

VMB -611

151
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Report 35

IG (12.)

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AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT CONFIDENTIAL

(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

REPORT No 35

XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

- (a) Target(s) and Location(s) Tobera 450-D (b) Time Over Target(s) 1113 L (Zone)
- (FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)
- (c) Clouds Over Target .2 Scat. CU 3000'
- (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
- (d) Visibility of Target Partially obscured (e) Visibility Unlimited
- (CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)
- (f) Bombing Tactics: Type Level Bomb Sight Used Mk 15 Mod 7
- (LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)
- Bombs Dropped per Run 3 All Spacing 100' Altitude of Bomb Release 12,800'
- (NUMBER) (FEET)
- (g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed None Probably Destroyed None Damaged None

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, S, B, or serious, destroyed, or sunk)
1 Tobera 450 D	2200' x 800'	4 VMB 611	12x1000 GP	12	Unobserved
2 Tobera 450 D	2200' x 800'	3 VMB 611	9x1000 SAP	9	Unobserved
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

Unobserved

(p) Were Photographs Taken? No Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple

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REPORT No. 35

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

- Method of Locating, Distance
- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Own Weaknesses
- Enemy Weaknesses
- Offensive Tactics, Own
- Offensive Tactics, Enemy
- Defensive Tactics, Own
- Defensive Tactics, Enemy
- Flexible Gunnery, Own
- Escort Tactics
- Fighter Direction
- Use of Radar
- Night Fighting
- Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

- Method of Locating Target
- Approach to Target
- Altitudes, Speeds
- Approach
- Dive
- Pull-Out
- Dive Angle
- Strafing
- Retirement
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

- Evasive Tactics, Ships
- Concealment
- Searchlights
- Night Fighter Tactics
- Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bombing Tactics
- Torpedo Tactics
- Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes
- Selection of Targets
- Fuzing
- Strafing Tactics
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Radar
- Reconnaissance
- Photography
- Briefing

OPERATIONAL

- Navigation
- Homing
- Rendezvous
- Recognition, Ships
- Communications
- Flight Operations
- Search and Tracking
- Base Operations
- Maintenance

<u>CALL</u>	<u>PILOT</u>	<u>T.O.</u>	<u>T.O.F.</u>	<u>T.O.R.</u>
242B21	Sarles	0915	1113	Various
243B21	Good	0915	1113	Various
244B21	McRobert	0915	1113	Various
245B21	Pollan	0915	-	0945
246B21	Kronick	0915	1113	Various
247B21	Peterson	0915	1113	Various
248B21	Horton	0915	1113	Various
249B21	Fish	0915	1113	Various

Lt. Col. Sarles and WMB 611 led 433, 413, 443 and six (6) New Zealand PV's to Tobera 450 D. From the time of departure, 0945, a course of 110 Mag was taken due to weather. At 1012 Selapiu Island was crossed and the briefed course taken up. More deviations due to weather followed later and the group arrived over the NW tip of New Britain and followed south down the coast line to the southern edge of Open Bay. At this point a turn to 063 Mag was made past Mt. Senavit and at 1100 a course of 025 Mag was taken up, lining up on Baluana Point. At 1111 the lead plane turned in on the bomb run at 057 Mag at an altitude of 12,800' and an airspeed of 155 knots. Bombs were away at 1113. The weather over the target was Savannah 1, with scattered clouds, giving .2 cover from 3000'. Not all of the bursts were observed, but from those seen it is thought that overall coverage was good.

A break right was made from the BRL and the flight proceeded to rally, from which the briefed course, 301 Mag, was taken. About 20 minutes before reaching the target, PBJ 35182, pilot Lt. Peterson, began to develop port engine trouble, the engine cutting out intermittently. Lt. Peterson was flying No. 2 in the second section. He pulled out of the formation to the left temporarily, and as the engine recovered was able to rejoin the section. During the breakaway, the engine again began to cut out and the pilot was unable to stay with the formation. At that time the Flight Leader was notified and Lt. Horton, flying No. 3 in the second section, was ordered to accompany Lt. Peterson to the base, the two a/c to return direct. At 1130, at an altitude of 7000', the port engine failed completely. Lt. Peterson was unable to maintain altitude with a prop setting of 2400 RPM and 35" MP on the starboard engine. An immediate jettisoning of removable gear commenced. The waist guns, the tail gun, the barrels and blocks of the turret guns, ammunition and boxes and conveyors, flares, smoke bombs, oxygen bottles, flak suits and helmets, and the co-pilot's armor were thrown out. By this time the plane had lost altitude to 5000' and this altitude was maintained. The two planes had lost contact with the rest of the flight and took up a direct course to Emirau, passing south of Kavieng. About 30 miles south of Djaul Island the planes ran into Savannah 4 to 5 weather, with extremely low visibility and moderate turbulence. Five minutes before running into weather, contact was made with Fido and the condition of the plane was reported to them. After having been steered to the island by Fido and due to the fact that Lt. Peterson's radio compass was out, Lt. Horton directed Lt. Peterson the last ten miles, maintaining

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ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance
Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack
Distance of Opening Fire
Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" " " " Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" " " " Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships
Concealment
Searchlights
Night Fighter Tactics
Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

(CONTINUATION)

range by radar and heading by radio compass. All during this last leg of the flight, Fido reported Savannah 5 weather. South Field was cleared for a straight-in approach and after making one circle of the island, Lt. Peterson landed, having lost sight of the strip on his downwind and base legs. The landing was effected at 1315. Lt. Horton landed on the North Field five minutes later. Meanwhile Col. Sarles and the rest of the group had also run into the weather. Running into moderate rains over New Hanover, the squadrons were ordered to open up. As the weather became worse, the flight broke up when the planes lost contact with each other. Lt. McRobert, PBJ 35196, running low on fuel over New Hanover, received permission to proceed independently to base and landed at 1240, followed by Lt. Kronick at 1245. Lt. Fish landed at 1310, leaving only the colonel and Lt. Good aloft. These last two planes proceeded to Mamote airstrip, landing there at 1430. At 1700 the same afternoon, they took off to return to Emirau, but were turned back by weather and landed at Mokerang at 1815. On the morning of 6 March 1945, Col. Sarles left Mokerang at 0730 and landed at Emirau at 0825 shortly before this field was closed. Lt. Good remained at Mokerang.

One plane, piloted by Lt. Pollan, of the eight scheduled to take off for this strike blew an exhaust stack and took off late. Unable to catch up with the rest of the flight, Lt. Pollan turned back to the base and landed at 0945.

A.S. BODRERO
1stLT. USMCR
SQUADRON INT. OFFICER

G.A. SARLES
Lt. Col.-USMC
Commanding Officer