

E X C E R P T

***** a. Sorge Paves Way For USSR - German Pact; The European picture was very black in the spring of 1939. The USSR had a choice of negotiations either with the Anglo-French or the Germans. After they had learned from Sorge that the Germans had proposed to Tokyo, with the support of Ambassador General Oshima Hiroshi, an alliance directed against the USSR and Great Britain, but that the Cabinet, the navy and the Zaibatsu were all opposed to such an alliance and had blocked it, the Soviet Government itself entered into the famous, and disastrous, non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939. It will be recalled that it was the signature of this pact, securing Hitler's eastern frontier, which precipitated the second world war by the invasion of Poland.

At the time of the "Nomonhan Incident," in the summer of 1939, when the Red Army and the Japanese Kwantung Army engaged in a full-scale, local war, the Red Army was able to learn Japanese intentions. They learned what units were being dispatched from what parts of Manchuria, as well as what reinforcements would come from Japan. Above all, they learned that the Japanese Government did not intend to exploit this incident, but intended to settle it locally, and the Russians conducted themselves accordingly. Aside from his sources in Tokyo, Sorge was able to get a good on-the-spot report from de Voukelitch who as a correspondent was taken to Nomonhan as the guest of the Japanese Army. The Japanese assessment of their lessons at Nomonhan, especially their need to mechanize all their forces and develop armored divisions on the German model, was transmitted by Sorge on the basis of information gathered both by the German Embassy and by Miyagi.

Sorge sent a reliable account of Japanese output of munitions, aircraft and motorcars, along with the report on the factories making these materials as well as iron and steel on 16 February 1940. From time to time, he brought these figures up to date. In August 1941 he reported on Japanese petroleum resources, a top secret bit of information of the most vital importance in estimating both Japanese war plans and capabilities. He reported that there was in storage in Japan sufficient petroleum for a two year's use by the navy, half a year by the army and half a year by the nation at large. His sources were the German Embassy and Miyagi.

1941 was the crucial year. After earlier general reports, on 20 May 1941; Sorge flashed the urgent warning that the Reichswehr would concentrate from 170 to 190 divisions on the Soviet border, and on 20 June would attack along the whole frontier. The main direction of the drive would be toward Moscow. It will be recalled that this attack did occur on 22 June. Naturally, thereafter, the answer to the question of Japanese attack from the east became the most vital mission of the Sorge ring. All questions, whether of Japanese-American relations, the war in China or internal politics were subordinated to answering that basic question. Without a sound answer the Red Army could not draw on their Far Eastern Army for use in the west, and, as the event showed, only a massing of limitless reserves made possible the stopping of the violent German thrusts.

Sorge could not come by the answer immediately, partly because it had not been decided definitely by the responsible Japanese authorities.. Naturally, Ambassador Ott was urging the Japanese to enter the war and distract the Russians on their eastern frontier. Sorge was able to report on 2 July, immediately after the Imperial Council of that date, that the Japanese Government had decided to push southward into French Indo-China and seize various bases. Meanwhile, while adhering to their neutrality treaty with the USSR, in view of the possibility of war with the Soviet Union, they would mobilize their whole forces. Late in July Sorge reported that a few troops from the Tokyo-Osaka areas had been sent south, but that to advance into Thailand and Malaya they needed 300,000 men. So far there were only 40,000 men in Indo-China.***

(Pages 49-50)

并護^例文書 三〇八七

抜萃

a ゾルゲ ソ聯独逸協定の途を閉じ

一九三九年春の歐洲の状況は暗澹たるものありし

ソ聯は英佛又は独逸のゾルゲと協定を結ぶ選擇權を擧ぐるゝ、ソ聯はゾルゲから独逸は日本。独逸は獨逸使大島將軍の支持の下にソ聯及英國に對抗す。同盟を締結する中入北^{東部政府に}を為し、海軍及財閥が之を阻止したるいふこの通報を受けた後ソ聯政府自身有るも、^{その}英佛を有るゝた^{ナク}独逸の不可侵條約を締結した

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月一日 於東京

供 述 者 若 松 只 一

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日於同所

立 會 人 島 内 龍 起

此の條約の締結がヒットラーの東方國境を確保——遂
 に^{独逸を}ポーランド侵畧による^{吾々は}第二次世界大戦のかり立てと
 現起するが如き。

一九三九年夏、赤軍と日本の國東軍との大規模な東
 地方的な戦闘を行つた所謂ノモンハン事件の際に
 赤軍は日本の島國とする所を知ることが出来た、赤軍
 は滿洲の如何なる地方を如何なる部隊が派遣さ
 れたか、又如何なる増援部隊が日本より到着するかを知ることが
 出来た。

特ニソ聯は日本政府は此の事件を利用して高志
 のないこと、——此の事件と地方的に解決する高志が

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月一日 於東京

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あることを知つた、
ソ聯はこの高志に從つて行動

ゾルゲは東京に居ける情報蒐集（根拠）以外に日本軍
の宿舎各々ノモンハンに從軍してウラゲリツチナラ
現場からのより情報を入手するところであつた

日本軍のノモンハンに於て得た教訓の集積、特に凡そ
軍隊を独逸式に機械するに及装甲部隊を差達
させる必要と痛感したところ、独逸大使館及官城（ミヤギ）より
得た情報を根拠としてゾルゲより通邪した、

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俟 述 者 若 松 只 一

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ソージは一九四〇年二月十六日日本の

軍需品、航空機、及び自動車製生産高

に関する責任ある記事と、鐵鋼鐵並りに

上記の材料を生産せる工場に関する報告

書と共に送つた。彼は屢々此等の数字を

時宜に適するものとす。一九四一年八月

日本の戦争計畫、戦争能力を知る上に

最も重大なる極秘の情報である日本の

石油次資源に関して報告した。彼は日本

には海軍に於いて二年間陸軍に於いて

半年間國民一般に於いて半年間使用す

るおりの石油が貯藏してある事を報告

した。

しては如何。右し日米諒解の結果、米國が太平洋から手が抜けるので、其の爲対英援助が一層強化されるということになつては、日本としては強硬に對する信義に反して面白くなく、又全体の情想が低調となる。

三 是案の内容が少し煩雜に過ぎる。
四 この原文は旧秩序に又復帰するといふ感じを興える故、新秩序建設といふ積極面をもう少しはつきり出したい。

五 迅速に事を運ばないと滿現の弊がある。この意味からも外相の聲明を督促する必要がある。

X X X X

十八日の連絡会議後、陸海軍と外務省は直に案の検討に着手した。此間寺崎アメリカ局長は野村大使に電報して「王談上賛成」の趣を米國側に傳えさせようとしたのであるが、大橋次官は、その趣旨には賛成しなから松岡外相の滞京を待つべきであるとして之を抑えたのである。当の松岡外相は二十日漸く大連に到着した。余は電話をもつて外相に連絡し

彼の情報、出所は独逸大使館並に

宮城のありを

支那事變處理の最捷徑であることは極めて明らかなである。

二 この結果に應じ日本兩國の接近を図ることは日米戦争回避の絶対手段たるのみならず、歐洲戦争の世界戦争に迄拡大することを防止し、世界平和を招來することの前途になるのではないか。

三 今日我國力の相当倍純していることからすれば、一日も速に事變を解決して國力の恢復者は望ましい。一部に主張されている増進論の如き、総帥部においても自信も準備もないという位で、加之國力培養の上からも一時不と手を廻り、物資等の元夫を將來の爲に図る必要がある。

かくして列席者は大體米米を交話すべしとの論に傾いたのであるが、その條件として左の如き意見があつた。

一 三山同盟と試みしないということを増進にする。之は強延に対する信義から当然である。

二 日本協同の趣旨が世界平和に貢献するものなることをもつとはつきり

一九四二年は決定的な年であった。

一九四一年五月二十日の早期一般報告の

後、~~ソルゲ~~ ^{ソルゲ} から ^{ドイツ} 防軍はソカイエトを境に

一七の乃至一九の師団を捕まぬし、而して

六月二十日は全戦線に亘る攻撃

の序に出づるであらうといふ ^{意図} があるが

~~打電~~ 打電された。 ^{その}

其間としてモスコーの方面に向き進軍する

であらう() の攻撃が六月二十日に

又 ^{意図} 一帯を相い出され、 ^{意図} である。

そこで自然、 ^{意図} 日本軍の攻撃

地方的ニ適用セラルル法案及個人ニ關スル法案ノ全部ハ専ラ下院ヨリ最初ニ提出セラルベシ但シ上院ハ修正ヲ提議シ又ハ之ニ同意スルコトヲ得

第十九節

(一) 大統領ハ議會ノ各通常會期ノ開始期日ヨリ十五日以内ニ一般歳出豫算法案ノ基礎タルベキ收支豫算書ヲ提出スベシ議會ハ議會及司法部ノ爲ノ歳出豫算ヲ除クノ外豫算書ニ明記セラレタル政府ノ政務遂行ノ爲大統領ガ勸告セル歳出豫算ヲ増加スルコトヲ得ズ豫算書ノ形式及其ノ掲グベキ参考事項ハ法律ニ依リ規定セラルベシ

(二) 一般歳出豫算法案中ノ或特定ノ歳出豫算ニ特ニ關係アルモノニ非ザレバ如何ナル規定又ハ法令モ一般歳出豫算中ニ包含セラルルコトナカルベシ又右ノ規定又ハ法令ハ其ノ適用ニ付テハ右歳出豫算ノミニ局限セラルベシ

第二十節

(一) 議會ニ代リ可決セラレタル一切ノ法案ハ法律ト爲ルニ先チ大統領ニ提出セラルベシ大統領ハ右法案ヲ裁可スル場合ニハ之ニ署名スベク又裁可セザル場合ニハ其ノ反對理由ヲ具シテ之ヲ最初ニ提出シタル議院ニ返付スベシ右議院ハ其ノ議事日誌中ニ反對理由ヲ詳細ニ記載シ且右法案ヲ再審議スベシ再審議ノ後右議院ノ全議員ノ三分ノ二ガ右法案ノ通過ニ同意スルニ於テハ該法案ハ反對理由ト共ニ地方ノ議院ニ送付セ

に關する問題の答へは ^{せうじ} ズルが ~~……~~

「重一」にこそ日取り重大な使命とならん ^{……}

の事柄也。 ^{……} 日中關係中 ^{……} 於ける競争

又は内閣の改組に關することあること

他の ^{……} 問題は又根本問題の答を得

る後の問題であった。 ^{……} 此問題の答

を得ずには ^{……} 陸軍軍部を西方に

回す事は出来なかつた。 ~~……~~

^{……} ~~……~~ 無敵の軍

備兵を集中するに ^{……} 組織的な

突入を ^{……} ことが出来た

7 あらう

地万的ニ適用セラルル法案及個人ニ關スル法案ノ全部ハ專ラ下院ヨリ最初ニ提出セラルベシ但シ上院ハ修正ヲ提議シ又ハ之ニ同意スルコトヲ得

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ソルゲはすく子は返答をうけに存かつ

た。と水は一つは二の問題が未だ未

任ある日本右邊の最終的決定と

経ておこなつたおのしあつた。オフトー

大使は勿論日本側を動かして参

戦させ、ソ連ト軍をその東部、或は

その境に境乱させたり奔走して

おた。遂²日二日、その日行はれた御

前會議の後、ソルゲは日本政府

が佛印の南進に幾つかの基地

を占領するに決意し、其旨を報

告するに及びた。またソ聯との

中立條約を守り、方針の一致

性にかんがひ日本はその全兵力を

動員するにあらうと考へられた。

A certain N.C.O., now being detained at the Sugamo Prison was alleged to have assaulted the responsible person of a organization, which then was employing POW labour, out of his indignation for the employer's lack of enthusiasms towards the POWs under his employ. The injured person lodged a protest to me personally against the N.C.O. on the occasion of my visit to that organization. At other time the fact came to my knowledge that a certain interpreter attached to a POW camp, though he had the habit of striking a POW from a slight cause, would, when a POW happened to fall sick, attend on him whole-heartedly almost without taking any rest or food, with the natural result that he was always popular with the POWs in spite of his bad habit. From these facts I can assure you that the POW camp staffs were real guardians for the Prisoners of War under their charge.

17. Measures Relative to the disposition of POW's in case of Gradual Change in the Situation (Army, Asia, Secret, No.2257) Aimed at the Following Two Points:(Ex.No.1978)
- (1) To transfer POW camps in order to avoid, by all means the giving up of POW's to enemy hands, and to prevent, as much as possible, POW casualties which might be inflicted by the air-raids.
 - (2) Not to make any mistakes in disposition in the event we were obliged to resort to emergency measures against POW's, owing to unavoidable circumstances, as stated above, this notification was made in order to protect POW's, and did not bear any implication of mistreatment towards them. As a result, for the purpose of preventing POW casualties to the utmost, about 10,000 POW's held in our homeland were removed from the Tokyo-Yokohama area, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Hakodate, Muroran areas, where air-raids were expected to be intensified, to such areas deemed to be comparatively safe from air-raids as the TOHOKU, HOKUROKU areas and the interior parts of HOKKAIDO.

Thanks to these steps taken, casualties inflicted by air-raids upon the POW's were smaller than our expectations, hardly amounting to 100. As a matter of fact, more than 13 places of the evacuated camps in the Tokyo and Osaka areas had actually been bombed.

18. It was from March, 1942 that the POW Information Bureau began its communications with regard to the POW situation. Up to August 1945, the number of POW's and internees reported was about 210,000, and since then up to August 1947 approximately 100,000 cases were reported, totalling 310,000. The number of the deceased reported of the POW's and the internees numbered about 45,000 cases.

The POW Information Bureau also undertook to release communication with regard to enemy personnel killed in action. Up to August 1945, they reported on about 11,000 cases.

In addition, the POW Information Bureau took it upon themselves to answer, with sincerity, any inquiries relative to POW's. They had answered about 1,000 cases, up to August 1945.

七月末ソルゲは東京および大阪地
区から若手幹部隊が南方へ送り
小松が、タイおよびマレー半島へ進

撃つためのは三十万の兵力を要
する旨を教へて、その方針印交す
那陸軍兵力は四万を過す所か

云、

（中四九一五〇頁）

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