

Hosetti, Wilhelm Vol. 8

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000

Stutt r Nachrichten
14 April 1953

*File in D-882
11 Apr 53
Jensen*

DECLASSIFIED
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
PL105-246

By: SLH Date: 4/18/2001

Der ehemalige SS-Offizier Wilhelm Hoell,
der im Zusammenhang mit einer Diplomatena-
abwehr in Salzburg verhaftet worden war,
ist wieder entlassen worden. (IT)

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Stuttgarter Nachrichten
8 April 1953

D-882

9 Apr 53

File

**Ehemaliger SS-Offizier
soll für den Osten spioniert haben**

WIEN (UP) — Amerikanische Polizei hat am Montag in Salzburg den ehemaligen SS-Offizier Wilhelm Höttl unter dem Verdacht der Spionage zugunsten der Sowjetunion verhaftet. Die Verhaftung erfolgte im Zusammenhang mit der Aufdeckung einer Spionagenetzwerke in Österreich und in Verbindung mit der Verhaftung der naturalisierten Amerikaner Kurt L. Ponger und Otto Verber, die bereits im Januar aus Wien nach den USA abtransportiert wurden, um dort vor Gericht gestellt zu werden. Wie aus österreichischer Quelle verlautet, hat Höttl in Verbindung mit Ponger und Verber gestanden. Höttl, der Verfasser des Buches „Die geheime Front“, wurde während der Nürnberger Kriegsverbrecherprozesse als Zeuge vernommen und soll damals mit Ponger bekanntgeworden sein, der in Nürnberg, als Dolmetscher fungierte.

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TO: SPEARHEAD, 12th ARMY GROUP

FROM: SCARS, MUNICH

RE: 036 REFERS.

- A. NO RECORD HABERMANN ARREST THIS AREA.
- B. SUGGEST SIMILARITY BETWEEN JAMES HABERMANN AND HABERMANN WHO A/T OPERATOR AND OTHER CREW HOTEL GROUP.
- C. HABERMANN STATES NO SIGNATURE ON HOTEL BOOK.
- D. INDENTS LAST RECEIVED MSG SENT 23 DAYS BEFORE AMERICANS ARRIVED HOTEL AREA TO SUBJECT STATING "IN CASE INTERRUPTION SHOULD OCCUR ALWAYS CAPABLE TO CALL."
- E. DAY AFTER AMERICANS ARRIVED HABERMANN AND HUBAVTECHNIK SENT MSG CONSISTING OF CALL SIGN AND ONE ENGLISH WORD "TEXT" IN CLEAR TO SUBJECT.
- F. ABOVE SENT WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OR PERMISSION OF HOTEL OR HUBAVTECHNIK.

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020005
RECEIVED ON 04 02 00 1951
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SALT

END

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HEADQUARTERS, TWELFTH ARMY
NO 655

23 May 45

SUBJECT: Radio equipment found in Hunting Lodge at STEINLIND, EC.

TO: CG, SGI, Twelfth Army Group.

Examination of the radio equipment used by Dr. HOFFER
Central at STEINLIND revealed nothing of outstanding interest. It
consisted of one standard 250 watt transmitter of Hungarian manu-
-facture covering a frequency band of 190-1950 Kcs. The antenna
-system between 15 and 16 meters in length. With this transmitter /
American Super Skyrider receiver is employed. The receiver is
model developed five or six years ago in Europe. The transmitter is
a relatively new model but of standard design. Both transmitter and
receiver are twin drivers, but can be operated from a generator
developing either 110 or 220 volts A.C. The transmitter set
included a second Hallicrafters Super Skyrider receiver, as well
as a built-in receiver and 100 watt transmitter, built by a Hungarian
mechanic about 3 months ago. All of this equipment is of the usual
sort and contains nothing new or unusual.

A third transmitter which had been placed in a truck for
transport was removed about 19 or 20 May by a man who identified
as a Hungarian major, and he presented a paper purporting to be authority
for the removal of the equipment to Hungary for use there by the
Hungarian Army.

The one item found which may prove to be of some real
interest was a cipher machine used by the Central for radio traffic
with Berlin. This machine is being turned over to the
Signal Intelligence of Hq., Twelfth Army Group.

All equipment found was inventoried and cataloged. The
radio station has been well constructed and equipped. It is capable
of immediate and continuing operation. Pending decisions as to the
disposition of this equipment, the room in which it is located has
been locked and sealed by the local CIC Detachment.

V. H. HOFFER
Capt. SGI
1: AG SGI/mtt

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TOP SECRET

D-887

26 May 1945

SUBJECT: HEUNTAUFEL, MENDEL, DEWORSKY, KLAUS, HENK WISSE
TO : Lt Flex

I supervised the above through M-R [initials] in their work on the question-naire submitted to them by you.

I believe that they have answered the questionnaire honestly and with no reservations.

Heuntaufel and Klaus seem to be the most knowledgeable and they were frequently consulted by the others.

SIGNED: W/S Martin

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Classification Canceled (or changed) to
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[Signature] by [Signature]
Date 12 Aug. 1952 GUY & WITCOMB
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NO. 23570

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b. Political reports on meetings of the cabinet, meetings between foreign diplomats and emissaries with Bulgarian officials on measures of political or economic nature planned by the Government, internal rearrangements of personnel.

V 20/17 had been specially charged to report on only to conversations of politicians and high ranking officers, as well as to turn in reports on public sentiment from all parts of the country (the latter were also furnished by V 20/07).

All told the Bulgaria referat employed between 40 and 50 agents referred to by numbers.

2. a. V 20/01 and V 20/02 maintained contact among themselves and with all agents.

Reports were rendered orally or in writing and transmitted to Amt VI by wireless (cipher) or by airmail (Luftansa).

3. Agents gathered information via their own connections or by using feeders (Zubringer).

Their connections extended into the Cabinet, Government, Ministry of War, Agrarians, Church, IARO, Democ. L., Volkshilfliche Front, national opposition and the Japanese Embassy (Amb. Major Yamaji).

4. Reports were excellent and comprehensive. The most prolific source was V 20/17; in his reports on personalities, however, he very often let himself be influenced by personal motives and ambition.

5. The net in Skoplje was run by V 20/16 who reported via the HB to Amt VI and who was given his mission either by Amt VI or the HB.

The net of the IARO was led by V 20/15 and sent its reports via the HB.

6. The HB's monthly budget amounted to approx 1 1/2 million Lira. Only V 20/17 and V 20/07 drew a fixed salary.

7. The question of a continuation of some under Allied supervision had never been broached.

8. -----

9. The old information net of the SD in Bulgaria has been radically destroyed. The chief agents and the He 10 do c, who had previously fled Bulgaria and went to Germany in September 1944, some of them taking with them those who stayed behind in Bulgaria have taken to the woods.

By virtue of its geographic position and the fact that the IARO, the importance of Bulgaria from a strategic point of view cannot be underestimated. The SD decided therefore to take on a reconstruction of the net outside the country.

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(I. 11a. Comment: The above statement has been reviewed on 11/11/51, and the desired contribution to the strictly technical question, under the best of circumstances, it throws into striking relief the desirability of the scheme. The desire to see us enrolled in the conflict, although in so far as preparing that the ostensible purpose of the radio installation, will be furnished with the existing facilities of an information net, will be silently by the board. Quid vidit it est utraque partes ut non p. routes).

JUGOSLAVIA

5. SOURCE: DR. HOTTEL

Just prior to Germany's capitulation new V/T operations had been started to feed V/T operators into Serbia via Croatia. Whether or not such an attempt succeeds or fails of these undertakings will result in a final picture can be drawn of existing intelligence facilities in Jugoslavia.

At the time Steyerling ceased operations in Jugoslavia, he was furnishing a direct line to the German General Franz Mihailovitch (D.M.), the main contact with the anti-Tito partisan groups and their fire constantly changing its position, and a wireless operator. The latter reported on political developments and combat actions of local interest, important in view of the fact that communications emanating from TITO's army (D.M. 1941) were cut off. The link to D.M. was politically expedient and directly served the purpose of establishing a supply route to the German Gov. agent. It is unlikely, HOTTEL believes, that this link is operative now that the main incentive has dropped away. It is further improbable that the V/T operators admitted by the P- will continue calling for any length of time after Steyerling's capture.

According to HOTTEL, the potential wireless contacts in Jugoslavia are considerable and increasing. Several groups (D.M. 1941) mostly with anti-Tito partisan bands, are in the process of activation but have not started sending yet. In addition there are several information agencies with units of the USTASCHA, Croatia, and not too much difficulty should be encountered calling them.

To what extent it will be possible to bring agents to Albania and Macedonia by land is doubtful. Two groups, one of which is composed of at least six V/T agents all equipped with sets, are en route to Albania. HOTTEL believes that assistance from the chiefs of certain Albanian tribes will be forthcoming as soon as the sets are sent, to start furnishing an information net in Albania. It is expected that agents in Macedonia. Not more than one or two sets of this kind will be needed for the job. A group of agents (insatated) is en route to Macedonia, composed of a German agent and the leader of the anti-Tito partisan movement.

27. SOURCE: SS-Hauptsturmführer Rupert H. 1941.
One of HOTTEL's colleagues in the P-11, SS-Untersturmführer VI
resident with SS-Leitstandort in Vienna until 1941.
Assigned to Amt VI P (technic) since 1942 where he is in charge
of agents.

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... group VI ... through technical missions (technische missionen), i.e. the ... devices to their destination of agents.

In addition he was given the task to organize an information net in the Yugoslav sector as a long-range ... Large scale operations were made by him from Belgrad and later from Agnes.

According to HOTEL he is a very gifted intelligence man and has expert knowledge of his assigned territory: Yugoslavia, Albania, Macedonia.

28. Answer to Questionnaire (see Annex I)

- a. GASPAREVIC, alias Gara de Borna ('Gara' in wireless messages), Serb
- b. 1.63 m, oval-shaped head, grey-blue eyes, dark-blond hair combed back.
- c. Vienna, later Serbia.
GASPAREVIC with a group of 60 men (Serbs) and a German liaison agent named SCHWARZ (alias 'Asat') from the Donau, had been fed into Serbia (East-Serbian) with the consent and after having been presented to General MIHAILOVITCH. General MIHAILOVITCH representative of General MIHAILOVITCH assisted in the move.
- d. To organize message centers especially in Belgrade and Nis, to report on all important or delicate military occurrences, to establish liaison to all areas in Serbia operating under the command of MIHAILOVITCH and to collect wherever important information they had, to establish liaison with the American and British intelligence services with a view to coordinating their work.
- e. Apr 1 month ago.
- f. MIHAILOVITCH movement, formerly Sjetlic (SFK).

2. All papers concerning cover-names etc have just lately been destroyed together with the other papers of VI ... reliability ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ that wireless ... has secured some of the papers.

3. Connections to political, economic and military circles through people he and his collaborators had.

4. He has reports on combat actions with partisans ... reports have been made with Genl MIHAILOVITCH. ... GASPAREVIC has a tendency to over-exaggerate.

5. 250 gold pieces (uncolored).

7. ... taken into account when he ... then specifically ordered to establish ... intelligence in Serbia and both he ...

Handwritten signature or initials at the bottom of the page.

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- 3. In view of his political antecedents he is reliable.
- 4. Wireless contact could be re-established via other lines. In that case an expansion would meet no obstacles.

- 29. 1. a. JAKUBEC, alias 'Janko', Banat-German.
- b. 1.70 m, oval-shaped head, dark hair and dark eyes, flushed face.
- c. Destination: Novi Sad and Belgrade.
- d. To organize message centers in the Banat and in Belgrade, to return, this time to be re-committed with W/T operators.
- e. Has not been heard of again.

4. All JAKUBEC was supposed to do was to arrange for the 'Anlaufstellen'.

7. Not informed.

8. Not possible. Uninformed about other groups.

9. Could be used as 'Anlaufstelle' in case he can be contacted again.

C. D. E. FROKLINIL - MIHAILOVITCH wireless link.

Preliminary arrangement agreed upon in contact between Ambassador MIHAILOVICH and GASPAROVIC. It was decided to contact the liaison work to STARKER (Stab Neubacher) and KLOPP (V). Pending final arrangements - KLOPP had to be brought back from San Jose - wireless contact was established.

2. a. Daily three times (morning, No and evening)

b. Language: French, international code.

c. Doppelkurzel-Vorfahren. - Detailed instructions possibly in the possession of wireless operator.

4. Reports on the military situation, requests for acquisition, clothing, rations, medical drugs.

1. 1. a. KLOPP alias 'Busko', Banat-German

b. 1.78 m, oval-shaped face, blue eyes, dark-blond hair, parted on the right.

c. Agent (Zagreb)

d. Liaison agent (Verbindungsführer) between MIHAILOVICH and STARKER.

.. Prior to leaving Zagreb for MIHAILOVICH had location trial-transmission.

and contact with MIHAILOVICH by the usual method and a wireless retreating from San Jose, including Army de... circuit present whereabouts of KLOPP unknown.

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- 32. FRANOZI alias 'Schill', Banat-born (Serb).
 - a. 1.35 m, black hair, dark-brown hair, round head.
 - c. Agram
 - d. Liaison agent (Verbindungsfuehrer) to HASANAGIC, Cemil, leader of the Moslems in Pribej (Sandzack).
- 3. HASANAGIC, Cemil, alias 'Hasan', Moslem, Sandzack
 - a. 1.98 m, black hair parted, black eyes, oval head.
 - c. Agram
 - d. To set up message centers in the Sandzack, to establish liaison with Albanian groups, in particular with BEJIF MAJUTA and BACAJ leaders of a resistance group in the vicinity of Novi-Pazar, to set up bases for the support of agents to be committed by him in the direction of Albania, collaboration with the USTASCHA (Croatia), concealing the German character of the act, co-operation with NIKALICWITCH movement, submerging differences between Moslems and Serbs.
 - e. Brief transmission from Agram.
 - f. HASANAGIC belongs to the STOJADINOVIC movement, a radical group. He and STOJADINOVIC were interned together during the Italian occupation he served as an official advisor to the Italian Governor of Montenegro. He then already worked for German intelligence services.

FRANOZI (see 32) is a member of the SD (Aust. milit. Angehoeriger). Studied at University of Belgrade together with HASANAGIC and belongs to the same political movement.

 - 3. Has connections in the highest political circles, in particular to Moslem dignitaries. Was appointed leader of the Moslems in Eastern Bosnia by Dr. Pavelic.
 - 4. HASANAGIC is a dependable and experienced intelligence agent.
 - 5. 150 Gold pieces (Napoleons), 10,000, 500 Kuna.
 - 7. This question was fully discussed both with HASANAGIC and in particular with FRANOZI and followed up. Both are convinced of the necessity of such an arrangement.
 - 8. Collaboration with communists quite inadvisable in view of his political antecedents.
 - 9. Very good prospects for expansion. HASANAGIC is in contact with Oberst SUMERIC, who is in charge of the military movement in Croatia and who collaborates very closely with the Ustaschi.

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4. KUNGERL, Adalbert alias 'Kuntel', German national (Volksdeutsche), native of Pancevo via Belgrade, journalist.

- b. 1.58 m, black eyes, black hair parted, oval face.
- c. Agram

d. Liaison-agent to Pavle DJUKIC and Dr. DRILJIC. DJUKIC is Chetnik leader in Montenegro and, up till late, served under the command of NIKSIC. In 1943 he switched his allegiance to Dr. DRILJIC, leader of the Croat independence movement which has the support of the USTASHA (Croatia)

His mission is the same as that of all other agents.

- e. Trial transmissions from Agram.

3. KUNGERL has been SD agent, for a long time in Agram. He is an expert on Balkan affairs. One of his closest collaborators is STABINIJA, writer and Balkan expert, who is the private secretary and travel companion of Dr DRILJIC (former minister-president of Montenegro)

- 6. 100 Gold pieces (Napoleondors)
- 7. Was told explicitly.
- 8. Incredible in view of political set backs.

5. KLASER, Konrad alias 'Kaktus' or 'Kaktus'. Austrian born list.

- b. 1.70, grey eyes, curly hair parted back, oval face, wears spectacles.
- c. Agram

d. Establish liaison to USTASHA circle, in part led by Herbert H-RANCIC and SUBURIC. Herbert H-RANCIC is known to be an Anglophile.

KLASER is well-acquainted with USTASHA. In 1943 for several years he was done intelligence work in Agram.

- e. One month ago from Agram.
- f. KLASER is politically indifferent. His sole profession is intelligence work. Fought on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. Later persecuted by the Communist Party because he was known to work for the SD.

- 6. 100 Gold pieces (Napoleondors).
- 7. Explicitly told and understood.

9. KLASER is an excellent intelligence agent and has done several assignments.

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36. The despatch of agents into Albania had been approved by the Minister of Defense Deva, but could not be undertaken. Consultations exist with PLEKO Beg, DAGA, ASJIF Bljuta and other national leaders of Albania.

PLEKO Beg in turn has good connections into PAVLOVIA, and especially ZE Skoplje with HASAN Shukri who is supposed to be on the COMECONIAN Committee.

37. SOURCE: Dr HOTEL

The Rumanian intelligence net is both in quality and in its verifications the best. The agents in Rumania are on a very high level, i.e. their connections actually reach up into places where no checks are being made. This can primarily be attributed to the fact that since political collaboration has been established it can do a few things united in their anti-bolshevik leaning, and obtain in such a manner yields a number of possibilities for intelligence work. The intelligence net is probably centralized in Bukarest. However, there are message centers exist already in the provinces.

Three transmitters are operating, but for security reasons only one is transmitting at a time.

The centralization of the information net is a result of the circumstance that AMBER has selected a group of agents to whom each other and between whom strong bonds of friendship exist, the necessity to break the system up into groups does therefore not exist.

Another element favoring intelligence work in Rumania can be found in the fact that the SD undertake several of its missions together with the Iron Guard, these High Command sub to Germany and also issued their orders through SD channels. From this circumstance the Rumanians derive a certain amount of security.

The intelligence net in Rumania as a result of the fact, can be gathered from the fact that several weeks ago a Colonel General, inactive command of a Corps, but who if and his services of information at the disposal of the SD. Another general, also in active command, hired an SD agent as his chauffeur, and to have a contact looking go-between with the SD. After the dismissal of the leader of the Bauern-partei and one of the best propaganda agents of the pro Western Allies orientation, also this group has contacts with the SD. Furthermore a gentlemen agreement was concluded between the Nationalpartei and The Iron Guard on the basis of the common fight against Bolshevism.

All the aforementioned circumstances have been taken into account in the process of intelligence work as envisaged by the group. The success of the Rumanian intelligence operation is therefore possibly be overrated.

38. The transmissions from Rumania so far received have been of not only of high quality but also the most numerous to be received from a Balkan country. On some days up to ten telegrams received. The main channel is being operated by a technical expert who is

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enjoys AUNER's unqualified confidence, he may be able to re-establish connections in short order. Agents reporting in Rumania are of high caliber and were in both in Vienna and later in Kremsmunster and Bucharest. Reports started coming in end of 1944 and daily reports have been the rule ever since.

The reports dealt for the most part with the political situation and also with the internal of Rumania's governmental policy.

40. The pros and cons of linking up the Rumanian underground directly with the message centers of the Allied (U.S. and British) intelligence services, resp the Military Mission in Bukarest, have been carefully weighed. Such an arrangement, if well thought out, could indicate a real element of danger: it would jeopardize the American or British representative who is under constant surveillance by the G.P.U. and diplomatic repercussions might result; it could also endanger the agents who try to contact a personality so closely watched. For that reason and because of the loss of time involved, it was decided to transmit only to the central receiver of the SD.

41. SOURCE: SS-Hauptsturmführer Kurt AUNER.
Used to be chief SD-agent of Amt VI in Rumania.

It was he who organized the SD-information net from 1939 until the Russian occupation in August 1944. His offices were in Bukarest. He is a close associate of HOTTI.
HOTTI calls him a very gifted intelligence man.

42. Answers to Questionnaire: (See Annex I)

- 1. GUNN, Roland alias BOB. Age: 32 years
Rumanian officer. German national (Volksdeutsche)
- b. 1.94 m, tall appearance, slim, blue eyes, brown hair, sharp features.
- c. Last address unknown.
Possible contact: Caraul, Jilau Street, Bukarest 06.
- d. In charge of the whole information network in Rumania.
- e. Last heard of by wireless message on 12 May 1945.
- f. belongs to group "Dr HOTTI".

GUNN's main assistants are:

1. R. H. Hens alias Tom Age: 27 years
Rumanian officer. German national (Volksdeutsche).

- b. 1.70 m, tall heavy-set appearance, blue eyes.
- c. Same as GUNN.

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was laid out in icy. Neither bank nor of the corporate and flying this to reaction. This notice involves a collectively feeble and the only expense involved is the commission paid to the addressee.

7. GERNER is not cognizant of plans to cut the net under American control. He frequently mentioned though that in case of German defeat, which he considered inevitable, the British and Americans might be interested in a well-oiled and well-organized intelligence apparatus, citing as an indication for such a move that he had been recruited by the British that they had been recruiting I/T operators from circles around us with his information net. At that time GERNER was to jump the gun, but to wait until he would give the go-ahead signal.

All along GERNER maintained contact with the American and British mission, occasionally feeding them information through Middleman. One of his middlemen was a certain Peter (last name), Popo Savu Street, Bucharest, who kept in touch with a British reporter named Gibson.

8. The friendship between GERNER and Middleman is of long standing, and Middleman believes that if ever GERNER should be running one of our own, he would find ways and means of throwing out a secret line to the intelligence to Middleman because of the close personal relationship. Several agents have been arrested by the Russians. In order to stay quite safe had the whole information apparatus checked by agents of Brancicoville II and 1st, Vienna, and also maintain a different net in Rumania. (Contact PIFF).

9. Prospects of expanding the net, and its American resources, and its disposal, with a financial (funds) and other (to be inserted) and material (I/T sets and spare parts).

The switch-over should not run into any serious difficulties with GERNER around, who is an experienced intelligence agent and who knows how to bring the various national groups in line with the requirements of the information net.

Wireless communications can be established at any time. It is understood that in case the central transmitter in the net is destroyed only the Rumania transmitters will continue to function for several months.

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the case of Marion ROBINSON of Hartmann...
Subject later...
employment with the...
Subject returned to her home in Germany.

Subject entered GENEVA, Switzerland, in June 1939 and remained there until the outbreak of the war in Europe. Subject worked in French. Subject later continued her studies at the HANSEATIC SCHOOL of LANGUAGES in Hamburg. In Dec 1939 subject returned to her home in NEHLHORN where she remained until Spring 1940, when she obtained employment as a secretary for a...
Subject remained until Apr 41, at which time she was ordered by the institution of Labor to report at the...
BREMEN for employment.

Subject disclosed the following information re persons and organization of Abt VI of the NSDA:

Abteilung VI - B / Balkan section/

WANNICK, Wilhelm, SS Obersturmbannführer, present whereabouts unknown. Chief of Abt VI-B.

UBER, Frau, SS Obersturmbannführer, present whereabouts unknown.

REYHER, Frau, SS Sturmbannführer, present whereabouts unknown.

WANNICH, Frau, Hauptsturmführer, present whereabouts unknown.

KLING / Klaus/, Frau, SS Hauptsturmführer, present whereabouts unknown.

WANN, Frau, SS Obersturmführer, present whereabouts unknown.

BELLMANN, Frau SS Obersturmführer, believed to be with WANNICK. Subject referred to BELLMANN as anti-Nazi.

STRINGER, Frau, SS Obersturmführer, present whereabouts unknown.

KLEBER, Frau, SS Hauptsturmführer, present whereabouts unknown.

WANNICH, Frau, SS Hauptsturmführer, present whereabouts unknown.

Abteilung VI-B/ North and South America, and.../

WANNICH, Dr. Frau, SS Obersturmführer, present whereabouts unknown.

WANNICH, Frau, SS Hauptsturmführer, present whereabouts unknown.

WANNICH, Dr. Frau, Obersturmführer, present whereabouts unknown.

WANNICH, Frau, SS Hauptsturmführer, present whereabouts unknown.

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Braun, Frau, SS Rottenfuhrer, present whereabouts unknown
Jahn, Frau, undetermined rank of SS, present whereabouts unknown.
Lang, Dr. Frau, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer, present whereabouts unknown.

Abteilung VI-B / France, Spain, Switzerland /

Stamm, Frau, undetermined rank in SS, present whereabouts unknown.

Subject stated that CLAUD, PRATON, LANGE, FULMER / all now mentioned / and WISSENBERGER, Frau, member of SS are believed to be with BRECK.

Subject further mentioned SCHEMELING, Frau, undetermined rank in SS, as Chief of Abt VI of the RSHA. Present whereabouts unknown.

ERNEST BRUNNER, Dr. Ernest, SS Obergruppenfuhrer, Chief of RSHA, present whereabouts unknown.

RICHARD, Frau, member of SD who she at 11:30 ordered the killing of many Jews, reported to be in the same room as BRECK.

ERNEST MANN, Frau, SS Obergruppenfuhrer, Chief of police in Hungary, present whereabouts unknown.

KI HAST, Frau, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer, Adjutant to BRECK, v. u.

BAUER, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer, 2nd Adjutant to BRECK, v. u.

GLECKE, Frau, SS Obersturmfuhrer, on staff of BRECK, v. u.

TRUMB, Frau, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer, on staff of BRECK, v. u.

Subject, age 29, ht. 5'7" wt. 120 lbs. brown hair, brown eyes, rather dark complexion, attractive, speaks very good English / speaks / in French. Subject has five sisters, all married and all in U.S., 2 in England. Subject also has an uncle who is a V.I.C.I.P., in his library at Geneva Conference, at 11:30 and 11:45 and Geneva - BOUGREIN, Chemin des Vallons 36, Geneva, Switzerland, where subject has visited on several occasions. Subject is a Communist, but claims any membership in any Nazi organization, that he has never been active in Nazi circles.

NOTE: Subject has been cooperative in discussing information on the above.

Subject has been very helpful to the informant in the above given information regarding SD work and activities in the area. Reliability of information confirmed by other sources. Activities were subsequently apprehended.

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1st Lt. 1st
2nd Lt. 1st

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CIVIL CENSORSHIP GROUP A (IS. CIA (US)

P APO 541 U.S. ARMY Salzburg STATION

Date of Comment... 14 April 55

Number S/1/29184

From: No sender posted in Salzburg		To: TILLY, Mr. Jungs Luisenstr. 133 Dorn, Germany	
Communication date	13 Apr 55 German	DISPOSITION	STATION ALLOCATION
Language	German	Passed (P) P	CIC
Examiner		Condemned (C)	
Reviewer		Held (H)	
Previous Comments		Excised (E)	
		Returned (RET)	
			CCO ALLOCATION CIC 115

LETTER REFERRING TO SPY CASE HOETTEL

" Dear Hans,

Many thanks for your letter dated 7 and 8 April to which I am replying immediately, seeing that you are a bit worried.

As far as Dr. H. is concerned, I don't think that his personal attitude has been correctly represented. H.'s sympathy is certainly with the West, but the American agents who as investigators had contacted him already in Thurnberg, questioned him on several of his connections without his knowing that these agents had become or maybe even had been then in contact with the East.

I believe that he has slid into an awkward situation rather innocently, but according to what I know about him he will manage to extricate himself. H. seems to me to dabble too much in intrigues of all sorts without any clear concept for the future. Of course, if the Americans want to stage a show trial on him, then I am sorry for him, for those democrats are quite capable of doing such a thing even at the risk of ruining or exposing their own friends or other absolutely pro-western elements.

I am quite certain that this will not entail any trouble whatever for you, apart from the fact that the thing will certainly be staged in Washington with VERBER, LOHNER. Incidentally H. will certainly be a very important witness in this trial. There is no doubt that the affair will be given considerable prominence.

Personally you need not be worried, you have nothing to do with it, and the mere fact of chancing to know him does not involve you in the least.

I suppose this will do for the time being. Should I hear anything of interest, I shall of course inform you.

pl.t.o.

ARMY-USA 12-52 7157

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As far as the meeting in August is concerned, I am increasingly in favor of deferring it to next year. Our comrades are mostly lacking the necessary traveling money, perhaps even interest. ...

Grashei is certainly still in office and, as far as I know, in connection with the infantry training.

I cannot recall any man of the name of Spinka, but I will inquire. ...

Your comrade

Signed: HERBERT."

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2 pages.

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AUTH: CG Third US Army
DATE: 10 September 1945
REF: 221

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Interrogation Center (Provisional)
AFO 403

INTERROGATION REPORT No 43

Source: HOETTL, Wilhelm AIC 894 10 September 1945

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AUSTRIAN POLITICS FROM 1918 TO THE PRESENT TIME

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THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
INTELLIGENCE CENTER
INTERROGATION SECTION
APO 403

C

Source: HOETTL, Wilhelm, AIC 894

SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 4

Because of the nature of the subject matter, the following information has been extracted from a routine interrogation report and is published for limited distribution.

In evaluating the information, it should be borne in mind that the source, although now apparently friendly, co-operative, and truthful, was until recently a faithful servant of the Nazis. And although he may have forsworn his allegiance, he makes no pretense of having forsworn his prejudices.

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 - Proposed Jesuit-RSHA Intelligence Exchange 2
 - Soviet-Vatican Anti-Nazi Plot 2
 - Jesuit Roll of Interest in Overthrowing HITLER 3

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SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 4

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1. Jesuit Intelligence Activities (Continued)

From the sketchy information that leaked out, Dr HOETTL was able to piece together the following story: The center of the conspiracy in GERMANY was the General-kommando in MUENCHEN (GSGS 4346/M 49/Y 8556). Investigations revealed that certain members of scientific institutes in ROME, Italy, had offered their services as liaison between German military circles and the Society of Jesus.

Most deeply implicated were several officers from Abwehrstelle MUENCHEN, and certain former leaders of the Bayerische Volkspartei, some of whom were residing in MUENCHEN and some of whom were living as emigres in ROME. The conspiracy was by no means confined to Army circles. Prominent German Foreign Office personalities (like Gesandter SCHELIAH, who was later executed) and certain officials of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium were also involved.

Jesuit Poll of Interest in Overthrowing HITLER. HOETTL relates an unconfirmed rumor to the effect that certain Army circles, prior to the abortive coup of 20 July 1944, commissioned the Society of Jesus to conduct a poll to determine whether German public sentiment would favor an overthrow of the HITLER regime. According to HOETTL's source, the poll indicated general apathy, and little sentiment in favor of an uprising was encountered.

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SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 4

1. Jesuit Intelligence Activities

Source. SS Sturmbannfuehrer Dr HOETTL, Hauptre-
ferent in Gruppe VI E of the RSHA. For further details about
HOETTL see Third US Army Interrogation Reports Nos 10, 15,
16, 18, 21, and 22, and Third US Army Special Interrogation
Reports Nos 1 and 2.

Summary. This report deals with several instances in
which the Jesuits are believed to have taken an active part
both in collaboration with and in opposition to the Nazis.

Proposed Jesuit-RSHA Intelligence Exchange. In 1939
Dr HOETTL sent the pan-European propagandist, Prince
ROHAN, as his emissary to the VATICAN. HOETTL was at that
time Amt VI referent in WIEN (GSGS 4346/O 49/X 4094).

Prince ROHAN was well enough acquainted with Count
LEDOCHOVSKY, Vicar General of the Society of Jesus, to sound
him out on the possibilities of an information exchange.
It was argued that this would implement the mutual interests
of both the SD and the VATICAN in eradicating Communism
from EUROPE. LEDOCHOVSKY accepted the proposition with
a great deal of enthusiasm and promised to submit the mat-
ter to the Pope.

The Vicar General showed ROHAN some of the reports
he received regularly from SOUTH AMERICA through Jesuit
circles. These reports described the activities of
Comintern agents in certain Latin American countries with
a wealth of detail unparalleled in any Amt VI reports on
the same subject. LEDOCHOVSKY said he was willing to col-
laborate with the Germans to the extent that he would pass
on to Amt VI all intelligence material at his disposal.
He expected in return to receive all pertinent information
obtained by the RSHA as the result of SD activities in the
USSR. This intelligence exchange was to go into effect
as soon as the Pope's consent could be obtained. In the
end all plans foundered on the Pope's refusal to countenance
any kind of co-operation with the SD, and on the objections
of SS Gruppenfuehrer JOST, Amtchef VI, who dared not sub-
mit the scheme to HEYDRICH.

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Soviet-Vatican Anti-Nazi Plot. In 1943 a special commission of Amt IV of the RSHA investigated an anti-Nazi conspiracy of considerable dimensions, the ramifications of which were traced to both Soviet and Vatican circles. The two-fold nature of the plot is reflected in the fact that the Amt IV investigators had to split into two groups. One followed up Russian leads under the covername of Rote Kapelle. (See Third US Army Interrogation Report No 8, 14 June 1945, paragraph 2, and 6824 DIC (MIS)/CI - 14) The other operation, under the covername Schwarze Kapelle, followed leads which implicated the VATICAN. All investigations were co-ordinated by SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr SCHMITZ, who later became the personal aide of SCHELLENBERG, Amtschef VI.

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For the AC of S, G-2:

Edmund L King
EDMUND L KING
Major, Infantry
Chief of Interrogation Section

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Intelligence Center, Third US Army

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HEADQUARTERS
US FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 655

882

PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION REPORT (PIR) NO 27

PRISONER: BEETZ, Hildegard, nee BURKHARDT

DATE: 19 July 1945

1. PERSONAL DATA

Frau BEETZ was an agent of Amt VI, RSHA. Born in OBERNISSA nr WEIMAR in 1919, she graduated from high school in 1938 and subsequently attended a private interpreters' school in ERFURT. She entered the SD in 1939, serving in WEIMAR until March 1940 when she was transferred to Amt VI, RSHA. She worked as interpreter and translator of Italian at both the ROSE and BERLIN offices up to September 1943, when she was chosen to become an agent. BEETZ was assigned as secretary to CIANO, then under house arrest at ALLMANNSHAUSEN/Starnberger See, MUENCHEN, with instructions to report his activities to Amt VI.

BEETZ grew fond of CIANO, who had been transferred to a prison at VERONA, Italy, and in October 1943 she decided to help him. Through her efforts she claims CIANO's diary and several documents pertaining to Italo-German relations were kept from falling into the hands of the SD and she was able to assist EDDA MURROGLINI in her escape to SWITZERLAND. Upon her own request, BEETZ was transferred back to WEIMAR in October 1944 where she continued her original work of translating and interpreting.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

BEETZ was arrested in WEIMAR, on 19 Jun 45, by 208 CIC Det. She arrived at USFET Interrogation Center on 20 Jun 45 and was accepted at the request of Chief G-2 (CIB), HQ USFET. Arrest report and SHAEF Card were not available. Reports forwarded with BEETZ were the following: HQ 12th Army Group SCI Det Report dated 18 Jun 45
SCI Det WEIMAR Report dated 14, 16 and 17 Jun 45
SCI Notes, SCI Det WEIMAR dated 25 Jun 45
A number of translations made by BEETZ

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3. KNOWLEDGE BRIEF

- a. Organization and personnel of WEIMAR, BERLIN and ROME offices of Amt VI, RSHA.
- b. Methods and agents employed by the SD in ITALY.
- c. SD methods for infiltrating personnel into SWITZERLAND.
- d. SD contacts in SWITZERLAND and ITALY.
- e. Information concerning Italo-German relations.

4. INTERROGATION PLAN

The interrogation will be conducted according to the knowledge brief.

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

BEEZ appears to be fully cooperative and should release information on the subjects mentioned in the knowledge brief.

The recipients of this report are requested to submit special briefs of any subjects upon which this prisoner should be interrogated and to indicate the desired distribution of the resultant report.

For Colonel PHILP:

Harry K. Lennon
 HARRY K. LENNON
 Captain, Inf
 B & E Section

00000

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G ✓

109, LONDON

28 June 1945

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110 & BEADING AMZON

FOLLOWING FURTHER DISCUSSION HOETTL CASE WE HAVE REACHED
FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:

- A. CASE HAS NOW BEEN DEVELOPED TO POINT WHERE WE HAVE SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF CONCRETE INFORMATION AND WE CANNOT EFFECTIVELY PLAY WITH IT FURTHER WITHOUT GETTING INTO FIELD OF POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE.
- B. LACKING POSITIVE ASSIGNMENT FROM US HOETTL'S TECHNICAL ASSISTANTS ARE ALREADY BECOMING SUSPICIOUS THAT OUR MOTIVES ARE MERELY TO PICK UP THEIR NETWORK.
- C. WE BELIEVE TIME HAS NOW COME TO CARRY OUT YOUR ORIGINAL PLAN AND TO PRESENT REPORT TO RUSSIANS. THIS CAN PROBABLY BEST BE DONE TO RUSSIAN LIAISON MISSION WITH SHARP AND SUGGEST TO THEM THAT WE JOINTLY EXPLOIT POSSIBILITIES OF CASE WITH VIEW TO COMPLETE UNCOVERING OF HOETTL'S NETWORK IN BALKANS.
- D. UNLESS YOU ADVISE TO CONTRARY WE WILL PROCEED ALONG ABOVE LINES AFTER CAREFULLY ASCERTAINING MOST APPROPRIATE RUSSIAN CHANNELS HERE.

AHB

00017

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C.V.

CORN, LONDON

27 JUNE 1945

SECRET

SPRINGHEAD, ANZON

ROUTINE

REF YOUR 795, DATED 26 JUNE, ANSWER IS YES AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.

*No: meeting 11/21/45
Case in connection with
a procedure
mentioned. This has been
discussed in () both
29/6*

F.F.P.
B.B.R.

06915

1-17-45

1495

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GO 2

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SAINT LOUIS

27 June 1945

SPEARHEAD AMZN

SECRET
ROUTINE

Ref. phone conversation with GOWER.

- 1. Documents pertaining to NOBTEL also going to you today by pouch.

00014

SHL...TTP...

10.30

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#882

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SAINT LOUDON
SPEARHEAD

23 June 1945

X-2 PRIORITY

- A. REF VAR 5575 THIS MAY REFER TO CUNYAN AN SPYRING ABOUT 150 MILES EAST SOUTHEAST OF AUGSBURG.
- B. REF VAR 5369 NO HABERMAN HAS CONTACTED US.
- C. STEYRLING STATION IS HOBBLE KNOWN TO YOU FROM MONTHLY INTERROGATION REPORT SENT YOU 2 JUNE AND UNRELEVANT TELEGRAMS.
- D. REFER ALSO TO REPORT BY STEAK DATED 10 JUNE LAST YOU 18 JUNE SUBJECT OPERATIONS AT CUNYANING FOR PERIOD 7-9 JUNE AND TO MY REPORT TO 109 DATED 8 JUNE TWO OF THE SUBJECT SENT YOU.
- E. YOU SHOULD HAVE HAD COPY OUR TELEGRAM TO 109 AND SAINT WASHINGTON INTO FORGOTTEN PARIS. SEE ALSO OUR 409 TO WAR ROOM.
- F. MESSAGES ON HOBBLE LINE AT CUNYANING WERE PASSED ON 9 JUNE AND 13 JUNE IN ADDITION TO OTHER D. DED, 4, 5, 11, 12, 15 JUNE.
- G. CONCERNING PARA BAKER VAR 5575 WE HAVE NO INDIC SIGN HERE THAT PRER ARGED SIGN WAS USED.
- H. WE ARE INQUIRING OF STEAK.
- I. STEYRLING IS NEARLY 6 HOURS DRIVE FROM BUCHAREST WHICH IS OUR NEAREST COMMUNICATION POINT.
- J. FREQUENCIES TO BUCHAREST ARE ABOUT 4400 CALL SIGN X L U AND CENTRALE 4400 CALL SIGN F Y P WITH 1515 DIRECTION BUCHAREST SHORTER TIME.
- K. FREQUENCIES TO BUDAPEST ARE ABOUT 4404 AND LATER 5473 CALL SIGN X L U LATER H G A AND CENTRALE / 4400 CALL SIGN

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CALL SIGN F Y P LATER O L R.

L. WE DO NOT HAVE TEXTS MESSAGES BUT EXPECT RECEIVE THEM FROM STEAK SHORTLY AND WILL POUCH THEM.

M. BUCHAREST CIPHER IS SLIGHT VARIATION FROM NORMAL DOUBLE TRANSPOSITION BASED ON PHRASE QUOTE MINKE REICHSJUGENDEUEHRER POTSDAM END QUOTE WE DO NOT HAVE BUDAPEST CIPHER BUT ARE REQUESTING IT FROM STEAK.

N. THUS FAR OPERATING BEEN CONFINED TO ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH HOETTL CHAIN.

O. NO POSITIVE INFORMATION BEEN ASKED FOR BUT GENERAL SIBERT AND COLONEL FORGAN HAVE AGREED WE MAY DO SO.

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[Handwritten notes]

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COULTRON talked with HERR... should have been on the look... did in fact, when he learned of the movement, what... it, but since KOLTHAN... (for information purposes), it was possible... information business, "Unternehmen Herweg", and...

COULTRON's contacts included the Vienna Social Democrats and through POPIK even some...

HERRMANN, an ex-Social Democrat, had contacts with HERRMANN and other Social Democrats.

ROSEN's own contacts were of... of course, Karl von... Gellner with... KOLTHAN's knowledge...

Others: Dr. GRUBER, of Zurich, Switzerland. He has central group... president of the European section of the... expert on oils and fats and... brought by ROSEN to the Swiss...

Then, in another group, the... Dr. BOHNE, referent for Southeast... contacts of Von HOFFMANN, who was... BOHNE, a w/d expert on propaganda... the Vatican referent Dr. KOLTHAN...

From intellectual circles:... of the German University,...

with Polish groups: through... who works closely with the London...

Not only Americans but... they were hard to handle because of... of the movement. The only one... Besides him, there was a... came to the... He had been close to... whole group stood with him.

ROSEN's best military contact... LOREN, who played along with...

GRUBER was the focal point of the... geographically.

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[Handwritten signature]

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- 3 -

Prince ROSSI was also with the group. He had contacts with the General of the Jesuit Order at Rome. Rossi had once been arrested by the Staps because of a book in which he had not been sufficiently condemnatory of the Russians. Some of his friends, e.g. his brother in law ANTONYI) were close to the movement.

KRUBACKER worked especially in southwestern Europe for the plan, and later in Austria. He got KISTNER's agreement to it.

4. GENERAL NOTES ON THE INTERNAL MOVEMENT

Only the central members of the movement knew of ROSSI's real plans, or of his trips to Switzerland.

The main line of the group was anti-Bolshevism, along with their dislike of the Nazi policies. There tended to be a strong Catholic tinge to the movement.

They wanted to create a strong basis for a government by bringing together these groups, but they did not want to squabble about choices of ministerial posts, as such details were omitted.

They agreed on an independent Austria, democratic (!), anti-Bolshevik, properly parliamentarian (Kistner remarks that they were an Anglophile group), under a president or a monarch (such details were beneath them).

This whole conspiracy was built up on a personal basis, with occasional meetings away from the main centers, using Kistner's place in Salzburg as a contact point, or at any time with Kistner at Vienna, probably not often after that time at least.

It appears that the movement had no specific membership, no organization, no positive aims, no plan for defeat or victory, no contacts with positive movements that it wanted to supplant; its nature was apparently that of a meeting circle of disgruntled old ladies.

5. CONCERNING ROSSI'S TRIP TO SWITZERLAND

ROSSI told a little about his first trip to Switzerland, on which he spoke with KISTNER and the other central people, who thought there were fair chances of success with the Americans. There was a great deal of talk about the had reached KISTNER's office at Vienna to get KISTNER to Switzerland, and got KISTNER's agreement to take the trip singly for himself. He had to make things up by telling KISTNER that he was going to do some political activity on the trip (?). He was also arrested by the Staps, and Kistner's secretary had to be he had tried to escape.

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6. THE VOLLMACHT

ROBERT observed that WEINBERGER received his Vollmacht early in April.

7. ROBERT AND THE SWISS

ROBERT intended to go along with his colleagues into the recruit, to help disintegrate it in the American interest. He had his w/T station set up already in Switzerland for this purpose. He took along his best men, HUBER, SCHNEIDER, and HUBER, and his secretary Paul. They were in contact with an American station near St. Gallen after mid-April. After ROBERT's third trip, arrangements were made for technical changes in the w/T system.

ROBERT's task was to keep in contact with the resistance movement in the mountains, to give information about military strength, etc. and to carry on his own work, e.g. study the effects of Allied w/T propaganda and leaflets, and to work with GRIMM-HORNER on propaganda leaflets. ROBERT mentioned, e.g., that leaflets should point out that only war criminals were desirous of continuing the fight, and that this was just to save their own skins.

8. ROBERT'S CONTACTS

To yesterday's contacts of the Austrian group, ROBERT added Dr. SCHNEIDER, a V-man for the Vatican, whom he saw twice or three times in Bern on his second visit to Switzerland. SCHNEIDER is a churchman who lectures at Fribourg; he is an old friend. He approved of ROBERT's attempt to work with Catholic groups.

Dr. GRIMM (mentioned yesterday) is a left-winger (though bourgeois), and ROBERT saw him in Switzerland, and arranged to work with GRIMM's people in Vienna.

LEINER, also in Switzerland, a contact of ROBERT, is a member of the Social Democrats.

9. RESISTANCE PLANS IN THE NORTH.

ROBERT was supposed to hold the main line from the north, with a line in the Bavarian mountains, south of which, ROBERT was to hold the main line in the east; ROBERT was to hold the main line in the west; ROBERT was to hold the main line in the south. The plan of having the main line in the north, military and political, was spoiled by the cutting of Germany into two parts.

ROBERT asserts that the recruit plans were genuine and serious, and points to the removal of the recruitment, and some others, to

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the mountains. He says the military men believed they could hold out for a considerable time, in a region not vulnerable to tanks and aircraft, by blowing up the valleys that gave access to it.

Each of the resistance would have depended on the party groups -- the Catholics as Reichsmatrosenschaft members (which they had become about 1942, but which had grown to be an important function only after 20 July 1944). Early in 1945 they received court martial rights, to strengthen the resistance. HIEBER particularly took his powers seriously, used them tyrannically, aiming to base resistance on the Volksturm, and even using mortar-aimed arms for it.

10. HIEBER

MUEHLNER had the task of working on HIEBER, who as a leader of Tyrol had a central part in the anti-Nazi scheme. HIEBER talked with MUEHLNER about this after his first trip to Switzerland; MUEHLNER went to HIEBER at the beginning of April. HIEBER was in a mood to carry on the fight against Tyrol; but at the end, MUEHLNER joined HIEBER in appealing to HORN. At the end of April there was a conference at Innsbruck, with HIEBER, MUEHLNER and VIEHMEYER present, in which HIEBER said that he would not resist any more. MUEHLNER at the time, and was informed of the result by HORN, who learned of it through his V-Plan at Meran, SCHNEIDER.

11. ROSE'S OFFER

ROSE's negotiations with the Americans took place first in Switzerland, and later with General G. H. directly, through DE ANTONIS, an Italian partisan.

12. HIEBER'S OFFER AND VIEHMEYER'S

At the conference, discussed in para. 10, HIEBER proposed allowing VIEHMEYER to capitulate first. The general agreed to stop the fight against the West, and to continue only against the Russians.

It was HIEBER's wish that VIEHMEYER should become military head for the South, and as such was to be for the West. VIEHMEYER told DE ANTONIS that he had felt that in the West, American threat, of course, was to have political control, HIEBER's representative. HIEBER's purpose was to have VIEHMEYER should know about the details of this. G. H. was to be the one to the South to be HIEBER's representative there, and DE ANTONIS agreed that this was a confusing arrangement.

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13. WOLFWOLF

The WOLFWOLF was to be directed from the Reich, and HORN was given the job of penetrating it for the Americans. It appears that his main effort in this direction was by taking up contact with SCHMIDT, whose Jagverbände were to supply the main military strength of underground resistance, although they were not officially part of the WOLFWOLF, but were rather joined in personal union with it through SCHMIDT. SCHMIDT's position regarding the WOLFWOLF was in fact much stronger than SCHMIDT's.

SCHMIDT and HORN both discussed the matter with SCHMIDT. HORN spoke with him at Salzburg in the beginning of May, when SCHMIDT was considering carrying on the fight in the mountains, feeling that he and his men standing, usually he had only a few hundred of his best soldiers with him.

SCHMIDT contacted SCHMIDT as contact man to HORN re WOLFWOLF matters, this at a discussion at the end of April, after HORN's second trip, in which HORN, SCHMIDT, and SCHMIDT took part.

SCHMIDT was expected to come south to lead the fight, but probably did not.

HORN's idea was to penetrate the WOLFWOLF, and get it to stop its activities in the West, and tell its members there to wait for further orders. He was unsure of what tactics to follow in the West; this was discussed with V. H. H., and there was hope of keeping control of it there for possible use.

HORN feels that the WOLFWOLF has usually organized. The Gauleiters were to keep the Reich's controls on it, and the NS was to contribute to it through SCHMIDT. There was to be some help from Wehrmacht units in the South; HORN does not know what ones, or on how large a scale.

14. NATIONALISM IN THE WEST

Nationalist movements were to take over the job of underground work in the formerly German-occupied areas in the West. SCHMIDT has sent a good many people there. The plans for the underground national organizations, working through resistance, were fairly far advanced, but HORN does not think they were well advanced with them.

SCHMIDT of JV contact was in charge of the West. Under him, Gustaf HORN, one of the Wehrmacht units, was in charge (he has been captured), and to be sent to the West. Gustaf HORN (or HORN) had a similar job for the West.

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joined with WINKELMAYER in opposing ROHM's plan for a government of broad concentration, and backing an authoritarian state under SAUBERT. WINKELMAYER worked behind the scenes for this, and had his SS men in position to prepare for the change.

WINKELMAYER remained with the extreme line, left SAUBERT, as his representative and came to Vienna. WINKELMAYER and SAUBERT flew to Berlin before 15 October and persuaded SAUBERT to approve backing the Iron Cross; previously, SAUBERT had backed ROHM in this matter, and e.g. 19 March, when the Germans occupied Hungary, succeeded in expanding to SAUBERT's plan to have the occupation carried out partly with Slovaks and Hungarians, and got ROHM's approval for an occupation by the Germans only.

ROHM's disagreements with the Iron Cross led to Italy, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, had made him unpopular by SAUBERT, and had caused also some ill feeling between SAUBERT and SAUBERT.

WINKELMAYER was suggested by SAUBERT as representative with the Iron Cross, but SAUBERT and WINKELMAYER arranged for SAUBERT to put WINKELMAYER in as Head of Bavaria.

18. SAUBERT

ROHM thinks that SAUBERT heard of SAUBERT's plans to act on his own in the South, and installed SAUBERT, a mortal foe to SAUBERT, to limit him.

SAUBERT announced he would visit Vienna, as holder of a Vollmacht, when ROHM was there, but did not actually get there. SAUBERT got his Vollmacht in mid-April, a few days after SAUBERT.

19. SAUBERT

He was actual, though not official, deputy of SAUBERT after SAUBERT's death, in the South. He was a foe of SAUBERT, and had expected, as object in mind in the South, to have SAUBERT. Later he went to the South, where he worked for SAUBERT.

20. SAUBERT AND THE VOLLMACHT

ROHM thinks SAUBERT did little with his Vollmacht. He was summoned to Berlin by SAUBERT about 16-April. SAUBERT did not come over to ROHM's line till near the end.

21. SAUBERT

SAUBERT had no direct part in the negotiations in Switzerland, but SAUBERT informed him about them, and SAUBERT

SAUBERT

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tried to get together for the American zone a counter-government against the Russian-sponsored one. He found candidates for it in Western Austria - GIESINGER, BURGER, ADERT, and others.

KREMERER went to Kitzbuehl, then to Zell am See. It was planned to have the New Government come to Salzburg to Claude-Henricus, who had the approval of Bishop RICHNER, but it was physically impossible to get them together; RICHNER came to Salzburg, but nobody else.

GOETTSCH's Viennese contacts never got out of Vienna.

22. Dr. BOERER

BOERER also remained in Vienna. ROSENBERG now says that he discussed the contact with BOERER on his first trip to Switzerland, but he himself felt that the trip to the U.S. to meet President ROOSEVELT was no longer practicable, and did not broach it, though this had been RICHNER's official reason for approving ROSENBERG's trip.

23. CLAUDE-HENRICUS

He had been initiated from the beginning in the negotiations, and ROSENBERG talked with him before and after each of his trips to Switzerland.

24. FRANZ ANTON RICHNER

ROSENBERG reported to KREMERER at Lucerne after his second trip. He had left Switzerland on 16 April, spent about two days at Lucerne; so the visit was about 20 April; he saw RICHNER first at Strättli, then two days or so later at Lucerne. Previously, only WILCOX had reported to KREMERER about BOERER's trips. RICHNER said that he went to HANAU and RICHNER at Lucerne; there was a meeting at Salzburg c. 25 April at which BOERER was present; at this, RICHNER stated he was going to let ROSENBERG speak in his name in Switzerland.

ROSENBERG remarks that from the start, he and GOETTSCH had been the protagonists of the Austrian solution; RICHNER had been lukewarm and uncommitted, and had above all seemed to undertake anything that might go counter to his ideal nation.

25. ROSENBERG'S TRIP TO SWITZERLAND

ROSENBERG met RICHNER at Vaduz on this trip, then went to Lucerne, and returned to Vaduz for RICHNER's meeting; he was supposed to meet RICHNER again at the Itzling border for a final meeting with the personal meeting with RICHNER, but had to leave, and got to Lucerne about 4-5 May. RICHNER was in Lucerne then.

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HOTTEL saw GANZ-ROSTENAU and HILFMAN at Salzburg, and discussed with HILFMAN the internal Austrian situation. GANZ went to Salzburg to see HILFMAN; the three proposed Government members (see para 21) were informed of the plans.

HILFMAN intended to stay outside the Government, as representative of the SS and the Reich, and to do some sort of "loading over" those groups to form a loyal opposition in the new state. He thought of disappearing in the mountains to carry out this task.

26. THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT AND OTHER OFFICIALS

With SCHIRACH (Vienna) there were no connections.

H. had no connections either with SCHI, who was however favorable and had contact with HILFMAN and HILFMAN.

With EICHNER, stubborn and unyielding, there were no contacts.

SCHNEI of Salzburg was also off the list, but H. points out that he turned favorable early.

HOPER was persuaded by HILFMAN (leaving early in March) and by the military not to try to fight on. H. talks of an Austrian government, and that the war was lost into the hands of the Austrian resistance, and was caused by the Nazis (the / /) in the mountains, caused; H's view is that, but H. learned of this, went to Innsbruck, and persuaded HILFMAN to take over HILFMAN. HOPER actually had relations with HILFMAN, and then when the Stages tried to get HILFMAN back, H. was very close to HILFMAN. HILFMAN tried to get HILFMAN over the border, but HILFMAN had to do so; in any case, HILFMAN was HILFMAN. The HILFMAN cases in the case were taken in HILFMAN.

HOPER had some contact with Christian Social groups in Tyrol at the end of April, H. thinks through a case of HILFMAN-RING's staff.

With HILFMAN of Constance there was no contact, but HILFMAN-BACHMA was in touch with him. H. calls HILFMAN a very capable man.

There was no contact with HILFMAN of Stuttgart.

27. HOPER AND THE BAVARIAN GOVERNMENT

HILFMAN had contact with Stages, HILFMAN at the time, HILFMAN, HILFMAN HILFMAN, one of the old HILFMAN, HILFMAN HILFMAN generally gave into opposition, in an attempt to HILFMAN HILFMAN HILFMAN the Bavarian opposition classes: HILFMAN HILFMAN HILFMAN

[Faint handwritten notes and stamps]

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ROSEN at the beginning of April. H. recalls that there was a Munich clique of such old Nazis who had come into a sort of opposition. Otherwise there were no connections with Bavarian groups, though H. thinks ROSEN was in contact with Rudolf. H. himself tried to arrange a meeting with ROSEN in Vienna but nothing came of it.

Another old Nazi who had become anti-Nazi was ROSENBERG the photographer. H. had talked with him, but H. strongly opposed to ROSENBERG.

These Munich "anti-Nazi" groups, in fact, were more than passive resistance toward the war, but they based criticism of their Sturmbattalions (storm battalions) and officers). H. suggested that ROSENBERG's group, which was very anti-Nazi, would be worth talking to about the war. The majority of this Munich group were old Nazis who had become "anti-Nazi".

28. ROSENBERG'S ACTIVITIES IN SWITZERLAND

ROSENBERG was the point of contact for H. He tried to place some of his people, including ROSENBERG, with H. and H.'s people urged ROSENBERG to take over the group which could be in the Norowolf. ROSENBERG was to be in charge of the group. SELSBURY urged ROSENBERG to do so. The money for ROSENBERG's activities would be paid out only through H. The money for ROSENBERG's activities was paid out on a personal basis. The money for ROSENBERG's activities was paid out on a personal basis.

ROSENBERG had known about the Norowolf since before H.'s second trip to Switzerland, when they discussed Norowolf activities in the West, while they might be conducted in the East.

H. does not know what ROSENBERG's activities in the Norowolf was. H. says he suggested ROSENBERG's activities in the Norowolf on his first trip to Switzerland, and discussed it fully with ROSENBERG on the second trip.

29. ROSENBERG IN AUSTRIA

The Norowolf was not well organized in Austria. ROSENBERG's group had come down at the beginning of April to discuss the matter with the Gestapo, so they would set up several possible agents, who were to contact the Gestapo. This was natural because over the Nazis in Austria (?) rejected the Norowolf, and the only candidates for it would be young people.

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- 12 -

H. sees the greatest danger from the Germans in the fact that there still must be considerable caches of arms, especially MP's, placed by the Volksturm in the mountains.

The Germans, he thinks, was best organized in the mountain-areas, under HINDL, but H. says he does not know exactly. He thinks it may also have been well organized in Bavaria. He recalls overhearing a telephone conversation at the beginning of April in which HINDL called up H. to ask for MP's, and HINDL arranged to send 5 or 6 loads of them from the Steyrerwerke to be used in combat against the Germans at Graz. H. believes these were not used in fighting but were captured; they were transported by the Volksturm, not by the Wehrmacht.

H. says that HINDL's people broke into a diamond mine store of the Steyrerwerke at Melnik, because HINDL of the Steyrerwerke refused to supply arms to the Volksturm.

HIGHER, H. thinks, is in Salzburg. He was at Bad Aussee on 7 May, and probably is hanging around in the Gausen.

30. REMARKS ON THE BALKANS

The Germans expected to use HINDL's MA Stellen for the same sort of jobs as in Germany. HINDL has given us information on his organization and on such operations.

The MA Stellen try to clear up their political operations in the Balkans with VE II.

He says that the Germans do not seem to have any information service other than their own -- i.e. VE II and other parts of the RMA were not in supply them with intelligence.

H. says that the degree of April by which VE II tried to clear its political operations with VE I had very little practical effect.

H. gives an instance of confusion -- VE I planned this winter to drop a Kommando to blow up a railway near the Carpathians, but VE II fortunately had their inspection people check on it, and found that Russian partisans had blown up the railway some time before.

H. says HINDL can tell about the number of partisans being trained by the Jugoslavians for the Wehrmacht. HINDL was often at Jaidhaus, where BARTSCH was in charge of this training.

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got together with HOFFER and through him with the Social Democrats. GILBERT was to ask Bishop HOFFMANN for his backing. HOFFER was to go to Salzburg and meet GILBERT, and pass on information to HOFFMANN at Vienna.

On 5 May, HOFFER went to Salzburg; HOFFMANN had gone (?) to tell Hill an ecc to discuss with GILBERT and HOFFMANN, and GILBERT told HOFFER that HOFFMANN approved their ideas, but would not consent to having any clerical representatives in the government, since he opposed politicizing the Church.

HOFFER then returned to Innsbruck.

35. HOFFMANN'S POSITION AT VIENNA

On the night of 6 or 7 May, HOFFMANN came to Innsbruck, and told HOFFER (as he had learned from Hill HOFFMANN) that HOFFMANN would not oppose the creation of a separate Austria, and was willing to give up the military part of the struggle to hold the Reich. HOFFMANN had decided to give up after his conference with Hill at Innsbruck, but the final decision was taken at Innsbruck.

36. STERNBERG'S POSITION

HOFFMANN wanted to send Hill to STERNBERG to urge on him the necessity of accepting the Austrian plan, and to tell him about the Austrian plan. STERNBERG was to go about 1 May, was delayed because of the lack of airplanes, but may have left later, though HOFFER thinks he is probably still in the South.

HOFFER adds that STERNBERG had been backed by PAUL HOFFMANN for the post of State Chancellor, and that a cabinet's appointment at that time placed GILBERT as Minister in the Ministry for Economics. STERNBERG is from Bavaria, and HOFFER thinks he may have been in contact with the disgruntled Nazis around Hitler.

STERNBERG had some position with HOFFMANN, possibly as representative of the Ministry for Economics. HOFFER was not initiated into the Austrian plans till the end, when HOFFMANN told him.

37. HOFFER, HOFFER, AND GILBERT


HOFFER was last with HOFFMANN, presumably at his Reg. in Hill on Dec. He is probably there, or has gone to the headquarters near Innsbruck in Austria. HOFFER suggests that if Hill told him, we should tell that he had been a member of the "Hitler Youth".

HOFFER, who comes from Salzburg, is a leading leader of the movement of Salzburg.

HOFFER'S POSITION AT VIENNA

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Y



Handwritten initials

Subject: HOETTL, Dr. Wilhelm
Employee of Unascertained Intelligence
Agency.

6 May 1952
L/26068

The following information was obtained by Informant 6433 from Rudolf SPRINGER-DOSKOCIL, who works for Subject as a collector of intelligence. Evaluation: Source "B", Sub-source "D", information "3".

On 4 March 1952 SPRINGER had a conversation with Subject during which Subject explained that the majority of his work was for the West German Intelligence Service, and that they had a main office in Munich, Germany. At the same time, he said, he was also in contact with a United States Political Secret Service whose offices were in Heidelberg, Germany.

Dr. HOETTL asked SPRINGER for more information concerning the National League, and said that he was assembling information on this group and that he had several informants who were reporting to him on the National League.

Subject next asked SPRINGER if he knew, or had heard, that CIC Gmunden was to be dissolved in the near future. HOETTL said that he learned that the CIC Chief in Gmunden, one JANKO, was returning to the United States. He then went on to say that it was a good thing for Austria and Germany that such agents as JANKO leave, for he has observed that most agents of Polish descent are Germanophobes. HOETTL then instructed SPRINGER to learn exactly what changes had taken place in CIC Gmunden, and what the future plans were for that office.

AGENTS NOTE: JANKO is probably a mispronunciation of YAESKO Wigmund C., who related to the CI on 30 January 1952.

FILE CHECK:

HOETTL has frequently been the subject of reports as a leader of intelligence net works, including some net work building for CIC. See AR, L/25749, dated 10 March 1952, subject: "HOETTL Wilhelm, intelligence activity", for the most recent report of his activities. SPRINGER IS an often unreliable source of information who has himself been mentioned in numerous reports dealing with his Nazi, Communist, National League, and Bewegung Reich activities.

CASE PENDING

APPROVED:

RAY A. NICHOLS
Major Party
OO Sub-let. "B" (Linz)

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THE PROVISIONS of Para 6 & 7, AR 351 - 130, apply

Regraded *unclassified*
Authority: *AR 130-5 (34)*
by _____
Date: *11/2/52*

CONFIDENTIAL
S/A WILHELM D. HOETTL

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SECRET BERLIN

18.8.45

SECRET

BURNING AND BLEEDING AMON

ROUTINE

A. G-2 RECEIVED BURNING FROM THE DEPARTMENT AND DEANE TODAY
BY G-2 CHECKING ON STATUS OF HOTEL CASE.

B. THE DEPARTMENT REPLY SAYS THAT ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION
WAS SENT TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 7 AUGUST FOR
THEIR CONSIDERATION BY JOINT CHIEFS STAFF.

C. DEANE TELEGRAM SAYS HE RECEIVED LETTER FROM GENERAL
... RECEIVED THE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM EXPRESSING
...

D. ... FOR CERTAIN FURTHER INFORMATION AND
...

E. ... HE FEEL THAT THE DEPARTMENT
...

F. ... TO G-2 ...

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STRUCTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH AR 380-5

THE PROVISIONS of Para 6 & 7, AR 381 - 130, apply

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ~~FOR~~ AUSTRIA
Office of the Director of Intelligence
APO 777 U.S. Army

6 August 1948


SUBJECT: HOETTL Dr. Wilhelm
A15-Aussoc 69, Bezirk Gaudenz, Land Upper Austria
Security Threat

TO : Deputy Director of Intelligence
European Command, Heidelberg
APO 403 U.S. Army

Inclosed Summary of Information, subject as above, dated
12 July 1948 is forwarded for your information.

1 Incl: SOI dtd 12 Jul 48
Telephone: VIENNA B-47143

ROBERT E VOLLENDORFF
Major Cavalry
Executive Officer



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SUBJECT: HETZL, Dr. Wilhelm, 22 July 1948
Alt-Wasser 69, Bezirk Gmunden, Land Upper Austria.
Security Threat.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

Investigation was conducted on Subject on the basis of his past activities as Deputy Chief of Amt VI B.M.A. for the Balkans, and allegation that Subject is currently engaging in intelligence activities without the direction or supervision of an American agency.

Interrogation of Subject in November 1947, when he was confined in Lager Klesheim, Salzburg, awaiting transfer to Vienna for trial before the People's Court for illegal Nazi activities, determined the following information concerning his past activities:

Subject, HETZL, Dr. Wilhelm, born 19 March 1915 in Vienna, Austrian national, currently residing Alt-Wasser 69, Bezirk Gmunden, Land Upper Austria, stated that he graduated from the University of Vienna in 1938 with the degree of Doctor of History. In May 1938 Subject was appointed Chief of the SS Foreign Political Intelligence Section in Vienna with the rank of SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer. In October 1941, Subject claimed that he was demoted to Private, by order of Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler, because he had contact with the Vatican and was trying to organize a police movement. Subject indicated that rather than serve as a common soldier he obtained employment as a war correspondent with the Waffen SS. In February 1943, after the death of HETZL, Subject was reinstated to his former rank of SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer and assigned to Amt VI B.M.A. as Deputy Chief for Southeast Europe, with headquarters in Berlin. In December 1943, Subject moved to Vienna, Austria with his staff, allegedly because he was in contact with the American Embassy in Madrid and for this reason wanted to get away from his headquarters in Berlin. In March 1944, Subject moved his headquarters to Budapest, Hungary, and in the summer of that year he succeeded in contacting the American Embassy in Bern, Switzerland. In December 1944 Subject, who was promoted at this time to the rank of SS-Sturmbannfuhrer, retreated in front of the advancing Soviet Army to Gedenburg on the Austro-Hungarian border. In March 1945 Subject, then in Steyring, Bezirk Kirchdorf a. d. Enns, Land Upper Austria, allegedly contacted a Mr. Jellis of OSS in Switzerland. In May 1945 Subject claims to have surrendered himself to the American authorities in Bad Aussee, Bezirk Gmunden, Land Upper Austria, and at this time submitted a complete report of his intelligence activities to OSS. Subject was then taken to Germany, where he was confined in various PW and interrogation camps until October 1947, at which time he was returned to Austria and confined in Lager Klesheim, Salzburg.

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SOL, dtd 12 Jul 48

On the basis of the above information this office refused clearance to the Austria police authorities for Subject's extradition to Vienna for trial and ordered his release from confinement. Subject was released from confinement in December 1947, at which time he was told to keep this office informed of his activities, but so far he failed to do.

Interrogation of SCHMIDLER Iris, nee JOCKL, a personal friend of Subject, determined the following information concerning his past and present activities:

SCHMIDLER Iris, nee JOCKL, born 14 November 1911 in Vienna, Austria, Austrian national, residing Haunspergstrasse 54, Salzburg, stated that she has known Subject since 1938. SCHMIDLER alleged that she heard from her husband, SCHMIDLER Arthur, former Adjutant to General KUNZE, the Chief of the SD, that Subject had been relieved of his rank and position in 1941 because it was discovered that he was selling information to the French, English, Americans, and the Vatican. SCHMIDLER further alleged that in the past two months Subject has been a frequent visitor to Salzburg where he has contacted various former German Intelligence personnel. SCHMIDLER further stated that Subject, although he is currently unemployed, has a seemingly unlimited supply of money.

Interrogation of KUNDEL Adalbert, former Chief, SD, Jugoslavia, concerning Subject's activities determined the following information:

KUNDEL Adalbert, born 9 October 1911 in Jugoslavia, Stateless, currently employed as an informant by TIB, MUCO, stated that he has known Subject since 1940 and that in his opinion Subject would work for any or all nations for money. KUNDEL alleged that in the early part of June 1948 he had been contacted by Subject who inquired of him whether or not he (KUNDEL) would like to work in an intelligence net which Subject was forming. KUNDEL further alleged that Subject had indicated that he (Subject) would have an intelligence net completed by the end of August 1948, at which time he would go to the highest American authorities and offer them his services, at a price. KUNDEL indicated that he had said no to Subject's offer and has not seen him since.

The following information concerning subject's activities was received from a reliable informant who is a personal friend of Subject's and is in direct contact with him. (Informant: "Herzmann" Evaluation: C-3)

Subject is currently engaged in forming an intelligence net which he plans to have in operation by the end of August 1948. Subject has contacted former German Intelligence personnel who are now working as informants for all four occupying powers and has inquired of them if they will work for him.

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SPI, dtd 12 Jul 48

Subject is alleged to be in contact with JEDLIČKA Ludwig, General Secretary of the Cominform for Austria, and GILOTTI Raman, former Chief, SD, Prague CCR, and since May 1945 leader of an intelligence net for the USSR, under the cover of a Press Bureau.

Informant was unable to give any further information concerning Subject or his activities.

On 15 June 1948, this agent received a letter from Subject in which he inquired as to the reasons why his good friend JEDLIČKA is being investigated by the CIC, Vienna. Subject also stated in his letter that one day he will have valuable forces of the former German Intelligence Service behind him when they are called upon to cooperate with the Americans.

A check of the files of this office failed to disclose any additional pertinent information concerning Subject or any of the other personalities mentioned above.

SOURCE: CIC Report

EVALUATION: C-3
Fairly reliable
Possibly true

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

461 (GHI/GIN/cps)

(Chin) 45-717
16 October 1945

SUBJECT: Interrogation Reports on WENTZ, Dr. William

TO : Counter Intelligence War Room, c/o United Kingdom Base, 400 413,
U S Army.

1. Reference cable your office UK - 5009, dated 9 October 1945.
2. Third United States Army Interrogation Reports numbers 1 and 15 were sent to your office on 11 September 1945. Reference letter this office, 451 (GHI/GIN/ps).
3. Inclosed herewith is one copy each of the following reports:
 - a. Headquarters Third United States Army Intelligence Center Interrogation Report Number 19 on The W/1 Plot of Gruppe VI E of the WFA, dated 13 July 1945.
 - b. Headquarters Third United States Army Interrogation Center (Provisional) Interrogation Report Number 38 on The Abschr and the SP in Spain and Plans of 1st VI for Post-war Activities in Spain, dated 9 September 1945.
4. Third United States Army has been directed to send you the other interrogation reports requested in reference cable.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

2 Incls: As stated above.

DTIC 2/28/42
Lt. Col., MC
Executive

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U.S. FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
INCOMING MESSAGE

DJB STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL USFET MAIN 593/9
PRO 091233Z OCT TOR 091735A CCT

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PRIORITY



INFO : UK EASE FROM CIMAR
NO FOR ACTION : USFET MAIN FOR G-2 FOR SANDS
REF NO : UK-56009, 9 OCT 1945

Reference Third Army report number 43 on HCETTL.

A. Para 1 refers. Reports number- 10, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22 and 39 had special reports 1, 2 and 4 on HOSTTL.

B. Those reports not held by War Room. If spare copies available would appreciate early receipt.

Please advise.

ACTION : G-2

INFORMATION : AG RECORDS

SAC IN 4245 9 Oct 45 1051A EBH/mr REF NO: UK-56009

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DECLASSIFIED
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
PL105-246

By: SJH Date: 4/18/2001

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT 2000

SECRET
DATE: 10 September 1945
LIT: Wh

HEAD QUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Interrogation Center (Provisional)
APO 403

INTERROGATION REPORT No 43

Source: ACETTL, Wilhelm AIC 894 10 September 1945

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AUSTRIAN POLITICS FROM 1918 TO THE PRESENT TIME

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AUSTRIAN POLITICS FROM 1918 TO THE PRESENT TIME

I. INTRODUCTION

The source for this report is Dr. Wilhelm Hostel, 304 304. As deputy chief of Gruppe VI E, RSMA, and co-director of the three separate for SLOVENIA, YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA, and HUNGARY, HOSTEL had access to great funds of information, and now that the war is over he is attempting to review his knowledge objectively. An apparently repentant Austrian Nazi, HOSTEL displays a natural but not excessive bias in his ideas.

Other information obtained from HOSTEL has appeared in Third United States Army Interrogation Reports Nos 10, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, and 30; and in Third United States Army Special Interrogation Reports Nos 1, 2, and 4.

II. INTRODUCTION

After the dissolution of the AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE as a result of World War I, the Austrian members of the old imperial parliament formed a so-called Nationalrat as a provisional national assembly. This body was composed of the representatives of the three main political parties: the Sozialdemokratische Partei Oesterreichs, the Christlichsozialer Partei, and the Alldeutsche Volkspartei. On 12 November 1918 the representatives of all three parties united in issuing a sole declaration to the effect that AUSTRIA was an integral part of the German Republic. From that time on, until the Anschluss of 1938, these parties guided the fortunes of AUSTRIA and their influence is discernible even today. A short survey of Austrian politics before the two wars may therefore assist in an understanding of present-day events.

III. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The Sozialdemokratische Partei Oesterreichs was at one time considered the most progressive and highly developed labor party in Europe. A large number of industrial workers had already been organized prior to World War I and at that time went on the unions penetrated all fields of endeavor. The Sozialdemokratische Partei was constructed upon a solid foundation of strong unions, and the leaders of the Freie Gewerkschaften (free unions) actively controlled the policies of their party.

The party's program, formulated in the so-called Linz-er Program, indicated that the Austrian Social Democrats were a radical and radical than their German counterparts. In fact this rather extreme stand on the part of the Social Democrats that caused the almost total elimination of the German labor party from the Austrian post-war political scene. The Socialists, after a brief period of power in the fall of 1918, found themselves ousted by an old guard that was not only more conservative but also more certain of its position and legislation. It was not long before the Communist Party lost most of its supporters.

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INTERNATIONAL

III. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS (Continued)

Without ever losing sight of their ultimate radical aims, the leaders of the Sozialdemokratische Partei steered a course along constitutional rather than revolutionary lines. Revolutionary agencies such as the soldiers' Soviets were transformed into constructive organizations or dissolved. Any problems, however, were bypassed when they appeared too difficult of solution and the leadership became cautious and hesitant. When the party found itself without a majority in the newly elected Parliament of 1920, it abandoned, more or less voluntarily, the executive power. Rather than take part in an uncertain and shaky coalition government, the Social Democrats relinquished the reins and the party joined the parliamentary opposition.

The new aim of the Social Democrats was to gain complete control of WIM (SOCS 4346/2 49/X 4049), the seat of one-third of WUSTALA's population. With this fortress as a base, they planned to undertake a systematic conquest of the provinces and the remaining two-thirds of the population. The first part of this project was carried out with complete success. The ultimate goal, however, remained at all times just beyond their grasp. In every election the party fell short of a majority by ten percent of the total vote.

This socialist hegemony over WIM (049/X 4094) has left even to this day a deep impression upon the political complexion of its citizens. It was completely true when the May Day paraders used to chant in unison "Wustala is red and WIM will stay red!" (WIM ist rot und WIM bleibt rot!). It was here that the Sozialdemokratische Partei had its central offices and many of the national leaders of the party became active in the city administration. After the death of the old labor leader, KUBER, stationmaster Dr. Herl Josik became Oberbürgermeister of WIM (049/X 4094) and proved in this capacity to become one of the most beloved figures in WUSTALA.

The task of the new city administration was indeed a gigantic one. The capital of WUSTALA, located on the edge of a new state of 20 million inhabitants, and without an agricultural hinterland of its own, could never, by itself, provide enough work and sustenance for its two million citizens. The fact that the Social Democrats were able to remain in power until 1934, weathering even the economic crisis of 1930 and 1931, is a tribute to their efficiency and ingenuity. They were, of course, unable to solve all the economic and social problems that troubled the unbalanced city, and the eventual collapse of the Socialist administration was recognized by all as being inevitable.

At their peak the Social Democratic unions numbered some 20,000 members, and it was this body of faithful followers that enabled the party to weather all storms until 1934. Most of these adherents lived in WIM (X 4094), for the Sozialdemokratische Partei with its administration was never outside the province. A few

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III. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS (Continued)

Islands of support may be found in the industrial South of Tyrol and in the Sardinian industrial zone of SASS. See also IIR (GOS 4346/1 48/3 6897), (GOS 4346/0 48/3 6999), and the suburbs of Innsbruck (GOS 4346/0 48/3 8999). There were only two Socialists in the holds in eastern Austria: the factory town of S. P. (GOS 4346/0 48/3 8589) and LINTZ (GOS 4346/1 48/3 8499). S. P. (GOS 4346/0 49/T 9861), the old munitions center of the Austrian Empire, was politically inactive but may have become a scene of underground operations after the outbreak of World War II brought it back into the industrial limelight.

Thus, while the party succeeded in dominating IER (A 4094) it failed to gain sufficient support in the provinces and made no attempt to broaden its base by including in its ranks the bourgeois and peasant elements of the population. The Sozialdemokratische Partei is also open to criticism in that it refused to accept any part of the governmental responsibility and preferred to remain in constitutional opposition to the national administration.

IV. THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALISTS

The Christlichsoziale Partei never attained the popular support and organizational perfection that characterized the Sozialdemokratische Partei. The Christian Socialist party was, naturally, the voice of the Catholic Church, but the Austrian ecclesiastical element never reached the dominant position attained by the German Catholics in the Zentrumspartei and the Bayerische Volkspartei.

The party had two periods of great popularity and unqualified support by the Church: the first was just before World War I under the leadership of Heinrich Dörmann, and the second was during the chancellorship of the prelate SCHÖLL from 1924 until 1934. At all other times, the Christlichsoziale Partei had very little popular support and was governed and controlled by a group of shrewd politicians and adroit parliamentarians. It had the complete support of the rural peasantry, but during the postwar years the urban petit bourgeoisie drifted into the ranks of the extreme right, the Heimatschutz and the NSDAP.

The Christlichsoziale Partei never adapted its program to the dictates of a new and rapidly changing economic and political situation, but simply expressed a desire to return to the status quo of 1914. The party, however, led by a group of exceedingly clever politicians, served as a rallying point for the conservative forces within the country, and managed to obtain a substantial number of votes in every national election. The combination of a certain number of votes from these groups interested the party, plus the support of the rural districts, was sufficient to insure the party's perpetual control of the national government. This was made possible by the fact that the Social Democrats refused either to form a minority government or to join a coalition.

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IV. THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALISTS (Continued)

The Christlichsoziale Partei was never a politically homogeneous organization. Its base was the politically passive rural population, which was organized into the Landbund. Then there was the party's ultraclerical wing led by the clergy and supported by a variety of Catholic organizations such as the Katholische Aktion, the Katholische Vereine, and several laymen's societies. Still additional party support came from a liberal wing composed of the Catholic workers' leagues under K. H. B. C. The monarchists also voted the Christian Socialist ticket.

The Heimwehr, at first a bitter opponent of the Christlichsoziale Partei, later added its forces to the clerical movement. The Heimwehr had its origin in the local home-guard units which had been formed to control the excesses of the communistic elements among the returning soldiers after World War I. These groups were consolidated and later combined with a number of veterans' organizations to form a powerful reactionary pressure bloc.

Inner disagreements and fundamentally divergent political attitudes during the late twenties, split the Heimwehr into several factions. The large group was centered in STEIERMARK under Dr. K. H. B. C. and adopted a decidedly Nazi doctrine. It was later dissolved and most of its members joined the NSDAP. Another important group under Dr. S. H. B. C. existed in the TIROL and in NIEDER-ÖSTERREICH and stood for the nationalistic Catholic program. Vacillating first on the fringes of the one group and then of the other was a third smaller faction led by Prince STARHUBER, a great admirer of Adolf HITLER. All three groups were definitely anti-democratic and authoritarian.

Dr. H. B. C., the Christian Socialist politician par excellence, used the Heimwehr movement for his own ends, playing one faction against the other and never actually ceding any of his power to these militant reactionaries. Dr. H. B. C.'s successors, however, were not so adept at the game and were forced to make definite commitments. Although the regular Christian Socialists had no sympathy for the ideology propounded by the Heimwehr, the party needed new blood if it was to be kept alive. Dr. H. B. C. was the decisive factor in forcing the Christian Socialists to include the Heimwehr in their ranks.

Dr. H. B. C. had always been sympathetic toward the anti-Fascist Heimwehr and he indicated to the Austrian government that a fusion of the Heimwehr with the Christian Social Party (and thereby the government) would meet with approval. Since the political situation made Austrian support essential, this wish was soon translated into action. In 1932 Dr. H. B. C. was elected Bundesführer of the Österreichische Heimwehr, as the newly consolidated and reorganized Heimwehr was called, and this militant group joined the government and became an agency of the Christlichsoziale Partei. At this time the predominance of Dr. H. B. C. in Austrian foreign affairs became absolute, and the influence of the Italian embassy in internal affairs was

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INTERCOMMUNIST FILE

IV. CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST (Continued)

thoroughgoing. Some sort of modus vivendi had to be established. This was attempted in the so-called protocols of MOE, a system of treaties which legalized the Italian hegemony in Austrian affairs, desired by Italy to offset the growing power of Nazi GERMANY.

This coalition had been an unnatural one from the very beginning. The Austrian government during 1932 and 1933 was shaken by one crisis after another, and the Heimwehr camp was a hotbed of plot and counterplot. In the continuous sequence of intrigues one of the Heimwehr leaders finally gained the upper hand. This was FEY, a war hero of the old imperial army.

The only concept that FEY understood was that of power, and he possessed the hardness and brutality to ride roughshod over all opposition. As Secretary of State for Security and later as Minister of the Interior under DOLLFUSS he set himself the task of eliminating the opposition of the Right and the left with every means at his disposal. It was he who directed the suppression of the Socialist revolution of 12 February 1934 and the Nazi uprising of 25 July 1934. He was neither a monarchist nor a Nazi nor even strongly clerical, but was interested only in having the power to run AUSTRIA as he saw fit.

It was a surprise to most observers that the Heimwehr should rise to such height of power under Chancellor DOLLFUSS who was considered a representative of the moderate faction in the Christlichsoziale Partei. DOLLFUSS rose to the chancellery from the position of Secretary General of the Landbund, the peasants' branch of the party. When he first took office he enjoyed considerable popularity because of a series of successful economic discussions which he arranged with the Western powers. He suddenly revealed himself in a different light when he gave the Heimwehr a free hand in the organization of his secret police system, the necessary prerequisite for a fascist state. His reign was abruptly severed by his murder in July 1934.

The only man who could stand up to FEY was SCHUBERTHUBER, who later succeeded DOLLFUSS as Chancellor. SCHUBERTHUBER was determined to break the power of the Heimwehr and by playing one faction against the other he managed to split the movement and to counter it with his own paramilitary organization, the Osterreichische Sturmabteilung. He finally emasculated all the militant groups by organizing them into a militia which was subordinate to the Army and commanded by a non-political general.

At the same time that SCHUBERTHUBER was waging an internal pre-front war against the Austrian rightists and leftists, he maintained an external struggle against Nazi GERMANY. All this was done without any visible support from the Western democracies and with only a 25% minority of the Austrian population behind him.

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... ASSOCIATION (Continued)

In the first few years after the Anschluss of 1938, the activity on the part of the Christlichsozialistische Partei was very slight. The leaders, with their unwholesome aims, could count on little popular support. The organization became the strongest Christian Socialist faction. This group was able to stand on its record of consistent opposition to Socialism. Its aim was the creation of a monarchy with the functional forms of an Austrian republican state, and supported by the western powers.

The Catholic clergy gradually gained influence in underground circles after the Nazi excesses became more extreme. The Austrian priests had at first not been especially anti-Nazi. Bishop SDBA, director of the anime at Rome, Italy had written a book which attempted to create a synthesis between Catholicism and National Socialism, and a large number of Austrian priests found the arguments valid. As time went on, however, the anti-clerical manipulations of the Nazis became more obvious and the Austrian prelates realized that there could be no compromise with Hitler.

Underground collaboration between the rightist and leftist groups was never close. Members of the clergy were prohibited from working actively with Communist-controlled organizations. The Catholic leader, Fr. SDBA, declared that one cannot fight fire with fire (den Teufel durch Scheitels austreiben) and the prevention of the spread of Communism in Austria was considered just as vital as the sustenance of the Nazis. (Shortly before the entry of the Red Army into Austria (X 4094), the Vatican sent Cardinal SDBA a letter embodying the following precepts: complete reserve in dealing with the occupying forces; no toleration of rapprochement between the Russians and representatives of the Church; intensified ecclesiastical activities to counteract the pernicious Communist propaganda among the faithful.)

V. ... Party

The ... party, as it was later known the ... party was the third great party which influenced the political life of the Austrian Republic. This party finally passed its term prior to World War II. At the end of the war, the party's leader advocated a Greater Austria under the leadership of an emperor of the house of Habsburg. ... had been over the course of the ... and became the leader of the "Army from ..." movement in Austria.

The ... party, with almost consistently between ten and twenty percent of the total vote, thus making its support indispensable to the party controlling the government of Austria. With the Christian Socialists and the Social Democrats, which between thirty and forty-five percent of the total vote. The ... party provided a sort of a balance for all nationalist movements which arose in the course of time, but its influence was eventually almost entirely absorbed by the ...

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THE RISE AND THE NAZIS (Continued)

Many of HITLER's ideas can be traced directly to the Pan-Germans and the Pan-Germans. When the Reich absorbed Austria in 1938, the ideal of the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei had been fulfilled, and the party then lost its reason for further existence. The Pan-Germans and the Heimwehr extremists had been drifting over to the Nazism as early as 1937. At that time, the year of the last free elections in Austria, the National Socialists were behind only the Social Democrats in number of votes, and were the second strongest group in the country. It is estimated that if an election had been held just before the Anschluss in 1938, the Nazis would have polled 40% of the vote, the Social Democrats would have polled 40%, and SCHUSCHNIG's Vaterlaendische Front would have received the remaining twenty percent.

VI. THE REVOLUTION OF 12 FEBRUARY 1934

Having traced the backgrounds and fortunes of the major parties of the Austrian Republic, this survey will now review the events of the last twelve years in Austria and in the losing fight of the liberal elements against the forces of reaction.

In 1933, spurred on by the easy successes which had greeted HITLER in GERMANY, the Christian Socialists, abetted by the Heimwehr, organized an authoritarian regime for Austria. The president and both vice presidents of the Austrian parliament had resigned because of a petty squabble and the Christian Socialist chancellor, DILLIGUS, took over the reins of government and reigned by executive edicts and proclamations based on the Kriegswirtschaftliche Ermachtigungsgesetz. This law, which some hair-splitting lawyer had dug out of the archives, where it had been resting since its enactment in 1917, had never been officially revoked and thus became a part of the Austrian constitution.

The Kriegswirtschaftliche Ermachtigungsgesetz gave the chancellor the right to govern without sanction of parliament. It was originally intended to provide the executive with a means of tidying over the economic life of the country during emergency periods and during the periods preceding the election of a new parliamentary president. This same law was later used to dissolve parliament and to foist a new constitution on the people, thus making the transition from a constitutional democracy to an authoritarian dictatorship complete.

The DILLIGUS government had little popular support. The opposition was recruited from both extremes: the Sozialdemokratische Partei on the left and the NSDAP on the right. The Christian Socialist minority, however, hoped to prevail with the aid of the small but well-organized army, the police force, and the support of SCHUSCHNIG. The real power behind the throne as well as its guiding genius was not SCHUSCHNIG but SCHUSCHNIG.

This, then, was the alignment of forces when the leaders of the Sozialdemokratische Partei, by no means unanimous in their resolve, decided to contest power with force and issued a call to arms to the Austrian proletariat. The main tactic to be used was not an armed coup d'etat but a general

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

12 FEBRUARY 1974 (Continued)

The use of the general strike had been perfected by the party leadership as the most powerful weapon during the strike in 1934. The mere threat of a general strike had previously been sufficient to force upon the government the adoption of measures of importance which the Social Democrats considered of vital importance.

In anticipation of an unexpected and unavoidable clash of arms, a considerable stock of weapons had been placed at the disposal of the party's para-military organization, the Schutzbund. These weapons were mainly a part of the enormous pile which had been hidden from the disarmament commissions and which had been transferred to the arsenals of the military auxiliaries of both parties.

The Social Democrats' plans were no secret to FEY, the Christian Socialist Minister of Security. His secret police network was highly efficient. As a matter of fact, one of the members of the Supreme Council of the Sozialdemokratische Partei was in FEY's employ and kept him informed of all the decisions of this body. FEY was aware of the divergence of opinion and indecision which prevailed among the liberal leaders, and he made use of this situation.

Without giving the Socialists time to complete their plans FEY managed to bring the revolt to a premature head. The most radical branch of the Sozialdemokratische Partei was met in ISE (X 4094) but in LI's (V 5489), and it was there that the Minister of the Interior decided to strike. The police confiscated some small arms at a workers' settlement in LI's and provoked a gun battle with members of the Schutzbund, setting off the signal for a general revolt. Commencing in ISE (X 4094) the conflict soon spread to LI's (V 5489) and succeeded in enrolling all Austrian Social Democrats.

The revolt of 12 February 1934 seemed at first to have every chance of success and even the commitment of units of the Austrian Army would not have sufficed to put it down if the general strike had been carried to a successful conclusion. But the power of the old labor unions was no longer the same. Success had brought conspiracy and the Christian Socialists and for some time had infiltrated small detachments of their henchmen into most of the vital industrial enterprises of the nation. These secret detachments provided a skeleton force for the operation of the important utilities and managed to bring the strike.

The Army High Command, operating the railroads under military control, was able to keep troops from one threatened area to the next. The revolution was totally crushed. Thousands of men were wounded at the barricades, a great many including high-ranking and some of the leaders were hanged. The government's control of all social democrats was broken under the control of the authoritarian minority. Finally, a special law of reactionary and reactionary nature of the Christian Social Party was appointed (I 4094).

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VII. THE REVOLUTION OF 12 FEBRUARY 1934 (Continued)

The Sozialdemokratische Partei never recovered from this blow. Its leaders in exile, mainly in CZECHOSLOVAKIA, never succeeded in organizing an underground structure of any importance. Many a Social Democrat shelved his principles and decided to continue the struggle against the Austrian dictatorship in the ranks of the Nazis, who at least had an efficient organization designed to survive long years of suppression. A number of Socialists also joined forces with the Communists, but the Third International never succeeded in establishing a strong and truly popular underground movement.

VII. AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS OF 1938

The German annexation of AUSTRIA in 1938 found the Austrian liberals inactive and apathetic. A great many sincere Social Democrats were actually glad to see the hated SOZIALISMUS regime get its just due and hoped that with this change there would come an alleviation of the atrocious economic conditions then prevailing. The German Nazis were greeted as the lesser of two evils.

The first period immediately after 1938 seemed indeed to be a chance for the better. The strong German controls did not at first concern the Austrian worker, who saw no profound difference between an Austrian and a German fascist. The unemployment problem was solved within a matter of months by the familiar Nazi method of embarking on a general rearmament program. The Alpine provinces also relieved a certain measure of prosperity, for the German tourist traffic, their principal source of income, increased by leaps and bounds. The German administrative and judicial measures were no radical change for the Austrian people, who had been suffering under a similar system for four years prior to HITLER'S conquest.

The Nazis were rather skillful in the field of communal politics. The first Oberbuergermeister of WIEN (X 4094) under the new regime was one HUBBACH, a former Social Democrat. Then he reappointed some of the functionaries who had served under him in the old city administration, a certain satisfaction was felt even among the most intransigent Social Democrats. This tact in local administration, combined with the ruthless application of all measures of terror and repression wherever they were indicated, succeeded in keeping the revolution in line and forestalled the organization of an effective resistance movement.

Until 1942 there was little active opposition to the National Socialist dictatorship in AUSTRIA. It was the deterioration of the military situation, combined with a simultaneous change in the personal welfare of the individual, that brought about the birth of an underground resistance movement of considerable proportions. This underground fight was largely led and encouraged by the Communists, although most of the participants were former Social Democrats.

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... (Continued)

The end war and was never an obstacle because many phases of its activity were... highly efficient secret police of the Soviet... had been successfully incorporated into the... other reason for the inefficiency of the... ment lies in the fact that the several underground... tions were never able to agree on a uniform program and to subordinate themselves to a firm and coordinated leadership. Instead of conducting an effective resistance, the various steering committees busied themselves with the preparation of blacklists of their enemies and whitelists of their friends, who were to be placed in positions of power after the overthrow of the Nazi regime by someone else. The abortive coup of 21 July 1944 was executed with little enthusiasm by the Austrian Socialists since the perpetrators of the plot, the Russian officers, were hardly more popular than the Nazis.

It was only with the approach of the Russians in the spring of 1945 that the various resistance groups finally decided on active collaboration with each other in a supreme congress. The "unified" underground, "C-5", was born a symbol than an active organization. Even under the most favorable circumstances, in a true community of interests in the fight against a universally-hated foe, the various political groups were unable to forget their old differences. It is to be expected that with the external pressure of Nazi dictatorship removed, these groups will again take up their struggle for power.

The Austrian political groups are united only in the more fundamental aspects of foreign policy, which means primarily that they favor a definite orientation toward the West. This is to be explained by the rather high standard of living enjoyed by the Austrian worker before the war. Even the Austrian Communists frequently look toward their Western comrades for support. According to informants, the leaders of the Austrian Communist underground expressed the wish in the beginning of 1945 that the Red Army would abstain from occupying Austria but would rather allow the nation to organize its own reconstruction.

Dr. Wilhelm H. ... of this report, claims that the leader of the left wing of the Austrian Liberation Committee, "H. ...", asked him to establish contact with American agents in ... in order to organize for an American occupation force to check the Russian advance. Dr. ... the Austrian underground representative in ... expressed, according to ... similar sentiments.

VIII. ENDING THE AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION

The arrival of Soviet troops in ... (X 4004) was preceded by a flood of atrocity stories spread by soldiers fleeing from ... Although ... such distressed, there was no mass exodus from the city, owing partly to the fact that there was no means of transportation available. The ... was entirely inactive and the underground activists found little opportunity to harass the ... Only ... the SS troops under ... and ... all ... small resistance ... in the pursuit of dispersed units and the ... of local centers of resistance.

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MEMORANDUM

VIII. DURING THE AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION (Continued)

When the time came for the establishment of a new government, the Austrian Communists soon realized they could fill only a fraction of the positions from their meager ranks. The resurgent Sozialdemokratische Partei became the gathering point for all those who wished to cooperate with the occupying forces without necessarily accepting the Soviet political creed. The Russians were well aware that this was the only truly popular party in Austria, and no Communists were appointed to key positions in the new administration. Some observers thought that this was merely a clever move on the part of the Russians to win British and American recognition for their Austrian coalition government.

Selected as head of the new administration was the universally respected Dr. Karl RENNER, the patriarch of Austrian socialism. RENNER also holds the Foreign Affairs portfolio, a rather superfluous office at the present time. It is important to note that RENNER is a man of more than seventy and has not for some years been in possession of his full mental and physical faculties.

The same may be said for KUNSCHE, who was chosen as the Christian Socialist representative in the cabinet. This old, exhausted man was the leader of the liberal wing of the Christlichsozialer Partei and became well known as the organizer of its powerless labor unions.

The Ministry of Commerce is held by LAMM, a shrewd politician who held the same post in several pre-1938 governments. Politically affiliated with the Christian Socialists, he was never able to gain their complete support or liking. He has the reputation of being one of those men whose political success has not been unattended by a corresponding rise in their material fortunes.

The Minister of Agriculture, SCHNEIDER, was active in the Bauernbund in Austria for a good many years and his qualifications as an agrarian expert are of the best.

The Minister of Justice, WENZ, was a prosecuting attorney until 1938, when he was forced to leave Austria because of his Jewish extraction and because of the fact that he had prosecuted many National Socialists in court. He only became politically active during his period of exile.

As Oberbuergermeister of VIENNA (X 4074) the Russians selected the popular Socialist, General Theodor KORNBLAU. As commander of the Sozialdemokratische Militaristische Schutzbund before 1934 he showed ability and great organizational talent. Today, however, General KORNBLAU is in his eighties and can be said to be senile. His vice mayors are the septuagenarian KUNSCHE and the young Communist underground fighter, SCHNEIDER.

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VIII. THE REAL RUSSIAN SITUATION (Continued)

On close examination, the Soviet-appointed government presents a peculiar aspect. Behind "Ukraine's" great historic figures, most of whom have one foot in the grave, stand the real administrators of the regime, the underground activists, the true color and worth of whom is yet to be shown. It is still too early to predict what will happen when the mask falls.

Richard H. Feulner
EDWARD L. KING *USA* SSGC
Major, Infantry
Commanding

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031100
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3 SEPT 1945

TO: AG/OGL, WASH
FROM: AG/OGL, SAL ARMY

REFER TO AG/OGL MESSAGE 16. HOE TFL
LUCKY IC ADVISES QUIZ NOW COMPLETE. BODY AVAILABLE UP
DISPOSITION AT OICE.

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AB12, THIRD 1945

1 September 1945
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AB21, MARCH

ROUTINE

- 1) AM trying get WHEEL brought WEST IC or local internment center soonest.
- 2) Suggest GENTLE remain LUCKY IC till after his transfer.

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TO: AR/000 AMZCN
FROM: AR/012, 3RD

1. LUCKY IC SAY WILL FINISH HOETTL BY 14 SEPT.
2. THEY WISH DISPOSE BODYS ON NEXT.
3. HOETTL SUSPICIOUS DOUBLE CROSS BY US AND PRESENT SECURITY PROBLEM TO IC.
4. SUGGEST BODY BE TAKEN USFET IC WAIT FINAL DECISION ON CASE.
5. ADVISE DISPOSITION SOONEST.

CRS IN 6399

Act: Miss Winslow

SAIST
EXEC

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE CENTER
INTERROGATION SECTION
APO 403

2 August 1945

SUBJECT : Frau Hildegard BEETZ
TO : SCI Det., Munich, 12th Army Group

Frau BEETZ was questioned in accordance with Special Brief of SCI Det., Munich, 12th Army Group, dated 21 July 45, and the following information obtained:

1. PRAGER, alleged German agent and Captain of the SS. Frau BEETZ met PRAGER for the first time in January 1944 at CERNOBBIO vic COMO. She went to CERNOBBIO in the company of SS Sturm-bannfuhrer Dr. HOTTL in order to arrange for permission to enter Switzerland. Her ostensible mission in SWITZERLAND was to work for the German Consul General at LUGANO. Actually she was to continue her original mission, viz to secure CIANO's diary and other important papers supposed to be in the hands of CIANO's widow who was detained by the Swiss. During her stay in Switzerland Frau BEETZ received frequent visits by PRAGER who brought her the official mail from the RSHA and who picked up her reports which he took back to Italy whence they were mailed to the RSHA. Frau BEETZ met PRAGER the second time in May 1944. At that time she again enlisted PRAGER's help to get her a permit of entry into Switzerland. She stayed at CERNOBBIO until end of June 1944 at which time her application was definitely turned down. During this period of time she had frequent personal contacts with PRAGER. Although he showed a great deal of reticence in talking about personal matters, Frau BEETZ was able to gain a fairly reliable picture of the position he held. She is less sure about his personal and professional background.

a) Grenzbefehlsstelle West

PRAGER is neither a member of the SS (information to the contrary notwithstanding) nor does he belong to the SD. He worked directly for the 'Grenzbefehlsstelle West' (GBW), the executive arm of the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei in Italy and as such embodying elements of Stapo, Kripo and SD. The GBW, as the name indicates, was charged with the security of the border districts separating Italy from Switzerland and from France. Commander of the GBW was SS Hauptsturmfuhrer VOETTERL who received his orders directly from the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei HASTER.

b) Position

PRAGER served the GEW in the capacity both of a confidential agent (V-mann) and liaison functionary (Verbindungsmann). Frau BEETZ believes that PRAGER, who is an affluent businessman, was not on the payroll of the SD but acted in an honorary capacity.

c) Private Business

PRAGER owned some commercial enterprise in the town of CHIASSO on the Swiss side of the Italo-Swiss border. Frau BEETZ does not know what branch of business PRAGER engaged in. The name of his firm was GIUSVOR. At the occasion of her first trip to Switzerland Frau BEETZ got Swiss currency through PRAGER and she believes that he engaged in currency transactions on a big scale. PRAGER told Frau BEETZ that he was frequently consulted by the German Chamber of Commerce in MILANO in respect to complications arising out of Allied pressure brought to bear on Switzerland with the aim to curtail transit of German resp Italian goods through that country.

d) Work for the GEW

PRAGER whose residence was in the vic of CHIASSO, however on the Italian side of the border, could cross into Switzerland and back into Italy as often as he wanted. This freedom of movement across the border aided him of course considerably in discharging the missions assigned him by GEW. As an example he could visit with the German Consul General at LUGANO or the Chamber of Commerce at ZURICH just any day without arousing any undue suspicion inasmuch as he was known to be a prominent businessman and presumably acting in pursuance of legitimate interests. Under this cloak he was able to aid in the maintenance of liaison between the SD and its representatives in Switzerland. About the latter he should be exceptionally well informed.

e) Special Qualifications

PRAGER's activities in behalf of the GEW were apparently closely linked with his economic interests. He was considered an authority on the Swiss border district called TESSIN. His knowledge of personalities playing an economic or political role in Switzerland was considered both prolific and reliable. By virtue of his knowledge and experience PRAGER wielded considerable influence in the GEW and even SS Hauptsturmfuhrer VOETTERL found himself reduced to a second string position. According to Frau BEETZ, PRAGER was the will and the brains of GEW.

f) Agent Net

Frau BEETZ has not heard anything indicating that

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PRAGER had an information net in Switzerland. At any rate he never mentioned the use of confidential agents. From all indications PRAGER confined himself to rendering opinions and occasionally to running errands into Switzerland.

g) Personal Data

PRAGER is married to a Swiss who is a native of the French speaking part of Switzerland. His father-in-law is a prominent physician in Lausanne and is rumored to have furnished his son-in-law with some valuable connections. There is an unsubstantiated rumor that PRAGER, an Austrian by birth, served as an Intelligence officer in the old Austro-Hungarian army. PRAGER is 60 years of age. He suffers from a severe case of diabetes.

2. MUSSOLINI ON GERMANY

a) Circumstances of find

The original of MUSSOLINI's expose of Germany (often referred to as his diary) was found by sheer accident contained in a small notebook among his personal effects during the GRAN SASSO raid. An alert SD man had a photostatic copy made, whereupon the original was returned to MUSSOLINI.

b) Translation

Where other translators in the RSHA failed, viz to decipher MUSSOLINI's all but illegible handwriting from an inferior photostatic copy, Frau BEETZ succeeded. Great precautions were taken to preclude any leakage. Frau BEETZ was sworn to secrecy and expressly forbidden to make any carbon copies. Despite very elaborate precautions Frau BEETZ managed to copy the main points in their original Italian version. As to the whereabouts of the photostatic copy SS Hauptsturmfuhrer KRALLERT should be questioned (group VI G, RSHA).

c) PUCCI

Frau BEETZ mentioned the existence of the expose and the fact of her having copied it in part to PUCCI in January 1944 when she looked him up in a Swiss hospital. PUCCI told Father PANCINO about it who in turn broached the matter to Frau BEETZ. She denied everything and passed it off as a product of PUCCI's febrile imagination. Frau BEETZ does not believe that Father PANCINO notified the SD.

d) Whereabouts of digest

The digest was among the other papers turned over by Frau BEETZ to Lt. FRENCH, SCI, in WEIMAR. She claims that, at the request of Lt. FRENCH, she translated it into English and

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retained her own handwritten Italian copy which should be with her personal effects in WIESBADEN.

/s/ EDMUND L KING
Major, Inf.
COMMANDING

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To: SEAWARD

From: WAB ROOM

Re your 355 on 5/1/44.

1. 14 traces confirm selected November 1944 for special mission in connection CLARK.

2. Questionnaire follows.

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(3) OGCZARSD, Kemerich, HOTTIL recounted the meeting with OGCZARSK which occurred at the Salzburg Customs Station on the Austro-German border in essentially the same terms as this meeting was reported elsewhere by KRICHBAUM. According to HOTTIL, after OGCZARSK's car had departed, he and KRICHBAUM questioned the man SCHEFFER and ICHER who had just come out of the customs office said, "Oh, you mean OGCZARSK," and then made some remarks about OGCZARSK'S being engaged in espionage activity because he was passed quietly through customs by the guards.

(4) Hildegard BETZ, HOTTIL stated that in a restaurant in Dusseldorf during the October trip through Germany he encountered Hildegard BETZ who was having lunch with a party of eight or ten at a large table in the restaurant. HOTTIL was not present. HOTTIL approached BETZ and spoke with her for several minutes. During this time, BETZ stated that she had recently married and that she did not wish to resume any of her previous intelligence associations. When asked about the present whereabouts of one of her friends, whom HOTTIL had known as an American intelligence officer, she stated that she believed FLEX to be in Berlin. HOTTIL admitted that he had previously mentioned BETZ'S name to FORGER and that he had a general idea of something about her.

A large number of names (50-75) were mentioned during the interrogation by HOTTIL or by the interrogators. In each case that a name was mentioned the interrogator asked whether the name had been discussed with HOTTIL. In each case, HOTTIL said either that it had not been discussed or that if it had, he did not remember. None of the names which HOTTIL did not have been discussed were connected with the Top Secret case or other matters the interrogator knows. In any event on such names as he did, HOTTIL, as well as other members of the Golden group and specific members of the group of Art Geklen, HOTTIL stated that no mention was ever made of the identity or of displayed by ICHER. HOTTIL admitted that he may have discussed such names as KRAMER, a personal enemy, and that General Geklen and ICHER may have come up because LAHOUSEL was known to be a source of material for HOTTIL's books. In summary, HOTTIL claimed that he did not know of Soviet intelligence anybody who is engaged in sensitive activity against the Soviets. He was not already known to ICHER. Concerning Art Geklen, he stated that he always had the impression that ICHER knew more than he did. If that be added that both Geklen and HOTTIL were discussed only as contacts of each other or as personalities. He admitted that ICHER urged HOTTIL to become a member of Art Geklen, saying that undoubtedly Art Geklen was the future German Intelligence Service and giving as his reason the fact that the Americans had spent millions of dollars building up the Golden group and would never permit another group to become important in German intelligence. When asked whether he knew that ICHER had attempted to make a connection between HOTTIL and American Intelligence in the summer of 1950, HOTTIL affected complete surprise and stated that he had no idea that this had happened and no idea why ICHER should have made such a suggestion.

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In the course of the interrogation, considerable valuable information was developed on ROBERT'S past and current activities. This information supported as it is by the documents impounded in the search of ROBERT'S quarters and office will be written up as typed reports and disseminated to interested customers. The impounded material includes diagrams of the organization which ROBERT was attempting to set up for H. I. and which he later attempted to sell to Kurt Gehlen. These diagrams include source lists of principal agents and of agents. It is interesting that these source lists include only the names of notorious fabricators or of professional criminals. There are no names on the list of persons who honestly collect intelligence, and all of the persons listed are, like ROBERT himself, primarily operations officers and arrangers. ROBERT admitted that with the exception of several special cases he had never himself handled an agent directly, either under the Nazi system or during the period following the war. He also admitted quite freely that he did not have the techniques of espionage at the collecting level and that he never considered himself to be a technician in this field, having always been concerned with the larger picture and with organizing operations at the top level.

c. The interrogators have the impression that ROBERT is definitely concealing information on a number of points. He showed defensiveness in the polygraph examination to all questions pertaining to the concealment or destruction of documents and, although he stated that he had not destroyed his files nor had he hidden other portions of his files outside of his house, the interrogators are convinced that some destruction or concealment has taken place. Technically ROBERT is not physiologically testable by polygraph. He has low blood pressure and a circulatory defect which makes the recording of changes in his pulse rate and blood pressure almost impossible. It was characteristic of his reactions on the polygraph machine that the strongest response was made to a question in which he was asked to state that he was not lying. It is also characteristic that he reacted in some respect to every question and that his breathing showed throughout a certain amount of tension. From these observations, which will be repeated periodically by another interrogator, and from direct observations during the course of the interrogation, the interrogators are convinced that ROBERT is lying about or concealing some piece of information which to them is extremely important. This piece of information may be connected with the knowledge of the relations between Anton GERSH and the ROBERT group. The interrogators have various theories about what ROBERT is concealing. These theories are all unsupported by concrete evidence. It is possible that ROBERT is a Soviet agent in contact with the Soviet-controlled network in H. I., either through ROBERT or through somebody else. It is possible that he is a Soviet agent who nevertheless was unaware of GERSH'S affiliation. It is also possible that he is not a Soviet agent but is involved in some intelligence involving the future German Intelligence Service and present German intelligence groups which he cannot afford to reveal to Americans. This last theory is partly supported by a number of curious circumstances surrounding the recent behavior by members of the Gehlen group and by members of other U.S.-sponsored intelligence operations which employ former German intelligence officers.

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Finally, it is possible that HOETTL is sincere in his statements that he expects Mr. Allen Walsh Dulles to take personal cognizance of his case and that he is under the impression that his present interrogators are hostile to Mr. Dulles. This fourth theory would explain his reactions to interrogation, but the theory cannot be accepted unless we assume that HOETTL is naive about the present organization of American intelligence. Such naivete is unlikely. In any event, the fourth theory will be tested in the next interrogation.

4. Future Plans.

a. Further Interrogation. HOETTL is at present in solitary confinement, where it is planned that he will remain until 3 April 1953 when he will be reintegrated. The decision to release him is being delayed until his reaction to solitary confinement can be learned.

b. Reports. It is planned to follow this preliminary report with a series of more detailed reports.

(1) HOETTL's reaction to the arrest of VERBER and POMER. HOETTL's immediate reactions when he learned through the press of the arrest of VERBER and POMER are recorded in part in correspondence between himself and his chief assistant, Baron Heinrich von MATH, as well as in his report to Rupert MARDEL and his report to Wolf W. HUBER. A separate report will be prepared covering this material.

(2) Personalities. The large number of personalities who have been mentioned during the course of the interrogation will be listed in a separate report with HOETTL's comments on each personality mentioned. This report will be of some value in the future investigation and will be of considerable value in the continuing counter-intelligence study of HOETTL's activities.

(3) Assessment of HOETTL. A report summarizing the assessment of HOETTL as a personality will be prepared. This assessment will include impressions formed by the interrogators, facts established concerning HOETTL's intelligence activity, and capacity, and results of study of documents impounded.

(4) HOETTL's Correspondence with LOUWER. A special report on the correspondence between the Central European Press and HOETTL is being prepared which will include the correspondence itself as well as HOETTL's responses to the intensive interrogation on this subject conducted during the evening hours of 26 March 1953.

(5) Impounded Material. The material impounded during the search of HOETTL'S house and office is being photographed and copies of these photographs will be made available for incorporation into appropriate files. In the course of time, research will be done on this material both in Austria and in Washington, and it is probable that a series of reports will issue from this research.

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
c. Press action. Press releases have been prepared in the event that public curiosity concerning ROSENBERG's arrest brings pressure to bear on American authorities in Austria. If the Department of Justice consents, it is our present desire to issue at some time in the future a press release which will implicate ROSENBERG directly with Kurt Dittus. The purpose of this press release is to insure that ROSENBERG is discredited once and for all with German Intelligence Services, and thereby to prevent his continued harassment of the United States by the processing through various channels of fabricated intelligence.

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... adoption and realization, it was not long before the Communist Party lost most of its supporters.

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INFORMATION REPORT No 43

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INFORMATION REPORT No 43

III. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS (Continued)

Without ever losing sight of their ultimate radical aims, the leaders of the Sozialdemokratische Partei steered a course along constitutional rather than revolutionary lines. Revolutionary agencies such as the soldiers' soviets were transformed into constructive organizations or dissolved. Many problems, however, were bypassed when they appeared too difficult of solution and the leadership became cautious and hesitant. When the party found itself without a majority in the newly elected parliament of 1920, it abandoned, more or less voluntarily, the executive power. Rather than take part in an uncertain and shaky coalition government, the Social Democrats relinquished the reins and the party joined the parliamentary opposition.

The new plan of the Social Democrats was to gain complete control of WIEN (GCSG 4840/49/X 4040), the seat of one-third of AUSTRIA's population. With this fortress as a base, they planned to undertake a systematic conquest of the provinces and the remaining two-thirds of the population. The first part of this project was carried out with complete success. The ultimate goal, however, remained at all times just beyond their grasp. In every election the party fell short of a majority by ten percent of the total vote.

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This socialist hegemony over WIEN (049/X 4094) has left even to this day a deep impression upon the political complexion of its citizens. It was completely true when the May Day paraders used to chant in unison "WIEN is red and VIENNA will stay red!" (WIEN ist rot und WIEN bleibt rot!). It was here that the Sozialdemokratische Partei held its central offices and many of the national leaders of the party became active in the city administration. After the death of the old labor leader, Eduard, Nationalist Dr. Karl SEITZ became Oberbuergermeister of WIEN (049/X 4094) and grew in this capacity to become one of the most beloved figures in AUSTRIA.

The task of the new city administration was indeed a gigantic one. The capital of AUSTRIA, located on the edge of a new state of six million inhabitants, and without an agricultural hinterland of its own, could never, by itself, provide enough work and sustenance for its two million citizens. The fact that the Social Democrats were able to remain in power until 1934, weathering even the economic crisis of 1930 and 1931, is a tribute to their efficiency and ingenuity. They were, of course, unable to solve all the economic and social problems that troubled the unbalanced city, and the eventual collapse of the Socialist administration was recognized by all as being inevitable.

At their peak the Social Democratic unions numbered some 800,000 members, and it was this body of faithful followers that enabled the party to weather all storms until 1934. Most of these adherents lived in WIEN (X 4094), for the Sozialdemokratische Partei with its subsidiaries was never strong in the provinces. A few

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IV. THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALISTS (Continued)

The Christlichsoziale Partei was never a politically homogeneous organization. Its base was the politically passive rural population, which was organized into the Landbund. Then there was the party's ultraclerical wing led by the clergy and supported by a variety of Church organizations such as the Katholische Aktion, the Kolpings-Vereine, and several laymen's societies. Still additional party support came from a liberal wing composed of the Catholic workers' leagues under MUNSCHAK. The monarchists also voted the Christian Socialist ticket.

The Heimwehr, at first a bitter opponent of the Christlichsoziale Partei, later added its forces to the clerical movement. The Heimwehr had its origin in the local home-guard units which had been formed to control the excesses of the communistic elements among the returning soldiers after World War I. These groups were consolidated and later combined with a number of veterans' organizations to form a powerful reactionary pressure bloc.

Inner disagreements and fundamentally divergent political attitudes during the late twenties, split the Heimwehr into several factions. One large group was centered in STEIERMARK under Dr. PRINZNER and adopted a decidedly Nazi doctrine. It was later dissolved and most of its members joined the NSDAP. Another important group under Dr. STEIDLE existed in the TIROL and in NIEDERÖSTERREICH and stood for the nationalistic Catholic program. Vacillating first on the fringes of the one group and then of the other was a third smaller faction led by Prince STARHemberg, a great admirer of Adolf Hitler. All three groups were definitely anti-democratic and authoritarian.

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SEIFEL, the Christian Socialist politician par excellence, used the Heimwehr movement for his own ends, playing one faction against the other and never actually ceding any of his power to these militant reactionaries. SEIFEL's successors, however were not so adept at the game and were forced to make definite commitments. Although the regular Christian Socialists had no sympathy for the ideology propounded by the Heimwehr, the party needed new blood if it was to be kept alive. MUSSOLINI was the decisive factor in forcing the Christian Socialists to include the Heimwehr in their ranks.

MUSSOLINI had always been sympathetic toward the semi-fascist Heimwehr and he indicated to the Austrian government that a fusion of STARHEMBERG's wing of the Heimwehr with the Christian Socialist party (and thereby the government) would be met with approval. Since the political situation made Italian support essential, this wish was soon translated into action. In 1932 STARHEMBERG was elected Bundesfuehrer of the Oesterreichische Heimatschutz, as the newly consolidated and reorganized Heimwehr was called, and this militant group joined the government and became an agency of the Christlichsoziale Partei. At this time the predominance of ITALY in Austrian foreign affairs became absolute, and the influence of the Italian embassy on internal affairs was

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INTERROGATION REPORT NO 43

IV. THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST (Continued)

In the first few years after the Anschluss of 1938, underground activity on the part of the Christlichsoziale Partei was very slight. The leaders, with their unwholesome past, could drum up little popular support. The monarchists became the strongest Christian Socialist faction. This group was able to stand on its record of consistent opposition to fascism. Its aim was the creation of a monarchy with the functional forms of an Austrian republican state, and guaranteed by the western powers.

The Catholic clergy gradually gained influence in underground circles after the Nazi excesses became more extreme. The Austrian priests had at first not been especially anti-Nazi. Bishop DUBAL, director of the Anima at ROMA, Italy had written a book which attempted to create a synthesis between Catholicism and National Socialism, and a large number of Austrian priests found the arguments valid. As time went on, however, the anti-clerical manipulations of the Nazis became more obvious and the Austrian prelates realized that there could be no compromise with HITLER.

Underground collaboration between the rightist and leftist groups was never close. Members of the clergy were prohibited from working actively with Communist-controlled organizations. The Catholic leader, Dr RUDOLPH, declared that one cannot fight fire with fire (den Teufel durch Beelzebub austreiben) and the prevention of the spread of Communism in AUSTRIA was considered just as vital as the ousting of the Nazis. (Shortly before the entry of the Red Army into WIEN (X 4094), the VATICAN sent Cardinal HILTZER a letter embodying the following precepts: Complete reserve in dealing with the occupying power; no toleration of rapprochement between the Russians and representatives of the Church; intensified ecclesiastical activities to counteract the pernicious Communist influence upon the faithful.)

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V. THE FAN-GERMANS AND THE NAXIS (Continued)

Many of HITLER's ideas can be traced directly to SCHOENERER and the Fan-Germans. When the Reich absorbed AUSTRIA in 1938, the ideal of the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei had been fulfilled, and the party then lost its reason for further existence. The Fan-Germans and the Heimwehr extremists had been drifting over to the Nazism as early as 1933. At that time, the year of the last free elections in AUSTRIA, the National Socialists were behind only the Social Democrats in number of votes, and were the second strongest group in the country. It is estimated that if an election had been held just before the Anschluss in 1938, the Nazis would have polled 40% of the vote, the Social Democrats would have polled 40%, and SCHUSCHNIGG's Vaterlaendische Front would have received the remaining twenty percent.

VI. THE REVOLUTION OF 12 FEBRUARY 1934

Having traced the backgrounds and fortunes of the major parties of the Austrian Republic, this survey will now review the events of the last twelve years in AUSTRIA and in the losing fight of the liberal elements against the forces of reaction.

In 1933, spurred on by the easy successes which had greeted HITLER in GERMANY, the Christian Socialists, abetted by the Heimwehr, organized an authoritarian regime for AUSTRIA. The president and both vice presidents of the Austrian parliament had resigned because of a petty squabble and the Christian Socialist chancellor, DOLLFUSS, took over the reins of government and reigned by executive edicts and proclamations based on the Kriegswirtschaftliche Ermessertigungsgesetz. This law, which some hair-splitting lawyer had dug out of the archives, where it had been resting since its enactment in 1917, had never been officially revoked and thus become a part of the Austrian constitution.

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V. THE PAN-GERMANS AND THE NAZIS

The Alldoitsche or, as it was later known the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei was the third great party which influenced the political life of the Austrian Republic. This party had already passed its prime prior to World War I. An admirer of BISMARCK, SCHOENERER, the party's leader advocated a Greater GERMANY under the leadership of an emperor of the house of HAPSBURG. SCHOENERER had taken over the slogans of the Kulturkampf and became the leader of the "Army from ROME" movement in AUSTRIA.

The Pan-German party polled almost consistently between ten and twenty percent of the total vote, thus making its support indispensable to the party controlling the government at the time. Both the Christian Socialists and the Social Democrats polled between thirty and forty-five percent of the total vote. The Grossdeutsche Volkspartei provided a pool of supporters for all nationalist movements which arose in the course of time, but its adherents were eventually almost entirely absorbed by the NSDAP.

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The Kriegswirtschaftliche Ermächtigungsgesetz gave the chancellor the right to govern without sanction of parliament. It was originally intended to provide the executive with a means of tidling over the economic life of the country during emergency periods and during the periods preceding the election of a new parliamentary president. This same law was later used to dissolve parliament and to foist a new constitution on the people, thus making the transition from a constitutional democracy to an authoritarian dictatorship complete.

The DOLLFUSS government had little popular support. The opposition was recruited from both extremes: the Sozialdemokratische Partei on the left and the NSDAP on the right. The Christian Socialist minority, however, hoped to prevail with the aid of the small but well-organized army, the police force, and the support of MUSSOLINI. The real power behind the throne as well as its guiding genius was not DOLLFUSS but SCHUSCHNIGG.

This, then, was the alignment of forces when the leaders of the Sozialdemokratische Partei, by no means unanimous in their resolve, decided to combat force with force and issued a call to arms to the Austrian proletariat. The main method to be used was not an armed coup d'etat but a general

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VI. THE REVOLUTION OF 12 FEBRUARY 1934 (Continued)

The Sozialdemokratische Partei never recovered from this blow. Its leaders in exile, mainly in CZECHOSLOVAKIA, never succeeded in organizing an underground structure of any importance. Many a Socialist proletariat shelved his principles and decided to continue the struggle against the Austrian dictatorship in the ranks of the Nazis, who at least had an efficient organization designed to survive long years of suppression. A number of Socialists also joined forces with the Communists, but the Third International never succeeded in establishing a strong and truly popular underground movement.

VII. AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS OF 1938

The German annexation of AUSTRIA in 1938 found the Austrian liberals inactive and apathetic. A great many sincere Social Democrats were actually glad to see the hated SCHUSCHNIGG regime get its just due and hoped that with this change there would come an alleviation of the atrocious economic conditions then prevailing. The German Nazis were greeted as the lesser of two evils.

The first period immediately after 1938 seemed indeed to be a change for the better. The strong German controls did not at first concern the Austrian worker, who saw no profound difference between an Austrian and a German fascist. The unemployment problem was solved within a matter of months by the familiar Nazi method of embarking on a general rearmament program. The Alpine provinces also achieved a certain measure of prosperity, for the German tourist traffic, their principal source of income, increased by leaps and bounds. The German administrative and judicial measures were no radical change for the Austrian people, who had been suffering under a similar system for four years prior to HITLER's conquest.

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The revolt of 12 February 1934 seemed at first to have every chance of success and even the commitment of units of the Austrian Army would not have sufficed to put it down if the general strike had been carried to a successful conclusion. But the power of the old labor unions was no longer the same. Success had brought complacency and the Christian Socialists had for some time been infiltrating small detachments of their henchmen into most of the vital industrial enterprises of the nation. These scab detachments provided a skeleton force for the operation of the important utilities and managed to break the strike.

The Army High Command, operating the railroads under military guard, was able to move troops from one threatened area to the next and the revolution was totally crushed. Thousands of workers were killed or wounded at the barricades, a great many unionists were interned, and ten of the leaders were hanged. The government was purged of all social Democrats and even the license socialist machine in VIEN (C 49/X 4094) was brought under the control of the authoritarian minority. SCHALLER, a spokesman of the most reactionary and repressive wing of the Christlichsoziale Partei, was appointed Oberbuergermeister of VIEN (X 4094).

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The Nazis were rather skillful in the field of communal politics. The first Oberbuergermeister of WIEN (X 4094) under the new regime was one NUBERGER, a former Social Democrat. When he reappointed some of the functionaries who had served under BREITZ in the old city administration, a certain satisfaction was felt even among the most intransigent Social Democrats. This tact in local administration, combined with the ruthless application of all measures of terror and repression wherever they were indicated, succeeded in keeping the population in line and forestalled the organization of an effective resistance movement.

Until 1942 there was little active opposition to the National Socialist dictatorship in AUSTRIA. It was the deterioration of the military situation, combined with a simultaneous change in the material welfare of the individual, that brought about the growth of an underground resistance movement of considerable proportions. This underground fight was largely led and encouraged by the Communists, although most of the participants were former Social Democrats.

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 43

VI. THE REVOLUTION OF 12 FEBRUARY 1934 (Continued)

strike. The use of the general strike had been perfected by the party leadership as its most powerful weapon during the struggle for power. The mere threat of a general strike had previously been sufficient to force upon the government the adoption or dismissal of measures which the Social Democrats considered of vital importance.

In anticipation of an unexpected and unavoidable clash of arms, a considerable stock of weapons had been placed at the disposal of the party's para-military organization, the Schutzbund. These weapons were mainly a part of the enormous pile which had been hidden from the disarmament commissions and which had been transferred to the arsenals of the military auxiliaries of both parties.

The Social Democrats' plans were no secret to FEY, the Christian Socialist Minister of Security. His secret police network was highly efficient. As a matter of fact, one of the members of the Supreme Council of the Sozialdemokratische Partei was in FEY's employ and kept him informed of all the decisions of this body. FEY was aware of the divergence of opinion and indecision which prevailed among the liberal leaders, and he made use of this situation.

Without giving the Socialists time to complete their plans FEY managed to bring the revolt to a premature head. The most radical branch of the Sozialdemokratische Partei was not in WIEN (X 4094) but in LINZ (V 8489), and it was there that the Minister of the Interior decided to strike. The police confiscated some small arms at a workers' settlement in LINZ and provoked a gun battle with members of the Schutzbund, setting off the signal for a general revolt. Commencing in OBERCERSTERNALCH the conflict soon spread to WIEN (X 4094) and succeeded in enrolling all Austrian Social Democrats.

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The Ministry of Commerce is held by HEINL, a shrewd politician who held the same post in several pre-1938 governments. Politically affiliated with the Christian Socialists, he was never able to gain their complete support or liking. He has the reputation of being one of those men whose political success has not been unattended by a corresponding rise in their material fortunes.

The Minister of Agriculture, BUCHINGER, was active in the Bauernbund in SALZBURG for a good many years and his qualifications as an agrarian expert are of the best.

The Minister of Justice, GRACE, was a prosecuting attorney until 1938, when he was forced to leave AUSTRIA because of his Jewish extraction and because of the fact that he had prosecuted many National Socialists in court. He only became politically active during his period of exile.

As Oberbuergermeister of WIEN (X 4094) the Russians selected the popular Socialist, General Theodor KERNER. As commander of the Sozialdemokratische Militarische Schutzbund before 1934 he showed ability and great organizational talent. Today, however, General KERNER is in his eighties and may be gentle. His vice mayors are the septuagenarian KURZBAK and the young Communist underground fighter, STEINHAUER.

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 43

VIII. DURING THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION (Continued)

When the time came for the establishment of a new government, the Austrian Communists soon realized that they could fill only a fraction of the positions from their own meager ranks. The re nascent Sozialdemokratische Partei became the gathering point for all those who wished to cooperate with the occupying forces without necessarily accepting the Soviet political creed. The Russians were well aware that this was the only truly popular party in AUSTRIA, and no Communists were appointed to key positions in the new administration. Some observers thought that this was merely a clever move on the part of the Russians to wangle British and American recognition for their Austrian coalition government.

Selected as head of the new administration was the universally respected Dr Karl RENNER, the patriarch of Austrian socialism. RENNER also holds the Foreign Affairs portfolio, a rather superfluous office at the present time. It is important to note that RENNER is a man of more than seventy and has not for some years been in possession of his full mental and physical faculties.

The same may be said for KUBISCHAK, who was chosen as the Christian Socialist representative in the cabinet. This old, exhausted man was the leader of the liberal wing of the Christlichsoziale Partei and became well known as the organizer of its powerless labor unions.

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The Austrian political groups are united only in the more fundamental aspects of foreign policy, which means primarily that they favor a definite orientation toward the West. This is to be explained by the rather high standard of living enjoyed by the Austrian worker before the war. Even the Austrian Communists frequently look toward their Western comrades for support. According to informants, the leaders of the Austrian Communist underground expressed the wish in the beginning of 1945 that the Red Army would abstain from occupying AUSTRIA but would rather allow the nation to organize its own reconstruction.

Dr Wilhelm H. GOETTL, source of this report, claims that the leader of the left wing of the Austrian Liberation Committee, "BOGNER," asked him to establish contact with American agents in SWITZERLAND in order to arrange for an American occupation force to check the Russian advance. Dr GOETTL, the Austrian underground representative in SWITZERLAND, expressed, according to GOETTL, similar sentiments.

VIII. DURING THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION

The arrival of Soviet troops in WIEN (X 4094) was preceded by a flood of atrocity stories spread by soldiers fleeing from AUSTRIA. Although the population was much distressed, there was no mass exodus from the city, owing partly to the fact that there was no means of transportation available. The Volksturm was entirely inactive and the underground activists found little opportunity to harass the hated Nazis. Only when the SS troops under Sepp DIETRICH withdrew from WIEN (X 4094) did small resistance detachments aid the Austrians in the pursuit of dispersed units and the elimination of local centers of resistance.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 43

VII. AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS OF 1938 (Continued)

The underground was never an outstanding success, because many phases of its activity were under the observation of a net of Gestapo agents and informants. The highly efficient secret police of the SCHEUCHTEL regime had been successfully incorporated into the Gestapo. Another reason for the inefficiency of the resistance movement lies in the fact that the several underground organizations were never able to agree on a uniform program and to subordinate themselves to a firm and coordinated leadership. Instead of conducting an effective resistance, the various steering committees busied themselves with the preparation of blacklists of their enemies and whitelists of their friends, who were to be placed in positions of power after the overthrow of the Nazi regime by someone else. The abortive coup of 20 July 1944 was greeted with little enthusiasm by the Austrian Socialists since the perpetrators of the plot, the Russian officers, were hardly more popular than the Nazis.

It was only with the approach of the Russians in the spring of 1945 that the various resistance groups finally decided on active collaboration with each other in a supreme congress. The "unified" underground, "C-5", was more a symbol than an active organization. Even under the most favorable circumstances, in a true community of interests in the fight against a universally-hated foe, the various political groups were unable to forget their old differences. It is to be expected that with the external pressure of Nazi dictatorship removed, these groups will again take up their struggle for power.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 43

VIII. DURING THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION (Continued)

On close examination, the Soviet-appointed government presents a peculiar aspect. Behind KUBSIKA's great historic figures, most of whom have one foot in the grave, stand the real administrators of the regime, the underground activists, the true color and worth of whom is yet to be shown. It is still too early to predict what will happen when the mask falls.

Richard A. Feathers
EDMOND L KING 1/1/4 S,2C
Major, Infantry
Commanding

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Sources: ATENDE, Hermann, AIC 1533 9 September 1945
STOEGER, Anton, AIC 1587
OBERBEIL, Wilhelm, AIC 1702
HOETTL, Wilhelm, AIC 894

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No. 38

I. THE ASTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN

Preamble

The information in this report was obtained from Hermann AMENDE, Anton STOEGER, and Wilhelm OBERBEIL.

AMENDE was born in 1903 in BENDORF (GSGS 4346/K 51/F 8902), Kreis COELENZ. After studying economics at the University of LEIPZIG (GSGS 4346/I 52/S 2415), he worked for various coal firms and finally obtained a managerial position. He lost his job in 1932 and, unable to find work, he joined the RAD in 1933. He was discharged from the RAD in 1935 with the rank of Unterfeldwebel. He entered the German Army in January 1936 and was discharged in May of the same year with the rank of Gefreiter.

Unable to obtain suitable employment in Germany, AMENDE went to SPAIN in the Spring of 1937. He claims that upon reaching the border he was told that he could not enter the country unless he first joined the Italian Brigade, a unit of the insurgent army. Seeing no other course open, he joined, received some training, and found himself on the BARRICADA front in March 1937. He claims that he had no desire to fight and managed to get out of the Italian Brigade with the help of a German consul.

During the fall of 1937 AMENDE worked in SAN SEBASTIAN, Spain, as an accountant for a man called KURZ, an agent for various German construction firms. From April 1938 until the beginning of 1939, AMENDE claims to have worked in TOLOSA, Spain, for a paper manufacturer called Vicente GONZALES. He went to LEIPZIG (GSGS 4346/I 52/S 2415) in the spring of 1939 with some Spanish industrialists and secured contracts for them at the industrial exposition in that city.

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In October 1939 A WENDE began working for the German vice consul in BARCELONA, Spain, performing general clerical duties. He was sent to MADRID, on various errands and there became acquainted with Emilio LANG, an employee of the Abwehr Kriegsorganisation. LANG asked him to get in touch with members of the Falange to see whether some of them could be engaged to work as German agents abroad.

In the fall of 1940 A WENDE went to work for the Abwehr in MADRID, and served there until September 1941, when he was discharged for refusing to undertake a mission to MEXICO and the UNITED STATES.

A WENDE then returned to GERMANY and obtained a position as Abteilungsleiter in Abteilung Versorgung in the Ukrainian regional headquarters of the Zentral Handelsgesellschaft Ost (Central Trading Corporation for the East), an organization that sold chemical fertilizers and other necessities to the farmers, and bought their products. When Russian advances destroyed his field of activity he returned to Germany to seek a new job.

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I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

In GERMANY he met Fliegerstabingenieur KURTH - a member of Abwehrstelle MÜNSTER (CGGS 4346/N 52/1 9374) - who thought that MENDE might help him make contacts in SPAIN. MENDE went to SPAIN in April 1943 to prepare the ground, then returned to GERMANY to pick up KURTH. They visited BILBAO and BARCELONA, Spain, and then returned to MÜNSTER. MENDE went to SPAIN again in March 1944, but when he returned to MÜNSTER he found that a change in plans and personnel had taken place and that his mission had been a waste of effort. He never returned to SPAIN.

Anton STOEGER was born in 1913 in HOHENKAMMER (CGGS 4346/N 49/Y 8088), Kreis ERBISIM. He entered the Bavarian civil service in 1936 as a Staatsdiplomatarbeiter with the Landrat of ERBING (CGGS 4346/1 49/1 0977). He transferred to the German Foreign Office in April 1939 and after four months' apprenticeship in BERLIN (CGGS 4346/N 53/7 8550) he was assigned to the consulate in GRESZCIN, Poland, as Konsulatspraktikant.

STOEGER returned to BERLIN (Z 8550) in October 1939 and worked in the Rechtsabteilung, collecting data on the sinkings of Allied ships. He was assigned to the German consulate in MALMÖ, Sweden, in April 1940 but returned to BERLIN (Z 8550) in September to work in the cryptographic department of the Foreign Office.

In August 1941 STOEGER was transferred to the German Embassy in MADRID, Spain. He was put in charge of the financial section which made payments to needy German residents and which paid the family allotments for Germans who were drafted from SPAIN. He left MADRID in March 1945 in order to join the German Army but managed to avoid induction by applying for a furlough through the Foreign Office.

Wilhelm OBERBEIL was born in 1914 in WESCHEN (CGGS 4346/N 49/Y 8556). He went to ARGENTINA in 1934 and worked there as a farm hand and later as an employee of the Deutsche Bank in BUENOS AIRES. When war broke out in 1939 he returned to GERMANY to join the German Army. In 1941 he was made a Leutnant. Because of his knowledge of Spanish, he was assigned to the Dolmetscher Kompanie MÜNCHEN (Y 8556), AOK VII, in the fall of 1943. After a minor assignment in ITALY, OBERBEIL was sent to KOZLOVA in December 1943. There he worked in Referat I B, translating and checking incoming messages. In November 1944 he returned to GERMANY and was put in charge of FAT 153, which was to operate on the Italian front but was never committed.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 39

I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

KO SPANIEN

Organization. The following list shows the organization of KO SPANIEN as of November 1944, according to Lieutenant OBERBEIL.

Leitor

Fregattenkapitän LEISNER, alias LENZ, alias SOMER

Referat I

Oberstleutnant KIEKEBUSCH	Leitor
Hauptmann Dr SCHOENE	I H.
Sonderfuehrer (?) CAMRIS	"
Leutnant OBERBEIL (source)	"
Kapitän OBERMUELLER	I H.
BUGGE, rank unknown	"
Korvettenkapitän GELDERN	"
Fregattenkapitän BALZER	"
Korvettenkapitän KELLER	"
Oberstleutnant von WENCKSPENN	I L.
Gefreiter von BUCH	"
Hauptmann KREH	I I (?)

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Fliegerstabingenieur (?) WEISS

I T/L

Sonderfuehrer COLLEMAN

Konsul RUEGGENBERG

I Wi (office in BARCELONA)

Referat II

Hauptmann EULEL

Leiter until early in 1944

Hauptmann M. UHANN

EULEL'S successor

Sonderfuehrer BAUMANN (BLAU)

WABER, rank unknown

Referat. III

Oberstleutnant von MOHRSCHEIDT

Leiter

Sonderfuehrer GROHM

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Hauptmann SEIDEL, leader of this agency, was succeeded by a Dr GERSTUNG in the early part of 1945.

Mexican Mission. In the summer of 1941, BLUM of Referat II, Kriegswaffenabteilung BRUNNEN, told AMENDE that he was to go on a mission to MEXICO. He was sent to BERLIN to prepare for the mission and took a course in the Physikalische Reichsinstitut in the JUNGFERNHEIDE, northwest of BERLIN.

This course lasted ten days and dealt with the preparation of improvised explosives. No practical experiments were conducted and there were no practice demolitions. No regular classes were held and AMENDE believes that there was never more than a handful of students there.

When AMENDE returned to MADRID, Spain, BLUM gave him a suitcase which was supposed to contain 15,000 US dollars. Emilio LANG had procured him a steamship ticket and a Spanish passport in the name of Eduardo Ernesto FENIX MARTIN. AMENDE claims that he was not given any specific briefing, but was told merely to photograph ships sailing from MEXICO and to transmit whatever information of interest he might find. He had the addresses of five or six Mexican fascists

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Sabotaging of Allied Shipping. STOEGER believes that some Allied ships were blown up in the harbors of MALAGA or SEVILLA, Spain, late in 1943 or early in 1944. The ships were being loaded with oranges destined for the British Isles and the Buera HUELBE managed to smuggle some explosives aboard with the fruit.

When the German ambassador at MADRID, Spain, heard of these incidents he was very displeased, especially since these actions were undertaken without his knowledge. Hauptmann HUELBE, the organizer of these sabotage missions, was later recalled to GERMANY where he received the Ritterkreuz for his services in Spain.

Supplying of German U-Boats. ROTHFRITZ, the proprietor of the EDIFICIO restaurant at Jovellanos 7, MADRID, Spain, frequently sold German canned goods to his friends in the city. ROTHFRITZ told STOEGER that these cans had originally been destined for use aboard German U-Boats but were rejected as being of poor quality. STOEGER does not know how ROTHFRITZ managed to get in them, but believes that the firm of Deposito de Carbonos de TENERIFE, owned by a man called JACOBSEN, figured in the deal. This firm supplied German ships in Spanish harbors with coal before the war.

Co-operation of Spanish Officials. NIENDE believes that the Spanish secret police had very close ties with the Abwehr and the SS. He cannot give any specific information but claims that this was common knowledge. He further believes that the foreign branch of the Falange submitted reports of various kinds to the Abwehr. Carlos PEREYRA, an

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

agent for the Mexican motion picture industry, residing in MADRID, Spain, seems to have been the liaison agent between the Abwehr and the Falange.

An Agent Retires. In August 1944 OBERBEIL was told to take to GERMANY a Spanish agent who had been in ENGLAND on Abwehr business, in order to keep him from being arrested by Spanish authorities.

OBERBEIL took charge of ALCAZAR DE VELASCO, the Spanish agent, at HENDAYE on the Franco-Spanish border, where he had been brought by FERCH, an Abwehr and SD agent in C. E. CEBAS - TIAN, Spain. OBERBEIL and DE VELASCO flew aboard a German Air Force plane from HENDAYE to BERNINI, and then proceeded to MUENCHEN (Y 8556) by rail. There OBERBEIL received instructions from 1st LIEUTENANT to take the agent to GERMISCH (D 5282), to the house of Frau KEHRELMAN. She was told that the Spaniard was a guest of the German government who had come to the mountains to write a book. OBERBEIL also provided the agent with a false passport, made out in the name of Juan GOMEZ-PEREZ, journalist.

In December 1944 OBERBEIL returned to GERMISCH (D 5282) and when he found that his friend was not satisfied with his lodgings at Frau KEHRELMAN's, he suggested for him to live in a hotel, the name of which he claims to have forgotten.

ALCAZAR DE VELASCO received 600 Marks a month from 1st LIEUTENANT, in recognition of his past Abwehr services.

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The SD in SPAIN

STOGER believed that the chief of the SD in SPAIN was undoubtedly the Polizeiatteche at the German Embassy. Kriminalrat SS Sturmbannfuhrer WINZER held this position from 1941 until September 1944 and was succeeded by Kriminalkommissar SS Sturmbannfuhrer HANNES. STOGER and MENDE have furnished the names of a number of SD agents in SPAIN but they claim not to know their exact functions.

SD Personnel in SPAIN.

MADRID

Kriminalkommandeur KULLMANN
Kriminalkommandeur SINGER
Kriminalsekretar BRALCK
Kriminalsekretar KOENNECKE
Kriminalsekretar SCHIET
Kriminalassistent GUTBIER
Kriminalassistent WITCZEK
Polizeiinspektor VEY
JUNG, rank unknown
MOSER, rank unknown
SCHWARZ, rank unknown

BAD JOZ

SS Hauptscharfuhrer DOMKE

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I. THE ABVEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

BARCELON.

Kriminalkommissar MUND
MURCO, rank unknown
WEBER, rank unknown

SAN SEBASTIAN

SEITHER, rank unknown

Personalities

ACHENBACH, Werner (?)

Director of KRUPP Works, had dealings with Spanish industrialists. Lived in R WITZENBURG (GSGS 4346/M 54/T 0172), near HAMBURG.

Age : 38 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Brown
(Identification: AMENDE)

AMBERG, Hans

Worked at the Dienststelle PLACEMENT in BILBAO, Spain. Is a veteran of the Legion Condor. Native of NUERNBERG. (GSGS 4346/M 50/O 4100).

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Age : 33 Hair: Dark blond, thinning
Height: 1.82 m Face: Round
Build : Athletic
(Identification: STOEGER)

BALCK, Robert

Kriminalsekretär. SS Hauptscharführer. Came to MADRID, Spain from BADAJOZ, Spain in the spring of 1944 and worked under Kriminalkommissar SINGER in SD MADRID. He is a native of HAMBURG (GSGS 4346/L 54/S 5054).

Age : 35 Hair: Blond, thinning
Height: 1.70 m Face: Round and swollen
Build : Stocky
(Identification: STOEGER)

BALZER, Freigattenskapitän

Was in Referat I M, KO SPANIEN from 1942 until September 1944. Last seen in VERONA, Italy, in April 1945. He was then on some Abwehr mission; possibly with a F/AT. Comes from Northern GERMANY.

Age : 50 Build: Slim
Height: 1.80 m Hair : Light
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

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SD Personnel in SPAIN.

MADRID

- Kriminalkommissar KULLMANN
- Kriminalkommissar GINGER
- Kriminalsekretar BIALOCK
- Kriminalsekretar KOENNECKE
- Kriminalsekretar SCHMITT
- Kriminalassistent GUTRIER
- Kriminalassistent WIONCZEK
- Polizeinspektor VEY
- JUNG, rank unknown
- MOSEK, rank unknown
- SCHWARZ, rank unknown

BADAJOS

SS Hauptscharfuhrer DOMKE

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agent for the Mexican motion picture industry, residing in MADRID, Spain, seems to have been the liaison agent between the Abwehr and the Falange.

An Agent Retires. In August 1944 OBERBEIL was told to take to GERMANY a Spanish agent who had been in ENGLAND on Abwehr business, in order to keep him from being arrested by Spanish authorities.

OBERBEIL took charge of ALCAZAR DE VELLASCO, the Spanish agent, at HENDAYE on the Franco-Spanish border, where he had been brought by FERCH, an Abwehr and SD agent in SAN SEBASTIAN, Spain. OBERBEIL and DE VELLASCO flew aboard a German Air Force plane from HENDAYE to BERLIN, and then proceeded to MUENCHEN (Y 8556) by rail. OBERBEIL received instructions from 1st MUENCHEN to take the agent to GERMISCH (D 5282), to the house of Frau KEERLHIN. She was told that the Spaniard was a guest of the German government who had come to the mountains to write a book. OBERBEIL also provided the agent with a false passport, made out in the name of Juan GOMEZ-PEREZ, journalist.

In December 1944 OBERBEIL returned to GERMISCH (D 5282) and then he found that his friend was not satisfied with his lodgings at Frau KEERLHIN's, he arranged for him to live in a hotel, the name of which he claims to have forgotten.

ALCAZAR DE VELLASCO received 600 Marks a month from 1st MUENCHEN, in recognition of his past Abwehr services.

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Age : 33 Hair: Dark blond, thinning
Height: 1.82 m Face: Round
Build : Athletic
(Identification: STOEGER)

BALCK, Robert.

Kriminalsekretar. SS Hauptscharfuhrer. Came to MADRID, Spain from MADRID, Spain in the spring of 1944 and worked under Kriminalkommissar SINGER in SD MADRID. He is a native of HAMBURG (GSGS 4346/L 54/S 5054).

Age : 35 Hair: Blond, thinning
Height: 1.70 m Face: Round and swollen
Build : Stocky
(Identification: STOEGER)

BALZER, Fregattenkapitlan

Was in Referat I M, KO SPANIEN from 1942 until September 1944. Last seen in VERONA, Italy, in April 1945. He was then on some Abwehr mission; possibly with a MAT. Comes from Northern GERMANY.

Age : 50 Build: Slim
Height: 1.80 m Hair : Light
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

von BUCH, Gefreiter

Was in Referat II L, KO SPANIEN, presumably until 1945. Was in CENTRAL AMERICA before the war. Speaks excellent Spanish.

Age : 38 Hair: Blond
Height: 1.78 m Eyes: wears glasses
Build : Slender
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

BUGGE, Hans

Worked in MOROCCO, probably TETOUAN and CEUTA, from 1941 until 1943. Later served in MADRID, Spain, Referat I M, KO SPANIEN, working with Korvettenkapitän GUDE. He is a native of HAMBURG (GGGS 4346/L 54/S 5054). See SHEEP Card.

Age : 38 Hair: Black
Height: 1.80 m Face: Oval
Build : Slender
(Identification: STOEGER)

CANARIS, Constantin

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Sonderfuehrer. Nephew of Admiral CANERIS. Worked in Kriegsorganisation SP.NIEN in 1941. See SHLEF Card.

Age : 35 Hair: Dark blond
Height: 1.70 m Build: Slim
(Identification: MENDE)

COLLEMAN

Sonderfuehrer. Began to work in Referat I T/LW, KO SP.NIEN in 1943.

Age : 50 Build: Thin
Height: 1.70 m Hair : Dark, thinning
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

DOMKE

SS Hauptscharfuehrer. Served with the SD in B.D.002, Spain, in 1941. See SHLEF Card.

Age : 35 Build: Powerful
Height: 1.90 m Hair : Dark, thinning
(Identification: MENDE)

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 39

I. THE ABTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

BAUMANN, alias BLUM, Friedrich, Sonderfuehrer

According to OBERBEIL: Began to work in Referat II, KO SPANIEN in 1942. Speaks Spanish without accent, also good English. An excellent tennis player.

According to AMENDE: Was put in charge of Referat II in September 1944. Had a brother in Abwehr II, BERLIN (Z 8550). See SLEEF cards 1559 (white) and 4512 (pink).

Age : 35 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Face : Round
(Identification: OBERBEIL and AMENDE)

BERGER

Hauptmann. Visited SPAIN with von BONIN in the fall of 1941, worked later at last BERLIN (Z 8550).

Age : 48 Build: Slender
Height: 1.80 m Hair : Blond, thinning
(Identification: AMENDE)

BEUER

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SS Hauptsturmführer. An SD agent in ITALY, apparently engaged in investigating SPEER Ministry personnel.

Age : 35 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Brown
(Identification: ACONDE)

von BONIN, alias BONIN

Kapitän zur See. Operated in MADRID and BARCELONA, Spain, after serving with the Abwehr in FRANCE. See SHAEF Card.

Age : 50 Build: Slender
Height: 1.65 m Hair : Grey, thinning
(Identification: ACONDE)

BORCILRT, alias BOENI, Roberto

Lieutenant. Worked for KO SPANIEN in BARCELONA until 1941 and then transferred to the AFRIKA Korps. See SHAEF Card.

Age : 29 Build: Slender
Height: 1.70 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: ACONDE)

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INFORMATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

FAUST, Oskar

Travelled abroad for the propaganda department of the Foreign Ministry before the war, then served at 1st HAMBURG (S 5054) and 1st WEINBERG (GSUS 4346/K 92/ A 9374). Travelled in FRANCE and BULGARIA.

Age : 40 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair: Dark, graying
(Identification: WEINBERG)

FURCH, Fritz, alias WEINBERG, Berlin

Worked at 1st WEINBERG (A 9374); then transferred to the SD and was in charge of activities in the region of SAN SEBASTIAN, Spain, in 1941. See SLEEF Card.

Age : 35 Build: Slender
Height: Medium Eyes: Wears glasses
(Identification: WEINBERG)

GELDERN

Korvettenkapitän. Was in Kommando I M, KC SPANIEN until October 1944. Last seen in BERLIN (Z 8550) in December 1944. Austrian. See SLEEF Card 1162 (white).

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Age : 50 Hair: Dark, thinning
Height: 1.73 m Eyes: Dark, uses glasses
Build: Broad-shouldered for reading
(Identification: WERBEIL)

GERLICH

In charge of the Deutsche Reichsbahn Zentrale MADRID, but had some sort of connection with the SD. He served in the German Army for a year and then returned to MADRID, Spain.

Age : 33 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: WENDE and STOEBER)

GERSTUNG

Came to MADRID late in 1944 and worked at the Dienststelle SEIDER. He may still be in SPAIN.

Age : 55 Hair: Dark blond, graying
Height: 1.75 m Face: Thin
Build: Slender
(Identification: STOLGER)

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

GROBIN

Sonderfuehrer. In Referat III, KO SPANIEN as of 1942. From Northern GERMANY, he speaks with a HEIDBURG accent.

Age : 35 Hair: Blond
Height: 1.75 m Eyes: light, wears glasses
Build : Slender
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

GROSS, alias GRANDE

SD agent working in SPAIN. Although he is a native of BERLIN (GSGS 4346/N 53/3 75) he speaks perfect Spanish and could pass as a Spaniard. See SHLEF Card.

Age : 32 Build: Slender
Height: 1.70 m Hair : Dark
(Identification: MENDEL)

GUDE

Korvettenkapitaen. He served in Referat II of KO SPANIEN until September 1943. He is a North German. See SHLEF Card.

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Age : 52 Build: Stocky
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Dark, thinning
(Identification: STONGER)

GUTHRIE

Criminalassistant. Formerly a musician, he joined the BRESLIAN (C/GS 4346/P 52/C 4919) police in 1933. He came to MADRID, Spain, in the fall of 1943 to work in the photostatic reproduction office of the SD there.

Age : 48 Build: Heavy
Height: 1.69 m Hair : Blond, almost bald
(Identification: STONGER)

HACK, or HLAG

Lived in the UNITED STATES for some time. He worked for Sgt MURPHY (GSGS 4346/K 52/L 9324) in 1943.
See SILEX Card.

Age : 45 Build: Slim
Height: 1.70 m Hair : Brown
He suffers from a skin disease which makes him scratch incessantly.
(Identification: MENDE)

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HORNBERG

Hauptmann. He was writer of Referat II of KO SPMIEN until April 1944 and then returned to GERLICH where he was awarded the Ritterkreuz. He was last reported working in KOBLENZ (GSGS 4346/K 51/F 4560).

Age : 42 Build: Slender
Height: 1.80 m
(Identification: AMENDE and STOEGER)

JUNG, Hermann

A journalist who contributed to various FRANKFURT am MAIN (GSGS 4346/L 51/G 5868) newspapers, but was actually an SD agent operating in MADRID, Spain. He came to SPAIN in 1944 and may still be there.

Age : 53 Build: Stocky
Height: 1.60 m Hair : Thin, blond
(Identification: STOEGER)

JUENGENSIN

Sonderführer with 1st STETTIN (GSGS 4346/O 54/Q 5358) in 1943. He was a merchant in MLENSBURG (GSGS 4346/L 55/C 2395) in civilian life.

Age : 39 Build: Slender
Height: 1.80 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: AMENDE)

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

KELLER

Korvettenkapitän: Was active on behalf of Referat I M, KO SPANIEN in AFRICA. Seen in MADRID in fall 1944, in BERLIN (Z 8550) in December 1944.

Age : 45 Hair: Brown, thinning
Height: 1.75 m
(Identification: BERBERG)

KESSEMEIER, Theodor

Travelled around EUROPE carried in propaganda work on behalf of the German Foreign Office. He owns the Falkenverlag printing firm in HAMBURG and resides at RITZBURG (GSG 4346/1 54/2 072), near HAMBURG.

Age : 40 Build: Slender
Height: 1.80 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: MENDE)

KIEKEBUSCH, Eberhard (?)

Oberstleutnant. Became Leiter of Referat I, KO SPANIEN in 1942. Was in SPAIN during the civil war, then returned to GERMANY for some staff assignment.

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Age : 45 Hair: Brown, thinning
Height: 1.75 m
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

KN. PPE

Defrauder or moneylender. Worked with KUCHLENTHEL
in MADRID. Spent time in SPAIN for a long time, married
to Spanish woman. See SHLEF Card 60297 (pink).

Age : 30 Hair: Dark
Height: 1.74 m Eyes: Dark
Build: Slender
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

KNITTEL, Gustav

Worked in the office of Korvettenkapitän GUDE at
RC SPANISH in MADRID, Spain from the summer of 1943
until 1945 and may still be in SPAIN.

Age : 43 Build: Heavy
Height: 1.70 m Hair : Dark
(Identification: STOEGER)

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE WAFFENR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

KOENNECKE, Rudolf

Kriminalsekretar and SS Hauptscharfuhrer. Worked with the SD in BILBAO, Spain, in 1941 and also served as deputy NSDAP Ortsgruppenleiter. He entered the office of the police attache in ALGERIA in 1942. He may still be in SPAIN.

Age : 35 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair: Blond
(Identification: MENDE and STOEGER)

KRAEMER

Was German consul at MELILLA, Spanish Morocco, until fall 1944, then came to ALGERIA. From MELILLA he had controlled agents for KOENNECKE, was apparently expelled.

Age : 48 Hair: Dark
Height: 1.70 m Other characteristics:
Build: Stout One hand crippled
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

KREH

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Hauptmann. Was in charge of Referat 1 I, KO SPANIEN from 1942 until October 1944. See SHLEF card 1098 (pink).

Age : 40 Build: Slender
Height: 1.72 m Hair: Dark
(Identification: OBERFEL)

KUEHNENHIL, Günther

In charge of reports for KO SPANIEN. He had an electrical appliance business in MADRID, Spain, before the war. His father, a retired Generalmajor, resides at GERMITON-113 BUNNEN (GSGS 4346/M 48/G 5383).

Age : 40 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair: Dark
(Identification: AMENDE and STOEGER)

KULLMANN

Kriminalkommissar. Worked with SD in MADRID, Spain, until October 1944. ... native of MUENCHEN (GSGS 4346/M 49/Y 8556) he worked with the Gestapo there for ten years.

Age : 37 Build: powerful
Height: 1.85 m Hair: dark
(Identification: STOEGER)

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INTERSECTION REPORT No 38

I. THE LEBNER AND THE SPAIN (Continued)

KURTH, Otto

Fliogerstabsingenieur. An Abwehr worker from List
MUNSTER (GSGS 4346/K 52/L 9374), he accompanied
AMENDE to SPAIN in October 1943.

Age : 35 Build : Stocky
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: AMENDE)

LANGE, Maria Augustin

A Catholic missionary in MEXICO, he travelled to
FRANCE a great deal where he had meetings with von
BONIN of the Abwehr and SCHWABER, the SD agent at
CERBERE (GSGS 4148/S 0872/3 20), France. A native
of SACHSEN, Germany, he has lived in SPAIN for twenty
years.

Age : 48 Hair: Black
Height: 1.75 m Face: Gaunt
Build : Slender
(Identification: AMENDE)

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LINDNER, Horst

SS Unterscharführer. SD agent at CERBERE (GSGS 4148/S 0872/6020), France, in 1941. He is a native of North GERMANY.

Age : 30 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Dark
(Identification: KENNEDY)

LUETH, Heinz

Served with 1st MAGNON, Portugal, from 1940 to 1941, and later worked in the Technisches Amt der Waffen SS in BERLIN. He is a native of EUTIN (GSGS 4346/K 55/N 8920) in SCHLESWIG,

Age : 42 Build: Slender
Height: 1.85 m Hair : Blond

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German vice consul in BARCELONA, Spain, and in charge of Abwehr activities there (I Wi). He was in the Abwehr in the last war, then went to SPAIN as a representative of IG Farbenindustrie.

Age : 67 Build: Heavy
Height: 1.70 m Hair : White
(Identification: MENDE)

SCHMITT

Oberst. Editor of List WEENSTER (GSGS 4346/K 52/L 9374) in 1943, then transferred to List NUERNBERG (GSGS 4346/K 50/O 4200).

Age : 52 Build: Slender
Height: Medium Hair : Grey, balding
(Identification: MENDE)

SCHMITT, Engelberg

Kriminalsekretär and SS Hauptscharführer. Came from the Kripo to work for the SD in MADRID, Spain, in 1943. He worked mostly on passports and cases of involuntary restriction.

Age : 39 Build: Athletic
Height: 1.76 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: STOEGER)

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German vice consul in BARCELONA, Spain, and in charge of Abwehr activities there (I 11). He was in the Abwehr in the last war, then went to SPAIN as a representative of IG Farbenindustrie.

Age : 67 Build: Heavy
Height: 1.70 m Hair : White
(Identification: MENDE)

SCHNET

Oberst. Officer of 1st BREMEN (GSGS 4346/K 52/L 9374) in 1943, then transferred to 1st NUERNBERG (GSGS 4346/K 50/C 4200).

Age : 52 Build: Slender
Height: Medium Hair : Grey, balding
(Identification: MENDE)

SCHNET, Engelberg

Kriminalsekretar and SS Hauptscharfuhrer. Came from the Kripo to work for the SD in MADRID, Spain, in 1943. He worked mostly on passports and cases of involuntary restriction.

Age : 39 Build: Athletic
Height: 1.76 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: STOEGER)

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I. THE ABTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

PFLEGER, Emmerich

SS Hauptscharfuhrer. In charge of the SD office at CERBERE, France (GSGS 4148/3 3922/6020). Native Vionnese, he was formerly employed by the police in WIEN (GSGS 4346/3 49/4094).

Age : 37 Build: Stocky
Height: 1.70 m Hair: Blond
(Identification: MENDE)

PLANKERT, Hans (?)

In charge of Dienststell. in LERNA, Spain. He arrived from BERLIN (GSGS 4746/W 53/3 75) in 1941. He comes from North GERMANY.

Age : 27 Hair: Light blond
Height: 1.65 m Race: Oval
Build : Stocky Complexion: Ruddy
(Identification: STOEGER)

RUEGGERBERG

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German vice consul in BARCELONA, Spain, and in charge of Abwehr activities there (I Wi). He was in the Abwehr in the last war, then went to SPAIN as a representative of IG Farbenindustrie.

Age : 67 Build: Heavy
Height: 1.70 m Hair : White
(Identification: MENDE)

SCHMIDT

Oberst. Letter of Lt NUNSTER (GSGS 4346/K 52/L 9374) in 1943, then transferred to Lt NURNBERG (GSGS 4346/K 50/O 4200).

Age : 52 Build: Slender
Height: Medium Hair : Grey, balding
(Identification: MENDE)

SCHMIDT, Engelbert

Kriminalsekretar and SS Hauptcharfuehrer. Came from the Kripo to work for the SD in ALERID, Spain, in 1943. He worked mostly on passports and cases of involuntary restriction.

Age : 39 Build: Athletic
Height: 1.76 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: STOEGER)

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Age : 33 Hair: Dark
Height: 1.65 m
(Identification: SPOECER)

SEITNER, Karl (P)

Worked for the West SAN SEBASTIAN, Spain, was drafted
in the Granzeled in 1943. His father owns a large
book store in BARCELONA, Spain.

Age : 30 Build: Slender
Height: 1.73 m Hair : Dark
(Identification: ...ENDE)

SIMBER, Heinz

Secretary to ...ENNER. ... SWEDEN German and a
fanatical Nazi.

Age : 40 Hair: Brown
Height: 1.83 m
(Identification: ...ENDE)

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE SAHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

SCHOENE

Hauptmann. Joined Referat I B in 1943. A lawyer, probably from BERLIN (Z 8550).

Age : 40 Hair: Blond
Height: 1.68 m Eyes: Light
Build : Stocky
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

SCHWARZ, Karl

Worked for Kriminalkommission BUNGER at SD MADRID, Spain. He was deported by the Spanish authorities in late 1944 but returned to MADRID in January 1945 under a different name and with dyed hair. He paints for a hobby, owns a house in BARRIO de EL JORCA, Spain.

Age : 45 Hair: Gray
Height: 1.75 m Face : Thin, scar on left
Slightly lame in one leg check.
(Identification: SPOEGER) Build: Frail

SEIDEL, Hans

Oberleutnant or Hauptmann. Came to MADRID, Spain, in 1944 and founded Dienststelle SEIDEL.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

SINGER

Kriminalkommissar. SS Hauptabteilungsfuehrer. Came from RSHA BERLIN (GSGS 4346/E 54/179) to work for SD MADRID, Spain at the end of 1941. He comes from the RHEINLAND.

Age : 35 Hair: Blond
Height: 1.70 m Face: Oval
(Identification: STOEGER)

TRETTNER, Gustav (?)

He is said to have worked for the SD in VALENCIA, Spain, and BARCELONA, Spain. He spent some time in IRON, Spain.

Age : 35 Hair: Dark
Height: 1.73 m
(Identification: LEMME)

VEY, Georg

Polizeiinspektor and SS Obersturmfuehrer. He worked for the SD in MADRID, Spain in 1941, was liaison officer to the Spanish AZUL Division in RUSSIA in 1943 and 1944, then returned to SPAIN.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

SINGER

Kriminalkommissar. SS Hauptabteilungsführer. Came from RSHA BERLIN (SSGS 4346/N 54/1 79) to work for SD MADRID, Spain at the end of 1942. He comes from the RHEINLAND.

Age : 35 Hair: Blond
Height: 1.70 m Face: Oval
(Identification: STOEGER)

TRETTNER, Gustav (?)

He is said to have worked for the SD in VALENCIA, Spain, and BARCELONA, Spain. He spent some time in IRON, Spain.

Age : 35 Hair: Dark
Height: 1.73 m
(Identification: MENDEL)

VEY, Georg

Polizeiinspektor and SS Obersturmführer. He worked for the SD in MADRID, Spain in 1941, was liaison officer to the Spanish AZUL Division in RUSSIA in 1943 and 1944, then returned to SPAIN.

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Age : 37 Hair: Dark, thinning
Height: 1.75 m Face: Round
(Identification: STOEGER)

WEBER

Worked in Bureau WEBER in MADRID, Spain, until March 1945, then flew with STOEGER to BRENCHEN (GSGS 4346/L 49/Y 5554) and proceeded to AUSTRIA.

Age : 28 Face : Thin
Height: 1.70 m Eyebrows : Bushy
Hair : Blond Mustache: Small
(Identification: STOEGER)

WEBER, Kurt

Performed ID functions at the German vice consulate in BARCELONA, Spain, from 1940 to 1941. He joined the embassy in MADRID, Spain, early in 1943 to take charge of the food rationing office there. He is a native of BARCELONA (GSGS 4346/L 54/S 5054).

Age : 55 Build: Heavy
Height: 1.65 m Hair : Reddish
(Identification: WENDE and STOEGER)

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WIONCZEK

Kriminalassistent. Came to MADRID in spring 1944 from the RSM in BERLIN (N 53/3 75). He was in charge of registration. He is a native of OBERSCHLESSEN.

Age : 38 Hair: Blond, thinning
Height: 1.80 m Face: Oval
Build: Slender
(Identification: WIONCZEK)

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RAUFF

SS Standartenfuhrer. In charge of SD in Northern Italy 1944-1945. Wore the insignia of the Afrika Korps.

Age : 35 Build: Stocky
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: RAUFF)

S E C R E T

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INFORMATION REPORT NO 39

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S E C R E T

I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

RICHTER

Worked for Buero HUBBEL in MADRID, Spain. He is North German.

Age : 38
Height: 1.65 m
(Identification: ~~XXXX~~)

Place: ~~XXXX~~
Date: ~~XXXX~~

ROEMER

Sonderfuehrer 3. Travelled through SPAIN with Hauptmann BERGER in 1941.

Age : 45
Height: 1.70 m
(Identification: ~~XXXX~~)

Build: ~~XXXX~~

von ROHRSCHEIDT

Oberstleutnant. Long-term letter to HQ STAMPEL.
See SLEEF Card 46900 (ink).

Age : 50
Height: 1.75 m

Wears
either pair of
glasses (one dark lens)

(Identification: OSERPEIL)

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Spaniards suspected of having worked for the SD or the Abwehr. (Source: MEMPH)

AGULLO, Alfonso

Worked for WEISNER at Kriessorganisation SPANIEN in MADRID, Spain. Was formerly the secretary of a Spanish admiral in the Naval Ministry.

Age : 35
Height: 1.82 m

Build: Slender
Hair: Dark

ALCAZAR DE VELASCO, Angel

He worked actively in SPAIN for the Abwehr from the beginning of the war, recruiting agents in close collaboration with Sonderführer KUSCHENTHAL up to the beginning of 1944. He has also been identified with Japanese intelligence circles as early as January 1941. He was present at the Spanish Embassy in LONDON, England, in January 1941. He went to GERMANY in the middle of July 1944 and was reported in MÜNCHEN (GSGS 4346/E 49/7 3550) in August 1944.

Age : 35
Height: 1.70 m

Build: Slender
Hair : Dark

S E C R E T

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

AMABLE

Belonged to Capitan CHINORRO's unit and was stationed in FIGUERAS, Spain. He worked with RUEGGEBERG, the German vice consul in BARCELONA, Spain.

Age : 32 Build: Slender
Height: 1.70 m Hair : Dark

BOMBIN

Was a high police official in BURGOS, Spain, during the Civil War. He later worked with the grain monopoly. Had relations with the former agent, Emilio LANG.

Age : 33 Hair : Dark
Height: 1.65 m Build: Slender

BUHIGAS

Is said to have worked for Vice Consul KUEHNLENTZ in PONTEVEDRA, Spain. He had no definite occupation and lived with a rich aunt.

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del CAMPO, Jose

He went abroad for KO SRANIEM in 1940. A Cuban, he was formerly in the Cuban Army.

Age : 43
Height: 1.70 m

Build: Slender

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CASPIEIRI, Pedro

He worked with BUNIGAS in the procurement of agents. He was an intimate friend of the former Spanish Foreign Secretary, SERRANO SUÑER. He has practiced law in OVIEDO, Spain.

Age : 53
Height: 1.75 m

Build: Heavy
Hair : Greying

de CASTRO, Fernando

Was a Falange leader in TANGIERS, North Africa, for a long time and worked for the Spanish Foreign Office. He performed some missions for KO SRANIEM and assisted KESSEMEIER.

Age : 45
Height: 1.75 m

Hair : Dark
Complexion: Dark

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

RICHTER

Worked for Buero HUMMEL in MADRID, Spain. He is North German.

Age : 38 Hair: Light Blond
Height: 1.65 m Face: Round
(Identification: ASENDE)

ROEMER

Sonderfuehrer 7. Travelled through SPAIN with Hauptmann BERGER in 1941.

Age : 45 Build: Slender
Height: 1.70 m
(Identification: ASENDE)

von ROHRSCHEIDT

Oberstleutnant, Long-term holder III, KO SPANLEN.
See SHEEP Card 46930 (pink).

Age : 50 Hair: Dark, thinning
Height: 1.75 m Eyes: One eye missing. Wears
either monocle or glasses (one dark lens)
(Identification: OSERHEIL)

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Spaniards suspected of having worked for the SD or the Abwehr. (Source: MENDE)

AGUILO, Alfonso

Worked for LEISNER at Kriegsorganisation SPANIEN in BARCELONA, Spain. Was formerly the secretary of a Spanish Admiral in the Naval Ministry.

Age : 35
Height: 1.82 m

Build: Slender
Hair : Dark

ALCAZAR DE VELAZCO, Angel

He worked actively in SPAIN for the Abwehr from the beginning of the war, recruiting agents in close collaboration with Grand Admiral RUDOLPH WESSELMANN up to the beginning of 1944. He has also been identified with Japanese intelligence circles as early as January 1941. He was present at the Spanish Embassy in LONDON, England, in January 1941. He went to GERMANY in the middle of July 1944 and was reported in MUNICH (SSGS 4346/W 49/Y 8556) in August 1944.

Age : 35
Height: 1.70 m

Build: Slender
Hair : Dark

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 39

I. THE ABTEHR LED THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

CASANUS, Ramon

He worked with LING, AMENDE, and other Abwehr personalities in MADRID, Spain. Was active in fascist politics in North AFRICA and worked later with the Falange.

Age : 43
Height: 1.70 m

Build: Stout
Hair: Dark and wavy

CHESORRO, Manuel

Captain. Worked with Lieutenant SCHMIDT, alias BODEN, an agent of KO SPAIN, in BARCELONA, Spain, in 1940 and 1941. See SH.REF Card 943 (pink).

CONDE or CONTE

Went to FRANCE in 1940 with Abwehr agent Emilio LING, remaining there a few weeks. He owned an antique shop in MADRID, Spain.

Age : 35
Height: 1.68 m

Build: Slender
Hair: Dark

HERRERAS, Fernando

Inspector del Trabajo in BARCELONA, Spain. He worked with Vice Consul RUEGGERBERG. He comes from BILBAO, Spain.

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Age : 33
Height: 1.70 m
Build : Stout

Hair: Dark
Eyes: Wears glasses

de JUANA, Licinio

Spanish police official who worked in the supervision of foreigners, he assisted Herr HUBER of Referat III, KO'STANJKA.

Age : 35
Height: 1.60 m

Build: Slight
Hair : Dark and wavy

KARL, Mauricio

Served in the Spanish security office in MADRID, Spain. He is said to have worked for Abwehr agent Emilio LANG. He is not personally known to MENDE.

SECRET

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Height: 1.75 m

Build: Slight
Hair : Dark and wavy

SECRET

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Age : 38
Height: 1.70 m
Build : Stout

Hair: Dark
Eyes: Wears glasses

de JUNA, Licio

A Spanish police official who worked in the supervision of foreigners, he assisted Herr HUBER of Referat III, KO'STANICE.

Age : 35
Height: 1.60 m

Build: Slight
Hair : Dark and wavy

KARL, Mauricio

Served in the Spanish security office in MADRID, Spain. He is said to have worked for Czech agent Emilio LANG. He is not personally known to MENDE.

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MICHA, Jose

Inspector of the border police at PORT BOU, Spain. He worked with FLEGER and other SD officials. He has a brother in the Spanish police administration in MADRID, Spain.

Age : 52
Height: 1.70 m

Build: Stout

QUEROL, Rudesindo

A former journalist, he served Vice Consul RUEGGENBERG as contact man for agents on ships in BARCELONA and VALENCIA, Spain.

Age : 43
Height: 1.70 m

Build: Slender
Hair : Dark

REVILLA, Manuel

Worked for von BONIN in 1941. Owns a factory near SAN SEBASTIAN, Spain.

Age : 32
Height: 1.75 m

Build: Slender
Hair : Dark and wavy

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE LEADER AND THE SO-CALLED (Continued)

MORENO BRAVO, Gregorio

Worked for Vice Consul RUEGGEBERG in BARCELONA, Spain. He introduced MORENO to all sorts of officials in that city. He works as a writer.

Age : Early 30's Build: Slender
Height: 1.80 m Hair : Dark and wavy

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PEREYRA, Carlos

Mexican resident of MADRID, Spain, represented Mexican movie industry, made his Mexican connections available to ROSENBERG.

Age : 40 Build: Slender
Height : 1.70 m Hair : Dark

POBLADOR, Jose Maria

A lawyer in BARCELONA, Spain, he contacted agents for German Vice Consul RUEGGEBERG.

Age : 40 Build: Stout
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Dark

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

SILCES, Jose Luis

Worked for Emilio LING in MADRID, Spain and PFLEGER at PORT BOU, Spain. He worked in the BILBAO, Spain police force.

Age : 32 Build: Slender
Height: 1.65 m Eyes : wears glasses

dn SILV..

Portuguese. Went to SOUTH AMERICA in 1941 for KO SP MIEN, then returned and is said to have served in the Spanish WUL Division in RUSSIA. See SILEF Card 19392 (pink) and, under the name of ALEXANDER, Jean Charles Alexandre, see SILEF pink cards 19281, 19282, 19283, 19284.

SOL, Alfonso

Engaged in the import and export business at PORT BOU, Spain. He worked for Sergeant PFLEGER.

Age : 30 Build: Slender
Height: 1.65 m Hair : Dark

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del VALLE, Ruiz

Belonged to Captain CHAZORRO's unit at FIGUERAS, Spain. He also worked for Vice Consul RUEGGEBERG at BARCELONA, Spain. He has lived in the UNITED STATES for some years.

Age : 35
Height: 1,85 m

Build: Slender
Hair : Dark

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

II. AMT VI PLANS FOR POST-WAR ACTIVITIES IN SPAIN

Suggestion for Allied Intelligence Control. As a means of checking on the activities of Amt VI personnel still at large in SPAIN, ROEFL suggests the re-activation of the pipeline which consisted of the former Hungarian General Staff (Wero-Linie). Well connected in Fascist circles and exceptionally well informed on German intelligence activities in SPAIN, this agency relied on, among other sources, the services of a Hungarian General Staff officer and honorary member of the FAJANSE, apparently the only prominent Hungarian who fought actively on FRANCO's side during the civil war.

Since the members of the Hungarian Intelligence Service usually enjoyed diplomatic status and for the most part did not identify themselves with the SZALASI regime, they might still be available for Allied intelligence purposes.

EDWARD L KING

SECRET

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IN

~~SECRET~~

LL

031208

071100

031415

3 SEPT 1945

TO: AB/OO4, AMZON

FROM: AB/012, 3RD ARMY

REF^HOEITL AB/021 MESSAGE 16.

HOETTTL

LUCKY IC ADVISES QUIZ NOW COMPLETE. BODY AVAILABLE YR
DISPOSITION AT ONCE.

8/2

OSS 6789

00068

SAINT

EXEC

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AB12, THIRD ARMY

1 September 1945
SECRET

AB21, AMSON

ROUTINE

- 1) AB4 trying get HOETTEL brought USMST IC or local internment center soonest.
- 2) Suggest GAMBIT remain LUCKY IC till after his transfer.

582

E.F.W.
F.F.S.

00067
SEP 1 1945

1000

bb

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SECRET

AUTH: CG Third US Army

DATE: 31 August 1945

INIT: ECJ

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Interrogation Center (Provisional)
APO 403

INTERROGATION REPORT No 36

Source: HOETTL, Wilhelm, SIC 894

31 August 1945

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 36

Japanese Intelligence Activities in EUROPE

Preamble. The source for the following report is SS Sturmbannfuhrer HOETTL, former chief consultant (Hauptreferent) of the RSHA, Amt VI E (South-East), who also furnished the material for Third US Army Interrogation Reports Nos 10, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, and for Third US Army Special Interrogation Reports Nos 1, 2, and 4.

ITALY. The Japanese and Italian intelligence services had certain common spheres of interest, particularly in the NEAR EAST and in INDIA. This led to an unusually great degree of co-operation, and several missions initiated by the Italians appear to have been planned and executed in conjunction with the Japanese. In 1944, HOETTL was told by an Italian military intelligence officer that ITALY had some 300 agents working in INDIA alone.

USSR. The important Japanese espionage network in the USSR was mainly controlled from bases in South-Eastern EUROPE, particularly in ROMANIA and TURKEY. The chief agents were members of the Japanese press and diplomatic corps.

From the CAUCASUS region, HOETTL's sources reported particularly strong Japanese activity, and several Caucasian groups in GERMANY, especially Georgians, were reported to draw substantial Japanese subsidies. A prominent Georgian (whom HOETTL claims he is no longer able to identify) once explained to HOETTL that the Japanese consider the CAUCASUS the boundary of their Western sphere of interest.

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GERMANY. In GERMANY, the activities of the Japanese Intelligence Service were marked by a lack of scruples in the choice of means and by a technical proficiency in the execution of missions.

In summer 1945 the Japanese succeeded in acquiring the plans of German Army Group NORD's strategic operations against the USSR, which was an outstanding feat in the eyes of experts and without precedent in the annals of German military history. The plans were found to have been photographed on micro-film, part of which had been wrapped tightly around a thin piece of wire and inserted into the rim of a condom (rubber contraceptive). Other parts of the film had been inserted into the bristle sockets of a wooden brush. The films were about the size of a pin-head.

This particular espionage mission was directed by the Manchurian Legation in BERLIN, and was executed by Poles loyal to the LONDON Polish government, posing as handymen of the legation. Generally, the Japanese intelligence appeared to employ "LONDON" Poles quite extensively.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 36

Japanese Intelligence Activities in EUROPE (Continued)

HOETTL states that it was incomprehensible to the German authorities that the Japanese should spy on their German allies, in particular since Ambassador OSHIMA was constantly informed of GERMANY's plans by HITLER personally.

HOETTL's explanation for the major act of Japanese espionage is that OSHIMA was distrusted by his own government and that this act was merely an attempt to check up on OSHIMA's information.

There were no diplomatic consequences as a result of the discovery of the act.

EDMUND L KING
Major, Infantry
Commanding

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US Army
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SECRET

210

311157

311100

311310

31 August 1945

TO: AB 000, AMZON

FROM: AB 12, Third Army

1. GAMBIT STILL WORKING HOSTIL EXPLOITATION.
2. LUCKY IC SAYS HENRIED (HER WORK?) COMPLETE THREAT.
3. DO YOU WISH REMOVE BEFORE DISPOSITION HOSTIL.
4. RE HOSTIL LUCKY IC REITERATE BODY SHOULD NOT BE PLACED
MOOS BERG OR AUSTRIAN CIE.
5. ADVISE SOONEST.

*Comments on this
spec. telegram*

*Attn: Maj. Saxe
Will you please
advise me
1/19*

055 6573

CAINT

00065

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SECRET

G-2

200

291745

291230

291915

29 AUG 45

TO: AB/000 AMZON
FROM: AB/012, 3RD

1. LUCKY IC SAY WILL FINISH HOETTL BY 14 SEPT.
2. THEY WISH DISPOSE BODYS ON NEXT.
3. HOETTLE SUSPICIOUS DOUBLE CROSS BY US AND PRESENT SECURITY PROBLEM TO IC.
4. SUGGEST BODY BE TAKEN USFET IC WAIT FINAL DECISION ON CASE.
5. ADVISE DISPOSITION SOONEST.

88-2

Act: Miss Winslow
Before acting, will
consult this with
Keating, please.
3/1/45

00064
 033 IN 6399

Act: Miss Winslow

SAINT ✓ Hoettle to be put in 1120-1121 on 28 Aug 45
 EXEC (Spec will inform us)
 Decision is USFET IC, 28 Aug 45

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G-2

PARIS FOR BERN SWITZERLAND

18 July 1949

SECRET

SPEARHEAD AMBON

ROUTINE

A. HOETTL reported during interrogation, Fred MEYER, American parachutist caught early April Innsbruck. His wireless operator escaped

B. Gauleiter ROGER wanted use MEYER contact Tyrol anti-Nazi resistance movement and probably Americans also.

C. Ostufel REBER of Innsbruck Stapo offered turn over American operator previously captured to help MEYER contact Americans.

D. MEYER and W/T operator, not clear whether same as in para C, were helped by HOETTL to reach Swiss border.

E. HOETTL does not know whether they arrived safely and does not know details of attempted contacts resistance movement or Americans.

F. No trace MEYER in London.

G. Could MEYER be agent of Vandenberg, sent Innsbruck early April?

TYP

BER

X-66

SOURCE: HOETTL interrogation and Para C Mr. Dulles.

00049

0915

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