

12 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,  
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

Witness General

WITNESS

FUJITA, Masamichi

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Memo for the files

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

*EPM*

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Incl  
(Described above)



11 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

SUBJECT: FUJITA, Masamichi

Search of IPS Files reveals no information on the Subject.



Henry A. Dolan Investigator  
IPS Investigative Division  
Room 381 W.M.B.



11 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton; Maj. General Vasiliev

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,  
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

Witness General  
Testified 3 June

WITNESS

FUJITA, Masamichi

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Curriculum Vitae

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
(Described above)

*E P M*  
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN



CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: FUJITA, Masamichi  
 Born: Mar. 3, 1904  
 Permanent Domicile: 150, Nishi-sengoku-machi, Kagoshima-shi,  
 Kagoshima-ken.

Names of Family and Date of Birth.	Mother	Natsu	Apr. 8 1873
	Elder Brother	Masami	June 9 1894
	Younger Brother	Masaharu	Nov 23, 1906
	Younger Brother	Susumu	Feb 16, 1912
	Wife	Teruko	Dec 23, 1911
	Eldest Son	Kimio	Aug 23, 1932
	Second Son	Michio	Dec 24 1934
	Third Son	Tadao	Nov 6, 1937
	Eldest Daughter	Kayoko	Apr 30, 1943

1920 Aug. 26	Ordered to enroll at the Naval Academy.	Naval Academy
1924 July 24	Finished the course of study at the Naval Academy.	"
1924 "	Commissioned Naval Cadet.	Navy Dept.
	Assigned on Board H.M.S. Izumo.	"
1925 Dec. 1	Commissioned 2nd. Sub-Lieutenant.	Cabinet
1927 Dec. 1	Commissioned Sub-Lieutenant.	"
1930 Dec. 1	Commissioned Lieutenant.	"
1935 Oct. 31	Ordered A Class student of the Naval Staff College.	
1936 Dec. 1	Commissioned Lieutenant-Commander.	Navy Dept. Cabinet.
1937 July 28	Appointed staff officer of the 3rd. Destroyer Squadron.	Navy Dept.
1937 Dec. 1	Appointed staff officer of the 8th Squadron.	"
1938 Dec. 15	Appointed staff officer of the 2nd. Destroyer Squadron.	"
1939 Nov. 1	Appointed staff officer of the 2nd Fleet.	"



1941 Oct 15	Commissioned Commander.	Cabinet
1942 May 5	Assigned to the Naval General Staff and concurrent by to the Navy Department.	Navy Dept.
"	Ordered to serve in the Navy Affairs Bureau, Navy Dept.	"
1942 June 20	Appointed member of the Navy Affairs Bureau, Navy Dept.	"
1944 Oct 15	Commissioned Captain.	Cabinet
"	Assigned to the Bureau of Naval Construction and concurrently to the Navy Affairs Bureau, Navy Department.	Navy Dept.
1945 Nov 20	Placed on the Reserve List.	"
"	Ordered general mobilization.	
Dec 1	Appointed member of the 2nd Demobilization Dept. (3rd. Rank of the Higher Civil Service) according to the Imperial Ordinance No. 686.	"
1945 Dec 1	Appointed member of the General Affairs Bureau of the 2nd Demobilization Dept.	2nd. Demobilization Dept.
1946 Apr 1	Appointed Secretary of the 2nd Demobilization Dept. (2nd class) according to the Imperial Ordinance No. 193	"
1946 June 15	Discharged from general mobilization.	"
" 1	Granted the 10th Grade Salary.	"
" 15	Appointed Secretary of the Demobilization Dept. (2nd class) according to the Imperial Ordinance No. 315.	
1946 June 15	Limitation Ordinance for Naval Officers abolished according to the Imperial Ordinance No. 322 of 1946.	
"	Assigned to the Materials Adjustment Section of the 2nd Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Office.	Demobilization Office.



1946 July 1	Granted the 25th Grade Salary	Demobilization Office.
1947 Mar 31	Granted the 27th Grade Salary.	"
"	Relieved of principle post at own request.	Cabinet

Compared with the Original  
June 5, 1947



Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF FUJITA, Masamichi  
by Mr. Blakeney

23,492  
23,505

The witness stated he lived in Tokyo, and identified Exhibit 2689 as his affidavit \* and verified it. The witness stated he was a Navy Captain and served in the Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry, from June 1942 to the end of the war, in charge of affairs dealing with organizing and moving of ships. He was one of the officers in charge of matters dealing with Soviet shipping. The Chief of the Bureau told him that the only major power \* with which Japan had normal international relations was the Soviet and they must devote every effort toward maintaining these friendly relations. All officers should devote greatest attention to this and assert every effort to avoid friction which would arise from military mistakes. Otherwise the diplomats might face an awkward situation. The witness and others scrupulously abided by these instructions and adopted extreme precautions not to violate any treaties, laws, or regulations which would provoke the Soviet.

23,506

Whenever any incident demanding negotiations arose, they compiled data to render the Soviet every possible concession and forwarded the report to the Foreign Ministry. They actually made concessions which were almost humiliating and many considered them to be abandoning lawful rights as a belligerent. An example of this is the unconditional release of Soviet ships which changed nationality.

23,507

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Navy established sea defense areas, designated navigation routes, and warned against entry into specified sea areas in the Straits of Coja and other places.

The Ministry's sole objective toward the Soviet was to maintain friendly relations, and this tempered to a large extent restrictions on navigation. They did not consider the matters adopted as coercive.

23,508

Strict orders were issued prohibiting inspection, apprehension or internment of ships unless in conformity with existing international usage. According to reports received, there was not a single violation of international regulations reported. All ships entering a prohibited area were intercepted and searched and officers questioned. \* This was absolutely necessary for various operational reasons and as



June 3, 1947

DEFENSE - Division IV - Russia

FUJITA - Direct

Page

a precautionary matter for preventing confusion with enemy craft, removing the cause for any resulting disaster or dispute. The inspection of the Sergev Kirov and the Angarstrov was in this category. They were brought to quiet waters to avert possible dangers.

23,509

Both entrances to the Tsugaru Straits are 10 nautical miles wide and the strait has long been recognized as a Japanese possession. Although the strait joins two open seas, there are other passages connecting the two seas. Every possible convenience in the circumstances was provided by notice as to what sea lanes were considered safe. Navigation waterways for Soviet shipping were restricted to two lanes, but they never refused the requests of the Soviet for passage through the Soya Straits. The reason for restricting Soviet shipping to two water lanes was that Japan was facing the grave danger of United States \* submarines passing through the straits and reaching the Japan Sea. As a counter-measure, absolutely necessary from a military point of view to preserve safety, they took this step. The measure also afforded a protective service for Soviet ships to secure safe passage.

23,510

On the Angarstrov they found the ship's papers were missing, it being reported that they were left at the port of embarkation, and it did not have necessary papers on radio conditions. The ship was released because instructions were not to provoke an incident which might mar relations with the Soviet. After the ship had been released it was sunk by a submarine about 10:00 PM on May 1, 1942 at a certain point. But there were absolutely no Japanese submarines operating in this area and none were stationed there at the time, as shown by Exhibit B.

On the same day a Japanese ship was sunk in the same area by a submarine. Although the Soviet entered a protest, alleging that the sinking was by Japanese submarine, they felt that the sinking of a Japanese ship at the same time and place might assist in arriving at a conclusion of whose submarine was in action. The Kayo Maru rescued the survivors of the Angarstrov after operating for hours in the dangerous waters. The crew was given full protection and the rescue undertaken was in keeping with the instructions for friendly relations. They expected gratitude from the Soviet, but were met with a protest. It was hardly conceivable that such a gross misrepresentation of actual facts could have been made.



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
June 3, 1947  
DEFENSE - Division IV - Russia  
FUJITA - Direct

Page 3613

Page

23,511 With respect to change of nationality and interning Soviet ships in the middle of 1943, the Kamenetz Potolsk and the Ingul were involved. They were interned \* because there was reasonable ground to suspect their nationality. They were detained for further investigation. Since the Soviet did not present appropriate evidence of nationality, the internment was unavoidably prolonged. Lack and disorder of ship's papers and falsity and inaccuracy of captain's statements were alone sufficient to provoke arrest. In keeping with their policy, however, of maintaining friendly relations, investigations were conducted by mere detention.

23,512 An investigation often revealed cases of ships possessing no papers or certificates of nationality. There were differences between papers and captain's statements and often the papers were incomplete and disorderly. Most of the entries in logs were made after the outbreak of the Pacific War, and all ships were suspected as being those of the United States because there was a natural tendency for United States ships to pose as Soviet to avoid capture. \* Despite conditions described, all ships were released almost unconditionally in furtherance of the policy toward the Soviet.

With respect to the Perekop and Maikop, they made a detailed and thorough inquiry into the matter and received reports that there were no Japanese planes corresponding to Soviet allegations and no such planes operating in that area at the time. Military men recognized the possibility of a mistake in identifying aircraft and without evidence no accurate conclusion could be reached. The Soviet had no photographs or other evidence which would assist in determining the matter.

The place where the Mariupol disaster occurred was recognized as a battle area and a strategically important point. It was impossible to tolerate a foreign ship stopping in those territorial waters for security reasons. From the standpoint of maintaining friendly relations the military disadvantages were accepted and they agreed to a Soviet proposal for relief operations by Soviet ships.

Owing to insufficient communication between the Soviet authorities and poor control in the system of command, considerable time elapsed before the rescue actually began and high waves and snow storms postponed beginning.



Page

23,514 The boat was firmly grounded and her engine room had exploded and the problem of refloating was most difficult. This accounts for the failure. Instructions which the witness and his group received repeatedly were to extend full service and rescue without respect to nationality and treaty provisions. They followed the provisions set forth in Naval Personnel Service Regulations, Exhibit D, and Explanations on Naval Overseas Regulations. They offered the greatest possible aid in existing circumstances and gave permission for Soviet \* ships to engage in rescue operations.

23,515

23,516 The witness stated that in establishing sea defense areas and such things it was the belief of the authorities that the measures so taken were taken in conformity with treaties. They believed that it was within their right \* to deny navigation through the Tsugaru Straits. They believed that ships like the Angarstrov could be seized by reason of absence of ship's papers. It was also their belief that ships like the Kamenetz fell within the provisions of the London Declaration on Naval Warfare, especially clauses 55 and 56 of Exhibit C. The naval authorities believed that the probability was very great that American ships had changed their registry to Soviet to avoid capture, and they believed they had grounds for detention and investigation of these ships.

23,518 Exhibit A to the affidavit, the agreement on the laying of automatic release submarine mines, stated that the belligerents undertake to provide, so far as possible, for mines becoming harmless after a limited time, and where they cease to be under observation to modify the danger zones as soon as military exigencies permit by a notice to mariners, which must also be communicated to the governments \* through diplomatic channels.

Exhibit B, the summary of movements and location of Japanese sea force in April-May 1942, showed that in the first submarine squadron, each submarine was under repairs in Yokosuka and inoperative. In the middle of May all began movement for the Aleutians.

In the second submarine squadron one was under repairs until early June. The others operated in the Indian Ocean in April and left Singapore for Yokosuka late in May.



June 3, 1947  
DEFENSE - Division IV - Russia  
FUJITA - Direct

Page

23,519

As to the third submarine squadron, since an attack of the United States Task Force was anticipated from the sea area east of Tokyo Bay, \* all these submarines left Kure on April 15th and advanced to the sea area in search of the Task Force. All but three of them moved at the end of the month to Kwajalein. Those three returned to Yokosuka and Kure for repairs.

With respect to the 8th submarine squadron, one left for Penang on April 11th and was engaged in the Indian Ocean in the latter part of April. Another submarine and the 1st submarine division left on April 15th for Penang and was engaged in the Indian Ocean in the latter part of April.

The 3rd and 4th submarine divisions advanced to the sea area east of Tokyo Bay and were engaged in searching for the United States Task Force. From the end of the month they were in the Coral Sea Area.

The 13th submarine division had all three ships under repair until the early part of May and inoperative. The 5th submarine squadron had all its ships under repair and inoperative. The 7th submarine squadron had its ships under repair until the end of May and were inoperative. The 21st submarine division was in operation at Rabaul after the middle of April. The 18th and 6th submarine divisions were engaged in educational operations at the Naval Submarine School and the other submarines were under repair. None made any movement beyond the area of the Inland Sea.

23,522

Exhibit C, articles 55 and 56, on the regulations with respect to the transfer of vessels, stated that the transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag before outbreak of hostilities is valid unless it is shown that the transfer was made to evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel is exposed. There is a presumption that if the bill of sale is not aboard a vessel which lost belligerent nationality less than sixty days before hostilities, the transfer is void. But the presumption may be rebutted.

The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag after outbreak of hostilities is void unless it was proved that the transfer was not made to evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel is exposed.



Page

23,523 Exhibit D, the regulations on rescue, stated that if a captain of a naval vessel sees a grounding, collision or fire, or that a ship is in distress, he must extend adequate relief if it does not hinder his duties. \* If, owing to weather conditions or duty demands, he can not extend relief, he must rescue human life if possible and deliver those rescued to any convenient harbor, reporting to the Navy Minister and commanding officer.

Exhibit D-1 provided that in Article 11 of the Treaty codifying regulations dealing with rescue and relief of ships in distress, it is stated that if human life is in danger at sea the captain is required to rescue that person, should the person be an enemy provided it shall not subject his ship, crew or passengers to grave danger. This is not applicable to naval service ships. It further stated that it could be argued whether there was an obligation internationally to rescue and extend relief when the obligation did not exist in treaties. It might be said that affording relief to ships in distress so far as circumstances permit was commonly observed in general.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by General Vasiliev

23,524 The witness stated he gave his testimony mainly from memory. The affidavit is mainly from memory, but the appendices are from documents. He could not produce any documents except the appendices. The witness stated when he took over his office from his predecessor he succeeded to his policies and many of his predecessor's policies were actually executed by him. He \*  
23,525 did not speak of these investigations from hearsay. He was one of several who were in charge of these matters.

23,526 By the release of Soviet ships which changed their nationality he meant ships which were of Soviet registry which had changed from American to Soviet registry after the outbreak of war and whose documents were faulty. He did not mean that the Soviet ships changed their nationality and sailed under foreign flags. \* When asked what American ships became Soviet, he meant the Kamenetz Potolsk and the Ingul. There were several others but he did not remember their names. \* When asked what documentary evidence he had that these ships had been American ships, the witness stated that under the London Declaration changes in nationalities of a ship after the outbreak of a war are not valid. The two ships had very faulty ship's documents  
23,527



Page

23,528 which would have been sufficient to warrant detention or seizure. That the ship's papers were faulty \* was the report made by the authorities who examined on the spot. He believed that they had the right to confiscate them, but they did not. The document which certifies that the papers produced by the captain were faulty does not exist now. These reports were in the Navy Ministry but were burned when the Navy Ministry was burned.

23,529 They did not consider the measures as established  
23,530 by Japan coercive. \* Since it was a friendly warning they could not prevent the Soviet from disregarding the warning at its own risk. \* With respect to the orders mentioned in his affidavit to adjust the attitude of Japanese authorities to Soviet shipping, these orders were issued by the Navy Minister and from him it went to the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, from there to the witness's section chief, and then to the witness. The witness conveyed these orders on every possible occasion by telephone.

23,531 With respect to the sinking of the Angarstrov, the only two enemy countries whose submarines could be operating in the area were England and America. It might have been either. They established by investigation that Japanese submarines were not operating in the area at the time. The ship was sunk at the Nanyo \* Archipelago to the west of Kyushu. The ship was sunk about 36 miles west of the archipelago. The nearest Japanese territory was only 40 miles away.



Page

23534

\* The witness marked with a red "x" the place where the Angarstrov was sunk. He stated he could not mark the place of the sinking of the Perekop, because it was sunk in the South China Sea, and he could not mark the sinking of the Maikop. He did not know about the sinking of the Kola or Ilmen. He had no recollection that in February 1942 they were sunk in the Korean Straits. He knew the Sangar Straits. \* By closing these straits, Japan deprived the Soviet of the shortest, most convenient way to the Pacific. He marked with red the way to the Pacific from Vladivostok through the Sangar Straits. He marked in blue the suggested routes from Vladivostok through the Korean Straits. He also marked the routes in blue through the Laperouza Straits and Kurilean Straits. \* This is a much longer route than through the straits at Tsugaru.

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Taking into consideration that the Laperouza Straits were covered with ice for two or three months, it would be inconvenient for Soviet navigation. The map was then admitted into evidence as exhibit No. 2690.

23537

\* The witness stated that he did not know that as far back as August 25, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow lodged a protest against the shipment from the U. S. to Vladivostok of goods purchased by the Soviet. He further stated he did not know that Japan promised Germany and reported to Germany the measures taken to hinder Soviet navigation in the Pacific.

23538

The attention of the Tribunal \* was called to exhibits No. 795-a, 778, 812-A, and 813 to 824 inclusive.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BLAKENEY.

23539

The witness stated he could not explain the heavy black line on exhibit No. 2690 running north of Hokkaido and in a northeasterly direction on the western side of the Kuriles. \* It had no relation to measures concerning navigation of the waters taken by the Japanese Navy during the war. There was no limit on Soviet navigation through the Straits within the Kurile Islands. He referred to all the various straits in the archipelago. \* He marked the various passages through the Kuriles. Through some of these navigation is easy, and through some it is very difficult.

23540



Page

23541

\* When asked to mark the passages easy of navigation with green, the witness said he was not an expert on navigation and could not speak of such matters from a technical standpoint.

23542

With respect to the instructions mentioned in paragraph ten of his affidavit, this meant according to their usual education and training. The term did \* not refer to specific written or oral instructions on these occasions.

RECROSS EXAMINATION BY GENERAL VASILIEV.

23544

\* The witness stated that before ships pass through any of the Kurile Straits they must pass through the Laperouza Straits. They did not prevent the passage of Soviet ships even at night when there were Soviet requests, but there were periods of two or three months when this passage was impossible. There is some difference \* in the difficulty and facility of passage through these straits, but he believed they were all passable.

23545

The blue line corresponding to the line indicated by the Naval General Staff he had given as an instance because he had known it was a regular route used by Soviet ships.

23549

Exhibit No. 2691, Japanese General Staff chart of the strength of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, stated \* that in 1931 the Soviet had in the Far East six sharpshooter divisions and two cavalry brigades. In 1932 they had 8 sharpshooter divisions, 1 cavalry division, 11 brigades, 200 planes, 250 tanks. \* In 1933 they had 8 sharpshooter divisions, 1 cavalry division, 1 brigade, 350 aircraft, 300 tanks. In 1934 they had 11 sharpshooter divisions, 2 cavalry, 500 aircraft, 650 tanks, 14 submarines, a total of 230,000 men. In 1935 they had 14 sharpshooter, 3 cavalry, 950 planes, and a total of 240,000 men.

23551

\* In 1936 they had 16 sharpshooter, 4 cavalry, 1200 aircraft, 1200 tanks, 17 submarines. In 1937, 20 sharpshooter, 1560 aircraft, 1500 tanks, 67 submarines, a total manpower of 370,000. In 1938 they had 24 sharpshooter, 2,000 aircraft, 1900 tanks, 75 submarines, and approximately 450,000 men. \* In 1939 they had 30 sharpshooter divisions, 2500 aircraft, 2200 tanks, 90 submarines, and total manpower of 270,000. In 1940

23552



3 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. D. N. Sutton  
FROM : Mr. Pedro Lopez  
SUBJECT : Defense Document No. 1593

1. It seems to me that the main body of the affidavit of FUJITA, Masamichi, is relevant, to deny the Prosecution theory that Japan had aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union, and that Japan went out of its way to appease Russia, going to the extent of releasing ships which had doubtful enemy origin. This is covered by paragraphs 1 to 8 of the affidavit. Obviously paragraphs 9 and 10, which refer to the sinking of the Perekop and Maikop and the disaster of the Mariupol, are included to rebut Prosecution evidence on these matters. I do not know if the Prosecution has introduced any evidence regarding them, and if not, then paragraphs 9 and 10 could be objected to as immaterial and irrelevant.

2. Exhibit A, on page 4 of the affidavit, has no relevancy at all, for it does not contribute to anything stated in the affidavit; Exhibit B is relevant as it attempts to establish the non-presence of Japanese submarines in the area described in paragraph 7 of the affidavit; Exhibit C is the purported law on transfers of enemy vessels covered by the affidavit from paragraphs 1 to 8, but its relevancy is far-fetched as the law speaks for itself; the same holds true with Exhibit D-1 which has reference to the last paragraph (par. 10 of the affidavit).



PEDRO LOPEZ  
Associate Prosecutor  
for the Philippines

P.S. If we object to Def Doc.  
No. 1677 - then we  
must do so here on  
same grounds practically.  
P.L.



Counts 1, 45, 35

Count 38 ships, airplanes  
did not include USSR.



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see 15 of Part 1 B  
7 off. B.

Def. Doc. No. 1593

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al )  
-vs- )  
ARAKI Sadao, et al )  
Defendants )

A F F I D A V I T  
of  
FUJITA, Masamichi

Shipping

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Fujita, Masamichi. I formerly was a captain in the Japanese Navy and served in the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry from June 1942 until the termination of the war. My duties placed me in charge of affairs dealing with the organization and movements of shipping. I was one of the officers in charge of administering matters dealing with shipping of the Soviet Union.

2. The Chief of the Bureau during the war told me, regarding my duties, that "the only major power with which Japan maintains normal international relations today is the Soviet Union. Therefore we must devote every effort toward maintaining friendly relations with that country. All officers concerned should devote the greatest attention to this and exert every effort to avoid any friction that might arise as a result of military mistakes. This is absolutely necessary because to do otherwise may force our diplomats to face an awkward situation."

and

I, and several others who were in charge of shipping matters relative to the Soviet Union, scrupulously abided by our instructions and adopted extreme precautions to the end of not violating any treaties, laws or regulations which might in any way provoke Soviet wrath. Whenever any incident or happening demanding Soviet-Japanese negotiations arose, we compiled data on the basis of rendering the Soviet Union every possible concession. Then we forwarded this report to the authorities of the Foreign Ministry. Actually we made concessions which were almost humiliating, and many of the officers considered them to be abandonment of our lawful rights as a belligerent power at that time. For example, I point to the unconditional release of Soviet ships which changed their nationality.

3. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese Navy enforced such measures as the establishment of sea-defense areas, designation of navigation routes and warnings against entry into specified sea areas at the Straits of Soya and a few other places. While this naturally restricted navigation, the procedure adopted was in accordance with Article 3 of the agreement on the laying of automatic release submarine mines (hereto attached and marked Exhibit "A"). It also conformed to existing international usage concerning the notification of establishment of sea-defense areas and specification of navigation routes.

The Ministry's desire and sole objective relative to the Soviet Union was to maintain friendly relations, and this motive tempered to a large extent the restrictions on liberty of navigation. We did not consider the measures adopted as coercive in any respect.

Mach...  
-1-  
by submarine  
...  
see will destroy all other ships



The Japanese ship Kayo Maru rescued the survivors of the Angarstroy's crew, after operating for an hour in waters considered dangerous because of enemy activities. The crew were afforded full protection and this dangerous rescue undertaking was further in keeping with our instructions to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union. We actually expected an expression of gratitude from the Soviet Union for this rescue but we were met with a protest. I well remember the "voices of indignation" raised because of the injustice to us; it was hardly conceivable that such a gross misinterpretation of the actual facts could have been made.

8. Regarding the change of nationality and the problem of interning Soviet Ships, I recall that in the middle of 1943 the Kamenetz Fotolsk and the Ingul were involved. These were Soviet ships which were interned because there was reasonable ground for suspicion concerning their nationality, they falling clearly within the provisions of the London Declaration on Naval Warfare (vide Clauses 55 and 56, hereto attached and marked Exhibit "C"). The ships were detained for further investigation, but as the Soviet Union did not present appropriate proof or evidence of their nationality the prolonged internment was unavoidable.

The lack and disorder of the ship's papers and the falsity and inaccuracy of the Captain's statements were alone sufficient to provoke arrest of the ships. But, in keeping with our policy and in the interests of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, investigations were conducted simply by mere detention.

The results of the investigation often revealed cases of some ships possessing no papers of any kind, nor certificates showing their nationality. There were differences between the ship's papers and the Captain's statements in many instances, and often the papers on all matters were very incomplete and disorderly arranged. Furthermore, most of the entries in the logs were made after the outbreak of the Pacific War, and all ships were under suspicion as being those of the United States because there was a natural tendency for American ships to pose as Soviet ships in order to avoid capture. This alone was sufficient ground for detention and complete investigations of all shipping. In spite of the existing conditions as I have described them, it must be emphasized that all ships were released almost unconditionally in furtherance of our policy toward the Soviet Union.

9. I recall the problem involved in the bombing and sinking of the Perekop and Malkop in response to Soviet protests against Japanese aircraft. Regarding these cases we made a detailed and thorough inquiry into the matter. We received reports that there were no Japanese planes corresponding to the Soviet allegations, and that there were no Japanese planes operating in that area at that time. Military men recognize the possibility of frequent mistakes of identification of aircraft, and since there was no evidence an accurate conclusion could not be reached. The Soviet Union unfortunately had no photographs or other evidence of a precise nature which would assist us in determining the matter fully.

10. Regarding the disaster of the Mariupol, I recall that the vicinity where the incident took place was already recognized as a battle area. It was moreover a strategically important point. It was impossible to tolerate the stopping of a foreign ship in our territorial waters for security reasons. However, from the standpoint of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the military disadvantages were accepted and we agreed to the Soviet proposal for relief operations by Soviet ships.



4. Strict orders were issued prohibiting the inspection, apprehension or internment of ships unless conducted in conformity with existing international usage. According to reports which I received from the sea-areas concerned, there was not a single case of a violation of international regulations reported. All ships entering the prohibited sea-areas were intercepted and searched, and the officers in charge were questioned. This wartime procedure was absolutely necessary for various operational reasons such as the precautionary matter of preventing the confusion of such ships with enemy craft, thus removing also the cause for any resulting disasters and disputes. The inspections conducted of the Sergay Kirov and the Angarstrov fit into this category. The reason for this bringing them to quiet waters was only to avert possible danger.

5. Both entrances to the Tsugaru Straits are 10 nautical miles wide (9.5 nautical miles at the narrowest point). This Strait has long since been recognized officially as under our possession. Therefore, it was within our legal and sovereign rights to deny navigation of such waters. I wish to emphasize that although the Tsugaru Straits join two open seas, there are other passages connecting the two seas. Moreover, every possible convenience in the existing circumstances was provided by notifying just what other sea-lanes were considered safe.

6. It is true that navigation waterways for Soviet shipping were restricted to two sea-lanes. However, when the Soviet Union demanded passage through Soya Straits we never refused their request. There was a reason for restricting Soviet shipping to two water-lanes. At that time we were facing the grave danger of United States submarines passing through the Straits and thereby reaching the Japan Sea; as a protective counter-measure, considered absolutely necessary from the military point of view to preserve this safety in navigation, we took this step. At the same time the measure adopted afforded a protective service for Soviet ships in securing their safe passage.

7. On inspecting the Angarstrov we found that the ship's papers were missing -- it was reported that the ship's papers had been left at the port of embarkation -- and that it also did not possess necessary papers on radio conditions, etc. Under international regulations we could have seized the ship on that count alone, but the ship was released because of our instructions not to provoke in any way an incident which might mar friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

After this ship had been released it was sunk by a submarine. The facts were as follows: Around 10:00 P.M. on 1 May 1942, at a point 36 nautical miles west of the Danjo Archipelagoes, 32 degrees 0 minutes North Latitude, 127 degrees 41 minutes East Longitude, the ship met its ill-fated end. There were absolutely no Japanese submarines operating in this area, not to mention any being stationed there at that time (report hereto attached and marked Exhibit "B"). Moreover, on the very same day, a Japanese ship -- the Calcutta Maru -- was sunk in the same area by a submarine attack. Although the Soviet Union entered a protest alleging that the sinking was by Japanese submarine, we feel that the sinking of the Japanese ship at the same time and at the same place may assist in arriving at a conclusion as to which country's submarine was in action.



The Japanese ship Kayo Maru rescued the survivors of the Angarstroy's crew, after operating for an hour in waters considered dangerous because of enemy activities. The crew were afforded full protection and this dangerous rescue undertaking was further in keeping with our instructions to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union. We actually expected an expression of gratitude from the Soviet Union for this rescue but we were met with a protest. I well remember the "voices of indignation" raised because of the injustice to us; it was hardly conceivable that such a gross misinterpretation of the actual facts could have been made.

8. Regarding the change of nationality and the problem of interning Soviet Ships, I recall that in the middle of 1943 the Kamenetz Potolsk and the Ingul were involved. These were Soviet ships which were interned because there was reasonable ground for suspicion concerning their nationality, they falling clearly within the provisions of the London Declaration on Naval Warfare (vide Clauses 55 and 56, hereto attached and marked Exhibit "C"). The ships were detained for further investigation, but as the Soviet Union did not present appropriate proof or evidence of their nationality the prolonged internment was unavoidable.

The lack and disorder of the ship's papers and the falsity and inaccuracy of the Captain's statements were alone sufficient to provoke arrest of the ships. But, in keeping with our policy and in the interests of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, investigations were conducted simply by mere detention.

The results of the investigation often revealed cases of some ships possessing no papers of any kind, nor certificates showing their nationality. There were differences between the ship's papers and the Captain's statements in many instances, and often the papers on all matters were very incomplete and disorderly arranged. Furthermore, most of the entries in the logs were made after the outbreak of the Pacific War, and all ships were under suspicion as being those of the United States because there was a natural tendency for American ships to pose as Soviet ships in order to avoid capture. This alone was sufficient ground for detention and complete investigations of all shipping. In spite of the existing conditions as I have described them, it must be emphasized that all ships were released almost unconditionally in furtherance of our policy toward the Soviet Union.

9. I recall the problem involved in the bombing and sinking of the Perekop and Malkop in response to Soviet protests against Japanese aircraft. Regarding these cases we made a detailed and thorough inquiry into the matter. We received reports that there were no Japanese planes corresponding to the Soviet allegations, and that there were no Japanese planes operating in that area at that time. Military men recognize the possibility of frequent mistakes of identification of aircraft, and since there was no evidence an accurate conclusion could not be reached. The Soviet Union unfortunately had no photographs or other evidence of a precise nature which would assist us in determining the matter fully.

10. Regarding the disaster of the Mariupol, I recall that the vicinity where the incident took place was already recognized as a battle area. It was moreover a strategically important point. It was impossible to tolerate the stopping of a foreign ship in our territorial waters for security reasons. However, from the standpoint of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the military disadvantages were accepted and we agreed to the Soviet proposal for relief operations by Soviet ships.



Owing to inefficient communication between Soviet authorities in the locality concerned, as well as poor control in the system of command, considerable time elapsed before the rescue project actually began; the high waves and snow-storms further postponed the beginning of the operations. The Mariupol was firmly grounded, and furthermore her engine-room had exploded and the problem of refloating her was most difficult. This accounts for the project's ending in failure. The instructions which I and my fellow-officers received time and time again was to extend full service in rescue operations without respect to nationality or treaty provisions. We of course, followed the provisions set forth in Naval Personnel Service Regulations, Clause 109, (hereto attached and marked Exhibit "D") and Explanations on Naval Overseas Regulations, Page 254 (hereto attached and marked Exhibit "D-1"). We offered the greatest possible aid in the existing circumstances, together with permission for Soviet ships to engage in rescue operations, which included long stoppage and so forth.

- - - -

Exhibit A

Extracts from the Convention Relative to  
the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines

Miscellaneous Regulations of  
the Navy.  
Vol. IV, Page 851

Article 3

When anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the safety of peaceful navigation.

The belligerents undertake to provide, so far as possible, for these mines becoming harmless after a limited time has elapsed, and, where the mines cease to be under observation, to notify the danger zones as soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice to mariners, which must also be communicated to the Governments through diplomatic channels.



Exhibit B

Certificate Concerning the Source and Compilation  
of Document.

I, DOHI Kazuo, Chief of War Records Section, Institute of War Records and Technical Intelligence, Second Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board, hereby certify that the attached document of four sheets of paper written in Japanese under the title, "Summary of the Movements and Locations of Japanese Submarine Forces around April and May 1942" has been investigated and compiled by the Imperial Japanese Government (War Records Section, Institute of War Records and Technical Intelligence, Second Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Board).

At Tokyo, 22 April 1947

DOHI Kazuo (seal)

I, witness, hereby certify that the above signature and seal have been made in my presence.

At Tokyo, 22 April 1947

YASUDA Shigeo (Seal)

-----  
Summary of the Movements and Locations of Japanese  
Submarine Forces around April and May 1942

1. The organization of the submarine forces and locations thereof as of 10 April 1942 are as set forth in the attached table.

2. The movements of submarines during the period from 10 April to May, 1942.

a. 1st Submarine Squadron

Each submarine of this squadron was under repairs at Yokosuka, and consequently in inoperative condition. In the middle part of May all submarines commenced their movements for the Aleutians Area.

b. 2nd Submarine Squadron.

Submarine I-1 was under overall repairs at Yokosuka till early June. The other submarines operated in the Indian Ocean during April, and left Singapore for Yokosuka late in May.

c. 3rd Submarine Squadron.

As the attack of a United States task force was anticipated from the sea area to the east of Tokyo Bay, all the submarines of this squadron, leaving Kure on 15 April, advanced to the above-mentioned sea area in search of the task force. From the end of the same month they moved to Kwajalein, except Submarines I-8, I-68 and I-72.



At the end of the month Submarine I-8 returned to Yokosuka because of certain troubles, and Submarine I-68 to Kure owing to engine trouble. Submarine I-72 also returned to Yokosuka at the beginning of May owing to the breakdown of her engine.

d. 8th Submarine Squadron.

Submarine I-30 left Kure directly for Penang on 11 April, and was engaged in operations in the Indian Ocean after the latter part of April. Submarine I-10 and the 1st Submarine Division left Kure on 15 April directly for Penang, and were engaged in operations in the Indian Ocean after the latter part of April.

The 3rd and 14th Submarine Divisions (exclusive of Submarine I-30), leaving Kure on 15 April, advanced to the sea area to the east of Tokyo Bay and were engaged in the search for the United States task force. From the end of the same month they were engaged in operations in the Coral Sea Area.

e. 13th Submarine Division.

Submarines I-121 and I-122 were under repairs at Kure, and Submarine I-123 at Yokosuka, till the early part of May, and they were consequently all in inoperative condition.

f. 5th Submarine Squadron.

Submarines I-56, I-57 and I-58 were under repairs at Kure and the other submarines at Sasebo, and they were consequently all in inoperative condition.

g. 7th Submarine Squadron.

The 26th and 33rd Submarine Divisions were under repairs till the end of May at Sasebo and Maizuru respectively, and they were consequently all in inoperative condition.

The 21st Submarine Division was engaged in operations in Rabaul Area after the middle part of April.

h. Submarines belonging to the Kure Naval Station Forces.

The 18th and 6th Submarine Divisions were generally engaged in the educational operations of the Naval Submarine School, and the other submarines were under repair. Accordingly none of them made movements anywhere beyond the area of the Inland Sea.



## Exhibit B (Attached Table)

Classification	Name of Submarine and Submarine Division	Movement or Location
6 F	1 Ss. 2 Sg(I-15, I-17, I-19) 4 Sg(I-25, I-26)	At Yokosuka, under repair.
	2 Ss. I-7 7 Sg(I-1, I-2, I-3) 8 Sg(I-4, I-5, I-6)	I-1, at Yokosuka under repair. Others, engaged in operations in Indian Ocean.
	3 Ss. I-8 11 Sg(I-74, I-75) 12 Sg(I-68, I-69, I-71, I-72)	At Kure under repair.
	8 Ss. I-10 1 Sg(I-16, I-18, I-20) 3 Sg(I-21, I-22, I-24) 14 Sg(I-27, I-28, I-29, I-30)	"
	13 Sg(I-121, I-122, I-123)	I-123, at Yokosuka under repair. Others at Kure under repair.
5 Ss.	19 Sg(I-56, I-57, I-58, I-59)	I-59 at Sasebo and others at Kure under repair.
	30 Sg(I-62, I-64, I-65, I-66)	I-64 returned to Sasebo from Indian Ocean on 12 April. Others at Sasebo under repair.
4F	7 Ss. 26 Sg(Ro-61, Ro-62, Ro-65, Ro-67)	At Sasebo under repair.
	33 Sg(Ro-63, Ro-64, Ro-68)	At Maizuru under repair.
	21 Sg(Ro-33, Ro-34)	At Truk under repair.
Kure Naval Station	18 Sg(I-53, I-54, I-55) 6 Sg(Ro-57, Ro-58, Ro-59) I-52. Ro-31	At Kure

(Note): The abbreviations used in the above table are as follows:

GF.....Combined Fleet  
 4F.....4th Fleet  
 6F.....6th Fleet  
 1Ss.....1st Submarine Squadron  
 13 Sg.....13th Submarine Division  
 I-9.....Submarine I-9  
 Ro-61.....Submarine Ro-61



Exhibit C

Extracts from the DECLARATION OF LONDON  
Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare.

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Elements of International Law  
in War-Time, Page 536.

Article 55. - The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, effected before the outbreak of hostilities, is valid, unless it is proved that such transfer was made in order to evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed. There is, however, a presumption, if the bill of sale is not on board a vessel which has lost her belligerent nationality less than sixty days before the outbreak of hostilities, that the transfer is void. This presumption may be rebutted.

Where the transfer was effected more than thirty days before the outbreak of hostilities, there is an absolute presumption that it is valid if it is unconditional, complete, and in conformity with the laws of the countries concerned, and if its effect is such that neither the control of, nor the profits arising from the employment of the vessel remain in the same hands as before the transfer. If, however, the vessel lost her belligerent nationality less than sixty days before the outbreak of hostilities and if the bill of sale is not on board, the capture of the vessel gives no right to damages.

Article 56. - The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, effected after the outbreak of hostilities, is void unless it is proved that such transfer was not made in order to evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed.

There, however, is an absolute presumption that a transfer is void--

- (1) If the transfer has been made during a voyage or in a blockaded port.
- (2) If a right to repurchase or recover the vessel is reserved to the vendor.
- (3) If the requirements of the municipal law governing the right to fly the flag under which the vessel is sailing, have not been fulfilled.



Exhibit D

Excerpt from:  
Naval Service Ships Personnel Service Regulations.  
Naval Routine Regulation. Volume One (Page 493)

Article 109

If the captain of a naval service ship observes a grounding, collision or fire, or facts showing a ship to be in distress, he must extend adequate relief if it does not hinder his duties. If, owing to weather conditions or the demands of duty, he is unable to afford relief, he must rescue human life if possible and deliver those rescued to any convenient harbor, and reporting the matter to the Navy Minister and also to the commanding officer of the unit to which he is attached.

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Exhibit D-1

Excerpt from;  
Explanation of Provisions for Naval Service Ships Operating  
Abroad. (Page 254)

(4) SUBJECT: On Extending Relief to Ships in Distress.

If a naval service ship is in distress at sea and seeks refuge into a foreign harbor, or is grounded or shipwrecked, it is customary for the nation concerned not only to afford relief and aid but to provide special facilities in the way of customs duty and other such matters, regardless of international treaties. (Most of the treaties of commerce and navigation include provisions concerning the above.)

In Article 11 of the Treaty on codification of regulations (concluded in September 1910) dealing with "rescue and relief of ships in distress" it is stated, "If human life is in danger at sea, the captain is required to rescue that person, should that person be an enemy national, provided it will not subject ship, crew or passengers of his own ship to grave danger." (This article is not applicable to naval service ships.)

Also, in Article 11 of the Seamen's Law, a provision is set forth on the captain's duty to rescue lives at sea. (See "Sea Disaster Relief Law" for reference)

It can be argued whether there is an obligation, from the viewpoint of international law, to rescue and extend relief when such obligation does not exist in treaties. However, it may be said that affording relief to ships in distress, so far as circumstances permit is commonly observed in general.







GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff  
Civil Intelligence Section

General Activities  
APO 500  
28 June 1947

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: FUJITA, Masamichi

Date of Birth: 31 Mar 1904  
Permanent Domicile: Kagoshima Ken.  
Present Address: 1307, Ohara Machi, Meguro Ku, Tokyo.

Career:

24 July 1924: Graduated Naval Academy.  
Appointed Naval Cadet and assigned to S.S. Izumo.  
Assigned to S.S. Hiei.  
10 Apr 1925: Appointed Ensign and assigned to S. S. Nagara.  
1 Dec 1925: Assigned to Naval Gunnery School.  
1 Dec 1926: Assigned to Naval Torpedo School.  
13 Apr 1927: Assigned to S. S. MUTSU.  
24 Jul 1927: Promoted to Lt. (jg).  
1 Dec 1927: Attached to KASUMIGAURA Naval Air Training School.  
10 Dec 1928: Assigned to Submarine RO56.  
25 Dec 1928: Assigned to S. S. Asama.  
1 Mar 1929: Promoted to Lt. Assigned to higher course, Naval  
1 Dec 1930: Gunnery School.  
1 Dec 1931: Appointed Divisional Commander aboard S. S. Kirishima.  
1 Dec 1932: Attached to special course, Naval Gunnery School.  
1 Nov 1933: Appointed Instructor and Divisional Commander, Naval  
Gunnery School.  
31 Oct 1935: Appointed student at Naval Staff College.  
1 Dec 1936: Promoted to Lt. Comdr.  
28 July 1937: Appointed to Staff, 3rd Torpedo Squadron.  
15 Oct 1941: Promoted to Comdr.  
8 Aug 1942: Appointed to Home Ministry Technical Committee  
(NAIMUSHO SEMMON IIN).  
15 Oct 1944: Promoted to Capt.  
30 Nov 1945: Retired. Appointed official of Second Demobiliza-  
tion Ministry.

Incl 1



# SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Operations, CIS, G-2  
Compilation Branch

APO 500  
29 July 1947

SUBJECT : FUJITA Masamichi

DATE OF BIRTH : 31 Mar 1904

PERMANENT ADDRESS : Hiroshima Prefecture.

PRESENT ADDRESS : 1307, Ohara-machi, Meguro-ku, Tokyo.

CAREER :

24 Jul 1924      Graduated from Naval Academy.  
Assigned to "IZUMO" as a naval cadet.

10 Apr 1925      Assigned to the "HIBI".

1 Dec 1925      Ensign; assigned to the "NAGARA".

1 Dec 1926      Student, ordinary course, Naval Gunnery School.

13 Apr 1927      Student, ordinary course, Naval Torpedo School.

24 Jul 1927      Assigned to "MUTSU".

1 Dec 1927      Lieutenant-junior grade.

25 Dec 1928      Assigned to Submarine 56.

1 Mar 1929      Assigned to the "ASAMA".

24 Dec 1929      Assigned to the "ASHI".

1 Dec 1930      Lieutenant Student, Higher Course, Naval Torpedo School.

1 Dec 1931      Divisional Officer of the KIRISHIMA.

1 Dec 1932      Special Course Student, Gunnery School.

1 Nov 1933      Instructor and Divisional Officer, of Naval Gunnery School.

Incl 7

# SECRET



# SECRET

FUJITA Masamichi---cont'd.

CAREER (cont'd) :

31 Oct 1935	Student, Naval Staff College.
1 Dec 1936	Lieutenant Commander.
28 Jul 1937	Staff Officer, 3rd Torpedo Corps.
1 Dec 1937	Staff Officer, 8th Battle Corps.
15 Oct 1941	Appointed Commander.
8 Aug 1942	Technical Committee of Home Ministry.
15 Oct 1944	Captain.
30 Nov 1945	Retired from active service.
1 Sep 1946	Official, Second Demobilization Ministry.

DECORATION :

10 Apr 1935	6th Order of the Sacred Treasure.
13 Oct 1938	5th Order of the Sacred Treasure.
29 Apr 1940	4th Order of the Golden Kite.
	4th Order of the Small Cordon of the Rising Sun.

# SECRET



CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: FUJITA, Masamichi  
 Born: Mar. 3, 1904  
 Permanent Domicile: 150, Nishi-sengoku-machi, Kagoshima-shi,  
 Kagoshima-ken.

Names of Family and Date of Birth.	Mother	Natsu	Apr. 8 1873
	Elder Brother	Masami	June 9 1894
	Younger Brother	Masaharu	Nov 23, 1906
	Younger Brother	Susumu	Feb 16, 1912
	Wife	Teruko	Dec 23, 1911
	Eldest Son	Kimio	Aug 23, 1932
	Second Son	Michio	Dec 24 1934
	Third Son	Tadao	Nov 6, 1937
	Eldest Daughter	Kayoko	Apr 30, 1943

1920 Aug. 26	Ordered to enroll at the Naval Academy.	Naval Academy
1924 July 24	Finished the course of study at the Naval Academy.	"
1924 "	Commissioned Naval Cadet.	Navy Dept.
	Assigned on Board H.M.S. Izumo.	"
1925 Dec. 1	Commissioned 2nd. Sub-Lieutenant.	Cabinet
1927 Dec. 1	Commissioned Sub-Lieutenant.	"
1930 Dec. 1	Commissioned Lieutenant.	"
1935 Oct. 31	Ordered A Class student of the Naval Staff College.	Navy Dept.
1936 Dec. 1	Commissioned Lieutenant-Commander.	Cabinet.
1937 July 28	Appointed staff officer of the 3rd. Destroyer Squadron.	Navy Dept.
1937 Dec. 1	Appointed staff officer of the 8th Squadron.	"
1938 Dec. 15	Appointed staff officer of the 2nd. Destroyer Squadron.	"
1939 Nov. 1	Appointed staff officer of the 2nd. Fleet.	"



1941 Oct 15	Commissioned Commander.	Cabinet
1942 May 5	Assigned to the Naval General Staff and concurrent by to the Navy Department.	Navy Dept.
"	Ordered to serve in the Navy Affairs Bureau.	"
1942 June 20	Appointed member of the Navy Affairs Bureau.	"
1944 Oct 15	Commissioned Captain.	Cabinet
"	Assigned to the Bureau of Naval Construction and concurrently to the Navy Affairs Bureau, Navy Department.	Navy Dept.
1945 Nov 20	Placed on the Reserve List.	"
"	Ordered general mobilization.	"
Dec 1	Appointed member of the 2nd Demobilization Dept. (3rd. Rank of the Higher Civil Service) according to the Imperial Ordinance No. 686.	"
1945 Dec 1	Appointed member of the General Affairs Bureau of the 2nd Demobilization Dept.	2nd. Demobilization Dept.
1946 Apr 1	Appointed Secretary of the 2nd Demobilization Dept. (2nd class) according to the Imperial Ordinance No. 193	"
1946 June 15	Discharged from general mobilization.	"
" 1	Granted the 10th Grade Salary.	"
" 15	Appointed Secretary of the Demobilization Dept. (2nd class) according to the Imperial Ordinance No. 315.	"
1946 June 15	Limitation Ordinance for Naval Officers abolished according to the Imperial Ordinance No. 322 of 1946.	"
"	Assigned to the Materials Adjustment Section of the 2nd Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Office.	Demobilization Office.



1946 July 1	Granted the 25th Grade Salary	Demobilization Office.
1947 Mar 31	Granted the 27th Grade Salary.	"
"	Relieved of principle post at own request.	Cabinet

Compared with the Original  
June 5, 1947



FUJITA, Masamichi

Def. Doc. 1593

Captain Japanese Navy

Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry from June 1942

One of the officers in charge of the administering matters dealing  
with shipping of the Soviet Union.



履歴正本

FUJITA, MASAMICHI

氏名 藤田 正路

族稱	明治 37. 3. 31	誕辰		
本籍地	鹿児島県鹿児島市西千石町 百五拾番地			
家族名及誕辰	母	明治 4. 8.	長男 公郎 昭和 7. 2. 27	
	兄	明治 27. 6. 9.	二男 道郎 昭和 9. 12. 24	
	弟	明治 39. 11. 23	三男 忠郎 昭和 12. 11. 6	
	弟	明治 45. 2. 16	長女 佳子 昭和 12. 4. 30	
	妻	明治 44. 12. 28		
年月日	職	記	事	應名
9. 8. 26	海軍兵學校生徒	7	命	兵學校
13. 7. 24	海軍兵學校放程卒業	7	證	"
13. 7. 24	海軍少尉候補生	7	命	海軍病
	出雲乗組	7	命	"
14. 12. 1	任海軍少尉			内 閣
昭和 2. 12. 1	任海軍中尉			内 閣
5. 12. 1	任海軍大尉			内 閣
10. 10. 31	海軍大學校甲種學生被仰付			海軍病
11. 12. 1	任海軍少佐			内 閣
12. 17. 25	補第=水雷戦隊参謀			海軍病
12. 12. 1	補第=八戦隊参謀			"
13. 12. 15	補第=水雷戦隊参謀			"
14. 11. 1	補第=艦隊参謀			"
16. 10. 15	任海軍中佐			内 閣
17. 5. 5	補第司令部出仕兼海軍病出仕			海軍病
"	海軍病軍務局=総務課入			"
17. 6. 20	補海軍病軍務局局員			海軍病
19. 10. 15	任海軍大佐			内 閣
"	補海軍艦政本部出仕兼海軍病			海軍病
	軍務局局員			

武官履歴紙 甲

海軍



20. 11. 20	豫備役被仰付	海軍部
..	充員名簿ヲ命ス	"
20. 12. 1	勅令第六八六號 = 依"第 = 復員官 (高等官三等) = 34セリ	
20. 12. 1	補給 = 復員局總務局局員 等 = 復員局	
21. 4. 1	勅令第一九三號 = 依"第 = 復員事務官(一級) = 34セリ	
21. 6. 15	充員名簿ヲ解除ス	等 = 復員局
21. 6. 1	賜十號俸	"
21. 6. 15	勅令第三一五號 = 依"復員事務官(一級) = 34セリ	
21. 6. 15	昭和二十年勅令第三二二號海軍特 技令限令廢止	
21. 6. 15	復員廳等 = 復員局資料整理部 部勅務ヲ命ス	復員局
21. 7. 1	賜二十五號俸	"
22. 3. 31	賜二十七號俸	"
22. 3. 31	依願免本官	内閣

昭和二十六年六月五日  
正本ト照合シ

二  
三




11 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

SUBJECT: FUJITA, Masamichi

Search of IPS Files reveals no information on the Subject.

  
Henry A. Dolan Investigator  
IPS Investigative Division  
Room 381 W.M.B.



Translated by  
K. Hori

Copy of the Original  
Curriculum Vitae

Name: FUJITA Masamichi

Born: March, 3, 1904

Permanent Domicile: 150, Nishi-sengoku-machi,  
Kagoshima-shi, Kagoshima-ken.

Names of Family and Date of Birth	Mother.	Natsu.	
			April 8, 1873
	Elder Brother.	Masami	June 9, 1894
	Younger Brother	Masaharu	Nov. 23, 1906
	Younger Brother	Susumi	Feb. 16, 1912
	Wife	Teruko	Dec. 23, 1911
	Eldest Son	Kimio	Aug. 23, 1932
	Second Son	Michio	Dec. 24, 1934
	Third Son	Tadao	Nov. 6, 1937
	Eldest Daughter	Kayoko	April 30, 1943

YEAR	MONTH	DAY	PARTICULARS	GOVERNMENT OFFICE
1920	Aug	26	Ordered to enroll at the Naval Academy	Naval Academy
1924	July	24	Finished the course of study at the Naval Academy.	"
1924	July	24	Commissioned Naval Cadet.	Navy Dept.
			Assigned on Board H.M.S. Izumo	"
1925	Dec.	1.	Commissioned 2nd. Sub-Lieutenant	Cabinet
1927	Dec.	1.	Commissioned Sub-Lieutenant	Cabinet
1930	Dec.	1.	Commissioned Lieutenant	Cabinet



YEAR	MONTH	DAY	PARTICULARS	GOVERNMENT OFFICE 2.
1935	Oct.	31	Ordered A Class student of the Naval Staff College	Navy Dept.
1936	Dec.	7.	Commissioned Lieutenant-Commander	Cabinet
1937.	July	28.	Appointed staff officer of the 3rd. Destroyer Squadron.	Navy Dept.
1937.	Dec.	1.	Appointed staff officer of the 8th Squadron.	"
1938	Dec.	15.	Appointed staff officer of the 2nd. Destroyer Squadron.	"
1939	Nov.	1.	Appointed staff officer of the 2nd. Fleet.	"
1941	Oct.	15.	Commissioned Commander	Cabinet
1942	May	5.	Assigned to the Naval General Staff and concurrently to the Navy Department.	Navy Dept.
"	"	"	Ordered to serve in the Navy Affairs Bureau, Navy Dept.	"
1942	June	20	Appointed member of the Navy Affairs Bureau, Navy Dept.	Navy Dept.
1944	Oct.	15.	Commissioned Captain.	Cabinet
"			Assigned to the Bureau of Naval Construction and concurrently to the Navy Affairs Bureau, Navy Department.	Navy Dept.
1945	Nov.	20	Placed on the Reserve List.	Navy Dept.
"	"	"	Ordered general mobilization	
1945	Dec.	1.	Appointed member of the 2nd. Demobilization Dept. (3rd. rank of the Higher Civil Service) according to the Imperial Ordinance No. 686.	"
1945	Dec.	1.	Appointed member of the General Affairs Bureau of the 2nd. Demobilization Dept.	2nd. Demobilization Dept.
1946	April	1.	Appointed Secretary of the 2nd Demobilization Dept.	2nd. Demobilization



			(2nd. Class) according to the Imperial Ordinance No. 193.	Dept.
1946	June	15.	Discharged from general mobilization	2nd Demobilization Dept.
1946	June	4.	Granted the 10th Grade Salary.	"
1946	June	15	Appointed Secretary of the Demobilization Dept. (2nd. Class) according to the Imperial Ordinance No. 315.	
1946	June	15.	Limitation Ordinance for Naval Officers abolished according to the Imperial Ordinance No. 322 of 1946.	
1946	June	15.	Assigned to the Materials Adjustment Section of the 2nd Demobilization Bureau, Demobilization Office	Demobilization Office
1946	July	1.	Granted the 25th Grade Salary.	"
1947	March	31.	Granted the 27th Grade Salary.	"
1947	March	31.	Relieved of principle post at own request.	Cabinet.

Compared with the Original  
June 5, 1947.



FUJITA, Masamichi

Def. Doc. 1593

Captain Japanese Navy

Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry from June 1942

One of the officers in charge of the administering matters dealing with shipping of the Soviet Union.




11 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

SUBJECT: FUJITA, Masamichi

Search of IPS Files reveals no information on the Subject.

  
Henry A. Dolan Investigator  
IPS Investigative Division  
Room 381 W.M.B.