

The Case of Croatian Wikipedia:

Encyclopaedia of Knowledge
or Encyclopaedia for the
Nation?

Authorial statement: This report represents the evaluation of the Croatian disinformation case by an external expert on the subject matter, who after conducting a thorough analysis of the Croatian community setting, provides three recommendations to address the ongoing challenges. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Wikimedia Foundation. The Wikimedia Foundation is publishing the report for transparency.

Executive Summary

[Croatian Wikipedia \(Hr.WP\)](#) has been struggling with content and conduct-related challenges, causing repeated concerns in the global volunteer community for more than a decade. With support of the Wikimedia Foundation Board of Trustees, the Foundation retained an external expert to evaluate the challenges faced by the project. The evaluation, conducted between February and May 2021, sought to assess whether there have been organized attempts to introduce disinformation into Croatian Wikipedia and whether the project has been captured by ideologically driven users who are structurally misaligned with [Wikipedia's five pillars](#) guiding the traditional editorial project setup of the Wikipedia projects.

Croatian Wikipedia represents the Croatian standard variant of the Serbo-Croatian language. Unlike other pluricentric Wikipedia language projects, such as English, French, German, and Spanish, Serbo-Croatian Wikipedia's community was split up into Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian, and the original Serbo-Croatian wikis starting in 2003. The report concludes that this structure enabled local language communities to sort by points of view on each project, often falling along political party lines in the respective regions. The report asserts, furthermore, it deprived the newly-created communities of editorial diversity that normally guides and underpins the traditionally successful process of editorial consensus in other pluricentric language projects.

The evaluation concluded that Hr.WP had been dominated by ideologically driven users who are misaligned with Wikipedia's five pillars, confirming concerns about the project's integrity from the global community. His review of Hr.WP articles and community-related documentation reveals that a group of administrators and editors have held de-facto control over the project for more than a decade. During that time, evidence that he evaluated suggests that they have intentionally distorted the content presented in articles, abused power, and systematically obstructed otherwise accepted global Wikipedia community practices.

While this investigation was proceeding, the volunteers of the Croatian-speaking community independently started to reorganize and pursue actions. As a result, a series of administrative actions against some of the concerning administrators resulted in one [global ban and revocation](#) of their administrator privileges. The report argues that this change is clearing the way for a potential

restoration of the community. Further, it states that the current admins and active editors are making tangible improvements to some of the most sensitive and most disputed articles on the project.

Based on extensive investigation, and on insights into how the movement has approached setting up other pluricentric Wikipedia language projects, the report provides three recommendations:

1. Encouraging the Croatian-speaking community to continue re-establishing a robust local governance system, requesting oversight and support from the rest of the Wikimedia movement as needed.
2. Encouraging the affected communities to discuss unifying community elections for admin and functionary roles across the involved wikis (Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian, and Serbo-Croatian).
3. Encouraging the affected communities to discuss the possibility of re-merging Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian language projects into the original Serbo-Croatian language projects to re-align with the practices of other pluricentric languages with unified Wikipedia projects; including but not limited to Chinese, English, German, Spanish, Tamil, Korean, and French language Wikipedias.

The report provides pros and cons regarding each recommendation and the lessons learned to support a stronger and more resilient community.

Introduction:

Croatian language Wikipedia was created on February 16, 2003, alongside Serbian language Wikipedia when both projects were split off from Serbo-Croatian language Wikipedia at the time when MediaWiki did not yet support script conversion of text. Serbo-Croatian is a [mutually intelligible pluricentric language](#)¹ in Southeastern Europe, written in both Cyrillic and Latin scripts and currently covered by four different smaller Wikipedia language versions: Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian, and the original Serbo-Croatian language Wikipedia that was temporarily archived² for a couple of months in 2005.

1. COMMUNITY DYNAMICS

- **Developments in 2021:** A series of administrative actions against the core of concerning admins on Croatian language Wikipedia, which began in November 2020 and culminated in March 2021, resulted in a [global ban and revocation](#) of administrator privileges for the group leaders who were primarily responsible for abusing the project through sock-puppeting. It has cleared the way for what may hopefully turn into the restoration of full functionality and realignment of Hr.WP.³ Starting from early 2021, the newly-elected admins and active editors have been making clear and tangible improvements to dozens of the most sensitive and most disputed articles on Croatian language Wikipedia. The reconstruction of Croatian-speaking community is underway and in the words of a long-term member of the Croatian Wikipedia community, “the newly-elected admins both adhere to Wikipedia principles and are ready to defend them”.⁴
- **Manipulative behaviour:** A thorough review of article content and available community-related documentation, including on-wiki discussions on the pages of individual articles and Requests for Comment (RfCs), covering the period between 2007 and 2020 (see [Register of reviewed Meta RfCs](#)), has revealed a widespread pattern of manipulative behaviour and abuse of power by an ideologically aligned group of Croatian language Wikipedia (Hr.WP) admins and other volunteer editors. The overall picture emerging from this review shows that the group has behaved in a coordinated and strategic way, and that their actions remained consistent across the observed timeline. It appears that the core members of the group dynamically adjusted their behaviour in order to avoid raising too many alarms or triggering reaction by the global community (see, for example, these RfC discussions from [2010](#), [2016](#), and [2019](#)).⁵
At the end of 2020, the community has proven that a core member of the group was obstructing community voting procedures through "sock-puppets", a highly manipulative practice of creating and

¹Pluricentric languages are defined through several interacting codified standard forms; other examples include Chinese, French, German, Portuguese, Spanish, and Tamil; see: Clyne, Michael G., ed. (1992). *Pluricentric Languages: Differing Norms in Different Nations*. Contributions to the sociology of language 62. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. ISBN 3-11-012855-1.

² [Temporary closure notice](#) on Meta.

³ According to some of the contacted Hr.WP volunteers.

⁴ Hr.WP community outreach done as a part of this investigation. All responses are anonymous.

⁵ Patterns of behaviour observed across the reviewed RfCs also point at possible instances of undue pressure that some members of the group exerted via off-Wiki channels.

using inauthentic online identities for the purpose of deception. The discovery and confirmation of false accounts led to the [global ban of the user in December 2020](#). This has created an opportunity for moderate editors who are ready to uphold five pillars to return to Croatian Wikipedia and organise fresh community elections, which resulted in the ouster of the remaining members of the group.

- **Project capture on Hr.WP:** The group, which had de-facto control over Croatian language Wikipedia for more than a decade, has intentionally distorted the content presented in Wikipedia articles and successfully obstructed any attempt by concerned community members to correct the nationalist bias and disinformation. This organised effort resulted in taking complete control over content and community dynamics (see [Key findings and case studies](#)). It lasted more than ten years and has led to the departure of editors upholding the five pillars and profound distortion of content in hundreds of articles and across different topics.⁶ Project capture of Croatian language Wikipedia has exposed – and exploited – a weakness in Wikipedia’s model of community self-governance. Echoing the phenomenon of *state capture*, one of the most pressing issues of today’s worldwide democratic backsliding, the case of Hr.WP has demonstrated that both community and content can *and will* decline if institutions are taken over by an organised and ideologically aligned group.

Wikipedia’s self-governance model is rooted in the communities’ “inclination to meet the ideal to organise themselves and their work as democratically as possible” ([Rijshouwer, 2019, p. 237](#)). As a social project, Wikipedia relies on the “prevailing ideology of democratic and transparent peer production through consensus and conflict mediation” ([Zachary J. McDowell, Matthew A.](#)).

- **Radical right grouping:** It appears that this group consisted of real-life friends, ideological sympathisers and political allies.⁷ Many articles created and edited by the members of this group present the views that match political and socio-cultural positions advocated by a loosely connected group of Croatian *radical right* political parties and ultra-conservative populist movements. The group has been using its on-wiki positions of power to attract new like-minded contributors, silence and ban dissenters, manipulate community elections and subvert Wikipedia’s and the broader movement’s native conflict resolution mechanisms. This included the obstruction of two local Arbitration Committees^{8 9} and several cases of online and offline bullying reported through RfCs and to the Wikimedia Foundation’s Trust and Safety team.
- **Mission misalignment:** It is also evident from the article content and RfC discussions that these editors and administrators acted out of belief that the purpose of Croatian language Wikipedia was not to provide the sum of all human knowledge in the Croatian language but instead is intended for the nation-state of Croatia and should therefore reflect conservative, patriotic points of view (see [Key findings and case studies](#):). Another widely held conviction within this group appears to be that other ethnic states and groups – especially those from the region – *can and should* have their own patriotic versions of the online encyclopaedia (This was especially evident in the RfC debates from [2013](#) and [2019](#))
- **Systematic obstruction of traditional community processes:** There were more than a dozen RfC discussions on Meta over the past decade, almost all of which ended inconclusively due to systemic

⁶ Confirmed through the review of article content, related Meta RfCs, and in the reports of local and regional media.

⁷ Confirmed through the review of related Meta RfCs.

⁸ Wikipedija:Arbitraža (First proposed Hr.WP ArbCom)

⁹ Wikipedija:Arbitražni odbor (Second Hr.WP ArbCom)

obstruction. While this may also be a sign of the local community's deeply entrenched ideological division, it is more likely that the obstruction was the result of a well-organised effort by the same closely connected group. It further appears that the group intentionally deflected legitimate concerns about content bias and/or problematic behaviour by using well-known disinformation tactics, including relativisation of facts,¹⁰ whataboutism,¹¹ discreditation of other participants¹² and outright bullying.¹³ Contrary to what might have been expected, the group of misaligned Hr.WP admins actively participated in Meta RfC discussions. The analysis of behaviour and communication on the surveyed RfCs has shown that in cases where the discussion began gaining momentum, it would soon a) branch out from the original topic; b) turn ad hominem; and c) become flooded with irrelevant comments and information. This type of communication had effectively "muddied the waters" and prolonged discussions ad infinitum, adding to overall disappointment of Hr.WP editors.

- **Culture of impunity:** It should be noted, however, that despite the potential involvement of political agenda, it was the pervasive and dominant culture of impunity when the concerning group interacted with other community members who were expressing concern on their local wiki that had cemented the takeover of Croatian language Wikipedia.
- **The role of the Wikimedia Foundation:** The Foundation's lack of intervention in the case of Hr.WP played an important role in the departure from and abandonment of Croatian Wikipedia by moderate editors and administrators after the failure of the community [RfC in 2013](#). This view was explicitly expressed by Croatian community members who took part in a survey that was part of this investigation. The broader global Wikimedia community and the Croatian public became aware as early as 2007 that the Croatian language version of the online encyclopaedia has community issues and hosts highly ideologically charged content.¹⁴

In a 2013 interview with Croatian liberal daily Jutarnji List, Wikipedia's founder, Jimmy Wales, confirmed the Foundation was aware and looking into the problems on the Croatian language project.¹⁵ However, the related RfC, which started that same year, ended inconclusively, having petered out after months of, at times, futile discussion. There was no Foundation process in place backstopping the struggling community effort.

The Foundation refrained from taking more decisive, direct action against the concerning group of editors to prioritise safeguarding the principle of community self-governance and other factors inhibited the Foundation's ability to act. While the majority of surveyed Croatian community members believe the Foundation's inaction actually harmed the community, they were not sure if a more aggressive approach would have prevented the project capture.

- **The failure of traditional global community processes to resolve the issues of Hr.WP:** More than a decade of repeated RfCs failed to solve any of Croatian language Wikipedia's lingering problems.

¹⁰ [Requests for comment/Croatian Wikipedia - User Suradnik13 - blocking and deleting - Meta](#)

¹¹ [Requests for comment/Croatian Wikipedia - User: Dalibor Bosits case - Meta](#)

¹² [Requests for comment/2013 issues on Croatian Wikipedia/Evidence/Conduct - Meta](#)

¹³ [Requests for comment/Site-wide administrator abuse and WP:PILLARS violations on the Croatian Wikipedia - Meta](#)

¹⁴ https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Requests_for_comment/Croatian_Wikipedia_-_User_Suradnik13_-_blocking_and_deleting

¹⁵ 'Srbi i Hrvati ne smiju imati odvojene Wikipedije' (Jutarnji List (in Croatian) Jimmy Wales - Serbs and Croats should not have separate Wikipedias)

Furthermore, this evaluation has found that the quality of content on Hr.WP degraded progressively between 2013 and 2019, with more revisionist claims and disinformation inserted in an increasing number of articles each year. The case of Hr.WP's mission misalignment has demonstrated what can happen when an organised group of ideologically dedicated users captures community institutions and turns the project into a source of propaganda. (See [Key findings and case studies](#))

- **The experience of Croatian language Wikipedia raises important questions regarding global governance risks.** It challenges the widely held view that all of Wikipedia is fairly and uniformly resilient in withstanding organised disinformation campaigns aiming to capture its language versions.¹⁶ Generally, the existing academic research into attempts at mounting organised disinformation campaigns on Wikipedia has primarily focused on detecting edits' frequency and filtering out suspicious editors¹⁷. The experience of Croatian language Wikipedia may send out a message to some of the disruptive editors that project capture may well be the best path to change the content without raising too many alerts in the established global community and complementary Foundation processes. It has shown that in the absence of timely attention and action by the community, a consolidated group of administrators, holding key positions in one language project, may be able to create, shape, profile, and modify large amounts of content contrary to the five pillars. The case of Croatian language Wikipedia demonstrates that there could be similar attempts of project capture in other languages as well. A more resourced and better-organized attempt could be harder to detect and eventually reverse. The lessons from Hr.WP pave the way for active community monitoring.

Autocratic governments around the world have been trying for years to co-opt, limit, or block Wikipedia projects in their respective languages, but the movement has so far demonstrated a remarkable resilience against this type of pressure.

Today, the online encyclopaedia often faces the same increased regulatory oversight as other platforms hosting user-generated content – despite their fundamental differences. Fresh calls for more institutional scrutiny of these other platforms now come from established democracies trying to design an appropriate response to a string of coordinated disinformation campaigns that destabilised their election processes and undermined civil society. Seen by many governments as accomplices – if not outright enablers – of disinformation operations, major social media platforms will likely become the main targets of new regulatory legislation. If it wants to preserve and defend its community-based editorial approach, Wikipedia may have to adapt its self-governance model to meet the new challenges.

¹⁶ Zachary J. McDowell, Matthew A. Vetter. It Takes a Village to Combat a Fake News Army: Wikipedia's Community and Policies for Information Literacy; *Social Media + Society*, Volume 6 Issue 3, July-September 2020

¹⁷ Stanford Internet Observatory [FSI | Cyber | Internet Observatory - How to Investigate Wikipedia: Our Process \(stanford.edu\)](#)

2. DISINFORMATION AND BIAS

Comparative analysis of the content published on the Croatian language Wikipedia against other language projects of Wikipedia, including Serbo-Croatian, two other standard varieties of the same polycentric language (Serbian and Bosnian), and the polycentric languages English, French, German and Spanish, has revealed numerous examples of systemic, deeply-rooted bias and disinformation on Croatian language Wikipedia.

- The analysis of content in Hr.WP articles describing sensitive social, political, and cultural issues has confirmed that they had for years contained pervasive ideological bias. This evaluation agrees with a former internal assessment by the Foundation, that the bias present throughout surveyed Hr.WP articles was structured in three distinctive ways:

Framing bias: Also known as emulated neutrality. Giving equal weight to a range of competing claims, presenting questionable claims side by side with factual truths, or contextualising facts in a way that misleads readers. **Source bias:** Citing non-neutral sources without disclosing their affiliation and/or providing dubious sources to back up claims presented in the article. Emulated neutrality regularly relies on this type of bias. **Selection bias:** Selectively including and excluding content regardless of its notability or topical relevance in order to affect the reader's perception.

- Identifying disinformation, which usually entails demonstrating intent, on Wikipedia as such is substantially more difficult. The online encyclopaedia's full transparency and "anyone can edit" design principle makes it much more resistant to classical disinformation campaigns and other organised attempts to influence content through inauthentic editing¹⁸. Wikipedia's resilience against bias and disinformation relies to a large extent on the existence of a functional and diverse community of editors and administrators. In larger language Wikipedia projects, like English, Spanish, French or German, this diversity comes from the sheer number of participants, but also from the fact that these are all pluricentric languages with substantial numbers of native speakers coming from different countries, bringing somewhat different socio-political and cultural frames of reference to the well-established editorial peer on-wiki processes.

WHEN DOES DISINFORMATION BECOME A CAMPAIGN?

A possible way to implement a disinformation campaign would be for an organised group of user accounts to take over the entire language project by banning dissenters and "installing" ideologically-aligned user accounts in roles essential to self-governance processes. *But for this effort to have any influence on a wider society reliant on the Wikipedia language project, it has to impact content in a substantial number of articles and for an extended period of time.* Those who visit and read Wikipedia would have to be exposed to disinformation and bias while being assured by the Wikipedia community's decades-long built reputation that they are reading neutral, fact-based information – and to keep doing so for a long period of time.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME

¹⁸ Stanford Internet Observatory [FSI | Cyber | Internet Observatory - How to Investigate Wikipedia: Our Process](#)

- A successful disinformation campaign, resulting in capturing a language version of Wikipedia, would therefore be a situation in which a large portion of the content significantly departs from the accepted academic consensus as defined by reliable sources. In other words, when *pseudoscience and historical negationism become dominant across a set of sensitive topics covered in Wikipedia entries, and when those remain online in such a captured language version of the project for a long period of time.*
- In the case of Croatian language Wikipedia, articles affected by historical revisionism and manipulation of facts *have been online and influencing the public sphere for more than a decade.* Contrary to Wikipedia's five pillars, which are meant to be upheld in any language, the ultimate goal of this endeavour appears to be to try to influence the reader's final moral or value judgement of a person, phenomenon or historical event described in an article and to do so in a way that supports and corresponds to the influencer's broader ideological views. In that sense, Croatian language Wikipedia can fairly be described as having been out of alignment with the first and second pillar of Wikipedia for a very long time.

RADICAL RIGHT

- Croatia's political spectrum is dominated by the two established mainstream political parties - the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SDP), and centre-right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). The last two election cycles were marked by the rise of smaller parties and movements, whose political views range from liberal left to ultra-conservative populism. Some of these groups got an opportunity to play a more important role in different levels of government.

The political landscape also includes about a dozen ultra-conservative, clericalist, and far-right political parties, political pressure groups and movements. Despite fragmentation and infighting, they share a significant number of socio-political and cultural positions that fit under a broader definition of the *radical right*¹⁹ - as used in political science related to European contexts. With few minor exceptions, these groups are *systemic* in the sense that they vie for political influence by taking part in the Croatian election process and recognise the authority of national institutions.

Several Croatian radical right groups and political parties trace their roots to the [Party of Rights](#) and its founder, Ante Starčević, and view the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) as a legitimate foundational state. Most openly declare their affiliation with the [Ustaše movement](#).²⁰ Croatia's present-day Constitution names the antifascist struggle against the NDH as one of the foundational principles of the country's independence.²¹

Following a period spent on the political fringe, the appeal of the radical right in Croatia has grown considerably over the past decade. It culminated at presidential and parliamentary elections in 2020, when, for the first time in the 21st Century, a candidate and a political coalition profiled around ultra-conservative values won a significant number of votes²². Its appeal is particularly strong among younger

¹⁹ Vedran Obučina, Right-Wing Extremism in Croatia, p 2; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012

²⁰ Ramet P. Sabrina (1999): The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989, pp 5-12, Penn State University Press

²¹ [The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia \(consolidated text\) | Croatian Parliament](#)

²² Miroslav Škoro, a right-wing candidate campaigning on a platform that shared many narratives of the radical right, won 24.4% of votes cast in the first round of Presidential elections in December 2020. The incumbent, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, and the social-democratic challenger, Zoran Milanović (who ultimately won the elections on January 5, 2021) got 26.65% and 29.55%, respectively. Škoro scored the best result for any hard right-wing candidate in the past ten years.

voters^{23, 24} who are the main consumers of social networks and alternative news outlets but also the top targets of far-right propaganda and disinformation on these platforms.

- The leading producers and amplifiers of far-right narratives are “*alternative*” news outlets that fall short of traditional requirements of Wikipedia credible sources. These outlets, which are often under the de-facto control of ultra-conservative cultural associations and/or political pressure groups, appear as sources in hundreds of articles on the Croatian language Wikipedia – which indirectly contributes to their visibility and impact ([see Questionable sources](#)).

²³ Vedran Obućina, Right-Wing Extremism in Croatia, p. 7; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012

²⁴ Study of European Values 2017; [EVS Survey 2017](#)

Possible policy recommendations:

[It would be enough to have a simple selection between Latin and Cyrillic alphabet] *“on one South-Slavic Wikipedia, and that would allow us to solve many common contentious topics because it would force us to write one common history; the one that would respect victims on all sides, have less mythology and more facts.”*

A long-time volunteer editor on Croatian language Wikipedia; May 2021. Response to an outreach that accompanied this evaluation.

Recommendations outlined below are an advisory opinion to the Foundation. They are based on extensive investigation into community and content issues on Croatian language Wikipedia, as well as on insights into other pluricentric language projects. Communities are encouraged to hold relevant discussions to explore these recommendations further.

1. Encouraging the Croatian-speaking community to continue re-establishing a robust local governance system, requesting oversight and support from the rest of Wikimedia as needed.

It was observed throughout the course of this study that Croatian language Wikipedia made important and tangible improvements in cleaning the content from ideological bias and disinformation.

Arguments in favour:

- It is vital that this community-led process continues and ultimately brings the project back into alignment with Wikipedia’s five pillars. These recent developments in Hr.WP have reaffirmed the principle of community self-governance. They have ultimately shown that solutions created by and implemented within the community organically follow Wikipedia’s basic democratic principle. However, the process of Hr.WP’s realignment has just begun, and the community may need to consider designing and developing instruments and institutions that will allow for more efficient content oversight, communication, and exchange of resources with neighbouring communities sharing the same, mutually intelligible pluricentric language. The Wikimedia Foundation should stand ready to work with the communities and provide any support and assistance, should one be required.

Arguments against:

- The solutions implemented by the community must be sustainable. To ensure this, it is advisable that the community puts in place a monitoring committee that revisits the developments over a period of time to ensure that the positive work does not get lost. The monitoring committee should also help the community counter more organized attempts of inducing disinformation in the projects at an early stage. But without a check in place, it’s too early to conclude that the current change is permanent.

2. Encouraging the affected communities to discuss unifying community elections for admin and functionary roles across the involved wikis (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian, Serbo-Croatian).

A clear majority of surveyed Croatian community members stated unambiguously that four Balkan Wikipedia language communities should improve communication and share their resources.

There is precedent for ideas of cross-wiki collaboration on community governance resourcing. In 2020, the Arabic language Wikimedians voted²⁵ to set up cross-wiki role accounts operated by a committee of trusted users under Foundation and steward oversight for their wikis, dealing locally and in their own language with threats some of their admins have been receiving in retaliation to bans of ISIS-related user accounts. A comparable regional cross-wiki model implemented through SecurePoll-elections for all admin and functionary roles on the affected Serbo-Croatian wikis could help restore the proper functioning of the editorial peer process on the affected wikis in line with Wikipedia's five pillars.

Arguments in favour:

- This approach supports the view expressed by the surveyed members of Hr.WP.
- A larger and more diverse community could protect itself more effectively against project capture and would be capable of discussing and resolving contentious editorial issues.
- This approach respects the fact that despite mutual intelligibility, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian are recognised as distinct languages belonging to the Serbo-Croatian macrolanguage²⁶.
- The newly merged community would be able to create ad-hoc institutions asked to support the editorial process on sensitive socio-political topics. For example, such an institution could require super-majority or unanimous approval for articles that deal with highly contentious issues.
- The existing language projects would keep their current URLs and locations ([Bosnian](#), [Croatian](#), [Serbian](#), [Serbo-Croatian](#)) while all existing communities would partially merge into one for voting and governance purposes. The administrators would be elected jointly and have the right to patrol the content on all affected language variants and editors the right to create and curate it. From the perspective of an average visitor, everything would stay the same; from the perspective of communities, (nearly) everything would change. The merger process would take place inside the communities. It would also give the administrators more time and allow them to be much more effective in reviewing together with other interested editors the existing problematic content across those wikis.

Arguments against:

- The newly-merged community may face serious problems, including but not limited to endless edit wars and article lockouts. However, this problem is equally possible if Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian and Serbo-Croatian projects are fully merged. Without swift and decisive action on all language projects against ideological warriors, harassment and bullying, the old problems will likely resurface after some time.

²⁵ [Vote on Ar.WP](#)

²⁶ Standardisation of languages: ISO 639-3 <https://iso639-3.sil.org/code/hbs>

3. Encouraging the affected communities to discuss the possibility of re-merging Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian language projects into the original Serbo-Croatian language projects to re-align with the practices of other pluricentric languages with unified Wikipedia projects; including but not limited to Chinese, English, German, Spanish, Tamil, Korean, and French language Wikipedias

A larger and more diverse pluricentric language community would probably have prevented the type of project capture witnessed on Croatian language Wikipedia.

Arguments in favour:

- Restores a shared onwiki knowledge space equal to how the movement has successfully handled other poly-centric languages: with a unified Wikipedia language version, for example, the English, French, German, Spanish, and Arabic language Wikipedia projects. A consolidated community that communicates in a mutually intelligible language and is able to build editorial consensus based on NPOV presentation of facts backed by credible sources is actually how other Wikipedias based on pluricentric languages regularly operate.
- Creation of a larger and more diverse community that could protect itself more effectively against project capture and would be capable of discussing and resolving contentious editorial issues.
- There are numerous examples of regional ad-hoc communities working together on various projects that vitally depend on the language, like for example, film, TV or theatrical coproductions. Actors and performers from Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia regularly participate in regional projects and their films, music or TV shows are enjoyed by audiences across the region - without language barriers.
- The very existence of one merged Wikipedia project would gradually (or quickly, if supported by a dedicated global community or Wikimedia Foundation office actions where merited) neutralise ideologically driven community members who will a) find it exponentially more difficult to push the ideologically-aligned POV without credible sources, and b) no longer be able to abuse positions of power within the local community without proper peer accountability for their actions.
- This may make the project more attractive to contributors ready to uphold the five pillars of Wikipedia and do not promote extremist positions – thus contributing to the community's overall ability to iron out differences while adhering to fact-based, NPOV presentation of article content;
- Cultivating a more encyclopaedic style of language that does not insist on nationalist neologisms/puritanisms may make Wikipedia more valuable to a wider audience of potential editors and readers across the Southwestern Balkans and beyond.

Arguments against:

- A survey of the Croatian community, conducted as a part of this investigation, has shown that the majority of respondents have explicitly stated that Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian language projects should not be re-merged. At the same time, they acknowledged that having four different versions of articles in what essentially is one multicentric language is a waste of time and resources.

- Though mutually intelligible, the three language Wikipedia projects have been existing as separate entities since 2003 with their own specificities which may lead to complications in everyday editing.
- The action is likely to be resisted by affected existing local Wikipedia communities. There will likely be a significant number of seriously disappointed/aggravated editors on all sides who will see this as a direct attack on their work and quite often a threat to their national identity, as embodied by the content they contributed. In fact, any such decision may unite the Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian community in resistance against what they may perceive as outside pressure.
- Perception is important. The decision to merge three language projects back into the original wiki is likely to attract significant media attention, even if seen as coming in an orderly fashion from the global community. The attention will likely be fuelled by the response of affected editors on social networks. If this gains traction, the tabloids from Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina will weigh in. Nationalist outlets, some of which are in collusion with radical right groups (see [Questionable sources](#)), often have the upper hand in fomenting emotions in socio political debates in the three countries.²⁷ An outcome like this may make the new project less attractive and raise the barrier to entry for new, good-faith contributors, particularly from Croatia, where the public support for the multicentric definition of the language is by far the lowest in the region²⁸.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATION: Strengthen global governance

The evident failure of the Meta RFC system to resolve the structural misalignment of Croatian language Wikipedia and the lack of an adequate alternative pathway to resolution, points at the significant weakness in the global Wikimedia community and - by extension - Wikimedia Foundation platform governance. This is a problem for public and regulatory confidence in the self-governance model provided for within the framework of the Foundation's policies, especially section 10. of the Terms of Use. While devising possible pathways to address this identified bigger challenge is beyond the scope of this disinformation assessment, it strikes the author of this evaluation as increasingly important to resolve in the light of heightened regulatory scrutiny of user-generated platform models, including Wikipedia, across the globe. It might also be worthwhile for the community or the foundation to investigate whether technical solutions could have exposed the misconduct of a group of users sooner. The communities and the foundation could also engage in a dialogue and develop collaborative solutions that would help monitor communities globally to timely identify major ideological shifts in projects.

²⁷ [Analiza mrežnih stranica u kontekstu govora mržnje | CMS](#) (Centre for Peace Studies; report in Croatian with a summary in English)

²⁸ [HAZU: Deklaracija o zajedničkom jeziku je besmislena, apsurdna i uzaludna inicijativa!](#) (Jutarnji list (in Croatian): Declaration on Common Language is a senseless, absurd and futile initiative - says Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences)

Key findings and case studies:

1. MEASURING DISINFORMATION

- An evaluation of articles about Croat and Serb military, police and political officials sentenced by the UN tribunal for atrocities committed during the 1991-1999 wars in Yugoslavia is used as a proxy to understand the extent of disinformation campaigns. It is an internationally academically well-researched historical issue with credible sources that also touches upon political and socio-cultural identities in the region. The evaluation conducted has shown that Croatian and Serbian language Wikipedias tend to bury the information about war crimes conviction down in the article sections less likely to be seen by readers if the perpetrator was of their ethnic kin.
- In order to measure and quantify disinformation, this evaluation has developed an indicator based on consistency of mentioning the war crimes conviction in Wikipedia articles. It is based on two premises: a) a hypothesis that information about a person's war crimes conviction is so important that it ought to be included in the leading paragraph of any Wikipedia biographical article; and b) the well-documented informational importance of an introductory paragraph.^{29 30} The hypothesis was tested - and confirmed - by a survey of articles in eight languages.
- The evaluation compared introductory paragraphs in Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian, Serbo-Croatian, English, French, Spanish, and German language Wikipedias. Articles in the Croatian language were reviewed in February and March 2021. Adjusting for the vastly different writing styles and editorial approaches of different communities, the introductory paragraph was defined for the purpose of this assessment as the first three sentences in an article.
- The total number of individuals convicted by the ICTY is 90 - of which 60 ethnic Serbs (66.6%) and 18 ethnic Croats (20%).^{31, 32} However, no single Wikipedia covers all of them, and in a significant number of cases articles about convicted war criminals exist in not more than two languages. In order to compensate for this and maintain approximate proportions, this evaluation has selected articles about 32 individuals who are considered well-known in the region and in their respective countries of origin and who have received at least 9 years of imprisonment. Data was collected between February and March 2021.
- Convictions by the UN war crimes tribunal are indisputable, objective, notable, and binary facts demonstrated by easily accessible, credible source materials. They are also hot-button political topics around the Western Balkans. The sum of failures by Croatian and Serbian language Wikipedia to state clearly and unambiguously in the *leading paragraph* that a member of their ethnic group had been convicted by the ICTY should be interpreted as disinformation (by deliberate omission of a key fact).

²⁹ [How Users Read on the Web](#) - a research by Nielsen Group

³⁰ Salgado, S. (2018). [Online media impact on politics. Views on post-truth politics and postpostmodernism](#). International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics, 14 (3), pp. 317-331 (University of Lisbon)

³¹ [Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments](#)

³² [Key Figures of the Cases](#) ICTY official statistics page

A large body of academic research has repeatedly demonstrated that parts of political, intellectual and cultural elites in Croatia and Serbia systematically play down crimes committed by “our people” and seek to reframe these actions by recontextualization of historical circumstances.³³

- The evaluation has shown that Croatian and Serbian language Wikipedia, in 62.5% and 39.1% of cases, respectively, avoid informing their visitors in the introductory paragraph that the person they’re reading about is a convicted war criminal who comes from the same ethnic group. All other surveyed Wikipedia languages – Serbo-Croatian, Bosnian, English, French, Spanish, and German – do this consistently and keep the information at the very beginning of an article - in most cases in the very first sentence. The first sentence is also an approximate amount of text that fits into Google’s Knowledge Panel (see: [Attention and exposure](#)).
- Adding to the circumstantial evidence for misleading intent indicating disinformation, Croatian Wikipedia is as correct as other surveyed projects when relaying information about war criminals from the respective other ethnic groups. It only becomes ambiguous and de-prioritises noting the convictions when covering the convictions of the project’s societal reference group. This leads to the conclusion that editors and administrators are perfectly capable of understanding the notability of convictions, context, and structuring of an article to carry the facts in an NPOV way consistent with the five pillars. It qualifies as disinformation because they *chose not to*, systematically, alongside ethnic lines across article content.
- The information about war crimes verdicts is never completely denied in articles reviewed by this evaluation. However, in the cases flagged by this review, Croatian and Serbian language Wikipedias made an obviously calculated attempt to push the information about convictions further down in the text, frame it as less important or phrase it ambiguously to relativise the historical context.
- A separate set of Croatian language Wikipedia articles that cover biographies of senior political and military officials of the [Independent State of Croatia \(NDH\)](#) used a disinformation strategy similar to that applied across the spectrum of articles describing the perpetrators of more recent atrocities. These articles are about NDH officials who were either convicted of war crimes or are by scholarly consensus considered responsible for some of the worst mass killings committed by the puppet state.
- Articles about convicted war criminals further manipulate perception of facts by selectively including or excluding the links to other articles about atrocities and locations where they took place (framing and reference bias). In many cases, these other articles also offer a distorted presentation of facts (see illustrative examples below). This, in turn, creates a web of distortion and disinformation across the local Wikipedia language version’s main space, which tries to influence the visitor’s perception and interpretation of facts.
- These narratives are eerily similar to the ones consistently repeated by groups and individuals in both Croatia and Serbia that belong to the radical right political spectrum.
- Illustrative examples include a Croatian language article about [Slobodan Praljak](#), a Bosnian Croat general who committed suicide in the courtroom after being sentenced to 20 years for crimes against humanity in Bosnia, a Serbian language article about [Ratko Mladić](#), a Bosnian Serb military

³³ For example, Jelena Subotić. *Hijacked justice: Dealing with the past in the Balkans*; Cornell University Press 2011.

commander sentenced to life imprisonment for genocide in Srebrenica, and a set of articles about the senior NDH officials.

Name of the convict	Ethnic back-ground ³⁴	Wikipedia ICTY Conviction mentioned in Google Knowledge Panel and/or in the leading paragraph. / = no article								Final sentence (years)
		EN	HR	SR	BH	SH	FR	DE	ES	
Bruno Stojić	CRO	Yes	No	/	/	/	/	/	Yes	20
Dario Kordić	CRO	Yes	Yes	/	Yes	Yes	/	/	Yes	25
Jadranko Prlić	CRO	Yes	Yes	/	/	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	25
Milivoj Petković	CRO	Yes	No	/	Yes	Yes	/	Yes	/	20
Mladen Naletilić Tuta	CRO	Yes	No	No	/	Yes	Yes	/	/	20
Slobodan Praljak	CRO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	20
Tihomir Blaškić	CRO	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	9
Valentin Ćorić	CRO	Yes	No	/	/	/	/	Yes	/	16
Dragoljub Ojdanić	SRB	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	15
Duško Tadić	SRB	Yes	Yes	/	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	20
Goran Jelisić	SRB	Yes	/	Yes	/	Yes	/	Yes	/	40

³⁴ As determined in the ICTY convictions.


The topic of ethnic background and ICTY convictions was treated in more detail by Stewart Ford, [Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments](#); NC Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation; Vol 39, 2013.

Ljubisa Beara	SRB	Yes	Life								
Milan Lukić	SRB	Yes	/	Yes	Yes	/	/	Yes	/		Life
Milan Martić	SRB	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	/	Yes	/		35
Milan Babić	SRB	Yes		13							
Mile Mrkšić	SRB	Yes		20							
Milomir Stakić	SRB	Yes	Yes	/	Yes	Yes	/	/	/		40
Momčilo Krajišnik	SRB	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		20
Nebojša Pavković	SRB	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		22
Nikola Šainović	SRB	Yes		18							
Radislav Krstić	SRB	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		35
Radoslav Brdjanin	SRB	Yes	/	No	/	Yes	/	Yes	/		30
Radovan Karadžić	SRB	Yes		Life							
Ratko Mladić	SRB	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	/		Life
Sredoje Lukić	SRB	Yes	/	Yes	/	/	/	/	/		27
Sreten Lukić	SRB	Yes		20							
Stanislav Galić	SRB	Yes		20							

Stojan Župljanin	SRB	Yes	/	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	22
Veselin Šljivančanin	SRB	Yes	Yes	Yes	/	Yes	/	Yes	Yes	10
Vinko Pandurević	SRB	Yes	/	No	/	/	/	/	/	13
Vojislav Šešelj	SRB	Yes	15							
Vujadin Popović	SRB	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	/	Yes	Yes	Life
Zdravko Tolimir	SRB	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Life

Total number of convictions by the ICTY: 90 (of which 60 ethnic Serbs (66.6%); 18 ethnic Croats (20%)³⁵,
36


Number of surveyed Wikipedia articles: 32 (8 ethnic Croats; 24 ethnic Serbs)



³⁵ [Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments](#)

³⁶ [Key Figures of the Cases](#)

SR.WP - Mentioning ICTY convictions of own ethnic group



SH.WP - ICTY Conviction mentioned in the leading paragraph



EN.WP - ICTY Conviction mentioned in the leading paragraph




FR.WP - ICTY conviction mentioned in the leading paragraph



ES.WP - ICTY conviction mentioned in the leading paragraph



DE.WP - ICTY conviction mentioned in the leading paragraph



2. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

Ratko Mladić:

- This Serbian language Wikipedia article about a Bosnian Serb military commander convicted of genocide in Srebrenica spends the first three paragraphs detailing his military career and achievements. When it first mentions the UN tribunal, in paragraph 4, it phrases the sentence to highlight the international pressure on Serbia to arrest the fugitive general and avoids mentioning what he was indicted and ultimately convicted for. At the time of reviewing, the article passage read: *“The Hague tribunal indicted Mladić in 1995. His arrest and extradition were among the conditions for the beginning of Serbia's EU accession talks; a reward of 1 to 10 million euros was offered for information that would contribute to his arrest. Mladić was arrested in Serbia on May 26, 2011, and extradited to The Hague tribunal on May 31. The trial began on May 16, 2012. He was sentenced to life imprisonment by the first-instance verdict of November 22, 2017.”*
- In fact, the article whitewashes Mladić’s biography and propagates narratives contained in two conspiracy theories widely held by Serbian radical right: a) that Serbs were the victims of the conspiracy of big powers (the EU/US/NATO); and b) that the ICTY was biased against and had selectively and disproportionately punished Serbs.
- In a section that discusses Mladić’s war crimes trial, the article spends four paragraphs detailing the number of changes made to the original indictment and highlighting the general’s opening statement in which he stated that the UN tribunal was a “kangaroo court”, established with an intent to punish Serbs and the Bosnian Serb Republic.
- The word “Srebrenica” is mentioned eight times in the 3,400-word article, but there is only one link related to it, and it points to Srebrenica as a toponym. In fact, the article on Serbian language Wikipedia about the massacre for which the general had been convicted is not once referenced in this text. Instead, there is a link that points to another article ([Operation Krivaja](#); the corresponding article in English language Wikipedia is “[the siege of Srebrenica](#)”) which lays out side by side two diametrically opposed versions of the events surrounding the massacre in Srebrenica: The first, proposed by two Russian historians, puts the number of civilian casualties at 153. The second version describes the crime in Srebrenica as a planned execution of 8,000 Muslim men and boys.
- The Serbian language article about Ratko Mladić mentions the massacre in a small paragraph that offers a wide range of estimated fatalities – which is in itself a promotion of controversy. It is preceded by a longer paragraph that contextualises the Srebrenica massacre as a reaction to earlier crimes committed against Serb civilians “by Muslim troops”, describing it as *“one of the main reasons for the attack on Srebrenica”*³⁷.
- Presenting controversial claims backed by questionable sources side by side with facts confirmed by reliable sources (teaching controversy) appears to be one of the most widely used disinformation strategies on both Croatian and Serbian language Wikipedia. Similar techniques were frequently

³⁷ <https://w.wiki/3AdX> (Wikipedia article in Serbian)

used in Croatian language articles that discussed the atrocities committed by the NDH and the number of people executed in Ustaše-led WWII concentration camps.

- The article ends with a detailed overview of what it describes as “positive” and “negative” public perception of the general’s role in the Yugoslav wars.
 - The section on [positive public perception](#) states that “*Serbs’ support for Ratko Mladić is best described by the results of public opinion surveys*”. This claim is supported by a selection of results from opinion polls conducted in 2009 and 2011, in which a significant number of respondents opposed the general’s extradition to the ICTY or considered him a hero. In addition, the article says, “*many Russian citizens expressed support for Ratko Mladić, sympathising with Serbs as victims of the breakup of Yugoslavia and condemning the double standards of the US and the EU.*”
 - The section on [negative public perception](#) gives a brief list of individuals and groups who welcomed Mladić’s arrest and subsequent extradition, labelling them as “those who support the EU accession”.

Slobodan Praljak:

Slobodan Praljak, the commander of Bosnian Croat paramilitary forces (Croatian Defence Council (HVO)) was sentenced in 2017 to 20 years of prison for crimes against humanity and the destruction of cultural heritage. He committed suicide in the courtroom upon hearing that the ICTY appeals panel upheld his conviction. Croatian language Wikipedia article stated correctly in the introductory paragraph that “he was found guilty” by the ICTY but made no mention of the length of punishment, nor did it specify the crimes he had been found guilty of – something that is consistently mentioned in the corresponding articles in other surveyed Wikipedias.

- The ICTY charged Praljak and five other senior Bosnian Croat military officials with mass war crimes committed in a joint criminal enterprise during the 1992-95 war in Bosnia. Other surveyed languages give detailed explanations of these atrocities, with links to relevant sources and Wikipedia articles. The charges were not properly contextualised - and some were not even mentioned - in different versions of the Croatian language article that were online in [2017](#), [2018](#), [2019](#), and [2020](#). The versions relied on Praljak’s own website and his self-published books and wartime diaries extensively to present his views of the events and portray the general in an overall positive manner. Where English Wikipedia states clearly and unambiguously that Praljak had opted to defend himself without a lawyer, the Hr.WP article states that “*Croatian General, Slobodan Praljak, decided to lead the battle for justice in The Hague.*”³⁸
- Other surveyed Wikipedia language versions state the fact that Praljak denied the responsibility for the destruction of Stari Most, the 16th-century Ottoman bridge that connects the two parts of the city of Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They also properly contextualise that denial in the light of the ICTY verdict which found him guilty for the destruction of cultural heritage. The Croatian language versions focused solely on Praljak’s version of the events – further supported in the article about [Stari Most](#), which relies extensively on the general’s books.

³⁸ [Slobodan Praljak](#) (Wikipedia article in Croatian)

- Reflecting the observed trend of increasing radical right bias across Hr.WP between 2013 and 2020, it should be noted that the then administrators quickly removed several attempts by moderate editors to include relevant information and state in the introductory paragraph that Praljak was a convicted war criminal. Versions of the article that were online between 2017 and 2020 were structured to highlight his academic accomplishments and his career as a film and theatre director, and university lecturer - as opposed to how articles about the convicted general are structured in [English](#), [Spanish](#), [German](#), and [Serbo-Croatian](#), for example.

Articles about NDH and senior Ustaše officials:

Articles covering senior officials, important events and toponyms related to the Ustaše regime regularly offered distorted interpretations of events, presented claims by controversial alternative historians, and used highly questionable sources. It appears that the main purpose of this was to intentionally reframe the movement and political regime as anti-communist and pro-independence. Croatian radical right often seeks to reframe and legitimise the legacy of Ustaše and the Independent State of Croatia as a part of the country's long quest for independence.

- It should be noted that some articles mentioned in this section have been completely overhauled during the course of this evaluation, resulting in new and significantly improved versions, cleaned from historical revisionism and non-credible sources. However, this review focuses on the legacy and impact of long-term exposure to bias and disinformation.

The list of reviewed articles includes - but is not limited to - those about the Ustaše movement ([EN](#), [HR](#)), and the head of NDH ([EN](#), [HR](#)), Ante Pavelić ([EN](#), [HR](#)), his most senior aides and military commanders.

- Croatian language articles describing WWII [Jasenovac concentration camp](#) and senior NDH and Ustaše officials ([Dinko Šakić](#) [[ver. 2013](#); [ver. 2016](#); [ver. 2019](#); [ver. 2020](#)], [Vjekoslav Luburić](#) [[ver. 2013](#), [ver. 2015](#), [ver. 2017](#), [ver. 2019](#), [ver. 2020](#)], [Miroslav Filipović](#), [Ljubo Miloš](#) [[ver. 2013](#), [ver. 2016](#), [ver. 2020](#)]) who were involved in mass killings that took place there are also an illustrative example showing how emulating neutrality can lead to confusion.

Articles in English, French, Spanish, or German state unambiguously in their introductory paragraphs that Jasenovac was “*a concentration and extermination camp*” established by the NDH, “*the only quisling regime in occupied Europe to operate extermination camps solely on their own for Jews and other ethnic groups* ([EN](#)).” ([FR](#), [ES](#), [DE](#)).

Croatian article - in various versions that were online between 2007 and December 2020 - presented a grossly distorted picture of the notorious extermination camp, with large portions of the text being devoted to disproving the number of victims. A list of claims, ranging from few thousand to half a million, was, in numerous versions of the article, presented in a way which suggested that it was up to the reader to “mix & match” their preferred estimate and context. It got there by giving equal weight to the claims by denialists of Holocaust and Jasenovac, and the findings of Yugoslav authorities, the work of peer-reviewed academic researchers, the US Museum of Holocaust, and Croatia's official Jasenovac Memorial Centre. This “mix” of numbers is a classical disinformation strategy (and an example of framing bias) which creates confusion and nudges the reader to conclude that the real numbers probably cannot be known and that each “side” has its own opaque political agenda.

Reflecting the increase in influence of the group that captured the Croatian WP project, the versions that had been online between 2013 and 2018 gradually included more and more denialist content. The article's leading paragraph, posted in August 2018, dropped any reference to "death camp" and described Jasenovac as *"the largest collection and labour camp in the NDH, and later in SFR Yugoslavia"*³⁹ – furthering baseless revisionist claim that the camp had been used by Yugoslav authorities.

Wikipedia articles in French, German, and Spanish presented properly contextualised and unambiguous facts surrounding the background and foundation of the notorious death camp. For example, after explaining that the NDH's fundamental policy was to create an ethnically pure state, [the article in French](#) stated that the puppet state had built its first concentration camp at the end of April 1941, thus making Croatia *"the only European 'state' to achieve the policy of extermination without the help of the Germans."* Articles in Spanish and German used similar phrasing. *"(Jasenovac) was the only extermination camp in Europe during World War II in which murders were carried out according to plan without German participation."*⁴⁰

Versions of the article in Croatian language, present on the Hr.WP between 2017 and 2020, offered somewhat different contextualisation of the death camp's history and the number of victims. The version from [2018](#) begins with a presentation of claims by a known Jasenovac denialist, while a version from [2019](#) contextualises the story of Jasenovac with Yugoslav propaganda whose claim about 700,000 victims had been used to "denigrate Croats". *"The aim of perpetuating this black myth was to denigrate, stigmatize and silence Croats, to cultivate a constant sense of shame inextricably linked to Croatian national consciousness and to taboo every thought of Croatian independence."* In all reviewed versions, the Hr.WP article contained a number of links to other articles containing equally distorted presentation of relevant political and military officials of the NDH, and those describing activities and works of known revisionists and Jasenovac-denialists⁴¹. Together, they formed a web of deception which creates confusion, and attempts to influence the reader's opinion and judgement about historic events.

Over the past seven years, Jasenovac article was the subject of intense - and highly critical - media scrutiny.^{42, 43, 44}

Many claims presented over the years in various versions of the text, were a major source of disinformation.

- Articles about senior Ustaše and NDH officials (Mile Budak, [Dinko Šakić](#), [Vjekoslav Luburić](#), [Miroslav Filipović](#), [Ljubo Miloš](#)) use similar disinformation tactics.

In a stark difference to how facts are presented in English, French or German Wikipedia, the Hr.WP article - in different versions online between 2013 and 2020 - portrayed Vjekoslav Luburić largely as a

³⁹ https://hr.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Koncentracijski_logor_Jasenovac&diff=5125230&oldid=5124642

⁴⁰ https://de.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=KZ_Jasenovac&oldid=209827733 (Article in German)

⁴¹ For example, the works of journalist and amateur historian, [Igor Vukić - Wikipedia](#), or a denialist documentary by Jakov Sedlar.

⁴² [How Croatian Wikipedia Made a Concentration Camp Disappear](#) (Article: Balkan Insight; in English)

⁴³ [Hrvatska Wikipedija: Paralelna povijest ekstremne desnice / Hrvatska / zone / home page](#) (Analytical piece (in Croatian): "The Parallel History of Croatia's Extreme Right")

⁴⁴ [Hrvatska Wikipedija je dotaknula samo dno novim člankom o Jasenovcu](#) (Article (in Croatian): Index.hr - "Croatian Wikipedia has bottomed out with its latest article about Jasenovac")

political activist, and subtly framed his later actions in the context of police brutality he had experienced as a young adult in Yugoslav Kingdom.

In fact, the article was a fine example of systemic disinformation, as well as selection and framing bias that this evaluation identified across the Croatian language Wikipedia. Disinformation here is considered systemic because it was so pervasive and has remained online and influencing the public discourse for so many years.

The English Wikipedia article [states](#) that *“Vjekoslav Luburić (6 March 1914 – 20 April 1969) was a Croatian Ustaše official who headed the system of concentration camps in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) during much of World War II. Luburić also personally oversaw and spearheaded the contemporaneous genocides of Serbs, Jews and Roma in the NDH.”*

Wikipedias in French, Spanish, Portuguese, and German use similar phrasing in their introductory paragraphs.

Different versions of the article in Croatian language, present online between from 2013 and 2019, stated that Luburić had been *“an Ustaše officer, commander of Jasenovac concentration camp, and Croatian political activist in the diaspora. He was declared a war criminal by Tito’s Yugoslavia.”* Over the years, the versions gradually dropped the “war criminal” reference, citing the lack of official confirmation of the indictment.

- The article about the Ustaše movement is another example of the same type of systemic disinformation and bias.

The introductory part of the article about Ustaše in English, [German](#), [French](#), [Portuguese](#), and [Spanish](#) describe it unambiguously as a terrorist movement, responsible for mass atrocities against Jews, Roma and Serbs. For example, the French Wikipedia describes Ustaše as an *“anti-Semitic, fascist and anti-Yugoslav separatist movement”*, and state that they *“established the independent state of Croatia, a dictatorship particularly arbitrary and murderous, which was marked by numerous massacres of the Serbian, Gypsy and Jewish populations of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.”*⁴⁵

The Croatian language version from [December 2020](#), states in the leading paragraph that Ustaše were *“a Croatian separatist and nationalist movement that fought against Greater Serbia centralism and hegemony in Yugoslavia.”* The description, which presents the movement as an underdog that fought against outside oppression, is almost an exact match to one of the central themes in nationalist myths and conspiracy theories - the mobilisation against perceived external threat.^{46 47}

The process of massive reinterpretation of events and the role of the NDH in the World War II in Croatia began in early 90’s and had largely been focused on discrediting the legacy of the Communist Party-led resistance movement and describing the NDH as a legitimate foundation state based on anti-Communist ideology.^{48 49}

⁴⁵ Oustachis — Wikipédia (FR)

⁴⁶ Nebojša Blanuša, Faculty of Political Science University of Zagreb Croatia; Internal Memory Divided: Conspiratorial Thinking, Ideological and Historical Cleavages in Croatia. Lessons for Europe; European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities EQPAM Vol.2, No.4, October 2013

⁴⁷ David Bruce Macdonald: Balkan holocausts? Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia; Manchester University Press, 2002; pp 98-105; 138-143

⁴⁸ Ibid. pp 99-100

⁴⁹ Ramet P. Sabrina (1999): The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989, pp 5-12, Penn State University Press

The same Hr.WP article further stated that *“the movement’s objective was to establish an independent Croatia by any means, including using terror and violence. It used terrorist methods before coming to power. The Ustaše regime was especially revanchist against the Serbs, because of the violence suffered in (the Kingdom of) Yugoslavia. Because of the pact with the Nazis and fascists, the Ustaše regime adopted alien ideology of hatred towards Jews and Roma and participated in the persecution and genocide of these ethnic groups. It persecuted Croat political opponents. It maintained close ties with its Nazi and fascist protectors whose many methods of persecution it took over. Due to the imported anti-Semitic ideology, foreign to Croatian political culture, it compromised the Croatian struggle for independence, which was later used against Croats in Yugoslavia and in diaspora.”*

3. PROPAGANDA

Articles presenting ideological labels as credible facts disguised as encyclopaedic entries are an important inroad for systemic bias and disinformation. These articles often exist in only one language version (Croatian or Serbian) but regularly rely on highly questionable sources that are usually deemed not meeting credibility and verifiability standards of Wikipedia language versions, including blog posts, self-published and alternative media outlets, as well as pages of cultural organisations recognised as ideologues of Croatian radical right without disclosing that affiliation.

This inquiry uncovered that some articles contain phrases and expressions that are unfit for encyclopaedic content and can be defined as derogatory or wartime propaganda labels (numbers provided below). These terms appear in articles on diverse topics, from football clubs to places and events from WWII and more recent past.

IDEOLOGICAL / PROPAGANDA LABELS

Some articles on Croatian and Serbian language Wikipedia represent an attempt to introduce dismissive and/or right-wing ideological labels into encyclopaedic articles. Examples include:

- *“[De-Croatisation](#)”*, the process of losing Croatian ethnic and national identity under the pressure of “alien” religions and ideologies. A similar article exists on Serbian language Wikipedia, under the name *“[De-Serbisation](#)”*;
- *“[De-Tudjmanisation](#)”*, a process of “systematic belittling” of political and statehood legacy of late Croatian President Franjo Tudjman;
- *“[Croatian Silence](#)”*, an article explaining repressed Croatian nationalist feelings in the post-WWII Yugoslavia.
- *“[Yugocommunist](#)”* (or Yugo-Communist)⁵⁰, used as an adjective and/or noun is an ideological label often employed by right-wing politicians and activists.⁵¹ The adjective “Yugocommunist” appears in more than 290 articles on Croatian language Wikipedia.⁵² Though its origins are not quite clear, the phrase has been used in the Croat diaspora press in the ‘70s and ‘80s and

⁵⁰ Reviewed version is from February 2020.

⁵¹ Typical example of the term being used as an ideological label: <https://portal.braniteljski-forum.com/blog/novosti/jugokomunisti-u-savezu-sa-srpskim-cetnicima>

⁵² Data collected in March and April 2021

slipped into the nationalist mainstream during and after the 1991-95 war of independence. Croatian language Wikipedia innocuously defines “Yugocommunist” or “Yugocommunism” as a shorthand for “Yugoslav Communist” and describes it as *“a set of values adopted and practised in the Yugoslav version of Communism”*.⁵³ However, the expression is never used in reputable academic sources and rarely outside the nationalist publications and media. The article on [“Yugocommunism”](#) exists only in Croatian language and is largely an unencyclopaedic article that promotes what essentially is a derogatory ideological label. It details an alleged conspiracy against Croatian nation and state by the then members of the Yugoslav Communist Party but also hints at today’s “Yugocommunist” by referring in the present tense to those who *“want to describe the Homeland War and the Republic of Croatia (above all) as a continuation of ZAVNOH (The State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia)”*.⁵⁴ In fact, the previous statement appears to be a subtle nod to the NDH. Croatia’s present-day Constitution states explicitly in its preamble⁵⁵ that ZAVNOH is one of the historical foundations of the country’s sovereignty - as opposed to the WWII puppet state. ZAVNOH was a supreme political representative body created in the Axis-occupied Croatia and led by the Croatian Communist Party and other organisations that resisted the regime of the [Independent State of Croatia \(NDH\)](#).

- “Srbočetnik” (noun); “srbočetnički” (adj.) – is a Croatian wartime propaganda phrase coined in the early days of the Croatian war of independence to denote members of Serb paramilitary forces, many of whom were responsible for atrocities against the Croat civilian population.⁵⁶ The phrase has quickly turned into a label and a derogatory depiction of ethnic Serbs. During the war and in the aftermath, the expression was widely used by the mainstream press and electronic media. In the early 21st Century, with the rise of awareness, usage has gradually died down. However, it is still common in the discourse of hardline nationalists, and it often appears in the texts published by far-right outlets. The phrase appears in 30 articles on Croatian Wikipedia, which describe the events from the Yugoslav wars (1991-99), toponyms, and football clubs and events. (data compiled between February and April 2021)
- Another set of articles that belong to this category covers persons (historical and living) whose biographies are presented in an overly positive way that subtly furthers the agenda of the radical right. These include articles about artists, intellectuals, government officials and military officers who had played important roles in the WWII regime of Ante Pavelić, as well as present-day professional

⁵³ [Jugokomunizam – Wikipedija](#)

⁵⁴ <https://hr.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Jugokomunizam&oldid=5440596>

⁵⁵ In its preamble (section Historical Foundations) Croatian Constitution states, inter alia, that *“(...) the historical right of the Croatian nation to full sovereignty, has manifested itself: (...) in the establishment of the foundations of state sovereignty during the course of the Second World War, as expressed in the decision of the Territorial Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia (1943) in opposition to proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia (1941)”*, [The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia \(consolidated text\) | Croatian Parliament](#)

⁵⁶ Data compiled in April 2021

and amateur historians, entertainers and TV personalities who are actively campaigning for the radical right political parties and organisations (for example, Velimir Bujanec, a Croatian TV presenter who runs a far-right and openly pro-Ustaše talkshow; Igor Vukić, a Holocaust-denialist whose works were extensively referenced in the earlier versions of articles about Jasenovac concentration camp; [Christophe Dolbeau](#), a French amateur historian who wrote an apologetic biography of Vjekoslav Luburić; to name a few).

- This evaluation has found that questionable online sources ([list](#)) were often used as references for dubious claims in biographical articles about prominent left-wing politicians, civil society activists or campaigners (see [the list of reviewed Hr.WP articles](#)). For example, the article about Vesna Pusić, Croatia's former foreign minister and a prominent liberal left activist, used stories from far-right media outlets to highlight a non-notable information that she had been "found guilty of treason" by an ad-hoc [ethic tribunal](#) founded and run by a hardline nationalist group and "declared a persona non-grata" by a little-known association of Croatian diaspora in Argentina. The information remained online between 2018 and 2020. (ver. [2018](#); ver. [2019](#); ver. [2020](#))
- In some cases, an article that covers a notable political, social, cultural or historical event or phenomena is emptied of fact-based, encyclopaedic content and brought out of alignment with the five pillars. The [Croatian article about propaganda](#) and [Serbian article about disinformation](#) are cases in point.

[Propaganda \(hr.wiki article\)](#)

- Practically all other language versions reviewed in the course of this evaluation present the term [propaganda](#) by outlining its origins, historical and contemporary context, main theoretical definitions, and different approaches to this form of communication. They present multiple examples laid out in proper historical/scientific context and explain the distinction between propaganda, public relations and advertising.
- The Croatian language version of the article on propaganda is itself an example of right-wing propaganda. Besides the apparent failure to set out the difference between propaganda, public relations, and advertising (["Due to negative connotations, the term \(propaganda\) has recently been replaced by the English term Public Relations."](#)⁵⁷), the short article is, in fact, the presentation of three frequent radical right narratives:⁵⁸ anti-EU sovereignty, anti-communism, and nationalism. The article is centred around a dubious claim that the rise of propaganda is linked with democratisation and the appearance of mass media. *"So, propaganda appears when the masses were given the right to vote and when there is a possibility of simple communication with the voters."*⁵⁹
- From there, it leads a narrative that does very little to provide information and facts about the concept of propaganda but clearly associates previously defined negative overtones with three examples aligned with nationalist-right narratives. When highlighting the abuse by totalitarian

⁵⁷ Reviewed versions - March 2021; June 2020

⁵⁸ Vedran Obućina. Far Right Extremism in Croatia. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012.

⁵⁹ [Version - June 2020](#)

regimes, it offers only the example of the Yugoslav Federation and the link to another biased article - *"Yugo-Communist propaganda"*. From there, it moves to explain propaganda in the 20th and 21st Century: *"Media propaganda during World War I is the first example of modern propaganda. Following the defeat of the Serbs in the Homeland War (Croatia's 1991 war of independence), Greater-Serbia propaganda acted as follows during the 1999 Kosovo conflict: "There were no media reports of Albanian refugees, the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo was described as overblown Western (NATO) propaganda."*⁶⁰

- And in the 21st Century: *"Propaganda is still used today for a number of political purposes. During Croatia's accession negotiations with the EU, especially before the referendum, advertising or propaganda of the European Union was ubiquitous."*⁶¹
- The two sentences quoted above are framed in a way that suggests that they are solid facts. Indeed, it is true that the regime of Slobodan Milošević had unleashed a large-scale war propaganda operation during the 1991-99 Yugoslav wars. It is also true that during the accession process the European Union offered the Croatian public the information – and not propaganda – about the benefits of membership.

It appears that the purpose of this framing bias is to communicate and contextualise messages often repeated by the radical right: the nationalist mythologisation of the Croatian war of independence (1991-95), and the suggestion that the EU had somehow manipulated Croatians into voting for the country's EU membership in the 2013 referendum.

Disinformation (sr. wiki article)

- Though it lacks some of the subtleties that appear in the Croatian language Wikipedia article on propaganda, the [Serbian language article on disinformation](#) evaluated in this assessment is no less corrosive. Instead of providing neutral, fact-based description of *disinformation* supported by credible sources, the article offers unsourced depiction of the phenomena: *"If we want to seriously study the issue of disinformation, we must go back to the intuition of the great ancestors, Lenin and Goebbels: in psychocracy, the truth does not matter; in fact, it doesn't even exist, what does exist is what imposed on people to believe in; or even better, what they are led to believe."*
- The article is largely a list of propaganda lines fabricated by the regime of Slobodan Milošević during the 1991-99 Yugoslav wars, framed as examples of the Western bias and/or disinformation operations against Serbs. *"Everyone has heard on the radio that Serbs, during the fight with Croat or Muslim foes, were always only 'killed', while their opponents were always 'brutally massacred or killed', which certainly carries more weight in the era of victimophilia."*
- Quoting a discredited story of allegedly [faked TV footage of a concentration camp in Trnopolje](#) run by the Bosnian Serb army, the article states that it had *"greatly contributed to the strengthening of the campaign of demonisation of Serbs"*.

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ Ibid.

- Despite being repeatedly discredited by researchers and credible media sources, the narratives listed in the article became accepted as facts in parts of society, thanks to decades of bias and disinformation pushed by nationalist tabloids and alternative outlets.

4. QUESTIONABLE SOURCES

“Truth isn’t truth.”

Rudy Giuliani, the lawyer of former US President Donald Trump (August 2018) ⁶²

The question of authenticity and integrity of sources used in hundreds of Croatian language Wikipedia articles touches upon a highly politicised and sensitive issue of what constitutes propaganda, fake news and disinformation – and who are the agents responsible for organised amplifying of such narratives.

- It is vital to note that while not every article that uses questionable sources is necessarily biased and/or distorted, those that significantly deviate from the NPOV principle rely heavily on questionable sources.
- This evaluation has identified a number of online sources that have been independently confirmed by Croatian and regional journalists and fact-checking organisations as creators and amplifiers of hate speech, fake news, disinformation and conspiracy theories.
- This evaluation has checked the possible undue influence from online sources marked as close to leftist groups but found no meaningful presence of such references on Hr.WP.
- The questionable online sources are categorised in the following way:
 - Self-published websites posing as authentic media outlets.
Not officially registered as legal entities in any of the surveyed jurisdictions (Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia); some of the surveyed websites offer no information about their editorial teams or the means of financing.
 - Openly far-right media outlets.
 - Websites of conservative pressure groups and far-right political parties. Officially registered as legal entities or media outlets with their respective country authorities;
 - Outlets and websites owned and/or under the de-facto control of cultural organisations considered close to Croatian radical right. Officially registered as legal entities or or media outlets with their respective country authorities.

⁶² [Giuliani says 'truth isn't truth'](#)

Name*	Description / comment	Number of referenced articles**
<u>Croatia Rediviva</u>	An informal association of historians. Positions are firmly right-wing and conservative-nationalist. It publishes research and opinion pieces, some of which are by historic revisionists who are whitewashing the role of Croatia's Ustaše movement during WWII. Croatia Rediviva is officially registered as a civil society group. It regularly publishes annual financial reports.	20
<u>HKV - Hrvatsko kulturno vijeće / Hrvatski tjednik</u>	Hrvatsko Kulturno Vijeće (Croatian Cultural Council) is an influential ultra-conservative nationalist cultural organisation and a loose association of intellectuals supporting identitarian, nativist, and far-right populist political positions. The organisation is officially registered with relevant Croatian authorities as a citizens' association. The HKV hosts an online version of "Hrvatski tjednik", Croatia's most extreme and openly neofascist print magazine with a history of major controversies. ^{63 64}	130
<u>HOP</u>	An "alternative news" platform. Not officially registered as a legal entity or an electronic media outlet with any of the surveyed jurisdictions (Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia). The outlet promotes cleronationalist narratives and publishes controversial conspiracy theories. Besides not being officially registered, HOP has no visible advertisements on its website, which may point at a possible involvement of a political and/or state actor. A report on media freedoms by one of Croatia's leading civil society organisations, GONG, has flagged it as a promoter of hate speech and disinformation. ⁶⁵	35
<u>Hrvatski fokus</u>	Hrvatski fokus (Croatian Focus) is officially registered as the website of "Tkanica", a publishing house based in Zagreb, Croatia. It is a conservative nationalist online magazine considered close to the Croatian Party of Rights.	90
<u>Hrvatsko Nebo / Pokret za hrvatsku budućnost</u>	An unregistered news outlet that doubles as the main vehicle for the promotion of the PHB (Pokret za hrvatsku budućnost; The Movement for Croatian Future), a little known ultranationalist political organisation. Both PHB and Hrvatsko Nebo are edited and curated by Nenad Piskač, a political activist, writer, journalist, and an amateur historian. Piskač is a regular contributor for Hrvatsko Kulturno Vijeće (HKV), an ultra-conservative nationalist cultural institution.	25

⁶³ [Zašto je Hrvatski tjednik, nakon desetaka vulgarnih naslovnica, tek sad postao 'moralno nakazan'](#) ("Why has "Hrvatski tjednik", after dozens of vulgar front pages, only now became 'morally repugnant'?" Jutarnji list; comment; in Croatian)

⁶⁴ [Neprihvatljivo žigovanje novinara u Hrvatskoj | Politika | DW | 31.05.2019](#) (Unacceptable branding of Journalists in Croatia)
An article and the official note of protest by Germany's Deutsche Welle after Hrvatski tjednik published "an arrest warrant" with photographs of Austrian and German journalists who criticised the presence of Croatian neo-Ustase at a memorial service in Austrian village of Bleiburg - the site of execution of thousands of soldiers and civilians associated with Axis powers in WWII.

⁶⁵ Detailed findings were published in a research report "Against Hate", part of the project by GONG, Centre for Peace Studies, and Finland's Justice Ministry. Available at: [Analiza mrežnih stranica u kontekstu govora mržnje | CMS](#)

<u>Kamenjar</u>	A self-publishing "alternative news" portal. Kamenjar and its parent publisher, "Eranijske Kronike" do not exist as legal entities in Croatia, Bosnia or Serbia. Kamenjar regularly publishes conspiracy theories and pseudo-historic articles attempting to whitewash the role of the Ustaše movement. The website was repeatedly flagged by regional fact-checking organisations as a major amplifier of disinformation. ^{66 67}	60
<u>Konzerva</u>	Far-right alternative news outlet of unknown background. It publishes conspiracy theories, anti-migrant and anti-LGBT stories. A report on media freedoms by one of Croatia's leading civil society organisations, GONG, has flagged it as a promoter of hate speech and disinformation. ⁶⁸	3
<u>Narod.hr</u>	Narod.hr describes itself as an independent news outlet. It is owned and controlled by the Croatian Catholic-conservative political pressure group "In the Name of the Family" (U ime obitelji). The organisation is a staunch opponent of abortion and it calls for limitation of LGBT rights. In 2013, it forced the Croatian parliament to call a constitutional referendum that would define marriage as a union between a man and a woman, thereby de-facto prohibiting same-sex marriage.	300
<u>Projekt Velebit</u>	Projekt Velebit is an alternative news and far-right website. ⁶⁹ Though not registered as a media outlet, it is an official mouthpiece of a far-right pressure group of the same name. Projekt Velebit promotes traditional nationalist and far-right narratives, and campaigns for the annexation of parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina where Croats are an ethnic majority. Recently, the website has been publishing Covid-19 and anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. One of the founders of Projekt Velebit, Marko Jurič, is a former TV journalist whose talk show had been sanctioned by a Croatian media regulator over hate speech. ⁷⁰ Jurič himself was investigated by Croatian prosecutors in 2019 over hate speech and ethnic hatred. ⁷¹	10
<u>Stina hrvatskih pradiđova (Stranka hrvatskog prava) (SHP)</u>	A cleronationalist and openly pro-Ustaše website and organisation. SHP is not officially registered as a legal entity or electronic media outlet with any of the surveyed jurisdictions. The website positions itself as a patriotic outlet that promotes different views of the NDH and its leader Ante Pavelić. It republishes stories from Projekt Velebit and other right-wing outlets mentioned in this list, but also YouTube video podcasts with far-right content. Comments section features numerous examples of hate speech.	35

⁶⁶ [Resonant Voices Radar: January 2020](#) (RV Radar monitors media outlets in the Western Balkans for disinformation, fake news, and hate speech)

⁶⁷ "Against Hate", part of the project by GONG, Centre for Peace Studies, and Finland's Justice Ministry. Available at: [Analiza mrežnih stranica u kontekstu govora mržnje | CMS](#) (pp. 9, 28-30)

⁶⁸ Ibid.

Dnevno.hr

Dnevno is a privately-held news outlet known for its promotion of far-right narratives and hate speech. It regularly published far-right conspiracy theories, extreme nationalist, and anti-migrant fake news. In 2017, it published a hate-mongering photomontage and an accompanying story which led to violence against an ethnic Serb MP from Croatia's Social-Democratic Party⁷². Oddly enough, Dnevno has had sister companies in Serbia and Bosnia which fed their readers the same far-right incendiary content - but with Serb and Bosnian Muslim flavour. Dnevno's publisher eventually bankrupted, largely from defamation lawsuits. The new management toned down the libellous rhetoric but the outlet is still firmly on the far-right side of the spectrum.⁷³

60

*Data compiled in March and April 2021

** The list is not exhaustive

⁶⁹ Ibid. pp. 8-9; 18-20; 31

⁷⁰ News story (in Croatian) (Croatia's Media regulator to shut down Z1 TV for three days over hate speech)

<https://hr.n1info.com/vijesti/a98747-zbog-govora-mrznje-vijece-za-elektronicke-medije-gasi-z1-televiziju-na-tri-dana/>

⁷¹ DORH pokrenuo kazneni postupak protiv Marka Juriča (Article in Croatian: "The State Attorney's Office initiated criminal proceedings against Marko Jurič")

⁷² [Moment of Truth: Reality Bites for Notorious News Brand](#)

⁷³ Ibid.

Background and context:

DEVELOPMENTS

- The newly-elected Hr.WP admins and active editors made clear and tangible improvements to some of Hr.WP's most sensitive and most disputed articles, including those that attracted significant media attention. These include but are not limited to articles about Jasenovac Concentration Camp⁷⁴, the Independent State of Croatia (NDH)⁷⁵, Ante Pavelić⁷⁶, Vjekoslav Luburić⁷⁷ and other officials of the Ustaše regime. The reformed community corrected or removed a number of gross misinterpretations of facts. Several articles that were little more than ideological labels have been completely removed. Many improvements took place independently of and in parallel with the research and creation of this report.

While this is undeniably a step in the right direction, it is too early to say if the recent changes will be enough to put Croatian language Wikipedia firmly back into alignment with the movement's broader mission. The project has been held captive for more than a decade, and content-related issues have long stopped being a matter of several politically sensitive articles and topics. It would be unrealistic to expect that the censured group of admins and editors, who spent years producing the content, will simply pack their bags and leave the scene altogether.

- There is a real risk that problems may return within a relatively short time frame. A simple act of removal of the *entire group* of rogue administrators may not prevent them or their allies from creating new accounts, reverting content changes and – given enough time – restoring their controlling positions in the project. As the history of Hr.WP has shown, the RfC process is unable to resolve systemic problems and attempts by organised groups to take over the entire project. The RfC is an efficient instrument when used as intended – to resolve individual disputes and isolated content-related issues – but it cannot act as a barrier against organised attempts to influence large parts of Wikipedia content.

ONE MULTICENTRIC LANGUAGE – FOUR WIKIPEDIA PROJECTS

- The creation of separate Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian language Wikipedias, in addition to the existing Serbo-Croatian project, almost two decades ago was, in the author's opinion, *a strategic mistake*.

It practically enabled the ethnonational division of the original Serbo-Croatian Wikipedia community by nudging editors and visitors to flock to their respective “nation-state projects”. Furthermore, it deprived the newly created communities of editorial diversity that normally guides and underpins the traditionally successful process of [editorial consensus](#) in other pluricentric language projects. Unsurprisingly, it led to nationalist bias and disinformation in articles that were supposed to give

⁷⁴ [Jasenovac concentration camp](#)

⁷⁵ [Independent State of Croatia](#)

⁷⁶ [Ante Pavelić - Wikipedia](#)

⁷⁷ [Vjekoslav Luburić](#)

fact-based, NPOV descriptions of different historical and societal events, phenomena and people in line with Wikipedia's five pillars.

- Wikipedia founder, Jimmy Wales, expressed similar views in 2013, when he told Croatian daily Jutarnji List that Serbian and Croatian Wikipedias should have never been separated. "My long-term position has always been that it is, in fact, wrong to have two separate Wikipedias in that part of the world," the daily quoted him as saying.⁷⁸
- Interestingly, the request for the creation of a separate Wikipedia project in the Montenegrin language has been rejected three times^{79, 80, 81} on the grounds of mutual intelligibility. Rejecting the latest request for Montenegrin Wikipedia, the Language Committee [argued](#) that *"if the current project creation rules had been in place before, the Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian Wikipedias would not have been created as projects separate from the original Serbo-Croatian Wikipedia."* The Committee advised Montenegrin community participate in Serbian or Serbo-Croatian project, adding that it *"does not consider political differences, since the Wikimedia Foundation's goal is to give every single person free, unbiased access to the sum of all human knowledge, rather than information from the viewpoint of individual political communities."*
- Wikipedia article depth is an indicator of the encyclopaedia's collaborative quality.⁸² The rank of article depth for Wikipedias with more than ten thousand articles consistently shows that Serbo-Croatian Wiki is second only to English. Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian language projects are ranked 18th, 31st and 88th out of 152, respectively.

INTELLIGIBILITY VS IDENTITY

- [Bosnian](#), [Croatian](#), [Montenegrin](#) and [Serbian](#) are standardised variants of [Serbo-Croatian](#), a [pluricentric language](#) with more than 20 million speakers in which Serbian and Croatian take up the largest share. The principal difference between Serbian and Croatian is that Serbian uses both Cyrillic and Latin alphabet, while Croatian is written only in the Latin script. Though Cyrillic is an official script of the Serbian language in Serbia, all state institutions and media regularly offer service in both alphabets, and the choice of version is largely left to personal preferences. Native speakers of Bosnian, Montenegrin and Serbian have the ability to read and write in both alphabets and often pay very little attention to this in everyday life. A series of psychometric studies performed between 1978 and 2004 on schoolchildren and young adults in Serbia and Bosnia discovered and confirmed that there was no statistically significant difference in cognitive response time to text written in Cyrillic or Latin alphabet.^{83, 84}

⁷⁸ Jutarnji List (in Croatian) [OSNIVAČ WIKIPEDIJE GOVORI ZA NEDJELJNI: 'Srbi i Hrvati ne smiju imati odvojene Wikipedije'](#)

⁷⁹ [Requests for new languages/Wikipedia Montenegrin - Meta](#)

⁸⁰ [Requests for new languages/Wikipedia Montenegrin 2 - Meta](#)

⁸¹ [Requests for new languages/Wikipedia Montenegrin 3 - Meta](#)

⁸² [Wikipedia article depth - Meta](#)

⁸³ Lukatela, G., Turvey, M.T. (1979). Some Experiments on the Roman and Cyrillic Alphabets of Serbo-Croatian. U J.V. Kavanagh and R. L. Venezsky (Ed.) Orthography, reading, and dyslexia. Baltimore, MD, University Park Press.

⁸⁴ Rot, N., Kostić, A. (1988). Čitljivost reči i rečenica štampanih latinicom i ćirilicom, Psihologija, XXI, 3-15.

- Over the past 30 years, parts of Croatian cultural establishment and academia made an effort to purify the Croatian language and make it more distinct from other BCS variants.⁸⁵ The campaign included the frequent introduction of new words and even subtitling regional film and TV production; it was largely successful, and its ideological subtext became widely accepted.
- Respecting the differences between the variants, major then-Yugoslav publishers regularly issued separate Croatian and Serbian translations of imported encyclopaedias, textbooks and books for children (For example, Larousse's Encyclopaedia for Children (1974) or The Great Medical Encyclopaedia⁸⁶). Today, virtually all producers and distributors of consumer goods provide separate product information, user manuals, advertisement and infomercials in Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian language.
- There are approximately 16 million people in Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia who consider one of the variants their mother tongue.⁸⁷ The languages are also spoken among Balkans diaspora communities, the largest of which are in Canada, Australia, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria.⁸⁸
- Mutual intelligibility of different BCS variants is equivalent to that between General American and Received Pronunciation in the English language.⁸⁹ In other words, an average-educated native speaker of any BCS variant should be able to fully comprehend and/or engage in any type and form of communication – be it literature, poetry, science, or finely-nuanced humour – in a language variant they do not refer to as their mother tongue.
- This fact was reflected in the policies and verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a UN court that prosecuted serious crimes committed during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. The Tribunal employed translators from all regions of the former Yugoslavia and accepted all national and regional variations, regardless of the nationality of the person on trial, on the grounds of mutual intelligibility.^{90, 91}

⁸⁵ David Bruce Macdonald. Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia. Manchester University Press 2002. pp. 138-145

⁸⁶ CORBISS; Open access database of the Serbian National Library:
<https://plus.sr.cobiss.net/opac7/bib/search/expert?c=id%3D14534912&db=nbs&mat=allmaterials&max=50&all=true>

⁸⁷ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbo-Croatian#Demographics>

⁸⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbo-Croatian>

⁸⁹ John Frederick Bailyn. To What Degree Are Croatian and Serbian the Same Language? Evidence from a Translation Study. Journal of Slavic Linguistics Vol. 18, No. 2 (2010), pp. 181-219

⁹⁰ <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tord/en/70623MS2.htm>

⁹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbo-Croatian#Contemporary_names

- In May 2010, Croatia donated to Serbia and Bosnia its official draft translation of Acquis Communautaire, a complex and very technical set of rules and regulations that makes the EU's body of law and the main fabric of the process of European integration⁹².
- In the present radical right discourse in the region, Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian languages are framed as identifiers of *the Other as a natural enemy*⁹³. The concept of the Other is at the very centre of the policies of radical right groups across the entire region who understand the world as a struggle of "us" versus "them".⁹⁴ This organised intolerance is characterised by an ideological and programmatic emphasis on the restoration of traditional values of the nation or community.⁹⁵ This type of discourse was evident and repeatedly demonstrated in articles on Hr.WP and in the RfC discussions reviewed throughout the course of this evaluation. More specifically, articles covering Croatia's WWII history, the 1991-99 breakup of Yugoslavia, and topics common to Eastern European nationalist-populist movements, regularly relied on selection and framing bias to positively reframe historical events and implicitly support traditional values.

IMPACT OF DISINFORMATION AND NATIONALIST BIAS

This evaluation has confirmed that numerous articles containing well-documented examples of disinformation and radical right bias remained unchallenged on Croatian Wikipedia for more than a decade.

DISINFORMATION OR BIAS, OR DISINFORMATION AND BIAS?

- A case study that quantified disinformation across the Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian language spectrum – done as a part of this investigation – has revealed systematic distortion of facts about individuals convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
- The majority of readers of Croatian language Wikipedia come from Croatia, and countries with a large Croat diaspora, including Bosnia, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and Canada.⁹⁶ A review conducted as part of this research has shown that between 2017 and 2020, articles containing nationalist bias were regularly among the top 30 most read entries on that wiki⁹⁷. *The prolonged and unchallenged presence of biased content on a large number of articles in ideological alignment can*

⁹² [Hrvatska poklonila Srbiji prevod standarda EU \(slobodnaevropa.org\)](https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/hr/vijesti/2010/05/100510_croatia_donates_eu_law_translations_to_serbia_and_bosnia/) (Article in Croatian: Radio Free Europe - "Croatia donates its translations of EU law to Serbia and Bosnia")

⁹³ Vedran Obućina (2012): Right-wing Extremism in Croatia, International Policy Analysis, pp 4-7, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

⁹⁴ Ramet P. Sabrina (1999): The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989, pp 5-12, Penn State University Press

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Total numbers compiled from the monthly traffic data from Wikistas over the period between 2017 and 2021. [https://stats.wikimedia.org/#/hr.wikipedia.org/reading/page-views-by-country/normal|map|last-month|\(access\)~desktop*mobile-app*mobile-web|monthly](https://stats.wikimedia.org/#/hr.wikipedia.org/reading/page-views-by-country/normal|map|last-month|(access)~desktop*mobile-app*mobile-web|monthly)

⁹⁷ Total numbers compiled from the monthly traffic data from Wikistas over the period between 2017 and 2021. [https://stats.wikimedia.org/#/hr.wikipedia.org/reading/top-viewed-articles/normal|table|2018-08-18~2018-08-19|\(access\)~desktop*mobile-app*mobile-web|monthly](https://stats.wikimedia.org/#/hr.wikipedia.org/reading/top-viewed-articles/normal|table|2018-08-18~2018-08-19|(access)~desktop*mobile-app*mobile-web|monthly)

be interpreted as an organised disinformation campaign. It is also a clear violation of the basic Wikipedia rules, most notably the first and second pillar.

- Unlike printed commercially available encyclopaedias, which are reviewed and fact-checked *before* they appear in a bookshop, Wikipedia is a dynamic, open-ended system in permanent interaction whose ultimate objective is to present broadly the same knowledge available in credible sources to people who speak different languages. Contrary to other platforms that publish user-generated content, Wikipedia relies on the community of volunteer editors and administrators who apply the same basic five-pillar principles to fact-check and streamline the content – in any language. However, a certain amount of unpredictability and diversity in how the facts are contextualised and presented on each Wikipedia language project is part of the online encyclopaedia’s genome. This unpredictability and diversity manifests itself through bits and pieces of intentional and unintentional bias.
- Therefore, some bias is unavoidable. People who write and edit texts, especially in articles that deal with politically or socially sensitive topics, cannot completely escape their frame of reference in the pursuit of encyclopaedic ideals. However, bias is usually found, discussed and ultimately corrected by the Wikipedia volunteer communities. Types of bias systematically appearing in hundreds of different articles, most of which cover the topics that matter in the internal and regional political arena, is a worrying indicator. *When this bias is structured in a way that corresponds to a specific political agenda, the article corpus ceases to be an NPOV presentation of facts. If a large quantity of these articles stays online long enough, the picture they form together becomes a part of an organised disinformation campaign.*

ATTENTION AND EXPOSURE

“Regrettably, we must warn Croatian students and pupils that much of the content on Croatian version of Wikipedia is not only dubious but also evidently falsified.”

Željko Jovanović, Croatian Minister of Education and Science; September 13, 2013⁹⁸

Human societies vitally depend and rely on a shared perception of what is factual truth and reality. Shared beliefs are crucial for people’s interaction with the world and with other people. In fact, they can be described as a glue that not only keeps societies together but each individual’s psychological integrity.⁹⁹

- Wikipedia strives to be a fact-based, NPOV collection of human knowledge available in any language. It cultivates the reputation of #1 reality check for billions of Internet users who rely on its encyclopaedic accuracy and perceived neutrality as an antidote for fake news and ideologically motivated disinformation. Accuracy and neutrality are achieved through the community self-governance that underpins the process of Wikipedia’s editorial consensus.

⁹⁸ News story (in Croatian) “Jovanovic: Do not use Croatian Wikipedia, children; the content there is falsified”: [Jovanović: Djeco, ne baratajte hrvatskom Wikipedijom jer su sadržaji falsificirani](#)

⁹⁹ E. Tory Higgins, Maya Rossignac-Milon, Gerald Echterhoff. Shared Reality: From Sharing-Is-Believing to Merging Minds; [Current Directions in Psychological Science - Volume 30, Number 2, Apr 01, 2021](#)

- Reflecting this reputation for factual accuracy, information from the introductory part of a Wikipedia article is fed directly into Google’s Knowledge Panel, an info box that appears on the top of the list of search results. In that sense, an introductory part of any Wikipedia article is by far the most desirable target for any manipulation of facts. This is important because any present-day analysis of disinformation has to factor in the fact that a large number of visitors only skim through the content and rarely get past the leading paragraph.¹⁰⁰ Consequently, many people – especially young – tend to form their opinions on tidbits of information coming from what they see as authoritative and trustworthy sources - like Wikipedia. And in Wikipedia’s case, most notably the article entries. But young people, mostly high-school and university students, are also the ones who most often read and explore Wikipedia beyond article entries.

A growing body of academic research has confirmed that they are indeed increasingly relying on Wikipedia to find information relevant for their assignments.¹⁰¹ One such survey, conducted in 2015 by the University of Osijek, Croatia, found that 54% of undergraduates regularly use Wikipedia as an educational tool.¹⁰² It is only reasonable to assume that the percentage has grown significantly meanwhile.

In that sense, the fact that nationalist bias and disinformation discovered on Croatian language Wikipedia had been influencing the public discourse for such a long time is probably one of the most serious consequences of the project capture.

Disinformation creates confusion.

- Emulating neutrality by providing equal weight or giving platform to all competing claims - especially in topics and cases where there is already a scholarly consensus about the veracity of facts - can only result in emotionally taxing confusion which leads to distrust and undermines the shared perception of factual truths.

To paraphrase Hannah Arendt’s remark¹⁰³ about falsehoods, the objective of what today is referred to as disinformation and falsehood is not to make people believe in them but to make them equally acceptable as the factual truths.¹⁰⁴

- A survey of political literacy among Croatian high-school seniors is an illustrative example showing how long-term exposure to teaching the controversy can result in confusion. Consecutive surveys, conducted in 2009, 2015 and 2021, have shown that more than half of the respondents were not sure if the NDH was a fascist state (48.5% in 2015, 53% in 2021,

¹⁰⁰ According to Alexa rankings, the average daily time spent on Wikipedia.org in 2021 is 3:46.

¹⁰¹ [Students' use of Wikipedia as an academic resource — Patterns of use and perceptions of usefulness](#)

¹⁰² [Sanjica Faletar Tanacković, Anja Đurđević, Boris Badurin. Wikipedija u akademskom okruženju: stavovi i iskustva studenata i nastavnika](#); Faculty of Philosophy, University of Osijek, Croatia; 2015. Libellarium, issue 2, Vol 8, pp. 161-199

¹⁰³ “If everybody always lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies, but rather that nobody believes anything any longer.” Hannah Arendt, Truth and Politics; an essay published in The New Yorker Magazine, February 17, 1967. <http://archives.newyorker.com/?i=1967-02-25#folio=048>

¹⁰⁴ Factual truth, as defined by Hannah Arendt in her 1967 essay “Truth and Politics”: “The hallmark of factual truth is that its opposite is neither error, nor illusion, nor opinion, no one of which reflects upon personal truthfulness, but the deliberate falsehood or lie.” The New Yorker, February 25, 1967 P. 49

respectively).¹⁰⁵ The results have consistently detected significant and increasing confusion among respondents, even when it comes to factual truths confirmed by broad scholarly consensus.¹⁰⁶ While such a high level of uncertainty is a reflection of socio-political polarisation in the Croatian society, it can also be attributed to the impact of disinformation and conspiracy theories that have been circulating in the public discourse for years.

	2015 Agree	2015 Neither agree nor disagree	2021 Agree	2021 Neither agree nor disagree
The NDH was a fascist creation	28.5%	48.6%	31.3%	53%
The EU decision-making endangers Croatia's sovereignty	23%	46%	-	-
Ustaše fought for Croatian national interests	-	-	30.1%	43.6%

The surveys are not directly related to anything written on Croatian language Wikipedia, and Hr.WP was by no means neither only nor the main source of radical right narratives in the period covered by the surveys. However, taken together, the studies clearly demonstrate the connection between confusion and disinformation.

In the author's opinion, these findings - though not causally related - appear to point to same conclusions: a) the full realignment of Croatian language Wikipedia is important not only for its own community but for the wider society that increasingly relies on its factual accuracy and neutrality in the process of constructing shared perception of reality and b) when a universally trusted source promotes historical revisionism side by side with scientifically confirmed facts, it can and will contribute to the generalised feeling of confusion and uncertainty.

EMOTIONAL TOLL

- Disinformation is defined as false or misleading information spread *with an intention* to deceive.¹⁰⁷ However, this definition tends to ignore one of the key aspects of the phenomena and one of its most important objectives: the negative emotional response of the recipient. The point of disinformation is to elicit a strong emotion – the feeling of outrage, despair, or helplessness – and a sense of belonging to a distinct group.¹⁰⁸ It is also *the fuel that powers conspiracy theories*.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ The surveys were jointly conducted by Croatian pro-democracy group GONG, Zagreb Institute for Social Research, University in Zagreb and Rijeka, Croatia, and the Centre for Southeast European Studies at the University of Graz, Austria

¹⁰⁶ Full results available at GONG website (in Croatian) [Politička pismenost učenika ca završnih razreda srednjih škola](#)

¹⁰⁷ [DISINFORMATION | meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary](#)

¹⁰⁸ Kate Starbird. Disinformation as collaborative work: Surfacing the participatory nature of strategic information operations. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction. 2019.

¹⁰⁹ Viren Swami, Martin Voracek, Stefan Stieger, Ulrich S Tran, Adrian Furnham; Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories. Randomized control trial; <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/25217762/>

- Disinformation and conspiracy theories share two important characteristics: they are *emotional*, given that they are caused by negative emotions and not rational deliberations, and they are *social*, given that they are closely associated with psychological motivations powering the conflict with the Other.¹¹⁰
- Disinformation is almost always contextualised and framed to obscure analytical thinking and avoid deconstruction by triggering an emotional reaction.
- Recent history has repeatedly shown that conspiracy theories and disinformation that fuel them can undermine even advanced democracies. However, it is important to note that post-conflict societies and those burdened with systemic corruption are significantly more vulnerable to their toxic influence.
- Disinformation narratives observed in a number of Croatian and Serbian language Wikipedia articles reviewed during the course of this evaluation appear to resonate not only with messages of political parties and ultra-conservative pressure groups colloquially referred to as the radical right, but also with popular conspiracy theories and *conspiracy mentality*.¹¹¹

MEDIA ATTENTION

“If the Croatian Wikipedia states that the Poles committed genocide against the Germans, who then attacked Poland to prevent further extermination of their ethnic kin, and that that was how World War II broke out, then it can no longer be a matter of the freedom of speech.”

Miljenko Jergović, Jutarnji list. Opinion piece, published on March 27, 2018 ^{112 113}

- The “Curious Case of Croatian Wikipedia”¹¹⁴ has been the subject of intense scrutiny by media outlets operating in the Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian-speaking regions. News stories, opinion and analytical pieces, published in Croatian and Bosnian mainstream press between 2012 and 2019, pointed at various instances of historical negationism¹¹⁵, nationalist bias and/or disinformation present all over Croatian language Wikipedia.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁰ Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Karen M. Douglas, Belief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging research domain; European Journal of Social Psychology, August 2018

¹¹¹ Boban Petrović, Janko Međedović, Olivera Radović, Sanja Radetić Lovrić, Conspiracy Mentality in Post-Conflict Societies: Relations With the Ethos of Conflict and Readiness for Reconciliation; Europe's Journal of Psychology 2019, Vol. 15(1), 59–81 <https://ejop.psychopen.eu/>

¹¹² Hr.WP article on Gdansk, Poland (from 2018): [Gdanjsk](#)

¹¹³ [NAZI WIKIPEDIA I HITLEROV NAPAD NA POLJSKU Kako je moguće da se u hrv. Wikipediji nađe teza da je Hitler Poljsku napao zbog genocida nad Nijemcima](#) (Jutarnji list (in Croatian): “How on Earth Croatian Wikipedia managed to claim that Hitler had attacked Poland over the genocide against Germans”)

¹¹⁴ A reference to an opinion piece discussing problems on Hr.WP published on Wikipedia Signpost. [Wikipedia Signpost - OPINION The Curious Case of Croatian Wikipedia](#)

¹¹⁵ [Historical negationism - Wikipedia](#)

¹¹⁶ Jutarnji list (in Croatian): ['NDH NIJE BILA TOTALITARNA, A ŽRTVE U JASENOVCU POBILI SU PARTIZANI' Desničari preuzeli uređivanje hrvatske Wikipedije](#)

In a clear reference to numerous articles which attempted to whitewash the role of the NDH, Croatia's Nazi puppet-state,¹¹⁷ the local Wikipedia project was described as "Nazi Wikipedia", or "NDH-pedia"¹¹⁸.

The reports in Croatian and regional mainstream press left little doubt that the situation on Hr.WP was inflicting serious reputational damage to Wikipedia. They also criticised the Foundation for not taking decisive action.

In 2013, media reports prompted the then minister of science and education to warn students and schoolchildren against using the Croatian version of the online encyclopaedia.

- On the other hand, outlets close to radical right political groups fiercely defended historical revisionism and right-wing narratives presented in some of the most disputed articles on Croatian language Wikipedia. They argued that disputed articles had revealed facts deliberately hidden from the public and offered a unique perspective of Croatia's long struggle for independence.
- In 2021, the mainstream press widely reported that the Croatian language project has begun to rebuild itself and that new versions of important articles no longer contain revisionist narratives.¹¹⁹
¹²⁰ The right-wing portals also reported about the recent changes, branding them a censorship and the return of [Titoism](#).^{121 122}

¹¹⁷ Balkan Insight: [How Croatian Wikipedia Made a Concentration Camp Disappear](#)

¹¹⁸ [Endehapedia](#) (Article in Croatian: "The NDH-pedia")

¹¹⁹ Jutarnji list (in Croatian) "The fall of Kubura: He received a global ban and his allies, now rudderless, are now withdrawing [Kuburin pad: Dobio je globalnu blokadu, a njegovi se sljedbenici, sada bez vođe, povlače](#)

¹²⁰ Index.hr (in Croatian): Croatian Wikipedia finally stops being an Ustase disgrace [\[Index\] "Hrvatska Wikipedija konačno prestaje biti ustaško ruglo"](#)

¹²¹ <https://www.hkv.hr/vijesti/jugo-ostavtina/35829-hrvatsku-wikipediju-preuzela-grupa-disidenata.html> (HKV: (in Croatian) The New Wikipedia: Tito, the Statesman; Pavelić, the Dictator

¹²² <https://narod.hr/svijet/suosnivac-wikipedije-pokrece-alternativnu-platformu-zbog-njenog-ostrog-skretanja-ulijevo> (Narod.hr: (in Croatian) Wikipedia's Co-founder to Launch an Alternative Platform to Counter the Encyclopaedia's Leftist Bias)

CROATIA AND YUGOSLAVIA; A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The following historical overview is meant solely to contextualise important narratives that appear in articles on Croatian language Wikipedia whose factual accuracy and neutrality was disputed during this evaluation, in numerous well-documented incidents reported on RfC discussions, and in the media. Historical events mentioned in this overview were selected for their notability and relevance, and were largely determined by the topics of Hr.WP articles reviewed for the purpose of this report.

- The Republic of Croatia is a country in South-Eastern Europe on the east coast of the Adriatic Sea. Its history was often turbulent and marked by the quest for regaining long-lost independence. Croatia went from being an independent kingdom to part of the Habsburg and Austro-Hungarian Empire and one of the founders of the [Kingdom of Yugoslavia](#) and the communist-led [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia \(SFRJ\)](#). It gained independence in 1991 through secession from SFRJ and the subsequent 1991-1995 war of independence.
- From the very inception, the ill-fated Kingdom of Yugoslavia, formed after the Great War (1914-1918), had been ravaged by political instability brought by opposing vectors of influence where the Serbian political elite's vision of unitary state clashed with Croatia's quest for broader political and territorial autonomy.
- Undermined by weak institutions and the authoritarian power of the Serbian royal dynasty, the Kingdom's dysfunctional parliamentary democracy was unable to produce a sustainable political solution for the opposing nationalisms. By 1929, the country descended into a formal¹²³ dictatorship. The subsequent assassination of the Yugoslav King by extreme nationalists in 1934,¹²⁴ in which Ustaše played an important role, had thwarted democratic reforms and further fanned the flames of nationalist separatism. When the Axis invaded in 1941, the country was already a tinderbox.
- The same fundamental conflict between the competing ethnic nationalisms, and the similar lack of democratic instruments to resolve it, will become the harbinger of death for the post-WWII Yugoslav Federation, which broke up in 1991, after a series of catastrophic failures to reinvent itself as a democratic multi-ethnic state resulted in a tragic civil war whose consequences still reverberate across the region.
- Following the Axis invasion, Ustaše, a fascist organisation led by Ante Pavelić, proclaimed an Independent State of Croatia (NDH) – a Nazi puppet-state propped up by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.
- The question of the short-lived entity's independence and its position in national history has turned into one of the most divisive issues in modern Croatian society. Attempts to reframe it as an authentic part of Croatia's long quest for independence represent an essential part of the myths and conspiracy theories propagated by the radical right.^{125 126}

¹²³ [6 January Dictatorship](#)

¹²⁴ [Yugoslav regency](#)

¹²⁵ David Bruce Macdonald. *Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia*. Manchester University Press 2002. pp. 138-145

¹²⁶ Nebojša Blanuša; *Internal Memory Divided: Conspiratorial Thinking, Ideological and Historical Cleavages in Croatia. Lessons for Europe*; Faculty of Political Science University of Zagreb Croatia.

- The semi-autonomous statelet operated a network of concentration camps in which it systematically executed more than one hundred thousand of its citizens – Jews, Serbs, Roma, and political opponents. It was, according to contemporary historians, one of the 20th Century's most murderous regimes.¹²⁷
- The anti-fascist resistance movement led to the creation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), a multi-ethnic federation ruled by the Communist Party and Josip Broz Tito, the country's lifetime President. Croatia was one of the founders of SFRJ and one of its six federal units. This anti-fascist legacy is explicitly recognised in the Croatian Constitution as one of the cornerstones of the country's independence.
- Croatia declared independence in 1991, after formal secession from the SFRJ. The act was opposed by ethnic Serbs, whose forces, backed by the regime of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia, used the firepower of Yugoslav Army to carve out territory and establish a [self-proclaimed statelet](#). Croatia's war of independence ended in 1995 after two military operations^{128, 129} had effectively re-established the country's sovereignty.
- The war in Croatia claimed 22,000 lives, exiled and displaced hundreds of thousands of people, and ruined the economy.¹³⁰ The UN war crimes tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) returned a series of verdicts against senior Serb military and political officials for crimes against humanity committed during the conflict. The ICTY investigated and transferred to the local judiciary several high-profile cases against Croatian political and military officials. Croatian military commanders, who were in charge of operations that ended the war, had been investigated and tried by the ICTY, and ultimately acquitted. The 1991-95 war is often the subject of nationalist interpretation and still causes political friction between Serbia and Croatia.
- From the first multi-party elections, held in 1991, Croatian political scene has been dominated by the powerful centre-right and nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). The party, which partly originates from the anti-communist and Catholic conservative Croatian diaspora, has held the position of Prime Minister in 10 out of 12 governments since 1991. Thanks to its traditionally strong gravitational pull, which co-opted both moderate conservatives and hardline nationalists, HDZ was able to withstand electoral challenges and reduce the impact of the emerging populist right. Between 2012 and 2014, the party itself and number of its senior officials, including a former Prime Minister, have been tried and ultimately convicted for high-level corruption¹³¹.
- However, despite setbacks and problems with systemic corruption and media freedoms, as described in the reports of international watchdogs¹³² and European institutions (levels of corruption and press freedom are better than in the region of former Yugoslavia, but worse than in advanced European democracies), Croatia is today a consolidated democracy with a dynamic political scene, strong civil society and state administration capable of organising free, fair and competitive elections. In 2009, Croatia joined NATO, and in 2013 it became the 28th member of the European Union.

¹²⁷ Historian Stanley G. Payne claimed that direct and indirect executions by NDH regime were an "extraordinary mass crime", which in proportionate terms exceeded any other European regime beside Hitler's Third Reich. [Independent State of Croatia](#)

¹²⁸ [Operation Flash](#)

¹²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Storm

¹³⁰ Yugoslav Wars. (Casualties in Croatian war)

¹³¹ [Former Croatia PM Ivo Sanader convicted of corruption](#)

¹³² [Croatia: Freedom in the World 2019 Country Report](#)

Basic information in articles about convicted war criminals

EN

HR

SR

SH

FR

DE

ES

<p>Slobodan Praljak (...) was a Bosnian Croat general who served in the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council, an army of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, between 1992 and 1995. Praljak was found guilty of committing violations of the laws of war, crimes against humanity and breaches of the Geneva Conventions during the Croat–Bosniak War by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2017.</p>	<p>Slobodan Praljak (...) was a Croatian philosopher, sociologist, film director and military commander, lieutenant-general of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defense Council. He was the representative of the MOD of the Republic of Croatia in the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna and the Croatian Defense Council (HVO), and the HVO Chief of Staff in 1993. He was convicted by the International Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia. Slobodan Praljak interrupted the second-instance verdict by drinking a bottle of poison in the courtroom of the Hague war crimes tribunal, shouting that he was not guilty.</p>	<p>Slobodan Praljak (...) was a Croatian film director, politician, military officer and convicted war criminal, known for serving as a Croatian Army general in the war in Croatia, and then as a general of Croatian Defence Council (HVO) in the Bosniak-Croat conflict, when forces under his command demolished the Old Bridge in Mostar in 1993.</p>	<p>Slobodan Praljak (...) was a Croatian film director, politician, military officer and convicted war criminal, known for serving as a Croatian Army general in the war in Croatia, and then as a general of Croatian Defence Council (HVO) in the Bosniak-Croat conflict, when forces under his command demolished the Old Bridge in Mostar in 1993.</p>	<p>Slobodan Praljak, (...) was a Bosnian Croat writer, director, officer and politician. He was convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. He committed suicide at the statement of the verdict, confirming his conviction on appeal.</p>	<p>Slobodan Praljak (...) was a Croatian director and military leader during the Croatian and Bosnian wars. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) charged him with involvement in several war crimes during his time as General of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO). In 2004 he stood before the court, and in 2013 and 2017 was sentenced as a war criminal in the first and second instance to 20 years imprisonment, which he avoided by committing public suicide in the courtroom.</p>	<p>Slobodan Praljak (...) was a Bosnian-Croat politician, engineer and military officer who rose to prominence during the Bosnian War, part of the Yugoslav Wars. He was one of the six defendants indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in connection with war crimes committed in the jurisdiction of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. He committed suicide by ingesting cyanide during the session in which the court upheld his sentence to 20 years in prison.</p>
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Bruno Stojić (...) is a Bosnian Croat politician **convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)**. His trial, joined with five co-accused Bosnian-Croat politicians active in the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia wartime entity, ended with him being found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Bruno Stojić (...), Croatian politician from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1992, Mate Boban appointed him commander of the HVO defence headquarters. In 1993, he was transferred to the Office for the Production of Weapons and Military Equipment.

N/A

N/A

N/A

Bruno Stojić (...) is a Bosnian Croat politician. During the Bosnian war, he held a senior political position of Defense Minister in the self-proclaimed Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. **After the war, together with other leaders of the entity, he was charged by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia with various war crimes, including crimes against humanity, and sentenced in 2013 to 20 years in prison.**

<p>Tihomir Blaškić (...) is a retired general of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) who served during the Bosnian War and the Croat–Bosniak War. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted him on war crimes charges, and in 2000 he was sentenced to 45 years of prison. In July 2004, the ICTY, on appeal, determined that his command responsibility for most of the charges was non-existent, and his sentence was lessened to nine years imprisonment.</p>	<p>Tihomir Blaškić (...) is a former general of the Croatian Defence Council (before the war, he was an officer in the Yugoslav Army (JNA)). He graduated in 1983 and received his MA in 2008 from the Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing in Zagreb. He was a captain in the JNA. He left the JNA on August 12, 1991 at the beginning of Serb aggression on the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and joined the HV and HVO. On June 27, 1992, he was appointed HVO commander in the Central Bosnia Operational Zone. He had the rank of colonel.</p>	<p>Tihomir Blaškić, also known as Tihofil, (...) was the chief of staff of the HVO in Mostar, and for crimes committed during the war in BiH, the Hague Tribunal sentenced to several years in prison.</p>	<p>Tihomir Blaškić (...) General of the Croatian Defense Council (pre-war officer in the JNA). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sentenced him to nine years in prison for war crimes in the Lasva Valley during the Croat-Bosniak conflict.</p>	<p>Tihomir Blaškić (...) is a former Croat general from Bosnia and Herzegovina convicted of war crimes. He was the commander of the Croatian forces in central Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1994, and specifically during the conflict between the Croats and Bosniaks. In 1994 he became general and, in 1995, inspector at the General Inspectorate of the Army of the Republic of Croatia (HV).</p>	<p>Tihomir Blaškić (...) was commander (from 1994 general) of the Croatian Defense Council HVO from 1992 to 1995.</p> <p>Blaškić commanded the HVO in the Lašva Valley in central Bosnia, mainly inhabited by Bosniaks and Croats. Between May 1992 and January 1993, tensions between the two communities increased. In April 1993, Croatian armed forces, headed by Blaškić attacked various Bosniak communities in the valley.</p>	<p>Tihomir Blaškić (born November 2, 1960, in Kiseljak, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia) was a Bosnian-Croat army officer of the Croatian Defense Council, convicted of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.</p>
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Ratko Mladić (...) is a convicted war criminal and a Bosnian Serb colonel-general who led the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) during the Yugoslav Wars. In 2017, he was found guilty of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Ratko Mladić (...) is a convicted war criminal, who commanded the Yugoslav forces in Croatia, and later the Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. The Zadar County Court sentenced him in absentia to 20 years in prison for war crimes. On May 26, 2011, he was arrested in the village of Lazarevo near Zrenjanin.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia sentenced Ratko Mladić to life in prison, genocide (two accounts), crimes against humanity (five accounts) and war crimes (four accounts) in a first-instance verdict on November 22 2017, which he committed in the capacity of the highest-ranking general in the Army of the Republika

Ratko Mladić (...) is a Serb general, chief of the General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska (1992-1995) and one of the Serb leaders during the breakup of Yugoslavia. During the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, he commanded a series of key military operations.

Mladić's first assignment was with Skopje garrison of the Third Army District on September 27, 1965, where he commanded the platoon of the 89th Infantry Regiment with the rank of lieutenant. He received the rank of lieutenant colonel on December 25, 1980, in the Operational Teaching Department in the Skopje garrison command. He was then appointed commander of the 39th Infantry Brigade in Stip.

Ratko Mladić (...) Yugoslav and Bosnian general. From 1991 to 1995, he played an important role in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the latter, he was the commander of the Army of the Republika Srpska in BiH.

The ICTY has charged him with responsibility for the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, as well as other war crimes between 1992 and 1995, for which he was sentenced to life in prison on November 22 2017. [2] He was on the run from 1995 to 2011.

Ratko Mladić (...) was the commander-in-chief of the Army of the Bosnian Serb Republic (VRS) during the 1992-95 war in Bosnia. He is called by the media "the butcher of the Balkans".

On May 26, 2011, after fifteen years on the run, he was arrested in Lazarevo (Vojvodina, Serbia), by the Serbian police. He was extradited to The Hague five days later to appear before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; his arrest was a precondition for Serbia's EU integration. He was sentenced to life imprisonment by the ICTY on November 22, 2017, convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war.

Ratko Mladić (...) is a former Bosnian-Serb general and convicted war criminal who acted as Commander-in-Chief of Vojska Republike Srpske from 1992 to 1996.

He is charged with numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Bosnian War, including the nearly four-year siege of Sarajevo and the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, in which more than 8,000 Bosnian men and young people were murdered. Mladić had been charged with the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) since 1995, accusing him of the genocide of the Bosniaks planned jointly with Radovan Karadžić.

Ratko Mladić (...) is the former Chief of Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) during the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995.

Born during the Second World War, he was raised in an atmosphere of war and nationalist sentiment. A man with a strong personality, influenced by the murder of his father during the world conflict and the suicide of his 23-year-old daughter in 1994, he joined very young the Yugoslav People's Army, and his career in it was meteoric.

In 1996, along with other Bosnian Serb leaders, he was charged with war crimes and genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, for the siege of Sarajevo,

Srpska and for the purpose of creating the Republika Srpska.

in which more than 10,000 people died, and for the Srebrenica massacre, in which more than 7,000 Bosnian men and boys were killed on July 11, 1995, in Srebrenica, the largest mass murder case in Europe since World War II.

Appendix

1. Register of Meta RfCs reviewed in the course of this assessment

1. [Requests for comment/Croatian Wikipedia - User Suradnik13 - blocking and deleting - Meta](#) (2008)
2. [Requests for comment/Croatian Wikipedia - User: Dalibor Bosits case - Meta](#) (2009)
3. [Requests for comment/Croatian Wikipedia-misuse of admin tools by User:Kubura - Meta](#) (2010)
4. [Requests for comment/2013 issues on Croatian Wikipedia - Meta](#) (2013)
5. [Requests for comment/2013 issues on Croatian Wikipedia/Evidence - Meta](#) (2013)
6. [Requests for comment/2013 issues on Croatian Wikipedia/Evidence/Content - Meta](#) (2013)
7. [Requests for comment/2013 issues on Croatian Wikipedia/Evidence/Conduct - Meta](#) (2013)
8. [Requests for comment/Hard line nationalism on the Croatian Wikipedia - Meta](#) (2015)
9. [Requests for comment/Administrator abuse on the Croatian Wikipedia - Meta](#) (2016)
10. [Requests for comment/Consistency and bias across different language Wikipedias \(Holocaust example\) - Meta](#) (2017)
11. [Requests for comment/Site-wide administrator abuse and WP:PILLARS violations on the Croatian Wikipedia - Meta](#) (2019)
12. https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Requests_for_comment/Global_ban_for_Kubura (2020)
13. [Wikipedija:Arbitražni odbor](#) (Second Hr.WP ArbCom)

2. List of articles reviewed in the course of this assessment

Notes:

- All links point to the current versions of the Hr.WP articles, unless specified otherwise.
- Each reviewed article was comparatively analysed for changes in content across the timeline covering the period between January 2013 and April 2021. Each article was also compared with its corresponding versions in English, French, Spanish, German, Serbo-Croatian, Serbian, and Bosnian (where available).
- Recent changes in the Hr.WP community have resulted in deletions of some of the articles reviewed throughout the course of this evaluation.

WWII-Related	Notes
1. Nezavisna drzava Hrvatska	Independent State of Croatia
2. Vlada Nezavisne Države Hrvatske – Wikipedija	The government of NDH

3.	Ante Pavelić – Wikipedija	
4.	Ustaška nadzorna služba – Wikipedija	Ustaša police
5.	Ustaška obrana – Wikipedija	Croatian only; A service in charge of concentration camps
6.	Oružništvo (NDH) (Ver. 2020)	Ustaša military
7.	Crna Legija (Ver. 2020)	An Ustaša paramilitary unit
8.	Ustaški sabirni logori – Wikipedija	Ustaša concentration camps
9.	Sabirni logor Stara Gradiška (Ver. 2020)	
10.	Koncentracijski logor Jasenovac (Ver. 2020)	
11.	Mile Budak – Wikipedija	
12.	Andrija Artuković – Wikipedija	
13.	Eugen Dido Kvaternik – Wikipedija	
14.	Ivo Rojnica (Ver. 2020)	
15.	Dinko Šakić (Ver. 2020)	
16.	Rafael Boban (Ver. 2019)	
17.	Miroslav Filipović (Ver. 2021)	
18.	Jure Francetić (Ver. 2019)	
19.	Josip Frank (Ver. 2020)	Croatian politician (late 19 th /early 20 th Century)
20.	Ustaške djevojke	Croatian only; Ustaša Girls
21.	Ženska loza ustaškog pokreta	Croatian only; Ustaša women organisation
22.	Hrvatski narodni otpor	Ustaša organization founded in 1955 in Spain
23.	Miro Barešić (Ver. 2020)	Croatian emigree; convicted of terrorism
24.	Rudolf Prskalo – Wikipedija	
25.	Bleiburška tragedija (Ver. 2020)	Bleiburg repatriations
26.	Svibanjska katastrofa (Ver. 2021)	Croatian only; May Catastrophe, the fall of the NDH
27.	Pokolj na Kočevskom Rogu – Wikipedija	A site of post-WWII mass execution

28.	Hrvatski hercegovački Blajburg	Croatian only; A site of post-WWII mass execution
29.	Križni put (1945.)	Croatian only; “Way of the Cross”, a story of the post-WWII execution of civilians and quisling forces in Yugoslavia
30.	Ante Beljo – Wikipedija	
31.	Srbi u NDH (Ver. 2020)	Croatian only; Serbs in the NDH
32.	Srbi u NDH: Broj žrtava (Ver. 2020; Serb casualties in the NDH)	EN, FR, DE, ES, SR have a separate article – “Genocide against Serbs in the NDH”
33.	Holokaust u NDH (Ver. 2020)	
34.	Christophe Dolbeau	French amateur historian
35.	Društvo za istraživanje trostrukog logora Jasenovac	Croatian only; Jasenovac-doubter association
36.	Jasenovački mit	Croatian only; The Myth of Jasenovac
37.	Igor Vukić – Wikipedija	Croatian journalist; Jasenovac denialist
38.	Ante Periša – Wikipedija	Croatian philosopher; member of Jasenovac-doubter association
39.	Stjepan Razum (Ver. 2019)	Leader of Jasenovac-doubter association
40.	Roman Leljak (Ver. 2019)	Slovenian author, researcher of communist-era crimes
41.	Huda Jama	A village in Slovenia and the site of a mass grave of victims executed immediately after the WWII)
42.	Hrvatski oslobodilački pokret (Ver. 2020; Croatian Liberation Movement)	HOP is an official successor of Ustaša movement
43.	Hrvatska (Buenos Aires) ()	Croatian diaspora magazine (Argentina)
44.	Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Toronto)	NDH; Croatian diaspora magazine (Canada)
45.	Ivan Alilović (Ver. 2020)	Croatian literature historian; current leader of the radical-right HOP
Yugoslavia-related		Notes
46.	Josip Broz Tito – Wikipedija	

47.	Jugokomunistička propaganda	(Article deleted in April 2021)
48.	Jugoslavenski komunistički zločini nakon završetka Drugog svjetskog rata (Ver. 2020)	Yugoslav Communist crimes after WWII
49.	Titoizam (Ver. 2020)	Titoism
50.	Jugokomunizam – Wikipedija	Yugo-Communism
51.	Narodnooslobodilačka vojska i partizanski odredi Jugoslavije – Wikipedija	Yugoslav Partisans
War in Yugoslavia		Notes
52.	Pokolj u Lovasu	War crime against Croatian civilians during the 1991-95 war
53.	Mostar – Wikipedija	
54.	Stari most u Mostaru (Ver. 2020);	The Old Bridge in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina
55.	Bošnjačko-hrvatski sukob: Dolina Lašve (Ver. 2020)	Only in Croatian; Articles in other languages refer to Lašva Valley ethnic cleansing)
56.	Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna – Wikipedija	Bosnian Croat statelet
57.	Vitez (BiH) – Wikipedija	Bosnian toponym
58.	Široki Brijeg – Wikipedija	Bosnian toponym
59.	Ljubuški – Wikipedija	Bosnian toponym
60.	Bosanskohercegovački Hrvati u ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini – Wikipedija (Only in Croatian)	Bosnian Croats in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
61.	Bošnjačko-hrvatski sukob – Wikipedija	Croatian-Bosniak conflict
62.	Logor Dretelj – Wikipedija	A Croat-controlled concentration camp (War in Bosnia)
63.	Hrvatske obrambene snage – Wikipedija	A Croatian paramilitary unit
64.	IX. bojna "Rafael vitez Boban" – Wikipedija	A Croatian paramilitary unit
65.	Pokolj u Ahmićima – Wikipedija	War crime in Bosnia
66.	Pokolj u Gospiću	War crime in Croatia
67.	Pokolj u Tovarniku 22. rujna 1991. – Wikipedija (wikipedia.org)	War crime in Croatia
68.	Масакр у Сребреници — Википедија (Sr.WP)	Srebrenica massacre

69.	Operacija Lukavac 93 (Sr.WP article)	Bosnian Serb military operation
70.	Operacija Krivaja (Sr.WP article)	The siege of Srebrenica
71.	Lov na Gotovinu	Croatian documentary film
72.	Bruno Stojić – Wikipedija	ICTY convict
73.	Tihomir Blaškić (Ver. 2020)	ICTY convict
74.	Dario Kordić	ICTY convict
75.	Jadranko Prlić	ICTY convict
76.	Milivoj Petković	ICTY convict
77.	Mladen Naletilić Tuta (Ver. 2020)	ICTY convict
78.	Slobodan Praljak (Ver. 2020)	ICTY convict
79.	Valentin Ćorić (Ver. 2020)	ICTY convict
80.	Dragoljub Ojdanić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
81.	Duško Tadić (Hr.WP article)	ICTY convict
82.	Goran Jelisić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
83.	Ljubisa Beara (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
84.	Milan Lukić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
85.	Milan Martić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
86.	Milan Babić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
87.	Mile Mrkšić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
88.	Milomir Stakić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
89.	Momčilo Krajišnik (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
90.	Nebojša Pavković (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
91.	Nikola Šainović (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
92.	Radislav Krstić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
93.	Radoslav Brdjanin (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
94.	Radovan Karadžić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
95.	Ratko Mladić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
96.	Sredoje Lukić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict

97.	Sreten Lukić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
98.	Stanislav Galić (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
99.	Stojan Župljanin (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
100.	Veselin Šljivančanin (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
101.	Vinko Pandurević (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
102.	Vojislav Šešelj (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
103.	Vujadin Popović (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
104.	Zdravko Tolimir (Sr.WP article)	ICTY convict
Other right-wing / nationalist topics		Notes
105.	Hrvatska šutnja (Ver. 2020)	Croatian Silence
106.	Hrvatska stranka prava (1919.)	Croatian Party of Rights
107.	Čista stranka prava – Wikipedija	Pure Party of Rights
108.	Stranka prava – Wikipedija	Party of Rights
109.	Ante Starčević – Wikipedija (Croatian politician)	Founder of the Croatian Party of Rights
110.	Hrvatsko kulturno vijeće – Wikipedija	HKV - Croatian Cultural Council
111.	Studia croatica – Wikipedija	Croatian diaspora magazine (Argentina)
112.	Hrvatski tjednik (Zagreb)	Croatian radical right magazine
113.	Hrvatsko nacionalno etičko sudište – Wikipedija	Croatian only; Croatian nationalist ethic tribunal
114.	Za dom – Wikipedija	Croatian WWII salutation
115.	Hrvatski istinski preporod – Wikipedija	Formerly a right-wing political party in Croatia
116.	Rashrvaćivanje (Ver. 2020)	Croatian only; De-Croatisation
117.	Detuđmanizacija – Wikipedija	Croatian only; De-Tudjmanisation
118.	Jugokomunizam – Wikipedija	Croatian only; Yugo-Communism
119.	Istospolna seksualnost (Same-sex sexuality)	Croatian only; Page deleted in May 2021)
120.	Homoseksualnost – Wikipedija	Homosexuality
121.	Istospolni brak – Wikipedija	Same-sex marriage

122. Pobačaj (Ver. 2020)	Abortion
123. Katolički pogled na pobačaj – Wikipedija	Catholic view on Abortion
124. Katolički pogled na kontracepciju – Wikipedija (Ver. 2013)	Croatian only; Catholic View on Contraception
125. Katolički pogled na umjetnu oplodnju	Croatian only; Catholic View on IVF
126. Antirodni pokret (Anti-gender Movement)	Ver. 2019 - Content from the article “Gender ideology”)
127. Dženderist – Wikipedija	“Genderist” (adj.)
128. Konvencija Vijeća Europe o sprečavanju i borbi protiv nasilja nad ženama i nasilja u obitelji – Wikipedija	Istanbul Convention
129. Vesna Pusić (Ver. 2019)	Croatian former Foreign Minister
130. Slavko Goldstein – Wikipedija	Croatian historian, politician and writer
131. Ivo Goldstein (Ver. 2021)	Croatian historian, author and ambassador
132. Dubravka Ugrešić (Ver. 2018)	Croatian author
133. Žarko Puhovski	Croatian author; political analyst
134. Propaganda (Ver. 2020)	
135. Dezinformacija (Sr.WP article)	
136. Gdanjsk	Hr.WP article about Gdansk, Poland; Ver. 2018
137. Antifašizam – Wikipedija	Anti-fascism
138. Komunizam (Ver. 2018)	Communism
139. Katoličanstvo u Hrvata Bosne i Hercegovine – Wikipedija	Christianity in Bosnian Croats
140. Europska migracijska kriza 2015. (Ver. 2020)	European Migrant Crisis
141. Aleksandar Vučić	
142. Velikosrpska ideologija (Ver. 2020)	Great-Serbian ideology
143. Holokaust (Ver. 2020)	
144. Hrvatski holokaust (Ver.2020)	Croatian only; Croatian Holocaust
145. Narodnooslobodilačka vojska i partizanski odredi Jugoslavije (Ver. 2020)	Yugoslav Partisans
146. Miljenko Jergović (Ver. 2020)	Croatian author and journalist

147. Ivica Đikić (Ver. 2020;)	Croatian author and journalist
148. Ante Tomić (novinar) (Ver. 2018)	Croatian journalist and screenwriter
149. Zlatko Hasanbegović (Ver. 2020)	Croatian right-wing politician
150. Bruna Esih	Croatian right-wing politician
151. U ime obitelji (Ver. 2020)	In the Name of the Family; Croatian Catholic-conservative movement)
152. Brak	Marriage
153. Brak u Hrvatskoj	Croatian only; Marriage in Croatia