

E 450

.T47

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS




00001747198









THE
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW;
TRIED BY THE
OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS.

BY

JOSEPH P. THOMPSON,
Pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle Church.

[REPRINTED FROM THE NEW ENGLANDER FOR NOV., 1850.]

NEW YORK:
MARK H. NEWMAN & Co., 199 BROADWAY.

1850.

E450
T47

~~37~~
~~1616~~

45567
'04

NEW HAVEN:
PRINTED BY B. L. HAMLIN,
Printer to Yale College.

W. C. C. 2. 1. 1. 1. 1.

THE Scriptural portion of the following argument was first delivered as a discourse in the Broadway Tabernacle, on Sabbath evening, Sept. 22nd, and was repeated, by request, on Sabbath evening, Oct. 13th. On its first delivery it was prefaced with the following remarks, which it may be important to preserve in this connection.

Whatever may be thought of the lawfulness or the expediency of introducing the general subject of slavery into the pulpit, there can be no question that the treatment due to fugitives from slavery is a legitimate topic for discussion there. That is a subject of which the Bible treats, and in making it a subject of discourse I am not preaching politics but am preaching the Gospel; applying the principles of the Bible to an important public interest. The subject legitimately belongs to the pulpit, and politicians should be careful how they tamper with it, lest they betray an ignorance of the principles of Biblical interpretation and of the spirit of Christianity, as gross as that ignorance of political affairs which they are prone to charge upon ministers of the Gospel. The treatment of fugitive slaves has indeed been made a political question; but it was a Biblical question and a question of morality long before it was dragged into the arena of politics, and it was legislated upon by the King of heaven and earth ages before the Congress of the United States had an existence. The discussion of it in the church, therefore; is not to be tabooed by the captious cry of 'Politics and the Pulpit.' The claim of Jesus of Nazareth to be the Messiah was made a political question by those who could not or would not comprehend the spirit-

ual character of his mission, and he was crucified under the pretense that he was guilty of treason. The disciple is not above his master, and the servants of Christ should not be deterred from the discussion of any moral question by the hue and cry of politicians. The question before us is not a political question, but a question of Biblical interpretation.

It is also a *practical* question. With slavery in general,—except where it exists in territories belonging to the national government—we of this locality have no direct concern. But the treatment of fugitive slaves is with us a personal matter—a question of almost daily interest. In the houses of some who hear me, fugitives from slavery are often harbored; while others are accustomed to contribute money to help such fugitives on their way. As a pastor, therefore, knowing, or at least suspecting such practices to exist among my congregation, it is my duty to expound to them the teachings of the word of God respecting fugitives from slavery, that those who are accustomed to hide the fugitive, or to aid his escape, may be led to desist from this course if it is wrong, or may be confirmed in it if it is right. There are also many who for the first time are inquiring thoughtfully and conscientiously about their duty with respect to fugitive slaves, and who are disposed to be guided in the matter not by mere human enactments, but by the word of God.

THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.

Passed by Congress, September, 1850.

AMONG the measures passed toward the close of the late session of Congress, and known as the "Compromise" or "Peace" measures—which after lumbering in the Senate for months in the shape of an omnibus, were at length worked through the opposition of North and South in disjointed fragments—was a Bill to amend the act entitled "An act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the service of their masters." This act is familiarly called the Fugitive Slave Law, yet the term slave or slavery does not once occur in it. The phraseology of the act is "fugitives from service or labor," "persons owing service or labor," &c., after the phraseology of the Constitution of the United States, which says, (Art. IV. Sec. 2.) "No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." This studious avoidance of any verbal recognition of slavery in the very act which is framed for the security of the institution, is quite significant; it shows that the public sentiment of the world forbids the inconsistency of an avowed legislation for slavery in a free republic, and that the abettors of slavery have not the shamelessness to face that sentiment.

With the provisions of this law the reader is already familiar; but we shall here give an abstract or analysis of the act as an introduction to some considerations drawn from the Scriptures upon the treatment due to fugitives from slavery.

The *first* section authorizes and requires all commissioners of the circuit courts of the United States in whom are vested the powers of a justice of the peace in respect to offenders, for any crime or offense against the United States, to exercise and discharge all the powers and duties conferred by this act.

The *second* section provides that the superior court of each organized territory of the United States shall have the same power to appoint commissioners to take acknowledgments of bail and affidavit, and to take depositions of witnesses in civil causes, which is now possessed by the circuit court of the United States, and those commissioners also are required to perform like duties, with the former, under this act.

Section *third* empowers the United States courts, both circuit and superior, to enlarge the number of commissioners in order the better to carry into effect this act.

The *fourth* section gives to said commissioners concurrent jurisdiction with the judges of the circuit and district courts of the United States over persons claimed as fugitives from service, according to the provisions of the act.

By section *fifth* it is made the duty of all marshals and deputy marshals to obey and execute all warrants and precepts issued under the provisions of this act, when to them directed, under the penalty of one thousand dollars for each instance of refusal, or neglect, or of the value of the fugitive in case he shall escape from custody. This section likewise authorizes the marshals to appoint agents and to summon the *posse comitatus* to assist them in executing the law.

The *sixth* section authorizes the claimant of a fugitive, or his or her agent or attorney, to pursue and reclaim such fugitive, to seize and arrest him either with or *without* process; requires the court, judge, or commissioner before whom the case is brought, to determine it in a *summary* manner; makes the deposition or affidavit of the claimant taken either in the state in which the arrest is made or in the state in which he resides, satisfactory proof of the fact that the person arrested owes him service or labor, and makes also the mere affidavit of the claimant proof of the identity of the fugitive; declares that "in no trial or hearing under this act shall the testimony of the alleged fugitive be admitted in evidence;" and authorizes the claimant, upon receiving a certificate from the court, judge, or commissioner, to use all necessary force to take back the fugitive to his own state.

The *seventh* section provides penalties for any attempt to harbor, conceal or rescue a fugitive. As this may be a matter of personal interest to the reader, we give the section entire.

SEC. 7. *And be it further enacted*, That any person who shall knowingly and willingly obstruct, hinder, or prevent such claimant, his agent or attorney, or any person or persons lawfully assisting him, her, or them, from arresting such a fugitive from service or labor, either with or without process as aforesaid; or shall rescue or attempt to rescue, such fugitive from service or labor, from the custody of such claimant, his or her agent or attorney, or other person or persons lawfully assisting as aforesaid, when so arrested, pursuant to the authority herein given and declared; or shall aid, abet, or assist such person so owing service or labor as aforesaid, directly or indirectly, to escape from such

claimant, his agent or attorney, or other person or persons legally authorized as aforesaid; or shall harbor or conceal such fugitive, so as to prevent the discovery and arrest of such person, after notice or knowledge of the fact that such person was a fugitive from service or labor as aforesaid, shall, for either of said offenses, be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment not exceeding six months, by indictment and conviction before the District Court of the United States for the district in which such offense may have been committed, or before the proper court of criminal jurisdiction, if committed within any one of the organized Territories of the United States; and shall moreover forfeit and pay, by way of civil damages to the party injured by such illegal conduct, the sum of one thousand dollars, for each fugitive so lost as aforesaid, to be recovered by action of debt, in any of the district or territorial courts aforesaid, within whose jurisdiction the said offense may have been committed.

By the *eighth* section the marshals, their deputies, and the clerks of the courts acting in the case, are declared to be entitled to the fees for similar services in other cases, and a special provision is made that a commissioner hearing such a case shall receive a fee of *ten* dollars if the alleged fugitive is delivered over, and *five* if he is not, and that any person or persons appointed by the commissioner to execute his process shall receive *five* dollars for each person he or they may arrest and take before the commissioner, and also such additional fees as the commissioner shall deem reasonable for the incidental expenses of keeping the fugitive in custody.

The *ninth* section provides that a sufficient force shall be deputed by the marshal to ensure the safe delivery of the fugitive to the claimant in his own state, whenever an affidavit is made by the claimant that he fears an attempt to rescue the fugitive from his hands; the expense of transportation to be paid out of the treasury of the United States.

The *tenth* section makes the transcript of a record of any court of record in any state, territory or district of the United States, duly authenticated, sufficient proof of the fact of the escape from service of the person therein described, and that record with an affidavit of the claimant to the identity of the alleged fugitive shall be a sufficient authority for the surrendry of the fugitive according to the former provisions of the act.

Such for substance are the provisions of this act. They should be studied and analyzed by every citizen, for every citizen has a direct personal interest in the law. There is no man north of Mason and Dixon's line who may not be required to act as a slave-catcher, under the fifth section, which commands all good citizens "to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this law," and who may not be subjected to the penalties provided by the seventh section, for any overt act of sympathy or succor to the fugitive. Should the venerable ex-President Day be passing by at the moment when a marshal or any of his subalterns is attempting to arrest an alleged fugitive, he could be

summoned by the officer to aid in the capture, and should he refuse to render that aid, for thus "knowingly and willingly obstructing" the arrest by his example, influence and lack of service, and at least "indirectly" aiding, abetting and assisting the escape of the fugitive, he would be liable to a fine of one thousand dollars and to imprisonment for six months, and also, in case of the actual escape of the fugitive through his refusal to aid in the arrest, to a further penalty of one thousand dollars "by way of civil damages to the party injured by such illegal conduct." Perhaps the venerable ex-Professor at Andover would be saved by his exegesis from incurring the penalties of the law, and yet we incline to think that if a fugitive slave stood before him in the concrete, his humane feelings and his intense love of liberty would get the better of his exegesis, and he would be the last man to help to send back a fellow man to that state of slavery which he has denounced with such indignant eloquence. Rather would he say to the slave-catcher,—we use his own language on a kindred point—"I would hold out my right hand to have it cut off, sooner than lift it up for such a [purpose]. I would not have upon my conscience the guilt of turning God's image, (redeemed by the blood of his Son, and made free by the Lord Jesus Christ himself,) into *goods* and *chattels*. I would not bring on my soul that guilt, for ten thousand worlds. To fine a man in the enormous sum of \$1,000, to imprison him moreover for six months, and then subject him to a civil action besides, for injury done to the master—and to do all this merely because of an interference which humanity pleads for, although the law condemns it, is Turkish justice, not American—at any rate not New England justice." To the honor of Prof. Stuart we believe that no where would a fugitive slave be more safe than on Andover hill; and yet for harboring him, or even refusing to aid in arresting him, the man whose name is venerated wherever learning and piety are esteemed, must submit to fines and imprisonment. This is one feature of the law.

It is remarkable that the bill has no provision against mistake, and no penalty for arresting and enslaving a freeman. It requires but the collusion of two men to seize a freeman in the streets of New York or of Boston, to drag him before a commissioner, to make affidavit of his escape from service and of his personal identity, and in one hour that freeman shall be in the custody of an armed force on his way to the slave-coffles of Bruin and Hill, to be sold to the rice plantations of the South. For such an outrage, entirely feasible under this law, there is no penalty and no redress. True the sufferer has his action at common law for false arrest; but if he should ever get back from bondage, how shall he, poor and defenceless, maintain such an action against the United States power that oppresses him? The law rides over the

right of trial by jury as if the plain of Runnemede were a fiction, and ignores the *Habeas Corpus*, as if the court of High Commission were established by the Constitution of the United States. It applies to apprentices at the north no less than to slaves at the south.

One of the most infamous features of the law is its appeal to the mercenary feelings of the commissioner against the liberty of the alleged fugitive, and to like feelings in the rabble against the liberties of a class of their fellow citizens. Five dollars reward, with incidental expenses *ad libitum*, to whoever shall arrest a fugitive whether he shall prove to be a fugitive or not; five dollars to the commissioner for hearing each case, and *ten* dollars for each case of conviction! Never was a bill more adroitly framed to array the baser passions of men against the instincts of humanity and the claims of justice; never was a bill more adroitly framed to give to the abettors of slavery absolute power over personal liberty, and over all the guards and bulwarks which centuries of conflict on the field of battle and in the hall of legislation have reared about that liberty. Of the constitutionality of such a law we do not purpose here to speak. That will be tested ere long before the proper tribunal upon some case of resistance designed for that very purpose. The Constitution of the United States (Art. IV, Sec. 2) declares, that "no person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." But it is a question whether the Constitution, which provides (Art. VII, Amended) that, "in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved," can allow the liberty of a man to be put in jeopardy without the judgment of his peers; or whether the instrument which declares (Art. V, Amend.) that "no *person* shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," will recognize a law dispensing with trial by jury in such cases as come within the intent of the phrase "*due process* of law;" or whether the declaration in Art. I, Sec. 9, made without exception of persons, that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it," will admit of a standing exception against any class of persons living under the government of the United States.

These questions we leave to be determined by the proper authority, enduring meanwhile, as best we may, the disgrace of the fact, that the federal government of the United States is the only government in the civilized world that reduces to slavery by force of law, men born under its protection and innocent of crime,

while the border government of a British province affords to thousands of men, women and children, flying from this oppression, the welcome of a free but inclement clime.

The morality of the fugitive slave law is with us a question of higher moment than its constitutionality. The treatment of fugitives from slavery is a question of morality; it is also a scriptural question, for it was a subject of positive enactment in the civil constitution which Jehovah gave to the people of Israel. In that code we read, "*Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant which is escaped from his master to thee; he shall dwell with thee, even among you in that place which he shall choose in one of thy gates where it liketh him best; thou shalt not oppress him.*" (Dent. xxiii, 15, 16.)

The meaning of this command is so obvious to an unsophisticated reader, that it does not seem to admit of dispute or even of a difference of opinion. Upon the face of it is seen the spirit of the Mosaic institutes toward slavery. Those institutes prohibited man-stealing and trafficking in Hebrew slaves, (Ex. xxi, 16, and Lev. xxv, 39-47); they provided for the manumission of slaves at brief and stated intervals; they secured to slaves many domestic, civil and religious rights and privileges; they guarded the life and the person of the slave from violence and abuse; they restricted the system of slavery at every point, with a view to the relief of the servant and the final overthrow of the system itself; and in this spirit and for this purpose—as a restraint upon the cruelty of masters, and as a means toward the abolition of slavery—they prohibited the delivery of a fugitive. But this view of the precept above quoted, so natural, and so entirely in accordance with the legislation of Moses, or rather of Jehovah through Moses, in reference to slavery, is rejected by some distinguished exegetes, who regard the precept as a local statute and not a law of universal application. The following is Professor Stuart's comment on the passage:

"The first enquiry of course is: Where does his master live? Among the Hebrews, or among foreigners? The language of the passage fully develops this, and answers the question. He "has escaped from his master unto the Hebrews (the text says—*thee, i. e., Israel*;) *he shall dwell with thee, among you in one of thy gates.*" Of course, then, he is an immigrant and did not dwell among them before his flight. If he had been a Hebrew servant, belonging to a Hebrew, the whole face of the thing would be changed. Restoration or restitution, if we may judge by the tenor of other property laws among the Hebrews, would have surely been enjoined. But be that as it may, the language of the text puts it beyond a doubt that the servant is a *foreigner*, and has fled from a *heathen master*. This entirely changes the complexion of the case. The Hebrews were God's chosen people, and were the only nation on earth which worshiped the only living and true God. On this ground, as they were the living depository of the oracles of God, great preference was given to them, and great caution exercised, to keep them from all tangling alliances and connection with the heathen. In case a slave escaped from them and came to the Hebrews, two things were taken into consideration, according to

the views of the Jewish legislator. The first was, that the treatment of slaves among the heathen was far more severe and rigorous, than it could lawfully be under the Mosaic law. The heathen master possessed the power of life and death, of scourging, or imprisoning, or putting to excessive toil even to any extent that he pleased. Not so among the Hebrews. *Humanity* pleaded for the protection of the fugitive. The second and most important consideration was, that only among the Hebrews could the fugitive slave come to the knowledge and worship of the only living and true God. The clause which says: "Thou shalt not oppress him," of course means, that he shall be denied none of the privileges of a resident in the land, and that he shall not be subjected to peculiar taxation or labor. The verses before us do not say, that such a refugee servant shall be circumcised; but the admission of him to the privileges of a freeman implies this. The servants of Hebrews, whether of domestic or foreign origin, were all to be circumcised, Gen. 17; 12-15. Of course the admitted denizen, in the present case, would be required to comply with such an injunction. By the right in question he became incorporated into the Jewish theocratical commonwealth, and therefore entitled, as even bond-men were, to all its religious privileges. Moses, therefore, would not suffer him to be forced back into the darkness of heathenism, nor allow that he should be delivered up to an enraged heathen master. Was he not in the right?

"But we now put the other case, viz: that of escape from a *Hebrew* master, who claimed and enjoyed Hebrew rights, is not the case greatly changed? Who would take from him the property which the Mosaic law gave him a right to hold? Neither the bond-man himself, nor the neighbor of his master to whom the fugitive might come. Reclamation of him could be *lawfully* made, and therefore must be enforced.

"With this view of the matter before us, how can we appeal to the passage in question, to justify, yea, even to urge, the retention of fugitive bond-men in our own country? We are one nation—one so-called *Christian* nation. Christianity is a *national* religion among us. I do not mean that all men are real Christians, or that Christianity is established by law; but I mean, that immeasurably the greatest part of our population, North and South, profess to respect Christianity, and appeal to its precepts as a test of morals, and as furnishing us with the rules of life. What state in the Union does not at least tacitly admit Christianity to hold such a place.

"When a fugitive-bondman, then, comes to us of the North, from a master at the South, in what relation do we of the North stand to the Southern master? Are our fellow-citizens and brethren of the South to be accounted as *heathen* in our sight? No, this will never do. I know not what the proportion of real Christians in the South may be, compared with those of the North; but this I do know, from personal observation made at the South, to some extent, and from a considerable acquaintance with people of the South, that there are among them many warm hearts and active hands in the cause of true Christianity. There is no state where such persons may not be found, and many of them too. A bond-man, fleeing from them to us, is a case of just the same kind as would have been presented among the Hebrews, if a Hebrew bond-man had fled from the tribe of Judah to that of Benjamin. We do *not* send back the refugee from the South to a *heathen* nation or tribe. There is many a *Christian* master there, and many too who deal with their servants as immortal beings. It may be, that the fugitive has left a severe and cruel master, who will wreak his vengeance upon him for escaping. And it may be, also, that if the fugitive takes up his abode here, he will find those who will maltreat him, and defraud him, and do other grievous things. Crimes of this sort have not as yet quite vanished from the North. But be the master as he may, since we of the North are only other tribes of the same great commonwealth, we can not sit in judgment on cruel masters belonging to tribes different from our own, and having by solemn compact, a separate and independent

jurisdiction in respect to all matters of justice between man and man, with which no stranger can on any pretence whatever intermeddle. We pity the restored fugitive, and have reason enough to pity him, when he is sent back to be delivered into the hands of enraged cruelty. But if he goes back to a lenient and a Christian master, the matter is less grievous. The responsibility, however, for bad treatment of the slave, rests not in the least degree on us of the North. The Mosaic law does not authorize us to reject the claims of our fellow countrymen and citizens, for strayed or stolen property—property authorized and guaranteed as such by Southern States to their respective citizens. These states are not *heathen*. We have acknowledged them as *brethren and fellow citizens* of the great community. A fugitive from them is not a fugitive from an idolatrous and polytheistic people. And even if the Bible had neither said nor implied anything in relation to this whole matter, the solemn compact which we have made, before heaven and earth, to deliver up fugitives when they are *held to service* in the state from which they have fled, is enough to settle the question of *legal* right on the part of the master, whatever we may think of his claim when viewed in the light of Christianity.”—*Conscience and the Constitution*, pp. 30–33.

The first point in this interpretation is the emphasis put upon the word *thee*, which makes it refer not to the Hebrews individually, but to the Hebrew nation collectively. The stress of this whole argument to prove that the injunction is not absolute and universal, but refers only to a special case, lies in the assumption that the pronoun *thee* relates to the Hebrew commonwealth, and not to each and every member of that commonwealth. As there is nothing in the construction of the Hebrew that requires this interpretation, an English reader who will take pains to compare this with other similar forms of expression in the laws of Moses, is competent to decide whether this interpretation is probable from usage and the context, or whether it is an instance of special pleading to make out a case. *Thee*, says Prof. Stuart, means *Israel*, i.e. Israel collectively, the nation and land of Israel; that it often has this meaning we do not dispute; but his argument claims that in the passage under consideration it has this meaning only, to the exclusion of any other; whereas there is no proof that the word does not in this, as in many other cases, refer to Israel *partitively* as well as collectively, which of course would spoil his reasoning. The fifth commandment is an example of this usage: *Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee*. Now though the land was given to Israel as a nation, it was also given in sections to each individual Israelite, and this command and promise have reference not to the nation collectively, but to each individual of the nation. Honor *thy* father and *thy* mother, is a command not to Israel but to each Israelite; that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth *thee*,—the land in which thou *as* an Israelite hast an inheritance. The nation as such was required by statute to enforce filial respect and obedience; but the fifth commandment was strictly personal in its application. Here then is a sentence of precisely the same

construction with that in Deut. xxiii, 15, in which the word *thee* denotes not Israel as a nation but each individual of the nation. And what proof is there that it has not the same meaning in that place also? Examples of this partitive sense of the word *thee* in such commandments might be multiplied to almost any extent. We give but two or three in addition. "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's landmark, which they of old time have set in thine inheritance, which thou shalt inherit in the land the Lord thy God giveth *thee* to possess it." (Deut. xix, 14.) Here of course *thee* refers to each individual owner or heir in the land of Israel. "Every man shall give as he is able, according to the blessing of the Lord thy God which he hath given *thee*;" i.e. each man. (Deut. xvi, 17.) The same phraseology is used in precepts regulating the conduct of the Israelites toward each other. "Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, and hide thyself from them: thou shalt in any case bring them to thy brother. And if thy brother be not nigh to *thee*—(does this mean if thy brother does not dwell in the land of *Israel*?)—if thy brother be not nigh to *thee*—(is not a near neighbor)—or if thou know him not, then thou shalt bring it to thine own house, and it shall be with *thee* (with whom?—*Israel*? or with the land of *Israel*?—or with this man, in his own house?) it shall be with thee until thy brother seek after it, and thou shalt restore it to him again." (Deut. xxii, 1,2.)

These instances will suffice to show that the use of the word *thee* in the passage under consideration does not prove that the precept relates solely to fugitives from surrounding nations to the land of Israel, but may refer as well to fugitives from one part of Israel to another. If it had been intended to apply solely to the former, we can not but think that it would have been made thus explicit by a qualifying clause; that it would have read "Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant which is escaped to thee from his master"—*from any of the nations which are round about thee*. Such a phrase is used in another instance where it is even superfluous: "Ye shall not go after other gods, *of the gods of the people which are round about you*." Why was not this explanatory clause inserted? The precepts of Moses are given with much precision; and special care is taken to discriminate in various ways between different classes of servants and the claims of their masters upon them. Why then if Moses meant only fugitives from among the heathen, did he not say so in a single word. But what has Moses said? He has given an unqualified injunction *not* to return the fugitive servant to his master; it is so plain that he that runs may read, and the obvious reading accords with every man's humane feelings and moral convictions, and with the entire legislation of Moses upon this subject, which, as Prof. Stuart says, "provided for many mitiga-

tions of the usual rigors of slavery." And the utmost that the ingenuity of learning can do to counteract this obvious meaning—the meaning which every man's heart tells him *must* be true—is to torture and twist that little word *thee*, so as to make it limit a command which is universal in its spirit, its reason, and its terms, and limit it against liberty, and against the genius of the Mosaic institutes which guarded and promoted liberty. We submit whether common sense is not better than learning so employed; yet it is not learning, it is not criticism, that begets such an interpretation, and sacred learning and the science of Biblical criticism should not be held accountable for it.

The ancient Hebrew doctors took a different view of this passage from that which Prof. Stuart has taken. They applied it to the case of Judaized servants of Hebrew masters, when threatened with removal from the land of Judea; as well as to fugitives from heathen masters. According to Selden, no mean authority in Hebrew antiquities, if a Hebrew master removed from the land of Israel to any other country, he could not compel his servant to go with him, if that servant was a Hebrew or had become in faith a Jew; and if the master should attempt to compel his servant to go with him and the servant should flee from him, the servant was safe in any part of Israel; the whole land and every part of it was his sanctuary. The master could not recover a fugitive in such a case.* Thus the Hebrew doctors made a broader application of the command in Deut. xxiii, 15 than is given to it by Prof. Stuart; yet there seems to be no just ground for even the limitation which they put upon it.

Count *Pastoret*, in his elaborate history of legislation, understands this prohibition to surrender the fugitive to be universal; and his opinion is the more valuable because it comes from one accustomed to the interpretation of laws, and who wrote not as a theologian, nor as a controversialist, but as an historian. Alluding to the servant who had been enfranchised by six years service, he says, "It is for such an one, or rather for *all* slaves, (the Scripture does not particularize,) that the Lord forbids the Israelite with whom one of these shall take refuge, to deliver him to his master, and commands to let him rest in the city which he shall choose as an asylum."† This opinion is fortified by quotations from Jewish authorities.

The author of the article in *Kitto's Cyclopædia* on Hebrew slavery, quotes this very passage to prove that among the Hebrews, "servants had the power of changing their masters, and of seeking protection where they pleased." Drs. Scott, Marsh, Wayland, and other judicious interpreters, take the same view.

* De Jure Nat. et Gent. juxta Discipl. Hebr. b. vi, c. 8, p. 745.

† Histoire de la Legislation, Tom. iii.

The learned, therefore, do not all agree with Prof. Stuart in his interpretation of this passage, and as we have before said, the unlearned are competent to judge for themselves of its meaning. Was it not an universal law, designed to give the slave security against the cruelty of his master, and, by rendering slavery insecure, to hasten its final abolition?

It is important to notice in this connection, that this is the *only* law respecting fugitives to be found in the institutes of Moses. Prof. Stuart assumes, or rather guesses, that there was a different law relating to the servants of Hebrew masters, but he does not tell us where it may be found, and we are sure that it can not be found in the Pentateuch. He says, "if the fugitive had been a Hebrew servant, belonging to a Hebrew, the whole face of the thing would be changed. Restoration, or restitution, if we may judge by the tenor of the other property-laws among the Hebrews, would have surely been enjoined. . . . Reclamation of him could be *lawfully* made, and therefore must be enforced." But where *is* the law under which reclamation could be made? Why do we not find it in the statute-book? Why did not Prof. Stuart produce it? He argues that fugitives could have been recovered under the *property*-laws given by Moses. But was this so? Were slaves among the Hebrews regarded as property, in such a sense that they could be recovered under a mere property-law in which they were not named? Have not slaves always been regarded as a peculiar species of property requiring special legislation? Suppose that the Constitution of the United States, instead of providing for the return of "fugitives from service," simply provided that property taken without permission from one state to another should be restored to its rightful owner; would any man dream of recovering a fugitive slave under such a law? Though slaves are regarded as property in the states in which they are held, a fugitive slave could not be reclaimed under any national law relating to strayed or stolen property, but only under a specific law relating to slaves. There was no such law among the Hebrews, and no property-law could by any possibility cover the case. The servant of a Hebrew was the property of his master in a very limited sense,—the property was in his service rather than in his person. If a Hebrew, he could go free after six years service, and his master must provide him an outfit; if a foreigner, though the Hebrews had permission to make continual drafts upon the heathen for slaves (Lev. xxv, 46, where 'for-ever' refers not to individual slaves in perpetuity, but to slaves *in perpetuo* from a certain class), yet he too might go free in the year of jubilee, when liberty was to be proclaimed "throughout all the land, to all the inhabitants thereof." (Lev. xxv, 10.) Such a proclamation at the south every fiftieth year, would materially change the character of slave-property.

Moreover the foreigner enslaved among the Hebrews, by embracing the Jewish religion, became entitled to many immunities in common with Hebrew servants. It is absurd to suppose that slaves held by such a tenure could have been reclaimed as fugitives under any property-law in the statute book of the Hebrew nation. Moses never regarded slaves as "chattels" or "things;" least of all did he so regard *Hebrew* servants, who could themselves hold property; and yet it is of such that Prof. Stuart says, they could have been reclaimed under *property-laws*. This is directly against the Mosaic laws on slavery. There was but *one* statute applicable to fugitive servants, and that prohibited their being sent back to the master *in any case, or upon any condition whatever*. It was the design of Moses by this and every other law upon the subject, to abolish slavery at the earliest day.

This law is as binding in its principle and spirit now as then: the *reason* for it still exists, and there is no safer canon of criticism than that which has always been a favorite canon with Prof. Stuart, "*manente ratione, manet ipsa lex.*" Prof. Stuart assigns two reasons for making such a law in favor of fugitives from among the heathen. "The first was, that the treatment of slaves among the heathen was far more severe and rigorous, than it could lawfully be under the Mosaic law. The heathen master possessed the power of life and death, of scourging, or imprisoning, or putting to excessive toil, even to any extent that he pleased. Not so among the Hebrews. *Humanity* pleaded, then, for the protection of the fugitive. The second and most important consideration was, that only among the Hebrews could the fugitive slave come to the knowledge and worship of the only living and true God."

But he argues that our relations to the South are not analogous to the relations of the Hebrews to the surrounding heathen, but to the relations of the different tribes of Israel toward each other. "A bond-man, fleeing from them to us, is a case of just the same kind as would have been presented among the Hebrews, if a Hebrew bond-man had fled from the tribe of Judah to that of Benjamin. (But we have seen that in such a case there was no law by which a fugitive could be reclaimed.) We do *not* send back the refugee from the South to a *heathen* nation or tribe. There is many a *Christian* master there, and many too who deal with their servants as immortal beings." Very true; there are Christian masters scattered through the South. And so in the course of time there were many devout and kind Hebrew masters scattered among the surrounding heathen nations. Will Prof. Stuart inform us whether a fugitive to "*thee,*" from a *Hebrew* master residing in a *heathen* nation, should have been delivered up to his master or protected from him? According to his view of the *property-laws* among the Hebrews, such a fugi-

tive must have been surrendered to his master; but that would have been to send him out of *thee*—"land of Israel," which Prof. Stuart admits, was expressly forbidden. How could this conflict of laws have been adjusted?

But passing this, we will proceed to test the law in Deut. xxiii, 15, by the principle that a law stands while the reason for it remains. The reasons given by Prof. Stuart for such a law touching the slaves of heathen masters are—1. That slavery existed in a much worse form among the heathen than among the Hebrews; and 2. That among the heathen, slaves could not come to the knowledge of God.

Is then the condition of slaves at the south in any respect like that of slaves among the heathen in the time of Moses? Upon this point Prof. Stuart shall be our witness; he has visited the South, and his testimony on this point may be presumed to be impartial. In the same pamphlet from which the previous extracts were made, he says, "As existing among us, slavery has taken its worst form; it degrades men made in the image of their God and Redeemer, into brute-beasts, or (which makes them still lower) converts them into mere *goods* and *chattels*."

Does then the law which forbade the Hebrews to send back a fugitive slave to a servitude "more severe and rigorous" than that which was tolerated by Moses, require or permit us to send back a fugitive to slavery in "its *worst* form?"

"In this form of slavery," he continues, "all the sacred, social relations of life are destroyed. Husband and wife, parent and child, brother and sister, are not known in law, nor protected nor cognized by it. In conformity with this, these relations are every day severed by some slave-dealers, without regard to the feelings of the wretched beings who are torn asunder; and all their parental, conjugal, and filial sympathies, are the subject of scorn if not of derision. No invasion of human rights can be worse than this; none more directly opposed to the will of God, inscribed upon the pages of the Scriptures, and on the very nature of mankind." And does a law that prohibited the surrender of fugitives from heathen masters, sanction or permit the surrender of men and women who have fled to us from such a state of brutality and cruelty as is here described?

But to proceed with Prof. Stuart's specification of the evils of American slavery. "As the inevitable consequence of this, the mass of slaves must live, and do live in a virtual state of concubinage; which, so far from being restrained, is often encouraged for the sake of increasing slave property." A further consequence of this violation of the conjugal relation is, "a widely diffused profligacy and licentiousness;" of which the Professor says, "If there were no other argument against slavery, this alone would be amply sufficient to secure the reprobation of it, in the eyes of

every impartial and enlightened Christian man." Shall we then compel men and women who have taken refuge among us, and who are living in the sacred relation of husband and wife, to return to this horrible state of profligacy and pollution? Does not "*Humanity* plead for the protection of the fugitive?" If there was anything worse than this in heathen slavery in the time of Moses, we know not what it could have been.

But we must not forget the second reason which Prof. Stuart assigns for the prohibition to surrender fugitives from heathen masters; viz. that among the Hebrews alone could the slave come to the knowledge of the true God. Now, according to Prof. Stuart, what is the prospect that a slave at the South will come to the knowledge of God? "Ignorance profound, and nearly universal, is the inevitable lot of the great mass of all who are held in bondage. In some of the states, the learning even to *read* is forbidden; thus contravening, with a high hand, the command of Heaven to search the Scriptures." In such a case, obedience to a human law is crime; it is treason against the Majesty of heaven and earth. [Let us hear Prof. Stuart, by the way, on the "higher law." "There is a law then, higher than human law. There is a case—and of that case, not Prof. Stuart only but any slave on a southern plantation is a competent judge—there is at least *one* case or class of cases, in which "*obedience to a human law is crime*;" and why? Because "it is treason against the Majesty of heaven and earth." Let Prof. Stuart be heard on the "higher law" of conscience! "Not only the temporal, but the eternal welfare of the slaves is often grievously neglected." And does a law which forbade the sending back of fugitives into heathen ignorance, require or permit us—who are commanded to give the Gospel to every creature—to send back our fellow men to a state in which "ignorance profound" shall be their "inevitable lot," in which they shall be forbidden to read God's word, and in which in all probability their eternal welfare will be "*grievously neglected*?"

Such is American Slavery as depicted by Prof. Stuart.* But is there no mitigation of the picture? May we not discriminate in favor of Christian masters? Alas! the horrid picture has no relief; for says the Professor, "*Slavery in its best attitude in our country, even among humane and Christian masters, is a degradation of a whole class of the community, below their proper rank as men.*" Well may he exclaim, "Enough, and more than enough, on this painful—this revolting subject. When a true hearted Christian runs his eye over such an assemblage of evils, which of necessity stand connected with our present system of slavery, is it possible that he can have a doubt as to what Christianity demands?"

* For the preceding quotations, see *Conscience and the Constitution*, pp. 104-106.

We thank Prof. Stuart for alluding to the demands of *Christianity* in such a connection. He elsewhere expresses still more strongly what is here implied; viz. that the *principles* of Christianity against slavery supersede all the *precedents* in its favor alleged from the Old Testament. "If we appeal to the patriarchs to justify slavery, then why not appeal to them in order to justify polygamy and concubinage? Undoubtedly they neither thought nor intended to do wrong in either of the cases that are before us. But this will not justify us in imitating them. The Gospel has given us better light. . . . Perhaps we may see, before we are through, that slavery is as little commanded or even permitted by the highest form of Christianity, as those practices. . . What Christ has *commanded* is our rule; and not what the patriarchs *did*, who lived when the light was just beginning to dawn."* This may serve as an offset to what Prof. Stuart seems to teach on page 32, of our obligation by compact to respect "the *legal* right of the master, *whatever we may think of his claim when viewed in the light of Christianity*;" and also to his own narrow interpretation of Deut xxiii, 15. If that command had originally the limits which Prof. Stuart would assign to it, then by his own showing the principles of Christianity have enlarged its margin, or have even superseded it altogether by their clearer light.

But that command had no such limitation. Words are to be taken in their *fullest meaning*, unless there is something in the nature of the subject, or in the context, or in the specific reference and occasion, or in the usage of the writer, to restrict that meaning. This principle lies at the foundation of all our interpretation of language. Especially does it apply to the interpretation of laws; it is the only safe and just rule by which a statute can be interpreted. Now here is a law which in its language is absolute and universal;—nothing could be more so. "*Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant which is escaped from his master to thee.*" It is impossible to frame a proposition more general than this. There is no class of servants specified; it reads, "*the servant*," which is *any* servant. The law makes no distinction in favor of a class of masters, and it makes no provision for compensating the master. It declares without any qualification, that *the* fugitive servant shall not be surrendered to *his* master, whoever that master may be. So the law reads; and it must be taken as it reads, unless good reason can be shown to the contrary. But what warrant is there for limiting the application of the law? There is none in the language itself, none in the usage of the author, none in any specialties of the case, none in the context, none in any known facts, none in the subject for

* Conscience and the Constitution, pp. 25-26.

which the law was made. The law as it stands, is in perfect harmony with all the legislation of Moses with respect to slavery. Says *Pastoret*, "Among no people have slaves received so much of the kind superintendence of law as among the Hebrews. Moses conformed to an existing state of things in tolerating slavery, but by keeping it within strict limits, he sought to harmonize its rigor with the benevolence of the Supreme. Slavery among the Hebrews terminated by redemption, by enfranchisement, by due course of law, by the death of the master, if a Gentile or proselyte, and by his death without issue, if a Hebrew." Is it credible that the author of such a code for the regulation of slavery—a code which, by the severest penalties, guarded the servant from the oppression and cruelty of his master, and which provided in so many ways for the emancipation of the servant, both voluntarily and compulsorily on the part of the master—is it credible that the author of such a code regarded servants as *chattels*, and left them in any case to be disposed of by the laws of property? Did he who with his own hand wrote that man was made in the image of God, regard man as *property* or a *thing*? The laws of Moses were given in the wilderness, to a people just escaped from bondage, and who therefore had no slaves; they were given in anticipation of the introduction of slavery among that people when they should come to be settled as conquerors in Canaan; they were given to restrain the lust of conquest and oppression, and to hedge in as much as possible the natural tendency of the emancipated to retaliate upon others the cruelties of their own bondage,—to prevent the Israelites from becoming to each other and to the Canaanites what the Egyptians had been to the Israelites; they were given in order, by a qualified and an onerous permission, to secure the overthrow of a system which, as the times and the people were, could not have been shut out by an absolute prohibition. And as the crowning act of legislation for the ultimate overthrow of an evil tolerated from necessity, it was decreed that no fugitive from slavery should ever be delivered up to his master. The slave was at liberty to escape from his master whenever he desired to better his condition, and in whatever part of Israel he should choose an asylum, there was he to be allowed to remain without molestation. Such was the *only* statute in the Hebrew institutes respecting "fugitives from service." It is an honor to the wisdom and the benevolence of its author; and shows that we should neither "consign Moses over to reprobation," nor "regard him as an *ignoramus*," however much Prof. Stuart's comments upon the Hebrew law-giver might dispose us to either. The principle of that law remains,—eclaircised by the Golden Rule of Christianity into a law for all time: "THOU SHALT NOT DELIVER TO HIS MASTER THE SERVANT WHICH IS ESCAPED FROM HIS MASTER TO THEE."

Should the slaveholder here ask, what redress we would give to one whose slave has escaped from him, we would commend to him the wisdom of Diogenes. When a slave ran away from Diogenes he would not pursue him, but observed, that it would be a frightful thing if Diogenes could not do without the slave, since the slave could do without Diogenes. Let the master prove himself to be as independent as the slave; and if the slave cares nothing about him, let him show the world that he cares nothing about the slave.

But it is claimed that we have the example of an Apostle for sending back a slave to his master, and therefore that this is a *Christian* duty. We will let Prof. Stuart state the case.

“What did Paul do at Rome? A slave of Philemon, at Colosse, ran away and came to Rome. There he was converted to Christianity under Paul’s preaching. The Apostle was so pleased with him, that he was desirous to retain him as a friend and a helper. Did he tell the slave that he had a right, nay, that it was his duty, to keep away from his master, and stay with him? Not at all. He sent back Onesimus, the slave, to his master, (Phil. v. 12,) and he tells the master, that he could not venture to retain Onesimus without knowing whether he would consent, v. 14. ‘Perhaps,’ says the Apostle, ‘he departed for a season, that thou shouldst receive him forever.’ He then expressed his ardent desire that Onesimus may be treated with great kindness, and as a *Christian* ought to be treated.

“What now have we here? Paul, sending back a *Christian* servant, who had run away, to his *Christian* master; and this even when Paul had such an estimation of the servant, that he much desired to keep him as a helper, while he himself was in bonds for the gospel’s sake. Yet he would not continue to do this, although it was so desirable to him. He enjoins it upon Onesimus to return to his master forever. This last phrase has reference to the fact, that Paul supposed that the sense of *Christian* obligation, which was now entertained by Onesimus, would prevent him from ever repeating his offense. And all this too, when Philemon, being an active and zealous Christian, would in a moment have submitted to any command of Paul respecting Onesimus. Why then did Paul send him back? There is only one answer to be given, viz., that Paul’s Christian conscience would not permit him to injure the vested rights of Philemon. He could not think of keeping the servant, even to minister as a friend to his own necessities while in prison. Paul’s conscience, then, like his doctrines, was very different from that of the abolitionists. Paul’s conscience sent back the fugitive slave; theirs encourages him to run away, and then protects him in the misdeed, yea, justifies, applauds, glorifies him, as a noble, independent fellow. The conscience of Paul sends back the fugitive, without any obligation at all on the ground of compact; theirs encourages and protects his escape in the face of the most solemn national compact.”—*Conscience and the Constitution*, pp. 60, 61.

In considering the case of Onesimus, the first question which arises is, *Was Onesimus a slave in the common acceptation of that term?*

There can be no doubt that Onesimus had run away from the service of Philemon, a citizen of Colosse in Phrygia, and had come to Rome, where Paul was at that time a prisoner, though not in close confinement. Onesimus had seen Paul at the house of his master, and either being in want, or desiring to see a fa-

miliar face, or becoming thoughtful on the subject of religion, or for some unknown reason, he came to Paul, who received him kindly and instructed him till he was brought to repentance and faith in Christ, and who then sent him back to Philemon, with a letter of intercession and commendation. In this way he is introduced to us, and all our knowledge of him must be derived from this epistle. In v. 16 of the epistle, there is an allusion to the relation which had subsisted between Onesimus and Philemon. Paul exhorts Philemon to receive Onesimus "not now as a *servant*, but above a servant, a brother beloved." It is plain therefore, that Onesimus had been a *servant* of Philemon; and the question is important, what that state of service was. Was Onesimus a *slave*, in our sense of the word;—i. e., "a person who is wholly subject to the will of another;—one whose person and services are wholly under the control of another." We do not affirm that he was *not* a slave; but no one, with any pretensions to scholarship, would attempt to prove that Onesimus was a slave, from the mere fact that he is spoken of as a servant, (*δοῦλον*.)

The whole question here turns upon the meaning of the Greek word *δοῦλος*, (*doulos*,) which in our version is translated by the term, *servant*. This meaning is to be ascertained from a comparison of the places in which the word is used in the New Testament, and from the common use of the term in Greek writers with respect to a then existing class of society. We shall consider it, therefore, exegetically and historically.

If we should speak of one as a *slave* there would be no mistaking his position; the term itself would define it. But if we should speak of one as a *servant*, it could not be known from the word whether he were a slave or a voluntary servant; for though every slave is a servant, not every servant is a slave. Or if we should speak of one as having been a slave or a servant in a remote period, *e. g.*, in feudal times, one could not fully understand his position till he had learned something of the state of society and the modes of service *at that time*. Now we affirm of the word *δοῦλος*, as commonly used in the New Testament, that it does not answer *generically* to the English word *slave*, but rather, as it is given in the English Bible, to the word *servant*. This will be plain from a few examples. In Matt. xx, 27, Christ says to his disciples, "whosoever will be chief among you, (*ἔστω ἑμῶν δοῦλος*,) let him be your *servant*;" but the disciples of Christ do not sustain toward each other the relation of slaves. Acts ii, 18. "And on my servants, (*τοὺς δούλους μου*,) and on my handmaidens, I will pour out in those days of my Spirit;" but God does not call his people his *slaves*.

Acts xvi, 17. "The same," i. e. the female soothsayer at Philippi, "followed Paul and us, and cried, saying, these men are the *servants* of the most high God, (*δούλοι τοῦ θεοῦ*,) which show

to us the way of salvation." How absurd to have called them slaves! Rom. i, 1. "Paul a *servant* of Jesus Christ" (*δοῦλος Ἰη. Χρ.*) Was Paul the *slave* of Christ or his willing servant? Again and again he speaks of himself as the servant of Christ, using always the same word.

So James begins his epistle (i, 1), "James a *servant* (*δοῦλος*) of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ." In the first verse of the Apocalypse this word is twice used: suppose we should read that verse thus—"The Revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave to him, to show to his *slaves* things which must shortly come to pass; and he sent and signified it by his angel to his *slave* John." Does not every one see the violence of such an interpretation?

In the same book the prophets (x, 7) and the martyrs (xix, 2) are called the *servants* of God. Did their relation to God resemble that of *slaves*, or of free-servants? Yet they were *δοῦλοι*. To crown all, we read in Rev. xxii, 3, that in heaven "there shall be no more curse; but the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it; and his *servants* shall serve him." Will the condition of the redeemed in heaven be in any respect analogous to that of *slaves* upon earth? Yet they will be the servants (*δοῦλοι*) of God.

It is evident therefore that the generic meaning of the term *δοῦλος* is expressed not by the word slave, but by the word servant. It is often applied to the *voluntary service* of the followers and worshipers of God, and of the followers and ministers of Christ, implying obedience, devotedness, fidelity and the like, but without the remotest allusion to a state of slavery. The fact therefore that Paul speaks of Onesimus as a *δοῦλος* is not in itself proof that Onesimus was a *slave*, any more than Paul was a slave, or anything like a slave when he called himself a *δοῦλος* of the Lord Jesus Christ. The generic meaning of the word in the prevailing usage of the New Testament is *servant* and not slave, though in some instances the context requires that the latter meaning should be given to the word.

It is a significant fact in this connection, that while the word *δοῦλος* occurs one hundred and twenty-two times in the New Testament, it is not once translated in our Bible by the term slave, but always by the term servant, except in one or two instances where the word *bondman* is used to heighten a contrast. The qualifying clause in 1 Tim. vi, 1, *under the yoke* (*δοῦλοι ἐπὶ ζυγόν*) shows that *δοῦλοι* alone did not define a state of servitude. In the opinion of the scholars who made our excellent version the word *δοῦλος* does not mean specifically a slave, but a servant in general; and this opinion has the more weight because the translation was made long before the morality of slavery began to be discussed in England, while slave-trading and slave-holding were practised by Christians without compunction, and therefore the word servant was chosen by the translators for philological rea-

sons only,—not because they had a point to carry, but because that word expressed the meaning of the original.

De Wette, who perhaps stands at the head of German expositors for critical knowledge and philological accuracy, translates the word *δοῦλος*, not by the German word *slave* or *slave*, but by the word *knecht*, which means a man-servant, especially one employed upon a farm,—and also a workman or journeyman at a trade. The precise difference between the two terms is this; “the right of a master over a *knecht* can extend only so far as to require from him that labor or service *which he has pledged himself to render*: but the *slave* is not only bound to do every kind of labor for his master, but all he has or acquires, nay, even his own person is subjected to him.”* This eminent scholar, so nice in the selection of words, in choosing a term to express the meaning of the Greek *δοῦλος*, rejects *slave* and takes *knecht*, the word which is used also in the German version of the New Testament. And since *De Wette* lived in a country where the subject of slavery is not agitated as it is with us, we have every reason to regard this as his unbiassed opinion as an interpreter: indeed, he was too jealous of his reputation as a scholar to have allowed any personal prejudice to have biassed him upon such a point.

From the philological view of the case we turn to another, viz.: the historical view. What light does the institution of slavery as it actually existed among the Greeks shed on the point before us? We say among the *Greeks*, because Philemon was a Greek, and a citizen of a Grecian state, and although at the date of this epistle the Roman empire extended over Asia Minor, it is not probable that in domestic institutions the Roman law superseded as yet the laws and usages of conquered provinces, any more than the Roman mythology and worship superseded theirs. We know that in Judea social customs and institutions were not molested by the conquerors; and we certainly should not form our idea of Greek slavery at this period from the code of Justinian, of a much later date. The Greek slave was commonly in a better condition than the Roman, and was more frequently manumitted. Roman slavery was slavery in its most absolute form, giving the master unconditional control over the person, the services and the life of the slave; but this power was somewhat restrained, and the whole system ameliorated, by the enactments of several of the emperors. The slave could not hold property; yet in large business transactions, which were sometimes committed to his care, a *peculium* was allowed him. Among the Greeks, or at least in Athens and in some affiliated states, the life and person of the slave were protected by law; a person who struck or maltreated

* Adler's Lexicon.

a slave was liable to an action; and a slave could not be put to death without a *legal* sentence. If a master was cruel, the slave could take refuge in the Theseion, and there remain till he could procure his transfer to a new master; for any one who conducted himself too harshly toward his slaves was by law compelled to sell them. A slave could even indict his master for assault and battery, and men were put to death for crimes against their bondmen as for crimes against their fellow citizens. Slaves were often hired out by their masters to work in mines, in agriculture, or in manufactures; and in such cases they sometimes worked on their own account, paying their masters a certain sum, or a percentage. In this way slaves sometimes amassed considerable property. Slaves acquired by conquest remained fixed to the soil, like the serfs in feudal times, but those obtained by purchase could be transported from place to place. Such in general was the state of slavery among the Greeks.*

We come now to a fact of much importance to the case in hand. Archbishop Potter of Canterbury, in his Greek Archæology—a work which passed rapidly through six editions in England, and was translated into foreign languages—speaking of slavery in Athens, says, “*Slaves*, as long as they were under the government of a master, were called *οικέται*, (*oiketai*,) but after their freedom was granted them, they were *δούλοι*, (*douloi*,) not being, like the former, a part of their master’s estate, but only obliged to some grateful acknowledgments and small services, such as were required of the *μέτοικοι*, to whom they were in some few things inferior; but seldom arrived to the dignity of citizens, especially if they had received their freedom from a private person, and not upon a public account.”† This testimony is the more reliable from the manner in which it is introduced. Bishop Potter wrote his antiquities upward of a century ago, before the modern discussions about slavery, and therefore without any bias from these; his work is one simply of antiquarian research, and in giving an account of slavery as it existed in Athens, he makes incidentally the remark quoted above. He is not trying to settle the meaning of *δούλος*—that does not seem to have been in his mind—but in writing a history of Athenian slavery, he finds that there were two classes of servants, one called *οικέται*, who were absolute slaves, and another called *δούλοι*, of which were *quondam* slaves,—*freed-men* or servants under limited obligations,—a class lower than the native born citizen, but higher than the slave. He states the fact, and gives his authority by citations from the Greek classics. But this fact does not rest upon the sole authority of Archbishop Potter. *Eschenburg* in his *Manual of Classical Lit-*

* Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, and St. John, History of the Manners and Customs of Ancient Greece.

† Vol. 1, p. 68.

erature—a work of high authority—makes nearly the same statement. “The slaves,” he says, using the term *δοῦλοι* generically, “were of different sorts, those belonging to the public, and those belonging to private citizens (*οἰκέται*). The latter were completely in the power of the master, and were often treated with great severity. Yet they sometimes purchased freedom by their own earnings, or received it by gift as a reward for merit. Public slaves also were often set at liberty, when they had rendered the state some valuable service. *Freedmen* very seldom, if ever, obtained the rights of *citizens*, and were still termed *δοῦλοι*.”*

Other standard writers on Greek antiquities give the same view. Prof. Edwards of Andover—who has written the most thorough and elaborate article upon Slavery in Ancient Greece which has yet appeared in this country, an article which has been republished and extensively circulated in Great Britain—adopts without qualification the statement of Potter that the *δοῦλοι* were not a part of their master’s estate, but were only required to render some small services, and that the name *δοῦλοι* was applied to slaves “after their freedom was granted them.”†

Anacharsis, describing slavery among the Greeks, says:—

“The laws gave protection to the slave; but when slaves were intelligent or had promising talents, interest guarded them better than the law; they enriched themselves by obtaining a part of the salary they received from one and another. These profits being multiplied, put them in a position to procure protection, to live in revolting luxury, and to join insolent pretensions to base ideas. . . . No one could injure another’s slave, under severe penalties. . . . When a slave was freed, he did not enter into the class of citizens, but of *domicilii*, who resembled citizens in their liberty, and slaves in the little consideration they enjoyed. The *domicilii* to the number of about ten thousand, were strangers fixed with their families in Athens, for the most part employed in trades or in the marine service, protected by the government, without participating in it; free but independent; useful to the republic, which dreaded them because it dreaded liberty when separated from a love of country; despised by the people who were jealous of the distinctions of citizenship. These had each to choose from the citizens a patron who became responsible for their conduct, and paid into the treasury a yearly tribute of twelve drachmas for the head of the family and six for their children. They lost their property when they did not comply with the first, and their liberty if they did not comply with the second; but if they rendered signal service to the state, they obtained exemption from tribute.”‡

Xenophon, in his Athenian Republic, says:—“The licentiousness of slaves and of aliens at Athens is excessive; none are allowed to strike them; nor will the slave yield to the freeman.” . . . He also speaks of the importance of “an equality of rights to slaves and freemen.”

St. John speaks of a class of serfs in *Crete*, lying off the coast of Phrygia, analogous to the *domicilii* of *Anacharsis*; who “were compelled to furnish the body of the citizens a certain sum of money, together with a part of their flocks and herds and agricultural produce. . . . These were sufficiently numerous and powerful to inspire their masters with dread.” . . . In *Thessaly*, also, there was a large class of “*voluntary villeins*” who cultivated the land subject to a yearly tribute.§

* p. 180.

† *Bib. Rep.*, Vol. V, p. 155.‡ *Travels*, Vol. II.§ *Manners and Customs of Ancient Greece*, Vol. III, pp. 62, 64.

The same author gives an extended vocabulary of names applied to slaves according to their condition. With reference to the distinction referred to by Potter, he says:—"Chrysippos makes a distinction between *οικέτης* and *δοῦλος*, but without much foundation;" but he then adds, "the term *οικέτης* [and the same would hold true, therefore, of *δοῦλος*] was applied to any person employed about a house, *whether slave or free.*"*

Some lexicographers, we are aware, regard *slave* as the primitive meaning of *δοῦλος*; and where authorities differ, we would not hazard an opinion. But the facts adduced above cannot be gainsaid; and these fully establish our position on the subject, viz., that so various were the classes of servants among the Greeks, and so various the uses of the term *δοῦλος*, that the application of that term to Onesimus by no means proves that he was a *slave*. Is not the presumption rather that he was a servant in some other capacity? especially as it is intimated in the 18th verse that he was in *debt* to Philemon, which would have been more likely if he was a hired servant, than if he was absolutely a slave. We do not affirm that he was *not* a slave; but it would be well for those who are eager to testify their regard for Apostolic example by sending back fugitives from slavery, and especially for those political journalists who read homilies upon this as a Christian duty, to settle first the point whether Onesimus ever was a slave. Till this is done we might rest the argument, for the burden of proof lies on the other side; but we are willing to waive this advantage and proceed to a second query.

Did Paul send back Onesimus *authoritatively* to his master? We will admit, for the sake of the argument, that Onesimus was a slave. Did the Apostle use any authority or coercion in order to return him to his master? There is no evidence that Paul even *urged* Onesimus to return to Philemon. Nothing could be plainer than that the return of Onesimus was voluntary. Paul, himself a prisoner, could use no force to restore a fugitive servant to his master. Paul was neither a commissioner from the court, nor a marshal, nor a deputy marshal, nor a *sub-commissioner*, empowered to summon the *posse comitatus* to arrest a fugitive, and under a thousand dollar bond to have him delivered over to his master; nor was he under the temptation of a five dollar fee to inform of a fugitive and secure his arrest. Whatever Paul did to promote the return of Onesimus to Philemon was simply in the way of advice and of friendly offices between the two. The phrase "whom I have *sent* again," requires nothing more than this; for Paul uses the same of his fellow-laborers, who were at different times his willing messengers to the churches, *e. g.*, "I suppose it necessary to *send* to you Epaphroditus my brother, and companion in labor." (Phil. ii, 25.) "All my state shall Tychicus de-

* Manners and Customs of Ancient Greece, Vol. III, p. 27.

clare to you, who is a beloved brother, and a faithful minister and fellow-servant in the Lord: whom I have *sent* to you for the same purpose, that he might know your estate." (Col. iv, 7, 8.) There is no evidence that Onesimus was *sent* in a manner different from that in which Epaphroditus and Tychicus were sent by Paul upon errands of love. It is evident, that Paul *did not at once send back Onesimus* to his master;—not till Onesimus was converted, and had been for some time "profitable" or useful to himself as a ministering brother. He does not seem to have thought of sending him back until this change took place in his character. He did not, therefore, send him back simply because he was a "fugitive held to service" in another state, nor did he send him by authority or any manner of constraint.

The whole letter of Paul to Philemon is entirely consistent with the supposition that Onesimus had proposed to return. This he may have been led to do by the change which had taken place in his character, causing him to feel that he had wronged Philemon by robbery or fraud, or by some abuse of trust for which he desired now to make reparation; or he may have wished to rejoin his family and acquaintances at Colosse, or he may have been pinched for the means of living in a strange city. It is quite evident that Onesimus went back willingly or he would not have gone at all—for nobody compelled him to return. The utmost that Paul could do was to *urge* him to go back, and there is no proof that he did even this, or anything more than to second the proposal of Onesimus himself to return. Paul undertook to negotiate with Philemon for the return of Onesimus in order to make his return easy and pleasant. Here again it lies with those who argue from this example for the *compulsory* return of fugitives—to *give the proof*.

Our third inquiry is, *In what character and for what intent* was Onesimus sent back to Philemon? Was he sent back to be again a *δούλος*, to live in the same capacity as before? Did Paul send him back to be made a slave? To answer this question satisfactorily we need only to read with care a few sentences of the letter to Philemon. "Wherefore," says the Apostle, "though I might be much bold in Christ to enjoin thee that which is convenient"—though I might command what is proper to be done toward Onesimus, and even detain him here with me, "yet for love's sake, I rather beseech thee, being such an one as Paul the aged, and now also a prisoner of Jesus Christ,"—an old man, a prisoner, might reasonably expect favors from a Christian friend,—"I beseech thee" as a personal favor, for my son Onesimus, "whom I have begotten in my bonds"—who has been converted by attending on my preaching in the prison, "which in time past was to thee unprofitable,"—a negligent and a fraudulent servant—"but now profitable," disposed to be useful "to thee and

to me : whom I have sent again ; thou therefore receive him, that is mine own bowels"—one dear to me as a son,—“whom I would have retained with me, that in thy stead he might have ministered to me in the bonds of the gospel,” rendering such friendly offices as you yourself would do if here. “But without thy mind would I do nothing ;” I would not keep him without thy free consent ; “that thy benefit”—the good which your servant would do to me—“should not be as it were of necessity, on your part, but *willingly*.” This language does not imply that Philemon had a hold upon Onesimus as his *slave*, for it is such language as one gentleman of honor and delicacy would use toward another with respect to a servant in any capacity. Suppose the servant of an old friend of the writer in New Haven should come to New York and enter into his service as a domestic ; and while in that relation should become converted, and then should acknowledge that he or she had left New Haven wrongfully, in violation of a contract, or by dissimulation and fraud. Suppose it was a girl or a boy who had been bound out to that friend and whose time had not yet expired. Would it be honorable in the writer to keep the servant in such circumstances ? Should he not write to his friend and say, “Your servant is at my house, is much changed in character and of great value to me ; but being now willing to return to you, I would on no account detain him or her without consulting your pleasure.” The language of Paul is perfectly consistent with the supposition that Onesimus was not a slave, but a freedman held by contract to certain services, which by running away he had failed to perform.

Paul next suggests that the temporary loss of Onesimus may in the end be a gain to Philemon, since he will now return with a much improved character—“For perhaps he therefore departed for a season, that thou shouldst receive him forever.”—But *how* should he receive him ? “*Not* now as a servant,” not as a slave surely, not even as a *δοῦλος*, a servant bound in any sense, “but above a *δοῦλος*—a brother beloved, specially to me, but how much more to thee, both in the flesh—as a part of thy domestic establishment—and in the Lord.” Whatever Onesimus had before been as a *δοῦλος*, that he was *not* to be hereafter. “If thou count me therefore a partner,—or an intimate friend—receive him as myself.” Paul wished moreover to have the past cancelled, so that Onesimus might be introduced to the confidence of Philemon, and so he adds, “If he hath wronged thee, or oweth thee ought, put that on mine account ; I Paul have written it with mine own hand, I will repay it.” Is it not probable that Onesimus had previously sustained the relation of a confidential servant, in which he had been unfaithful, and now Paul would not have him required even to make good that deficiency of service, but received as a brother in Christ ? It is palpable that Paul in send-

ing back Onesimus did not even dream that he should become a *slave*. Whatever relation he may hitherto have sustained to Philemon, in whatever capacity he may have served him, it was the wish of Paul that he should not be treated as in that inferior relation, but received as a Christian brother and an equal. Such is the plain sense of the letter; such the impression which it makes on every candid mind. This is also the interpretation of the ablest Biblical commentators, such as DeWette of Germany and Mr. Barnes of our own country. The view of the latter is so appropriate that we will give it in his own words.

“It would be impossible for Philemon to comply with the wishes breathed forth in this letter, and meet exactly the desires of Paul in the case, and yet retain Onesimus as a slave, or regard him as property, as a ‘chattel’—as a ‘thing.’ For *if* he had been formerly a slave; if this is the fair meaning of the word δούλος—then this is expressly declared. Thus in v. 16 he is commanded to receive him *not now as a servant*—οὐκέτι ὡς δούλον. If he had been a slave before he did not *wish* that he should be received as such now, or regarded as such any longer. How *could* Philemon comply with the wish of the Apostle and yet regard Onesimus as a slave? The very attempt to do it would be directly in the face of the expressed desire of Paul, and every moment he held him as such he would be disregarding his wishes. He desired him to receive and treat him, in all respects, as a Christian brother—as one redeemed, as a man:—*above a servant, a brother beloved!* How could he do this, and yet regard and treat him as a slave? *Is* it treating one as a Christian brother to hold him as property; to deprive him of freedom; to consider him an article of merchandize; to exact his labor without compensation? Would the man himself who makes another a slave suppose that *he* was treated as a Christian brother, if *he* were reduced to that condition? Would he feel that his son was so regarded if *he* was made a slave? There are no ways of reconciling these things. It is *impossible* for a master to regard his slave as, in the proper and full sense of the phrase, ‘*a Christian brother.*’ He may, indeed, esteem him highly as a Christian; he may treat him with kindness; he may show him many favors; *but he regards him also as his slave*; and this fact makes a difference wide “as from the center thrice to the utmost pole” in his feelings toward him and other Christians. He is *not* on a level with them *as* a Christian. The notion of his being *his slave* mingles with all his feelings toward him, and gives a coloring to all his views of him. He can not but feel, if he himself is under the influence of religion, that that slave, if he were treated in all respects *as* a Christian, would be as free as himself; would have a right to his time, and skill, and liberty; would be permitted to form his own plans, and to enjoy the avails of his own labor; and would be secure from the possibility of being *sold*.

“Suppose now that Paul, after a short interval, had actually come to the residence of Philemon, as he expected to, and had found him regarding and treating Onesimus *as a slave*, would he have felt that Philemon had complied with his wishes? Did he ask this of him? Did he not request just the contrary? Would it not be natural for him to say to him that he had *not* received him as he wished him to? And how would Philemon reply to this?”

Paul desired Philemon to receive Onesimus as he would receive himself, or his son. If Paul had visited Philemon, would Philemon have clapped chains upon him and have sent him out into the field to work under the lash? or would he have held him to any sort of compulsory service? Would Philemon have

given such a reception to Timothy the adopted son of Paul? No more could he have treated Onesimus as a slave.

Our last inquiry relates to *the character of Philemon*, to whom Onesimus was returned. This is an important link in the chain of argument. If Onesimus was a fugitive slave and was sent back as such,—which we do not at all admit,—to what sort of a master was he returned? Philemon was a Christian; a convert of Paul, and an intimate personal friend of the Apostle. In this very letter Paul requests him to prepare for him a lodging against his next visit to Colosse. Paul knew him well, and had so much confidence in him as a kind and candid Christian man that he was willing to trust Onesimus in his hands. Onesimus knew him also, and was willing to go back and to put himself at the disposal of Philemon. If then Onesimus was a slave, the fact that he was sent back, *with his own consent*, to *such* a master, gives no warrant for sending back by force every fugitive slave to any and every master. The example of Paul admits of no such latitude.

We have now examined the four sections of the Fugitive Slave Bill of the New Testament. Under the first section it is doubtful whether the bill treats at all of fugitive slaves. The term *δοῦλος* does not prove it, and there is no evidence that Onesimus was a slave. Under the second section, it is plain that no authority or coercion was used to restore the fugitive slave, if such he was.

Under the third section, it is evident, that the fugitive was not sent back to be again a slave, if such he was before, but to be a freeman, a friend, and a brother in Christ: While from the fourth section it appears, that he was sent back to one who recognized his own obligations to Christ, and who would treat him according to the law of justice and the kind spirit of the gospel.

We are quite willing that this New Testament Bill should be compared section by section with any Fugitive Slave Law of a later date. We do not think there has been any improvement upon the original bill as drafted by Moses and illustrated by Paul—though we are living in a free country and in the middle of the nineteenth century. Upon that bill we take our stand. That is our law as Christians in relation to this matter. And now what is the utmost that the example of Paul requires or even warrants with respect to the surrender of fugitives from service? Admitting that Onesimus was a slave,—of which there is no adequate proof—what is the utmost which that example requires of a Christian citizen? A fugitive comes to a Christian citizen, one who is a Christian minister, (for we wish a definite and strong case,) and expresses a desire to return to his master; that master is known to be a benevolent and Christian man; the slave is quite

willing to trust himself in his hands, but wishes this minister to aid his return and to intercede for him with his master that he may be freed from certain liabilities. The minister complies with the request, and sends him back to his master, his own friend, with the earnest request that he will receive and treat him as a Christian,—just as he would treat himself. In such a case he might perhaps feel that he was imitating Paul. But suppose a man comes to him and says;

“Sir, I am a run-away slave, will you not help me to a place of safety.”

“A run-away slave! And do you come to me, a minister of the gospel, to countenance you in running away from the master whom God has placed over you? It is my duty to send you back as Paul sent back Onesimus.”

“Ah sir,” he replies, “but I am a Christian, and for the love of the Savior who bought us with his blood, I pray you have pity upon me.”

“A Christian indeed! And do you not know that it is the duty of servants to obey their masters, and that it is your duty to return to yours?”

“But, Sir, my master is cruel, and I carry with me the marks of the lash and of the brand; I can not have the Bible; I am torn away from my wife and children; how can I go back to be whipped and tortured and made wretched? I had rather die first.”

“Well, if you will not be persuaded, I must try other means;”—so seizing him by the collar, this minister of Christ calls to the bystanders, the *posse comitatus*, “What, ho! here is a run-away slave, help me to secure him for his master.” And with that they bind the struggling fugitive with ropes, and drag him to a commissioner to await the appearance of a claimant; and having thus discharged his duty to “Conscience *and* the Constitution,” he draws upon the treasury of the United States for five dollars and expenses as by law provided. Now is he not a saint? Does he not walk in the footsteps of the Apostle Paul? Is he not a glorious representative of the spirit of Christianity? Is he not a worthy follower and minister of the Lord Jesus Christ?—The slave indeed expected different treatment from a minister of Christ, but he did not know how much light has been shed upon the gospel duty of catching negroes, by the discussions of politicians and other learned and godly men.

Does any one believe that the man who wrote this epistle to Philemon would be a slave-catcher under modern law? Would Paul have laid hands upon *James Hamlet* to force him back to slavery? He would have rotted in jail first. In the time of Paul, the Roman law respecting fugitives was stringent and severe. A runaway slave could not be lawfully received or har-

bored ; to conceal him was *furtum*—theft. The master was entitled to pursue the fugitive, and it was the duty of all the authorities to aid in his arrest ; there was also a class of men called *fugitivarii*,—a despicable class, as such men must ever be,—whose business it was to recover fugitives ; and yet Paul retained Onesimus for some time as his own servant, and finally sent him back only when he was willing to go. As Christians we dare not, in this matter, go beyond the example of the Apostle Paul.

But what if the laws require us to go farther and make it penal for us to recognize a fugitive slave as a man and a Christian, and to minister to his necessities. How shall we regard such a law ? That is a question which every man must answer for himself according to the light which God has given him. We will answer it by asking another. The constitution of the republic of Chili establishes the Roman Catholic religion as the religion of the state to the exclusion of all others. Suppose that there was such an article in the Constitution of the United States—how ought we to regard it ? Suppose the law of the land, instead of guarding religious liberty, should require all citizens to worship according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church—how ought we to act under such a law ? Or suppose that Congress should pass an act legalizing polygamy or kidnapping, should we feel bound in conscience to carry out its provisions ? These questions may help to show that not every thing which is passed into a human statute is binding on the conscience before God. But how shall we act toward an unrighteous law—a law demanding what conscience and the word of God forbid ? We know how the Puritans acted under the oppressive measures of Laud and the tyrannical Stuarts, and we are accustomed to praise them, as does Hume, as the fathers of civil and religious liberty. We know how the martyrs and confessors of the Christian faith in all ages, have acted under laws that did violence to their religious convictions. These have been orderly and peaceable citizens, supporting government, making no rebellion, but choosing to suffer the *penalty* of unrighteous laws, rather than to sin against God by obeying such laws. Nearly all that is noble and heroic in history, nearly all that has been accomplished for the emancipation and the progress of the race, stands connected with the decision, the self-denial and the suffering of these conscientious, these “obstinate” men. As to what is duty toward fugitives from slavery, let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind. The laws of the free states know no such thing as a slave ; and for our part, living where personal liberty and life are made secure, we shall never acknowledge any man in the streets of our abode to be anything but a man, having the same right to walk the streets and breathe the air, the same right to protection in life, liberty,


and the pursuit of happiness, that God has given us. If to act on such a principle be an iniquity to be punished by the judge, then do we accept the penalty; saying with Paul before Festus, "for if I be an offender, or have committed anything worthy of death, I refuse not to die." The fugitive shall have bread; he shall have money; he shall have shelter; though at the cost of fines and imprisonment.

Some will denounce such language as treason, and will thereat fly into paroxysms of eloquence about the Constitution and the Union. We are quite willing to take our stand by Prof. Stuart, and say, "In such a case, obedience to a human law is crime; it is *treason* against the Majesty of Heaven and earth." The Professor applauds Dr. Palmer of Charleston, S. C., for having told Gov. Hayne, "that he should not obey the law" which forbade him to teach the blacks to read; a law which the Professor thoroughly denounces as "unlawful, anti-Christian," and "an invasion of the high prerogatives of Heaven's court." In this matter of treason, therefore, we find ourselves in excellent company both at the North and at the South. But *is it* treason simply to refuse to obey a civil law, while we offer no violence, stir up no rebellion, but accept its penalty and thus render a passive obedience? The Quakers have uniformly refused to obey any law relating to military service; yet the Quakers are everywhere most peaceable and orderly citizens. The Constitution itself is an *amendable* instrument, and in order to procure its amendment, if that is required, we must discuss the bearing of laws enacted to carry out its provisions, and if those laws are opposed to conscience, then must we peaceably but firmly oppose such laws, and suffer till the hour of full redress.

Some are perplexed because they do not find in the epistle to Philemon an express prohibition or denunciation of slavery, inasmuch as the epistle throughout borders upon the subject, and the occasion would seem to have been a fit one for expressing the mind of the Spirit with regard to this institution. But if Philemon was not in any proper sense of the term a *slave-holder*, there was no occasion to advert to the subject of slavery in a letter to him; and even if he was a slaveholder, would not the apostle have been less likely to discuss the general subject of slavery in a familiar letter to a friend than in his more formal letters to the churches? In this letter the Apostle plainly teaches Philemon his own duty, and gives him instructions which, if followed, would soon cause him to cease all connection with slavery; and it was doubtless better to approach him thus upon the side of personal friendship and Christian principle and affection, than to give him an argument against slavery in the abstract. Christ and the Apostles were more concerned to *introduce principles* into the world than to *apply* those principles to specific institutions; the

application of principles was left to time ; they were infused into society like leaven, and the progress of light and inquiry makes more palpable the meaning of the precepts of the gospel and the extent of their application. It is so with slavery. The principles of the gospel are opposed to it. Its doctrine of the unity and the essential equality of the human race—the doctrine of a true and universal brotherhood among all men made of one blood by one Father ; its doctrine of redemption for all alike, and of the absolute equality of all believers, in rights and privileges ; its precepts of charity, of justice, and of humility ; its golden rule, and its doctrine of man's immortality—these are all diametrically opposed to slavery, and these can not prevail without overthrowing slavery, wherever and however it exists ; therefore it is that slavery hates the Bible, and therefore it is that we must oppose slavery with the Bible. But first of all we must retrieve the Bible itself from the dishonor put upon it by those who would use its toleration of evils in remote ages, because of the hardness of men's hearts, to bolster up oppression in this nineteenth century. Let all Christians act up to the Bible in their spirit and conduct toward all mankind, and by personal holiness and impartial benevolence conspire to render complete and universal the reign, already begun, of truth, liberty and love—the reign of the Redeemer, who came, according to the sublime promises of inspired prophecy, to preach deliverance to the captives and the opening of the prison doors to them that are bound.

Faint, illegible text covering the upper half of the page, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side.







WERT
BOOKBINDING
Cranville, Pa.
March - April 1989
made in quality bound

