

Interv. TOJO (8 March 46)

DOC 4176

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Hideki Tojo

Date and Time: 8 March 1946, 0930-1130 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : General Hideki Tojo
Mr. John W. Fihelly, Interrogator
Commander Yale Maxon, USNR, Interpreter
Miss Myrtle B. Mills, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Fihelly

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Q As War Minister, you approved, did you not, of the Joint Declaration of November 1940 between Japan, China, and Manchukuo?

A Of course I did. I agreed with it.

Q Was not the basic economic principle of this Joint Declaration the creation of a co-prosperity sphere among the three nations involved similar to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere later set up?

A The scope was different. The scope of the former was Japan, China, and Manchukuo. The scope of the latter, which came into being after the war had started, was enlarged in conformity with the territories occupied. Another point of difference was this: that in the former Declaration, the rights and interests of other countries were respected. Except for those two differences, the same spirit was common to both. One other point: Japan, when she broke the ice in beginning conversations with America in the middle ten days of April 1941, had the same spirit. At this time, I was War Minister and the responsibility for diplomatic procedures was elsewhere - with the Foreign Minister. As War Minister, I had impressions, but the responsibility was elsewhere.

Q When the China Incident started, why did Japan not discuss the facts of dispute with China and the other parties, as provided for in the Nine-Power Treaty?

A From the standpoint of responsibility, I cannot answer that.

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- Q As an individual, you know, do you not, that there was no discussion?
- A I don't know about that. I was in Manchuria.
- Q Did you not learn, as an individual, that Japan refused to discuss or arbitrate these matters?
- A I didn't hear about it. I didn't hear anything about it relative to the Manchurian Incident, but I do know that after the Shanghai Incident of 1932, England and America mediated and the Japanese troops were withdrawn in accordance with the understanding arrived at.
- Q Did you hear, as an individual or as an officer, that there had ever been any such discussion relative to the China Incident between Japan, China, and other countries, as provided for by the Nine-Power Treaty?
- A No.
- Q Did you ever hear, as an officer or as an individual, that China had requested that these matters be discussed, as provided in that treaty?
- A China asked who?
- Q She requested Japan to discuss it with her and with the other nations which were parties to the treaty.
- A I don't know about it. I was a soldier in Manchuria and I don't know about these political matters.
- Q Did you at any time ever learn of that fact?
- A No, but I did know that Japan had two policies with respect to the facts in dispute. One policy was that of a local settlement; the other, a policy of localizing the Incident. The working out of these policies was a political matter and, as I have said, I don't know about it.
- Q Did you not state to Marquis KIDO, during the Japanese-American negotiations in 1941, that you were in favor of sending troops into French Indo-China with or without the consent of the French Government?
- A I favored the sending of troops into Indo-China, but on the basis of consent by the French.

- Q This is not a question of your views, it is a question of fact. Did you not make such a statement to Marquis KIDO in 1941?
- A I favored sending troops to French Indo-China but on the basis of the consent of France.
- Q But this is a question of fact - did you make such a statement?
- A No. Particularly during this time, it was a matter of southern Indo-China. It was not a matter of northern Indo-China. The problem of sending troops into southern French Indo-China was extremely delicate and so it is unlikely that the War Minister would have sent troops there without the consent of the French.
- Q Did you make any such statement to Marquis KIDO with regard to moving troops from one part of French Indo-China to another without French consent?
- A No, I didn't. As I said before, I was in favor of it with the consent of France, but not without.
- Q Did you not tell Marquis KIDO, during the period of the Japanese-American negotiations in 1941, that you favored expansion /kakuchō/ by Japan into the south Pacific in order to get oil and other necessary raw materials?
- A About the meaning of "expansion" - I strongly favored getting oil from the south, but I did not mean territorial expansion.
- Q This is not a question of your views, but a question of fact. Did you so state to Marquis KIDO at that time?
- A No, I deny it. I was in favor of seeking oil, but I was not in favor of territorial expansion.
- Q Did you tell Marquis KIDO during this period that you favored Japan's seeking oil and raw materials in the South Pacific?
- A Yes, I did because it was necessary for Japan to get oil and raw materials from somewhere because of the economic pressure, and so forth, but I did not favor acquisition of territory.

Continued

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Q Did you not at this time state to Marquis KIDO that you were in favor of using force, if necessary, to obtain oil and raw materials from the South Pacific?

A No.

Q Did you not also tell KIDO at this time and on this general matter that you would even favor attacking the United States if she interfered with Japan's plans to get oil and raw materials from the South Pacific?

A When was that? The time is very important. At the Imperial Conference of 1 December, I shouldn't be surprised if I said it since Japan's life was threatened.

Q But did you not say that in the summer of 1941?

A I don't remember about the summer. It was a problem before and just before the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941.

Q This is simply a question of fact. Did you not make such a statement to KIDO in the summer of 1941?

A No, I did not. The reason was that at that time we were very hopeful of a break in the Japanese-American negotiations.

Q Did you not, at the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941, and at Liaison Conferences preceding it, advocate war against any Power that interfered with Japan's plan to get oil and raw materials from the South Pacific?

A The Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 was not concerned with war. The central problem of that Imperial Conference was the joint defense of French Indo-China and the stationing of troops in the south on a basis of that. Hence, the problem of whether to attack some other Power or not could not have arisen, particularly, also, since the negotiations between Japan and America were at their height.

Continued

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Q Did you not, during this same period, state to Marquis KIDO that, although you favored changing the status quo and establishing a Co-Prosperity Sphere in East Asia peacefully, you favored use of force to do so, if necessary?

A That is different from my thought so I believe I did not say it. The establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by resort to force was not my thought, nor is it my thought now.

Q Did Foreign Minister TOGO not discuss with you, in October or November 1941, the proposal of Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU to TOGO that he take up with Marquis KIDO the advisability of the President's sending a message to the Japanese Government regarding the neutralization of French Indo-China, Siam, and the Netherlands East Indies?

A I don't clearly remember, but I think that on an important thing such as that, I was probably informed.

Q Do you not recall that you replied to Foreign Minister TOGO that you were against the President's sending any such a suggestion?

A I don't remember any such thing. Was I Premier?

Q Yes, you were Premier.

A I don't remember it.

Q Do you deny that such a thing happened and that you so responded?

A I don't remember it.

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Certificate of Interpreter

I, Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR, 11-35-72
(Name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 5 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Yale Maxon
Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of August, 1946.

John W. Fihelly
John W. Fihelly

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Myrtle B. Mills, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Myrtle B. Mills
Myrtle B. Mills

Certificate of Interrogator

I, John W. Fihelly, certify that on 8th

day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me TOJO

Hideki, and according to Commander Yale Maxon, USNR,

Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

John W. Fihelly
John W. Fihelly

TOKYO
(Place)

12 August 46
(Date)

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