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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3135

Date: 28 August 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Typewritten Memorandum addressed to the Vice Minister /Foreign Affairs/ with notation in blue pencil - "Manuscript by KASE" on Matters Pertaining to HULL Proposition.

Date: 10 Oct 41 Original (x) Copy ( ) Language: Jap

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

IPS Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL

Japanese Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

KASE, Shunichi (Toshikaza); AMAU, Eiji

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Relations with US - Japanese-American negotiations

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

This document is a memorandum addressed to the Vice Minister /Foreign Affairs - AMAU, Eiji/ with the notation in blue pencil, "Manuscript by KASE" and the subject concerns the opinion of the writer concerning the HULL Proposition which is referred to by KASE as a "query" made by HULL to Ambassador NOMURA in their interview of 7 October.

Hull is quoted as stating, - "What would Japan think if the man in highest authority in CHINA affirms CHINA's most sincere friendship and trust of Japanese Government and people and desires the recovery of friendly relations between Japan and China?"

The writer /KASE?/ gives his opinion and analysis of the "HULL Proposal" as follows:

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1. Since the question of Japan's stationing of troops is the most "difficult matter" in the negotiations, "it is America's intention to make this the subject of a direct talk between Japan and China." It is supposed that HULL must have had "some talk with CHIANG's side beforehand" and therefore China will not "obstruct the negotiation." Therefore, the conclusion is that the opportunity is good for beginning direct negotiation with China with no intervention by America.

2. The American recommendation of peace with China might have "the effect of appeasing the anti-Japan idea" and so some solution might be expected to the problem of the stationing of troops. In this way, "we /Japan/ might be able to practically utilize America but formally avoid the intervention of a foreign government.

3. The present situation of Japan is found to be favorable in comparison to the situation before Japanese-American negotiations.

4. "HULL proposition" is analyzed as possibly "thought out" as a solution for excluding the complicated China problem from American-Japanese negotiations and so direct negotiation with China "along the line of HULL Proposal" is advocated.

5. Other matters, outside of China problem, shall be concluded separately from HULL Proposal.

6. America's motive for a Japan-China direct negotiation is analyzed as possibly being a means used by U.S. to break up American-Japanese negotiations. Writer advises that the relation between the Japan-America negotiations and the Hull Proposal first be affirmed.

Kanuchi

Japanese File No. [35]

subject. "Matters pertaining to HULL proposition"

date. 10 Oct. 1941.

Content a Memo type-written, but  
added in blue pencil "manuscript  
by KASE" ad addressed to the  
Vice Minister.

1. stating —

1. Secretary HULL has made a query to  
Ambassador NOMURA at the interview of  
7. Oct., giving his personal opinion in this way:

"What would Japan think, if  
the man in highest authority in China  
affirms China's most sincere friend-  
ship and trust to Japanese Government  
and people and desires the recovery  
of friendly relations<sup>between</sup> Japan and  
China"

and asked to communicate and ask  
intention of Japanese Government.

2. Comments and opinion of  
the writer  
what are his opinions

2.) This seems to disclose that, as the question of stationing of Japanese troops in China being the most difficult matter in Japan-American it is America's intention, <sup>the</sup> negotiation, to make this matter a subject of a direct talk <sup>between</sup> of Japan and China. In other words, ~~to~~ make Chiang Kai-shek propose <sup>that</sup> to Japan to open peace negotiation, and America shall <sup>- mediator</sup> act as "bridging over" between the two.

In proposing <sup>plan</sup> to such a way, even in un-official way, <sup>it might be supposed that</sup> Hull must have <sup>had</sup> some talk with CHIANG'S side beforehand, and if the negotiation with China is opened <sup>through</sup> by the mediation of America, she will <sup>courteously</sup> ~~of course~~ show some good will toward us and never obstruct the negotiation. This might be deemed to be a good opportunity to begin direct negotiation with China, with no intervention <sup>by</sup> ~~objection~~ of America, which was our intention from the beginning, a rather desirable situation for us.

3. Some one might say that, even if America acts as mediator, the China negotiation shall never come to <sup>an</sup> easy conclusion ~~on account~~ <sup>because</sup> of our demands for stationing troops. But the American recommendation of peace might have <sup>the</sup> effect of appeasing the anti-japan idea to some degree, by which <sup>some solution to</sup> the stationing problem might be expected ~~some solution~~.

In this way, we might be able to practically utilize America, but formally avoiding the intervention <sup>intervention</sup> of foreign government.

(In the Japan-American ~~understanding~~  
<sup>understanding</sup> plan which admits the ~~intermediation~~  
of America publicly, there are somethings undesirable <sup>to</sup> for the status of the Empire as ~~the~~ East Asia's leader, which implies some reaction in opinion inside the Nation).

4.

Comparing ~~with~~ the situation before the Japan-American negotiation, our situation might be said to have been much improved. That is, the American relation at one hand (recovery of commercial relations, &c), and the China relation might be recovered with no foreign objection on the other hand.

5.

It might be taken that the HULL proposition was thought out as releasing the <sup>CHINA</sup> an expedient for, ~~lattle~~ neck, thereby cutting out the complicated China problem from Japan-American negotiation, so that the ~~latter~~ negotiations might ~~promptly~~ go through. In the case of not acknowledging this proposition, the Japan-American negotiation might, ~~get to~~ <sup>Hull</sup> insoluble ~~had knot in~~ <sup>all</sup> greatest probability, become It seems most desirable to go on into direct negotiation with China along the line of Hull proposition.

6. In utilizing the HOLL proposition, other matters besides China problems shall of course be concluded separately.

7. If an ill-intentioned interpretation might be admitted, America might be suspected <sup>of</sup> to having intentions to make the direct negotiations of China and Japan, which must <sup>safely</sup> be delayed on account of ~~make~~ stationing troops question, and ~~Japan~~ responsible for the breaking up of American-Japan <sup>Keep in mind</sup> negotiations. Guarding for this supposition, it must first be affirmed <sup>there is between</sup> that in what relation ~~with~~ the Japan-American negotiation, and the proposition to be transacted,

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End