

2222

HIROTA

證明書

近衛文磨年記「平和への努力」第三頁乃至第五頁より抜萃と題  
せる別添文書は昭和五年四月一日日本電報通信社より発行せる近  
衛文磨年記「平和への努力」と題する書籍の当該頁よりの正確な  
る抜萃なる事を證明す

昭和二十二年一月廿一日

東京都京橋區銀座

日本電



近衛文麿手記「平和への努力」第三頁乃至第五頁より抜萃

一方蔣作賓は十年の夏たつたが、一先づ帰国した。これは重大な意味があつたのである。作賓は新加坡倉山に引越した時分から日支和平案件といふものを持ち二人がきつてゐた。それを今度帰国して蔣氏に令で、去分談合して具体案を作つ来る、といふことになつてゐたのである。

當時蔣氏は四川方面の赤軍討伐中であつたが、作賓はそこへ訪ねて行き、それから重慶に三週間たつたが三ヶ月たつたが、とに角一緒に居つて和平問題を練つた。そして出来上つた案を丁紹伊に持たせて日本に送りこいた。丁は日本に着くと、早速輕井澤に私を訪ねて来た。

彼の携へて来た日支和平案といふのは

- 一、滿洲問題に對する(現在の空念ひは支那に於ては取あけられぬ)。

二、日支ノ關係ヲ平等ノ基礎ノ上ニ置クノ結果トシテ凡ソノ不平等條約ヲ撤  
廢スル。但シ滿洲ニ關係ノアル不平等條約ハ除外シテイマタ排日教育ハ所  
止スル。

三、平等互惠ノ關係ノモトニ日支經濟提携ヲスコト。

四、經濟提携ノ成績ヲ見タラヘテ軍事協定ヲ結ブ（軍事協定締結ノ場  
合には、蔣氏不白身は日本を訪問してとよとよののである）。

大体右ノヤウな内容のものであつた。

私はこの草案は大賛成であつたかう。老翁が努力しようとして丁に撞つたのである。

この支那の提案を取あげた私は、議令で廣田外相に各軍事情を話し、政府に  
於ても日支問題の解決に可なり努力するやう頼んだ。廣田も外務省も同感であ  
つたのだが、軍部が又反対の者があつた。それは提案草案の滿洲を「不向」に  
附するといふ点か「義認」と改めよといふのである。これには廣田も固つた。

この時の陸相は誰であつたか——昭和十一年の二二六事件以前の議令右左林が川島であり、後の廣田内閣成立後のことなる、寺内である。私は二二二事件のあとであつたやうに思つてゐる。

軍部が反対と聞して、丁紹伍はかつかりしてさびいとま乞ひに私のところに見えた。しかし其折丁は自分はまた希望を持つてゐる。今後この問題を取りあがる場合には、日支間の連絡として日本人側からは若くは、何れも宮崎龍介、年寄りを、秋山定輔、この人達をよこしてとれと私に頼んで歸國した。

宮崎や秋山は、蔣作賓も内の人として扱へる。(まり支那の台所はかう入つて行ける人物であるといふ意味なうた。

私はこの時の丁の言葉を覚えてゐたりで、昭和十二年七月蘆溝橋事件が起ると同時に、宮崎秋山の西名を南京に派遣しようとした。ところが途中宮崎は神戸で、秋山は東京で憲兵に押へられて了つた。こちらでもすぐ押へる配したが

釋放するといひ乍うぐづくすること一週間、そのうち事件は拡大して終に特捜を矢  
しつろつた。當時厚がこの西名を押つたのは、西人に対するスパイの疑いを持つてね  
たといふのが、何ともお説にならうない。

(Translation)

*not orig*

Extracts from the memorandum, "EFFORTS FOR PEACE",  
by AYAMARO KONOYE (pp. 3-5).

Meanwhile, Chiang Tso-Ping, in the summer of 1935, if I remember correctly, returned home temporarily. This had an important significance, for Chiang Tso-Ping had been approaching me with a peace proposal between Japan and China since about the time I moved to Kamakura-yama. His going home had the purpose of formulating some concrete plans of peace in full consultation with Chiang Kai-shek.

At that time, Chiang Kai-shek was in Szechuan fighting the Reds. Chiang Tso-Ping went there to stay with him at Chunking for three weeks (or was it three months?) discussing peace problems. He sent Ting Shao-jen to Japan with the plans thus formulated. On arriving in Japan, Ting came to see me at Karuizawa.

The crude outline of the peace proposal which he brought to me was as follows:

1. The Manchurian problem will be laid aside for the time being (for it is impossible to discuss the matter in the present atmosphere in China).
2. The relations between Japan and China will be placed upon the basis of equality, and as a result all unequal treaties will be abolished, excepting those relating to Manchuria. Anti-Japanese education will be suppressed.
3. Japan and China will make economic cooperation based on equality and reciprocity.
4. Military agreement will be concluded depending upon the results of economic cooperation. (In the event of signing a military agreement, Chiang Kai-shek himself will not be reluctant to visit Japan.) Being heartily satisfied with this plan, I promised him to do my best for its realization.

Approving this Chinese proposal, I saw Foreign Minister Hirota in the Diet, informed him of the circumstances and asked him that the government should make efforts to solve the Sino-Japanese problem. While Hirota and the Foreign Office approved this proposal, opposition came from among the military. They objected to "laying aside the Manchurian problem" and insisted upon "recognition" which embarrassed Hirota.

Who was the War Minister at that time? If it was in the Diet session before the February 26th Incident in 1936, the Minister must have been Hayashi or Kawashima; and if it was after the formation of the Hirota Cabinet, it must have been Terauchi. I believe it was after the February 26th Incident.

Hearing that the military was opposed to the plan, Ting Shao-jen was bitterly disappointed and came to inform me of his decision to leave. Ting said, however, that he still had hopes and asked that in case this proposal should be taken up again in the future, Ryusuke Miyazaki, if a young man is suitable, or Teisuke Akiyama, if an older person is preferred, be sent to establish liaison between Japan and China; and he went home.

What he had in mind is that either Miyazaki or Akiyama can be regarded by Chiang Tso-Ping as one of his own, or, in other words, they were men who could enter China by the kitchen door.

Remembering Ting's words at this time, I tried to dispatch Miyazaki and Akiyama to Nanking upon the occurrence of the Lukouchiao Incident in July, 1937. They were detained by the military police on their way, Miyazaki at Kobe and Akiyama in Tokyo. Although I immediately made arrangements with the military, the military procrastinated their release for a week, and the Incident had spread and the opportunity was lost forever. The reason for the detention of these men by the military was claimed to be suspicion of espionage, a laughable nonsense.

Extracts from the memorandum, "EFFORTS FOR PEACE", by AYAMARO KONOYE (pp. 3-5).

Meanwhile, Chiang Tso-Ping, in the summer of 1935 if I remember correctly, returned home temporarily. This had an important significance, for Chiang Tso-ping had been approaching me with a peace proposal between Japan and China since about the time I moved to Kamakura-yama. His going home had the purpose of formulating some concrete plans of peace in full consultation with Chiang Kai-shek.

At that time, Chiang Kai-shek was in Szechuan fighting the Reds. Chiang Tso-ping went there to stay with him at Chungking for three weeks (or was it three months?) discussing peace problems. He sent Ting Shao-jen to Japan with the plans thus formulated. On arriving in Japan, Ting came to see me at Karuizawa.

The crude outline of the peace proposal which he brought to me was as follows:

1. The Manchurian problem will be laid aside for the time being (for it is impossible to discuss the matter in the present atmosphere in China).

2. The relations between Japan and China will be placed upon the basis of equality, and as a result all unequal treaties will be abolished, excepting those relating to Manchuria. Anti-Japanese education will be suppressed.

3. Japan and China will make economic cooperation based on



equality and reciprocity.

4. Military agreement will be concluded depending upon the results of economic cooperation. (In the event of signing a military agreement, Chiang Kai-shek himself will not be reluctant to visit Japan.) Being heartily satisfied with this plan, I promised him to do my best for its realization.

Approving this Chinese proposal, I saw Foreign Minister Hirota in the Diet, informed him of the circumstances and asked him that the government should make efforts to solve the Sino-Japanese problem. While Hirota and the Foreign Office approved this proposal, opposition came from among the military. They objected to "laying aside the Manchurian problem" and insisted upon "recognition" which embarrassed Hirota.

Who was the War Minister at that time? If it was in the Diet session before the February 26th Incident in 1936, the Minister must have been Hayashi or Kawashima; and if it was after the formation of the Hirota Cabinet, it must have been Terauchi. I believe it was after the February 26th Incident.

Hearing that the military was opposed to the plan, Ting Shao-jen was bitterly disappointed and came to inform me of his decision to leave. Ting said, however, that he still had hopes and asked that in case this proposal should be taken up again in the future, Ryusuke Miyazaki, if a young man is suitable, or Teisuke Akiyama, if an older person is preferred, be sent to

establish liaison between Japan and China; and he went home.

What he had in mind is that either Miyazaki or Akiyama can be regarded by Chiang Tso-ping as one of his own, or, in other words, they were men who could enter China by the kitchen-door.

Remembering Ting's words at this time, I tried to dispatch Miyazaki and Akiyama to Nanking upon the occurrence of the Lukouchiao Incident in July, 1937. They were detained by the military police on their way, Miyazaki at Kobe and Akiyama in Tokyo. Although I immediately made arrangements with the military, the military procrastinated their release for a week, and the Incident had spread and the opportunity was lost forever. The reason for the detention of these men by the military was claimed to be suspicion of espionage, a laughable nonsense.

2222

Certificate of Source

W.C.  
I hereby certify that the document hereto  
attached, written by KONOE, Fuminaro  
personally, entitled "Efforts for Peace"  
is an exact and authorized copy  
excerpt <sup>(P.P. 3 to P.P. 5)</sup> from the book <sup>from</sup> ~~(P.P. 3 to P.P. 5)~~  
which issued by NIPPON DENPO TSUSHIN-

SHA, April 1 1946.

Certified

on the 31 day of Jan. 1947

NIPPON DENPO TSUSHIN-SHA (Seal)

1-147 GINZA KYOBASHI-KU

Tokyo.