain Safford's statement and they are
24 still looking for some others and we had intended to put them
25 all in at the same time.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: We will get them all in at the same time.

3 Mr. M_osten: I think this 281430, that is one of the
4 documents we have here. If you wish me to do so, I will
5 read it into the record now.

6 Mr. Murphy: No, I will wait. I want them all to go
7 in at the same time in the record so that we can refer to
8 them at one place.

9 Captain Safford said that his superiors were heckling
10 him. You did not indulge in any heckling of Captain Safford,
11 did you?

12 Admiral Noyes: I never did.

13 Mr. Murphy: That is on page 8 of his statement.

14 Now, he says on page 10:

15 "We used to 'sample' these broadcasts periodically
16 until the F.C.C.'s Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service
17 came into existence and relieved the U.S. Navy of this
18 duty."

19 And he is speaking there of general information broad-
20 casts, as well as Dome1 News to its diplomatic and consular
21 officials in foreign lands.

22 Is it true, Admiral, that the F.C.C. did take over that
23 function from the Navy?

24 Admiral Noyes: The Navy never had that function, Mr.
25 Murphy. Mr. Berle, who was Assistant Secretary of State, -

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 one of his representatives came to see me at one time and
3 asked if we would not expand our copying of Japanese broad-
4 casts. I told him that we did not want to go into that bus-
5 iness, we had all we could handle with official traffic and I
6 suggested that we much preferred that the F.C.C. should do
7 it. Eventually the F.C.C. got some funds or found some funds
8 and took that on. It was more a taking on than a taking over.

9 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, Captain Safford then in connec-
10 tion with that on page 10 said:

11 "There is no basis for assuming that the Winds
12 message had to be sent on a voice broadcast",
13 and then he leaves the inference to me, at least, on page 10
14 that the Navy then started, after December 1st, to listen
15 in on these broadcasts which F.C.C. was covering generally.
16 Do you know whether or not that is true?

17 Admiral Noyes: I do not agree with him about its not
18 being necessary to send the broadcast by voice. It had to
19 be sent in accordance with the instructions that they had
20 sent out, on certain broadcasts, which was at a definite time,
21 and in voice. We only covered such broadcasts as were speci-
22 fically covered by those two circulars.

23 Mr. Murphy: Well, it is true, is it not, that F.C.C.
24 was covering the general information broadcast and the Dome
25 News broadcast to diplomatic and consular officials?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Admiral Noyes: I think so, sir.

3

Mr. Murphy: And do you of your own knowledge know whether or not Cheltenham then decided to go into that field as a result of this dispatch on page 155 in exhibit 1?

4

Admiral Noyes: Whether Cheltenham started to cover this circular 2354 on page 155?

5

Mr. Murphy: Yes, sir.

6

Admiral Noyes: The one we were talking about is page 154.

7

8

Mr. Murphy: That is right, but Safford talks about page 155 instead of 154.

9

10

Admiral Noyes: No, sir, I think he has got them mixed up.

11

12

Mr. Murphy: He says:

13

"We expected that the Winds message would be sent in Morse code -- and it was."

14

15

Admiral Noyes: Well, I think --

16

Mr. Murphy: Were you expecting it to come in Morse code?

17

Admiral Noyes: No, sir. I think Commander Rochefort testified to the same effect on that.

18

19

Mr. Murphy: Well, Commander Rochefort was listening only for voice and he certainly would not get code if he was listening for voice.

20

21

Admiral Noyes: I think that the twenty-four hour a day

22

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 coverage that he mentioned was -- it is, and I may be repeat-
3 ing, - just like WINX in their news broadcasts. They do
4 not send it out twenty-four hours a day, all day, but during
5 the twenty-four hours of the day they had certain schedules
6 on which they broadcast that news and people listen for it.

7 Mr. Murphy: Now, Captain Safford said on page 11:

8 "The original documents giving details of the inter-
9 ception of the Winds message are not available."

10 What is your answer to that?

11 Admiral Noyes: He was in charge of the files at the
12 time. I will say further I left Washington in February 1942
13 and I have no knowledge of what has occurred since then.

14 Mr. Murphy: Well, he also stated that after he went to
15 your office that there was a smooth copy placed in the dis-
16 patch case and that that was delivered to each of the recip-
17 ients in the Army and the Navy. Of course, he had only an
18 impression on that.

19 Did you ever approve any winds intercept as being au-
20 thentic so that it would get over to Captain Kramer and then
21 be placed as a communication for each of the recipients of
22 magic in the Navy and the Army?

23 Admiral Noyes: I did not, Mr. Murphy.

24 I would like to say about the files, I was talking to
25 the commanding officer of the radio station at Cheltenham.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 This broadcast business, when you intercept it is not addressed
3 to us. It is things like weather reports and press and things
4 like that that build up to a terrible amount of paper in a
5 short time and it is customary in any naval radio station
6 to keep files of any message addressed to a station for which
7 they are responsible or which comes for information, in other
8 words, all Navy business, but intercept stuff is never kept
9 more than three or four months.

10 Now, this question not having been raised, as I under-
11 stand it, until almost a year later whatever station might have
12 intercepted would have by that time destroyed intercepts that
13 far back. The commanding officer at Cheltenham told me it
14 was customary to keep it for three or four months.

15 Mr. Murphy: Well, you did receive then after that month-
16 ly reports from Cheltenham, Winter Harbor and Bainbridge
17 Island, did you not?

18 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: And those reports for 1941 are still down
20 in the Navy Department, aren't they?

21 Admiral Noyes: I left there. I have no information on
22 that matter.

23 Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate I am going to ask the
24 Navy liaison to make a statement in the record as to whether
25 they are or not. I understand they are and have been since

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 1941, but I would like to have it definitely by the Navy De-
3 partment.

4 Now, then, he says at page 12 -- is he in a position
5 to indicate it now?

6 The Chairman: Not at the moment.

7 Mr. Murphy: My question is whether or not the reports
8 from Cheltenham, Bainbridge Island and Winter Harbor are
9 available at the Navy Department presently for the month of
10 December 1941.

11 Commander Baecher: They are, sir.

12 Mr. Murphy: And they have been since 1941, have they,
13 the monthly reports?

14 Commander Baecher: Yes, that is the way I understand it,
15 sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

17 Now, then, at page 12, Admiral Noyes, Captain Safford
18 said:

19 "The Winds broadcast message was about two hundred
20 words long, with the code words prescribed in Tokyo
21 circular 2353" -- so that would be voice broadcast --
22 "appearing in the middle of the message, whereas we had
23 expected to find the code words of Tokyo circular 2354
24 in a Morse broadcast."

25 Now, then, if you will just go back to 154 and 155 a

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 while, in 154 it was to appear in the middle of the daily
3 Japanese language short wave broadcast and at the end and the
4 sentence was to be repeated twice. On the one on page 155
5 it was to be repeated five times and both at the beginning
6 and at the end. On 154 it was to be in voice. On 155 it
7 was to be in code. So that Captain Safford describes one
8 that is part of 154 and one that is part of 155. Do the
9 Japanese do things like that?

10 Admiral Noyes: They did not, sir. I think the Japan-
11 ese are much more meticulous than any people I know of in
12 carrying out exactly instructions that they send out. That
13 is supposed to be one of their faults.

14 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, as I understand it you have no
15 recollection whatever of a call from Captain Sattler to in-
16 quire as to what word was used, do you? Do you have any such
17 recollection?

18 Admiral Noyes: As I understand it from listening to
19 Colonel Sattler's testimony he talks about the 5th of December
20 and Captain Safford's is the 4th of December.

21 Mr. Murphy: Well, now, do you have any recollection of
22 having either on the first, second, third, fourth, fifth,
23 sixth or seventh of December had a call from Colonel Sattler
24 asking you what word was used in the alleged winds intercept?

25 Admiral Noyes: I have no such recollection, sir.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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I could not say that he did not ask me such a question because we handled many messages together and the only thing that I am surprised at is that he would make a point of some one, that I would say, - that he would say that I would speak of the message when we handled so many things together.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, when did you first have a talk with Captain Safford as to whether or not there were any missing papers or did you ever have a talk with him? He has been talking to a lot of people for a long time. Did he talk to you about it?

Admiral Noyes: The only time I have talked to Captain Safford, - I had been away from Washington from February 1942 until March 1945 and some time after I got back. I had not heard any more about Pearl Harbor since I had appeared before the Naval Court of Inquiry.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: Now at this point I would like it if
3 counsel would produce the page in the record referring to
4 the Rochefort message that Colonel Bratton said he forwarded
5 to Hawaii, and I would like to offer that in the record at
6 this point for the reason that the record shows it was
7 mailed instead of dispatched, and I would like to ask the
8 witness about it.

9 Do you have that? It is in the B, C or D of the Army
10 Board.

11 Mr. Masten: We do not have it in our record.

12 Mr. Murphy: While you are getting that, I will move on.

13 Admiral Noyes: I did not finish, Mr. Murphy.

14 Mr. Murphy: Excuse me. Go ahead, if you will. I am
15 sorry.

16 Admiral Noyes: I do not know whether you want to go
17 ahead with my talk with Captain Safford.

18 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

19 Admiral Noyes: I did not see Captain Safford from
20 the time I left Washington or hear from him until I got
21 back in March 1945.

22 Mr. Murphy: So you did not talk to him in the meantime?

23 Admiral Noyes: I did not.

24 Mr. Murphy: Did he try to communicate with you?

25 Admiral Noyes: Did he try to communicate with me?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

3 Admiral Noyes: No, sir, he did not, to the best of
4 my knowledge.

5 Mr. Murphy: When you came to Washington, - you say
6 it was what month of 1945?

7 Admiral Noyes: March, 1945.

8 Mr. Murphy: Now then, Captain Safford did talk to
9 you on your return to Washington?

10 Admiral Noyes: He came to see me on my initiative.

11 Mr. Murphy: Will you tell us what that conversation was?
12 First tell us when it was, and then what it was.

13 Admiral Noyes: I gathered from the questions that
14 were asked me in the Naval Court of Inquiry that somebody
15 had had a different recollection on certain matters from
16 mine. So I called up Safford and asked him to have lunch
17 with me. He said he was very busy and could not, but he
18 would come down to the office. I told him I wanted to see
19 him about things in connection with our past, with the
20 Office of Naval Communications.

21 So when he came down I told him I gathered from the
22 questions that were asked me that there was some difference
23 of opinion, and asked him why he and Kramer and I could
24 not get together and get hold of the files, now that we
25 were here in Washington, and remove any of these discrepancies

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 and decide them one way or another.

3 Well, he said there were not many discrepancies, and
4 he said he was sure there was a winds message and that
5 everybody else agreed with me. I said, "Can't you find
6 some evidence that you are right, that you can show me what
7 this is based on?" He said no, that he had not been able
8 to find anything. So he said he was going to write a
9 statement and when he got it together he would show it to
10 me and we would talk it over.

11 Well, I did not hear from him. In about, I think it
12 was in August, there was something in the newspaper about
13 Pearl Harbor. So I called him up. There were some things
14 that I had not ever heard of. I called him up and I asked
15 him what he was doing about his statement in conference with
16 me. He said that he was still working on it. Within a
17 few days it was proposed that this congressional inquiry
18 occur. So he called me up and said he thought it would be
19 better if we did not have any conference, that we might
20 be criticised for talking together, and I agreed with him,
21 and so we dropped it.

22 Mr. Murphy: Do you know of any trouble that Captain
23 Safford had, or any differences between him and anyone
24 down there at the Navy?

25 Admiral Noyes: I do not.

Hook
follows

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Murphy
Mr. Gearhart

Shack(2)

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2 Mr. Murphy: Was there any difference between him
3 and Captain Redman, or anyone else there that you know
4 of?

5 Admiral Noyes: I left Washington in February, 1942.

6 Mr. Murphy: That is right.

7 Mr. Chairman, I have just one other thing that I want
8 to cover, that I will pass for the time being. When I find
9 that one thing I want to show a reference in the Army Board
10 to the Rochefort message.

11 The Chairman: All right. We will pass you temporarily.

12 Senator Brewster is absent.

13 Mr. Gearhart.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Admiral, did I understand you correctly
15 to say that you testified first in the Navy Court of Inquiry
16 investigation?

17 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Gearhart: You have not testified in any other
19 investigations other than that one, and this one?

20 Admiral Noyes: That is correct, Mr. Gearhart.

21 Mr. Gearhart: And the Navy Court of Inquiry investi-
22 gation was carried on during the summer months of 1944?

23 Admiral Noyes: Well, they did not get out to San
24 Francisco until December, 1944, as I remember it.

25 Mr. Gearhart: It started in the summer and continued

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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1 through the balance of the year?

2 Admiral Noyes: I believe they went out to Pearl Harbor
3 and on the way back, they stopped at San Francisco, and I
4 was called as a witness there.
5

6 Mr. Gearhart: That, you say, was in December?

7 Admiral Noyes: I thought it was December. I may be
8 wrong about the month.

9 Mr. Gearhart: The Secretary of the Navy's statement
10 is the next to the last notation that appears in the suc-
11 cession of events, and that was the 28th of August, 1944.

12 Admiral Noyes: I must be wrong about the date, then.
13 It ought to show the date that I appeared in the transcript.
14 I did not appear in Washington. I appeared in San Francisco.

15 Mr. Gearhart: The thing that makes me inquire about
16 that is the fact that the Secretary of the Navy himself
17 prepared a statement in reference to the Court of Inquiry's
18 decision, which is the fourth endorsement, and that is dated
19 the 28th day of August, unless I am mistaken.

20 No, I see another one here now. That was the 3rd
21 endorsement which preceded the one I have reference to.
22 The date of the fourth one is December, 1944. So it extended
23 from the summer to the end of the year.

24 Admiral Noyes: That is my recollection.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, I think you are right. The dates

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 are so confusing, but they are here nevertheless.

3 Now, what did you have to do, if anything, with or
4 in the investigations that preceded the Navy Court of
5 Inquiry?

6 Were you consulted in reference to your knowledge
7 about these matters or did you have anything to do with
8 it at all?

9 Admiral Noyes: When the Roberts Commission was held,
10 I was directed to prepare the dispatches to and from the
11 Navy Department bearing on the incident, for the use of the
12 committee, or the commission, whatever it was called.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Did that involve the making out of any
14 memorandum, or any evaluations, or any statement as to your
15 own participation in or with relation to the events?

16 Admiral Noyes: It involved nothing but a file of
17 dispatches, with a list and index.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Well, did you prepare a memorandum
19 between December 7, 1941, and December of 1944, as an
20 aid to your memory?

21 Admiral Noyes: I did not, sir. I did not particularly
22 because I was at sea, in the Pacific, and I think in general
23 the Naval officers at that time did not know about magic.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Well, when you testified in December,
25 1944, you testified from your memory at that moment, unaided

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 by any memorandum that you may have made between December
3 7, 1941 and the time you testified?

4 Admiral Noyes: I was not only testifying from memory,
5 but I did not know until I got into the room what I was
6 going to be asked, or what the questions would be, or the
7 subject.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Between Pearl Harbor and the giving of
9 your testimony, many earth-shaking events had occurred,
10 events of tremendous importance, hadn't there? That is
11 correct, isn't it?

12 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Matters of tremendous importance, which,
14 in your mind, as in other persons' minds, overshadowed the
15 earlier events, isn't that true?

16 Admiral Noyes: That is true, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Now, you have heard the testimony of
18 Captain Kramer with reference to the so-called winds execute.
19 He said that a watch officer came by and handed you a tele-
20 type paper on which there was an evaluation, or a translation,
21 rather, of a message, what he constructed to be a winds
22 execute message. He was so impressed with it, that he went
23 to Captain Safford and said, "This is it." You have heard
24 that testimony, haven't you?

25 Admiral Noyes: I thought that was Captain Safford's

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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1
2 testimony.

3 Mr. Gearhart: No, Captain Kramer's testimony, and also
4 Captain Safford's testimony. They you heard the testimony
5 of Admiral Ingersoll to the effect that they brought him
6 the message and he read it, and tossed it aside, because
7 he considered it unimportant, that there were many other
8 events, many other messages which preceded it, which con-
9 vinced him that war was very imminent.

10 You heard his testimony to that effect, didn't you?

11 Admiral Noyes: Yes, I heard Admiral Ingersoll's
12 testimony.

13 Mr. Gearhart: There we have three Naval officers who
14 say it was a winds execute; all three of them said they saw
15 it, and Admiral Ingersoll said it was unimportant.

16 Admiral Noyes: I did not gather that from Captain
17 Kramer's testimony, Mr. Gearhart.

18 Mr. Gearhart: What?

19 Admiral Noyes: I did not gather that from Captain
20 Kramer's testimony.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Well, I think you will find that that
22 is a correct statement.

23 Admiral Noyes: I certainly did not gather that he
24 agreed with Captain Safford at all.

25 Mr. Gearhart: He agreed definitely that he took it from

Witness Noyes

questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 the hands of the watch officer, hastily read it, and took
3 it to Captain Safford and said "This is it." No question
4 about that. He does not pretend to remember clearly what
5 was in that message, but he has stated in his testimony
6 over and over and over again, "When I handed it to Captain
7 Safford, I said 'This is it'". He also testified definitely
8 that he, Captain Kramer, considered it the winds execute
9 message. So Captain Kramer absolutely corroborates Captain
10 Safford, as far as he goes, and that was as far as he did
11 go.

12 Then Admiral Ingersoll steps into the picture and tells
13 us, "Yes, they brought it to me. I read it, but I did not
14 consider it important. There were so many other things of
15 greater importance that indicated to me that war was imminent
16 and I tossed it aside."

17 But the substance of that testimony is that there was a
18 winds execute. Now, I say those things preliminarily to
19 asking you this question: In all fairness, isn't it possible
20 that you read it too, but considered it so unimportant,
21 for the same reason that Admiral Ingersoll considered it unim-
22 portant, and you not being interrogated on the subject from
23 December 7, 1941 until December 1944, that it might have gone
24 from your mind? Isn't that possible?

25 Admiral Noyes: No, sir, not in my opinion.

Shack (4) pm
follows
Hook
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1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: You knew about the message of November
3 29, after which things were automatically going to happen?
4 You knew about that, didn't you?

5 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Now that was a very, very important
7 intercept, that was telling us of the hostile attitude of
8 Japan, wasn't it, "things were going automatically to begin
9 to happen"?

10 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Gearhart: That was a very direct warning, wasn't
12 it?

13 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Gearhart: It was of overshadowing importance,
15 wasn't it?

16 Admiral Noyes: Progressive importance, I would say, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: And you knew all about the Japanese
18 message directing their Ambassadors, their Consuls, and
19 all the other Japanese agents of different degrees, the
20 Japanese nationals, directing them to destroy their codes,
21 didn't you? The fact that Consuls were included indicated
22 more than anything else the suspension of diplomatic nego-
23 tiations, didn't it?

24 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Those messages collectively were of

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

tremendous importance, were they not?

Admiral Noyes: As I say, each one carried matters a step further.

Mr. Gearhart: All right. Then if you should get another message which would merely tell you that relations between the United States and Japan were becoming dangerous, you would regard that message as of overshadowing importance, would you not, after you had already received these other messages?

Admiral Noyes: I would not consider it as of overshadowing importance, but it would be of sufficient importance so it would be taken up, under my standard system, and handled as a message.

Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

Admiral Noyes: There would have been at least 50 copies around Washington before we got through -- not 50, but 30 I should say. If somebody had brought to me in November, 1943, a paper with my initials on it I would have had to admit that my recollection was wrong. If anybody could have brought me other documentary evidence I would have to admit my recollection had failed me. I am only testifying to the best of my recollection, except in this case I have studied other people's testimony and I can find no testimony that will hang together against my own recollection.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 There is nothing that in any way tends to make me feel
3 that my recollection as to the fact that there was no
4 execute message is not correct.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Well, supposing you had gotten the
6 execute message conveying that thought to you, that rela-
7 tions with Japan were growing dangerous -- that is a literal
8 interpretation of the words, isn't it?

9 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. What it was primarily is
10 an instruction to destroy the codes.

11 Mr. Gearhart: That is right.

12 Admiral Noyes: We would have written it up as an
13 instruction to destroy the codes.

14 Mr. Gearhart: The message on the destruction of codes
15 was an important message?

16 Admiral Noyes: Yes.

17 Mr. Gearhart: That was the tell-tale to us of what
18 Japan was up to?

19 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Now if you got this other message, the
21 winds execute message, after you had read all these other
22 messages about the destruction of codes, would you be called
23 upon to do anything about it?

24 Admiral Noyes: There was nothing to do about it,
25 except it would be written up, distributed and handled as

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1 Witness Noyes Questions by: Mr. Gearhart
2 an enemy intercept, just like all these messages that are
3 in the book.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Did you send every message that came
5 over your desk to all these distributees, whether it was
6 important or unimportant?

7 Admiral Noyes: No, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: You decided whether or not it was im-
9 portant enough to be distributed, did you not? That was
10 one of your jobs?

11 Admiral Noyes: But it was gauged not on whether action
12 was to be taken, but the subject matter of the message.
13 There were lots of messages about typewriters, personnel,
14 promoting clerks, and that sort of thing, which we just
15 threw out, which we did not finish translating. But anything
16 of that character would have been carried through as a matter
17 of record.

18 Mr. Gearhart: But in view of this importance of the
19 message would not you have distributed it? You had already
20 distributed the very, very ultra important ones, and here
21 you had the most important one, in the light of events,
22 and yet you might have tossed that aside as unimportant,
23 just like Ingersoll said he did when he read it?

24 Admiral Noyes: Admiral Ingersoll was not in my position,
25 sir. I was responsible for all this business, whereas

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 Admiral Ingersoll had it as only one of his activities.

2 To him it was very far down the list, and to me it was down
3 the list, too, but it still had to be taken care of.
4

5 If it had been an authentic execute, we had all these
6 people copying and intercepting messages, the War Department,
7 the FCC, we would have had to distribute it as a message.

8 I cannot imagine, from Colonel Sadtler's testimony,
9 how the War Department, if they thought it was authentic at
10 all, could have thought of dropping it, why they would not
11 have followed it through, unless it was a false message.

12 Mr. Gearhart: That was just the point I had in mind.
13 Here you have several people saying they are very positive
14 as to the existence of the winds execute, and you seem to
15 be equally positive what they testified to is not the fact.
16 So I was trying to harmonize the testimony they have given
17 with the testimony that you have given on the ground that
18 you simply don't remember, because you regarded it, as
19 Admiral Ingersoll did, as being only in part important.

20 Admiral Noyes: May I ask you a question, sir?

21 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

22 Admiral Noyes: Did you hear my testimony in answer
23 to the counsel this morning?

24 Mr. Gearhart: I have listened, but if you wish to
25 repeat what you have said, that I may have overlooked I

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 would be glad to hear it again.

3 Admiral Noyes: I testified that there were several
4 false messages that came in. It is very difficult for me
5 to answer when these different witnesses all differ in
6 their description of the circumstances. The dates are
7 different, the conditions are different.

(6) 8 I am perfectly willing to admit that Captain Safford
9 may have sent me such a message and on the face of it, from
10 a documentary point of view, I would never have accepted
11 that message as an execute of the winds message, and I gave
12 the reasons to the counsel for my believing as I do.

13 Mr. Gearhart: How can so many testify to the same
14 thing and it not have a semblance of truth? These other
15 things that these other officers have said must be true,
16 because you don't remember whether it was true or not true.

17 Then when you come up to the winds execute message you
18 positively say there was none, in the face of these other
19 men testifying there was a winds execute. How can you be
20 so positive about that and at the same time you are willing
21 to accept what Captain Safford says, or Colonel Sadtler?

22 Admiral Noyes: Colonel Sadtler?

23 Mr. Gearhart: You said many things he said may have
24 been true because he said so. You have no memory on it.

25 Admiral Noyes: I am perfectly willing to admit that

every one of the witnesses that have testified to a so-called winds execute has some message in mind of which I had knowledge, but I do not think that any one of their stories, their recollection, their description will stand up as a description of a true winds execute, nor do they fit together.

Captain Kramer's and Captain Safford's descriptions were entirely different. It is very difficult for me to answer if you ask me if I got a message on the 4th or the 5th. Captain Safford goes into great detail about his reasons for thinking it was the 4th, although his original testimony was it was the 5th.

I do not want to question the fact that their recollection is the best they have, but that does not convince me that there is anything wrong with my recollection. That is all I can say about that, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: That is all.

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral, as I understand it now, in your Department you were the head and it was your duty, in effect, to determine what messages were to be distributed to certain persons, which included the President, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Naval Operations, the War Plans Division, the Intelligence Department -- and what other departments of the Navy?

Admiral Noyes: I think that is all.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: That is all?

2 Admiral Noyes: Yes. But I had nothing to do with them.

3
4 Senator Ferguson: No, but you determined what messages
5 were to be distributed.

6 Admiral Noyes: No, Senator Ferguson, I did not.

7 Senator Ferguson: Now let us get down then to this:
8 If a message came to your desk, or your Department, about
9 hiring a clerk in the Embassy and one came in relation to a
10 reply to the message of the 26th, who determined what message
11 would be delivered to the President? What Department?

12 Admiral Noyes: The Director of Naval Intelligence.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, who determined how that
14 message would get to the Naval Intelligence?

15 Admiral Noyes: In the mechanics of deciphering, Captain
16 Kramer, who was primarily the subordinate to the Director
17 of Naval Intelligence, had the additional duty with me,
18 so that one officer could carry through the whole process
19 from the interception, from the receipt in Washington of an
20 enemy message in cipher until it was actually delivered,
21 as far as he was concerned. On account of the load we had,
22 and the peak loads we had, we could not possibly decipher
23 every message of the ones we received. Therefore, having
24 started the message, as soon as it turned out to be of
25 no apparent value, it was laid aside and the next one was

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 gone ahead with. We had to do that.

3 We found at first that the Army and ourselves working
4 independently were wasting a lot of time by translating the
5 same messages. We might work three days on a message and
6 find we had the same thing. At a conference we decided the
7 best solution was to take the Tokyo date of origin, and it
8 was agreed that the Navy would take all messages originated
9 in Tokyo on the odd day and the Army would take all messages
10 originated in Tokyo on an even day.

11 In order to determine when it originated in Tokyo it
12 was necessary to start to break the message. So each service
13 took the message coming from its own intercept stations and
14 the message was given a number, and as soon as they had
15 reached the date of origin they kept it or sent it over
16 as it might be.

(8) 17 Now from there on the other service went on until they
18 discovered it seemed to be something that was not of
19 diplomatic, or military, or political value and they laid
20 it aside.

21 Senator Ferguson: Did he have before him the cipher
22 to break the date?

23 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: So that you had to know what key
25 in the cipher or the machine was necessary by breaking the

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 date?

3 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: And then you sent the key over to
5 the other Department, or would you let them work it out
6 for themselves?

7 Admiral Noyes: Well, we had a constant interchange.
8 If there was any recovery of keys, we had a direct telephone
9 from our code room to theirs, a secret phone.

10 Senator Ferguson: Then as soon as the date was ascer-
11 tained you had the cipher and you knew what key it was in?

12 Admiral Noyes: We did not necessarily. We might
13 get that far and still not be able to go all the way through,
14 but we had a start then.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now we come back to the question,
16 and you say it was Kramer's duty to ascertain and determine
17 what messages were distributed to the list that I gave you
18 just in my former question.

19 Admiral Noyes: The question of what messages were
20 finished was primarily determined below, by Kramer, who
21 supervised --

22 Senator Ferguson: (Interposing) I am trying to get
23 an answer to this particular question, because I think it
24 is very important.

25 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. I understand, Senator Ferguson,

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 and I am trying to explain it to you, sir. Some messages
2 were never finished. Other messages that were finished, I
3 doubt if they were all sent to the White House. I did not
4 censor them myself. The Director of Naval Intelligence
5 was the one who did that function, in regard to the finished
6 messages. He probably did not want to bother the President
7 with a lot of messages, or the Secretary of State.

8 In other words, there were certain messages that he
9 probably had culled out of certain books, but, as far as I
10 know, there was nothing culled out of the finished stuff
11 from the Navy books.

12
13 Senator Ferguson: Who, in your Department, or in any-
14 one's department, determined what messages would be decoded?
15 You say some were decoded just part way and you determined
16 they were not of any value. Now who had that determination?

17 Admiral Noyes: Well, I should say Kramer was the one
18 who was directly responsible for that. If he had a question
19 he could bring it to me.

20 Senator Ferguson: Yes, if he was in doubt he could
21 bring it to you. Then it was your responsibility to
22 determine what was decoded, is that right?

23 Admiral Noyes: I was responsible for it, yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, then, who determined
25 what messages were sent in to Intelligence when they were

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 intelligence?

3 Admiral Noyes: They were all sent to Intelligence.

4 Senator Ferguson: They were all sent to Intelligence?

5 Admiral Noyes: Everything that was decoded was sent
6 to Intelligence, whether it was important or not.

7 Senator Ferguson: Whether it was hiring a clerk or
8 doing something else?

9 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: It was sent to Intelligence?

11 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. Incidentally, some of those
12 things that we did not bother with ourselves, all personnel
13 matters, were sent to FBI, as a matter of fact. That was
14 done by Naval Intelligence.

15 Senator Ferguson: Then you did not have to determine
16 what messages went in to Intelligence because all that was
17 translated, that Kramer determined should be determined,
18 unless he needed your help, went immediately in to Intelligence?

19 Admiral Noyes: That is correct, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now with that in mind, how can you
21 reconcile this fact, that you were to get the winds code
22 message?

23 Admiral Noyes: Because that was a special thing.
24 It required no translation. They had set up those Japanese
25 expressions which actually were plain Japanese. What they

1 Witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson
 2 said in Japanese was "East Wind Rain", in the Japanese
 3 language, with no cipher, no code. They were not the ordinary
 4 run of diplomatic messages.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: You just told me that after it was completely translated, it, by necessity, went to the Intelligence Branch, and this was in Japanese and therefore needed translation.

Admiral Noyes: It did not need translation, Senator Ferguson. They had given certain expressions a fixed meaning. Anyone of us could have told what the message was.

Those words did not mean destroy codes and ciphers; they just had an arbitrary meaning.

Senator Ferguson: They mean what was in the message you had previously received?

Admiral Noyes: They appeared to be a weather report, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you draw up cards on that particular code message?

Admiral Noyes: Cards were drawn up to give the meaning of this in English, so that by telephone, in case we ever got an authentic execute of the winds code, Admiral Stark and the people concerned could be called over the telephone, and without any give-away we would say, "We received a weather report 'east wind rain'" and he would know what it meant.

Senator Ferguson: Who ordered the cards drawn up?

Admiral Noyes: Well, I ordered it. It was my responsi-

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 bility.

3 Senator Ferguson: Did you send one to the White House?

4 Admiral Noyes: No, sir. I think the Naval Aide
5 had one.

6 Senator Ferguson: The Naval Aide had one?

7 Admiral Noyes: Yes. We did not deal directly with
8 the President. I think the Naval Aide dealt with the Presi-
9 dent.

10 Senator Ferguson: Then one went to the White House,
11 to Admiral Beardall?

12 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. I am not certain that he was
13 one of them, but I think so.

14 Senator Ferguson: Had you ever set up a similar system
15 of cards?

16 Admiral Noyes: Never, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: This was an outstandingly important
18 message?

19 Admiral Noyes: At the time it was received, we thought
20 it was the first -- at the 28th of November, we thought it
21 was very important and might give us our first tip as to
22 what was to occur.

23 Senator Ferguson: But a little later you say it had
24 become a little doubtful.

25 Admiral Noyes: Become what, sir?

1 Witness Noyes

questions by: senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: A little doubtful as to its
3 value, because you got similar messages about destruction
4 of codes.

5 Admiral Noyes: Having gotten the message from the
6 Japanese in their own cipher, with detailed instructions
7 about destroying the codes, it went very far down in im-
8 portance.

9 Senator Ferguson: But you still kept the cards?

10 Admiral Noyes: I do not remember whether the cards
11 were destroyed at that time or not. The cards only said
12 "East wind rain; U.S." WE made them with the idea if
13 anybody lost them, nothing would be given away.

14 Senator Ferguson: That was in English?

15 Admiral Noyes: In English.

16 Senator Ferguson: All right.

17 If Colonel Sadtler is correct, that you called him and
18 told him that was it -- do you remember that testimony?

19 Admiral Noyes: I do not, sir. I remember the testi-
20 mony, but I do not remember the incident.

21 Senator Ferguson: He called you back and you told
22 him you could not get the translation for him because you
23 were going to a meeting. How could you reconcile your
24 testimony with that, that you did not see any winds code
25 message, any winds code execute message?

1 Witness Noyes

questionsby: Senator Ferguson

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Admiral Noyes: Senator Ferguson, that is not the way I interpreted his testimony.

As I interpreted it, what he said was he called back to ask for the exact words that were in the intercept.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

And you were too busy to give it to him.

Admiral Noyes: That I do not admit , but that is what he said.

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1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: You have no memory of it?

3 Admiral Noyes: I have no memory of it.

4 Senator Ferguson: If there wasn't any winds code
5 execute message how do you account for Admiral Ingersoll
6 testifying here in this room that he saw one and never knew
7 that there was any question about it being a genuine or a
8 phoney until sometime just recently when he landed back in
9 this country?

10 Admiral Noyes: I do not account for it, sir. I think
11 he is very busy and had many things to do at the time. I
12 think he stated in his testimony that it very likely did
13 turn out to be a false message.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now I want to ask you this: Could
15 it have been that you called Sadtler when you received
16 this message from the watch officer that Kramer and Safford
17 talked about going to your office with your message? Could
18 that be a true statement?

19 Admiral Noyes: Could I have called Sadtler?

20 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

21 Admiral Noyes: When I first got this message?

22 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

23 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now will you tell me --

25 The Chairman: (Interposing) I did not understand his

WARD PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 Witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 answer.

3 Admiral Noyes: I said I could have called Sadtler
4 when someone came to my office with a message. I had a
5 private phone to his office.

6 Senator Ferguson: So at that particular time you believed
7 that this was a genuine message on this winds execute code,
8 isn't that true?

9 Admiral Noyes: I would think it was a possible message.

10 Senator Ferguson: All right.

11 Admiral Noyes: That is the impression he got, as I
12 take it.

13 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now I will ask you
14 whether or not you ever made an examination to determine
15 that the message that the watch officer delivered to you,
16 that Kramer and Safford were talking about, and that you
17 telephoned to Sadtler about, whether you ever determined
18 that that was a phoney and not a genuine message?

19 Admiral Noyes: I will give you a reconstruction that
20 could be possible, if you would like to have me do it.

21 Senator Ferguson: I would like to know whether you
22 ever made a determination that this message that you telephoned
23 about, that the watch officer gave you, whether you ever
24 made a determination that that particular message was a phoney
25 and was not the genuine message in compliance with the code.

1 Witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Admiral Noyes: The message has been testified to,
3 that it was received on two different days.

4 Senator Ferguson: That is not my question. My question
5 is whether or not you ever made a determination at that time.
6 I am not asking you what you determine now as you try to
7 reconstruct, but I want to know whether or not you ever made
8 a determination that that message that was sent to you was
9 a phoney.

10 Admiral Noyes: If the message that Captain Safford
11 describes in his statement was presented to me, and I think
12 very likely it was, I would have determined it to be a phoney
13 message.

14 Senator Ferguson: I want to ask you that. Did you
15 determine that that message was a phoney?

16 Admiral Noyes: I have no direct recollection from his
17 description, but from his own description I would not have
18 accepted it. That is the best I can say, Senator Ferguson.

19 Senator Ferguson: You would not have accepted it.
20 How could you then have called Sadtler about that message?

21 Admiral Noyes: Sadtler says it was a different day,
22 it is not the same day.

23 Senator Ferguson: I am not talking about the recon-
24 struction now, I mean as to what you heard testified here.
25 Could you have kept it over a day and then called him? That

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1 Witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 even makes his testimony stronger, that it was a genuine
3 message.

4 Admiral Noyes: I would not think of doing such a thing.

5 Senator Ferguson: What I am trying to do is to get
6 the facts as to whether or not you ever made a determination
7 that the message brought to you by the watch officer was
8 not a genuine message.

9 Admiral Noyes: I am certain, sir, that I did not seem
10 to make myself clear. I am perfectly willing to admit that
11 several messages, which in the end turned out to be false,
12 were brought to me by various watch officers. I also think
13 one watch officer telephoned me at my home about one of
14 the messages, which was afterwards delivered to me. I think
15 every one was determined by me to be not correct, and, so
16 far as I knew, everyone was in concurrence, no one raising
17 a question, no one questioning my decision, to the best
18 of my knowledge and belief at the time.

19 The first time any question was raised was much later on.

20 Senator Ferguson: After the 7th?

21 Admiral Noyes: No, after I had left Washington. Nobody
22 every questioned me while I was here.

23 Senator Ferguson: I will ask you this question: Did
24 you ever notify Kramer that the message that he saw and
25 said "Here it is", or whatever his expression was at the time,

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Witness Noyes

1 and showed it to Safford and they sent a watch officer to
2 you, did you ever notify Kramer that that message was a
3 phoney or a bad message?
4

5 Admiral Noyes: I was not supposed to be present,
6 Senator Ferguson, when Kramer said "Here it is". That
7 identifies nothing to me.

8 Senator Ferguson: You admit here that Safford could
9 have sent you a message. Did you ever send word back to
10 Kramer, or to Safford, that that message was not a genuine
11 message?

12 Admiral Noyes: I undoubtedly did, if this message as
13 described by Safford -- which I am not at all sure is correct --
14 is not what he told me this summer at all, and I am not
15 sure that it is at all correct, but if it is correct, I
16 would have determined it to be not a proper winds execute,
17 and I would have informed him.

18 Senator Ferguson: Did you inform him?

19 Admiral Noyes: I have no recollection of the message
20 being received as described nor of having determined it as
21 being wrong, and therefore not informing him.

22 Senator Ferguson: My question is a short one. Did
23 you so inform him, that it was not a genuine message?

24 Admiral Noyes: I cannot admit that this message, as
25 now described by Captain Safford, was ever delivered to me, si

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 and showed it to Safford and they sent a watch officer to
3 you, did you ever notify Kramer that that message was a
4 phoney or a bad message?

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6 Senator Ferguson, when Kramer said "Here it is". That
7 identifies nothing to me.

8 Senator Ferguson: You admit here that Safford could
9 have sent you a message. Did you ever send word back to
10 Kramer, or to Safford, that that message was not a genuine
11 message?

12 Admiral Noyes: I undoubtedly did, if this message as
13 described by Safford -- which I am not at all sure is correct --
14 is not what he told me this summer at all, and I am not
15 sure that it is at all correct, but if it is correct, I
16 would have determined it to be not a proper winds execute,
17 and I would have informed him.

18 Senator Ferguson: Did you inform him?

19 Admiral Noyes: I have no recollection of the message
20 being received as described nor of having determined it as
21 being wrong, and therefore not informing him.

22 Senator Ferguson: My question is a short one. Did
23 you so inform him, that it was not a genuine message?

24 Admiral Noyes: I cannot admit that this message, as
25 now described by Captain Safford, was ever delivered to me, sir.

1 Witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 It does not comply with the description that he gave me
3 as long ago as four months ago.

4 Senator Ferguson: That is not what I am talking about.
5 He has testified that he had delivered to you a message
6 that he believed was a genuine one. My question to you now
7 is: Did you ever notify him that that message was not a
8 genuine message?

9 Mr. Murphy: Now, Mr. Chairman --

10 Admiral Noyes: I do not agree with his testimony,
11 Mr. Ferguson.

12 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman --

13 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever notify Safford personally
14 then that any message on the winds was not a genuine one?

15 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: On what occasion?

17 Admiral Noyes: I could not tell you.

18 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield for a correction?

19 Senator Ferguson: Not at this time.

20 The Chairman: All right.

21 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever notify Sadtler - keeping
22 in mind his testimony - that you had two conversations with
23 him - that it was not a genuine message?

24 Admiral Noyes: I have no recollection of that, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Do you know of any other people in

1 Witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 the Department there that you notified that there had come
3 in some messages that were not genuine as far as the winds
4 execute code was concerned?

5 Admiral Noyes: I have no specific recollection of the
6 details regarding any of the false messages at this time.

(13) 7 Senator Ferguson: Would you have done what you did not
8 do if you had received a winds code execute on either the
9 4th or the 5th?

10 Admiral Noyes: I would have approved the message as
11 a winds code execute, and it would have been written up and
12 distributed to the regular recipients. It is very difficult
13 for me to say now everything I would have done. I think I
14 would have put a note on it saying "This confirms the
15 previous information from the Naval Attaches and Commander
16 in Chief."

17 Senator Ferguson: I understood that only the messages
18 that Kramer was in doubt about went to you. Why were you
19 wanting this particular message? What were you going to do
20 with it?

21 Admiral Noyes: This was the only instance that occurred,
22 this was the only message of that sort which came up during
23 my experience, that is this and the others that go with it.
24 There is a series of them, I mean the ones that are shown
25 in this book.

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: When did you come to the conclusion
3 that war between Japan and the United States was imminent?

4 Admiral Noyes: Imminent?

5 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

6 Admiral Noyes: I first held a conference in my Division
7 in September 1939, shortly after I took the Division over.
8 I told them at that time that I thought that the chances
9 of our being involved in the war which had started in Europe
10 were considerable, and that we in 20 years had gotten very
11 much on a peacetime basis and I wanted everything done to
12 get us on a war basis, and I had a report for everything that
13 was necessary to put us on a war basis in Naval Communications.
14 That brought in the question of this time lapse, the inter-
15 cepted enemy messages, but I imagine you would not be interested
16 in all of the details.

17 However, in May, 1941, on my recommendations, the
18 Communications were mobilized, which meant that we had gone
19 on a war status, as far as Communications were concerned.
20 From then on we were on a war basis. I was cognizant,
21 through my position, of these various messages as we went
22 along. I considered that things practically continuously
23 got worse.

24 At the time that when I came into the Department, which
25 I think was June --

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 The Chairman: 1940?

3 Admiral Noyes: Of 1940. -- there was one time when
4 I thought we might likely go to war with Japan. In June,
5 1941, was another time. Each time we got by, but it became
6 worse.

7 I think that the last chance that I thought of a peaceful
8 settlement was when we turned down the Japanese proposition
9 and submitted our last note, to which the 13 parts was the
10 reply.

11 Senator Ferguson: In other words, when we turned down
12 the modus vivendi and sent the message of the 26th, you
13 then considered that we would have war?

14 Admiral Noyes: That is nothing by my personal opinion,
15 sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: How is that?

17 Admiral Noyes: This is my personal opinion, Senator.

18 Senator Ferguson: That is what I mean.

19 Admiral Noyes: In my own opinion, Japan would not
20 accept those terms, and therefore she would go ahead with
21 her invasion of Siam, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and
22 the question was what the result would be of that, were
23 we or were we not going to stand for it.

24 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now did you know about
25 the message that the President gave on the 17th of August,

(14)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 1941?

3 Admiral Noyes: I do not identify it that way, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did you know what we were going to
5 do in case of an attack, or a further move into the Southwest
6 Pacific?

7 Admiral Noyes: I knew that we had tried to impress the
8 Japanese with the idea that we would take definite action
9 if they proceeded with their invasion.

10 Senator Ferguson: If they proceeded with an invasion
11 of the British or the Dutch, or both of them, we had under-
12 taken, as you say now --

13 Admiral Noyes: (Interposing) No, sir, I beg your
14 pardon. I did not say we had undertaken.

15 Senator Ferguson: Will you read his answer?

16 (The record was read by the reporter.)

17 Senator Ferguson: Now we tried to impress the Japanese
18 with what we would do if they proceeded? What would we do
19 if they proceeded?

20 Admiral Noyes: One thing we did was cut off the oil
21 and scrap iron shipments.

22 Senator Ferguson: What else did we do to impress them
23 if they moved down there that we would take action? You
24 understand your answer, don't you?

25 Admiral Noyes: Yes.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: What else did we do to impress them
3 that we would take action?

4 Admiral Noyes: Other than arguments and notes, we had
5 done nothing.

6 Senator Ferguson: What did we say in notes to impress
7 them?

8 The Chairman: Senator, will not those notes speak
9 for themselves? They are in the record, they are a part
10 of the testimony.

11 Senator Ferguson: I haven't any idea as to whether all
12 of the notes are in evidence yet.

13 Admiral Noyes: I must say I am not familiar offhand
14 with the contents of those notes individually, Senator
15 Ferguson.

16 Senator Ferguson: But you just told me that we tried
17 to impress them that if they made further moves we would
18 take action. That is the substance of what you said.

19 Admiral Noyes: That is what I gathered from what I
20 had been reading in the papers, and what I also knew of
21 officially. I had no direct knowledge of what was going
22 on through the State Department.

23 Senator Ferguson: How could you evaluate the evidence
24 if you had not any knowledge of our policy?

25 Admiral Noyes: I said I had no direct knowledge of what

1 Witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 was going on through the State Department, sir. I think
3 you will find most of it appeared in the press. I had some
4 access to other information through this book.

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, that book is Exhibit 1. Those
6 are the messages that we had been given.

7 Admiral Noyes: I had a general familiarity with the
8 messages that are in this book. That is where I got my
9 picture partly.

10 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, for the record I would like
11 to object. They are not the messages that we were given
12 that were sent out. They are the Jap version of certain
13 dispatches.

14 Senator Ferguson: The record is clear as to what
15 Exhibit 1 is.

16 Were we intercepting messages to Rome?

17 Admiral Noyes: To whom in Rome?

(15) 18 Senator Ferguson: The Japanese. To anyone in Rome.

19 Admiral Noyes: From time to time we got messages that
20 were from the Japanese Ambassadors abroad.

21 Senator Ferguson: That was not quite the question.
22 The question is, were we intercepting Japanese messages to
23 Rome?

24 Admiral Noyes: From time to time, yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: From Tokyo to Rome?

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir, or Rome to Tokyo. I do
3 not remember seeing any from Tokyo to Rome. It is more
4 difficult for us to intercept from Tokyo to Rome. Rome to
5 Tokyo was a different proposition.

6 Senator Ferguson: I do not think I have been able to
7 find any messages in Exhibit 1 that we intercepted from Rome
8 to Tokyo or Tokyo to Rome.

9 Admiral Noyes: I think there is one in there that I
10 saw.

11 Senator Ferguson: I wish you would point them out.

12 Mr. Murphy: The one of December 3rd.

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes, there is one on page 228, the
14 3rd of December. Are you familiar with that message?

15 Admiral Noyes: What page, sir?

16 Senator Ferguson: On page 228.

17 Admiral Noyes: I would like to say I had never seen
18 this book until two weeks ago when it was given me by the
19 counsel of the committee.

20 I have read the message now, sir. I do not recall it
21 specifically. It was not translated until the 6th of
22 December, according to the note.

23 Senator Ferguson: Do you know when it was delivered
24 to the people who were supposed to receive these messages?

25 Admiral Noyes: I have no idea, sir.

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Now one paragraph there on page 229,
3 "Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on
4 the United States and Great Britain I asked would it be
5 due almost immediately and Mussolini replied of course she
6 is obligated to do so under the terms of the tripartite pact.
7 Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we
8 would like to confer with Germany on this point."

9 That would indicate that the message that they are
10 talking about was that they were trying to get a commitment
11 from Italy as to whether or not, if the war started, they
12 would join in it. Would not you say that is a fair con-
13 struction of that paragraph?

14 Admiral Noyes: I should think so, yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Did that indicate to you that they
16 were going into a war with America?

17 Admiral Noyes: I do not imagine I saw this message
18 before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

19 Senator Ferguson: You do not know as you saw it?

20 Admiral Noyes: No, sir, I have no definite recollection
21 of it, and I would not be surprised at that sort of con-
22 versation. I think it was a natural thing for the Ambassador
23 to discuss matters like that. In my own opinion, some
24 of the Japanese were afraid that we were going to war with
25 them if they went ahead with their invasion. It was not

1 Witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson
 2 that they wanted to go to war with us, it was that they
 3 wanted to occupy Southwest Asia. If we let them do it
 4 they would not go to war with us.

5 Senator Ferguson: Then you think the reason for the
 6 attack, as you give in this last answer, would be that they
 7 expected that we would interfere with their occupation of
 8 other countries?

9 Admiral Noyes: That would be my personal opinion, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: That is your personal opinion. And
 11 you were of that opinion back in December of 1941?

12 Admiral Noyes: As I stated, that if we had been willing
 13 to accept their point and allow them to occupy Siam, French
 14 Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, they would probably not
 15 have gone to war with us, if they could avoid it.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Were you surprised on December 7 that there had been an attack by the Japanese on an American possession?

Admiral Noyes: I was surprised that the attack got in. I was surprised that an air raid was made on Pearl Harbor at that time.

Senator Ferguson: Now, wait. You said first that you were surprised that the attack got in. You mean that it was successful?

Admiral Noyes: I will put it in the reverse. I was surprised that an air attack was made on Pearl Harbor at that time, and if it was made, I was surprised it got in.

Senator Ferguson: Did you expect an attack on the 7th?

Admiral Noyes: I did not expect an attack on the 7th, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Anywhere?

Admiral Noyes: Beg pardon?

Senator Ferguson: Any where?

Admiral Noyes: When, sir?

Senator Ferguson: I mean anywhere on the 7th, any country by the Japanese.

Admiral Noyes: I do not understand. At what time did I expect an attack on the 7th? I didn't expect an attack on

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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the 7th.

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Senator Ferguson: You did not expect the Japanese
to attack any country on the 7th?

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Admiral Noyes: I did not expect it, no, sir.

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I knew that 30 warships, a large convoy was heading
south, and they were going to attack somewhere within a
short time. The convoy would not probably have landed on
the 7th. They could go to the Philippines, but they were
pretty far away to get in on the 7th.

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Senator Ferguson: They were over in the north of Siam?

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Admiral Noyes: That is right.

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I had considerable to do with traffic on that point.

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Senator Ferguson: Now, I will ask you about that
traffic. Were you not in contact with Admiral Hart, about
that move?

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Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: You knew the movement was to the Kra
Peninsula, did you not?

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Admiral Noyes: I did not, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Did not America know from the message
that our Ambassador Winant sent here at 10:40 on the morning
of the 6th, which was Saturday, that the movement was on the
Kra Peninsula, and that we could expect an attack within 14
hours?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Admiral Noyes: I never saw that message, sir. That was not a Navy message. It was a State Department message.

Senator Ferguson: Where did you understand the movement was going?

Admiral Noyes: Probably somewhere in that vicinity. Whether they were going first into Indo-China, or Thailand, or direct to the Kra Peninsula, I could not say, but there was always a possibility that they could turn toward the Philippines. It was in that order of possibilities.

Senator Ferguson: They would have had to reverse their course and sail almost 1,000 miles, would they not, to the Philippines from where they were?

Admiral Noyes: I do not think so, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How far?

Admiral Noyes: I do not remember exactly the position, but Camranh Bay is a little less distant to Manila Bay than it is to the Kra Peninsula.

Senator Ferguson: Had not the ships gone further than that on Saturday?

Admiral Noyes: I do not think so.

Senator Ferguson: Had not the ships gone further than Camranh Bay on Saturday?

Admiral Noyes: I do not think so, sir. I have no definite recollection of the exact position, but as I remember,

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 it was somewhere near Camranh Bay.

3 Senator Ferguson: Then you would not have been
4 surprised at an attack on the Philippines on Sunday?

5 Admiral Noyes: I am getting a little out of my depth,
6 Senator Ferguson. I was not concerned with the war plans
7 or with this from a strategic point of view. That was not
8 my business at the time. I was merely handling the traffic.

9 I got involved in an expression of my personal views.
10 I had no responsibility in this respect in the Navy Depart-
11 ment.

12 Senator Ferguson: Do you know what I mean when I say
13 the pilot message?

14 Admiral Noyes: The what message, sir?

15 Senator Ferguson: The pilot message.

16 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Do you know what that is? It is
18 in Exhibit 1.

19 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Will you look at it and just tell
21 me when you first knew that there was such a message, if you
22 knew at all, prior to the attack?

23 Admiral Noyes: My recollection is not clear as to
24 exactly when I saw that message. I think it was in the
25 afternoon. I do not think I saw the message prior to the at-

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Well, was it the 6th?

Admiral Noyes: I thought you were speaking of the morning of the 7th.

Senator Ferguson: That is when you saw it. Do you know when it came in?

Admiral Noyes: A message came in during the night of the 6th, that is during our night of the 6th.

Senator Ferguson: I will ask you whether it was this message from Admiral Hart:

"To OPNAV.

"Learn from Singapore we have assured British armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you."

Admiral Noyes: No, sir, that is not the message to which I was referring.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know that there was such a message?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir, I think I knew at the time. I have heard it discussed here.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know of it before the attack?

Admiral Noyes: I should say I did. I think that I knew of it before the attack.

Senator Ferguson: Well, what interpretation did you give that?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: senator Ferguson

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Admiral Noyes: That it was some misinformation in regard to the ABC agreement.

Senator Ferguson: You say it was some misinformation?

Admiral Noyes: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Why do you say that?

Admiral Noyes: Because the ABC agreement was purely a military conversation, starting with an assumption that the United States would be associated with certain other countries in a war with Japan, and from there on the plans would be put into effect if that assumption should come through.

Senator Ferguson: What does this mean:

"Learn from Singapore we have assured British armed support under three or four eventualities."

Admiral Noyes: I think it was somebody misinterpreting the ABC agreement. That is my personal opinion.

Senator Ferguson: Did you understand in case of war we were to give them armed support?

Admiral Noyes: What war, sir?

Senator Ferguson: With Japan.

Admiral Noyes: I do not understand.

Senator Ferguson: What did you interpret this to mean:

"Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities"?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: senator Ferguson

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Admiral Noyes: I was familiar with the ABC agreement because I had certain duties under it, and I knew whoever said that misinterpreted what the whole agreement was.

I suppose it is a case of some young liaison officer getting off the track.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Noyes

questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: If this was Admiral Phillips of
3 the Royal British Navy, you wouldn't expect that he would
4 be very far off the track, would you?

5 Admiral Noyes: I don't believe it was Admiral Phillips
6 of the British Navy. I think it was some young man in our
7 Navy talking to some man in the British Navy.

8 Senator Ferguson: Where did you ever get that idea?
9 Where did you ever hear that?

10 Admiral Noyes: You asked me what I thought of the
11 message.

12 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

13 Admiral Noyes: I suppose I should have said I don't
14 know anything about it.

15 Senator Ferguson: You said you do know, now.

16 Admiral Noyes: I said I supposed that that was discussed.
17 You asked me what I thought at the time. The truth was I
18 thought somebody had misinterpreted the agreement.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that Admiral Phillips
20 told Admiral Hart this at Manila on December 6, and that is
21 why Admiral Hart cabled to Washington to find out why he
22 didn't have the information that the British had, and there
23 was about to be an attack upon the British?

24 Admiral Noyes: I did not know that information, sir,
25 and I knew I had read and was involved in the duties in the

1 Witness Noyes

questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 ABCD agreement, and it is purely a military agreement,
3 starting out with an assumption.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that Phillips was in
5 command of the British in Singapore?

6 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. I don't, I don't know; I
7 wouldn't be positive about that now. I thought he was a
8 Captain on one of the British ships, but my recollection
9 may be wrong.

10 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did you really think at
11 the time that Admiral Hart would wire Washington if some
12 young officer told him this, that the British were assured
13 armed support under three or four eventualities?

14 Admiral Noyes: You are asking me what I think now, and
15 what I thought then, sir. I do not remember having any
16 particular thoughts on it. The best answer I can give is
17 that that is what seems to me would have been my reaction
18 then, seeing that message.

19 Senator Ferguson: Isn't it true that you were working
20 on this? I didn't bring it up. You brought it up, about
21 working, you were busily engaged on this Hart proposition
22 in the South Pacific.

23 Admiral Noyes: You asked me what I was doing.

24 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

25 Now, I show you this message.

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: I will ask you whether or not you
4 saw that message that morning and were working on that pro-
5 position?

6 Admiral Noyes: May I ask the date of the date of the
7 message?

8 Senator Ferguson: Yes. It came in Saturday night.

9 (A paper was handed to Admiral Noyes.)

10 Admiral Noyes: I did not have this message in mind
11 at all. I had thought that this message came in before the
12 7th.

13 Mr. Ferguson: Yes, it did. It came in Saturday
14 night.

15 Admiral Noyes: I hadn't thought it was a message that
16 was in it.

17 Senator Ferguson: What were you working on? What mes-
18 sage were you replying to? Didn't Admiral Hart then sent
19 a much longer message and a wire also, cable, from the British
20 about this proposition, that very day? Is that what you were
21 working on?

22 Admiral Noyes: The recollection I have is the strategic
23 and tactical implications of a convoy. I do not remember any
24 other messages specifically.

25 Senator Ferguson: Will you explain just what it was

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 you were working on and what you had worked out, whether you
3 had sent a message?

4 Admiral Noyes: We had been following the -- trying to
5 follow the course of this convoy, because we -- you are
6 again asking me something I had nothing to do with except
7 from seeing messages.

8 Senator Ferguson: You stated, as I understood you,
9 that you were working on this proposition of Admiral Hart in
10 the South Pacific. Now, this was one of the propositions
11 that he had and he sent a long message which was replied to
12 before the attack, but not actually sent until after the
13 attack, and that is in the record -- on this very point.
14 Did you know about that?

15 Admiral Noyes: I don't recollect such a message, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, what were you working on
17 about the convoy? What were you doing that morning?

18 Admiral Noyes: This message had come in in regard to
19 the scouting, reports on the convoy entirely aside from this
20 other enemy intercept. This was a straight Naval message
21 from Admiral Hart.

22 A British officer came to see me with some information
23 that he had on the same, in regard to what information the
24 British received about the movements of the big convoy. I
25 gave him the information we had. He went up to see the

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy,
3 I believe, and later on he asked me if I would arrange for
4 him, ask for an appointment for him with the Secretary
5 of State.

6 I called up the Secretary of State's office, and asked
7 for an appointment. That is the one message that sticks in
8 my mind on Sunday morning other than the note business.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now, do I understand that you did
10 this all Sunday morning?

11 Admiral Noyes: I can't -- no, sir. I had all the
12 Atlantic traffic --

13 Senator Ferguson: Do. Did you call The Secretary of
14 State? Did you see the British officer on Sunday morning?

15 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Then do I understand that the British
3 had an officer talking with you about this convoy going
4 to the Kra Peninsula, or going somewhere, and you and he were
5 working it out as to where it was going?

6 Admiral Noyes: We weren't working out where it was
7 going. He came to me with his information.

8 Senator Ferguson: What for, what information did he have?

9 Admiral Noyes: I don't remember the specific informa-
10 tion now.

11 Senator Ferguson: Can you recall what you gave him?

12 Admiral Noyes: No, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: What information did you have on that
14 convoy?

15 Admiral Noyes: I think I have seen it in some of these
16 dispatches but I don't remember the text of it now.

17 Senator Ferguson: What I am trying to point out is
18 why he would come to the Communications Officer, the head
19 of the Communications, this British Officer, and not come
20 to our Intelligence Branch, if he wanted to get this informa-
21 tion. You were not an evaluator of this information, were you?

22 Admiral Noyes: No.

23 Senator Ferguson: Who was this British Officer that
24 came to you Sunday morning and what time did he come?

25 Admiral Noyes: I could not give you the exact hour, sir.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 else. I have no recollection of the British Officer except
2 the part that I have explained to you, sir. I had no con-
3 versation about Singapore. I had no conversation about
4 political matters. It was purely in regard to the strategic
5 and technical implications of this convoy movement. Why
6 he came to me, probably was because it was Sunday morning
7 and there probably weren't so many people down there.

8
9 Senator Ferguson: Was your office alerted this morning
10 to war?

11 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. It was, 24 hours a day,
12 since May 1941.

13 Senator Ferguson: What was said, why did you send him
14 to the Secretary of State and not to the Intelligence De-
15 partment of the Navy?

16 Admiral Noyes: That I said to the Secretary of State?

17 Senator Ferguson: Didn't I understand that you called
18 the Secretary of State for an appointment?

19 Admiral Noyes: I called his office.

20 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

21 Admiral Noyes: Some subordinate.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did you make an appointment with
23 the Secretary of State?

24 Admiral Noyes: I did, yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: What was the point that he wanted

1 Witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 you to get him in touch with the Secretary of State to
3 discuss?

4 Admiral Noyes: He didn't tell me, sir. He merely
5 said everybody was busy and would I ring up the State De-
6 partment and ask if they could see him.

7 Senator Ferguson: Did he say who he wanted to see in
8 the State Department?

9 Admiral Noyes: I am not sure whom he wanted to see.
10 I thought it was the Secretary of State. It might have
11 been the Under Secretary.

12 Senator Ferguson: What was the rank of this officer?

13 Admiral Noyes: I think he was a Rear Admiral.

14 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that at 10:00 o'clock
15 that morning there was a meeting between the Secretary of
16 State, the Secretary of War, and Secretary of Navy?

17 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Did you know why that had been called?

19 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Will you tell us why?

21 Admiral Noyes: It was called on the Canada note.

22 Senator Ferguson: Had you received word that the
23 Secretary of State had told the Secretary of the Navy that
24 it was up to the Army and Navy as early as the 27th of
25 November?

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Admiral Noyes: No, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: You never knew that?

4 Admiral Noyes: I know it now.

5 Senator Ferguson: Before the 7th you didn't know it?

6 Admiral Noyes: I think not. I don't remember having
7 it brought to my attention.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Where did you get the information
3 about the meeting between the three Secretaries?

4 Admiral Noyes: I don't remember. I imagine Kramer
5 told me. Kramer, or one of his people.

6 Senator Ferguson: Pardon?

7 Admiral Noyes: Kramer, or one of his assistants.

8 Senator Ferguson: Did you know of any meeting in
9 Admiral Stark's office that morning?

10 Admiral Noyes: Admiral Stark's office was more or less
11 full of meetings in those days, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: I didn't understand.

13 Admiral Noyes: There were meetings going on all the
14 time in Admiral Stark's office. I remember nothing specific
15 about it that morning.

16 Senator Ferguson: You don't recall anything about that
17 morning?

18 Admiral Noyes: I did not see Admiral Stark that morning.
19 I saw Admiral Ingersoll, but not Admiral Stark.

20 Senator Ferguson: Where was Admiral Ingersoll when you
21 saw him?

22 Admiral Noyes: I think in his office.

23 Senator Ferguson: On what occasion was it that you saw
24 him Sunday morning?

25 Admiral Noyes: I don't remember, sir.

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1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: You don't recall that at all.

3 Admiral Noyes: No. I saw him very often. He was
4 Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and I dealt a great
5 deal with him.

6 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any discussion about
7 the 14 parts message or the pilot message or any of these
8 other messages?

9 Admiral Noyes: No, sir, I remember nothing. I be-
10 lieve, as I remember it, that I felt they were having this
11 meeting and they had the note and would decide what they
12 were going to do about it.

13 Senator Ferguson: Then you would say that was a normal
14 morning in your office and in Admiral Ingersoll's office?

15 Admiral Noyes: Normal for the last week. There had
16 been gradually increasing tension.

17 Senator Ferguson: Normal for the last week. Will you
18 explain that a little more? Things were getting rather
19 tense were they not?

20 Admiral Noyes: Yes. I think from the 28th of November
21 on, some important dispatch had been sent out almost every
22 day in regard to the situation. There was hardly a day
23 that there wasn't some approach to the crisis.

24 Senator Ferguson: And it was gradually getting worse.

25 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Witness Noyes

questions by: senator Ferguson

h3

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you ever see the message,
3 the answer to General Marshall's note sent by General
4 Short?

5 Admiral Noyes: No, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: You did not.

7 Admiral Noyes: I say I didn't. I didn't see it
8 before Pearl Harbor. I have seen it since.

9 Senator Ferguson: You didn't know then what was going
10 on between General Marshall and General Short, or Admiral
11 Kimmel and Admiral Stark?

12 Admiral Noyes: Oh, yes, I handled the war warning
13 message that was sent by the Navy. I didn't see the Army's
14 incoming message. The message from General Short to the
15 War Department. We exchanged this intercepted enemy traffic
16 with the War Department. Our ordinary business was not ex-
17 changed through me. We didn't send a copy to the War Depart-
18 ment of every message we sent to the field.

19 The important messages were in general discussed between
20 Admiral Stark and General Marshall. And at one time I was
21 sent over to see General Marshall about a message and clear
22 it with him. Whenever it involved the Army, we endeavored
23 to clear with the Army.

24 But it didn't happen that General Short's message to
25 the War Department ever came to my attention until after Pearl

Questions by: senator Ferguson

Witness Noyes

h4

Harbor.

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Senator Ferguson: Now Captain Safford has testified that he drafted a message to CINCPAC for information of Wake:

In view of the imminence of war destroy all registered publications on Wake except this system and current editions of aircraft code and direction finding code.

This message was not sent.

Admiral Noyes asked what do you mean by using such language as that?

Captain Safford, - Admiral, the war is just a matter of days if not hours.

Admiral Noyes, - You may think there is going to be war, but I think they are bluffing.

Captain Safford, - Well, Admiral, if all these publications on Wake are captured, we will never be able to explain.

Now, do you remember such a conversation?

Admiral Noyes: What date was this, may I ask? Was this message under discussion?

Senator Ferguson: I may refresh your memory further on it:

Admiral Noyes rewrote 061743.

That is the number of the message which was sent, deferred on December 6, and received after the attack. It was

Witness Noyes

Questions by: senator Ferguson

1 that message about the destruction of codes on Wake.

2 Admiral Noyes: I recollect no such conversation as
3 you have read me, Senator Ferguson.

4 Senator Ferguson: Pardon?

5 Admiral Noyes: I recollect no such conversation with
6 Captain Safford. As a matter of fact, I took the initiative
7 in the sending of these previous -- the only argument that
8 I recollect having with Captain Safford in regard to the
9 destruction of codes, which we both agreed as being responsible
10 for the security of our own codes, we were both in agreement
11 that we would like to get all of the dangerous ones out of
12 the way, but we recognized the fact that it had a very direct
13 influence on the operations people, intelligence and war
14 plans, and I think he recognized, as well as I did that we
15 had to get their concurrence, and that is the reason we had
16 to consider quite a bit before it was sent.

17
18 The one argument we had about it was that he wanted
19 to specify to the Commander in Chief what codes, exactly
20 what codes should be kept, and I, since you bring it up,
21 sir, it comes back to me, that argument that I had with him
22 that he shouldn't tell Admiral Kimmel which codes to keep
23 with the outlying islands; let him decide that for himself.

24 That is the only difference of opinion that I remember,
25 except I think he stuck in some rather brusque language to

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h6

1 the Commander in Chief, which was contrary to the policy
2 of the Chief of Naval Operations, and I scratched it out.

3 Senator Ferguson: What kind of language?

4 Admiral Noyes: Brusque.

5 Senator Ferguson: There could have been such a conver-
6 sation then: "What do you mean by using such language as
7 that?"

8 Admiral Noyes: Well, that might have been -- I will
9 modify what I said to that extent, if that is what he
10 refers to. You didn't say what the language was.

11 Senator Ferguson: No.

12 Admiral Noyes: I think he made the direct order to
13 Admiral Kimmel that he should destroy certain codes in the
14 outlying islands, something to that effect. Nobody was
15 willing to go along with that because they felt Admiral Kimmel
16 should have more discretion in the matter.

17 Senator Ferguson: Didn't you believe that you and Captain
18 Safford would know more about what codes to destroy than
19 Admiral Kimmel would because you were the men who knew your
20 codes, knew how you would have to communicate? Wouldn't
21 you say you had more experience along that line and should
22 have told him what to destroy?

23 Admiral Noyes: We can't run the Navy that way, sir.
24 We have to let the man in the field use his judgment in
25