

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1634-J

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages, dated 30 June, 1936, and described as follows: Matters pertaining to basic principles of State policy, a conference of Premier, Foreign, Finance, Army, and Navy Ministers, following a Cabinet conference June 30, 1936.

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Foreign Ministry  
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Signed at Tokyo on this

21st day of Sept, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

23 day of Sept, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME  
Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ J...Curtis, 2dLt

"The fundamental principle of our national policy", (signed by the five Ministers - the Premier, War, Navy, Finance, and Foreign Ministers - 11 August 1936).

### Fundamentals of our National Policy

- I The fundamental principle of administering the state based on righteousness lies in realizing the ideal of our national foundation by strengthening the foundation of our country internally and prospering externally, thereby making the Japanese Empire develop into the stabilization Power, nominal and virtual, in the East Asia, secure peace in the Orient and contribute to the peace and welfare of mankind throughout the world. In view of the situation of the Empire, both home and abroad, to establish the fundamental national policy consists in securing a steady footing of our empire in the Eastern Continent as well as developing in the South Seas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defense. The general basic principles are as follows:
- (1) To exclude the Military Rule Policy of the Powers and follow our policy to share mutual welfare by participating in co-existence and co-prosperity principle is the only way of realizing the ideal of our Imperial Rule of Justice. It should, therefore, be the immutable leading spirit in all times in relation to our overseas development.
  - (2) In order to secure the stability of our Empire and to safe-guard its development so as to acquire the position of the real stabilization Power in the East Asia, nominally and virtually, we are to complete our defensive armament.
  - (3) We should strive to eradicate the Russian menace on the North, in order to realize a steadfast development of Manchuria, and for the solid defense of both Japan and Manchuria. We should also be prepared for Britain and America, attempting at the same time an economic development by the close cooperation of Japan, China and Manchuria. The above should be our fundamental policy for the Continent. For the achievement of such an object we should always be careful to hold most amicable relations with the Powers.
  - (4) For the furtherance of our plan to achieve the social and economic development of our Empire toward the South Seas, especially on the Outer South Sea Islands Area, we should take a gradual and peaceful measure, always avoiding to stimulate other nations, and try to fulfill our national strength correlative with the completion of Manchuria.
- II Making the above fundamental principle the pivotal point of our national policy, we expect thereby to unify all our policies, internal and external, and generally innovate the administration in accordance with the present situation of the Empire. The outline of our new policy is as follows:

- (1) The fulfillment of the National Defense Armament.
  - (a) As to the Army armaments, we should aim to counteract all the military forces that Russia can furnish to employ in the Far East; and, especially, so as to enable us to strike a hit at the very out-set of the war upon the Russians, we should complete our military force in Korea and Manchuria.
  - (b) As to the Naval Armaments, we should attempt to fulfill its strength to such an extent as to be sufficient for securing the command of the sea on the Western Pacific counter to the American Navy.
- (2) Our diplomatic policy is solely to make it the first principle to try to prosecute the national scheme in smooth and amicable manner, and thereby to conduct an innovation and improvement in general. The military authorities on their part are required to assist the activities of the diplomatic organ from within in order to have it act fully and advantageously, evading all the time to act from without as far as possible.
- (3) In order to renovate and improve political and administrative organ, to establish financial and economic policies, and to manage other plans and schemes, according to our fundamental principle, the following measures should be taken properly:
  - (a) Lead and unify public opinion at home, and strengthen the will of the people to tide over the extraordinary emergency of our country.
  - (b) In order to advance and further our trade and industry essential to the prosecution of the national policy, an appropriate improvement should be introduced to the administrative and economic organs.
  - (c) An adequate measure should be taken concerning the stabilization of the people's livelihood, the development of their physical strength, and fostering sound and healthy mind and idea.
  - (d) A suitable measure should be taken in order to make a drastic progress in air as well as sea transportation.
  - (e) It is required to accelerate the establishment of a self-supporting and self-sufficient policy for the important resources and materials essential to national defense and industry.
  - (f) By innovating diplomatic organs, as well as completing information and publicity systems we should strive to quicken our diplomatic function, and to enhance the national culture abroad.

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21st day of Sept. 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
(Signature of Official)  
(SEAL)

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

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(Official Capacity)

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Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

## OUR POLICY TOWARD CHINA

(Decided by the Ministries  
Concerned on 11 August 1936)

For the present, our policy toward China should be according to our foreign policy defined on 7 August 1936. It is as follows:

(Part of Item 8: beginning of Item 8, Chapters 1 and 4)

(1) Our Policy Toward North China.

The main purpose of our policy toward North China is to make the area anti-communistic and to make it friendly to Japan and Manchukuo and to secure national defense materials for Japan as well as to better its transportation facilities so that our national defense against Soviet Russia's invasion may be perfect and the cooperation and mutual assistance of Japan, Manchukuo and China may be secured. It is to be learned that the area to be turned friendly toward Japan, China and Manchukuo consists of 5 provinces in the northern part of China.

However, it is not a wise policy for Japan to try to extend our power or to try to gain administration in a hurry, since such a policy will surely cause more trouble without achieving the very object. We may say that it would be detrimental to our diplomacy toward Soviet Russia. We should rather devote ourselves to gain administration over Hopeh and Chahar first and then to get the rest of the provinces ready for economic cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and China as well as for making them anti-communistic and pro-Japanese.

Regarding the manner of our administration, we should try to realize substantial gain regardless of the denomination of our administration. Again, we should be careful not to disgrace the Nanking Government. The wisest way for us is to lead the Nanking Government to acknowledge our administration as if it were willingly entrusted to our charge. And, in our accepting it from the Nanking Government, we may place the Nanking Government under obligation. We may in turn ask a favour of the Chinese Government.

In order to gain as much as possible from this bargaining, the Japanese Central Government as well as the local Japanese officials should become one in acting rigidly as well as according to circumstances lest it should allow the Nanking Government to take the so-called double policy.

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Matters Pertaining to Basic Principle  
Of State Policy: 30 June 1936

Conference of Premier, Army, Navy,  
Foreign, Finance Ministers

On 30 June 1936, after the cabinet conference ended, the premier, the foreign and finance ministers remained on request by both the army and navy ministers. At the meeting of the above five ministers, the navy minister presented the annexed report (Basic Principle of State Policy) and explained it.

1. First, the finance minister remarked that "to correct the militaristic despotism of foreign powers", etc., as stated in (1) of Item 1 has been his intentions and have followed this policy to date. He therefore stated that he had no objections to this policy in general. But he added that it is essential that Japan too, must not carry out militaristic despotism.

2. The foreign minister declared that he too had no objections to this proposal and that its principles coincide with the foreign policy which he had under consideration. However, detailed plans have been conferred on by the three ministers and that they are being prepared now under his care. He agreed entirely with what the finance minister had said. For example, he thought it would be better to avoid using methods such as the special trade with East HOPEH. To this, the navy minister remarked that he too agreed with them and further explained that the preamble of (1) states, "according to the great cause and righteousness".

3. The foreign minister said that in view of the present international situation, it was necessary for JAPAN to make efforts to avoid isolation. Since in (3) of Item 1, it is stated "strive for friendly relationship with foreign countries", the foreign minister considered the spirit to be in line with his idea. However the phrase "to provide against England and America" seemed to be cause for some apprehension and he requested a definition of this phrase. The navy minister explained that this was only a provision for military preparedness in case of emergency and that it was absolutely not intended to look upon England and America as enemies. The foreign minister then stated that under the

present international situation, Japan should not only be regardful of keeping friendly relationship with England and America but should strive further to assume a more conciliatory attitude than in ordinary circumstances.

4. The finance minister remarked that "to make efforts to render assistance from the inside and to avoid outward activities" in (2) of Item 2 is exceedingly satisfactory. He sincerely hoped that it would be carried out in this manner.

5. The foreign minister asked the finance minister that if war should break out, would Japan be able to furnish war expenditures without relying on foreign loans? To this question, the finance minister replied that it would be difficult to rely on foreign loans. There would be no other means than floating national bonds and the issuance of paper currency. The finance minister further explained that the finance minister is at present promoting the merging of local banks to expedite the circulation of currency from local provinces to the Bank of Japan.

6. Finally, the premier said that in general, he had no objections to this plan. The navy minister declared that if there are no objections to this principle, a more concrete plan will be drafted based on this principle.

Remarks: At the conference of the three ministers on July 3rd, the foreign minister inquired whether the concrete plans mentioned in the last part of this report had been drawn up or not by the Army or Navy. The navy minister replied that the plan was not particularly drafted but that his subordinates may possibly be studying it.



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- EMERGENCY NO. 979
- (1) To exclude the Military Rule Policy of the Powers and follow our policy to share mutual welfare by participating in co-existence and co-prosperity principle is the only way of realizing the ideal of our Imperial Rule of Justice. It should, therefore, be the immutable leading spirit in all times in relation to our overseas development.
  - (2) In order to secure the stability of our Empire and to safe-guard its development so as to acquire the position of the real stabilization Power in the East Asia, nominally and virtually, we are to complete our defensive armament.
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II Making the above fundamental principle the pivotal point of our national policy, we expect thereby to unify all our policies, internal and external, and generally innovate the administration in accordance with the present situation of the Empire. The outline of our new policy is as follows:

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Investigator, IPS  
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(Stamp) TOP SECRET

AN OUTLINE REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CHINA INCIDENT

(Note on the margin: Oct. 1 - Signatures of Premier, Army, Navy and Foreign Ministers)

General Provisions

## 1. General Policy:

The present incident will be brought to a speedy conclusion through the efforts of armed forces combined with timely diplomatic action and with making China abolish her anti-Japanese and pro-Communistic policy, and establishing a truly bright and lasting friendship between Japan and China. We will make the realization of bringing about harmony and co-prosperity between Japan, Manchuria and China our main objective. In order to withstand lengthy use of military force, depending upon the situation, necessary measures will be taken to meet the need.

## 2. Military Operations:

Military operations will have China's speedy relinquishment of her hostile intention as their objective and the exercising of military force, the occupation of key points, and other various operations that become necessary for this objective, shall be taken as the occasion calls.

## 3. Diplomatic Measures:

The objective of the diplomatic measures will be to urge China's reconsideration of her hostile attitude towards Japan and induce her into a position that we desire. With China and third Powers, opportune negotiations and operations will be carried out. On concluding the incident, China will be made to give up her anti-Japanese and pro-Communistic policies, and diplomatic negotiations will be conducted along lines of epoch-making diplomatic readjustment, unbiased by the past circumstances between Japan and China.

4. In employing military and diplomatic measures and other necessary steps involved in this operation, utmost care should be exercised not to overstep the limits fixed by international law.

CRITERION

## 1. Use of Military Force:

(1) The principal areas where land forces will operate are mainly Hopeh-Chahar and Shanghai.

(2) In areas where it is necessary, sea and air operations be conducted.

2. Preparations for total national strength:

To make the conducting of operations smooth and to cope with the possibility of a change for the worse in the international situation, various national functionary facilities such as, enforcement of nationwide mobilization, enactment of wartime laws, realization of durable national unity - will be resorted to, as it becomes necessary.

3. Plans to be taken in regard to North China:

The solution of the North China problem aims at the realization of co-existence and co-prosperity among the three countries - Japan, China and Manchuria, - its major objective being to truly make North China a bright and cheerful district under the Chinese Central Government.

4. Plans to be taken in regard to Central and South China:

In Central and South China, we look forward to a situation suitable for the advancement and development of Sino-Japanese trade and commerce.

5. Measures to be taken in regard to the rear-operation zones of North China:

Measures to be taken in regard to the rear-operation zones in North China during the incident will shake off the idea of its being occupied enemy territory, and for the most part the zone will be governed as follows:

(1) No administration will be conducted in the occupied territory; security will be maintained, however, under the leadership of military forces.

(2) The administrative organ will be left to independent organization by the natives; however, proper guidance will be given so that it may be made a bright institution.

(3) The management of a communication and exploitation of natural resources necessary for military purposes will be carried out under necessary control.

However, Items (2) and (3) above will not affect readjustment talks on diplomatic relations which take place after the amicable settlement.

6. Economic, Finance and Foreign Trade:

Matters relating to commerce, economics and finance between Japan, China and third Powers will be regulated with making China give up her hostile attitude as the main objective.

7. Relations with Third Powers:

Diplomatic policies towards third Powers and various operations connected with it will, along with having the third Powers entertain goodwill towards us on their own accord, be executed so as not to brew a conflict with them or invite their interference. In carrying out military operations and other measures involved therein, utmost care should be exercised so that they are in compliance with the main objective stated above.

8. Measures re (Japanese) Residents:

Relief will be administered to (Japanese) residents.

9. The concrete plans for the foregoing provisions will be decided separately.

(Stamp) TOP SECRET

CONCRETE PLANS FOR THE OUTLINED  
POLICIES RE THE INCIDENT

The conditions for the settlement of the situation are for the most part as follows:

I North China:

(a) Establishment of demilitarized zones.  
A designated area (probably a line linking the area adjacent to the Yungtinghe with Changkiakow) will be established as a demilitarized zone, where the maintenance of public peace and order will be entrusted to restrictedly-armed Chinese police.

(b) The minimum of the Japanese demands in North China.

(1) If necessary, Japan will reveal her intentions to voluntarily reduce, as much as possible, the number of our occupation troops and limit it to the number at the time of the outbreak of the incident.

(2) The Tangku Truce (Including the various arrangements concluded in accordance with this agreement. However, those arrangements concluded in accordance with the Peking (local) arrangements, such as, (1) the seizure of the Gateways of the Great Wall; (2) through traffic of railway; (3) establishment of custom houses; (4) mail service; and (5) air service,

will be excepted) and the Doihara-Chin-T-Chen Agreement, and Umezu-Young-Chin Agreement will be dissolved. (The Central Forces in Hopei will, of course, be withdrawn from the province.)

However, it is to be pledged that control over anti-Japanism and prevention of Bolshovization in the above-mentioned demilitarized areas will be strictly enforced.

(3) It is to be agreed that Hopei-Chahar and Eastern Hopei (Councils) will be abolished and that the administration of these areas will be conducted by the Nanking Government as she pleases. However, it is desirable that the administrative leaders of this area be influential for bringing about proper suitable the realization of Sino-Japanese friendly relations.

In connection with the above, Japan will make an agreement with China, aiming at Sino-Japanese economic collaborations. This, of course, is a collaboration depending upon joint management by the two countries on an equal footing.

## II Shanghai:

Establishment of demilitarized zone in Shanghai.

(1) A designated area around Shanghai will be established as a demilitarized zone, where the international police or the restrictedly-armed Chinese police will be responsible for maintaining peace and order; they will be assisted by the Settlement Municipal Police.

(2) With the above measures, it will become unnecessary for each country to retain their land forces in the settlement. (The anchorage of war-ships is not included in this)

## III The general readjustment of Sino-Japanese Relations.

Simultaneously or subsequently to the truce parleys stipulated in I and II, negotiations regarding the readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations will be conducted without being influenced by the past state of affairs between the two countries. The outline for the readjustment plan is as follows:

Upon the successful conclusion of the intended truce parley, the two countries shall issue a statement stating that they have entered upon a "New Deal" for the purpose of bringing about close friendship between the two countries.

### 1. Political side:

(1) China will grant formal recognition to Manchukuo.



(2) An anti-Comintern Pact will be concluded between Japan and China (anti-Comintern movements in the North China demilitarized zone will naturally be brought about by this Pact, but especially strict control will be enforced in this area).

(3) In addition to the abolition of the Hopeh-Chahar Council and Eastern-Hopei Regime as it is stipulated in the truce pact, Japan will, with regard to Inner Mongolia, also try to persuade China, through negotiations, to concede to Japan's righteous demands (provided in Item (2) ) in that area. (China will recognize the present status of Prince Teh in the SI and CHA Banners and they will be made a mutual zone between China and Manchukuo, the preservation of which both Japan and China will respect.

(4) China will undertake to exercise a strict nationwide control over anti-Japanism and to effect completely the Ordinance of Friendly Relations with Powers. (Naturally, especially rigid control will be taken over anti-Japanism in the demilitarized area in North China.)

2. Military Matters:

Free serial flights will be abolished.

3. Economic Matters:

- (1) Reduction of custom tariffs on specific goods.
- (2) Abolition of Eastern-Hopei special trade and restoration to the Chinese the freedom to control smuggling in the sea off the demilitarized areas.

(Stamp) TOP SECRET

VARIOUS MATTERS TO BE TAKEN UP FOR  
NEGOTIATION SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE  
READJUSTMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The plan regarding the settlement of the aforesaid situation is:

- (1) to minimize the danger of future armed conflict between China and Japan by establishing demilitarized zones and so forth, along with,
- (2) removing deep-rooted causes for clashes by general readjustment of diplomatic relations, and thus establish a truly bright friendship between China and Japan, based on newly-built-up diplomatic relations. Consequently, to solve the pending issues between the two countries amicably through normal conversations after establishment of a bright cheerful diplomatic relationship and to more strongly promote mutual understanding between Japan and

China, will be our goal. But along with the expansion of the aspects of war, the people's expectation of the fruits of war will grow larger and they will not be content with merely the normal and ordinary things but will be anxious to secure conditions of a more tangible nature, such as indemnities and so forth. Accordingly, in considering the internal situation, we must be consistent as much as possible in the spirit of being broad-minded in the settlement of the situation as stated above, and at the same time that we negotiate on the readjustment of diplomatic relations, we will take up the various conditions stated below:

#### Special Conditions

##### (A) Indemnities:

(Indemnities for the direct damages done to the Japanese owned properties and rights, which China has assumed the responsibility of protecting, and for the direct damages due to illegal use or disposal by China of Japanese owned properties and rights, and similarly caused damages.)

(b) Formation and operation of a large-scale Sino-Japanese joint syndicate which engages in the following enterprises:-

(1) Marine transportation: Merger of the China Merchants Navigation Company with the Nisshin Kisen (Sino-Japanese Steamship Co.) and Dairen Kisen (Dairen Steamship Co.)

(2) Aviation: (2) Operation of the Shanghai-Fukuoka, Tsingtao-Fukuoka, Fukien-Taipai (T. N. Northern Formosa) and Kwantung-Taipai lines. (b) Sino-Manchurian air service (with which are to be merged the lines under the management of Hwei-Tung Co.)

Whether the air service between Asia and Europe is to be operated as a joint enterprise by the syndicate, and whether this is to be dealt with in a special negotiation, - requires further study, but for the present the following items will be considered:

(c) The Asia-European Air Service Company will be amalgamated into the syndicate (German holdings in the company will be bought up by Japan).

(3) Railroads: (2) Construction and management of the Shantung Railroad and its branch lines. (b) Construction and management of the Tsingshih Railway. (c) Construction and management of the Chengtch-Peiping Railway.

(4) Mining: Gold, iron, coal mines in North China.

(5) Agriculture and other suitable enterprises.

(C) Settlement of pending issues (the numbers at the head of the clauses show the order in which the issues will be settled):

(1) Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese tariff treaty, (the particulars are mentioned on separate list A.)

Reduction or removal of import and export duties.

(2) Removal or modifications of the ban and restrictions on import and export (for the particulars, refer to the separate list B.)

(3) Removal of restrictions on the production and export of salt.

The Basis of National Policy

June 30, 1936 (SHOWA 11)

The War and Navy Ministries

I. The fundamentals of administering state affairs lie in strengthening our national foundation at home and bringing about the prosperity of our nation abroad so that, on the basis of the relations between sovereign and subject, our Empire may secure the peace of the Orient and contribute to the welfare of mankind as the real stabilizing power in East ASIA, thereby realizing the ideal underlying the foundation of our nation. In view of the internal and external situation of the Empire, her fundamental policies must consist in advancing and developing in the Southern Seas as well as obtaining a firm position in the East Oriental continent for the stabilization of our national defense.

These fundamental policies are as follows:

(1) We must strive to correct the great Powers' aggressive policies and share happiness and favor with others according to a real principle of give and take; that is to say, our guiding principle must be to realize the spirit of the 'Imperial Way' (KODO) by a consistent policy of overseas expansion.

(2) We must complete our national defense armament in order to maintain peace and tranquillity, to safeguard our prosperity and to secure the position of the Empire as the stabilizing power in East ASIA in fact as well as in name.

(3) We expect the sound development of MANCHUKUO and hope by accomplishing this to stabilize Japan-Manchukuo national defense; thus in order to promote our economic development, we intend to get rid of the menace of the U.S.S.R., while preparing against BRITAIN and the U. S. and bringing about close collaboration between JAPAN, MANCHUKUO and CHINA. This is the basis of our continental policy in the execution of which we must also pay due attention to friendly relations with other powers.

(4) We plan to promote our racial and economic development in the Southern Seas, especially in the Outer Southern Seas, and without rousing other powers to action, we must attempt to extend our strength by moderate and peaceful measures. Thus with the establishment of MANCHUKUO in addition to the above, we may expect the full development of our national resources and the completion of our national defense.

II. On the basis of the above fundamental national policies we expect to reform our government system so as to make it suitable for the present external and internal situation, and to unify political, financial and economic policies both within and without the country. The essential points are as follows:

(1) Defensive armament preparations.

a) The aim of our military preparations is to enable us to cope with any force which the U.S.S.R. can mobilize in the Far East. Especially, our force in MANCHUKUO and KOREA must be strengthened so that we may smash her Far Eastern force at one blow from the beginning.

b) As for the navy, we must complete its armament sufficiently to maintain the command of the Western Pacific against the U. S. Navy.

(2) The first principle of our diplomatic policy lies in the smooth execution of our fundamental state policies as well as synthesizing and renewing them. The military will give undercover assistance without appearing on the surface so that the activities of our diplomatic organs may progress advantageously and smoothly.

(3) We must reform and improve our administrative system and establish an economic and financial policy by means of every facility available so as to strengthen our defensive strength and to promote our economic development vigorously. For this purpose, we will take suitable steps concerning the following matters.

a) We should direct and unify internal public opinion and make the resolution of the people steady to tide over the present emergency.

b) We should appropriately improve our political and economic systems in order to develop the important trade and industries which are necessary for the execution of national policy and national defense.

c) We should take appropriate measures to stabilize the life of the people, promote their physical strength and lead their thoughts into sound channels.

d) We should make appropriate arrangements for the rapid development of the aviation and shipping business.

e) We should promote the establishment of a self-supporting and self-sufficient policy for resources and materials important for national defense and industry.

f) We should reform our diplomatic organs and also draw up a system of information and propaganda in order to make our diplomatic function and the spread of our culture in the world more active.

~~Matters Pertaining to Outline of the  
State Policy~~

~~June 30, 1936~~

~~The War and Navy Ministries~~

~~I. The vision of Japan is to make clear the justice and cause of the country, to plan the rise of the country and to realize the peace of the East and contribute to the welfare of the human being.~~

~~"In view of the internal and external situations of the Empire, the fundamental policies of the Empire must lie in advancing and developing into the Southern Seas as well as obtaining firm position in the East Oriental continent stabilizing the national defense."~~

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1634-I

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated 30 June, 1936, and described as follows:

Outline of the basis of National Policy by War and Navy Ministers

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
20th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity SEAL

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Ex. 3735

TOP SECRET (Stamp)

Plan for Disposing of Incident

General principle

1. General policy:-

It is our main object to settle the present Incident as quickly as possible by effective military operations as well as successful diplomatic measures so that China shall lose her pretext for anti-Japanism and there may be created between Japan and China a fair and permanent diplomatic relation with cooperation and co-prosperity between Japan, Manchukou and China.

2. The aim of our military action:--

The aim of our military action is to make CHINA give up her will to fight in the shortest possible time. For a prompt settlement of the incident, such measures as the use of military force, occupation of strategic points and accompanying necessary operations, etc., shall be taken.

3. The aim of the diplomatic measures:--

The aim of diplomatic measures is to urge China's reconsideration as soon as possible so that she may be led to such position as desired by us. For this purpose, timely negotiations and actions will be carried out.

4. The way of settling the Incident and remedial measures:--

The way of settling the Incident and its remedial measures is to make CHINA lose her pretext for anti-Japanese policy, and to negotiate with her under such epoch-making conditions not biased by past circumstances.

5. Military and diplomatic measures and accompanying operations shall be carefully taken within the bounds of international law.

Criterion

1. The extent and way of using military force:--

a. Principal areas for using military force on the land shall be Hopen-Chahar and Shanghai.

b. Against areas where it is necessitated, military operations shall be carried out from the sea and from the air.

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## 7. Relations with third countries:--

Military action, diplomatic measures as well as the accompanying actions, shall be carefully taken lest they should cause any entanglements with third countries or induce their intervention.

## 8. Measures regarding Japanese residents:--

Depending upon the situation, all Japanese residents shall be evacuated. Their relief will be considered.

Additional remarks

Although it is our main purpose to bring the Incident to an immediate settlement, we should be determined to exercise military power on a large scale and for a long period of time. Therefore, by taking necessary steps in this connection, we should make quick preparations so as to be able to meet any development in the situation.

(Marginal note: Decided on Aug 7 at the Office of the Premier, by Foreign, Army & Navy Ministers, and their signatures).

- I - The Foreign Office will try secretly and as quickly as possible to have the Chinese make proposals for peace.
- II - The conditions for settling the situation are generally as follows:

## A - Creation of a disarmed zone:--

(Marginal note: First plan entrusted to the Foreign Ministry).

1. The eastern and northern areas of the line which connects PAOCHANG-CHANGPEI,--LUNGMEN--YENKING--MENTOUKOU--CHOW-CHOW---KUAU---YUNGTSIN---SINGAN--TULIUCHEN--HSINGNUNCHEN--FAOSHALING (including areas on the line), shall be a disarmed zone shutting out Chinese troops. The maintenance of peace and order in these districts shall be in charge of the 'Peace Preservation Corps' whose strength and equipment shall be stipulated in another article.

(Marginal note: Second plan, taken as the final one).

2. PAOCHANG--CHANGPEI--LUNGMEN--YENKING--MENTOUKOU line (including areas on the line) and the adjoining areas in the HOPEI Province, left of the Yungtung and Hai rivers (including CHANGSINTIEN and its neighboring uplands and TIENTSIN and its vicinity) shall be disarmed zone (the maintenance of peace and order by the 'Peace Preservation Corps' as mentioned in 1, above).

3. In case CHINA, in accepting the above, 1 or 2, lay emphasis on a time limit to be attached to the disarmed zone, there is no objection to such a time agreement.

(Marginal note: To be studied during negotiation).

(However, in case a time limit is attached, we will take into consideration what is to be done on its expiration.)

(Marginal note: First plan, entrusted to the Foreign Ministry).

(However, in case a time limit is attached, an understanding shall be reached that on its expiration another disarmed zone shall be newly established along the Sino-Manchurian border, drawn by a fixed line (for instance, 30 kilometers from the Great Wall).

(Marginal note: Second plan, taken as the final one).

B - The limit of the Empire's sanction:--

1. According to necessity, we will express our willingness to voluntarily reduce the strength of our occupation troops within the limits of the strength at the time of the Incident's outbreak.
2. The TANGKU truce Pact shall be abolished. Various agreements based on this Pact will be adjusted, if necessary. However, various arrangements based upon the PEIPING Arrangement, such as
  - a. Confiscation of the Great Wall's gates
  - b. Through railway traffic
  - c. Customs
  - d. Through mail service
  - e. Aviation

shall not be abolished.

The DOIHARA-CHIN TE-CHIN and UMEZU-HO YING-CHIN Agreements shall be abolished (though it is a matter of course that the Central Army having penetrated into the HOPEI Province will have to be evacuated from the Province). However, we will make CHINA promise to strengthen her control of anti-Japanese movement as well as preventing Bolshevization in the above disarmed zone.

3. We agree to the dissolution of the HOPEI-CHAHAR and EASTERN HOPEI governments, and the administration in these districts be left at the discretion of the Nanking Government.

We hope, however, that the Chief Administrators in these districts would be influential persons suitable for realizing Sino-Japanese harmony.

Further, in the above connection an agreement shall be reached on the purport of economic collaboration in NORTH CHINA, but it, of course, should be a collaboration under the joint management based upon Sino-Japanese equality. (Note: Although we are of the mind that there is no objections to the dissolution of the EASTERN HOPEI Government, we must consider making the most of the bargaining in the negotiations.)

(Marginal Note: To be kept in mind by the Foreign Ministry).

- C - Negotiations for adjusting Sino-Japanese relations, unbiased by past circumstances, shall be made concurrently with or following the peace negotiations stipulated in A and B. This plan will be explained separately.

NOTES: I - If the above peace agreement be reached between JAPAN and China, and the evacuation of Chinese troops from the disarmed zones and the Central Army from the HOPEI Province, is effected, then the evacuation of our troops shall commence. (The announcement of our intentions of evacuation, however, shall be timed with the reaching of the above agreement.)

II - Further, on reaching the above peace agreement, a mutual announcement shall be made that the two countries will henceforth enter into a 'New Deal' for realization of true friendship.

TOP SECRET (Stamp)

Outline of the Proposal for the  
General Adjustment of Sino-Japanese Relations  
(Evening 6 August 1937)

## I - Political Side: -

1. CHINA shall give a tacit promise to leave MANCHOUKOU alone.
2. Conclusion of an anti-communistic agreement between JAPAN and CHINA. (Consequently, anti-communism in the disarmed zone will naturally be practiced, and it shall be strictly controlled in this area).
3. Besides dissolving EASTERN HOPEI and HOPEI CHAHAR Governments by virtue of the conditions for peace, JAPAN will negotiate with NANKING on INNER MONGOLIA and SUIYUAN districts in an effort to have it accept our rightful requests (mostly included in the above, 2) and we have no intention of excluding NANKING's influence from those districts.
4. CHINA shall strictly control anti-Japanese movements and emphasize its 'good neighbor Ordinance' throughout the country. (Naturally, any anti-Japanese movement in the disarmed zone must be especially controlled in strictness).

## II - Military Side:-

1. If China strongly demands the abolition of the SHANGHAI Peace Agreement, we will agree after making the most of the transaction.
2. Abolish free aviation.

## III - Economic Side:--

1. Lowering of customs tariff on specific articles.
2. Rightful abolition of EASTERN HOPEI special trade and restoration of free-hand control in CHINA's smuggling on the sea bordering the disarmed zone.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1634

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Yuzo ISONO, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 1/2 Items, dated 1934 - , 1937, and described as follows: File: Important Decisions re: International and National Policies. 1934-1937.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives of files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of June, 1946.

/Sign/ Y. Isono  
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo /Sign/

SEAL  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, William C Prout, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of June, 1946

/Sign/ William C Prout  
NAME

Witness: Claire Stefanelli /Sign?

\_\_\_\_\_  
Investigator IPS  
Official Capacity

CERTIFICATE


I, JAMES HOYT, hereby certify:

1. That I am Acting Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP: as such I have possession, custody and control of original or copies of all documents obtained by the Section.

2. That among such documents was a copy of IPS Document No. 1634M which formed part of the official files of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and was obtained by the International Prosecution Section from that ministry.

3. The same has been mislaid by a member of the International Prosecution Section who is unable to locate it.

4. It is further certified that the Japanese copy of the above-described document to be tendered in evidence is an exact copy thereof.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
JAMES HOYT

Dated: 7 January 1948

證 明 書

余、ジエイムス、ホイト / JAMES HOYT / ハ茲  
ニ左記ノ如ク證明ス。

記

- 一 余ハ連合國最高指揮官總司令部國際檢察部文書課々長代理ニシテ、且ツ本職ノ任トシテ右檢察部ノ入手ニ係ル總テノ書類ノ原本或ハ寫シノ保持、保管、管理ニ當ルモノナルコト、
- 二 右ノ書類中ニ國際檢察部文書第一六三四號Mノ寫シ一部存在シタルモ、之ハ日本外務省ノ公文書綴ノ一部ヲナシ且ツ國際檢察部ガ同省ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコト。
- 三 右文書ハ國際檢察部一職員ガ遺失シ未ダ所在ヲ發見スルニ到ラズ。
- 四 證據トシテ提出サルベキ上記文書ノ日本文寫シハ、右原文ノ正確ナル寫シナルコトヲ更ニ茲ニ證明ス。

一九四八年一月七日

ジエイムス、ホイト / 署名 /  
JAMES HOYT

*James Hoyt*

RECEIVED ~~TO~~ VAULT

8 Jan 1947

Original English and \_\_\_\_\_ Japanese copies of  
Doc. No. 1634.

\_\_\_\_\_  
DPU

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature 



CHARGE OUT SLIP

Date: 5 Jan 1947

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 1634

TRIAL BRIEF \_\_\_\_\_

EXHIBIT NO. \_\_\_\_\_

BACKGROUT DOC. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

PRESSTRANS \_\_\_\_\_

U.S.S.B.S. \_\_\_\_\_

DEFENSE DOC. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

Signature In Procurement

Room # \_\_\_\_\_

Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File.

"IMPORTANT DECISION Re INTERNATIONAL and NATIONAL POLICIES."

The gist of plans for dealing with North China.

13 January 1936. The Army Department.

A. 1. Kimitsu (confidential) No. 8.  
21 January 1936.

To Ambassador Akiyoshi in China.

From Foreign Minister HIROTA.

re dispatch of a copy of "the gist of plans for dealing with North China" which was drawn up by the Army.

We have already informed you by telegram of an outline of "the plans for dealing with North China" which was drawn up by the Army. Attached hereto, we send you a full text of the above-mentioned plans.

Copies sent to Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, Manchoukuo, Chang-chia-kon.

Instruction to the commander of the stationary troops in China.

"Gist of plans for dealing with North China".

13 January 1936.

Policy:

The principal objects to be borne in mind in dealing with North China area, are to assist the Chinese people in realizing a self-government in North China by themselves, and thus to let the people enjoy their lives and jobs peacefully; also to let them adjust their relations with Japan and Manchoukuo, and thus promote the mutual welfare of these three nations. In order to realize the above objects, we are determined to give support and guidance to the new political organization and thus expand and strengthen its functions.

Gist of the plans:

1. Territorially speaking, the five provinces of North China will be made the object of the above-mentioned self-government; but we must be careful not to be too eager to enlarge in self-government area; on the contrary, we should first aim at a gradual realization of self-government in the Hopeh and Chahar provinces as well as in Peiping and Tientsin cities in accordance with the points given in paragraph 2 and others of this letter, and thus, we should aim at inducing the remaining three provinces to join the two voluntarily. Our advice and guidance to the Hopeh-Chahar political council should be given

through Mr. Sung che Yuan for the time being, and self-government movements by the people should be encouraged insofar as they remain fair and just, and should make use of them in gradually realizing an actual self-government among the people of these two provinces, thus laying firmly the foundation of the self-government for the five provinces in North China.

With regard to the East Hopeh self-government, we should uphold its independency as long as the self-government function of the Hopoh-Chahar political council remains unsatisfactory, but when the self-government in the Hopeh and Chahar Provinces is established to such a degree as will generally justify our confidence in it, we should induce the East Hopeh self-government to merge into the Hopoh-Chahar political council at the earliest opportunity as possible.

2. With regard to the extent of the self-government, it would, of course, be better to let the people have as much liberty as possible, but for the present, we should aim at and endeavor for, the realization of such state as will leave no room for the Manqing Government to carry out anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policies, and by leaving the rest for gradual achievement in future we should avoid too hasty desire for an acquisition of independent powers.
3. With regard to the guidance to be given by us, we should endeavor principally to guide in the economic field, especially in finance, and also, in military affairs, along with the education and guidance of the general populace; and in doing so, we should confine our guidance in the general line, leaving, as much as possible, the details to the task and responsibility of the Chinese people. In this connection, we should like to call your special attention to the following points:

In giving guidances this time, we are to take no such measures as might be misunderstood (by the world) that Japan is going to set up an independent state like Manchukuo, or she is intending to carry out an expansion of Manchukuo; accordingly, appointments of Japanese advisers should be confined to various committees within the (Hopoh-Chahar) political council and to the 29th Army, and their members should be restricted to the smallest possible number; moreover, these personnel and material which are necessary for public utilities and exploitation of industries, etc., inclusive of advisers mentioned above, should be sought from Japan proper as far as possible. With regard to economic penetration, it should be left principally to voluntary debouchment of private capital, and should be so guided as to serve for the realization of the principle of live and let live.

4. Operations towards Inner Mongolia should, of course, be continued on the line pursued hitherto; but those measures which might become obstacles to the strengthening of self-governing power of the Hopoh-Chahar political council and an expansion of self-government in Shan-si and Sui-yuan provinces, should be held back for the time being and the southward expansion of Mongolian influence should be

kept under proper control; consequently our operations in Inner Mongolia should generally be confined to the areas north of the Great Wall of China, and should not be allowed to extend into the area belonging to East Sui-yuan and Sunong villages.

5. The management of North China would be the duty of the commander of the Japanese stationary troops in China, and as a rule, he should execute this duty by direct contact with the Hopeh-Chahar and East Hopeh governments; in doing so, he should aim at giving advices and guidances informally.

With regard to economic penetration, the stationary forces should not assume a leading part, but should guide it from aside. However, for the convenience of assisting the Hopeh-Chahar political council, for the time being we are going to establish in Peiping a provisional organization which would be placed under the supervision of the commander of the Japanese stationary troops in China (concerning problems of the self-government organizations as well as of controlling advisers, etc.).

The Kwantung Army and various organizations in North China should cooperate in these operations. Besides, each military attache in China should act in concert with these operations, especially the military attaches to the Japanese Embassy and those residing in Nanking should try, from time to time, to convince the Nanking Government of the necessity of granting self-government to the North China area, and at the same time should try to get the approval of the Nanking Government for the six items pertaining to self-governing power for North China area, or at least, get the Nanking Government's promise that they will carry out no maneuvers which will disturb the self-government in North China.

6. In carrying out "these plans", the various military organizations mentioned above, should keep close contact with the officials of the Foreign Office and the Navy stationed in China, as and when the occasion may require.

## Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File

## "Important Decisions re International and National Policies"

Basic Principle of National Policy, 7 August, 1936,  
Decided by Prime Minister  
Foreign Minister  
Finance Minister  
War Minister  
Navy Minister

- I. The basic principle of governing the state is to realize the ideal of the founding of the Empire, which means to solidify, based on righteousness, the national foundation inwardly and prosper outwardly, making the Empire both in name and reality a stabilizing power in East Asia, thus securing peace in East Asia, and contributing to the well-being and happiness of the whole world.

In view of the situation in and out of the Empire, the fundamental national policy to be established by the Empire is to secure the position of the Empire on the East Asia Continent by dint of diplomatic policy and national defence, mutually dependent on each other, as well as to advance and develop the Empire toward the South Seas. The basic principles are as follows:

1. It is the realization of the Imperial way to correct dominating policies of the powers and to share mutual happiness according to the real spirit of co-existence and co-prosperity. This should be our consistent guiding principle for our outward developing policy.
2. We should replete our national defence and military preparations, which are necessary to secure peace for the nation, protect its development, and to ensure the position of the Empire, which should be a stabilizing power in East Asia.
3. The fundamental principles of our continental policy are as follows: a sound development and accomplishment of Manchoukuo; intensification of national defence of Japan and Manchoukuo in order to eradicate the Soviet menace in the north and at the same time to prepare against Britain and America; and realization of a close cooperation among Japan, Manchoukuo and China for our economic development. In carrying out these policies, we should be careful to have friendly relations with other countries.

THE 3rd ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY TOWARD NORTH CHINA

Feb. 20, 1937.

The object in view

1. The principal object of administering North China is to complete our aim of making Manchukuo quite pro-Japanese and pro-anti-com-intern, procuring defense materials, enforcing transportation, preparing the defense against U.S.S.R. and establishing the concert between Japan, Manchukuo and China.
2. To complete the above object, we do our best for the economic policy in North China, aid in secret government of North China and make Nanking Government recognize the speciality of North China and aid the concert between Japan, Manchukuo and China.

Principles

1. Attitude toward Administering North China

The measures which we took for North China made the foreign powers think that we were aggressive in China. So we must abstain from all the actions as give other powers misunderstanding of our intention. We should do our best for the culture of the people in North China.

For the economic development of North China we welcome the investment of private capitals. To the demand by the Government of East Hopeh and by that of Nanking we should always respond with sympathetic attitude. For the special trade and for free flight in East Hopeh we continue our already decided plan to settle the matter quickly.

2. In guiding the government of Hopeh and Chahar, we must take a fair attitude, evade all the militaristic policies in finance, economy and military affairs and win the popular mind.
3. In guiding the government of East Hopeh, we aid the progress in its inner government and its industries. We must establish there the paradise free from the exploitation by Chinese militarists.

Considering that East Hopeh cannot govern itself, we must not take any measures as to hinder the guidance of East Hopeh.

4. Guiding the governments of Shantung, Shanhsi and Suiyuan.

We aim the concert of these governments with Japan by our cultural and economic policy for these governments. As it may stimulate the anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese if we carry out our anti-comintern and pro-Japanese and pro-Manchukuo propaganda, we must pay strict attention.

5. Object of developing Economy.

We welcome the investment of private capitals, and by the extension of our rights and interests in North China we establish the close friendship between Japan and China. By thus establishing the friendship not only in time of peace but in time of war we may procure the materials for munition industries.

As for the interests and rights of the third parties, we must estimate the, and in case of need we concert with the, or we make the most of their capitals.

亞一機密第八號

昭和十一年一月二十二日

在支 有吉大使

FILE COPY  
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陸軍側「北支處理要綱」送付件

陸軍側「北支處理要綱」ニ關シテハ大要不取敢電報  
致置キタル處茲ニ右全文別紙ノ通送付ス

本信並附屬書寫送付先

北平 天津 南京 滿 張家口

支那駐屯軍司令官ニ對スル指示

北支處理要綱 昭和十一 一 三 陸軍省

方針

北支處理ノ主眼ハ北支民衆ヲ中心トスル自治ノ完成ヲ  
援助シ以テ其ノ安居樂業ヲ得セシメ且日滿兩國ト關  
係ヲ調整シ相互ノ福祉ヲ増進セシムルニアリ  
之ヲ爲新政治機構ヲ支持シ之ヲ指導誘掖シテ其機能ノ  
強化擴充ヲ期ス

要綱

一 自治ノ區域ハ北支五省ヲ曰途トスルモ徒ニ地域ノ擴大ニ焦  
慮スルコトナク第二項以下ノ要領ニ則リ徐ニ先ツ冀察ニ省及



平津二市、自治、完成ヲ期シ爾他三省ヲシテ自ラ進ンテ  
之ニ合流セシムル如クスルモノトス

冀察政治委員會ニ對スル指導ハ當分宋哲元ヲ通シテ之ヲ  
行ヒ民衆ノ自治運動ニシテ公正妥當ナルモノハ之ヲ包容セシメツ  
逐次其ノ實質的自治ヲ具現セシメ北支五省ノ自治ノ基礎ヲ確立  
ス

冀東自治政府ニ對シテハ冀察政務委員會ノ自治機能未ク充  
分ナラサル間其ノ獨立性ヲ支持シ冀察ノ自治概ニ信賴スルニ至  
ラ成ルヘク速ニ之ニ合流セシムルモノトス

二、自治ノ程度ハ成ル可ク擴汎ナル自由ヲ獲得セシムルヲ可トスルモ差當リ  
南京政權ヲシテ反日滿的政策ヲ遂行スルノ餘地ナカラシムル狀態  
ヲ目途トシテ之ヲ促進シ其他ハ漸進的ニ之ヲ行ヒ多心激ニ獨立  
的權限ノ獲得ヲ庶幾スルカ如キハ之ヲ避クルモノトス

三、自治機能強化ニ對スル指導ハ財政經濟特ニ金融、軍事及一般  
民衆指導ニ重點ヲ指向シ且大局ヲ把握シ細部ハ努メテ之ヲ  
支那側ニ委シ自ラ實行、責ニ任セシム

特ニ指導ニ當リ滿洲國ト同様ノ獨立國家ヲ育成シ或ハ滿洲國  
ノ延長ヲ顯現スルモノト認メラルルカノ如キ施策ハ實施セサルモノトス  
從テ日本人顧問ハ政務委員會内及第二十九軍内ニ限リ少數限  
度ニ止メ之等顧問其他公共事業產業開發等ニ要スル人的財  
的融通ハ已ムヲ得サルモノノ外ナルヘク日本内地ニ之ヲ求ム

經濟進出ハ民間資本ノ自由進出ニ據ルヲ本旨トシ且共存共榮  
ノ主義ヲ如實ニ具現スル如ク指導スルモノトス

四、對内蒙工作ハ依然從來ノ趣旨ニ基キ繼續スヘキト固ヨリナルモ冀察  
政務委員會ノ自治強化及山西、遼兩省ニ對スル自治擴大ノ為、  
工作ノ進展ヲ阻害スルノ虞アル施策ハ當分ニ之ヲ差控ヘテ蒙人勢力

ノ南漸ハ適宜之ヲ制限ヲ加フルモノトス  
 之カ爲對内蒙工作ハ其範圍ヲ概シテ外長城線以外北ニ限定  
 シ且東部 遠四蒙旗ノ地域ニ波及セシメサルモノトス

五北支處理ハ支那駐屯軍司令官ノ任スル所ニシテ直接冀察  
 冀東西當局ヲ對象トシテ實施スルヲ本則トシ且飽ク迄内面的  
 指導ヲ主旨トス又經濟進出ニ對シテハ軍ハ主動ノ地位ニ立ツ  
 コトナリ側面的ニ之ヲ指導スルモノトス

但當分ノ間冀察政務委員會指導ノ爲一機關ヲ北平ニ置  
 キ支那駐屯軍司令官ノ一區處(自治機構ノ指導並ニ顧問ノ統  
 制等)ヲ受ケシハ關東軍及北支各機關ハ右工作ニ協力スルモ  
 ノトス

其ノ他在支各武官ハ右工作ニ策應シ特ニ大使館附武官及南  
 京駐在武官ハ適時南京政權ニ對シ北支自治ノ必要性ヲ理解  
 セシムト共ニ自治權限六項目ノ承認ヲ強要シ少クモ自治ヲ妨  
 害スルカ如キ策動ヲ禁遏セシムモノトス

六本處理要綱ノ實施ニ當リテハ前項各機關ハ適宜外務海軍  
 各出先官憲ト密ニ連絡スルモノトス

亞一機密合第七七號

昭和十一年一月二十一日

北平、天津、張家口

南京、滿

廣田外務大臣

陸軍側「北支處理要綱」送付ノ件

本件ニ關シ御參考迄ニ別紙送付ス

### 帝國外交方針大綱

昭和十一年六月二十九日

東亞ノ恒久的平和ヲ確立シ帝國ノ存立發展ヲ完ウスルカ  
爲滿洲國トノ特殊不可分關係ヲ益々安固ナラシムルト共ニ滿  
洲國ニ隣接スル蘇支兩國トノ關係ヲ調整シ東亞ノ安定カタルノ  
實ヲ舉グルヲ以テ現下帝國外交ノ中樞方針ト爲ス而シテ帝國  
ハ此方針ノ遂行ニ當リ現下ノ國際情勢ニ全面的考察ヲ  
加ヘ其他ノ主要列國トノ關係ヲ調整シ以テ帝國カ國際的孤  
立ニ陥ルヲ避ケ我ニ有利ナル情勢ヲ誘致スルヲ期セサルヘカラス

一 對蘇關係ノ調整ハ全國ノ日滿兩國ニ對スル軍備的脅威ヲ  
解消シ又其ノ赤化進出ヲ阻止シ我東亞政策ノ遂行上障礙ナ  
カラシムルヲ以テ目的トス而シテ之カ爲メ帝國ハ充分ニ國防ト  
外交上ノ機能ヲ整備スルト共ニ對蘇諸懸案ノ解決ニ努メカヲ爲スヲ  
要ス

二 帝國ノ對支外交ハ同國ヲシテ東亞安定ノ共同責任ヲ自覺シ自ラ  
進テ帝國ニ依然セシメ同國ノ經濟的更生ノタメ彼我合作ノ實  
現ヲ見ル如ク誘導スルヲ以テ主眼トナスヘク支那ヲシテ或ハ歐米  
依存主義ニ走リ或ハ蘇聯政策ニ出ヅルカ如キコトナカラシムルコト肝  
要ナリ故ニ我内蒙及北支工作モ亦右方針ニ導由スルヲ期セサルヘ  
カラス

三、英國ハ歐米列強中東亞ニ於テ最大ノ權益ト實力ト有シ而モ全國ノ有力者中ニ右ノ權益ヲ保持シ帝國ノ協力ヲ至諒解ヲ必要トスル意見見存スルニ鑑ミ帝國ハ努メテ同國トノ親善關係ヲ増進シ殊ニ帝國ノ對蘇關係ニ於テ常ニ我ニ好意アル態度ヲ維持セシムルヲ得策トス而シテ之カ爲メ英國ニシテ支那ニ於ケル帝國ノ特殊地位ヲ承認シ我ノ權益ヲ尊重スル限リ我モ差向キ英國ノ在支權益ヲ尊重シ又世界ニ亘ル兩國經濟關係ノ全面的調整ニ付必要ナル諒解ヲ遂クルヲ辞スヘキニ非ス若シ夫レ英國ニシテ一朝ニ蘇聯邦ト結ビ或ハ米國ト謀リ對日包圍戰線ヲ策スルカ如キコトアラシカ是レ固ヨリ帝國ノ甚ク不利トスル所ナルヲ以テ帝國ハ極力斯ル情勢ノ生起ヲ防止セラルヘカラス

四、獨波兩國ハ對蘇關係ニ於テ概テ帝國ト利害ヲ齊シテ殊ニ佛蘇ノ特殊關係ニ鑑ミ獨波兩國ハ國防上益ニ亦化對策上我トノ協調ヲ便トスヘキ立場ニ在リ故ニ帝國ハ此點ヲ顧念シ獨逸トノ間ニ何等カ政治的諒解ヲ遂ゲ又波蘭トモ親善關係ヲ増進シ以テ蘇聯ヲ背後ヨリ牽制スルノ具ニ供スルヲ得策トス尤モ獨逸トノ政治的諒解ヲ遂クルニ當リテハ英國ヲシテ疑懼ヲ抱カシメカル様留意スルノ要アリ

五、日米兩國ハ政治上及經濟上重大ナル利害ノ衝突スルモノナキヲ以テ努メテ米國トノ友好關係ヲ増進シ同國ヲシテ帝國ノ東亞政策ヲ遂行ニ對シ常ニ好意アル態度ヲ保持セシムル様之ヲ誘導スルヲ得策トス

六 佛國ニ對シテハ其ノ佛蘇相互援助條約ノ關係上幾分警戒ヲ要スヘキモ帝國トシテハ英獨ノ同國ニ對スル制壓ヲ適宜利用シテ其ノ對蘇關係ヲ牽制スルノ余地ナキニ非スト認ム

七 伊國ハ東亞ニ於テ重大ナル利害ヲ有セサルモ人口資源等ノ關係ニ於テ帝國ト共通ナル點アルノミナラス歐洲列強ノ離合ニ於テ同國ノ動向ハ將來特ニ注意ヲ要スルモノアルヲ以テ同國トノ親善關係ハ努メテ之ヲ保持シ「エチオピア」問題ニ就テモ帝國ハ必スシモ聯盟ノ態度ニ順應スルコトナク時宜ニ由リ獨自ノ決定ヲ為スラ適當トス

八 蘇聯邦ニ隣接スル土耳其、芬蘭、「イラン」「アフガニスタン」波羅的諸國ニ對シテハ今後益々友好關係ヲ増進シ帝國ノ對蘇政策ヲ補強スルモノトス

九 暹羅、蘭領印度、比律賓等ノ南洋地方濠洲「ニエー」  
「ランド」阿非利加及中南米諸國ノ如キハ帝國ノ産業及國防上必要ナル原料ノ給源ニ對シテハ今後益々經濟關係ヲ増進シ次資源ノ獲得、原料給源ノ分散販路ノ擴張等ニ依リ我對外通商ノ合理的伸展ヲ計リ延テ我國民員擔力ノ涵養ニ努ムルヲ要ス

一〇 國際聯盟ニ對シテハ今後モ政治的關與ヲ避クルヲ可トスルモ平和機構改組問題他國際問題ニ對スルソノ動向ニ怠ラズ留

吾心スル共ニ經濟的人道の及文化的協力ヲ繼續シ人類ノ福  
祉増進ニ對スル帝國不變ノ方針ヲ具現スルニ努ムヘキモトス

No. 1

国策ノ基準

總理、外務、大藏

一、国家経綸ノ根本

RETIURN TO BOOKS

36

華固ニシテ外國運ノ發展ヲ遂ゲ帝國ヲ名實共ニ東

亞ノ安定勢力トナリテ東洋ノ平和ヲ確保シ世界人

類ノ安寧福祉ニ貢獻シテ茲ニ肇國ノ理想ヲ顯現

スルニアリ

帝国内外ノ情勢ニ鑑ミ当ニ帝國トシテ確立スヘキ根

本國策ハ外交ト国防ト相俟テ東亞大陸ニ於ケル帝國

ノ地歩ヲ確歩スルト共ニ南方海洋ニ進出發展スルニ在

リテ其ノ基準ニ綱ハ左記ニ據ル

(一) 列強ノ覇道政策ヲ是正シ眞個共存共榮主義ニヨ

リ互ニ慶福ヲ頌タシトスルハ即チ皇道精神ノ具現

ニシテ我對外發展政策上常ニ一貫セシムベキ指導ナリ

精神ナリ

(二) 國家ノ安泰ヲ期シ其ノ發展ヲ擁護シ以テ名實共ニ

東亞ノ安定勢力カクルヘキ帝國ノ地位ヲ確保スルニ要スル

国防軍備ヲ充實ス

(三) 滿洲國ノ健全ナル發展及其ノ完成ト日滿国防ノ安

固ヲ期シ北方蘇國ノ脅威ヲ除去スルト共ニ英米ニ備

日滿支三國ノ緊密ナル提携ヲ具現シテ我加經濟  
的發展ヲ策スルヲ以テ大陸政策ノ其調トス而シテ之  
カ遂行ニオリテハ列國トノ友好關係ニ留意ス

(四) 南洋海洋殊ニ外南洋方面ニ對シ我民族の經濟  
的發展ヲ策シ努メテ他國ニ對スル刺戟ヲ避ケツツ漸  
進的和平的手段ニヨリテ我勢力ノ進出ヲ計リ以テ南  
洲國ノ完成ト相俟テ國力充實、國防強化ノ兩全ヲ期ス  
ニ右根本國策ヲ樞軸トシテ外交其ノ他財政政策等  
内外各般ノ政策ヲ統一調整シ現下内外ノ情勢ニ照  
應スル庶政一新ヲ期ス要綱左ノ如シ

(一) 國防軍備ノ整備ハ

(1) 陸軍軍備ハ蘇國ノ極東ニ使用シ得ル兵力ニ對抗  
スルヲ目途トシ特ニ其在極東兵力ニ對シ用戰初頭一  
擊ヲ加ヘ得ル如ク在滿鮮兵力ヲ充實ス

(2) 海軍軍備ハ米國海軍ニ對シ西太平洋ノ制海權ヲ  
確保スルニ足ル兵力ヲ整備充實ス

(二) 我外交方策ハニ根本國策ノ円滿ナル遂行ヲ本義  
トシテ之ヲ綜合刷新シ軍部ハ外文機關ノ活動ヲ有  
利且円滿ニ進捗セシムル爲内面的援助ニ勉メ表面的



ITEM 工作ヲ避ク

1634 (三) 政治行政機構ノ刷新改善及財政經濟政策ノ確立其ノ他各般ノ施設運営ヲシテ國防力ノ強化並ニ躍進的經濟發展ニ綜合セシムルヲ主眼トスルヲ要ス

DOC. 尚之カ爲左記事項ニ関シテハ適當ノ措置ヲ講ス

(一) 国内輿論ヲ指導統一シ非常時局打開ニ関スル國民ノ覺悟ヲ鞏固ナラシム

(二) 國策ノ遂行、國防上必要ナル産業並ニ重要ナル貿易ノ振興ヲ期スル爲政治機構並ニ經濟組織ニ適切ナル改善ヲ加フ

(ハ) 國民生活ノ安定、國民体力ノ增強、國民思想ノ健全化ニ就キ適當ナル措置ヲ講ス

(ニ) 航空並ニ海軍事業躍進ノ爲適當ナル方策ヲ講ス

(ホ) 國防及産業ニ要スル重要ナル資源並ニ原料ニ對スル自給自足方策ノ確立ヲ促進ス

(ハ) 外交機關ノ刷新ト共ニ情報宣傳組織ヲ云々備シ外交機能並ニ對外文化界場ヲ活潑ニス

第二次北支處理要綱(昭和十一年八月十日關係諸省間決定)

方針

一 北支處理ノ主眼ハ北支民衆ヲ主眼トスル分治政治ノ完成ヲ援助シ  
 該地域ニ確固タル防共親日滿地帶ヲ建設セシメ併テ國防資  
 源ノ獲得並ニ交通施設ノ擴充ヲ以テハ蘇國ノ侵寇ニ備ヘ  
 一 日滿支三國提携共助毎實現ノ基礎ヲラシムルニ在リ  
 二 右目的達成ノ爲ニ該地政權ニ對スル内面指導ニ依リ共ニ之ト併行  
 シ南京政權ヲシテ北支ノ特殊性ヲ確認シ北支ノ分治ノ牽制スルガ  
 如キ措施ヲナサズ進テ北支政權ニ對シ特殊且包括的ナル分治  
 權限ヲ賦與セシムル様施策スルモノトス

要綱

一 分治ノ内容  
 分治ノ内容ハ前記方針ニ基キ北支政權ヲシテ財政産業交通等  
 諸般ノ事項ニ付實質上ノ權限ヲ行使セシメ北支民衆ノ安居樂業  
 並ニ日滿支三國ノ提携共助ノ目的トスル政治上及經濟上各般ノ  
 措施ニ関シ南京政權其他ノ排日的工作ヨリ影響日ク受ケザルガ  
 如キ状態ニ在ラシムルヲ以テ自途トス。特ニ該地域ニ於ケル支那領土權ヲ  
 否認シ又ハ南京政權ヨリ離脱セテ獨立國家ヲ云成シ或ハ滿州國ノ  
 延長ヲ實現スルヲ以テ帝國ノ目的タルガ如ク解セラル、行動ハ嚴ニ之  
 ヲ避クルヲ要ス

### 二分治地域

分治ノ地域ハ窮極ニ於テ北支有者ノ自途トスルニ徒ニ地域ノ擴大ニ考慮スルハ却テ我方所期ノ目的ヲ達スル所以ニ非ザルヲ以テ先ツ北支察例ニ省ノ明朗化(經濟ノ開發及民心ノ安定)ト分治ノ完成ニ主カシ傾倒ス。尚爾他ニ省ニ對シテハ第五項ニ基キ施策スルモノトス。

### 三北支察政權指導

北支察政權ノ指導ニ當リテハ最モ公明ナル態度以テ臨ミ該政權ノ機構ヲ改善シ其ノ人的洋化創新ヲ計ルト共ニ特ニ財政經濟軍事等百般事業ニ關シテ軍閥的社政ヲ清浄スレテ明朗ナル地域ヲ構成シ民心ヲ把握ニ努メシムルヲ要ス

右内面指導ト共ニ南京政權ニ對スル工作ニ依リ同政權ヲシテ帝國ノ對北支政策ニ協力セシムル如ク施策スル等南京政權利用策ヲ併用レ兩々相俟ツニ效果ノ向上ニ努ムルヲ要ス

### 四北支察自治政府指導

北支察自治政府ノ指導ニ當リテハ特ニ其ノ内政ノ向上ニ努ムレノ同政權ヲシテ北支察政權ニ對スル範ヲ示シテ之ヲ遵守スルヲ要スルヲ同時ニ北支察自治政府ハ結局軍閥ニ存主シ得ザラザル點ヲ考慮シ容レ北支五省分治結成ノ障害トナルカ如キ施策ハ之ヲナサザルヲ要ス  
北支察政權ノ分治機能信頼スルニ足ルニ至ラバ北支察地域ハ之ヲ北支察政權下ノ特別區トシテ同政權ニ合流セシムルモノトス

### 五山東山西及綏遠諸政權ノ指導

山東ニ對シテ強ク之ヲ北支察例ニ合流セシムルカ如キ工作ノ行ハ却テ其ノ

對日依存ヲ困難ナラシメ延テ其存在ヲミ危クスルノ惧多クテ以テ之ヲ慎ミ  
防共親日及日滿支經濟提携ヲ主眼トスル諸般ノ工作ヲ依リテ帝國  
トノ聯帶關係シ一層密接ナラシムルコト茲ニ成ルベシ南京政權其ノ他ノ  
妨害ヲ排除シテ將來ノ分治ヲ容且勿ナラシムルコトニ着意レテ之ヲ指導  
スルモノトス。

山西及綏遠ニ関シテハ右ニ準ズ。而シテ此等兩政權ニ對スル指導ハ内  
蒙工作トシテ調和ヲ必要トスルコト勿論ナルモ同時ニ對支政策ノ圓満ヲ  
遂行ニ留意シ該省政權ヲ驅逐シ又之ヲ内蒙政權ニ隸屬セシム  
ルガ如キ施策ハ之ヲ行ハサルモノトス。

六 北支經濟開發ハ民間資本ノ自由進出ヲ本旨トスル我方權益  
伸暢ニ依リ日支人ノ一致セル經濟的利益ヲ基礎トスル日支不可分ノ  
事態ニ構成シ、平戰兩時ニ於ケル北支ノ親日態度保持ニ資セ  
ルニテ以テ目的トス。特ニ國防上必西支ナル軍需資源（鐵、石炭  
塩等）ノ開發茲ニ之ニ關聯スル交通電力等ヲ施設ハ西支スレバ特  
殊資本ニ依リ速ニ之ガ實現ヲ圖ルモノトス。

尙經濟開發ニ當リテハ第三國ノレク北支ニ於ケル我特殊地位竝

權益ヲ尊重セント共ニ第三國ノ既得權益ハ之ヲ尊重シ要スレバ此  
等諸國ノ施設ト合同經營シ又ハ其ノ資本材料等ヲモ利用スル等ヲ  
ニ國特ニ莫末ト提携共助ニ留意スルモノトス。

附録(昭和十一年八月十一日閣僚諸者間決定)

一、別紙第一ハ「第二次北支處理要綱」ノ趣旨ニ基キ  
差當リ冀察政權側(冀東政權亦之ニ準ズ)ヲシ  
テ執ラシムベキ措置ノ限度ヲ例示セルモノナリ

一、別紙第二ハ北支ニ於ケル國防資源中連ニ用テシ  
計ルベキモノヲ例示セルモノナリ從テ其具體的事  
項ニ付テハ今後調査ノ上改革ヲ必要トスルモノアル  
ベク又之ガ實現ニ當リテハ所要資金ノ調達ノ関  
係ヲ考慮スルモノトス

### 別紙第一

#### 一、關稅ノ處理

(a)  
關稅ノ處理ハ外債負擔部分及海關維持費ヲ除  
キタル河北省關稅收入(已レ得ザレバ内債負擔部分ヲモ  
控除スルコトヲ得)ヲ收得スルヲ目的トシ冀察政權ヲ  
シテ南支政權トシテ依リ之ヲ實現セシムルヲ原則  
トス若シ南支政權ガ飽ク迄右諸右ニ依ル接收ヲ  
拒否スル場合ニ於テハ窮極ノ處置トシテ海關監督

ヲ通ジ海關行政ノ實質ヲ官手握シ依テ以テ關餉ノ收  
得ヲ圖ルモノトス但シ如何ナル場左ニ於テモ海關ノ實  
力的接收、海關人事ニ關スル實力干渉、海關組織  
ノ分離又ハ統一破壞、特殊關稅制度及地帶ノ設定  
並ニ外債負擔部分ノ抑留積立等ハ之ヲ爲サルモノ  
トス

## 二、金融對策

窮極ノ目標ハ南京側金融支既ヨリ脱却セル北支ノ中央金  
庫ヲ設立スルニ在リト雖北支金融ノ現情、南京政權ノ通  
貨金融政策、其他ノ諸情勢ハ直ニ右目的ヲ達成シ  
難キモノアルニ鑑ミ河北省銀行ノ如キ北支既存金融機關  
ニ付其ノ内容ヲ調査ノ上適當ト認ナラレタムモノヲ漸ク追  
テ育成強化シ以テ名實兼備セル冀望ノ中央金庫  
ノ基礎ヲ構成スルコトヲ差當リノ目途トス

## 三、關稅以外ノ中央稅權ノ處理

鹽稅統稅其他中央稅權ニ付テハ概テ第一項關稅處  
理ノ原則的接收方法ニ依ヒ以テ中央稅權統一ノ破壞及ニ  
重課稅ノ發生ヲ避ケ收入ノ接收ヲ旨トスル一方外債負担  
擔部方ニ觸レザルコトトス

## 四、交通通信等

交通通信等ニ關シテハ差當リ既存施設ノ統右改善ヲ圖  
ルヲ主旨トシ分治ノ限度ニ付テハ具體的問題ノ進展ニ

ニ伴ヒ考慮スベキモ概ネ地方的行政ニ割ルモノト全國的行政ニ割ルモノトニ分ケ前者ニ付テハ出來得ル限り廣汎ナル權限ヲ要求セシムルモ後者ニ付テハ南幸政權例ノ交通通信機關トノ連絡上ノ便宜ヲモ考慮ニ宜シ統一ノ破壞ヲ避クルモノトス（鐵道ニ割レテハ支那ニ於ケル鐵道統一ニ關スル華府會議決議案照）

## 別紙第二

### 第一、國防資源

#### 一、鐵礦

先ツ龍烟鉄坑及河北省ニ於ケル有望ナル諸鉄坑ヲ開發ス

右ハ差當リ興中公司ヲシテ實施セシメ滿鉄ヲシテ之ニ協力セシム。礦石トシテ輸出スヘキヤ或ハ製鉄ノ上輸出スヘキヤハ幸邦内地外地滿洲等ニ於ケル斯業トノ調整並企業者ノ持弄關係其他ニ依リ決定ス。山車省金嶺鎮鉄坑ハ既ニ秋ノ利權關係アルヲ以テ前記其業兩者ニ於ケル鉄坑開發ノ進度ヲ見タル上之ヲ開發スルコトニ決ス。

#### 二、コークス用炭礦

津石鐵道建設ニ關聯シ對日輸出ヲ目的トシ井陘炭坑ニ日軍資金ヲ注入シ日文右辦トシ其ノ増産ヲ期ス



山東省黒山炭坑ヲ中心トシ附近十炭坑ノ統合經營ヲ誘導ス

開採炭坑ニ関シテハ龍烟銍坑ノ開發及北支製銍事業ノ便宜ヲモ考慮シ窮極ニ於テ日英支右辦事業タラシムル如ク指導スニ努ム之ガ爲前記井陘炭及博山炭ノ増産ヲモ適宜利用スルモノトス

### 三、鹽

長蘆塩ニ山東塩ノ改良増産ヲ圖ル

製塩事業ハ支那人ニ依ル民營ニ委スルモ我方ヨリ所要ノ資金並ニ技術的援助ヲ與フルモノトス

長蘆塩ノ改良増産及對日輸出ハ既定ノ方針ニ依リ急速實現ヲ期ス

### 四、棉花

(d) 先ツ河北山東西省ニ於ケル棉花ノ改良増産ヲ圖リ逐次之ヲ山西其他ノ地方ニ及ホスモノトス

改良増産ハ農民ノ自覚ト北支當局ノ指導ヲ獎勵ニ俟ツベキモ我方ヨリモ所要ノ資金及技術的援助ヲ與フルヲ要ス尚既定方針ニ從ヒ興業公司ノ設立スベキ棉花倉庫公司及運輸公司ヲシテ棉花ノ取引輸送等ニ関シ産棉事業ノ發達ノ爲極力セシム

### 五、液体燃料

北支就中山西省ニ於ケル石炭ヲ利用シ我方ノ技術及資本ノ援助ニヨリ石炭液体化事業ヲ促進ス

六、羊毛

羊毛ノ改良増殖ニ依リ羊毛ノ増産ヲ圖ル

先ツ寧崑崙山北、山車者ニ於テ實施シ逐次綏遠其ノ他西北地方ニ及キスモノトス

羊毛ノ改良増殖ハ功ヲ急クコトナク差當リ技術的指導ニ重點ヲ置ク

第二、其ノ他ノ國防施設

前記國防資源ノ開發ヲ促進シ併ヒテ戰時之カ確保ヲ遺憾ナカラシムル爲此又ニ於ケル交通機關ノ整備擴充ヲ

策ニ就中龍烟鉄坑及井陘炭坑ノ開發ニ伴フ鉄道建設及改良並ニ必要ニ應シ關係港灣ノ改良等ノ急進ナル實現ヲ期ス

高國防的經濟的見地ヨリスレハ夫々平綏綽ノ改良及西

部延長並山東鉄道ノ延長ヲ重要トスルヲ以テ二等ニ付テテ逐次實現ヲ期ス

才三次北支処理要綱

(十二三十一)

方針

一 北支処理ノ主眼ハ該地域ヲ確保タル防共親日満ノ地帯  
 夕ラシメ併セテ国防資源ノ獲得並ニ交通施設ノ拡充ニ  
 資シ以テ一ハ蘇國ノ侵寇ニ備ヘ一ハ日満支ニ國搜携共助  
 實現ノ基礎夕ラシムルニ在リ

二 右目的達成ノ爲差當リ先ツ北支民衆ヲ対象トスル  
 経済工作ノ遂行ニ主力ヲ注クモノトス。然レテ右工作ノ  
 遂行ニ當リテハ北支政权ニ對スル内面指導ノ外、南京政权  
 ニ對スル施策ニ依リ同政权ヲシテ北支ノ特殊性ヲ確認シ  
 進ニテ日満反搜携共助ノ諸施策ニ協力セシムル  
 枚指導スルモノトス

要

綱

(1634-ITEM-4)  
-1-)

一、北支處理ニ對スル態度

北支ニ對スル我方ノ施策ハ同地域ノ地理的的特殊性ニモ  
鑑ミ從來動モスレハ支那並列國ニ對シテ恰モ帝國ニ  
於テ停戦地域ノ拡張、滿洲國ノ國境推進乃至ハ北  
支ノ獨立企圖等ノ野望ヲ有スル力如キ誤解ヲ与ヘ  
タルコトナキニ非ス。仍テ今後ノ對北支施策ニ當リテ  
ハ此種無用ノ誤解ヲ与フル力如キ行動ハ嚴ニ之ヲ  
慎ムト共ニ先ツ北支民衆ノ安居樂業ヲ本トスル  
文化的、經濟的工作ノ遂行ニ專念シ以テ我方所辦  
ノ目的達成ニ資スルコト肝要ナリ。

北支ノ文化的、經濟的開發ニ當リテハ努力メテ解放的  
態度ヲ採リ民間貿易ノ自由ナル進出ヲ計ルト共ニ  
冀望政权又ハ南京政权ノ要望ニシテ其ノ至當ナル  
モノ又ハ面子上尤ナリト認メラルルモノニ對シ

于ハ常ニ理解アル態度ヲ以テ臨ムコト必要ナリ。  
冀東地区ニ於ル特殊貿易及北支自由飛行等  
ノ問題ニ関シテハ概ネ既定ノ方針ニ基キ速ニ  
之ヲ解決ヲ計ルモノトス

## 二、冀察政权ノ指導

冀察政权成立ノ根柢義ニ鑑ミ同政权ニ效スル指導  
ニ当リテハ最モ公明ナル態度ヲ以テ臨ミ特ニ財政至  
濟軍事等百般ノ事總テ軍閥的私政ヲ清算シテ  
明朗ナル地域ヲ構成シ民心ノ把握ニ努メレムルヲ  
要ス

## 三、冀東自治政权ノ指導

冀東自治政权<sup>府</sup>ノ指導ニ当リテハ特ニ甚ノ内政ノ向上ニ努  
メ産業ノ徹底的開發ヲ行ハシムルト共ニ眞ニ軍閥的

搾取政策「キ安居樂業ノ模範地域ヲラシメ以テ  
帝國ノ北支ニ對スル眞意ヲ事實ノ上ニ具現セシムルコトニ  
努ム

苏記施策ニ當リテハ冀東政权ハ結局單獨ニ存立シ得  
サルモノナル点ヲモ考慮ニ容レ冀察政权指導上ノ障害  
トナルカ如キ措施ハ之ヲ昇サバシムルヲ要ス。

#### 四、山東、山西、綏遠諸政权ノ指導

此等諸政权ニ對スル施策ハ曰滿支ノ融通提携ヲ目的トスル  
文化的經濟的工作ノ漸進的遂行ニ依リ帝國トノ聯帶關係  
ヲ一層密接ナラシムルコトヲ以テ主眼トス。

防共親日滿等ヲ目的トスル政治的工作ノ急激ナル遂行  
ハ却テ民衆ノ感情ヲ激發シ支那側ニ排抗日ノ口實ヲ  
与フルノ結果トナルノ惧アルヲ以テ嚴ニ注意スルヲ要ス。

#### 五、經濟開發ニ關スル方針

北支経済開発ハ民間資本ノ自由進出ヲ本旨トスル我々之利益  
ノ伸暢ニ依リ曰<sup>支</sup>々人ノ一致セル経済的利益ヲ基礎トスル  
曰支不可分ノ事能ク構成シ平然而時ニ於ル北支ノ親日  
態度保持ニ資セシムルヲ以テ目的トス 特ニ国防上必要ナル  
軍需資源(鉄、石炭、塩等)ノ開発並之レニ因聯スル  
交通、電力等ノ施設ハ要スレハ特殊資本ニ依リ速ニ之ヲ  
実現ヲ図ルモノトス

尚経済開発ニ當リテハオ三国ヲシテ北支ニ於ル我々特殊  
地位並利益ヲ尊重セシムルト共ニオ三国ノ既得利益ハ之レ  
ヲ尊重シ要スレハ此等諸国ノ施設ト合同經營シ又ハ其  
資本材料ヲ<sup>得</sup>モ利用スル等オ三国特ニ英米トノ提携并助ニモ  
留意スルモノトス。

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### 北支指導方針

昭和十二年四月十六日 外務、  
大藏、陸軍、海軍四大臣決定

### 方針

一、北支指導、主眼ハ該地域ヲシテ實質上確固タル防共親日  
満、地帯ヲラシメ併セテ國防資源、獲得並ニ交通施設ノ  
擴充ニ資シ以テ一ハ赤化勢力ノ脅威ニ備ヘ一ハ日滿支三國提  
携共功實現、基礎ヲラシムルニ在リ。

二、右目的達成ノ爲メ差当リ先フ北支民衆ヲ對象トスル經濟工作  
ノ遂行ニ主カヲ注クモノトス。然レテ右工作ノ遂行ニ当リテハ  
北支政權、<sup>(ニ對スル)</sup>内面指導、外南京政權ニ對スル施策ニヨリ同政  
權ヲシテ實質上北支、特殊地位ヲ確認シ進ムテ日滿互提  
携共助、諸施策ニ協カセシムル様指導スルモノトス。

### 要綱

一、北支指導ニ對スル態度  
北支ニ對スル我方、施策ハ同地域ノ地理的特殊性ニモ鑑ミ從來

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(9)



動モスレバ支那並ニ列國ニ對シテ恰モ帝國ニ於テ停戰地域ノ擴  
張、滿洲國ノ國境推進乃至ハ北支ノ獨立等ノ企圖ヲ有スルカ  
如キ誤解ヲ與ヘタルコトナキニ非ス。仍テ今後ノ對北支施策ニ  
當リテハ此ノ種無用ノ誤解ヲ與フルカ如キ行動ハ嚴ニ之ヲ慎ムト  
共ニ先ツ北支民衆ノ安居樂業ヲ本旨トスル文化的經濟的ニ作  
道行ニ專念シ以テ我々所期ノ目的達成ニ資スルニ肝要ナリ。  
北支ノ文化的經濟的開發ニ當リテハ努メテ解放的態度ヲ採リ民間  
資本ノ自由ナル進出ヲ計ルト共ニ冀察政權又ハ南京政權ノ要  
望ニシテ其ノ至當ナルモノ又ハ面子上尤モナリト認メラルルモノ  
ニ對シテハ常ニ理解アル態度ヲ以テ臨ムコト必要ナリ。冀東  
地ニ於ケル特殊貿易並ニ北支自由飛行ノ問題ニ関シテハ速ニ之  
ガ解決ヲ計ルモトス。

### 二、冀察政權ノ指導

冀察政權ニ對スル指導ニ當リテハ最モ公明ナル態度ヲ以テ臨ミ  
特ニ財政經濟軍事等百般ノ事總テ軍閥的稅政ヲ清算シテ  
明朗ナル地域ヲ構成シ民心ノ把握ニ努ムレムルヲ要ス。

三、冀東自治政府ノ指導

冀東自治政府ノ指導ニ當リテハ特ニ其ノ内政ノ向上ニ努メ産業ノ徹底的開発ヲ行ハシムルト共ニ眞ニ軍閥的搾取稅政ナキ安居樂業ノ模範地域ヲラシメ以テ北支ニ對スル帝國ノ公正ナル眞意ヲ事實ノ上ニ具現セシムルコトニ努ム。

前記施策ニ當リテハ冀東自治政府ハ結局單獨ニ存立シ得サルモノナル矣<sup>ニ</sup>考慮ニ答レ北支諸政權指導上ノ障害トナルカ如キ施策ハ之ヲ爲ササルヲ要ス。

四、山東、山西、綏遠諸政權ノ指導

此等諸政權特ニ山東ニ對スル施策ハ日滿支ノ融通提携ヲ目的トスル文化的經濟的工作ノ漸進的遂行ニ依リ帝國トノ連帶關係ヲ一層密接トシシムルヲ以テ主眼トス。

右施策ニ當リテハ最モ公正ナル態度ヲ以テ臨ミ徒ニ民衆ノ感情ヲ激発シ支那側ニ排抗日ノ口実ヲ與フルノ虞アルカ如キ政治工作ハ之ヲ避ケルヲ要ス。

五、經濟開發ニ關スル方針

北支經濟開發ハ民間資本ノ自由進出ヲ本旨トスル然ルモ權益ノ

・ 仲暢ヲ圖ルト共ニ支那資本ヲモ誘致シ以テ日支人ノ一致セル經濟的利益ヲ基礎トスル日支不可分ノ事態ヲ構成シ平戰兩時ニ於ケル日支ノ親日態度保持ニ資セルヲ以テ目的トス。特ニ國防上必要ナル軍需資源（鉄、石炭、塩等）ノ開發竝ニ之ニ關係スル交通、電力等ノ施設ハ要スルハ特殊資本ニ依リ速ニ之カ實現ヲ圖ルモノトス。

尚經濟開發ニ當リテハ亦三國ヲシテ日支ニ於ケル我カ特殊地位竝ニ權益ヲ尊重センハト共ニ亦三國ノ既得權益ハ之ヲ尊重シ要スル此等諸國ノ施設ト合同經營シ又ハ其資本材料等ヲモ利用スル等亦三國特ニ英米トノ提携共助ニモ留意スルモノトス。

極秘

國策大綱 (一一一三〇)

陸軍省  
海軍省

一 國家經濟ノ基本ハ大義名分ニ即シテ内國礎ヲ鞏固  
ニシ外國運ノ發展ヲ遂ゲ帝國ガ名實共ニ東亞ノ安  
定勢力トナリテ東洋ノ平和ヲ確保シ世界人類ノ安  
寧福祉ニ貢獻シテ茲ニ華國ノ理想ヲ顯現スルニア  
リ

帝國内外ノ情勢ニ鑑ミ當ニ帝國トシテ確立スベキ  
根本國策ハ國防ヲ安固ニシテ東亞大陸ニ於ケル帝  
國ノ地歩ヲ確保スルト共ニ南方海洋ニ進出發展ス  
ルニ在リテ其ノ基準大綱ハ左記ニ據ル

(一) 列強ノ覇道政策ヲ是正シ眞個共存共榮主義ニヨ  
リ互ニ慶福ヲ頌タントスルハ即チ皇道精神ノ具  
現ニシテ我對外發展政策上常ニ一貫セシムベキ  
指導精神ナリ

(二) 國家ノ安泰ヲ期シ其ノ發展ヲ擁護シ以テ名實共  
ニ東亞ノ安定勢力タルベキ帝國ノ地位ヲ確保ス  
ルニ要スル國防軍備ヲ充實ス

(三) 滿洲國ノ健全ナル發達及其ノ完成ト日滿國防ノ  
安固ヲ期シ北方蘇國ノ脅威ヲ除去スルト共ニ英  
米ニ備ヘ日滿支三國ノ緊密ナル提携ヲ具現シテ  
我カ經濟的發展ヲ策スルヲ以テ大陸政策ノ基調  
トス而シテ之ガ遂行ニ方リテハ列國トノ友好關  
係ニ留意ス

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(四) 南方海洋殊ニ外南洋方面ニ對シ我民族的經濟的發展ヲ策シ努メテ他國ニ對スル刺戟ヲ避ケツツ漸進的平和的手段ニヨリ我勢力ノ進出ヲ計リ以テ滿洲國ノ完成ト相俟テ國力充實、國防強化ノ兩全ヲ期ス

ニ右根本國策ヲ樞軸トシテ外交其ノ他財經政策等内外各般ノ政策ヲ統一調整シ現下内外ノ情勢ニ照應スル庶政一新ヲ期ス要綱左ノ如シ

(一) 國防軍備ノ整備ハ

(イ) 陸軍軍備ハ蘇國ノ極東ニ使用シ得ル兵力ニ對抗スルヲ目途トシ特ニ其在極東兵力ニ對シ開戰初頭一撃ヲ加ヘ得ル如ク在滿鮮兵力ヲ充實ス

(ロ) 海軍軍備ハ米國海軍ニ對シ西太平洋ノ制海權ヲ確保スルニ足ル兵力ヲ整備充實ス

(二) 我外交方策ハ一ニ根本國策ノ圓滿ナル遂行ヲ本義トシテ之ヲ綜合刷新シ軍部ハ外交機關ノ活動ヲ有利且圓滿ニ進涉セシムル爲内面的援助ニ勉メ表面的工作ヲ避ク

(三) 政治行政機構ノ刷新改善及財政經濟政策ノ確立其ノ他各般ノ施設運営ヲシテ國防力ノ強化並ニ躍進的經濟發展ニ綜合セシムルヲ主眼トスルヲ要ス尙之ガ爲左記事項ニ關シテハ適當ノ措置ヲ

講ズ

- (イ) 國內輿論ヲ指導統一シ非常時局打開ニ關スル  
國民ノ覺悟ヲ鞏固ナラシム
- (ロ) 國策ノ遂行、國防上必要ナル産業並ニ重要ナル貿易ノ振興ヲ期スル爲政治機構並ニ經濟組織ニ適切ナル改善ヲ加フ
- (ハ) 國民生活ノ安定、國民體力ノ增強、國民思想ノ健全化ニ就キ適切ナル措置ヲ講ズ
- (ニ) 航空並ニ海運事業躍進ノ爲適當ナル方策ヲ講ズ
- (ホ) 國防及産業ニ要スル重要ナル資源並ニ原料ニ對スル自給自足方策ノ確立ヲ促進ス
- (ヘ) 外交機關ノ刷新ト共ニ情報宣傳組織ヲ充備シ外交機能並ニ對外文化發揚ヲ活潑ニス

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證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 號

國 際 檢 察 部 第一六三四ノ一號

典據及び公正ニ關スル證明

余、林驊ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、五頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十六年ノ昭和十一年ノ六月三十日附、下記題名、即チ國策大綱（一一一六一三〇陸軍省）ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。海軍省）ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及び文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及び綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラバ綴者號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ）

1634 I-5

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月二十日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄 林 驥

右ノ者ノ公的資格 外務省文書課長

証 人 角戸長春

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、リチャード・エイチ・ラーシュ  
Richard H. Hersh / ハ、余ガ聯合國最高指  
揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ上記題  
名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨ  
リ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月廿三日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄 Richard H. Hersh

右ノ者ノ公的資格 HESTLEATOR L.P.S

証 人 J.A. CURTIS 2D. LT.



978

16348-1

極秘

國策大綱ニ關スル件

昭和十一年六月廿日閣議終了後陸海軍兩大臣ノ求メニ依リ總理、外務、大藏三大臣居瀛リ以上五大臣會合ノ席上海軍大臣別紙（國策大綱）ヲ提示シ且説明ノ任ニ當リ

一先ヅ大藏大臣ヨリ一ノ（一）中「列強ノ覇道ヲ是正シ」云々トアル處自分ハ是レ迄其ノ氣持ニテ行ヒ來レルコト、テ大体異議無シ然シ日本亦自ラ覇道ヲ行ハザルコト肝要ナリト述べ、

ニ外務大臣ヨリ本案ニ對シテハ自分モ大体異議無ク其ノ趣旨ハ自分ノカネテ考へ居ル外交方針ト一致シ居レルモ詳細ナル方針ニ付テハ過日三相間ノ打合せモアリ目下自分ノ手許ニ於テ準備中ナリト述べ大藏大臣ノ云ハレタル處ハ自分モ全然同感ニシテ、假令へバ冀東特殊貿易ノ如キ遠方ハ之ヲ避クルヲ可トスベシト述べ、之ニ對シ海軍大臣ヨリ勿論然リ其レハ（一）ノ前文ニモ「大義名分ニ即シ」トアル次第ナリト説明セリ

三外務大臣ヨリ今日ノ國際情勢ニ照シ日本ハ孤立ヲ避クルノ要アリ一ノ（二）ニハ「列國トノ友好關係ニ留意ス」トアル故其ノ精神ハ自分ノ考ト同様ナラント思考スルモ「英米ニ備へ」ノ一句ハ其ノ點ニ於テ多少氣懸リニ思ハル、處其ノ意味如何ト尋ネ

タルニ對シ海軍大臣ヨリ右ハ只軍備上万一ニ備フルノ意味ニシテ決シテ英米ヲ敵視スト云フ主旨ニハ非ズト説明セリ。依テ外務大臣ヨリ今日ノ國際情勢ニ於テハ英米ニ對シテハ只友好關係ニ留意スト云フノミニ止マラズ普通ノ場合ヨリモ一層妥協的ニ出ヅルヲ要スルコトモアルベシト述べ置ケリ。

四 大藏大臣ヨリ二ノ口ニ「內面的援助ニ勉メ表面的工作ヲ避ク」トアルハ頗ル可ナリ是非左様實行アリ度シト述べタリ。

五 外務大臣ヨリ万一開戦ノ場合日本ハ外債ニ依ラズシテ戰費ヲ賄ヒ得ルヤト大藏大臣ニ問ヒタルニ對シ大藏大臣ハ外債ニ依ルコトハ困難ナルベク結局内國債ト紙幣ニ依ルノ外無カラシ大藏省ハ現ニ地方銀行ノ合併ヲ助長シ紙幣ガ地方ニ廻リ再ビ日銀ニ還リ來ル循環作用ヲ容易ナラシムト工夫シツ、アル次第ナリト説明セリ。

六 最後ニ總理ヨリ本案ハ大体異議ナシト述べ海軍大臣ヨリ結局此ノ大綱ニ異議ナケレバ之ニ基キ更ニ具体案ヲ作成スベシト云ヘリ。

備考 七月三日三大臣懇談會ニ於テ外相ヨリ末尾ノ

具体案云々ニ關シ陸海軍ニテ作成シツ、アリヤト尋ネタルニ海相ハ特別出來居ラズ或ハ下僚ノ間ニ研究シツ、アルヤモ知レズト答へ居タリ。

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 號  
國 際 檢 察 部 第一六三四ノ丁號

典據及び公正ニ關スル證明

余、林驥ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書  
課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコ  
ト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、六  
頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十六年ノ昭和十一年ノ六月三  
十日附、下記題名、即チ國策大綱ニ關スル件ノ文書  
ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及び文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及び綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ綴番  
號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

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16348-4

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月二十一日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄

林

職印

右ノ者ノ公的資格

外務省文書課長

證

人

佐藤武五郎印

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、リチャード・エツチ・ラーシュハ、余ガ聯合國  
Richard H. Larsh  
最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ  
上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名  
官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月二十三日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名

欄

Richard H. Larsh

右ノ者ノ公的資格

Investigator HPS

證

人

J. A. Curtis

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1634 K-1

昭和十一年八月十一日

總理、陸海軍、大藏、外務五大臣花押

國策ノ基準

一 國家經濟ノ基本ハ大義名分ニ即シテ内國礎ヲ鞏固ニシ外國運ノ發展ヲ遂ゲ帝國ガ名實共ニ東亞ノ安定勢力トナリテ東洋ノ平和ヲ確保シ世界人類ノ安寧福祉ニ貢獻シテ茲ニ華國ノ理想ヲ顯現スルニアリ

帝國內外ノ情勢ニ鑑ミ當ニ帝國トシテ確立スベキ根本國策ハ外交國防相俟ツテ東亞大陸ニ於ケル帝國ノ地歩ヲ確保スルト共ニ南方海洋ニ進出發展スルニ在リテ其ノ基準大綱ハ左記ニ據ル

(一) 東亞ニ於ケル列強ノ霸道政策ヲ排除シ眞個共存共榮主義ニヨリ互ニ慶福ヲ領タントスルハ即チ皇道精神ノ具現ニシテ我對外發展政策上常ニ一貫セシムベキ指導精神ナリ

(二) 國家ノ安泰ヲ期シ其ノ發展ヲ擁護シ以テ名實共ニ東亞ノ安定勢力タルベキ帝國ノ地位ヲ確保スルニ要スル國防軍備ヲ充實ス

(三) 滿洲國ノ健全ナル發達ト日滿國防ノ安固ヲ期シ北方蘇國ノ脅威ヲ除去スルト共ニ英米ニ備ヘ日滿支三國ノ緊密ナル提携ヲ具現シテ我カ經濟的

發展ヲ策スルヲ以テ大陸ニ對スル政策ノ基調ト  
ス而シテ之ガ遂行ニ方リテハ列國トノ友好關係  
ニ留意ス

(四) 南方海洋殊ニ外南洋方面ニ對シ我民族的經濟的  
發展ヲ努メテ他國ニ對スル刺戟ヲ避ケツツ漸進的  
和平的手段ニヨリ我勢力ノ進出ヲ計リ以テ滿洲  
國ノ完成ト相俟ツテ國力ノ充實強化ヲ期ス

ニ右根本國策ヲ樞軸トシテ内外各般ノ政策ヲ統一調  
整シ現下ノ情勢ニ照應スル庶幾一新ヲ期ス要綱左  
ノ如シ

(一) 國防軍備ノ整備ハ

(イ) 陸軍軍備ハ蘇國ノ極東ニ使用シ得ル兵力ニ對  
抗スルヲ目途トシ特ニ其在極東兵力ニ對シ開  
戰初頭一擊ヲ加ヘ得ル如ク在滿鮮兵力ヲ充實  
ス

(ロ) 海軍軍備ハ米國海軍ニ對シ西太平洋ノ制海權  
ヲ確保スルニ足ル兵力ヲ整備充實ス

(二) 我外交方策ハ一ニ根本國策ノ圓滿ナル遂行ヲ本  
義トシテ之ヲ綜合刷新シ軍部ハ外交機關ノ活動  
ヲ有利且圓滿ニ進歩セシムル爲内面的援助ニ勉  
メ表面的工作ヲ遂ク

(三) 政治行政機構ノ刷新改善及財政經濟政策ノ確立

其ノ他各般ノ施設運営ヲシテ右根本國策ニ適應  
セシムルカ爲左記事項ニ關シテハ適當ノ措置ヲ  
講ズ

(イ) 國內輿論ヲ指導統一シ非常時局打開ニ關スル  
國民ノ覺悟ヲ鞏固ナラシム

(ロ) 國策ノ遂行上必要ナル産業並ニ重要ナル貿易  
ノ振興ヲ期スル爲行政機構並ニ經濟組織ニ適  
切ナル改善ヲ加フ

(ハ) 國民生活ノ安定、國民體力ノ増強、國民思想  
ノ健全化ニ就キ適切ナル措置ヲ講ズ

(ニ) 航空並ニ海運專業促進ノ爲適當ナル方策ヲ講  
ズ

(ホ) 國防及産業ニ要スル重要ナル資源並ニ原料ニ  
對スル自給自足方策ノ確立ヲ促進ス

(ヘ) 外交機關ノ刷新ト共ニ情報宣傳組織ヲ充備シ  
外交機能並ニ對外文化發揚ヲ活潑ニス

1634 K-4

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 號  
國 際 檢 察 部 第一六三四ノ五號

典據及び公正ニ説スル證明

余、林驍ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書  
課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコ  
ト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、五  
頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十六年ノ昭和十一年ノ八月十  
一日附、下記題名、即チ總理、陸海軍、大藏、外務  
五大臣花押「國策ノ基準」ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ル  
コトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及び文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及び綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ綴番  
號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)



1634K-5

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月二十一日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄

ホ

馨

右ノ者ノ公的資格

證

人

佐藤武五郎

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、リチャード・エツチ・ラーシュハ、余が聯合國  
／Richard. H. Hersh  
最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ  
上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名  
官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月廿三日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名欄

Richard. H. Hersh

右ノ者ノ公的資格

Investigator I P S

證

人

J. A. Curtis 2d Lt

極秘

事變對處要項  
總則

Doc 1634-M

Ex. 3735

No. 1

一、一般方針

今次事變ハ軍事行動ノ成果トシテ外交措置ノ機宜ト両々相俟テ成ルヘク速ニ之ヲ終結セシメ國那ヲシテ皆ノ口実ヲ夫ハシメ眞ニ明澄且ツ恒久的ナル外交關係ヲ日支間ニ樹立シ併ヒテ日滿及ノ融和共榮ノ實現ヲ期スルヲ本旨トス。

二、軍事行動ノ目途

軍事行動ハ最短期間内ニ支那ヲシテ戰意ヲ拋棄セシムルヲ目途トシ兵クノ行使ノ要地ノ占據及之ニ伴フ必要ナル工作等即結ニ適切ナル手段ヲ執ルモス。

三、外交措置ノ目途

外交措置ハ最短期間内ニ支那ノ反省ヲ促シ我方ノ所期スル境地ニ支那ヲ誘致スルヲ目途トシ機宜ノ折衝及工作ヲス。

四、事變ノ終結方法並善後策

事變ノ終結方法並善後策ハ支那ヲシテ抗日ノ口実ヲ夫ハシメ從來ノ行懸ニ捉ハレサル劃期的國交調整條件ヲ又テ外交々渉ヲ行フ。

五、軍事外交及之ニ伴フ諸施設ハ國際法上許サ

ルヘキ範圍ヲ逸脱セサル様慎重定行ス。

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準則

一、兵力行使ノ範圍並ニ方法

(1) 陸上ニ於ケル兵力行使ノ主要地域ハ冀察及上海方面トス

(2) 所要地域ニ對シ海上並ニ航空作戰ヲ行フ

二、作戰ノ後方準備

作戰遂行ノ円滑ナラシムル爲總動員ノ定規非常時立法ノ制定等所要ニ應シ逐次國家諸般機關ノ運営ヲ戰時體制ニ轉移セシム

三、北支ノ明朗化

北支問題ノ解決ハ日滿支三國ノ共存共榮ヲ實現スルヲ目途トシ支那中央政府ノ下ニ眞ニ北支ヲ明朗ナラシムルヲ以テ本旨トス

四、中南支ノ明朗化

事變善後處理ニ於テ中南支ヲ日支通商貿易増進及發展ノ永續ニ適スル事態ヲ出現セシムルコトヲ期ス

五、北支作戰後方地域ニ對スル措置

事變中北支作戰後方地域ニ對スル措置ハ敵國領土占領ノ觀念ヨリ脱却シ概本在ノ如ク律ス  
(1) 占領地行政ハ之ヲ行ハス但治安ハ軍ノ指導ヲヨリ之ヲ確立ス

(2) 政治機關ハ現地住民ノ自主的組成ニ委ス但之ヲ指導シ明朗ナル施政ヲナサシム

(3) 軍事上必要ナル交通施設及物資ノ開發ハ必要ナル統制下ニ之ヲ行フ

但上(一)及(二)和局出現後、國交調整ニ影響セシムルコトナシ

六、對外通商並經濟財政關係

日支及才三國間、通商並經濟財政事項ニ関シテハ支那ヲシテ戰意ヲ放棄セシムルヲ主眼トシ之ヲ律ス

七、對才三國關係

軍事行動、外交措置並之ニ伴フ諸工作ハ才三國トノ紛争ヲ醸シ又ハ其干涉ヲ誘致スルコトナキ様慎重施行ス

八、居留民ニ對スル處置

情勢ニ依リ居留民ノ全面的引揚ヲ行ヒ居留民ニ對シテ救恤ス

附則

事變ノ即結ヲ本旨トスルモ大規模且又長期ノ兵力行使ニ堪ユルノ覺悟ヲ以テ之ニ関スル所要ノ處置ヲ促進シ情勢ニ即応シウル準備ヲ速ニ整ヒ置クニトス

花押 花押 八月七日於總理室 (外務陸海 三大臣花押)

花押

一停戰提議ハ支那側ヨリ持出サシムル様外務有

ニ於テ大至急裏面工作ヲナス

ニ時局收拾ノ條件ハ概不左ノ通りトス

甲) 非武装地帯ノ設定

第一案

極秘

外務省ノ交 渉ニ委スル

(1) 德花、張北、龍門、延慶、門頭溝、涿州、

固安、永清、信安、濁流鎮、興農鎮、高沙

嶺ヲ連スル線(線上ハ之ヲ含ム)ノ東及以

北地區ヲ非武装地帯トシ右地域内ニ支那

軍ハ駐屯セサルモノトス

右地區内ノ治安ハ保安隊ヲ以テ維持ス該

保安隊ノ人員及裝備ニ関シテハ別ニ定ム

ル所ニ依ル

第二案

最後の決定 トスル

(2) 寶昌、張北、龍門、延慶、門頭溝ヲ連スル線

(線上ハ之ヲ含ム)ノ東及以北並ニ之ト接續ス

河北省内永定河及海河左岸(長辛店及

附近高地並ニ天津周辺ヲ含ム)地區ヲ非

武装地帯トスルト同意ス(此場合ニ於

テモ保安隊ノ件前項ニ同シ)

(3) 支那側カ非武装地帯ノ設定ニ付一定ノ期

限ヲ附スルコトヲ條件トシテ前記(1)若ハ(2)ヲ

受諾スヘキ旨強ク主張スル場合ハ期限付

ニ同意ニ差支ナシ

交渉ノ  
經過  
ニヨリ  
考究  
スル

第ニ案  
最後ノ案トシ  
テ考ヘ置ク

外務省ノ交渉  
ニ委スル

(但シ期限付ノ場合ニハ期限満了ノ際ノ措  
置ニ付更ニ研究ス)

(但シ期限付ノ場合ニハ期限満了ト共ニ新ニ  
滿支國境ニ沿フ地區ニ一定ノ線(例ヘハ長城  
ヨリニノ好)ヲ劃シテ非武装地帯ヲ設定スル  
ノ了解ヲ確立シ置クモトス)

(乙) 帝國ノ許與シ得ル限度

(1) 必要ニ應シ我方駐屯軍ノ兵數モ事変勃  
發時ノ兵數ノ範圍内ニ於テ出業得ル限  
リ自發的ニ縮スルノ意向アル旨表示ス

(2) 塘沽停戰協定

(之ニ準據ニ成セル各種約束ヲ含ム、但シ北平  
申合ニ準據セル各種申合即チ(1)長城諸關  
門ノ接收(2)通車(3)設関(4)通郵(5)通空ハ解  
消セラサルモトス)土肥原秦德純協定及梅  
津何應欽協定ハ之ヲ解消ス(尤モ現ニ河北省内  
ニ進出シ居ル中央軍ハ有外ニ撤退スヘキコト  
勿論ナリトス)

但シ右非武装地帯内ノ排日抗日ノ取締及  
赤化防止ヲ嚴ニスルコトヲ約セシム

(3) 冀察及冀東ヲ解消シ南京政府ニ於テ  
任意右地域ノ行政ヲ行フコトニ同意ス  
但シ右地域ノ行政首腦者ハ日支融和ノ具

外務省ノ肚  
ニ置ク

現ニ適當ナル有力者タルコトヲ希望ス

尚右ニ関連シ北支ニ於ケル日支經濟合作ノ趣旨  
ヲ協定ス、但シ右ノ日支平等ノ立場ニ立テル合  
辦其他ニ依ル合作タルコト勿論ナリ

「註、冀東ノ解消ハ差支ナシト、肚ナルモ交渉ノ  
懸引ニ充分利用スル様考慮スヘキモノトス」

(兩)以上(甲)及(乙)ニヨル停戰談ト同時ニ又ハ引續キ後  
末ノ行懸リニ控ハセサル日支國交調整ニ關スル  
交渉ヲ行フモノトス、其案ハ別ニ具ス

備考

一、前記日支間停戰ノ話合成立シ支那軍隊ノ  
非武装地帯外撤収及中央軍ノ河北省外撤  
退ヲ見タルハ我軍撤収ヲ開始スルモノトス  
(尤モ前記話合成立ト共ニ適宜我方撤収ノ意  
向ヲ聲明ス)

二、尚右停戰ノ話合成立シタルトキハ日支双方ニ於テ  
從末ノ行懸リヲ棄テ、眞ニ兩國ノ親善ヲ  
具視セントスル「ニストテール」ニ入ルモノナルコトヲ  
聲明スルモノトス

日支國交全般的調整案要綱 (十二、八、六、夕)

一、政治的方面

先方ニ正式承認ノ意向アリ  
 比標ナラハハ  
 スル

極秘

(一) 支那ハ滿洲國ヲ今後問題トセストノ約束ヲ隱約ノ間ニナスコト

(二) 日支間防共協定(非武装地帯内ノ防共ハ之ニ依リテ当然實現サルヘキモ同地帯ニ關シテハ特ニ取締ヲ嚴ニス)

(三) 停戰條件ニヨリ冀東冀察ヲ解消セシムル外日本ハ内蒙及綏遠方面ニ就テモ南京トノ間ニ該合ニ南京ヲシテ先方ノ正當ナル要望(概テ前記ニ包含セラル)ヲ容レシムルコトナシ同方面ヨリ南京ノ勢力ヲ排除スルカ如キコトヲナサス

(四) 支那ハ全國ニ亘リ抗日排日ヲ嚴ニ取締リ邦交敦睦令ヲ徹底セシムルコト(非武装地帯内ノ排日抗日ニ關シ特ニ取締ヲ嚴ニスヘキハ勿論ナリ)

二、軍事的方面

本協定ト列國トノ關係ヲ考慮スル

(一) 上海停戰協定ノ解消ハ支那側ヨリ強キ希望アリリタル場合掛引ニ十分利用シタル上之ニ同意ス

(二) 自由飛行ヲ廢止スルコト

三、經濟的方面

(一) 特定品ノ關稅率引下

(二) 冀東特殊貿易口ノ当然ナル廢止並ニ非武装地帯海面ニ於ケル支那側密輸取締ノ自由恢復



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證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 號

國 際 檢 察 部 第一六三四號

典據及ビ公正ニ關スル證明

余、磯野ユイゾー / ISONO YUZO / ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添付セラレタル、十四項ヨリ成ル、一九三四一—一九三七年附、下記題名、即チ綴込—自一九三四年至一九三七年對外、對内政策ニ關スル重要決定ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ) 外務省

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 六月十八日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄 磯野ユイゾー / Y. ISONO / 署名 /

右ノ者ノ公的資格

證 人 尾戸長春 / ODO. Nagaharu / 署名 /

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公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ウイリアム・シー・ブラウト / William C. Prout  
ハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノ  
ナルコト、竝ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本  
政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ  
茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 六月十八日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 欄  
ウイリアム・シー・ブラウト  
William C. Prout // 署名 /  
右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際檢察部調査官

証人  
クレナ・ステファニア  
Stefanelle Claire // 署名 /

No. 11-231-200

Doc. 1634-N

(總理外務陸海四大臣花押)

十月一日

極

花押 花押 花押

Ex. 3262

交渉

支那事変対処要綱

總則 COPY

一 一般返御 TURN TO ROOM 361

今次事変ハ、軍事行動ノ成果ト外交措置ノ  
機宜ト兩々相俟テ成ルヘク速ニ之ヲ終結セシ  
メ支那ヲシテ抗日政策及容共政策ヲ解消セシメ  
眞明澄且ツ恒久的ナル國交ヲ日支間ニ樹立シ  
以テ日滿支ノ融和共栄ノ實現ヲ期スルヲ本旨  
トス。

情勢ニ依リ、長期兵力行使ニ堪ユル為メ之ニ関  
スル此要ノ処置ヲ講ス。

二 軍事行動

軍事行動ハ支那ヲシテ速ニ戰意ヲ拋棄セシム  
ルヲ目途トシ、兵力ノ行使要地ノ占據及之ニ  
伴フ必要ナル諸工作等、適時適切ナル手段ヲ  
執ルモノトス。

三 外交措置

外交措置ハ、速ニ支那ノ反省ヲ促シ、我方ノ所期  
スル境地ニ支那ヲ誘致スルヲ目途トシ、支那次第  
三國ニ對シ、機宜ノ折衝及工作ヲナス。事変ノ  
終結ニ方リテハ、支那ヲシテ、抗日政策及容共政

策ヲ解消セシメ、從來ノ行懸ニ捉ハレサル劃期的  
的因交調整條件ヲ以テ、外交交渉ヲ行フ。  
四、軍事、外交、及之ニ伴フ諸施策ハ、國際法上許サ  
ルヘキ範圍ヲ逸脱セサル様、慎重實行ス。

準則

一、兵力行使

(1) 陸上兵力行使ノ主要地域ハ、概ネ冀察及  
上海方面トス。

(2) 所要地域ニ対シ、海上竝ニ航空作戰ヲ行フ。  
二、國家總力ノ整備

作戰ノ遂行ヲ円滑ナラシムルト共ニ、國際情勢ノ最  
悪化スル場合ニ應スル為、總動員ノ實施、戰時法令  
制定、耐久的舉國一致ノ具現等、所要ニ應シ、  
國家諸般ノ運営ヲ之ニ適合セシム。

三、北支対策

北支問題ノ解決ハ、日滿支三國ノ共存共栄ヲ實現  
スルヲ目途トシ、支那中央政府ノ下ニ、眞ニ北支ヲ  
明朗ナラシムルヲ以テ本旨トス。

四、中南支対策

中南支ハ、日支通商貿易ノ増進及發展ノ永  
續ニ適スル情態ヲ、此処ニ、出現セシムルコトヲ期ス。

五、北支作戰後方地域ニ對スル措置

事變中、北支作戰後方地域ニ對スル措置ハ、敵國

領土占領ノ觀念ヨリ脱却シ概ネ左ノ如ク律ス

(一) 占領地行政ハ之ヲ行ハス 但治安ハ軍ノ指

導ニヨリ之ヲ確立ス

(二) 政治機關ハ現地位民ノ自主的組織ニ安ス但之ヲ

指導シ明朗ナル施設ヲサセシム

(三) 軍事ニ必要ナル交通施設及資源ノ開発ハ必要ナ

ル統制下ニ之ヲ行フ

但以上(二)及(三)ハ和局出現後ノ國交調整ニ影

響セシムルコトナシ

六 対外通商並經濟財政關係

日支及第三國間ノ通商並經濟財政事項ニ

關シテハ支那ヲシテ戰意ヲ拋棄セシムルヲ主眼

トシ之ヲ律ス

七 対第三國關係

第三國ニ對スル外交措置並ニ之ニ伴フ諸工作ハ

進テ我ニ好意ヲ持タシムル共ニ第三國トシテ紛

争ヲ醸シ又其干渉ヲ誘発スルコトナキ様之ヲ

施策ス 軍事行動及之ニ伴フ諸工作モ亦

右ノ主旨ニ副フ様慎重施行ス

八 居留民ニ對スル処置

居留民ニ對シテハ救恤ヲ行ス

九 亦記諸項ノ具体的方策ハ別ニ之ヲ定ム

事變對處要綱所屬具體的方策

時局收拾條件の概ネ左通リトス。  
第一北支

(甲) 非武装地帯ノ設定

北支某一定地域(概ネ永定河附近ヨリ張家口ヲ連ヌル線)ヲ非武装地帯トシ同地帯ノ治安維持ハ武装ヲ制限セル支那警察ヲシテ其責ニ任セシム。

(乙) 北支ニ於テ帝國許與シ得ル限度

(1) 必要ニ應シ我方駐屯軍ノ兵數モ事變勃発當時兵數ノ範圍内ニ於テ出来得ル限リ自発的ニ縮ソスルノ意向アル旨表示ス。

(2) 塘沽停戰協定ニ準據ニ成立セル各種約束ヲ含ム。但北平申合ニ準據セル各種申合即チ(1)長城諸関門ノ接收(2)通車(3)設関(4)通郵(5)通空ハ解消セラレサルモトス。上肥原泰徳純協定及梅津何應欽協定ハ之ヲ解消ス。(尤モ現ニ河北省内ニ進出シ居ル中央軍ハ省外撤退スルヲ勿論ナリ)

但右非武装地帯内ハ排日抗日ノ取締及赤化防止ヲ嚴ニシコトヲ望ム。  
(3) 冀察及北冀東ヲ解消シ南京政府ニ於テ任意右地域ノ行政ヲ行フコトニ同意ス。

但右地域ノ行政首腦者ハ日支融和ノ具現ニ適當ナル有力者ヲルコトヲ希望ス。

尚右關聯シ北支ニ於ケル日支經濟合作ノ趣旨ヲ協定ス。但右ハ日支平等立場ニ立テル合辦其他

ニ依ル合作ヲムルト勿論ナリ。

第二、上海

上海ニ非武装地帯ノ設定

(1) 上海周邊一定地域ヲ非武装地帯トシ、同地帯ノ治安維持ハ國際警察若ハ武装ヲ制限セル支那警察ヲシテ、其ノ責ニ任セシメ、租界ニ部局警察之ヲ援助ス。  
(2) 右ニ依リ、各國カ租界ニ陸上兵ヲ保持スル、西女ナキ情態ヲ出現セシムルコト。(軍艦ノ在泊ハ此ノ限ニ非ス)

第三、日支國交、全般的調整

以上、第一及第二ニ依ル停戰談ト同時ニ又ハ引續キ、從來ノ行懸リニ提ハレサル、日支國交調整ニ関スル交渉ヲ行フモトス。

國交調整案ノ要綱左ノ通り。

尚右停戰ノ話合成立シタルトキハ、日支双方ニ於テ、從來ノ行懸ヘリヲ棄テ、眞ニ兩國ノ親善ヲ具現セントスルコトニテ、イニルモノナルコトヲ聲明スルモトス。

一、政治的方面

(1) 支那ハ滿洲國ヲ正式承認スルコト

(2) 日支間防共協定(北支非武装地帯内ノ防共ハ之ニ依リテ當然實現サルヘキモ、同地帯ニ関シテハ特ニ取締ヲ嚴ニス)

(3) 停戰條件ニヨリ北冀東冀察ヲ解消セシムル外、日本ハ内蒙方面ニ就テモ、南京トノ間ニ話合シ、南京ヲシテ我方ノ正當ナル要望(概ネ前記ニ)

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包含セラルルヲ容レシムルコト(支那ハ錫、察兩盟ニ於ケル德王ノ原狀ヲ認メ之ヲ持テ滿支間、緩衝地帶トシ、双方右狀態保持ヲ尊重ス。)

四) 支那ハ全國ニ亘リ抗日、排日ヲ嚴ニ取締リ、邦交敦睦令ヲ徹底セシムルコト。(北支非武装地帯内、排日抗日ニ関シ、特ニ取締ヲ嚴ニスヘキハ勿論ナリ。)

### 二、軍事方面

自由飛行ヲ廢止スルコト

### 三、經濟方面

(一) 特定品、関稅率引下

(二) 冀東特殊貿易ノ廢止並ニ非武装地帯海面

ニ於ケル支那側密輸取締、自由恢復



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國交調整上同時交渉スヘキ諸事項

前述時局收拾ニ因テ方針(一)非武装地帯ノ設定等ニ依リ  
將來於先日交向軍事衝突ノ危險ヲ緩和スルニ  
國交全般の調整ニ依リ兩國間之齟齬ノ相剋ノ原因ヲ其際  
ニ新ニ國交關係ノ基礎ニ於テ眞ニ明朗ニ日交關係ヲ樹  
立セシメト期スルモノナリ。

從テ日交向懸念事項ノ如キモ、右明朗ニ國交關係其ノ  
緒ヲ着キタル上、日交双方ノ常道の誼合依リ内滿ノ解  
決ヲ計リ、兩國之善解ヲ愈々強化増進セシメト理想トス。  
然レニ戰局ノ拡大ニシテ國民戰果ニ對テ期待モ亦増大ニ以  
上ノ如キ常道ニ満足スル能ハス、賠償等物負の條件、  
獲得ヲ熱望スヘキヲ以テ對内的考慮ニ基キ、前述大衆的  
收拾策ノ精神ニ基キ得ル限り背馳セザルヲ念ヒ、國交調整  
交渉上同時ニ左記諸項ヲ交渉スルモノトス。

別途條件

(甲)賠償(支那側ニ於テ保護ヲ引受ケ先、我方財產  
並ニ權益ニ與ヘ先直接損害、及支那側ノ我方財產及  
ハ權益ヲ不法ニ使用又ハ處分シタルト依リ生シタル直接  
損害及之ニ類スル損害等)

(乙)日交合辦(一)「シンシケ」トシテ創立三例(ハ左記事業  
ヲ經營ス)

(1)海運(招商局ト日清汽船ト及大連汽船トノ合併)  
(2)航空

(1)上海福州、青島福州、福建台北、広東台北連絡

No. 7

飛行ノ実施

(四) 滿支連絡(惠)通公司ノ營業線ニ吸收ス

「政亞連絡飛行」合辦トシ、本「シンジケート」ニ入ルヘキヤ  
又、別途交渉トスヘキヤ、研究ヲ要スルモ、差シ当リ左記  
ヲ考慮ス

(一) 政亞航空公司ヲ本「シンジケート」ニ合併ス(同公司獨逸

側持株ヲ我方ニ於テ買收ス)

(三) 鐵道

(一) 膠濟鐵道及同延長線建設及經營

(二) 津石鐵道建設及經營

(三) 承平鐵道建設及經營

(四) 礦業

北支ニ於テ金、鐵、炭、硫等

(五) 農畜業其他適當ナル事業

(丙) 懸案ノ解決(左記頭番号ハ概テ解決ヲ計ルヘキ順  
序ヲ示ス)

(一) 日支関稅協定締結(細目別表甲)

輸出入稅ノ引下若ハ撤廢

(二) 輸出入ノ禁止制限撤廢若ハ緩和(細目別表乙)

(三) 鹽ノ生産及輸出入制限撤廢

7 Jan 1948

**CERTIFICATE**

This is to certify that the original of IPS Document No. 1634M for which I am charged from the Prosecution vault has been mislaid and cannot be found.

T. C. Liu  
Chinese Division  
International Prosecution Section

*Signed Copy  
in Mayor's File*

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.F.S. No. 853

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 143 pages, dated Oct-Nov-Dec, 1937, and described as follows: \_\_\_\_\_

Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident. (Vol. 2).

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this 23rd day of Sept., 1946.

K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Sect  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHN ACURTIS, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at TOKYO on this 23 day of SEPT., 1946

Witness: Richard H. Lorsch

J. Acurtis 2d Lt.  
NAME  
Investigator  
Official Capacity