GHQ/SCAP Records(RG 331)
Description of contents

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

(1) Box no. 2239

(2) Folder title/number: (9)
Incoming Radios

(3) Date: Nov. 1946

(4) Subject:

Classification	Type of record
020	n

(5) Item description and comment:
Secret

(6) Reproduction: (Yes) No

(7) Film no. Sheet no.

[Incoming Radios]

16 Nov to 30 Nov.

1946 9

SECRET

INCOMING RADIOS

Nov 1 to Nov 18 1946

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

JLR
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INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT



UNCLASSIFIED
URGENT

FROM : WASHINGTON (STATE DEPT)

TO : USPOLAD BERLIN, AM REP BUDAPEST, DAAO (UNKNOWN)
AM EMBASSY ROME, AM REP SOFIA, AM LEGATION VIENNA,
AM EMBASSY NANKING, AM EMBASSY MANILA, SCAP

INFO : WASHINGTON (CHIEF OF STAFF)

NR : CIRCULAR 29TH

The following statement has been released by the White House today: "The President today called attention to the favorable situation in the procurement of grain for export to people in need abroad and to the difficulties in rail transportation of grain for this purpose and to the modification in the restrictions on domestic use of grain. Exports of grain together with wheat purchased or under contract by the Department of Agriculture and amounts to be shipped as flour are sufficient to reach the original goal of 257 million bushels for the year ending June 30, 1947. Good crops of all grains and a record corn crop made it possible later to raise the goal to a total of 400 million of wheat, corn and other grains. It now appears that it would be possible to make available for export as much as 550 million bushels of all grains if sufficient transportation could be obtained. However owing largely to the shortage of box cars there are difficulties even in the movement of as much as 400 million bushels. In view of the continuing urgent need for food abroad the Office of Defense Transportation is being asked by the President to make every effort to supply the necessary transportation for export grain and if necessary to provide preferential treatment to move grain for this purpose. Because of the favorable grain supply situation, and in the light of transportation difficulties,

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
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INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
URGENT

FROM : WDS NR: CIRCULAR 29TH 30 NOV 46 CONT'D

modifications in the restrictions on the domestic use of grain are being announced by Secretary of Agriculture Clinton P Anderson. The Department of Agriculture will take the following actions:

1. Remove the limitation on the domestic distribution of flour.

2. Permit brewers for the quarter beginning December 1, 1946 to use as much grain as in the corresponding months of 1945 and 1946 but retain the prohibition against their use of wheat and the limitation on the use of rice.

3. Permit distillers to use unlimited quantities of corn below grade 3 but retain the prohibition against their use of wheat and the limitation of their use of rye.

Please emphasize to officials and press that actions described imply no lessening US appreciation difficult food situation abroad or slackening of US efforts to export maximum possible quantity grains. On contrary, statement implies US willingness to export more than original target and intensify transportation efforts. However actual exports in excess of 400 million bushels unlikely. In any case, relaxation of domestic controls will still leave supply for export in excess of amount which can be transported.

Airgram follows giving text of Secretary Agriculture's letter on which President's statement based.

ACHESON

ACTION: DIPLOMATIC SECT

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, AG

ADDED DIST: ECON & SCI SECT, NAT RES SECT, GOVT SECT

37338

TOO: 301155 Z
MCN: YA 52/30

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

UNCLASSIFIED
URGENT 30 Nov 46

FROM : CG USAFIK

TO : USAMGIK (LIAISON OFFICER), AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI

INFO : CG NANKING HQ COMD, SCAP (GOVT SECT)

NR : TFYNG 3178

Reference SCAP radio (cite C 67223 140614 Z) subject repatriation of Chinese Puppet Consular personnel "Be prepared to repatriate from Pusan about 25 Nov all Chinese Puppet Consular personnel presently held in protective custody. Understand approximately half personnel involved do not desire repatriation but unless American Embassy Nanking advise US to contrary it is proposed to repatriate all Chinese Puppet personnel." Following members former Chinese Puppet Consular personnel previously residing in US Zone KREW departed Pusan for Shanghai 27 Nov aboard QST Q 43 ETA Shanghai 2 Dec. Feng Wen Hsiung, wife and four children; Huag Po Chun, wife and three children; Yank Ching Ch'uan; Chan Chuan Kuan; Hsu Tzu Chun, wife and three children; Chinag Chun Hsi; Chem Po, wife and one child; Wang Shao Qi; Teng Yi Shan; Chiang Ta Chuan, wife and three children; Chen Wei Fe and wife Wuye Hsing Junior member of Consular Staff hospitalized in Seoul due to recent appendectomy operation, will be repatriated first available opportunity following recovery. Advise Chinese Govt authorities group being returned as repatriates. Processing at Pusan prior to departure consisted of customs examination, typhus stool test, smallpox.

NO SIG

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URGENT

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
URGENT

FROM: CG USAFIK, NR: TFYNG 3178, DTD 30 NOV 46, CONT'D

INFORMATION : COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, G-3,
AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

jbf

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
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INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE

29 Nov 46

FROM : WASH (WDSCA ES)

TO : CINCAFPAC

NR : WCI 32946

Re request Tansey to McMahon in letter 6 Nov 46, following are divs and functions Alien Property Custodian office as of 30 Sept 46:

1. Custodian-responsible for exercise all powers and performance all duties under Trading with Enemy Act delegated to Alien Property Custodian.

2. Exec Committee-serves in advisory capacity to custodian in determination of policies and adm actions.

3. Vested Property Claims Committee-conducts hearings and examines evidence on claims filed with office and determines, subj to review by custodian, their appropriate disposition.

4. Office of exec Off-responsible for budgetary control, adm planning, and coordination of activities of Sv Dv.

5. Div of Pers responsible for recruitment, classification, and related pers activities; maintains pers records; adm pers laws and regs.

6. Div of Adm Svs-provides procurement, messenger, duplicating and other Adm Svs; maintains files and records.

7. Managers, Field Off-Manager of Territorial and Insular Offices responsible for immediate directional activities in Hawaii and Philippines; managers of NY and SF Offices responsible for coordination activities of Divs in their offices.

8. Office of Secy-provides liaison with other Govt agencies; handles gen correspondence of office; reviews and processes formal orders and documents; acts asst secy to Exec Committe; coordinates policies and practices of office.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
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INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE
FROM: WAR ((WDSCA ES) NR: WCL 32946 29, Nov 46 CONT'D

9. Office of Gen Counsel-renders opinions concerning auth of offices and legal aspects of proposed policies and actions; handles legislative matters; cooperates with Dept of Justice on litigation involving office; prepares or reviews orders and other legal documents.

10. Div of Research and Statistics-conducts research to evaluate effectiveness of programs and assist in policy formulation; assemble statistical data on controlled properties; prepares annual and other official reports.

11. Comptrollers Div maintains all accounting reports pertaining to vested property and adm expenses and prepares financial reports: reviews finacial data on vested and supervised business enterprises.

12. Div of Investigation responsible for identification and establishment of proof of ownership all enemy owned assets except patents, copyrights, trade marks, estates, and insurance policies.

13. Div on Business Management and Control-supervises operation of business enterprises continuing as going concerns and conducts sales of vested interests; control policies and activities of Field Offices in Hawaii and Philippine Islands.

14. Div of Real Estate and Liquidation-supervises liquidation of enterprises not continued as going concerns; manages and sells real estate, mortgages, and tangible pers property.

15. Property Div represents enemy national in court proceedings; investigates enemy ownership of property involved in such proceedings, especially estates and trusts; investigates insurance policies; obtains possession of vested properties; handles cash transactions; administers all property not asgd to other Div.

16. Div of Patent Adm-administers programs relating to patents, copyrights, and trade marks, including investigation of enemy ownership, licensing, patent prosecution, royalty collection, and contract re-negotiation.

NO SIG

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ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE

FROM: WAR (WDSCA ES) NR: WCL 32946 DTD 29 NOV 46 CONT'D

ACTION: CIV PROP CUST

INFORMATION: GOVT SECT, ECON & SCI SECT

36682

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED
-3

TOO : 272137 Z
MCN : YFA 90/28

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
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bah



INCOMING MESSAGE

CORRECTED COPY

Secret

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY 28 Nov 46

FROM : CG USAFIK

TO : CINCAFPAC (ATTN OF GENERAL MACARTHUR)

NR : TFGCG 539

Herein quoted is body of letter received today from General Chistiakov Commanding Soviet 20-5th Army in North Korea.

"I acknowledge the receipt of your letter dtd Nov 1,46.

It is with regret that I have to conclude that the conditions upon which you propose to renew the negotiations of the Joint Soviet-American Commission in substance do not differ from the position laid down in your previous letter, which, in the opinion of the Soviet Delegation is in contradiction to the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Actually, you propose that the Joint Commission should consult with any person, political party or social organization which adheres to and aided by the declaration published in communique Nov 5, moreover, such persons, parties or social organizations must not and will not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

Thus, according to this formula, the Joint Commission must consult not only with democratic parties and social organizations which uphold

36326

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret

CORRECTED COPY

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COPY NO. 78

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED
29 NOV 1946

CORRECTED COPY

Secret

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG USAFIK NR : TFGCG 539 28 NOV 46 CONT'D

the Moscow Decision, but also with those parties and organizations which are hostile to this decision. Furthermore, these latter parties and organizations are even given an opportunity to continue these activities directly against the Moscow Decision with the exception that they should not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

The acceptance of such a proposal would appear, rather as a call to reactionary parties and groups not to retreat from their hostile position towards the Moscow Decision, but merely to curtail temporarily their activities directed against this decision so that they may have an opportunity to take part in the consultations with the Joint Commission. I must remind you that it was precisely in such manner that these parties accepted your public announcement of April 27, 46 which contained an analagous interpretation of the agreement embodied in communique nbr 5.

The result was that the parties and organizations which had voiced their opposition to the Moscow Decision agreed to sign the declaration, but on the very second day after the termination of the work of the Joint Commission, prominent leaders of these parties and organizations again returned to an active fight against the Moscow Decision and its supporters.

There is no doubt that participation by those elements in the consultations would be utilized by them with the aid of sabotaging the fulfillment of the Moscow

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INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED
29 NOV 1946

CORRECTED COPY

Secret

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG USAFIK NR : TFGCG 539 28 NOV 46 CONT'D

Decision and would only facilitate their activities in that direction.

I must again declare that if we are aiming at actual and complete realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea, then, in the opinion of the Soviet Delegation, it is impossible to consult on the question of methods of fulfilling this decision with those persons, parties and organizations who voice opposition to the above mentioned decision and who are aiming at sabotaging its fulfillment, whom, for tactical considerations, may for the period of consultation with the Joint Commission temporarily and in part limit their activities directed against the Moscow Decision in order that they may renew these activities in full force as soon as consultation with Joint Commission is terminated.

The foregoing in no way limits the freedom of Korean democratic parties, social organizations or individuals to express their position regarding the formation of the Korean Govt or other questions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

In my previous letter I have already directed your attention to the fact that the Soviet Delegation has never made proposals directed against the freedom of individuals, parties or organizations to express anywhere their views on these questions and it is accordingly understood that any party or social organization as well as an individual Korean citizen can

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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
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INCOMING MESSAGE



CORRECTED COPY

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG USAFIK NR : TFGCG 539 28 NOV 46 CONT'D

express similar views or present them to the Joint Commission.

Desiring to fulfill the Moscow Decision of Koreans speedily and as definitely as possible, the Soviet side advances the following proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission.

1. The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea.

2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case such parties social organizations, by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.

In the event you should agree to the foregoing proposals the Soviet Delegation is prepared, without delay, to arrive in Seoul for the resumption of the negotiations of the Joint Commission."

36326

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
Secret
-4-
CORRECTED COPY

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INCOMING MESSAGE

CORRECTED COPY
Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG USAFIK NR : TFGCG 539 28 NOV 46 CONT'D

This appears to put the status of Joint Commission exactly where it was when General Chistiakov made his opening speech on 20 March 46, in which he indicated that the Russians would not consult with any Korean parties or groups who did not support all aspects of the Moscow Decision.

Will make specific recommendations later. Request pass to War and State for info. Have not released publications. Will not with out informing you.

HODGE

ACTION : SECY GEN STAFF

INFORMATION : COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE : Corrected copy received in AG Office at 281720 I.

NOTE : This msg has been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to WAR (FOR STATE DEPT) for Info.

36326 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY TOO : 270740 Z
Secret MCN : TJC 48/27
-5-
CORRECTED COPY

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Unclassified
~~Secret~~
~~Confidential~~
ROUTINE

28 Nov 46

FROM : WASHINGTON (FROM PETERSEN)

TO : CINCAFPAC (FOR MACARTHUR)

NR : W 86512

In War 84871 WD cleared with you the proposed pers plan for Japanese reparations. Yesterday (Nov 25) at the invitation of the Sec of War a selected group of representatives of the nations leading engineering, construction, appraisal and evaluation firms met with the Sec, myself and Gen Hilldring, Asst Sec of State. Their assistance in solving the Japanese reparations problem, both in an advisory capacity and in personnel matters, was requested. The following named people representing their firms attended and subscribed to the results of the meeting: Paul B Coffman, president, Standard Research Consultants; Clifford Strike, president, FH McGraw Company; Frank Carhart, Sr partner, Jackson and Moreland; Horace Perry, Jr partner, Jackson and Moreland; Archibald Hossock, president, American Appraisal Company; J. W. Cunningham, American Appraisal Company; Clifton H. Chadwick, Coverdale and Colpitts; Shipley Thomas, chairman, Board of Directors, Ford, Bacon, and Davis; Robert Hamil, partner, Sanderson and Porter; John R. Lotz, chairman, Board of Directors, Stone Webster Engineering Company; F. C. Mackrell, Stone and Webster Engineering Company; Gano Dunn, J. C. White Engineering Corp; K. W. Reece, president, Engineering Department, Ebasco Services Inc.; M. J. Madigan, partner, Madigan and Hyland.

After the scope and importance of the job had been presented by the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War and Assistant Secretary of State, this group in private conference prepared and subscribed to the following aide

36646

ROUTINE

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COPY NO. 22

132

091.1

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

RECEIVED
29 NOV 1946

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
ROUTINE

FROM: WASH (FROM PETERSON) NR: W 86512 28 Nov 46 CONT'D

memoire: "The group of engineering companies desire to be of assistance to the Secretary of War and immediately accept the opportunity to that end by serving as an advisory group in connection with the problem of Japanese reparations. As far as possible, a general plan should be worked out before representatives go to Japan by a small committee in the nature of an executive committee that will represent and report to the group. It has seemed desirable before any definite plans can be made to explore the problem through the visit to Japan of one or more important representatives of the group who will make contact with General MacArthur and give a preliminary study to the scope and nature of the work, also to the elements of time within which it must be accomplished. On a report from these representatives, the group will consider the extent to which, under separate but uniform contracts, it can contribute to the carrying out of the work by supplying certain experts from the several companies who may then be in a position to supply them. A general form of contract should be discussed and agreed upon in advance of the visit of the representatives, all to work under a project manager selected by the group who would represent the group in their relations with the WD. It is the unanimous opinion of the officers and representatives present that the execution of the work by a group of engineering companies will be more prompt, efficient and will cost less to the government than execution by selected individuals directly employed by the government."

The willingness of this group to cooperate and assist the WD in the reparations problem outlined in the aide memoire I feel represents a very definite step toward obtaining the expert assistance and guidance needed to vitalize the Japanese reparations program. In order to be in a position to implement the WD side of this agreement, I plan to request the President through Mr. Pauley to authorize the WD in this case to draw a

36646

ROUTINE
Secret
-2-

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret

ROUTINE

FROM: WASH (FROM PETERSON) NR: W 86512 28 Nov 46 CONT'D

general form of contract to cover the services of the forms recommended for the job by the group of consultants. I feel that only in this way can the WD acquire the services of the experts in this field and thereby promptly and efficiently approach a solution.

Around the first of the year, it is believed Strike, Coffman and Perry will agree to proceed to Japan to familiarize themselves to the greatest extent possible with the problems from that side. They will then return and implement an agreed-upon program. Because of the willingness of this group to cooperate with the WD, the Secretary of War is retaining all members of the group as consultants without compensation to act through the entire program as advisors and to meet on call of the Secretary in Washington at such times as it is deemed necessary. I will continue to keep you advised.

NO SIG

ACTION: DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF SCAP

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-4, AG, GOVT SECT, ECON & SCI SECT, CIV PROP CUST

36646 ROUTINE Secret -3- TOO : 272331 Z MCN : SA 83/28

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RLJ
vrb

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
ROUTINE

FROM : WASHINGTON (WDGID)

TO : CINCAFPAC, USFET, NANKING HQ COMD, HQ CARIB DEF COMD C.Z., CG US FORCES VIENNA, HQ ALASKAN COMD, CG AFWESPAC, HQ PANAMA CANAL DEPT C.Z., CG AFMIDPAC, PEIPING, CG TRIN PORT OF SPAIN, CG GROUND FT MONROE, CG 1ST ARMY, CG 2ND ARMY, CG 7TH ARMY, CG 4TH ARMY, CG 5TH ARMY, CG 6TH ARMY, SAN JUAN PUERTO RICO

NR : WX 86309 (DRAA 967 WEDWORSIT)

Several prominent (Western Europe) Spanish generals reportedly negotiating formation committee to demand Franco to monarchical restoration. Republicans reportedly pledged silent co-operation. Comment: Coup possible but not expected.

British Empire: In Commons 18 Nov left wing laborite amendment urging independent Socialist foreign policy defeated 353 to nothing. Conservatives supported labor government in opposing amendment but approximately 100 labor members abstained voting. House also defeated left wing labor amendment opposing peacetime conscription 320 to 53 with many abstentions. Comment: Government hoping overwhelming vote confidence in Bevins policies greatly disappointed. Anticipate influence government policies by laborites and widespread public questioning of wisdom tying British foreign policy too closely with American.

British War Secretary Bellenger recently announced details plan reestablishment territorial Army early 1947. Proposed is well balanced force including 2 armored and 6 infantry divisions and airborne division

35856

ROUTINE
Secret
-1-

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COPY NO. 45

092

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DECLASSIFIED PUBLIC LAW 105-153 SEC. 3(b)(2) AND 3(b)(3) OR (E) NNDB # 779012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED 28 NOV 1946

Secret
ROUTINE

WASHINGTON MSG NBR WX 86309 OF 27 NOV 46 CONTINUED:

headquarters. Comment: British War Office considers plan adequate postwar requirements. Parliamentary approval complete plan anticipated.

Far Eastern: China: Nationalist offensive actions mob element defy cease fire order. Communists continue harassing actions on line of communications.

Scientific: Doctor Max Kramer inventor and builder of high angle guided bombs resembling our Raxon bomb recently arrived United States employed government contract. Kramer previously technical director French Guided Missile Research Center predicts French developments fruitless several years. Comment: Transfer resulted from dissatisfaction French research techniques, scarcity funds and French under estimates project importance.

NO SIG

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, G-3, AG, GOVT SECT

35856

ROUTINE
Secret

TOO: 260006 Z
MCN: YA 57/26

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COPY NO.

AUTHORITY NND 773012 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(J) OR (E) NND,

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INCOMING MESSAGE



Secret
ROUTINE

FROM : WASHINGTON (WDSCA ES)

TO : CINCAFPAC

NR : W 86354

Reurad Oct C 66710, Aug C 64433, ourad Oct W 84255, Nov W 84686 . State apl of British proposal was fwd by ourad Oct. Your proposal to ship UK 1,000 bales silk plus 200 cases odd lots in immediate future has our full apl. See also ourad Nov.

2. View present limitations capacity US silk industry to process as much raw silk as US entitled to receive of current availabilities under quota plan recommend immediate suspension quotas time being.

3. Unless you perceive objection, inform governmental purchasing missions accredited SCAP quotas suspended and for time being at least they may procure their full requirements without restriction as to grades or deniers at prices based on average prices obtained NY auction. To protect position believe necessary to insist govts take delivery shortest practicable period after acceptance order by SCAP.

4. US advising Inter Allied Trade Board quota plan has been suspended at least until such time as supply deemed less than requirements. US also proposing to trade board that beginning some future date yet determined all silk be sold in NY at auctions conducted under USCC auspices. This proposal contemplates sale of silk located in Japan for delivery in Japan or later delivery in US as well as sale of silk in US. Also contemplates sales in Sterlung and other acceptable

36019 ROUTINE
Secret

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COPY NO. 48

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AUTHORITY FOR DOWNGRADING SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NMCR # 77012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED 28 NOV 1946

Secret
ROUTINE

WASHINGTON MSG NBR W 86354 OF 27 NOV 46 CONTINUED:

(1.e convertible) currencies as well as dollars. Full details US proposal as presented trade board will be forwarded for your consideration and comment. Pending receipt your reaction and trade board recommendation, several weeks at least, we recommend you continue to arrange spot sales to govt having purchasing missions in Tokyo.

5. British proposal for pricing and pmt after arrival and inspection in UK outlined ourad Oct para 3. Believe here British could make good case for your acceptance this proposal. Should be possible and probably desirable to agree on maximum time which could elapse between date shmpt and dates pricing and pmt. That this time lapse should be left your judgement and negotiation with British.

6. Have considered further urad Aug which we now understand proposed in effect that silk prices FOB Jap port be determined by discounting NY prices not only to allow for (A) freight and insurance, but also for (B) other actual expenses to recipient govts of storage, testing and marketing silk, (C) length of time after shmpt before proceeds of sale are avail for SCAP use (D) tendency of Japanese to overgrade, and (E) USCC's 3 percent commission. We believe in interest of equitable relationship prices. For raw silk by silk industry in various countries item (E) above should be disregarded. Item (D) should be disregarded on grounds existence such tendency not fully established. Item (C) should be disregarded except to extent recipient govts are given privilege of deferring pmt to SCAP for

36019
EAD circulate File

ROUTINE
Secret

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COPY NO.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDS # 775012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED 28 NOV 1946

Secret
ROUTINE

WASHINGTON MSG NBR W 86354 OF 27 NOV 46 CONTINUED:

approximate length of time they require to obtain pmt from their silk industry. Allowance of discount for expenses actually incurred by recipient govts, item (B), appears fully justified. However, we leave to your discretion question whether allowable discount should be predetermined by agreement with British in Tokyo or determined after UK Govt knows exactly what these charges will be. Allowances for freight and insurance should be based on current costs these items rather than fixed percentage. Freight on silk from Jap port to warehouses in US now approximately 8165 per 100 pounds. Marine and war risk insurance 70 cents per 100 dollars valuation.

7. Para 2 our Oct was not meant to imply objection to shpmts to UK via Canada. We assume UK Liaison Mission has instructions or authority from London to arrange shipping.

8. Acceptance by you of British proposal for pmt after silk arrives in UK and on basis Heath grading may appear to Australians to be unfair to them. However, if such objection develop terms of future sales to Australia can be reconsidered if necessary to bring them into line.

NO SIG

ACTION: ECON & SCI SECT

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, G-4, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

36019 ROUTINE Secret TOO: 261809 Z MCN: YA 10/27

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AUTHORITY FOR DOWNGRADING AND/OR TRUSE SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 779012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

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INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED 28 NOV 1946

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

27 Nov 46

FROM : CG 24TH CORPS (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON)

TO : SCAP (PASS TO STATE DEPT)

NR : TFPOL 51 (THIS IS POLAD SEOULS NBR 139 TO STATE)

Subj is Syngan Rhee and references are Depts 150 and 147 Nov 22 and 8 respectively.

Anticipated in my 131 of Nov 4 Dr Rhee has decided to return to US and will probably sail from Inchon about Dec 1. Particulars and date arrival will be furnished Dept as soon as known.

On Nov 22 Rhee announced that purpose of his return was to handle Korean question in UNO Assembly, and local press, both Right and Left, is apprehensive as to how he will handle it. So are we. Although we recognize that discussion of the Korean problem in the assembly is desirable, since it will focus world attention on the unhappy position of the Korean people caused by the prolonged division of their country and may mobilize world sympathy for them for whatever it may be worth to the Soviets, we do not believe Rhee veiws the discussion in the same light. We suspect he intends to use it to denounce the Soviet and praise the American occupation and plead for nullification of the Moscow agreement and for immediate independence. As the Soviets may still believe Rhee to be our puppet, they may conceivably confuse Rhees pleading with American policy, to the detriment and delay of the joint solution of the problem. The

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COPY NO. 32

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NND # 779012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM:CG 24TH CORPS (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON), NR:TFPOL 51 (THIS IS POLAD SEOULS NBR 139 TO STATE, 27 NOV 46, CONT'D

Dept may therefore wish to follow this matter closely so that if Rhee gets out of hand in the assembly it may appropriately dissociate the US Govt with any movement to set aside the Moscow decision or to obtain recognition of a separate South Korean Govt.

Depts 7129 Sept 23 mentioned in Serial 150 has not been received or identified and we would be interested in its contents.

HODGE

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-2, AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to WAR (STATE DEPT) for info.

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36175 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY Secret -2- TOO: 270511 Z MCN: TJC 38/27

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNCC # 779012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

25 Nov 46

RECEIVED 26 NOV 1946

FROM : HQ 24 CORPS (HODGE)

TO : CINCAFPAC (GEN MACARTHUR)

NR : TFGCG 538

In order to meet the local political situation and in one final attempt to save the coalition effort in Korea, I have this date ordered that elections be held over in 2 areas, namely Seoul and Kangwon Do Province. Although investigation shows few, if any, more factual discrepencies than existed in provinces that were cleared by the coalition committee, I feel that such action may possibly help to clear the atmosphere and give a better send-off for the legislative assembly. It is still uncertain that any leftists will agree to serve in legislature, even with this concession. If this move fails I see no future in coalition attempts. Recent activities are confirming my belief that the leftist group here constitutes a noisy professional minority under complete control of the Communists and that there is no means of cooperation.

HODGE

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

35146

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY TOO: 250820
Secret MCN: TJC 63/25

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(J) OR (E) NNDB # 775012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

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RECEIVED
25 NOV 1946

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

24 Nov 46

FROM : CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON)

TO : SCAP (PASS TO STATE DEPT)

NR : TFGBI 526 (THIS IS POLADSEOULS NO 137 TO STATE)

"Summary conditions Korea November 1 through 15.

1. Political. Mob attacks against police stations occurred chiefly in South Cholla Province, all of which on November 4 involved first instance of organized attack on US Troops. Approximately 25 attacks were reported in period and estimated casualties listed as rioters, 25 killed, 18 wounded; police 7 killed, 23 wounded. That these attacks were planned is indicated by the fact that on 11 November police stations in 6 towns inside radius of 10 miles were attacked within ½ hours time. Four instances of sabotage to US Military Communications were reported. An unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Seoul Police Chief was made by Leftists. Four hundred prisoners escaped Chonju jail November 11, over 170 of whom are now recaptured.

The joint American-Korean conference to investigate the causes of the disorders and to make remedial recommendations continued its meetings, covering in the period the Korean charges of abuse by, and undesirable Korean elements within the police and Military Government.

General Hodge has not confirmed for office the successful candidates in the October elections for the Interim Legislature, it being necessary first to investigate the accusations of unfairness in the elections. Also he has not received the Coalition Committe's recommendations for appointed members.

34939

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
Secret
-1-

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COPY NO. 29

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED
25 NOV 1946

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON) NR: TFGBI 526
(THIS IS POLAD SEOULS NO 137 TO STATE) 24 NOV 46 CONT'D

The Committee's failure so far to recommend is related to its formal request on November 4, in which Lyuh seems more insistent than Doctor Kang, for new elections throughout the zone or in certain Provinces. Moderate Leftist dissappointment with the election and with the fact that some alleged "Pro-Japanese" sold seats and knowledge that overall re-elections will probably not be held (due in part to the urgency of convening this initial assembly which is required by Ordinance immediately to enact a law replacing itself by more representative assembly) have been tempered by the renewed hope of a reconvening of the Russo-American Commission aroused by public announcement concerning General Hodge and Soviet Commander. In addition, General Hodge's statement of November 7 explaining the American position on Korean trusteeship and independence was received favorably by the majority of political parties. In Assembly favorable action on Louise Sims proposal on Korean independence received wide publicity and contributed to enhancement of Rightist Party and general feeling of hopefulness.

At the first executive meeting on November 12 of the Socialist Labor Party (Merger of moderate and Nationalist Leftists in the 3 Leftist Parties) chairman Lyuh Woon Huung avocated its unconditional merger with the South Korea Labor Party) composed of radical elements of left (with the understanding this united group would support the Coalition Committee to which Lyuh seems definitely committed. Doctor Paik, Anm Un and Kang Jin, the chairman respectively of the New Democratic and Nationalist Communist Parties in the former Democratic Peoples front, returned from Pyongyang with apparent approval to support Lyuh and the Coalition.

34939

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
Secret

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED
25 NOV 1946

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON) NR: TFGBI 526
(THIS IS POIAD SEOULS NO 137 TO STATE) 24 NOV 46 CONT'D

2. North Korea. Results of election held in gala atmosphere on November 3 of candidates for provincial and municipal Peoples Committees showed large victories for Kim Il Sawng and his regime. Radio broadcast from North Korea stated that 96 per cent of over 4,000,000 registed voters voted 99 per cent for the recommended candidates. Electoral procedure allowed only political parties registerd with Interim Peoples Committee to recommend candidates and provided for no choice by electorate other than negative or affirmative vote by ballot for sponsored candidates. In post-elections radio broadcast, Kim Il Sawng praised the power of their Army and implied that it was instrumental in his victory. Another occasion of much festivity was celebration on November 7 of anniversary of Russian Revolution, the expected repercussion of which failed to materialize in South Korea although information of press caused police and US Troops to be alerted.

The liquidation of Soviet Adminstrative control is proceeding rapidly, it being replaced by Korean administration, although political guidance is still active.

1,500 Chinese 8th Route Arms Troops are reported to have retreated to Hwanghae Province after defeat in Mukden Area.

3. Military Government and Economic. The food ration in Seoul for period November 6 to 16 was 60 grams flour, 1/2 hop of wheat and 1/3 of rice or barley. In view of the delay in convening the Interim Legislature, General Lerch announced on November 5 that his original plan that the Legislature should decide whether or not there should be free market in Korea cannot now be effected in that present rice purchase-collection plan must be applied to this year's harvest.

34939

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Handling and transmission of literal plaintext of this message as correspondence of the same classification has been authorized by the War Department in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 16-C, 18-E, 53-A, 53-D (1) (2) (3), and 60-A (1) (2) (3) (4), AR 380-5, 6 March 1946.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
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INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED
25 NOV 1946

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: CG USAFIK (HODGE SENDS FOR LANGDON) NR: TFGBI 526
(THIS IS POLAD SEOULS NO 137 TO STATE) 24 NOV 46 CONT'D

Limited press comment indicates that a free market in rice is preferred to government plan, the fear being expressed that any distribution and rationing system will not be effective. Order effective November first prohibiting manufacture of alcoholic beverages from rice with view to conservation of rice has received unfavorable criticism by Koreans.

In effort to expedite turning over actual government administration to Koreans, thereby leaving American in advisory positions, Mil Govt has begun to move all American personnel from Main National Capitol to new offices in adjacent annex, the completion of this move being planned for end of December.

On 14 November 44 US Coast Guard cutters were commissioned into Korean Coast Guard, thereby increasing its total ships to 20. 76 vessels have been impounded since Coast Guard was organized one year ago.

Department of Education announced it has issued to date nearly 6,000,000 books to schools. American books were translated because Japanese books were unsuited and Korean legends too adult for children.

French corvette, Tonkinois, Ballevau at Inchon November 12 bringing 3 French officials for survey French interest and preparation reopening of Consulate.

NO SIG

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to Washington (State Dept).

34939 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY TOO: 230340 Z
Secret MCN: ZUI 18/24

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN EXCEPTIONS TO PARAGRAPH 3 EXECUTIVE ORDER 10501 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NMCC * 179012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

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INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED
25 NOV 1946

UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY

24 Nov 46

FROM : WAR

TO : CINCAFPAC (PERSONAL TO MACARTHUR AND HODGE) (PASS TO CG USAFIK)

NR : WCL 31993

Only pertinent press material single editorial in Baltimore Sun this date commenting on statement by Professor Robert Oliver, Syracuse University, recently returned from survey of Korean conditions. After reviewing Yalta Agreement and the resultant 38th Parallel Div which has split the country into 2 airtight compartments," editorial continues: "The results are pointed out by Professor Oliver, who has seen them. The basis for the throttling of Korean recovery, he writes, is in the fact that industry, mines and hydroelectric power are concentrated in the Russian held area, while the agriculture is in the American Zone. With that artery of trade completely cut, the country has no chance economically. People in Northern Korea get insufficient food while those in the Southern section find no consumer goods on the market. The inevitable result is inflation which is growing beyond reason. Unemployment is high. Even the avenue of relief by imports is cut off by the policy of military occupation.

Meanwhile, Professor Oliver finds, the Russians are engaged in stamping out Nationalism in their zone and promoting the interests of the Communist Party, thereby directing any emergence of political feeling and responsibility into their own channels. He deplores the lack of a definite policy on the part of this country toward the development of Korean Independence politically. It is his

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 947012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
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RECEIVED
25 NOV 1946
RECEIVED
25 NOV

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY

FROM : WAR NR: WCL 31993 24 NOV 46 CONTINUED

contention that we should disband our Military Government in Korea, leave troops there as 'a bar to further Russian aggression,' make every effort to force Russia to withdraw from Northern Korea, and give such material aid to the country that it can have a chance to establish itself.

There are certain practical obstacles in the way of Professor Olivers plan. One is the extreme improbability of getting Russia to withdraw. Another is based on the fact that Korea lived under the heavy hand of Japanese domination for 35 years. In such circumstances, it takes time to develop the vigorous political institutions which are the essential basis of responsible self government. The fact remains that Korea is the Cinderella of World War II, and that our efforts in her behalf, so far, have been nothing to be proud of."

PARKS

INFORMATION : COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG. PUB REL OFF, GOVT SECT, CIV I & E OFF, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE : This msg has been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to CG USAFIK (Personal to HODGE) for Info.

34805

PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED
-2-

TOO : 231848 Z
MCN : SA 92/23

DECLASSIFIED AND ENTRY #1092 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(J) OR (K) NNDS # 775012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER



INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
ROUTINE

24 Nov 46

FROM : WAR (STATE DEPT)

TO : CINCAFPAC (FOR POL ADVISOR)

INFO : WAR DEPT C/S

NR : W SVC 7306 (STATE SERIAL 580 NOV 22, 7 PM)

Following Aide-Memoire Nov 21 handed (urtel 492 Oct 29) DR. Tan Shao-Hwa Minister Counselor Chinese Emb who stated he would communicate contents his Govt.

"Reference is made to a recent oral inquiry by a member of the staff of the Chinese Emb concerning the status of Taiwanese in Japan, and the related question of their exemption, as United Nations Nationals, from the jurisdiction of Japanese police and, in criminal cases, from the jurisdiction of Japanese courts. In this connection, it is understood that the Chinese Govt now considers all Taiwanese to be Chinese, excepting only those who have executed before the proper authorities a declaration of unwillingness to acquire Chinese nationality.

"It is the view of the Dept that the removal of United Nations Nationals from the jurisdiction of Japanese police and courts was a measure designed primarily to facilitate the work of the occupation authorities

34768

ROUTINE
Restricted
-1-

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DECLASSIFIED AUTH: NARA DATE 2-28-74 PER E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDS # 779012

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED
25 NOV 1946

Restricted
ROUTINE

FROM: WAR (STATE DEPT) NR: W SVC 7306 (STATE SERIAL 580 NOV 22, 7 PM 24 NOV 46 (CONT)

and to safeguard occupation personnel. Americans and most other nationals of members of the United Nations who are not engaged in occupational duties have in general been repatriated from Japan, and there do not exist there the facilities which would be necessary for properly maintaining order and administering justice were the privilege of exemption from Japanese jurisdiction to be extended to a large community of persons for whom it was not intended. In particular, it is considered that exemption from Japanese jurisdiction was not intended to be accorded the estimated 20,000 persons in Japan claiming to be Taiwanese; these persons throughout the war were enemy nationals and according to Japanese law still retain Japanese nationality, excepting only those who have individually divested themselves thereof in accordance with established procedure.

" The rights of the Taiwanese in Japan to this special treatment therefore would appear to rest upon the technical grounds of the extension to them under Chinese law of the status of Chinese Nationals. It should, however, be pointed out from the legal standpoint the transfer of Taiwanese Sovereignty remains to be formalized; assurably a treaty of cession will in due time be negotiated which will effect such transfer

34768

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COPY NO.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED
25 NOV 1946

Restricted
ROUTINE

FROM: WAR (STATE DEPT) NR: W SVC 7306 STATE SERIAL 580 NOV 22, 7 PM 24 NOV 46 (CONT)

and which may contain provisions in regard to appropriate change in the national status of Taiwanese residents. It is, of course, not now possible to state with certainty that the terms of such a treaty will effect a change in the national status of persons of Taiwanese derivation who have abandoned their Taiwanese residence and settled in other lands. Finally, it should be pointed out that a great proportion of the alleged Taiwanese in Japan are without Chinese certificates of identity and nationality.

"In this connection, it would be most helpful if Chinese authorities would undertake to screen all Taiwanese in Japan, repatriating those who are unable to establish that they have a legitimate means of livelihood and issuing suitable certificates of identity to the remainder. Should the number of individuals in Japan now claiming a special status as Taiwanese be reduced through such a process to a relatively small body of properly investigated and documented persons, it might be possible to extend to them the special treatment which now is claimed for them. In the meantime, this Govt would be disposed to hold that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, on the basis of the aforementioned considerations and on the grounds of Military necessity, would be justified

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED
25 NOV 1946

Restricted
ROUTINE

FROM: WAR (STATE DEPT) NR: W SVC 7306 (STATE SERIAL 530 NOV 22, 7 PM) 24 NOV 46 (CONT)

in authorizing the Japanese police and courts to continue to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwanese in Japan."

ACHESON

ACTION : DIPLOMATIC SECT

INFORMATION : COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-2, AG, PROVOST MARSHAL, GOVT SECT, LEGAL SECT, CIV PROP CUST

34768

ROUTINE
Restricted
-4-

TOO: 230849 Z
MCN: USF 74/23

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED 24 NOV 1946

Secret
URGENT

FROM : CG USAFIK, NR : TFYMG 3146, 23 NOV 46, CONT'D

(3) Koreans who claim residence in North Korea have not been given opportunity to repatriate. Will those Koreans be considered as retaining their Japanese nationality after 15 Dec under announced policy?

(4) Based on strong protests and representation already made, it is the opinion of this Hqs that violent repercussion to announced policy will be forthcoming both in Japan and Korea following more complete dissemination of this news to the masses and to political groups. Korean leaders and groups inimical to American authorities in South Korea will use this announcement to make it appear to Koreans both here and in Japan that the Americans have betrayed them.

(5) Furthermore, this policy raises numerous legal questions as to whether or not Korean owned property and assets in Japan become in fact Japanese and THUXG subj to the same directive as apply to properties and assets owned by Japanese, ABFEU conquered people.

In view of the above, this Hqs believes it urgently expedient to reconsider this matter and revise announced policy to better facilitate the aims of the American occupation of South Korea. Suggested approach to problem would be to regard Koreans in Japan as friendly nationals pending the establishment of a sovereign Korean state, at which time those Koreans in Japan would be given their choice of accepting Korean or Japanese citizenship. If announced policy stands, request immediate clarification and statement of basis as well as enumeration of practical objectives, AIRKS expected to accomplish, for release to the Korean press. Please advise earliest.

NO SIG

34657

URGENT
Secret
-2-

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RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
URGENT

FROM : CG USAFIK, NR : TFYMG 3146, 23 NOV 46, CONT'D



ACTION: GOVT SECT

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-2, G-3, AG, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: Service has been requested for correction of underscored portion.

34657

URGENT
Secret
-3-

TOO: 230405 Z
MCN: TJC 23/23

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INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED
24 NOV 1946

Restricted
PRIORITY

23 Nov 46

FROM : CG USAFIK

TO : CINCAFPAC (PASS TO WAR G-2 FOR PASSING TO STATE DEPT WITH INFO COPY TO US EMBASSY MOSCOW)

NR : TFGBI 523

Cite W 86548 DTG 022003/Z May. Korean press analysis for period 111800 to 171800 Nov. Attention of the press again turned to the complex Koreanpolitical scene as new parties came into existence, old parties reorganized, and political leaders issued statements on many subjects. Cha Yoo Shinmun (Korean free press-text) 12 Nov and Hansung Ilbo (Seoul daily-right) 13 Nov commented on the division in the Leftist parties as Kyenghyang Shinmun (urban and rural news-right) 14 Nov reported the first executive committee meeting of the Socialist Labor Party in which Lyuh, Woon Hyung requested unconditional merger with the South Korean Labor Party in an attempt to include the radical Leftists with the more moderate members of his group. Dong A Ilbo (Oriental daily news-right) 13 Nov reported approximately 7 Rightist women's organizations will merge into the General Women's Association and Doklip Sinbo (independence news-left) 15 Nov reported the start of a political party headed by Kim, Kyu Sik, tentatively named the Alliance of Fighters for Independence. Dong A Ilbo 16 Nov announced the opening of the school for Korean National Young Men's Association at Su Won which will train 200 young men

34530

PRIORITY
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COPY NO.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
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INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED 24 NOV 1946

Restricted
PRIORITY

FROM : CG USAFIK NR : TFGBI 523 23 NOV 46 CONT'D

from different localities to be party leaders. The first anniversary celebration of the Seoul Branch of the Chosun Democratic Party, headed nationally by Cho, Man Sik, was reported 14 Nov in Dai Fong Shinmun (Great Eastern News-extreme right). Kyeng Hyang Shinmun 16 Nov reported a movement begun by the Socialist Democratic, Socialist Labor, and Young Friends Parties to organize mass people's meetings all over South Korea and a demonstration to accelerate the resumption of the USC-Soviet Joint Commission meetings. Comments on the legislative body continued as Cha Yoo Shinmun 15 Nov announced that the Military Govt would announce the names of the 45 members to be appointed on 20 Nov and that the body would convene 28 Nov. Doklip Sinbo 15 Nov printed the Socialist Democratic Party's demand for a reelection and Cha Yoo Shinmun same day printed General Hodge's reply to Kim, Kyu Sik's request for a reelection which stated that an answer would be given after the results of the present investigation of the election were known.

The Han Sung Ilbo annouuncement 12 Nov that the US-USSR meeting on disposition of Japanese property in Korea was progressing arcused many protests as Dong A Ilbo 13 Nov printed the Korean Independence Party and General Unification Hqs statements that Japanese gains in Korea were the result of Korean blood and toil and belonged to Korea. Kyeng Hyang Shinmun report 14 Nov on Pauley's statement concerning the possibility of America representing Korea in any reparation conference

34530

PRIORITY
Restricted
-2-

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INCOMING MESSAGE

RECEIVED 24 NOV 1946

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PRIORITY

in order to insure Korea's securing some material benefit from Japan was received gratefully according to editorials same day in Chosun Ilbo (Korean daily news-right) and FCI-Hon Dok-Rip Shinmun (Great Korean Independence Press-right).

Internal disturbances included the escape of 400 prisoners from Ahonju prison reported in Han Sung Ilbo 13 Nov, the attempt on the life of police chief Chang, Taik Sang by 2 MT with hand grenades, resulting in head injuries and death of his driver reported in Kyeng Hyang Shinmun 14 Nov, and attacks on the police near the border by armed groups who escaped across the border, were disarmed and returned as being Rhee, Syng Man and Kim Koo men as reported in Han Sung Ilbo 12 Nov.

General news included reports in all newspapers of General Lerch going to Tokyo for an operation 15 Nov and General Hodge returning from Tokyo same day. Cha Yoo Shinmun 15 Nov reported a train accident at Aong Dong Po 13 Nov in which 41 persons lost their lives and 67 were injured. Doklip Sinbo reported 14 Nov a head-on collision between 2 engines at Taejon, no deaths or injuries. Han Sung Ilbo commented favorably 13 Nov on Wellington Koo's speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations stating that Korean rehabilitation presented one of the most urgent problems in Asia.

NO SIG

34530

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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PRIORITY



FROM : CG USAFIK NR : TFGBI 523 23 NOV 46 CONT'D

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG, GOVT SECT, STAT & RPTS SECT, ECON & SCI SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT, CIV PROP CUST

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to WAR G-2 (FOR PASSING TO STATE DEPT WITH INFO COPY TO US EMBASSY MOSCOW).

34530 PRIORITY Restricted TOO : 211000 Z MCN : TJC 3/23

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted

ROUTINE

23 Nov 46

FROM : WAR (WDSCA ES)

TO : CINCAFPAC

NR : W 86130

RECEIVED 24 NOV 1946

Re Atcheson airgram A 89 Oct 8, 46. Tariff concessions granted under Trade Agreements Act are currently extended by US to imports from all countries, including Japan. US presumably will continue to grant most-favored-nation treatment to Japanese products for duration of occupation since Japanese commercial policy during occupation period is guided primarily by terms of US economic directives. So long as occupation of Japan imposes financial burden upon US, failure to grant most-favored-nation treatment to Japanese products might reduce proceeds from exports and hence increase burden of occupation.

At end of occupation, or at such time as Japan might be declared eligible for membership in proposed International Trade Orgn, question may have to be reconsidered. Meantime, State Dept is disposed to advocate granting by all countries of most-favored-nation treatment to Japanese exports including tariff and other concessions made pursuant to proposed International Conference on trade and employment to be held in 47.

This matter may be considered further in light of discussions at current meeting in London of Preparatory Committee for International Trade Conference. For your info copy of "Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization" and related documents being fwd under separate cover.

NO SIG

34300

ROUTINE

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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ROUTINE

FROM : WAR (WDSCA ES), NR: W 86130, DTD 23 NOV 46 CONT'D



ACTION: ECON & SCI SECT

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

34300

ROUTINE
Distributed
-2-

TOO : 221747 Z
MCN : YB 106/22

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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ROUTINE



FROM : WAR (WDSCA ES)

TO : CINCAFPAC

NR : WAR 86044

Assets of Imperial household, Japanese Emperor and members of Imperial family is subj.
Request fol info.
1. By what standards will Japanese Govt decide whether assets are property Imperial household or pers property Emperor, and other members Imperial family?
2. If decision has been made, what is nature and estimated valuation property owned personally by (a) Emperor, (b) other members Imperial family, and (c) property Imperial household?
3. In this connection request immediate airmail copy draft proposed "Imperial Household Intendance Law" and "Imperial House Law".

NO SIG

ACTION: GOVT SECT

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, AG, CIV PROP CUST

33883 ROUTINE Restricted TOO: 212031 Z MCN: ZUI 9/22

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
PRIORITY



FROM : WASHINGTON (WDSCA ES)

TO : CINCAFPAC (PASS TO CG USAFIK FOR ACTION)

NR : W 85883

Reurad TFYMG 2731. Radio in 2 parts.

Part 1. Exploratory inquiries indicate procurement new series Bank Chosen Currency in quantity and denominations requested will cost about $700,000. After date apl, estimated time required for printing is 6 to 7 months.

Before final action consider necessary to secure decision from State Dept on proposed conversion South Korea since exercise such basic Govt function may suggest to Koreans and world that US committed to two Koreas.

In order that Govt agencies here may consider your currency and general inflationary problem and its solution on basis full info, request your comment soonest on following:

1. In view time required for new currency and actual conversion, police measures are contemplated by you to curb menace of counterfeiting and illegal importation present currency. Also what add measures to control inflationary pressures and check commodity hoarding during interim period resulting from possible Korean awareness of pending conversion?

2. Is a distinct South Korea currency contemplated with appropriate markings to identify it as such, or is a currency appropriate for possible later use for all of Korea under consideration?

3. After conversion Chosen notes in South Korea, do you intend to declare old Chosen notes non-legal tender in South Korea? If so, do you contemplate giving compensation to holders Chosen notes outside South Korea?

33473

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
PRIORITY

FROM: WASH NR: W 85883 DTD: 21 NOV 46 CONTD

4. Based on your experience in screening deposits Bank Japan Currency in connection with conversion of that currency, do you consider screening large holdings Bank Chosen Currency for purpose detecting illegal acquisition practicable from administrative viewpoint?

5. Do you consider feasible blocking large holdings Bank Chosen Currency for any substantial period pending investigation of source, inasmuch as no general program similar to Japanese is contemplated. What would be attitude of Koreans towards such controls imposed by you?

6. In view of proposal to continue use of old notes of 1 to 5 yen denominations, have you considered possibility such notes may be horded for cloaking illegally acquired holdings, or that persons may acquire them to evade blocking measures, thus resulting in a shortage such notes for trade purposes during conversion period?

7. What is your estimate of:

A. Bank Chosen Currency in circulation North Korea and other areas outside South Korea?

B. Bank Chosen Currency taken up in exchange for other currency in North Korea? Request any available info respect to status holders Bank of Chosen Currency in North Korea, and extent to which conversion Chosen Currency to other currencies has already been effected in North Korea.

Part 2. Would appreciate your comments on imposition of a graduated tax simultaneously with currency conversion, and conversion other than on a 1 to 1 basis

33473

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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
PRIORITY

FROM: WASH NR: W 85853 DTD: 21 NOV 46 CONT'D

as possible anti-inflation measures. To what extent is rapid increase in currency circulation attributable to:

A. Deficit financing of Govt expenditures?
B. Withdrawals from bank deposits?

If not already prepared suggest steps be taken by you toward formulation comprehensive plan for economic stabilization of South Korea. Would appreciate transmittal such plan to Washington as well as your full views on foregoing, including political effects on South Koreans of proposed currency conversion in South Korea; and views of POLAD and Bunce. Nothing further.

NO SIG

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4, AG, FISC DIR, GOVT SECT, ECON & SCI SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to CG XXIV CORPS for Action.

NOTE: Delay due to service.

33473

PRIORITY
Secret
-3-

TOO: 200125
MCN: YA 76-20

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
PRIORITY



FROM : WAR (WDSCA ES)

TO : CINCAFPAC (PASS TO CG USAFIK)

NR : W 85961

Reourads Oct W 84396, Nov W 84690 and Nov W 85009. Disposal of Japanese property in Korea is subj. Request date on which your comments on proposed policy regarding subj will be available here.

NO SIG

INFORMATION : COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4, AG, GOVT SECT, ECON & SCI SECT, LEGAL SECT, CIV PROP CUST

NOTE : This msg has been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to CG USAFIK for Action.

33399

PRIORITY
Secret

TOO: 202304 Z
MCN: YFA 19/21

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COPY NO. 13

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386

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY 20 Nov 46

FROM : CG 24TH CORPS

TO : CINCAFPAC

INFO : CG 8TH ARMY

NR : TFGCG 532

Info brought back by our Liaison Officer is that there is considerable reluctance on the part of higher Hqs to approve development project 24 Ord-1- Dev for 1444 vehicles which was submitted by letter this Hqs dtd 16 Oct 46. It appears that this reluctance is based on an assumption that 1444 vehicles are essentially for civilian supply. This Hqs wishes to point out that these vehicles are not for Korean civilian supply except insofar as they might be used to prevent, mitigate, terminate quickly, civilian disease and unrest. We must appreciate that in Korea, civilian disease and unrest resulting from any cause will not only endanger the occupation mission in itself, but will be utilized by certain elements to attack the desirability and the practicability, of the entire American occupation of Korea. This Hqs considers that it is essential that the CG USAFIK have at his immediate disposal a pool of vehicles in Korea, not to expand the efforts of civilian supply but to be equipped with the means to prevent, as far as transportation is a factor, either incipient or actual disease and unrest. Up to the moment it has been possible generally to furnish these vehicles from stocks available in Korea which have been held against the

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COPY NO. 18

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG 24TH CORPS NR: TFGCG 532 20 NOV 46 CONTINUED

30 June 1949 disposition level. Due to issue of considerable nbrs of these vehicles against proposed equipment modification lists, normal replacements, and such unforseen circumstances such as our attempt to carry through successfully a rice collection program and the recent Taigu riots and other unrest throughout Korea, this stock of vehicles is nearing depletion. Therefore it is considered essential to the successful occupation of Korea that development project XXIV Ord-1-Dev be approved with a strong forwarding recommendation to the WD. This Hqs wishes to point out that every indication is that non-favorable consideration will at some future date result in our having to call on 8th Army for considerable nbrs of vehicles it is assumed at the time that the shipment of these vehicles will be justified fully, but the time LC inherent in the shipment of vehicles from Japan to Korea may in our opinion jeopardize seriously our whole occupation mission.

NO SIG

ACTION: G-4

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, AG, ORD OFF, GOVT SECT

32980

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
Secret
-2-

TOO : 200225 Z
MCN : TJC 39/20

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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ROUTINE 20 Nov 46



FROM : CG USAFIK

TO : SCAP

NR : TFYMG 310

Reurad 150901 Z, subj: Repatriation. Of a conducting survey to determine nbr of Chinese still desiring repatriation. Most Japanese in South Korea are performing essential work previously requested by Military Government and have been authorized to remain pending completion of their essential duties. Account fact all subj personnel are scattered throughout provinces, completion of survey will require approximately 3 weeks at which time shipping requirements for additional Chinese and Japanese repatriation will be dispatched.

NO SIG

ACTION: G-3

INFORMATION: G-1, AG, GOVT SECT, COMNAVJAP, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: Ref 150901 Z is Z 24848 (G-3).

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ROUTINE
Restricted

TOO: 200247 Z
MCN: TJC-A 78/20

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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Good Send

18 Nov 46

FROM : WSD

TO : CINCAFPAC (PASS TO CG 24TH CORPS)

INFO : WARCOS (POLAD)

NR : STATE SERIAL 4167, Nov 17

Relay from Moscow.

Pravda Nov 16 carries article by Smolenski "Situation in Korea" containing 1st comprehensive statement by Soviet Press on developments in Korea. Full summary follows:

"First it should be noted that primary task set by Moscow Conference on Korean question, task of creating provisional Korean Democratic Govt still remains unresolved. Representatives of USA in Joint Soviet American Commission established to fulfill this task has displayed tendency to complicate negotiations to delay creating of Provisional Korean Govt and to substitute for this major task, question of 'Unifying' economy of all Korea under leadership of American Administration. American Delegation displayed particular interest in seeing to it that reactionary leaders opposing Moscow Decision should be guaranteed supremacy in future Korean Govt. Delegates of USA sought to limit rights of large Democratic Parties and public organizations which sincerely supported Moscow Decision. Soviet Delegation in Joint Commission decisively rejected attempts to violate spirit and letter of Moscow Decision. American Delegation which was convinced of necessity for imposing its viewpoint on Soviet Delegation and for achieving revision of Moscow Decisions repeatedly during discussions threatened rupture of negotiations and proposed suspending work of Joint Commission."

"General Hodge and other official American representatives attempted to blame for rupture of negotiations on Soviet Delegation which had allegedly infringed sacred principle of freedom of speech. However, facts concerning conduct

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
URGENT

FROM : WSD NR: STATE SERIAL 4167, Nov 17 DTD: 18 Nov 46

of Soviet-American negotiations testify that American Delegation Joint Commission fought for 'Freedom of Speech'. Only for small number of reactionary groups and denied this right to mass democratic organizations."

"Repressions against Korean Democratic Organizations in Southern Korea, closing there of Left-Wing Papers, mass arrests of democratic figures and encouragement to reactionary groups, all this revealed real attitude of Americans toward Moscow Decision."

"As General Chistiakov Commander of Soviet troops in Northern Korea has noted delay in forming provisional Korean Democratic Government is hindering necessary unification of Korea into single state having harmful effect on economic and political situation in Korean people and delaying fulfillment of democratic reforms throughout all Korea."

"Who profits from this delay? In answering this question it is enough to compare situation in Northern Korea, Zone of USSR Military responsibility and in Southern Korea, Zone of US responsibility."

"Relying on wide block of democratic parties and public organizations provisional Popular Committee of Northern Korea representing administration authority has achieved immense success in restoring industry and transport, improving situation of workers and democratizing country's entire internal life. Land reform has been carried out. In Northern Korea about 1,000,000 Hectares which had belonged to Japanese and Korean landowners were confiscated and distributed free of charge for permanent use of Korean peasants. Parasitic landowner class bulwark of Japanese militarism and reaction was liquidated together with medieval tenantry system. Industry, transport, communications, and banks which had belonged to Japanese conquerors and to traitors of Korean people have been confiscated and placed at disposal of Popular Committees.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
URGENT

FROM : WSD NR: STATE SERIAL 4167, Nov 17 DTD: 18 Nov 46 CONT'D

Eight hr day has been introduced together with social insurance and protection of labor under special law governing workers and employees. Law on equal rights for women has given them opportunity to participate actively in all forms of political and economic life."

"New genuine democratic authority in Northern Korea has won general recognition. Clear evidence of this lies in elections to provincial town and Popular Committees held on Nov 3. Speech of peasant from Sunan, Lu Chun Don, is indicative of Popular mood. He stated, 'Popular Committee looks after us like our own father. I received land from Popular Committee and I will vote for such persons who show concern for the people."

"In what countries of West can such political activity be observed? 4,501,813 persons or 99.6% of general number of registered voters participated in elections."

"Northern Korea is moving confidently along path of full democratic development in accordance with Moscow Decision."

"There is no doubt that democratic reforms carried out by provisional Popular Committee of Northern Korea reflect aspirations and interest of entire Korean people. Evidence of this can be found in numerous statements in Seoul Press in resolutions of mass meeting of workers and Intelligentsia in various towns and villages of Southern Korea, etc. During general strike in Southern Korea in Sept and Oct, one of strikers chief demands was conduct to reforms similar to those carried out in Northern Korea. Why have these reforms not yet been carried out in US Zone of Military Administration? American correspondent D L Olmsted, who spent 8 months with American occupation troops in Southern Korea, makes interesting admissions in this connection."

"When we landed Korea to free country, writes Olmsted in newspaper Korean Independence-Americans had fine opportunity to aid this gallant people in its struggle for independence,

31986

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
URGENT

FROM : WSD NR : STATE SERIAL 4167, Nov 17 DTD : 18 Nov 46

struggle. General Hodges attempt to explain this unprecedented uprising as 'Agitation carried out by people outside Southern Korea', was unconvincing. Korean people demand radical democratic reforms in spirit of Moscow Decisions. However, such reforms evidently do not correspond with aims of American Occupation."

"Attempts of American Administration to manufacture 'Independent Government' of Southern Korea with reactionary elements was not crowned with success. Newspaper Korean Independence writes 'American Military Administration has so far had several consultative organs but they have all failed owing to fact that they have not been able to attract Left-wing representation and have been turned into loyal defenders of cause of Korean reactionaries."

"It should be noted that plan to create 'Legislative organ' in Southern Korea, as reported by AP, has been approved by US Govt which ascribed motive for establishing such organ to 'Difficulty of achieving agreement with Soviet. This explanation only testifies to American tendency to avoid fulfilling Moscow Decision in Korea."

"There can be no doubt that such policy of American Occupation authorities by no means contributes to restoration of Korea as independent state and to countrys development on democratic basis."

ACHESON

31986

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
URGENT

FROM : WSD NR : STATE SERIAL 4167, Nov 17 DATED : 18 Nov 46

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, G-3, G-4, AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to CG XXIV CORPS for Info.

31986

TOO: 172300 Z
MCN: YB 10/18

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
PRIORITY 18 Nov 46

FROM : CG USAFIK

TO : SCAP (PASS TO WAR CAD)

NR : TFGDS 724

Reference Civilian Supply Program for Korea. The 140 locomotives and other rolling stock and parts previously requisitioned are urgently needed. This Command is now receiving FLC supplies from Japan, Iwo Jima and the Philippines and more are scheduled to arrive. Supplies to support the occupation of Korea, primarily to alleviate disease and unrest, are landed at the Port of Pusan, the only suitable port in the American Zone for receipt of these supplies. The bulk of the supplies are needed in the Seoul area 280 miles to the northwest. There are no roads suitable for the movement of supplies in quantity. This means that the supplies must be moved by rail. There is a double track line connecting Seoul and Pusan but the rolling stock both locomotives and cars is in deplorable condition due to years of neglect and lack of maintenance. Only by the most strenous and unremetting efforts is this Command able to keep any of these decrepit locomotives in operation. Conditions of equipment is such that for every day in operation the average engine must be shipped for one week. Due to the type of equipment and the quality of fuel available it takes five engines to move twenty carloads of freight from Pusan to Seoul. These facts are set forth at length to emphasize what has been previously stated namely that without additional motive power the movement of supplies and the entire occupation of Korea will be seriously compromised. This Command understands that the following has been approved for shipment from Europe: 140 locomotives, 2-8-0 type 80 ton, 56½ in gauge, 50 tank cars, 50 refrigerator cars, 2 ea 75 ton railway cranes and 6 ea 20 ton railway cranes. Reference TFGDS 360 of 21 July.

31962

PRIORITY
Confidential

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COPY NO.

253

091.1K

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

WIF
crw

INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
PRIORITY

FROM : CG USAFIK, NR : TFGDS 724, 18 NOV 46 CONT'D

A. Where is this equipment now located?
B, When can this Command expect its arrival in Pusan?
Ernestly request that aggressive action be taken by all appropriate agencies to the end that this equipment be received by this Command in Pusan Korea at the earliest. Further request that this Command be kept advised of the progress made in the movement of this equipment to Korea.

NO SIG

INFORMATION: G-4, GOVT SECT, PUB HEALTH & WELFARE, ECON & SCI SECT, NAT RES SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to WAR (CAD) for Action.

31962

PRIORITY
Confidential

TOO: 170455/Z
MCN: TJC 56/17

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COPY NO.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

WWD WDGS RECEIVED 18 NOV 1946

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
ROUTINE

17 Nov 1946

FROM : WASHINGTON (WDSCA GO)

TO : CINCAFPAC (POLAD) (PASS TO CG USAFIK FOR ACTION)

NR : WX 85697

Moscow 4061 and 4062 NOVE 4 of Oct 26, referred to "ltrs written by Gen Hodge to Gen Chistiakov," gave excerpts from that of Aug 12 and concluded that: "It has become evident that American Delegation, which during work Joint Commission took position for revision of decisions on Korea, adopted by Moscow conference of three ministers for foreign affairs, at this time continues to adhere to this position, not showing any desire to carry out these decisions with exactitude."

State and War have no objection to publication in Gen Hodges discretion of exchange of ltrs.

State and War approve reply to Chistiakov quoted in TFURC 66 and substance Gen Hodges press statement of Nov 7 (TFGCG 524). If in further exchanges on this subject it is felt that Russians are basing their willingness to agree to commission meeting again on assumption that we have changed our basic position and are now willing to make concessions of substance, it is suggested that Gen Hodge continue to make clear that our basic position is unchanged. While we should be willing to accept formula which would enable Soviet representatives to save face, we do not feel that any useful purpose would be served by reconvening commission unless there is prospect of real progress.

NO SIG

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to CG USAFIK for action.

31900

ROUTINE
Secret

TOO : 162001 Z
MCN : YB 10/17

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COPY NO. 29

236

091.1K

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

CWH
hbp

INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
ROUTINE

FROM : WAR (WDSCA ES)

TO : CINCAFPAC

NR : W 85699

Reurad Oct C 66072 part II sect 2 A (3) (C) (1) ourad Oct TT 7218 considered here that failure fix permitted machine tool inventory level in comprehensive reparations program would necessitate undesireable expansion of list of industries subj industrial disarmament controls . Industrial disarmament program based on concept that controls need be exercised only over primary and secondary War facilities and limited list of War-supporting industries. Limitation of overall machine tool inventory considered crucial adjunct this program as substitute for extensive industry list in area where industry lines vague and capacity highly convertible. Felt here that substantial excess of machine tools will remain after reductions consequent to industrial disarmament and reparations removals programs for specific industries. Alternative to specific limitation on overall machine tool holdings is specific reduction of capacity or of machine tools inventories in every industry making substantial use of machine tools. Because of great burden which would be placed on Wash offices and your Hq in developing and supporting such program before FEC, propose overall limitation as only feasible choice. Your estimate therefore requested as to overall machine tool inventory required for Japanese economy taking into account technological considerations and industrial limits proposed in Oct TT 7218, particularly limit on steel production.

NO SIG

31861

ROUTINE
Restricted
-1-

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COPY NO.

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9

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
ROUTINE

FROM : WAR (WDSCA ES), NR: W 85699, DTD 17 NOV 46 CONT'D

ACTION: ECON & SCI SECT

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4, AG, GOVT SECT, CIV PROP CUST

31861

ROUTINE
Restricted
-2-

TOO : 162002 Z
MCN : SA 9/17

Ed Circular

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COPY NO.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
ROUTINE

17 Nov 1946

FROM : WASHINGTON (WDSCA GO)

TO : CINCAFPAC (POLAD) (PASS TO CG USAFIK FOR ACTION)

NR : WX 85697

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NO SIG

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE: This message has been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to CG USAFIK for action.

31900 ROUTINE Secret

TOO : 162001 Z
MCN : YB 10/17

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

BBS
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Secret
ROUTINE

17 Nov 46



FROM : CG USAFIK (HODGE FOR BUNCE)

TO : SCAP (PASS TO STATE)

NR : TFGCG 529 (THIS IS SEOUL POLAD NBR 134)

Reurad W 84781-T00-051801/7 existing procedures are adequate to control foreign trade whether handled privately or by USCC. Unless practicable arrangements for handling balances as indicated ourad TFYMG 2883 to SCAP believe it inadvisable to permit business men into Korea at this time. Even assuming practicable arrangement, such men should be carefully briefed re limited trade prospects and because of lack of housing and other facilities would necessarily be limited in nbr and duration of visit. For these reasons prior clearance with Theater Command would be advisable. Businessmen of allied countries should be admitted with Americans on the basis of reciprocity. Concur in your view that establishment of exchange rate is not essential prerequisite to success limited private trade. Because of instability of price level here establishment of stable exchange rate not now practical. A commercial exchange rate is desirable earliest to permit, under controls, the accumulation of foreign exchange from exports, foreign residents espenditures, and souvenir purchases. Pressure for commercial exchange rate will become more critical if one is established for Japan.

31360

ROUTINE
Secret
-1-

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COPY NO. 21

27

091.1 K

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
ROUTINE

FROM: CG USAFIK NR: TFGCG 529 16 NOV 46 CONT'D

Ability to stabilize price and establish a stable rate will depend upon the success of the food program, reconversion, tax collection and expanded production of consumer goods. Plans should be made in advance for establishing a commercial exchange rate as soon as internal conditions make this possible. Hodge and LIREN concur.

HODGE

INFORMATION : COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-4, AG, FISC DIR, GOVT SECT, ECON & SCI SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE : This msg has been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to WASHINGTON (STATE DEPT).

31360

ROUTINE
Secret
-2-

TOO: 150807 Z
MCN: TJCA 72-16

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

BBS
hbp

INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
PRIORITY 17 Nov 46

FROM : WAR (WDSCA PL)

TO : CINCAFPAC

NR : W 85666

1. Reourads Oct WX 84180, WX 84214, WX 84426 and reurad C 66818. Time and manner of issuance of FEC policy decision on review of new Japanese Constitution is subj. Following developments above subj are transmitted for your info:

A. Policy decision passed by FEC on 17 Oct with US reservation that time and manner of issuance would be subj to later determination after receipt of your views.

B. At FEC meeting on 31 Oct Australian, New Zealand, Canadian, Indian, French and British representatives all felt that question of publication was not a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of SCAP; that every effort should be made to obtain publication as soon as possible; and expressed hope that publication be before promulgation of Constitution on 3 Nov. US representative stated that inasmuch as no reply had then been recd from SCAP, US could not support immediate publication.

C. On 1 Nov a special FEC meeting was called to consider reply urad. General expression by other representatives favored view that FEC decision (WX 84180) should be made known to Jap govt, but others did not agree that widespread publicity was required. Your views (C 66818) were referred to FEC committee on constitutional and legal reform for preparation of consultative message between Gen McCoy and you.

D. On 6 Nov Constitutional Committee, after having apd transmission to you of verbatim FEC minutes on 31 Oct and 1 Nov, now enroute to you via air courier, apd with US and Philippine opposition, a recommendation that FEC adopt policy as follows:

31764

PRIORITY
Confidential
-1-

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COPY NO.

252

FEC

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
PRIORITY

FROM : WAR (WDSCA PL), NR : W 85666, DTD 17 NOV 46 CONT'D

"Far Eastern Commission considers that it is now necessary to acquaint Japanese people with terms of policy decision of 17 Oct 46 relative to provisions for review of a New Japanese constitution (WX 84180) and requests US govt to direct SCAP to communicate terms of commission policy formally to Japanese govt before date of meeting of special session of Diet on 25 Nov 46."

E. Above recommendation was considered at Steering Committee meeting on 12 Nov and at suggestion of NUS member committee agreed to postpone further consideration until US had chance to consult with you, but will be discussed at FEC meeting on 21 Nov.

2. Informal advice here reveals that New Zealand elections and discussions in Australian Parliament may force publicity of contents of FEC review policy in those countries in near future. Some leakage of this review decision appears most probable.

3. Inasmuch as promulgation of Constitution is already accomplished without dampening effects of a concurremt public announcement of review policy, it is felt, sub to receipt of your comments, and unless you have strong feelings to contrary, that Prime Minister could be informed of review policy and that matter of full publicity in Japan should be left to your discretion.

4. Following statement of a proposed US position is transmitted for your comment:

A. US govt proposes to request SCAP to advise formally Prime Minister of Japan of policy decision of FEC contained in WX 84180 as soon as practicable.

B. It proposes to indicate to SCAP that question of publicity of this policy decision in Japan is a matter for SCAP discretion.

C. US govt considers this arrangement would adequately accomplish objectives of FEC and would provide SCAP with

31764

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
PRIORITY

FROM : WAR (WDSCA PL), NR: W 85666, DTD 17 NOV 46 CONT'D

flexibility needed to safeguard political situation in Japan.
5. Your comments are specifically requested on proposal recommended by constitutional committee contained in para 1 D and on tentative counter-proposal contained in para 4, both in light of verbatim FEC minutes dispatched to you via courier on 9 Nov. Re counter-proposal, what would be earliest date you would consider practical in advising Prime Minister?

NO SIG

ACTION : GOVT SECT

INFORMATION : COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, AG,
DIPLOMATIC SECT

31764

PRIORITY
Confidential
3-

TOO : 160201 Z
MCN : YB 90/16

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

VWB

INCOMING MESSAGE

Restricted
PRIORITY

17 Nov 19 46

RECEIVED
18 NOV 1946

FROM : WASHINGTON (WDSCA PT)

TO : CINCAFPAC

NR : W 85511

Reur AG 091.3 dtd 15 Oct 46. Your comments on Zaibatsu Policy statement recd and note taken of your statement that increase in your present staff is necessary to execute this policy.

2. Henderson of ESS Cartels and Antitrust Div advises fol is minimum need for additional pers which must be met if Zaibatsu Program is to have any chance of success;

(A). Two economists, competent to evaluate over-all policy considerations relative to industrial organization: P 8.

(B). Four lawyers with experience in corporate reorganization: P 8.

(C). Two financial analysts with training in accounting and statistics: P 8.

(D). One man with experience of training in Field of Govt control of industry: P 8.

3. In view of importance of Zaibatsu policy as one of major occupation objectives, desire to procure persons needed by you for execution of such policy.

(A) Is Hendersons statement above an adequate specification of your need for additional personnel in connection Zaibatsu Program?

(B) Do you have funds to pay the nine additional persons specified above?

(C) If so please submit formal requests with rating and job descriptions.

NO SIG

ACTION: ECON & SCI SECT

INFORMATION: G-1, AG, GOVT SECT, CIV PERS SECT

31944

PRIORITY

Restricted

TOO : 150009 Z
MCN : YC 19/17

EO
Cancelled

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COPY NO.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

BBB
bah
17 NOV 1946

INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
ROUTINE 16 Nov 46

FROM : WAR (WDSCA GO)

TO : CINCAFPAC

NR : W 85608

Recurad Sept WX 81893 and urad Oct CX 66168. In order to keep our allies currently informed as to developments of policy and oprs in occupation of Japan, US member of Economic Committee of FEC made statement to Committee on 22 Oct 46 along fol lines: US Govt would shortly present to FEC policy statement on international civil aviation in Japan which would provide that "No discrimination would be exercised against nationals of any United Nation which does not discriminate civil aviation of Allied Nations in former enemy countries occupied by it". He also stated that arrangements were being made for representatives of Am Airlines to visit Tokyo to discuss detailed operating arrangements. He then added that representatives of other airlines which wished to participate in international civil aviation serving Japan with oprs limited to passenger, cargo and mail, deposit or pick-up, in Tokyo destined to or originated by occupation forces and agencies accredited near SCAP, could also make arrangements through usual channels for consultation with SCAP on operating details.

This will inform you concerning US position in case requests are made by liaison missions of other Govts for such consultations.

NO SIG

31450

ROUTINE
Confidential
-1-

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COPY NO.

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FEC

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Confidential
ROUTINE

FROM : WAR (WDSCA GO) NR : W 85608 16 NOV 46 CONT'D

ACTION: G-4,

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3,
AG, ECON & SCI SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT, PACUSA

ADDED DIST : GOVT SECT

31450

ROUTINE
Confidential
-2-

TOO : 152148 Z
MCN : YD 7/16

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COPY NO.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

RLJ
jdl

INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT
Secret
URGENT

16 Nov 46

FROM : CG USAFIK

TO : CINCAFPAC

NR : TFYMG 3094

Consider proposed interim directive for guidance of Military Government in Korea is in general satisfactory. The following recommendations are offered:

1. Six A should be amended by adding as 2nd sentence "you will take action necessary to annul any laws and practices promulgated or followed by the Japanese authorities which discriminate for or against any person because of race, nationality, creed or political opinion."

2. Regarding suggested changes contained in appendix, views of this Hq on proposed amendments are:

A Consider proposed addition to para 3 A (1) is unnecessary because it states obvious fact and is undesirable because "friendly" is susceptible to various definitions.

B Consider proposed changes in para 10 D and para 10 C to be desirable.

C Strongly oppose propose changes in para 17 since they may defeat a primary objective of the occupation by tying Korean trade to Japan. Para 17 as stated in the body of the directive is decidedly preferable. Urge addition of following sentences at end of para 17 sub-paragraph 2 B "the United States will be reimbursed for these advances in the same manner as for all other occupational cost of Korea Since one of the primary objectives of the occupation is to sever Korea from its dependence on the Japanese economy, exports to Japan from Korea should

31632

URGENT
Secret
(1)
URGENT

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COPY NO. 11

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091.1

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

RLJ
jd1

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret
URGENT

FROM : CG USAFIK NR : TJYMG 3094 16 Nov 46 CON'D

normally be limited to goods which cannot be sold to greater advantage in other markets."

D Change in para 21 is considered immaterial.

E Consider proposed addition of sentence in para 24 regarding assumption of obligations by Korean Government is inadvisable because it seems to recognize the existence of doubt without providing any legal advantage.

Request above views of USAFIK be passed to BHS, Bunce and Loren concur this message and request State and Treasury be advised.

NO SIG

ACTION: GOVT SECT

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG, DIPLOMATIC SECT

31632 URGENT Secret TOO : 160515/Z MCN : TJC 37/16

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COPY NO.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

BBS
bah
RECEIVED
NOV 17

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE 16 Nov 46

FROM : WAR (STATE DEPT)

TO : CINCAFPAC (FOR POLITICAL ADVISOR)

INFO : WAR DEPT CHIEF OF STAFF

NR : 151954 Z

From Moscow fifteenth summary follows, 2 1/2 column Izvestiya Nov 14 article by V Yarovoi, "Postwar Economy of Japan and American Monoplies".

"Policy of Japanese ruling circles since capitulation has been directed toward doing everything possible to subvert their fulfillment****one means for attaining this purpose was tendency of Japanese monopolies to re-establish their pre-war ties with commercial industrial, and banking circles of US and Britain****from first days following capitulation of Japan many leaders of influential American firms began to consider how to restore Japan as supplier of number of products****it is quite understandable that American monopolies showed little interest in fact that pre-war stream of goods from US to China assisted Japanese military production and therefore had direct effect on Pearl Harbor Catastrophe quotes tendencies towards expansion, consideration of military-strategic nature and also business have pressed and continue to press American Imperialists toward contact with Zaibatsu and toward maximum penetration of Japanese postwar economy.

"American businessmen relying on support of occupational authorities are already making considerable efforts to extract profit from restored Japanese foreign trade." (Figures follow on current Japanese American foreign trade). "American capital seeks not only to gain

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FROM : WAR (STATE DEPT) NR : 151954 Z 16 NOV 46 CONT'D

possession of Japan as market for its goods. American monopolies are extremely active in question of capital investment in various branches of postwar Japanese economy. This is case both with companies which had capital investments in Japan prior to war and with those which evidenced interest in Japan after its capitulation.¶***Total amount of American capital investment in pre-war Japan varied between 4 and 5 million dollars.

"Under circumstances and in view of growing interest of American capital in postwar Japanese economy Japanese magnates of finance welcome in every way increasing activity of American business circles."****It goes without saying that Japanese concerns are in no way disturbed by fact that realization of their appeals to American capitalists will inevitably lead to enslavement of Japanese economy by foreign capital. Japanese monopolies are anxious to preserve their positions in country's economy. Cherishing dreams of rebirth of Japanese Imperialism, concerns seek to 'Interest' American industrialists to highest degree. This finds very broad response among latter since they approach policy from their own expansionist desires.

"In light of this 'Rappoochement' between Japanese interests and American monopolies it becomes clear that during year since Japans capitulation dissolution of Zaibatsu has been slowed down in every way."

"It is known that in 1945 MacArthur issued order for Zaibatsu's dissolution and drew up measures to this end. Practical fulfillment of this directive was entrusted

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to Japanese Govt which reflected interests of those very concerns which it should liquidate. It is clear that Zaibatsu clique made broad use of this circumstance and during year since MacArthur's directive has been able to protect their interests to maximum and actually to disrupt fulfillment of this directive. Indeed American occupation authorities themselves adopted no severe measures for directives implementation which was therefore tantamount to a demonstration calculated for foreign consumption.**** On Oct 1, 1946 representative of so-called Liquidation Commission under Japanese Govt announced that work had begun to liquidate Zaibatsu. As result three concerns Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Yasuda-stated that they are terminating their activity, in which connection commission is receiving from these concerns securities amounting to 1.7 billion yen. Representative further indicated that 11 remaining major Japanese companies will shortly cease their activity and surrender all their securities to commission****is this so?

"By end of war, capital of various industries banking and commercial companies controlled by only 4 concerns-Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yasuda and Sumitomo-reached total of about 100 billion yen. All these concerns held not less than 40% of country's total national wealth.

"This is why 'Self dissolution' of Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Yasuda concerns and their transfer of securities in amount of 1.7 billion yen seems not to be liquidation of monopoly but common maneuver calculated to deceive world public opinion. Such 'Dissolution' gives Japanese monopolies opportunity to preserve their economic and political positions in country.

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FROM : WAR (STATE DEPT) NR : 151954 Z 16 NOV 46 CONT'D

"But this is primarily related to policy of American occupation authorities who according to Chicago Sun correspondent consider that 'Adoption at present of any radical measures against Zaibatsu would seriously reflect against rebirth of Japanese economy'.****It is scarcely surprising that representatives of these monopolies feel extremely free and, willingly greeting American expansionist designs, consider exploiting with them jointly both population of Japan and peoples of other Asiatic countries.

"Thus desire of American capital to seize Japanese economy meets a response among mandates of Japanese finance capital who count on strengthening their position by satisfying American designs. All this creates conditions hindering execution of Potsdam Declaration which demands democratization of Japan and its transformation into peaceful state."

ACHESON

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF. G-2, AG, PUB REL OFF, GOVT SECT, STAT & RPTS SECT, ECON & SCI SECT, NAT RES SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

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TOO : 151954 Z
MCN : YB 96/15

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ROUTINE 16 Nov 46

FROM : US EMBASSY STATE DEPT PARIS FRANCE

TO : CINCAFPAC (PASS TO SEOUL KOREA)

NR : 151415 Z

Following digest leading article Brigadier Fitzroy MacLean MP recently returned from Japan and Korea appearing Times Nov 17.

Korea already occasion 2 Far Eastern conflicts. Now Korea once again on way becoming international powder magazine. Across 38th parallel quarter million Soviet troops face some 40,000 Americans. Relations between 2 Commands to all intents broken off. In Russian Zone familiar pattern of Soviet State rapidly taking shape. In American Zone Communist engineered "Oct Revolution" threatens make administration impossible.

At Yalta decided in principle restore Korean independence. After Jap capitulation Soviets and Americans came in theory at least not as conquerors but as liberators. Terms of reference Allied Forces of Occupation worked out at Moscow. Joint Soviet-American Commission set up under terms met Seoul in March. But ran into difficulties over question which today exercises world, namely, correct definition term democratic Russian refusal admit any party could be democratic that opposed Moscow Decision caused consternation for with exception Communists Soviets have covered whole range Korean political parties.

Soviet definition democracy not shared by General Hodge who maintained such interference essentially undemocratic. Complete deadlock was reached and early in May Joint Commission adjourned and has not met since. Consequently no progress made toward formation provisional

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FROM : US EMBASSY STATE DEPT PARIS FRANCE NR: 151415 Z
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Govt and coordination economic and administrative matters. Meanwhile iron curtain dropped along38th parallel with Americans and Soviets "Democratizing" respective zones according own lights.

In Soviet Zone Communist party disappeared but Left-Wing coalition bearing name "Labor Party" has emerged. This party controlled by former CEC OG Communist party backed by efficient police and 250,000 Red troops Labor Party making excellent progress along Soviet lines.

In American Zone things not going so smoothly, chief obstacle being South Korean Communists who obstructing work Mil Govt and preventing political unity. They have aggravated inflationary tendency by counterfeiting currency and have stirred up strikes which have lead to disturbances so violent as to be referred to in Korea "Oct Revolution".

Influence from north 38th parallel dominates whole situation. Brief visit inspires grave misgivings. Situation leaves one with feeling Korea may take its place with Trieste, Greece and Dardanelles as international trouble center. Prospects unified democratic state receding. Profoundly to be hoped 4 Trustee Powers will make serious attempt break existing deadlock.

GALLMAN

INFORMATION : COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, AG, GOVT SECT, DIPLOMATIC SECT

NOTE : This msg bas been passed to Signal Center for redispatch to CG USAFIK for Info.

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