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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**LESSONS FROM CENTRAL AND SOUTHEAST EUROPE
FOR THE EXPANDING ALLIANCES**

by

Robert D. Woods

June 2008

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Donald Abenheim
Richard J. Hoffman

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**LESSONS FROM CENTRAL AND SOUTHEAST EUROPE FOR THE
EXPANDING ALLIANCES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to explain what hinders former neutral- and non-aligned nations from fully integrating themselves into such collective security regimes as NATO, the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, and UN Peace Support Operations: What delays or denies such states from joining? When they do join, what keeps them from providing more than token material or personnel contributions to alliances? Examining three geographically close but historically distinct cases, the Republics of Austria, Croatia and Montenegro, this work assesses the commonalities and idiosyncrasies in their relationships with those collective security regimes. Each case study examines five characteristics that influence national acceptance of collective security: history, government objectives, public attitudes, defense structures and operations. The study arrives at three conclusions. First, though geographically close, the three countries have substantial differences in their historical, official and popular definitions of national security. These differences strongly influence the way national leaders and the voting public views individual collective security regimes such as the UN, NATO and the EU. Second, the three nations' historical and current experience suggests that proponents of collective security should engage partner nations based on a more precise understanding of national security objectives. It further concludes that neither the NATO nor EU visions for European collective security accurately captures what motivates these three states to join and to support collective security regimes.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	PURPOSE.....	1
B.	IMPORTANCE.....	2
C.	LITERATURE REVIEW	3
	1. Context.....	3
	2. How This Work Contributes.....	4
	3. Related Works and Arguments	4
D.	METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.....	6
	1. Independent and Intervening Variables	8
	2. Dependent Variable	9
E.	RESULTS	9
II.	REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA	11
A.	HISTORY	11
	1. Introduction.....	11
	2. Transnational Basis of Empire	13
	3. First Republic (1918-1933).....	14
	4. Foundation of Second Republic (1945-1955).....	15
	5. Under Occupation.....	16
	6. Post Occupation	17
	7. US Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction.....	17
	8. Post Cold War	18
	<i>a. Early Activism and Promotion of EU as Alternative to</i>	
	<i>NATO.....</i>	<i>18</i>
B.	GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES.....	19
	1. NATO Intentions.....	19
	2. EU Intentions.....	21
	3. Toward the United Nations	21
	4. Toward Private Actors	22
C.	PUBLIC ATTITUDES	22
	1. Toward NATO	22
	2. Toward EU	23
D.	STRUCTURES.....	24
	1. Collective Defense Level.....	24
	2. NATO	25
	3. Convention Level	26
	4. Voluntary / Bilateral.....	26
	5. Non-Proliferation Structures	27
E.	OPERATIONS	29
	1. NATO.....	29
	2. European Union	30
	3. United Nations.....	30

4.	Sum of Operational Participation	31
F.	NATIONAL CONCLUSION.....	31
III.	REPUBLIC OF CROATIA	35
A.	HISTORY	35
1.	Introduction.....	35
2.	Austro-Hungarian Empire.....	35
3.	Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918-1929).....	36
4.	Ustaše Period	37
5.	Independence to Present.....	38
B.	GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES.....	39
1.	NATO Intentions.....	40
2.	UN Intentions/Peace Support Operations Policy	40
3.	Toward Private Actors	41
C.	PUBLIC ATTITUDES	42
1.	Toward NATO	42
D.	STRUCTURES.....	44
1.	Collective Defense: EU and NATO	46
2.	Convention Level	46
E.	OPERATIONS	47
F.	NATIONAL CONCLUSION.....	47
IV.	REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO.....	49
A.	HISTORY	49
1.	Geography	49
2.	Pre-1878	49
3.	Yugoslav Wars of Dissolution to Present.....	51
a.	<i>1992-1997: The Client State's Last Gasp.....</i>	<i>51</i>
b.	<i>1997-2001: Slow-Walking Away from Belgrade.....</i>	<i>53</i>
c.	<i>2002-Present: Defining the Terms of Independence.....</i>	<i>54</i>
B.	GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES.....	54
C.	PUBLIC ATTITUDES	55
1.	Toward NATO	56
2.	Toward EU	57
D.	SECURITY STRUCTURES	57
1.	Government Structures.....	58
a.	<i>Legal Infrastructure for Collective Security.....</i>	<i>58</i>
b.	<i>Convention Level.....</i>	<i>59</i>
c.	<i>Voluntary / Bilateral</i>	<i>59</i>
d.	<i>United Nations.....</i>	<i>60</i>
2.	Private Level Structures.....	60
a.	<i>Commercial</i>	<i>60</i>
b.	<i>Social</i>	<i>61</i>
E.	OPERATIONS	61
1.	NATO	62
2.	European Union	62
3.	Proliferation Security Initiative.....	63

4.	United Nations Stabilization Program	63
5.	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)	64
F.	NATIONAL CONCLUSION.....	64
V.	CONCLUSION	67
A.	COMMON TRAITS.....	68
1.	Objectives.....	68
2.	Attitudes.....	69
3.	Structures.....	70
a.	<i>Legacy Problems</i>	72
b.	<i>Problems of Scale</i>	72
c.	<i>The Proliferation of Channels</i>	73
d.	<i>Challenges of Military Transformation</i>	73
4.	Operations	74
B.	IDIOSYNCRATIC TRAITS.....	74
1.	Austria: “Otherness” and Identity	74
2.	Croatia: Towed by Public Opinion	75
3.	Montenegro: Seeking Reward for Europe’s ‘Security Entrepreneurs’	75
C.	IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS...76	
	LIST OF REFERENCES	79
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	89

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This thesis analyzes the experience of three North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries to identify the factors that most influence their adaptation of an international security cooperation mindset. Freed from their Cold War geopolitical constraints, and facing a host of trans-national security threats, the nations of Central Europe have strong incentives to forge security partnerships and formalize their working relationships with collective security organizations. Yet despite 15 years of reform, major structural, legal and political impediments to security and defense cooperation remain. Some states hesitate to join alliances. Others eagerly seek membership in NATO and the European Union, yet simultaneously resist participation in the very activities that would provide the enhanced security that motivated them to join in the first place. The objective of this work is to identify the common and idiosyncratic sources of such resistance and the limits of a state's power to overcome them.

The primary Research Question this thesis seeks to answer is: *What factors most inhibit NATO's Partner nations from fully participating in collective security* regimes?* It addresses a range of such regimes in Southeast Europe, from the most treaty-based and compulsory (NATO) to the most informal and voluntary (the Proliferation Security Initiative). In comparing the experiences of Austria, Croatia and Montenegro, it identifies common and nation-specific factors that limit the will and the ability of those PfP nations to contribute actively to international security alliances. Identification of those factors will require the examination of three subordinate questions:

* For a contextual discussion of the definition of "collective security", its distinction from "collective defense" and the political and organizational associations of each, see Dr. David Yost's "Collective Defense and Collective Security after Kosovo" in Rob de Wijk, ed. *NATO After Kosovo* (Breda: Royal Netherlands Military Academy, 2000), 19-43. To avoid repetition, and for institutional reasons that are explained in the Methodology and Conclusions sections, except where required for clarity, this study deliberately elides the two concepts together. The intention here is to address broadly all of the reasons these nations would be inclined to seek international partners to enhance their national security. The collective defense mission—alliance against an external threat—thereby becomes but one subset of the more broadly defined collective security.

1. What is the relative importance of historical experience, tradition, public opinion and government intent in these nations' acceptance of the collective security concept?
2. Do individuals and institutions operate based on coherent concepts of "collective security?"
3. What are the means and limits of government influence over public attitudes toward collective security?

B. IMPORTANCE

This thesis supports United States and NATO efforts to integrate prospective-member countries into the Alliance via the Partnership for Peace. As the controversy in 2008 over member country roles in Afghanistan indicates, membership in the Alliance does not guarantee to full and unconditional support for its operations. Conversely, some countries that have no aspiration to join NATO nevertheless strongly support collective security operations under other regimes. An example of this latter group is the Republic of Austria, which presently supports European Union operations in Kosovo and Chad with deployments that far exceed those of larger Western European countries, and whose per-capita financial contribution to support for the UN far exceeds larger nations.

Answering this Research Question and its subordinate questions will provide two types of information useful to the NATO International Military Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense and Combatant Commanders in their efforts to further integrate PfP countries:

1. internationally comparable criteria to track partner nation progress in the adoption of collective security regimes;
2. information useful in recognizing opportunities for the further expansion of collective security agreements.

In precisely mapping the problems these three countries have faced, this thesis will draw general conclusions from their commonalities and identify their relative importance and degree of challenge for NATO.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Context

This is a work about the relationship between public attitudes, tradition and innovation in statecraft. Although governments in Central and Southeast Europe universally claim to support international defense cooperation, the force of public opinion often overrules the will of governments to support such cooperation. At the most formal and binding level of collective security regimes—the treaty-based alliance—electoral mandates directly steer national policy toward membership. At the less-binding convention level (e.g. the European Police Office, EUROPOL)—public opinion commands the resources and determines the *bona fides* of cooperation and accountability. Even at the most informal level of cooperation (voluntary working groups such as the Proliferation Security Initiative), public opinion determines national cooperation via press scrutiny and legislative inquiries.

One of the paradoxes of reform in former communist states is that as governments have democratized to join NATO they have simultaneously lost their ability to guarantee national participation in NATO operations.¹ The same holds true for national relationships with the EU, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other regional security organizations. Where democratization has preceded institutional reform, Defense Ministry and General Staffs have adopted a siege mindset and used their political power to forestall substantive change. Nowhere is this more pandemic than in Southeast Europe. The balkanization of former Yugoslav states into regional and ethnic groups is mirrored in their defense institutions. Austria has certainly not followed that course, and an explication of the differences may be instructive for other PfP nations. The challenge of integrating new members into collective security

¹ Wallace J. Thies notes a similar paradox, albeit in reference to democratic reform in Western European NATO members, in *Friendly Rivals : Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003.

frameworks cannot be divorced from the challenge of reforming their defense institutions. This thesis will add to the body of work that addresses those conjoined challenges.

2. How This Work Contributes

This project complements the existing literature regarding the post Cold War enlargement of NATO and the EU. While most previous efforts have focused on the institutions themselves as agents of change and integration, this work places its emphasis on the internal dynamics of Partnership states. Where existing works have examined enlargement primarily in terms of structures and operations, this project analyzes the political objectives and public attitudes that work in parallel with those two criteria.

In its scope of inquiry, this project makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, it focuses on a set of Alpine-Adriatic countries whose defense reform efforts have not previously been compared. Second, it addresses a broader concept of collective security than existing works, which have analyzed only one type of collective security organization, the treaty organization. Third, in its examination of the relationship of leadership objectives and public attitudes to defense structures and military operations on the other, it will map the extent of government influence in all four components of collective security.

3. Related Works and Arguments

In the study of national acceptance of collective security among former communist and neutral nations, the existing literature is organized into four general groups:

1. **International relations theory** concerning the role of institutional integration in preventing and shaping conflict. The dominant debate in this group is between “neo-liberal institutionalists” and “neo-realists.” The former, including Robert Keohane, argue that the international integration of national defense structures through collective security organizations is itself the

greatest check against military conflict.² The latter, such as Robert Krasner, counter that collective security integration only occurs to where an overwhelming external threat requires it, or if that integration favors the interests of a stronger party (e.g. the US in NATO).³

2. **Examinations of international organizations** (NATO/EU/UN) as the agents of change;
3. **Structural analysis** closely linked to logistical interoperability;
4. **Historical/cultural analysis** focusing on leadership attitudes and methods;

This study makes use of sources from all four categories, but approaches the question from a comparative, institutional perspective.

Five years ago, University of Texas Professor Zoltan Barany produced a study of defense reform and its implications for the Future of NATO Expansion. In its selection of case studies, this thesis meshes like the teeth of a gear with Barany's work. His work focused on Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania.⁴ This work addresses Austria, Croatia and Montenegro. Though this work will address a broader cross-section of collective security organizations, Barany's book provides useful comparison both in methodology and regional conclusions. Deni (2007), likewise, informs this analysis in his explanation of the "bargaining" process between candidate nations for a NATO Rapid Reaction Force and the Alliance's International Military Staff.⁵

A number of works have addressed the specific structural shortcomings of former Warsaw Pact militaries engaged in NATO operations. Jeffrey Simon (2005) examines the specific problems of coalition members in Out of Area missions. His findings focused mostly on Human Resource problems of conscript forces and the command and

² Hemmer, Christopher M. (Christopher Michael) 1969- and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (2002), 579, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_organization/v056/56.3hemmer.html (accessed 05 March 2008).

³ Stephen D. Krasner, "Rethinking the Sovereign State Model," *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 5 (December 2001), 31, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1410798071&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 04 March 2008).

⁴ Zoltan D. Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion : Four Case Studies* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 267.

⁵ John R. Deni, *Alliance Management and Maintenance : Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century* (Aldershot, Hampshire, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 79-84.

control incompatibilities of forces whose senior leadership trained under Warsaw Pact doctrine.⁶ Adrian Hyde Pierce (2005) examines the “embedded strategic cultures” that define national attitudes toward collective security. Pierce concludes that European leaders, despite an appreciation of the changed of threats, still approach collective security with a “collective territorial defense” mindset.⁷ His analysis and prescriptions are primarily appropriate for scrutinizing the operational aspect of collective security.

The Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has studied extensively Central and East European nations undergoing defense reform. These studies focus primarily on national reform of defense institutions to facilitate interoperability with collective security organizations. The DCAF studies examine both what legal reforms are necessary to allow former communist states to participate in multilateral Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and what organizational dynamics tend to resist those legal reforms.⁸ While both the content and cases studies overlap with this thesis, the DCAF works have not commented on the relationship between public opinion and government objectives in this context.

D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

This project employs a comparative, case study method to answer the primary research question. It examines three NATO Partnership for Peace nations and compares them in terms of their engagement with the broad concept of “collective security.” Each case study begins with a review of historical factors that influence national adoption of collective security, including historical participation in collective security regimes. It then examines the current national status of collective security in four components: Objectives, Attitudes, Structures and Operations. Chapter One defines collective security, identifies the work’s objectives, and introduces its comparative methodology. Chapters

⁶ National Defense University Washington DC Institute for National Strategic Studies and Jeffrey Simon, *NATO Expeditionary Operations: Impacts upon New Members and Partners*, [2005]).

⁷ Kerry Anne Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski, *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda* (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), 140.

⁸ Pietz, Tobias and Marc Remillard, *Defense Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia* (Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, [2006]). <http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief34/content.php> (accessed 11 January 2008).

Two through Four examine the case studies. The concluding chapter identifies common and idiosyncratic traits in the case studies and draws conclusions regarding the extent of government influence over public attitudes toward collective security. The practical objective of this work is to provide theater Foreign Area Officers, Fleet and COCOM staffs with a set of criteria they can use to assess partner country progress, set priorities for recommended structural reforms and recognize opportunities to capitalize on shifts of public opinion.

The intention of this work is not to focus solely on NATO. Rather, it examines the topic of “collective security” as a general concept that encompasses three types of cooperation:

1. Treaty-based alliances, also known as “Collective Defense” organizations;
2. Law-enforcement collaboration conducted under binding bilateral or multilateral Conventions;
3. Working Groups that rely solely on member country voluntary participation.

The three case studies examined, Austria, Croatia and Montenegro, are all Partnership for Peace countries that have undergone significant defense reform since the collapse of Soviet and Yugoslav communism. To avoid parochial focus on NATO, these case studies have been selected because they represent a range of intentions regarding membership: Austria, with its constitutionally-enshrined policy of neutrality, has declared that it will not join NATO, but will actively engage in Partnership arrangements with the organization. Montenegro has declared its intention to join NATO, but public support for the organization has recently weakened and polarized. Croatia represents the extreme upper end of government resolve and public support for joining the Alliance (which culminated in its April, 2008 Bucharest Summit invitation to join the Alliance), but may suffer from structural problems that prevent it from being a full, active participant in the NATO.

The three nations also provide a means to look at the concept of collective security more generally because they represent three distinct stages of democratic reform.

Montenegro, having achieved independence from Yugoslavia in mid-2006, still represents a dominant single-party system. Croatia has undergone significant democratic reforms in its 15 years of independence, but did not have its first election with significant minority-party competition until 2000. Austria's democratic tradition dates to the end of World War II.

While above differences between the three case studies provide a means to address collective security as a general concept, they share some commonalities that will aid in the assessment and comparison of their attitudes toward collective security. All three favor (and Austria has achieved) EU membership; all three participated in the anti-nuclear Proliferation Security Initiative.⁹ Each of them has a constitutional structure that is legally compatible with participation in collective security regimes at all three levels (treaty, convention, voluntary association). Each of them has an ostensibly transparent Ministry of Defense with accessibility to documents and structures that relate to collective security organizations. Each of them has allowed access for foreign organizations to conduct public opinion polling relevant to attitudes toward collective security.

This work will attempt to recognize and address limitations on comparability of the three countries as well. A review of national history and post-Cold War reform will examine national differences. The analytical framework will attempt to account, for example, for the difference between long-standing traditions of defense structure in Imperial Austria, monarchial Croatia and Montenegro's unique defensive history. In more recent history, the chapter analysis will address the differences that stem from Croatia and Montenegro's history under Yugoslav communism.

1. Independent and Intervening Variables

The independent variable considered in this analysis is the national level civil-military relationship. To capture this relationship in a fashion that lends itself to

⁹ United States Department of State, "Proliferation Security Initiative Participants," Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c19310.htm> (accessed 21 February 2008).

comparison among nations, this thesis analyzes four intervening variables: government objectives, public attitudes, defense structures and military operations.

To accurately assess the relationship between declared attitudes on the one hand and actual structures/operations on the other, this analysis must account for two kinds of intervening variables: Historic and Subjective. Historic factors include the cultural traits and doctrinal pre-assumptions that dictate a way military and political leaders think about security. Subjective factors are those relating to the human perception of what constitutes security. The two subjective factors this work addresses are:

- The level of coherence between individual and institutional definitions of security;
- The level of consistency between public attitudes toward different types of collective security organizations (US-based /EU/NATO/UN). The lack of consistency in this area drives the third Subordinate Question listed above.

2. Dependent Variable

The Dependent Variable examined in this study is national participation in international collective security arrangements as measured by:

1. Completion of Partnership Action Plan required structural reforms (NATO)
2. Cooperation with EUROPOL anti-smuggling efforts (EU)
3. Nature and extent of participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
4. Participation in multi-national Peace Support Operations

E. RESULTS

The major question this thesis addresses is: What factors most inhibit NATO Partner nations from fully participating in collective security regimes? Its objectives are to identify the specific factors in each of the three Southeast European nations, assess commonalities between the three, and provide illustrations of areas in which current collective security institutions fail to represent the priorities and security conceptualization of these states. Its outcome suggests the process of national integration into international collective security regimes is not the unidirectional, deterministic march that NATO's Membership Action Plan process suggests. It is a set of simultaneous dialogues, between the national government and international

organization and between government and popular opinions. In its strategy toward PfP nations, NATO may be better served to promote a multi-channel method of engagement than to blindly promote those nations' membership in the Alliance. A policy of substantial multi-channel engagement, even with collective security organizations that compete with NATO for resources—may better achieve cooperative security objectives.

II. REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA

A hundred kilometers upstream from Vienna, where the Danube begins its convoluted course through the Wachau, sits a prime site to study the origins of collective security in Austria: the Melk Abbey. Melk sits above the river where it narrows and, paying homage to Bernoulli, speeds up. Despite its high religious status, Melk was originally settled because of its ability to command the rapids. According to a tour guide, a heavy chain lay across the bottom of the river, waiting to tear the keel out of uncooperative commercial boats. A trumpet blast greeted their arrival, conveying a blunt message: Pay the toll or we'll raise the chain.

Before the Austro Hungarian Empire there was Holy Roman Empire, before that a feudal alliance; a Slavic settlement; a Roman outpost. Melk played host to them all. Now a museum, every period it commemorates had a formative impact on the current Austrian conception of collective security. Though the *Republik Österreich* is a thoroughly modern state, understanding the Austrian nation's approach to collective security begins and ends with history. Austria's neutrality concept, first dictated under occupation in 1955 but ultimately infused with the original views of the nation's leaders, stems from an attempt to avoid repeating history's mistakes. The Second Republic has spent much of its five decades searching for ways to expand its role in international security cooperation while abiding that retrospective concept of neutrality. During the Cold War, the result was a unique hybrid, a militarily pacifistic yet socially activist state.

A. HISTORY

1. Introduction

In the early years of Austria's Second Republic, British historian Edward Crankshaw wrote of Austria's legacy: "A restoration of the Habsburgs is unthinkable; but a restoration of Europe as a complex of interdependent peoples is something to be striven

for by all decent means."¹⁰ The romanticized ideal Crankshaw referred to was a unique collective security and collective defense hybrid that evolved into the Habsburg Empire. In several respects, the modern European security environment mirrors the traits that made the Habsburg Empire viable over a century. Austria's concept of collective security derives from a period of occupations that began with Rome and continued in phases until 1955. That Austria was occupied was not unique. The specific way that Austria evolved based on the occupations, however, has been. The empire's "complex of interdependent peoples" represents a novel situation in European history: a state of many states and nationalities.

The simultaneous outlook on collective defense and collective security institutions among Austrians today matches the ascendant Franz Josef's dilemma in mid-19th Century. His challenge then was to maintain the Empire despite the external threats from Russia and Serbia and the internal threat of economic growth among the Empire's junior partners. Those twin threats required a balance of collective defense and collective security mindsets. Formal alliances had to provide a sound military defense against external threats, while not provoking conflict by appearing too united or too activist. Internally, those same alliances had to address the sources of conflict and competition within the Empire, and to forestall the growth of those sources through economic, structural integration.

Under the Habsburg Empire, widespread consensus on the need to balance those two factors, the internal and the external, led to the "constitutionalist" movement that followed on the 1848 Congress of Vienna. That transnational framework for Central Europe, which a century and a half of nationalist movements shredded, is only now re-emerging today. Edward Crankshaw cites Baron Eichhoff, a senior Austrian defense official as summarizing the spirit of the constitutionalists' international consensus: "mutual dependence in the economic sphere -- independence in the political sphere...a

¹⁰ Edward Crankshaw, *The Fall of the House of Habsburg* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 3.

glorified customs union of quasi-autonomous peoples." Eichhoff's concept might have been excerpted as easily from the European Union's yet unratified constitution as from its original imperial context.¹¹

2. Transnational Basis of Empire

The Empire's enduring precedent for Austrian engagement with collective security was a mechanical interplay between social classes and the structure of alliance. Austria was not unique among countries with an imperial past and a significant industrial growth during the 19th century, but it was the most extreme case of industrial growth combined with an imperial capital. This growth yielded a linkage between political parties and the alliance options available to the Habsburgs. As Barbara Jelavich explains, the industrial revolution in Austria coincided with the dissemination of revolutionary movements throughout Germany, and Eastern Europe. The growth of Austria's merchant class meant that the emperor had to tolerate a significant level of autonomy among industrial regions. In fact, economic network-building became a central tool of security policy.¹² Austria's imperial model fundamentally shifted, and with it the imperial concepts of what constituted security and how to achieve it. Prior to 1848, Austria's empire was a culturally inclusive amalgamation of regions, which relied on expansion and consolidation of power through arranged marriages.¹³ Industrial growth and the pressure to compete with the Great Powers resulted in a new, transnational basis of empire. Describing that novel imperial model, Crankshaw writes:

As a concept, Austrian patriotism did not exist...at the height of centralized Imperial might Vienna had become the capital of a great Empire and the dynasty ruled over a dozen races...where patriotism existed as a force it was either local or racial (and) usually at odds with the pretensions of the dynasty.¹⁴

¹¹ Edward Crankshaw, *The Fall of the House of Habsburg* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 352.

¹² Barbara Jelavich, *Modern Austria : Empire and Republic, 1815-1986* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 56.

¹³ Edward Crankshaw, *The Fall of the House of Habsburg* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

The separation of linguistic from ethnic and ethnic from national identity meant that the Empire had a unique approach to questions of collective security. The empire itself was both a collective defense mechanism versus the other Great Powers and a collective security regime that channeled internal disputes into palace intrigue and commercial competition. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the processes of creating a common defense were subordinated to that dynastic concept. Despite National Socialism's attempt to make ethnicity synonymous with the nation, that dynastic separation has endured into the present.

3. First Republic (1918-1933)

The Treaty of Saint-Germain codified Austria's boundaries in a Deutsch-Österreich identity. The Austrian law, as historians Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms explain, based citizenship solely on current domicile ("zustaendigkeit") and geographic origin ("Heimat"), a situation that between the World Wars left Adolf Hitler a "stateless person." Though annulment of this citizenship law was one of the Nazis' first acts following the 1939 Anschluss, the Second World War constituted only a temporary suspension of a century-long multi-ethnic concept of Austrian citizenship.¹⁵

After 1919, national boundaries no longer coincided with ethnic populations. The architects of post-World War I Central Europe intentionally attempted to de-couple ethnic identity from state security. The concept of a Pan-Slavist state that would elide Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian cultures into a single Kingdom was a prime example of that mindset. World War II, though caused by the failure of that transnational experiment, ultimately reinforced the separation of state from ethnic identity. In Austria, that distinction was constitutionally enshrined in the First Republic's constitution. So successful was the Treaty of St. Germain in enforcing state boundaries across ethnic lines, Timms contends the Entente's power in the 1920's exceeded the United Nations' ability in the early 1990s to enforce such boundaries.¹⁶ Among the three states under

¹⁵ Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms, *The Habsburg Legacy : National Identity in Historical Perspective*, Vol. 5 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 162, 166.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 159.

comparison, therefore, Austria has the longest and most legally precedented multi-ethnic concept of citizenship and national identity. This tradition has led to an activist attitude among Austrians toward collective security institutions. Not only are Austrians comfortable with the concept of a supranational organization arbitrating disputes that span cultural and legal boundaries, a strong consensus favors an activist role of collective security organizations to address such discontinuities. For Austria, collective security is not a passive, reactive function. It is an essential component to the definition and maintenance of national identity.

4. Foundation of Second Republic (1945-1955)

The Austrian Republic's rushed creation at the end of World War II had lasting implications for the nation's relationship with collective security regimes. Even beyond the occupation's end in 1955, public attitudes toward NATO, the EU and bilateral defense cooperation remained a national form of 'frozen conflicts' that would not be articulated in domestic politics until the Soviet Union's demise in 1991.

Between the Axis' defeat and the 1955 withdrawal of occupying forces, Austria contended with a set of competing factions. Where the Austro-Hungarian Empire consolidated several geographically distinct cultures under a divinely blessed cult of personality, Austria after the war had the worst of both worlds: rival ethnic factions, geographically intermixed, but without a central governing authority. James Carafano described the situation as follows:

After the Anschluss, Germany had amalgamated Austrian troops into its own military forces so at the end of the conflict the country had no independent military service. In the immediate postwar period, a number of paramilitary organizations sponsored by French, British, Yugoslav, Slovene and Austrian communists claimed some kind of lineage and legitimacy.¹⁷

While the military threat those groups posed was small compared to the occupying forces, the experience of negotiating with terrorists, or at least factoring their

¹⁷ James Jay Carafano, *Waltzing into the Cold War : The Struggle for Occupied Austria* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2002), 174.

demands into the political process, became central to the Austrian relationship with collective security regimes during the Cold War.

In stark contrast to the paramilitary organizations, which pursued the politics of extortion until the Republic was strong enough to ignore them and the occupation forces succeeded in disrupting them, the Catholic Church played a consistent role in redefining Austria's concept of security. Anton Pelinka asserts that in the formative years of occupation and the Second Republic's foundation, the Church played a simultaneously stabilizing and progressive role. While publicly associated with nostalgia for the old order, Austria's Catholic leadership was instrumental in framing the public debate over national identity between the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties.¹⁸

5. Under Occupation

Under four-power occupation, a cumbersome constitutional structure replaced the Soviet role in Vienna, thereby preventing the development or expression of any national or regional consensus on collective security. Austria's political leadership paid close attention to the attitudes, structures and working relationships of the surrounding nations in defining its role. Like the eagle of imperial Austria Hungary, the Second Republic's national security apparatus had two heads, one looking to the East, the other to the West. Even before the Federal Republic of Germany formalized its security and defense structures for integration into NATO, Westward-leaning Austrian leaders sought to configure the nation institutionally for a shadow membership in the Alliance. Communist-influenced leaders meanwhile focused their efforts on keeping defense resources within limits acceptable to Austria's Eastern neighbors, and ensuring that the nation's political structure retained its commitment to neutral diplomacy. The nation's parliamentary structure, designed as a compromise between a strongly socialist urban

¹⁸ James Jay Carafano, *Waltzing into the Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2002), 178.

population and an equally entrenched alpine Christian Democratic movement, guaranteed that debates over any national leanings East or West of passive neutrality would remain consigned to social venues.¹⁹

6. Post Occupation

As the cold war progressed, the hysterical divides of opinion among political leaders regarding the nation's proper role in international security resulted in an odd role for the Austrian Republic in the international system. Though external military threats and internal political divides ruled out an activist foreign policy, Vienna played host to many of the organizations where important security decisions were transacted. These included the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In its role of diplomatic host, the Austrian Republic thereby came to play a central role in how concepts of collective security evolved on both sides of Churchill's "Iron Curtain."

7. US Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction

James Jay Carafano's description of postwar reconstruction in Austria, published in 2002, bears some striking parallels to the more recent US experience in Iraq. According to Carafano, at the close of World War II, US forces in Austria suffered from a lack of doctrine and experience in reconstruction and peacekeeping. The Austrian experience under occupation and in the reconstitution of its armed forces bore the marks of influence from this American inexperience.²⁰

Austria enshrined in its defense institutions an explicit policy of agile neutrality, which contrasted to the strong neutrality of its Western neighbor Switzerland. Instead of premising its defense policy on a strong border defense, Austria assumed in a major conflict it would either be overrun or that NATO would intervene on the nation's behalf. This fact led to its external policy of declared neutrality. The internal counterpart to that

¹⁹ Jelavich, *Modern Austria : Empire and Republic, 1815-1986*, 247-248.

²⁰ Carafano, *Waltzing into the Cold War : The Struggle for Occupied Austria*, 248.

defense concept was a belief that insurgent groups posed a great enough threat to require co-opting. Thus instead of abandoning Vienna to stronger invaders and retreating to the mountains (as, repeatedly the monarchy had done in the Imperial era), the Austrian Republic's founding defense concept was to engage only diplomatically beyond its borders and to arm defensively only against weaker invaders. A policy of active engagement and shifting alliances in both East and West would match Austria's attempt to defensively fortify its center.²¹

8. Post Cold War

As Communism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans collapsed, Austria became a pivot point for reform of national models of security and defense. The first intellectual movements to propagate widely throughout the Austrian Republic's foreign policy infrastructure were the pan-European attempts of neo-liberal theorists to define a new agenda even while the old system was still alive. Among these was the effort to "rethink European security" sponsored by the West European Forum on the Problems of Peace and War.²²

a. Early Activism and Promotion of EU as Alternative to NATO

The first structural change of the Austrian armed forces based on participation in collective security regimes was the nation's 1992 initiation of its "Stand-by Arrangement System" with the United Nations. Though the Austrian Peoples' Party (ÖVP) and Social Democratic (SPÖ) differed significantly in their strategies, a strong consensus existed that Austria should take a leadership role in amassing coalitions for

²¹ Carafano, *Waltzing into the Cold War : The Struggle for Occupied Austria*, 175.

²² For a discussion of the state of neo-liberal theory regarding the revision of neutrality and its implications for collective security, see Margaret Johannsen "Beyond Deterrence Through Collective Security" in Furio Cerutti and others, *Rethinking European Security* (New York; Bristol, PA: C. Russak; Taylor & Francis distributor, 1990), 53-55.

Peacekeeping operations. In 1996, Austria created the CENCOOP, an organization of Central European states inclined toward providing regional support packages for United Nations Peacekeeping operations.²³

The most significant shift in Austria's policy toward collective security regimes occurred after September 11th, 2001. The details of this shift are provided hereafter in the Structures section.

B. GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES

According to Commander of Land Forces LTG Edmund Entacher, contemporary Austria has five primary defense missions:

1. Contending with the consequences of terrorism
2. Combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
3. Preventing and responding to regional conflicts
4. Preventing state failures
5. Contending with the consequences of organised crime
6. Responding to Natural disasters²⁴

The strategy that derives from those threats constitutes Austria's cold war neutrality turned on its head. Instead of expecting an overwhelming force and attempting to avoid conflict through diplomacy, it is premised on the expectation that conflict is inevitable and the primary security challenge is to prepare for its effects. This strategy reflects in the formal ties Austria has forged with each type of collective security regime: collective defense organizations (NATO *and* EU), treaties, conventions and voluntary cooperation programs.

1. NATO Intentions

Austria's post cold war revised attitude towards NATO was first formalized in 1995. Then Foreign Minister Alois Mock in the NATO Journal affirmed both Austria's

²³ "Austria's International Role," BMLV Republic of Austria, <http://www.bmlv.gv.at/english/introle/introle.shtml> (accessed 30 April 2008).

²⁴ Edmund Entacher, "The Army's Evolution," *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace*, no. 1 (2006), 24, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1085516191&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 01 May 2008).

commitment to undersigning the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy as part of its EU membership, and the compatibility of that CFSP membership with an active role in the Partnership for Peace. This was the first time in the history of the Second Republic that an Austrian official publicly declared participation in regional collective defense regimes to be compatible with the nation's constitutional commitment to neutrality.²⁵

Austria was one of the first nations to join NATO's Partnership for Peace. Since 1995, it has given Pfp a prominent position in its foreign policy. To reinforce its dedication to Pfp and provide a legislative liaison between NATO Headquarters and the Austrian parliament, both Foreign and Defense Ministries created permanent organizations dedicated to Pfp.²⁶

In addition to its formal affiliation with NATO through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, since 2000 Austria has maintained a "bilateral tailored cooperation programme" with NATO Headquarters. In practice this relationship has served as a channel to re-negotiate the EAPC objectives and to lobby NATO for inclusion of former Yugoslav states in the Partnership for Peace.²⁷

According to the United Nations, September 11th resulted in sweeping changes in Austria's defense doctrine. The nation's most immediate public response was the December, 2001 passage of a new "comprehensive security concept" which constituted a formal doctrinal shift from crisis response to "crisis prevention," an explicit reorientation

²⁵ Alois Mock, "Austria's Role in the New Europe," *NATO Review* 43, no. 2 (March 1995), 15, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=4506541&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 02 May 2008).

²⁶ "Austria Participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace (Pfp) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)," Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, Republic of Austria, <http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/foreign-policy/europe/nato-pfp-and-eapc.html> (accessed 26 March 2008).

²⁷ "the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (Pfp)," United Nations Headquarters, http://www.un.int/austria/policy/01/euro_security.shtml (accessed 03 May 2008).

toward "non-military threats" and most importantly, amendment of the nation's half-century policy of "permanent neutrality" in favor of a new model, the "alliance free state."²⁸

2. EU Intentions

As Oxford Analytica in 2008 concluded, finding appropriate niche leadership roles for Europe's small but modern defense forces is a significant part of the overall attempt to resuscitate the EU's constitutional movement. The Austrian government, accordingly, has made defense reform for international operations one of its public examples of national leadership in the EU.²⁹

The Prague Institute of International Relations' Michal Koran has reviewed the evolution of Austria's concept of neutrality among the nation's political leaders since the end of the Warsaw Pact. According to Koran, despite overwhelming public support for the European Union's Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) and general acceptance of a cooperative working relationship with NATO, Austria's "holy mantle of neutrality" remains political kryptonite for any leader who might choose to re-negotiate it.³⁰

3. Toward the United Nations

Austria's history with the United Nations has been a constant quest to enjoy a stronger leadership role and to make a regional security contribution out of proportion to the resources it is able to devote to the cause. As in its relationship to NATO, the ratio of Austria's prominence to its financial and military contribution has led the nation's

²⁸ "the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP)", United Nations Headquarters, http://www.un.int/austria/policy/01/euro_security.shtml (accessed 03 May 2008).

²⁹ "EUROPEAN UNION: 'Euro-Sclerosis' Looks Set to Worsen," *OxResearch* (28 February 2008), 1, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1440853231&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

³⁰ Michal Koran, "Austrian Neutrality: Burden of History in the Making Or Moral Good Rediscovered?" *Perspectives*, no. 26 (Summer 2006), 23, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1164920311&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

detractors to accuse it of enjoying a "free rider" status in the collective security system.³¹ To less dismissive observers, however, the Republic's methods and objectives are a model for effective niche contribution to an international order.

4. Toward Private Actors

Private actors, including individuals, churches and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) play a large and sanctioned role in Austria's engagement with collective security organizations. Beyond coexistence, the Austrian government frequently incorporates NGOs into both the formulation and execution of foreign policy for international security cooperation. In some cases, NGOs act internationally and independently. For example, the government has directly reimbursed the Church-based Caritas for its role in coordinating de-mining activities.³²

C. PUBLIC ATTITUDES

1. Toward NATO

In the mid- to late 1990s, Austrian public attitudes toward collective defense and collective security organizations were generally ambivalent and confused. A 1997 United States Information Agency survey, for example, found that Austrians had the lowest level of confidence in NATO among 19 Western and Central European nations (plus Canada). Only 30% of those polled expressed a "fair amount" or "great deal" of confidence in the organization. National attitudes toward the United Nations, and the Western European Union (WEU), while more favorable, were still below the group average. Even the OSCE, enjoying a home court advantage, did not poll better than 50% favorable response.³³ The chief reason for the lack of Austrian confidence in collective

³¹ Norabert Darabos "Austria to Contribute 200 Troops to EU Force for Kosovo, Bosnia" Interview with Austrian Foreign Minister. BBC Monitoring Europe 11 May 2007. BBC Worldwide Monitoring.

³² "Austria: Developments since 1999", Human Rights Watch, <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2000/austria#fn2759> (accessed 03 May 2008).

³³ United States Information Agency. Office of Research and Media Reaction, *The New European Security Architecture. Volume IV, Public Attitudes Toward European Security on the Eve of NATO's 50th Anniversary* (Washington, D.C: USIA Office of Research and Media, 1999), 4-5.

security regimes was the firsthand experience Austrian citizens had with NATO, the EU and UN's failure to intervene in the Yugoslav Wars of Dissolution.

2. Toward EU

A significant literature on Austrian public attitudes toward the EU exists, including some studies that detail the attitudes of specific political parties over time, and how inter-party negotiation has been tied to EU membership. Few studies have addressed the topic at the party level of detail, focusing solely on security however. Analysis of Austrian attitudes toward the EU as a collective defense mechanism must therefore be tempered by the knowledge that in Austria, as in former communist states, the EU is primarily associated with economic matters and material gain, whereas NATO is associated almost entirely with security.

Austria was unique among the three nations studied in that throughout the 1990s, citizens identified the EU simultaneously with military stability and economic advantage³⁴ Erik Tillman's study of Austria in 2000 concluded that the Republic's voting behavior and public attitudes repudiated the earlier conclusion of a "democratic deficit" between government attitudes and citizen opinions. Citizens, to the contrary, played a definitive role. Furthermore, Tillman concluded that in Austria, public attitudes toward the EU corresponded to elements of EU policy, not views on the Union itself as a disembodied entity. Tillman's work reaffirmed Matthew Gabel's earlier conclusion that Austrians' individual attitudes toward the EU did not strongly correlate to left-right political status or party affiliation.³⁵ That weak correlation is particularly ironic for Austria because the nation's three main political parties, the social democratic SPO, christian conservative OVP and nationalist FPO all slavishly tied their voting records and campaigns to the nation's relationship with the European Union. In the most extreme

³⁴ Erik R. Tillman, "The European Union at the Ballot Box? European Integration and Voting Behavior in the New Member States," *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 5 (June 2004), 604, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=681477701&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 02 May 2008).

³⁵ Matthew Gabel, "European Integration, Voters and National Politics," *West European Politics* 23, no. 4 (October 2000), 59, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a2h&AN=4082417&site=ehost-live> (accessed 02 May 2008).

example, talks regarding formation of a Grand Coalition between the SPO and OVP in 2003 fell apart over a dispute regarding Austria's acquisition of the Eurofighter.³⁶

D. STRUCTURES

Austria's role in regional security, includes active participation in all regional cooperation regimes, including those of NATO. At the voluntary, multilateral level, so many regional and sub-regional structures have proliferated, the Balkans represent the upper extreme of overlapping responsibilities.

The desire to engage more extensively and effectively with collective security operations were central in Austria's 2004 defense reform, which according to the *EIU Viewswire*, will result in the closure of "Around 40% of the barracks...with a general shift in emphasis away from traditional defense to a more flexible and mobile force with rapid reaction capability."³⁷

1. Collective Defense Level

Austria's role as champion of an EU-based collective defense regime in competition with NATO was sealed in its 1998 role of rotational EU president. At that time, widespread consensus in Western Europe favored the formalization of an exclusive EU force. That consensus created a prisoner's dilemma of incentives among traditional EU holdouts to the idea. Whichever state first abandoned its resistance to the EUROFOR concept in exchange would reap a leadership role in designing the new force. As Michael Quinlan explains, the "thinking aloud character of the [1998 Austrian] Portschach exchanges" provoked British Prime Minister Tony Blair to throw his weight behind the European Force, lest Britain be widely perceived as passive.³⁸

³⁶ "Austria," *Oxford Economic Country Briefings* (01 November 2006), 1, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1262632001&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 02 May 2008).

³⁷ "Austria: International Relations and Defence," *EIU Viewswire* (06 September 2005), <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=905730441&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 02 May 2008).

³⁸ Michael Quinlan, *European Defense Cooperation : Asset Or Threat to NATO?* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 28.

In the nation's first address to the UN General Assembly following the 2001 attacks, Austria's Permanent Representative pledged to abide by the European Council's "comprehensive Action Plan" for international cooperation to combat terrorist networks.³⁹ In the succeeding 7 years, Austria has overwhelmingly abided by that pledge. September 2005 saw ratification of the EU Convention on Suppression of Acts of Terror, police procedure standardization, civil defense, threat assessment and crisis coordination. Austria also ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,⁴⁰ European Arrest Warrant, Joint Investigation Teams, Amendments to EUROPOL convention, as well as *acquis communautaire* Old conventions on hijacking, aviation security, nuclear material, maritime security⁴¹

As of the first EUFOR Capabilities Declaration in 2000, Austria pledged to earmark 2000 troops (4% of its total combat force) for EU Joint Operations. In 2005, when the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was formalized in the "battlegroup" concept, Austria reaffirmed that pledge with a commitment to supporting a standing unit with Germany and the Czech Republic.⁴²

2. NATO

The growth of Austrian commitment to an independent EU deployable force between 1998 and 2005 belies a fundamental shift in national security strategy that occurred after 9/11. In all four areas of the Austria's defense policy, the terrorist attacks of 2001 brought about a dramatic shift from a competitive to a cooperative relationship

³⁹ "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Statement by H.E. Dr. Gerhard Pfanzelter, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations, New York, " (United Nations, New York, Homeland Security Digital Library, 56th Session of the General Assembly, Agenda Item 166: 02 October 2001), <https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/nonprof/nps08-092204-60.pdf&code=543321c01cde65266244daf6a0d685f4> (accessed 04 May 2008).

⁴⁰ "Report of Counter Terrorism Coordinator to European Council: Implementation of the Action Plan to Combat Terrorism" 15704/05, (12 December 2005): 4,8, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st15/st15704.en05.pdf> (accessed 04 May 2008).

⁴¹ Ibid.17, 21, 23.

⁴² "Declaration on European Military Capabilities " (2005), 9, http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/2005/03/18defcapab/18defcap.pdf. (accessed 28 April 2008), Robert Edwards Hunter and others, *The European Security and Defense Policy : NATO's Companion--Or Competitor?* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 95.

with NATO. The 2004 Madrid Train bombings, which highlighted European 'crossroads cities' vulnerability to attack, affirmed the national change in priorities. The chief mechanism for mediating the EU / NATO resource conflicts has been the EAPC Action Plan, which provided wide-ranging support for NATO contingency operations in areas previously requiring round-robin approval.⁴³

The primary structures that formally link Austrian defense organization to NATO are the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Among EAPC members, Austria stands out. Where traditionally the organization was dedicated to addressing resource shortages, i.e. areas where EU and NATO commitments might speak for the same forces, Austria has actively employed EAPC as a means to promote an independent conception of EU foreign policy.

3. Convention Level

Austria is a signatory to all Weapons of Mass Destruction Treaties, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.⁴⁴

4. Voluntary / Bilateral

The Stability Pact, which bills itself as "the first serious attempt by the international community to replace the previous, reactive crisis intervention policy in South Eastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy" is a regional, multilateral, voluntary framework sponsored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on behalf of the EU.⁴⁵

⁴³ "The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP)"

⁴⁴ Joel A. Doolin, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm," *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 2 (Spring 2006), 29, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1062544951&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 02 May 2008).

⁴⁵ "About the Stability Pact", Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, <http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/default.asp> (accessed 28 April 2008).

Austria has pursued an activist role within the United Nations throughout the Second Republic's history of membership. Despite, and in conscious compensation for the nation's "Verdross Doctrine," which formalized Austria's right to opt-out of any United Nations operation that violated its constitutional doctrine of neutrality, Austria has continually played an active--though numerically limited--role in UN Peacekeeping Operations.⁴⁶

Some of the Austrian contributions to the United Nations are products of Verdross, in that they involve significant logistical support without committing personnel or resources beyond the nation's borders. Examples include Austria's considerable financial support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna and the nation's sponsorship of track-two and formal diplomatic negotiations such as the "Agreement on Succession Issues of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."⁴⁷

As Michal Koran explains, Karl Zemanek's politically successful re-interpretation of the Verdross Doctrine in 1961 allowed Austria to engage more widely with the United Nations, contributing armed troops to operations conducted "for peaceful purposes." In practice, this translated to a legislative carte blanche to participate in UN Chapter Six (Peacekeeping) operations wherever resources could be found and risk--be it physical to the soldiers or political to the superpowers--was moderate. That mandate would continue until 1983's coalition government recast the policy as a regional one.⁴⁸

5. Non-Proliferation Structures

Consistent with its thematic support for non-proliferation efforts through the IAEA, Austria is an active and contributing member of all UNSCR 1540 non- and counter-proliferation organizations. These include the Waasenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers' Group, Zangger Committee, Missile Technology Control Regime and

⁴⁶ Koran, *Austrian Neutrality: Burden of History in the Making Or Moral Good Rediscovered?*, 26.

⁴⁷ "Balkan Crisis Zone," United Nations Headquarters, http://www.un.int/austria/policy/01/balkan_crisis.shtml (accessed 02 May 2008).

⁴⁸ Koran, *Austrian Neutrality: Burden of History in the Making Or Moral Good Rediscovered?*, 29.

Australia Group. Beyond formal affiliation with those organizations, Austria is an active member of the Proliferation Security Initiative and has hosted at state expense numerous relevant academic conferences.

In addition to its key role in global non-proliferation efforts for strategic weapons, Austria is active in a number of initiatives dedicated to controlling conventional weapons proliferation and destroying legacy weapons systems in former communist states. The greatest expenditure from the Austrian defense budget has been for measures related to mine clearance and destruction in Former Yugoslavia.⁴⁹

In the 1990s, Austria's legal cooperation for collective security focused on the coordination of voluntary international working agreements through Vienna's UN Center for International Crime Prevention. As with questions regarding more traditional military roles and structures, however, the terror attacks in 2001 shook consensus out of decades-long intractable political debates over information sharing and law enforcement. The tragic 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings reinforced this consensus, and ensured that the declarations in the immediate wake of 9/11 translated into law.⁵⁰

While the Second Republic has pursued a constant strategy of engagement with as many collective security organizations as its constitution would at each phase allow, the greatest indication of its future may lie not in the public, but in the private realm. As will be explained in the succeeding chapters, Austrian businesses themselves may constitute the greatest tool for influencing regional collective security, and traditionally they had the power to dictate the terms of engagement. It is therefore ironic that Austria, having achieved military independence and security against a threat from the East, is now more than ever subject to commercial decisions made in Moscow. Traditionally, business in Austria has been an arm of foreign policy. Now that Gazprom has a controlling stake in the Baumgarten natural gas terminal, the relationship may be reversed.⁵¹

⁴⁹ "The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP)"

⁵⁰ "Introduction to the Center for International Crime Prevention," United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, <http://www.uncjin.org/CICP/cicp.html> (accessed 03 April 2008).

⁵¹ Robert M. Cutler, "European Union Looks to Central Asia to Energy," *Central Asia Caucasus Institute Analyst* (17 April 2008), <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4838> (accessed 01 May 2008).

E. OPERATIONS

Austria's military operations today are unparalleled in Europe in their level of transparency and orientation toward Peace Support and Peacekeeping Operations (PSO/PKO). Most of the organizational structures, command relationships and legal documentation that underpin them are directly available on the Bundesheer website.⁵² The inauguration of Austria's Joint Forces Command Graz (AUTJFC) in September, 2006 represented a major step toward interoperability with all the collective security regimes the nation participates in.⁵³ While such JFCs are the norm throughout NATO and the European Union, Austrian forces from 1955 until the defense reform legislation in 2001 still had an operational framework that reflected its origins under military occupation. Beyond its doctrinal weaknesses, the old command and control system was tied to regional government and parliamentary party orientation. It effectively required legislators to perform the role normally played by a ministry of defense. Each time a potential PSO opportunity surfaced, legislators had to work out its permissions, logistics and command structure.

1. NATO

Austria's formal participation in NATO operations dates to 1996, when the nation deployed a brigade in support of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵⁴ Other Article VIII (Out of Area) operations have included continuous support for the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since 2002⁵⁵ and a rotation as commander of the Kosovo MNTF-S Command starting in May, 2008.⁵⁶ With the establishment of Austrian "Forces for International Operations" (FIOP) program

⁵² "OPCON of Austrian Armed Forces in International Operations", BMLV Republic of Austria, <http://www.bmlv.gv.at/truppendienst/international/artikel.php?id=27> (accessed 03 April 2008).

⁵³ Entacher, *The Army's Evolution*, 24.

⁵⁴ "OPCON of Austrian Armed Forces in International Operations"

⁵⁵ "NATO's Relations with Austria: How does Cooperation Work in Practice?" North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-austria/practice.html> (accessed 03 April 2008).

⁵⁶ European Military Press Association, "Austrian 4th Mechanized Brigade in Albania" *EMPA Newsletter* 9, no. 778 (2007), 2, http://www.empa.hu/files/9/778/newsletter_2_2007.pdf (accessed 30 April 2008).

under the Austrian Joint Forces Command, the process of approving further participation in any NATO out-of-area mission will involve a simple yea or nay decision by the Council of Ministers and the Parliament.⁵⁷ Ironically, it will be more legally straightforward for Austrian forces to serve in support of NATO's international peacekeeping operations than in support of any Article V (collective defense) mission.

2. European Union

The European Union enjoys a straightforward operating relationship with Austria, consistent with long term Austrian participation in the ESDP. Technically, the 300 troops provided for SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted an EU force, though the entire structure was created in coordination with NATO. As will be discussed later, this mixing of alliance roles has led to a conceptual uncertainty and significant public response in the Balkans. Austria has supported the EU MNTF-N force since 2005, and in the counterpart to Bosnia is relieving NATO in the South this month.⁵⁸ The largest Austrian commitment of combat troops for EU operations thus far has been the nation's leadership role in developing a response force for Chad. Deployed in response to the humanitarian crisis which has spilled over from neighboring Darfur, Sudan, the Austrian commitment there constitutes a return to leadership as a lobbyist for expanded EU out-of-area operations.

3. United Nations

Austrian operational support for United Nations PKO/PSO dates to 1960's Congo.⁵⁹ The high level of general approval hamstrung by inter-party conflict, however, meant that Austrian deployments had to be kept to observer missions or very small details. Only occasionally would parliamentary leaders agree on larger deployments.

In 1997, Austria volunteered troops for Operation Alba, an Italian-sponsored ad hoc coalition to address the humanitarian crisis in Albania. John Deni identifies Alba as

⁵⁷ *NATO's Relations with Austria: How does Cooperation Work in Practice?*

⁵⁸ Entacher, *The Army's Evolution*, 24.

⁵⁹ "OPCON of Austrian Armed Forces in International Operations"

a major "missed opportunity" for NATO, which laid bare the Alliance's weaknesses of resources, political will, doctrine and organizational inertia. Austria's experience in Alba (including the irony that the nation, as a NATO holdout, wound up compensating for a lack of NATO consensus) was instrumental in the nation's decision to formally re-define its PKO policy from 1997-2002.⁶⁰

4. Sum of Operational Participation

Austria's attitude toward collective security operations has undergone a marked transition over the last decade. From a reactive mindset, that provided troops on a contingency basis where available and focused primarily on maintaining the nation's international image, Austria has transitioned to a well-defined activist policy that seeks to create and maintain standing forces and define their role within standing coalitions in advance of deployments. In contrast to the nation's rhetoric and policy in the 1990s, Austria's operations in the last decade have demonstrated a shift away from promoting the EU as a collective defense competitor to NATO and toward a focus on maximum contribution to regional stability.

F. NATIONAL CONCLUSION

Despite the sophistication of its civil military relations, limited and earmarked defense resources prevent Austria from taking a strong leadership role in regional collective security regimes. Austria today is a nation whose public attitudes toward collective security reflect a mature and highly participative approach to democratic control of the armed forces. Utterly gone are the aspirations to Great Power and territorial hegemony, as are the attitudes of cultural superiority that originally drove them. Yet some traits of the nation's imperial past still remain. The willingness of political leaders to promote alliance building, even where it meets with lackluster public approval, remains central. The acceptance of simultaneous cooperation with regimes that compete for the same scarce resources is also consistent. Further, just as the empire tolerated the

⁶⁰ John R. Deni, *Alliance Management and Maintenance : Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century* (Aldershot, Hampshire, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 63,64.

independent diplomacy of subordinate states, Austrian law and political practice allows for the active role of sub-national actors in regional collective security cooperation. The conservative OVP, for, example, has independently played an active role in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (the "Stability Pact") by sponsoring academic and diplomatic conferences promoting international approaches to common security challenges. In this role, the OVP Diplomatic Academy has blurred the distinction between scholarship and politics. Other areas where multiple channels for negotiation with collective security regimes are proliferating include multi-national corporations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and political parties. The "Stability Pact" demonstrates not only can all those organizations co-exist within a single voluntary collective security regime, they can convert the regime into a tool for building consensus behind their preferred legal or treaty based frameworks. If the number and type of national organizations that engage with voluntary-consensual collective security regimes are an indicator of national will, Austria is Europe's most active proponent of collective security.⁶¹

In both deliberate foreign policy and in public acceptance of collective security institutions, the mindset of Austria's imperial past still echoes. Austria's concepts of alliance and threat, though infused with democratic influences, still mirror those of the imperial epoch. Alliances are geographically and socially compartmentalized; interest coalitions form and dissolve independently while remaining subordinate to the overall structure. For Austrians today, defensive coalitions still bear a strong resemblance to the arranged marriages of their imperial past: realistic only in the pairing of compatible partners, desirable only if they yield a stronger supranational identity than the status quo.

Austria's is a foreign policy that still favors preemptive action to address impending challenges. While the long tradition of preemption was based on great power gaming, now the nation's foreign policy establishment operates based on a clearly articulated consensus of the nation's strategic priorities and vulnerabilities. According to

⁶¹ *"Regional Workshop: Engaging SEE Parliamentarians in the Fight Against Organised Crime."* Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe,[2006], <http://www.stabilitypact.org/rt/Tirana%20Final%20Agenda.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2008).

Andrew Cottey, Austria and Germany "have common interests in Central Europe and have taken a leading role in promoting EU/NATO engagement in that region."⁶² While a similar general observation is appropriate for the Balkans, some fundamental differences exist in both national interests and the degree to which nations pursue those interests through collective security regimes.

⁶² Andrew Cottey, *Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe : Building Security, Prosperity, and Solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea* (New York: St. Martin's Press, in association with the Eastwest Institute, 1999), 250.

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III. REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

A. HISTORY

1. Introduction

Among European states, Croatia is one of the strongest current examples where ethnic and religious identity coincide with sovereign borders. This fact is not an accident, nor was it always the case. Croatia's status as one of the most ethnically homogenous states of Europe owes partially to its strong ethno-religious identity, but also largely to the experience of dealing with stronger invaders. Its current homogeneity also owes to two brutal 20th century episodes of ethnic cleansing.

Croatian mythology depicts the country as the independent Southeastern bulwark of Catholicism, but while that history is filled with military triumphs, it tells an incomplete story of the the nation's experience with collective defense and collective security regimes. From a Slavic outpost to a Roman province, from partition under the Venetian Empire to Habsburg seaport, from fascist collaborator to laboratory of socialist federalism, Croatia has extensive experience as a client state to larger regional powers. If the current Croatian public is suspicious of transnational security schemes, however, that historical experience includes plenty of examples to justify such wariness. Though Croatia has a millennium of experience integrating itself into transnational collective defense regimes, most of those initiatives have resulted in a subsequent forfeit of national sovereignty.

2. Austro-Hungarian Empire

As discussed in the Austrian case study, the Habsburg Empire functioned both as collective defense and collective security mechanism. Vienna carefully managed national rivalries in support of a supranational state concept. Within that system, Croatia played a relatively consistent role. In a process Kathleen Pond describes in *Endgame in the Balkans*, Croatian nobles first pledged themselves to Hungarian rule for both

collective defense and collective security reasons. Hungarian rule provided the organizing structure and strategic depth necessary to coordinate Croatian defense against the Ottoman Turks. It also served as a primitive collective security system by preventing a crisis of succession after the death of King Zvonimir. As the Croatian knights ejected the Turks and consolidated their control over inland territories, however, it became clear that the Hungarian nobility would continue its occupation and retain its control over Croat lands.⁶³ Croatian nobles had forfeited national autonomy in favor of collective defense.

When the Hungarian rulers joined the revolutions of 1848, Croatia's nobility echoed with a pan-slavist revolt of their own. Though the movement did not resonate across the Danube in the Kingdom of Serbia, it provided the ideological concept on which the post-World War I pan-slavist alliance would be based.⁶⁴ Of equal importance, the military conflict that followed the 1848 revolt delivered Istria and the Dalmatian coast into the hands of an enlarged and emboldened Habsburg Empire.

3. Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918-1929)

In the aftermath of the World War that had begun in Sarajevo, Croatia became a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. What began as a pan-Slavist experiment after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire quickly revealed how the Habsburg structure had kept ethnic and religious conflict in check. In what Sabrina Ramet labels the "bi-polar" system, Yugoslavia quickly re-aggregated into a pair of warring camps. Where previously, collective defense under a transnational structure had been the order of the day, the newly "unified" Kingdom was born at war with itself.⁶⁵

⁶³ Elizabeth Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans : Regime Change, European Style* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 123.

⁶⁴ Sabrina P. Ramet and Sabrina P. Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 41.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

4. Ustaše Period

Croatia's collaboration with the Axis during World War II bears little resemblance to the nation's current concept of collective security. Two characteristics of this dark period in the nation's history do, however, influence the nation's current concept of approach to alliances. First, Croatia's relationship with the Axis during the Second World War was consistent both in precedent and in mechanics to its previous alliances with larger regional powers. Second, self-reliance in national defense was associated with expeditionary, offensive action.

As with Hungarian rule, Croatia in World War II sought alliance with Germany on favorable terms by offering the Axis a significant (and largely self-contained) expeditionary offensive capability. Beyond the level that Nazi coercion or defense against a Soviet threat might reasonably explain, Croatia took an active role in combat operations on the German Eastern Front. National views on the history, however, are consistent with what Bruce MacDonald labels two longstanding Croatian myths, the "myth of continuous Croatian statehood," and the myth of "reactive nature."⁶⁶ Excepting the two collective security structures forced on Croatia in defeat, the 1918 Yugoslav Kingdom and the 1946 Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, a millennium of Croatian history had seen the state growing more cohesive through activist diplomacy with superior regional powers. As MacDonald concludes, however, the prevailing opinion among Croatian citizens continues to be that the Ustaše committed atrocities only as necessary to preserve the state and in reaction to the Soviet threat.⁶⁷

For individuals, Ustaše rule provided an opportunity to shred the aristocratic institutions which had formed the basis of national identity and the means to justify international alliances under the Yugoslav Kingdom. Croatia's public emerged from the war stunned, polarized and more ethnically divided than ever. In what became the

⁶⁶ David Bruce MacDonald, *Balkan Holocausts? : Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centred Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia* (Manchester ; New York; New York: Manchester University Press; Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave, 2002), 115.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 153.

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the government would spend much of its resources on freezing and suppressing those ethnic divisions.

5. Independence to Present

Alex J. Bellamy and Timothy Edmunds, in their 2005 review of Croatian civil-military relations, divided the Croatian postwar history of reform into three phases, “nation building,” “regime defence,” and “reform.” The first phase, which lasted from the nation’s 1991 independence declaration until 1995, approached international defense cooperation only as acts of necessity and expedience in support of a fundamentally domestic military effort. Like its running-mate Slovenia (and later Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro), Croatia’s primary challenge in this period was not the overhaul of inherited defense institutions but the creation of new institutions in the midst of a war. During this period, international cooperation on security was limited to ad hoc and sometimes inconsistent working arrangements.⁶⁸ Bellamy and Edmunds’ second phase, from 1995 until the death of the Republic’s patriarch in 2000, saw individual leaders and Ministry of Defense (MoD) departments attempt to formalize their existing arrangements in a frontier constitution that would legally codify the positions they held:

Prior to 1998 Ministry of Defense spending was not even audited by the State Auditing Office nor did it provide yearly reports to parliament...this endemic politicization soured relations between the military and wider society in Croatia.⁶⁹

Though Croatia officially announced its intention to join the Partnership for Peace in 1994 and maintained a high level of diplomatic engagement with the NATO Headquarters, the reform of defense institutions that were prerequisite to membership was frozen out until Franjo Tuđman’s death.

Bellamy and Edwards’ “third phase,” which began in 2000 and continues to the present, represented the first attempt to divorce defense policy from executive privilege,

⁶⁸ Bellamy, Alex J. and Timothy Edmunds, "Civil-Military Relations in Croatia: Politicization and Politics of Reform," *European Security* 14, no. 1 (March 2005), 72.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 73.

the Ministry of Defense from the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and international cooperation from a nationalist vision of the state.⁷⁰ While the overhaul of defense institutions to eliminate the culture of patronage took center stage in the 2000 parliamentary elections, Croatia's desire to access International Military Education and Training funds played a significant role in the transition. Tuđman's rule permitted none of the reforms necessary for substantial integration with NATO or the EU. Beyond the President's extensive constitutional powers, which he wielded to protect his political appointees within the Ministry of Defense (and General Staff), his resistance to reform carried down to the lowest levels of the Croatian military.

B. GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES

Throughout Croatia's violent process of gaining independence and state formation, the Republic of Croatia's official statements indicated an intention to become a peer state with West European members of NATO and the EU. While Non-Governmental Organizations widely criticized Croatia under the Tuđman dynasty for enshrouding its intentions in secrecy, today's Croatian Defense publications are a model of transparency. Put more precisely, they are transparent, but largely copied from Western models. Though the Ministry of Defense and General Staff do not religiously adhere to the published intentions, the written guidance is consistent. Croatia's 2002 defense strategy was modeled on its earlier US counterparts, and was released deliberately in parallel with the US post-9/11 update. The 2002 public strategy was the flagship of the short-lived Mesić reform government, and survived even when that government became a victim of its own reformist zeal.

⁷⁰ Bellamy, Alex J. and Timothy Edmunds, "Civil-Military Relations in Croatia: Politicization and Politics of Reform," *European Security* 14, no. 1 (March 2005), 73.

1. NATO Intentions

According to the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government of Croatia seeks NATO membership as the centerpiece of a multi-lateral security strategy based on “reciprocity.” The Croatian strategy makes explicit linkage between NATO membership and the nation’s economic prospects.⁷¹

2. UN Intentions/Peace Support Operations Policy

Croatia has a history of governmental support for UN Peace Support Operations that predates the founding of the Republic. Under the SFRY, Croatia sent military observers to a number of UN monitoring missions. The participation of Yugoslav National Army (JNA) troops in blue-helmet operations was central to Marshal Tito’s promotion of Yugoslavia as a leader for the “non-aligned movement” among lesser developed nations.⁷² While the declaration of independence saw the recall of Croats deployed on UN peacekeeping missions, the United Nations’ played a central role in the new state. A UN force monitored the Krajina region through UNCRO in 1994-95, culminating in the setup of the UNPROFOR.⁷³ Thereafter, the Republic of Croatia became a regular (small scale) contributor of forces to UN monitoring and peacekeeping missions. In 2006, Croatia contributed 46 peacekeepers to UN missions worldwide.⁷⁴

Croatia’s greatest support and integration into United Nations has not been through Peacekeeping Operations, however. Rather, it has been in national support for regional peacekeeping, stabilization and reconstruction, and confidence-building regimes created under the UN flag. To date, Croatia’s largest contribution has been its

⁷¹ "Foreign Policy Aims," Republic of Croatia Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, <http://www.mvpei.hr/MVP.asp?pcpid=30> (accessed 21 April 2008).

⁷² Nora Beloff, *Tito's Flawed Legacy : Yugoslavia & the West since 1939* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1985), 183.

⁷³ "Past Operations: UNCRO," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/uncro.htm (accessed 12 March 2008).

⁷⁴ "Peacekeeping Contributors 2006," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/year_review06/PKcontributors.pdf (accessed 24 March 2008).

sponsorship of a Zagreb logistics hub in support of UN operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR, subsequently transferred to the International Force IFOR then the EU Stabilization Force SFOR).

3. Toward Private Actors

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played a literally commanding role in the development of Croatia's defense institutions since the nation won its independence. In other states attitudes toward NGOs have ranged from wary tolerance (Montenegro) to symbiotic cooperation (Austria). In the Republic of Croatia, the relationship between government and NGO extends beyond even the Austrian model: Croatia has formally integrated foreign NGOs, businesses and private consultants and private actors into a broad range of its defense institutions. The irony of that extensive collaboration is that Croatia itself has almost no homegrown NGOs of its own.⁷⁵

In the second half of the 1990s, thanks largely to negative feedback over the slow pace of institutional reform under the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) single-party rule, Croatia engaged the U.S.-based Military Professional Resources Institute (MPRI) to create or completely revise most of the nation's key defense documents. As A.J. Bellamy explains, the HDZ's acceptance of MPRI's advice was at first grudging, then increasingly eager. Offered as a stop-gap during a period in which the EU arms embargo and NATO diplomacy prevented formal military-to-military consulting, MPRI's guidance broke loose impediments to reform in several areas of Croatia's Defense Ministry and overnight created a public image of transparency.⁷⁶ So pervasive was MPRI's influence on Croatian reform, Ministry of Defense officials sought to demonstrate achievement of the consultancy's reform requirements so that they might find alternative sources of funding and shift MPRI out. As the Naval Postgraduate School's Professor Donald Abenheim (who worked with the Croatian Ministry of Defense in 2000) explains, the Croatian Ministry of Defense actively courted the United States to receive International Military

⁷⁵ Bellamy, Alex J. and Timothy Edmunds, *Civil-Military Relations in Croatia: Politicization and Politics of Reform*, 76.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 73.

Education and Training funds as a means to lessen their dependence on MPRI.⁷⁷ The recent history of Croatian defense structures, therefore, has been the transition from complete insularity, to intrusive management, to independent initiative.

C. PUBLIC ATTITUDES

Collective security regimes, from formal institutions such as NATO and the EU's European Security and Defense Policy to informal working arrangements (such as cooperation with Bosnia-Herzegovina over de-mining activities), figure prominently in press coverage and domestic politics. While defense policy does not currently figure as prominently as it did during the reform government of 2000-2003, the nation's engagement with regional and international collective security regimes remains central to the national agenda.

1. Toward NATO

Croatia's April 2008 invitation to join NATO does not indicate an increased consensus in support of the Alliance. Croatia's attitude toward NATO is deeply ambivalent. Croatians generally consider NATO membership as both a military necessity (to bolster national defenses against Serbia) and a prerequisite for the more economically beneficial membership in the European Union. Public skepticism about the cost and value of NATO membership stems from the Atlantic Alliance's refusal to intervene on Croatia's behalf in 1992. As NATO operations have involved increasing financial and personnel commitments for out-of-area operations, that skepticism has grown. Despite a clear appreciation of the transnational threats NATO addresses (terrorism and crime), the increasing level of hazard for Croatian military personnel deployed in support of NATO and the increasing cost of weapons systems optimized for Article 8 operations have made it increasingly difficult for collective security organizations to keep public opinion favorably engaged.

⁷⁷ Donald Abenheim, Personal Interview, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 01 June 2008.

Countervailing against the sticker shock for NATO operations, Croatia's public consensus favors membership in NATO to reinforce the nation's standing as a Western European peer. As Greenwood's 2005 study noted "a strong strand in popular opinion sentiment in Croatia which deeply deplores the fact that NATO (like the EU) has not already allowed the state to rejoin the European mainstream."⁷⁸

Croatia's progress toward NATO membership, which culminated in the nation's Accession Invitation at the April Bucharest Summit, was not without setbacks and complications. In fact, public consensus on joining the Alliance was strongest in the early period of independence when the prospect of accession was farthest from reach. Initially, Croatian public opinion equated NATO membership with a security guarantee against the remainder of Yugoslavia. When under the JNA onslaught in 1991 the North Atlantic Council demurred, public opinion suffered the first of several shocks of disillusionment with NATO. As with steel, this cold shock tempered public opinion into a stronger but less flexible mass. Thus while national resolve to join the Alliance strengthened, individual attitudes toward NATO and Croatia's proper role in it became skeptical. Such cynicism about the national price of collective defense became one of the greatest lasting challenges to further integration.

Another aspect of public opinion, which applies both to NATO and the EU in 2008 is the phenomenon Dušan Reljić refers to as "Enlargement Fatigue." According to Reljić, Croatian public opinion has engaged strongly with collective security organizations but the public's resolve toward participation in collective security operations has steadily waned. This impulse—to join but not contribute—owes to two factors. First, the gap between expectation and reality regarding the benefits of membership has continually widened. Second, the Croatian public became saturated with

⁷⁸ David ed Greenwood, *Western Balkan Candidates for NATO Membership and Partnership* (Groningen, Netherlands: Center for European Security Studies,[2005]).

media coverage about NATO and the EU. The same channels broadcast the same message, often directed more to decision-makers in Brussels than to the proximate audience.⁷⁹

D. STRUCTURES

Despite how hastily Croatia created its defense institutions and how quickly they grew and transformed during the national war for independence, the nation's defense structures display the greatest resistance to reform among the three case studies in this work. The legal basis for Civil Military Relations in Croatia, though dramatically more specific than it was during the nation's first decade, is still far from established. A 2005 Centre for European Security Studies report concluded:

So far as 'roles and responsibilities' are concerned, lack of clarity is most evident in Croatia, where lines of authority are reportedly confused, even chaotic.⁸⁰

While defense reform has played a prominent role in Croatian parliamentary politics since Operation Storm re-established the nation's territorial sovereignty, the Ministry of Defense still maintains much of the insular status it won during the war. (Croatia's MoD preceded all other government institutions.) In fact, the level of parliamentary inquiry into ministerial decisions has been a key indicator of Croatia's democratic reform status. The first legislative efforts to challenge the MoD's authority and to define Croatia's working relationship with NATO and collective security institutions did not take place until 2002.⁸¹

Another structural challenge that has strong influence on public attitudes toward collective security regimes is Croatia's unresolved task of repatriating non-Croat refugees displaced in the War of Independence. As Bjorn Kuehne notes, the European Union,

⁷⁹ Dušan Reljić, "A Long Way Towards EU Accession? Membership Perspectives and the Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western Balkan Countries," *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 8, no. 23 (2007), 17, <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue23.pdf> (accessed 18 April 2008).

⁸⁰ Greenwood, *Western Balkan Candidates for NATO Membership and Partnership*, 22.

⁸¹ Bellamy, Alex J. and Timothy Edmunds, *Civil-Military Relations in Croatia: Politicization and Politics of Reform*, 74.

OSCE and United Nations have simultaneously attempted to address the challenge, with little success. Lack of progress toward resolution of this issue preserves longstanding tensions with Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro. From cooperation in NATO training, to regional crime-fighting efforts, to support for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), those tensions are a key impediment to Croatia's structural integration with its neighbors under collective security regimes.⁸²

Though the problems of Internally and Externally-Displaced Persons (IDP/EDP) are significant challenges, Croatia's defense structures do not all discourage integration into collective security regimes. In some ways, the nation has been singularly lucky. One example, which Dušan Reljić notes was Croatia's exemption from France's "Turkish Clause," which would otherwise have delayed the nation's bid for EU membership.⁸³ A second example is the EU's Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) system. Though Croatia has yet to earn an invitation to join the EU, the EU's adoption of the QMV system favors Croatian integration. QMV, according to Reljić, will both clear the way for the accession of Croatia (if not already admitted by 2014), and will significantly enhance the small nation's legislative impact if it has.⁸⁴ Furthermore, though the challenge of repatriation greatly retards structural integration, Kuehne identifies the "Energy Treaty for South Eastern Europe" as an example where "sectoral expansion" has both preceded and promoted the integration of defense institutions.⁸⁵ Many structural factors influence a nation's integration into collective security regimes; only a few achieve that influence through altering public opinion.

⁸² Bjoern Kuehne, "From the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to the Regional Cooperation Council -- Achievements, Lessons Learnt and Future Challenges," *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 8, no. 23 (15 November 2007), 12, <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter.issue23.pdf>. (accessed 21 May 2008).

⁸³ Reljić, *A Long Way Towards EU Accession? Membership Perspectives and the Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western Balkan Countries*, 16.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁸⁵ Kuehne, *From the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to the Regional Cooperation Council -- Achievements, Lessons Learnt and Future Challenges*, 12.

1. Collective Defense: EU and NATO

Of the five Croatian defense “impediments to reform” Bellamy identifies, four bear directly on the nation’s ability to integrate itself into collective security regimes: an “absence of clear separation of powers between civilian and military authority,” a “legacy of politicization” within the MoD, a “lack of civilian defense expertise” and a corresponding “lack of developed non-governmental community.”⁸⁶ The last of these is ironic, given the decisive role awarded to external consultant MPRI in the 2000 reform process.

2. Convention Level

Continued regional tensions in the Southwest Balkans during the late 1990s caught the region’s nations in a chicken-and-egg dilemma regarding EU and NATO membership. Where the political will to join existed, nations such as Croatia could not meet the stability requirements for membership. That membership, in turn, was key to providing stability. In 1999, the European Union’s Secretariat created the Stability Pact to address that impasse.⁸⁷

The political strength of the Stability Pact lay in its clear association with EU membership. Though designed merely as an ancillary to national Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) with the EU, the Stability Pact has grown to become the most influential convention-level collective security regime in the Western Balkans. The Stability Pact’s combination of organization, resources and certifying authority for aspiring EU members created a means for institutional engagement that bypassed many of the roadblocks nations had encountered in fulfilling their SAAs. As Bjorn Kuehne writes, the Stability Pact has grown from its original role of supporting stability to an active role as the regional “honest broker and matchmaker” between NATO, the World Bank and the EU. Though the Pact lacks the military-to-military contact necessary for

⁸⁶ Bellamy, Alex J. and Timothy Edmunds, *Civil-Military Relations in Croatia: Politicization and Politics of Reform*, 76.

⁸⁷ Kuehne, *From the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to the Regional Cooperation Council -- Achievements, Lessons Learnt and Future Challenges*, 8.

institutional reform, its ability to tie infrastructure funding to specific reforms has allowed it to manage “excessive expectations” regarding the benefits of membership in the EU and NATO.⁸⁸ As of February, the Stability Pact transitioned from an agreement to an organization in the form of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC).⁸⁹ Whereas the Stability Pact served as a surrogate to individual state Membership Action Plans (NATO) and Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA), funneling structural recommendations to aspiring EU and NATO member states, the RCC will be an active body that will articulate the common interests of regional states to the European Commission and the NATO International Military Staff.

E. OPERATIONS

Croatia has participated in United Nations Peace Support Operations since the earliest days of the Republic’s independence. Initially, national participation consisted of token contributions of military observers, which has gradually expanded to include standing support to the UN’s Southeast Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP). The Regional Cooperation Council, heir to the Stability Pact, now serves as the EU troika’s designated intermediary for coordinating regional participation in UN PKO. Croatia plays a leadership role in the RCC through its contribution of personnel and budget.⁹⁰

F. NATIONAL CONCLUSION

The Republic of Croatia’s history is the antithesis to the collective security concept. Collective security is premised on international assistance; Croatia achieved its independence utterly unaided. Collective security promotes the sharing of defense structures and practices; Croatia’s Army formed ad hoc and grew its structures organically. Collective security is the realm of the professional soldier yet Croatia’s was an overwhelmingly volunteer force composed mostly from civilian volunteers.

⁸⁸ Kuehne, *From the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to the Regional Cooperation Council -- Achievements, Lessons Learnt and Future Challenges*, 11.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

Collective security regimes export the doctrines, laws and organizations of strong global powers; Croatia's security structures were formed not by occupiers, but in defiance of occupation.

Setting aside the moral proposition that the conflicts in Former Yugoslavia illustrate the human cost of collective security's failure (and that of collective defense as well), the Republic of Croatia represents the counterpoint to any security concept based on international collaboration. By all rights, Croatia ought to subscribe to a narrow definition of collective defense, one that addresses the shortcomings of the immediate past and commits the state only minimally beyond its core protective mission. Surprisingly, however, Croatia is among the most active proponents of collective security. According to the Center for European Security Studies, the nation is an "exemplary active participant in every existing regional forum for cooperation."⁹¹

Croatia's surprising support for collective security regimes of all types, especially in budgetary choices and operational contributions to regimes that operate far from the nation's homeland defense mission, speak volumes about the keys to engagement with new partner nations. Despite the EU and NATO's multi-channel attempts to engage Croatia's defense institutions, the nation's objectives, attitudes, structures and operations did not adapt to a collective security concept until domestic political pressures forced them to. Public opinion ultimately won the strategic battle against a recalcitrant defense hierarchy and a convoluted legal structure.

⁹¹ Greenwood, *Western Balkan Candidates for NATO Membership and Partnership*, 43.

IV. REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO

A. HISTORY

1. Geography

If geography influences a nation's attitudes and options for international defense cooperation, Montenegro's ought to hold some very stark prescriptions. The nation's location has made it an eyewitness to the transit of empires; its topography is the Balkan of Balkans. Passage to (or from) Serbia in the Northeast or Kosovo in the East involves a meandering trip through a series of gorges. High, seasonally impassible ridges mark the border with Herzegovina in the North. In the South, the path into Albania leads down a wide valley, but one flanked by the imposing mountain from which the nation draws its name. To the West, seaborne access is like the punch line to the geological joke: The Bay of Kotor's deep water penetrates 30km inland, but through a series of ridges so forbidding they appear able, even without the coastal artillery perched on them, to chew up an amphibious assault. To a greater extent even than the Alpine hinterlands of the Austrian Empire or Croatia's two distinct regions, Montenegro's geography has promoted a distinct national concept of collective security. The nation has a coherent and enduring sense of national identity, but a long history of negotiation with foreign powers to maintain its sovereign independence.

2. Pre-1878

The bulk of Montenegro's historical experience with collective security and collective defense has been devoted its most brutal form, empire. In its early history, Montenegro grew territorially and coalesced culturally through its confederation with regional empires. From Roman to Venetian, Byzantine to Ottoman, Russian to Austro-Hungarian, empires have played a central role in the formation of Montenegrin identity, a culture that integrates as it defends.

In the extreme, the mythology surrounding Montenegro's most famous folk hero, Petar Petrovich-Njegos, holds that Montenegro was the vanguard for all South Slav peoples and the Orthodox Church while the other kingdoms were under Ottoman subjugation.⁹² Ironically, the Montenegrin myth of perpetual independence, a Montenegro "never conquered by the Turks, never pacified by the Germans" figured prominently in Serbian propaganda opposing a Montenegrin independence referendum in 2000.⁹³

While the Venetian and Austro Hungarian empire domination of Montenegro played significant roles in forming the state's defense institutions that lasted through World War II, the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) entirely re-cast and enlarged those institutions.⁹⁴ The most formative event in Montenegro's modern history that continues to shape the nation's approach to all aspects of collective security—government objectives, public attitudes, security structures and operations--was the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. At the stroke of its signing pen, the Berlin treaty created an independent kingdom of Montenegro as a diplomatic peer to Serbia and more than compensated for Montenegro's earlier loss of territory under the Treaty of San Stefano.⁹⁵ A collective security regime, thereby, was responsible for creating the largest independent Montenegrin state in history. Austria, Italy, Germany and Serbia's subsequent failure to preserve Montenegro's independence became a prominent feature of national identity that wasn't set right until the nation's independence in 2006. The Treaty of Berlin explains Montenegro's public advocacy and private ambivalence about collective security organizations.

⁹² David Bruce MacDonald, *Balkan Holocausts? : Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centred Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia* (Manchester ; New York; New York: Manchester University Press; Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave, 2002), 71.

⁹³ Paul Wood, "Tensions Rise in Montenegro," BBC World Service, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/704363.stm> (accessed 26 March 2008).

⁹⁴ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military : The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 8.

⁹⁵ Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia : The Third Balkan War*, 3rd rev. ed. (New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 1996), 257.

3. Yugoslav Wars of Dissolution to Present

While Montenegro only gained internationally recognized independence from Serbia in 2006, the social and political processes that led to independence from Serbia were well underway when Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia elected to leave the Federation. Albanian Historian Aldo Bumçi breaks Montenegrin history since the breakup of the SFRY into three periods: a “dominant power politics” phase from 1992-1997, the “split with Slobodan Milošević” which took place between 1997 and 2001, and the “drive towards independence” which continued until the successful independence recognition in 2006.⁹⁶ Scrutiny of Montenegro’s recent history broken into Bumçi’s three time periods reveals that each era had a distinct impact on Montenegro’s current attitude toward collective security mechanisms.

a. 1992-1997: *The Client State’s Last Gasp*

As a client state of Serbia throughout the 1990’s, Montenegro sidestepped the process of ethnic and religious partition that caused such grievous damage elsewhere in the Former Yugoslavia. Ethnic differences existed, but five factors distinguished Montenegro from the other former Yugoslav republics, all of which hindered the war-profiteering that fueled ethnic separatism: First, Montenegro’s economy depended heavily on primary-commodity production.⁹⁷ The vertical integration, fixed infrastructure and limited number of customers for Montenegro’s mines did not permit armed confiscation or regional division. Gangsters in Montenegro would have to try a more gentrified approach. “Self-Management Socialism,” which effectively dispersed political and commercial power in Slovenia and Croatia, in Montenegro functioned in name only.⁹⁸ Political and commercial power rested in the hands of a relatively concentrated and ethnically homogenous elite at the time when the SFRY began to break

⁹⁶ Aldo Bumçi, "Montenegro: The Twofold Challenges of Internal Reform and Unsettled Status Question" (Vienna, Austria, Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, Republik Österreich, 20 April 2002), http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/bumc02.pdf (accessed 02 April 2008).

⁹⁷ Elizabeth Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans : Regime Change, European Style* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 235.

⁹⁸ Sabrina P. Ramet and Sabrina P. Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 214.

up. Third, a large Yugoslav National Army (JNA) presence, dominated by Serb and Montenegrin-Serb command was positioned to quell any ethnic separatist movement. Fourth, Montenegro's ethnic groups were physically interspersed. In analogy to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro's ethnic map was more like integrated Sarajevo than homogenous Bihać. Furthermore, ethnic Montenegrins had a long and stable history of negotiating their ethnic identity with Serbs. Maj. Michael Tarquinto addressed the nature of that relationship in his 2005 Naval Postgraduate School thesis.⁹⁹ While the two groups have never settled the question--whether Montenegrins are "coastal Serbs"¹⁰⁰ or Serbs the ethnic progeny of Montenegrins¹⁰¹--their discord on the subject has a long history of adhering to cultural norms and non-violent channels.¹⁰² The fifth and final factor which discouraged ethnic division and molded the way Montenegrin's approach collective security was the decisive influence of one man: Slobodan Milošević. The descendant of a prominent Montenegrin family, Milošević enjoyed widespread popularity in Montenegro in the early 1990s. His status as president of the SFRY elevated Montenegro's influence and forestalled public debate about the region's ethnic distinction from Serbia.¹⁰³ As other regions of Yugoslavia gained their independence, Milošević deliberately sought to strengthen his patronage links with government officials and industrial leaders in Montenegro. His assistance to those leaders took the form of military support through the JNA and both direct and indirect bribes. Mirroring the process taking place in Russia at the time, Milošević "privatized" many state-owned industries into the hands of their managers.¹⁰⁴ That policy would ultimately become the basis for the high-level corruption cases examined below.

⁹⁹ Michael S. Tarquinto and Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.), *Serbia and Montenegro : Together Forever Or One-Night Stand? [Electronic Resource]* (Monterey, Calif; Springfield, Va: Naval Postgraduate School; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2005), 10, <http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/05Jun%5FTarquinto.pdf> (224 KB); <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA435605> (accessed 29 March 2008).

¹⁰⁰ Ramet and Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991*, 233.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 212.

¹⁰² Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans : Regime Change, European Style*, 236.

¹⁰³ Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia : The Third Balkan War*, 33.

¹⁰⁴ Tarquinto and Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.), *Serbia and Montenegro : Together Forever Or One-Night Stand? [Electronic Resource]*, 40.

b. 1997-2001: *Slow-Walking Away from Belgrade*

Montenegro's move toward independence was by no means unidirectional. NATO's 1999 air campaign in Kosovo, while successful in compelling Serbia to withdraw its troops there, overwhelmingly re-oriented the Montenegrin public toward union with the Yugoslav state's remnant. Operation Allied Force fused the association of NATO with United States unilateral foreign policy. Montenegro's citizens have yet to conceive of NATO as an Article V (collective defense) alliance. While convincing Montenegro to seek NATO membership turns out to be a surmountable challenge, OAF cemented in the minds of many Montenegrins the belief that joining NATO amounts to a necessary but unpalatable trade of one illegitimate security regime for another.

Where NATO fared worse in Montenegro's public opinion for its campaign against the Milošević regime, the same campaign against the Yugoslav ruler significantly improved public awareness and attitudes toward the Hague. The UN Tribunal's engagement with Montenegro between 1997 and 2001, though it yielded few prosecutions other than Milošević's, created a clear and positive image for collective security institutions in fighting transnational crime. Serbian opposition leader Vojislav Kostunica's evolving relationship with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia paralleled the transformation of public attitudes in Montenegro.¹⁰⁵ Corruption and organized crime had been rampant throughout the 1990s; the Hague's action against the King of the Untouchables provided the first hint of a reversal of that trend. As the effort to prosecute Milošević gained political legitimacy and legal momentum in Serbia, so did the political consensus behind Filip Vujanovic's presidency. Vujanovic gradually steered the Montenegrin parliament's legislative agenda to overhauling existing defense institutions and negotiating with Serbia new forces for an independent Montenegro.

¹⁰⁵ Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans : Regime Change, European Style*, 220.

c. 2002-Present: Defining the Terms of Independence

Since 2001, Montenegro's attitude toward collective security mechanisms has evolved based on optimism toward the United Nations, skepticism about the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, a strong desire to join the European Union and an equally strong sense of resignation that joining NATO is a prerequisite to achieve the greater EU goal. At the time of its freedom from Milošević, the political and economic structure of Montenegro was much narrower than that of the other federated states. The acts and statements of a few party leaders masked the broader attitudes of the many. As James Gow explains, the client state was not a one-party state. Unlike in Serbia, Montenegro's communist party since 1990 never held a majority of the popular support.¹⁰⁶ After 1990, Montenegro never fought a struggle to maintain regime legitimacy because the communists never had it. The regime's chassis rolled on wheels of personal patronage. When Milošević left for the Hague, the wheels fell off that cart.

Ironically, the process that in 2006 resulted in Montenegro's independence defies the conventional definition of "balkanization." Absent military pressure from Serbia and Milošević as the focal point for unionist Serbs, Montenegro did not decay into a set of regional or ethnic camps. Instead, as Elizabeth Pond describes in *Endgame in the Balkans*, Prime Minister Vujanovic acted unilaterally, methodically and boldly. Capitalizing on a lack of Serbian consensus against Montenegrin independence, and without waiting for a domestic consensus favoring the same to emerge, Vujanovic pushed the European Union to establish an achievable voting standard for an independence referendum. Largely because of Vujanovic's early, sustained and public cooperation with the ICTY, the EU obliged.¹⁰⁷

B. GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES

Of the three nations under consideration, Montenegro's official intentions regarding collective security regimes are the most transparent. This may be because

¹⁰⁶ Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military : The Yugoslav Crisis*, 123.

¹⁰⁷ Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans : Regime Change, European Style*, 260.

Montenegro's government attitude toward membership in collective security organizations is the farthest removed from public opinion. Croatia's successful campaign for NATO membership showed a similar level of resolve, but based on a much more opaque process. Austria's foreign policy process is highly transparent, but with a strong resolve *against* membership.

Government statements favoring membership in the EU and NATO, active participation in UN collective security agreements and bilateral cooperation programs with the United States all antedated Montenegrin independence. At the April 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, Montenegro's Prime Minister welcomed the nation's invitation to participate in Intensified Dialogue and reaffirmed its intention to join the Alliance. He also voiced full support for the Croatian and Albanian membership invitations.

C. PUBLIC ATTITUDES

In Montenegro, public attitudes toward collective security organizations reflect two common phenomena: the ability to simultaneously support mutually incompatible conclusions and a strong social pressure to join groups. Turning Groucho Marx's desire "never to join a group that would have me as a member" on its head, Montenegro's citizens aspire most strongly to membership in the groups that are hardest to join.

Viewed individually, public attitudes toward specific collective security organizations do not rationally correspond to either recent historical experience nor the impact those organizations would likely have on Montenegro's citizens. Across the board, while aspirations for economic achievement and international commerce are high, attitudes toward collective security organizations are low. Even the European Union, though it is more closely associated with economic achievement than NATO, does not score a majority approval rating.¹⁰⁸ Yet despite their low popularity ratings, however, there is widespread consensus in Montenegro that joining both NATO and the EU are

¹⁰⁸ "IDEA Survey: Montenegro" *South Eastern Europe: New Means for Regional Analysis, Montenegro Survey Results* (Stockholm, Sweden: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, [2002]), http://archive.idea.int/balkans/survey_country_pres.htm (accessed 24 March 2008).

inevitable outcomes. In the cynical perspective of public opinion polls, alliances with collective security organizations are forged by unaccountable elites. The reality of Montenegrin defense structures and operations largely confirms that conclusion.

1. Toward NATO

One of the greatest challenges for creating a strategy to engage public opinion on collective security is that the general public is not usually aware of its influence. Montenegrin citizen's attitudes toward NATO reflect that common disconnect between perception of international organizations and the reality of their role.

In 2002, the Stockholm-based Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance polled citizens throughout Southeast Europe to assess their attitudes toward collective security organizations and their preference for national engagement with those organizations. The survey found that while there was widespread approbation for engagement with collective security regimes, they were viewed only as abstract means to economic ends. Only 20 percent of the population perceived joining the EU and NATO as the best way for Montenegro to protect its security interests. 26.3 percent favored joining only the EU, and in contrast only 1 percent saw membership exclusively in NATO as the best path.¹⁰⁹ Polling by the Center for Democratic Research (CEDEM), an independent Non-Governmental Organization based in Podgorica has produced similar results. In CEDEM's continual sampling of Montenegrin public opinion, NATO's favorability rating was extremely low following NATO operations against Serbia in 1999, rose to a peak of 44% the month of Montenegrin independence, then steadily decayed to a February 2008 level of only 29%.¹¹⁰

Likewise, though NATO membership would have clear economic and lifestyle implications for Montenegrins, it is difficult to connect their daily lives with the Alliance. As Jelena Radoman of the Belgrade-based Western Balkan Security Observer concluded:

¹⁰⁹ "IDEA Survey: Montenegro" *South Eastern Europe: New Means for Regional Analysis, Montenegro Survey Results* (Stockholm, Sweden: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,[2002]), http://archive.idea.int/balkans/survey_country_pres.htm (accessed 24 March 2008).

¹¹⁰ "Political Public Opinion - February 2008" CEDEM Center for Democracy and Human Rights,[2008]), <http://www.cedem.cg.yu/opolls/detail.php?id=57> (accessed 02 April 2008).

Contrary to the EU - perceived primarily as an economic and political community- NATO membership does not entail a clear and direct benefit for a Montenegrin citizen. He does not find the system of collective security understandable by itself, or as representing an obvious interest of the state.¹¹¹

In Radoman's review of survey data, the strongest public factor which appeared to favor NATO was the widespread belief that Montenegro should follow the path of neighboring countries. Now that Albania and Croatia have been accepted for membership, that social pressure is likely to intensify.

2. Toward EU

A 2007 Center for Democracy and Human Rights survey of public attitudes toward the EU suggests that the *nature* of public support for the EU may be more important than *extent* of that support. Though public approval for joining the European Union hovered only around 50%, the overwhelming majority of responses indicated that Montenegrins accept an activist role of the EU in reforming government institutions prior to the nation's accession.¹¹² As indicated in the historical review, the EU played an early, active and transparent role in establishing criteria for Montenegrin law enforcement and defense reform cooperation. The Vujanovic administration's efforts to shepherd the EU *acquis communautaire* (legal harmonization to EU standards) through the parliament have likewise met with little public resistance.

D. SECURITY STRUCTURES

In small states dependent on larger ones for their security, the decision-making power to form alliances and working arrangements to maintain security has historically been reserved for national leaders. In fact, the forging of such relationships has been a core function of central government. In general, the smaller the state, the more centralized the power. Montenegro is an exception to that rule. In Montenegro, the

¹¹¹ Jelena Radoman, "Montenegrin Debate on Accession to NATO."

¹¹² Nenad Koprivica, (Podgorica, Montenegro: Center for Democracy and Human Rights,[2007]), <http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=468447fe-390b-432c-92e3-07965d8a759f> (accessed 03 April 2008).

formation of international ties to collective security arrangements that preserve the state's independence has traditionally been an all-hands effort. That tradition has not only continued, but expanded since Montenegro danced its 2006 *Šota* away from Serbia. Both private individuals and government officials are central to the decisions that determine the working relationship between nation and collective security partners. In the increasing influence of private actors, both social and commercial, Montenegro is the vanguard of a growing trend throughout Europe.

1. Government Structures

a. *Legal Infrastructure for Collective Security*

As with many aspects of Montenegro's foreign policy, the scale and sophistication of Montenegro's interaction with NATO far exceeds the nation's size and length of independence. Montenegro preceded its independence with a broad second-track program of engagement with collective security institutions, including NATO. In fact, Montenegro's success in peacefully achieving independence from the SFRY owes strongly to its adept policy of engagement with collective defense partners. National leaders who favored independence were unsure how negatively the Serbian government would react to a successful independence referendum. Convincing the European Union to mediate the process and Belgrade to accept the same was one strategy that reduced the chance of conflict. A decade-long policy of integrating NATO partners into its civil defense infrastructure was another. Such overt engagement diplomacy both increased the likelihood (the words 'security guarantee' are deliberately avoided here) that if Serbia attempted to check the independence movement through force of arms NATO would assist.¹¹³ Montenegro joined NATO's Partnership for Peace immediately upon its independence in 2006 and on April 3rd, 2008 was invited to participate in the "Intensified Dialogue (ID)," which for prior candidate nations within two years has translated to an invitation to join NATO.

¹¹³ "Sailing Apart." *Economist.Com / Global Agenda* (13 September 2006): 1.

b. Convention Level

Montenegro's most prominent defense relationship with a convention-level collective security regime is its participation in the UN-Sponsored Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) program. According to the Ministry of Defense, "Montenegro has committed to complying with all appropriate UN and OSCE agreements and mechanisms relating to the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Program." In compliance with the program, Montenegro signed an agreement with the OSCE on 18 April 2007 providing for UN-funded assistance in destroying 9900 metric tons of conventional ammunition, 128 tons of propellant, 25 tons of Napalm located in Kotor Bay and at the Podgorica Airport. The OSCE document on Small Arms and Light Weapons is an anti-trafficking effort based on the voluntary participation of member countries. Though it is not legally a convention, its structure of multiple bilateral Memoranda of Understanding makes it the functional equivalent.¹¹⁴

c. Voluntary / Bilateral

Montenegro has eagerly sought out bilateral cooperation programs as part of its effort to demonstrate compatibility with the EU and NATO. This has included participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and numerous technical agreements. An example of a large bilateral cooperation program is the December, 2007 US – Montenegro Technical Agreement for homeland security training. According to US press releases, Montenegro has participated in several similar bilateral agreements, even pre-dating the nation's independence from Serbia. In 2004, after Montenegrin police assumed responsibility for border enforcement, the United States and Montenegro conducted joint border training. In December, the United States and Montenegro signed

¹¹⁴ "Capacity Development Programme for SALW (Conventional Weapons)", "United Nations Development Programme, www2.undp.org.yu—Annex A ProDoc Hazardous Waste Disposal FINAL.pdf <<http://www2.undp.org.yu/montenegro/ijr/projects/Montenegro%20Demilitarization/Annex%20A%20ProDoc%20Hazardous%20Waste%20Disposal%20FINAL.pdf>> (accessed 29 March 2008). United States Navy NTIP, "Naval Treaty Implementation Program - SALW", www.ntip.navy.mil <<http://www.ntip.navy.mil/>> (accessed 09 March 2008).

a bilateral agreement to coordinate the destruction of SA-7 portable surface to air missiles, cluster munitions, torpedoes and mines.¹¹⁵

d. United Nations

Montenegro showed little delay in joining voluntary collective security mechanisms following its Summer 2006 Declaration of Independence. In December of that year, it signed a "Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA)" with the United Nations Development Programme, which pledged broad support for UN demilitarization programs.

Elsewhere in the United Nations structure of voluntary regimes, Montenegro has been less aggressive. Among the voluntary groups founded under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, Montenegro's participation has been mixed. As of March, 2008, Montenegro is not yet a member of the Zangger Committee, Australia Group or the Waasenaar Arrangement. It did participate in a working group meeting in 2004, but has not subsequently reaffirmed its commitment to Waasenaar since independence. Montenegro is currently a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime and the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse.¹¹⁶

2. Private Level Structures

a. Commercial

In many countries, foreign ownership of companies and the desire to attract foreign investment has a significant influence on the formation of foreign policy. In Montenegro, the role of multi-national corporations is so large, it may eclipse the decision-making power of government. In an Austrian Diplomatic Academy Study found, for example, that Montenegro's largest mine is under the control of an Austrian-

¹¹⁵ Embassy of the United States, Podgorica Montenegro, "Press Release: "U.S. and Montenegro Conclude Technical Agreement on Small Weapons Destruction Program", " Department of State, United States of America, <http://podgorica.usembassy.gov/ministry-of-defense.html> (accessed 29 March 2008).

¹¹⁶ Zangger, Australia Group, Waasenaar, NSG, MTCR, SEEC websites.

based multinational corporation (MNC). To contend with the effects of such structural imbalances, the European Union is creating its own regional defense planning infrastructure that creates a working relationship between MNCs and the EU akin to the US Department of Commerce regulation of foreign ownership in defense related companies.¹¹⁷

b. Social

Montenegro's social identity and international social ties demonstrate the frustrating futility of trying to define any Balkan nation as a cultural monolith. Religious leaders play a significant role in defining the social acceptance or rejection of international structures. Upon completion of Montenegro's Referendum on Independence, the Montenegrin Orthodox church immediately declared its own independence from the Serbian Orthodoxy.¹¹⁸

E. OPERATIONS

The three rounds of NATO accession have led to a tendency to seek parallels between countries. Montenegro is a reminder that such parallels are not always feasible or desirable. While some elements of participation in collective security regimes can be scaled down, and while growing collective security regimes across the board have improved in their ability to assess comparative advantage and find an appropriate role for member countries, there is an absolute lower limit for some types of military forces. Montenegro has been eager to project the image of an international contributor to Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and Peace Support Operations (PSO).

Montenegro's desire to validate its UN membership and to create the option of joining NATO and the EU has led to a foreign policy that aggressively seeks participation

¹¹⁷ Auer, "Waasenaar Arrangement: Export Control and its Role in Strengthening International Security." Vienna, Austria: Diplomatiscche Akademie Wien, 2005.

¹¹⁸ D. Tanturovski and others, "Differences and Similarities in Reproduction and its Control Determined by Religious Orientation," *European Journal of Contraception & Reproductive Health Care* 9 (June 2004), 72, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=665074801&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 02 May 2008)..

in international collective security operations. As indicated above, however, serious structural problems limit the VCG-*Vojske Crne Gore*'s expeditionary capability. To begin with, from the time of the nation's Referendum on Independence (May, 2006) until March of this year, it was not even certain that Montenegro would elect to preserve a standing army.¹¹⁹

1. NATO

While the March "law on participation in allied missions" guarantees Montenegro's hypothetical participation in Out of Area missions, there is no guarantee (legislative or otherwise) that the nation will possess the number and type of troops necessary to contribute to Article 8 operations. Currently, the VCG's size, equipment and training do not permit the force or its Interior Ministry and Border Police counterparts from to follow Georgia and Ukraine's example through participation in NATO operations under Partnership for Peace auspices.¹²⁰

2. European Union

Montenegro's primary priority to join the European Union reflects in its cooperation with EU collective security operations such as EUROPOL. As Montenegro has discovered, prosecuting transnational crime can be a double-edged sword. A series of prosecutions of high-level Montenegrin officials for transnational criminal activities, starting in 2002, simultaneously raised public confidence regarding President Djukanovic's willingness to take on organized crime interests and public doubt regarding how pervasive that criminal activity might be.¹²¹ In terms of financial cost and political resistance, police reform and anti-crime operations may turn out to be more expensive

¹¹⁹ Republic of Slovenia Public Communication Office, "Defence Minister Promises Montenegro Aid in NATO Bid," Government Communication Office, Republic of Slovenia, <http://www.ukom.gov.si/eng/slovenia/publications/slovenia-news/6158/6186/> (accessed 29 March 2008).

¹²⁰ *NATO Backgrounder: Partners in the Southern Caucasus* (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, [2007]), http://www.nato.int/docu/caucasus/southern_caucasus_partners-e.pdf (accessed 02 April 2008).

¹²¹ Tarquinto and Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.), *Serbia and Montenegro : Together Forever Or One-Night Stand?* [Electronic Resource], 39.

than military reform. In Montenegro, two factors favor that conclusion. First, international partners share a large share of the cost for destroying military equipment and facilities. Second, since the command structure of Montenegrin military units traditionally ran to Belgrade, not Podgorica, those military interests do not tend to be as entrenched in Montenegro's government as they do in Croatia and other parts of the SFRY. Pursuing organized crime, however, involves the prosecution of individuals who frequently have strong government connections. It is a task to be undertaken more carefully. It remains to be seen whether the European Union will provide the appropriate level of resources, and whether Vujanovic will have enough political capital to continue the prosecution of transnational crime.

3. Proliferation Security Initiative

Montenegro has accepted the Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Principles and taken part in the joint exercise "Adriatic Gate 2007"¹²² While the exact extent of national participation is unknown, the United States and other NATO countries have consistently called upon Montenegro to improve prosecution of money laundering activities which have the potential for ties to nuclear proliferation networks.

4. United Nations Stabilization Program

Well prior to Montenegro's Independence Referendum, with the acquiescence of the Serbian government, Montenegro began seeking to participate in United Nations Stabilization Program operations. This cooperation culminated in "Montenegro has committed to complying with all appropriate UN and OSCE agreements and mechanisms relating to SALW" In compliance with the program, Montenegro signed an agreement with the OSCE on 18 April 2007 providing for UN-funded assistance program to destroy 9900 metric tons of conventional ammunition, 128 tons of propellant, 25 tons of Napalm located in Kotor Bay and at the Podgorica Airport. The OSCE document on Small Arms and Light Weapons is an anti-trafficking effort based on the voluntary participation of

¹²² Embassy of the United States Seoul, Korea, "U.S. Security Initiative Draws More Participants", http://seoul.usembassy.gov/410_053107.html (accessed 03 April 2008).

member countries. Though it is not legally a convention, its structure of multiple bilateral Memorandums of Understanding makes it the functional equivalent.

5. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

To date, Montenegro's force structure has not permitted beyond a token level of participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations. In 2001, Montenegrin police took part in a joint mission with Serbia to support UN PKO in Timor L'Este. Subsequently, the nation's soldiers have been deployed in support of the UN monitoring mission in Liberia.¹²³

F. NATIONAL CONCLUSION

No concept more perfectly distills the Montenegrin attitude toward collective security than the notion of a 'security entrepreneur.'¹²⁴ A combination of four factors:

- limited military resources;
- economic structure that perpetuates dependence on a few trading partners;
- negative historical experience with international security mechanisms; and
- a strong cultural identity that transcends ethnic lines

makes Montenegro a nation that defines security in extremely defensive terms. Montenegro owes its independence to the practice of assessing and balancing regional powers while promoting a clear sense of its own identity.

Beyond its own interests, Montenegro lies sandwiched between three nation's whose survival depends upon their stable interaction with collective security organizations. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, those organizations form the backbone of government. In Serbia, domestic political forces require the simultaneous pursuit of two

¹²³ "UN Envoy Decorates UNMIL Serbia and Montenegro Police Contingent with UN Peacekeeping Medals " United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Mission in Liberia, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/pr47.pdf> (accessed 23 March 2008).

¹²⁴ The term 'security entrepreneur' is widely used in reference to contracting and the privatization of military forces, but is not generally employed to characterize the actions of entire nations.

contradictory tracks. While Serbia's government pursues a public policy of confrontation over Kosovo, it simultaneously seeks to curry favorable opinion in Western Europe for membership in the EU and NATO.

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V. CONCLUSION

From the narrow perspective of international security institutions, many are the reasons to demote Southeast Europe in the priorities of focus in 2008: Larger conflicts and calamities loom in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South America loom. The bulk of NATO's resources for expeditionary operations are committed to ISAF in Afghanistan. US forces that might otherwise augment NATO missions are committed in Iraq. Beyond the scarcity of resources, the security situation in Southeast Europe is calm compared to what it was a decade prior. The genocidal catastrophe that demolished Yugoslavia has burned to embers now only a few thousand troops are sufficient to tend. Even the crisis surrounding Kosovo's February 2008 independence declaration is a minor security exercise compared to the challenges of pacifying and administering Afghanistan. The greatest source of threat and uncertainty in the 1990s, Serbia, has now only a fraction of its former military power. Proponents of collective security organizations, however, would be ill served to allow the crush of events to constrict and divert their approach to the Western Balkans and Central Europe. Not in spite of, but *because of* heavy military commitments elsewhere, Europe's collaborative security mechanisms must learn to recruit, to engage and to effectively incorporate the nations of this region.

The common and idiosyncratic traits of Austrian, Croatian and Montenegrin engagement with collective security demonstrate both the need for precision and the cost of imprecision. As the proponents of collective security reach out to new partners, the accuracy of their understanding of national motivations will determine the success of integration. In an era of spiraling costs and escalating commitments, a lack of savvy regarding national objectives expectations and capabilities poses two risks: It may leave the nations of Southeast Europe beggars at the banquet, unable to afford the tools of Transformation. Worse, it threatens to weaken collective security regimes by bringing under the same tent members who hold incoherent and incompatible concepts of alliance.

A. COMMON TRAITS

A review of the three case studies, scrutinizing separately their objectives, attitudes, structures and operations relevant to collective security yields several common traits.

1. Objectives

Current efforts to recruit and reform NATO Partner countries in Southeast Europe operate from a primitive and often inaccurate understanding of why the nations in the region accept collective security. Austria seeks an active role in collective security institutions and operations, but no longer primarily as a proxy for the rivalry between NATO and the European Union. Croatia no longer seeks membership in NATO out of a primary need to achieve Article V protection from a Serbian threat. The threats that today drive Montenegro to seek membership in collective security regimes are mostly effects of transnational crime that spill over from neighbors. Ironically, some of those neighbors are likely to precede Montenegro into NATO.

Among the three case studies, one common thread in their objectives toward collective security was the strong and primary linkage to economic achievement. For better or worse, throughout Southeast Europe, participation in all international security institutions is seen as a military means to an economic end. Entry into the European Union is the priority; geo-strategic concerns are subordinate to that goal. The 1990s saw the proliferation of a range of collective security instruments that encouraged each nation to custom-tailor its commitments. In this region, however, the net effect of that proliferation has been a blurring of distinctions. In the current collective security regimes active in Central and Southeast Europe, the United Nations works for NATO, NATO for the EU and in some cases the EU for the United Nations. This that blurring has erased the distinction between those who favor an EU centered versus a NATO-centered collective defense architecture. In its place, it leaves nations in only two categories: those who seek the economic benefits of EU membership at all cost and those who prize national autonomy over regional integration. Of the three case studies in this project, all of them have chosen the former.

Having resolved to promote collective security integration as a means to EU membership, national governments must then contend with a more difficult challenge, to assess public opinion and achieve the greatest permissible level of participation under the domestic political constraints.

2. Attitudes

Austria, Croatia and Montenegro demonstrate the malleability of public attitudes toward collective security, and the strong role institutional identity plays in shaping those attitudes. While the specific histories of the three nations are distinct, they bear common traits. For all three, the disintegration of Yugoslavia created strong and negative associations with specific collective security regimes. NATO, the UN and the nascent EU failed to intervene in a timely and decisive fashion when nationalist conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina loomed. This failure to act created an attitude of cynicism toward all three institutions that prevails to this day. NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo, far from redeeming that cynicism, reinforced the public perception of NATO as a tool of *Machtspolitik*. If the distinction in public attitudes toward collective defense versus collective security institutions and toward treaties versus voluntary working groups were hazy in 1991, the two decades of Yugoslavia's agony have done little to clarify them. The web of working arrangements and regional initiatives that link established security institutions has so blurred the public understanding of relationships and identities, public opinion in all three countries has largely reverted to a mix of cynicism and suspicion. Instead of disabusing Southeast European citizens of their beliefs that NATO is a proxy for the United States, the EU a proxy for Germany and France, the interweaving of collective security regimes in the three countries has reinforced a prevailing public opinion that Europe's future will be divided only into two groups: members and non-members.

Public opinion is malleable; however the factors that influence it are increasingly far removed from government control. Dušan Reljić, in observing Bosnian and Kosovar attempts to join the EU, asserted that "politicizing and mythologizing Europe by political

elites...is slowly down the speed of Europeanisation” of partner nations’ societies.¹²⁵ Now that the majority of Western Balkan states have established Membership Action Plans with NATO and Stabilization and Association Agreements with the European Union, national engagement with collective security institutions has begun to broaden from an exercise for political elites to a broader dialogue between public opinion and multinational institutions. Only now can the harder debate begin, the task of establishing how much the region’s voters are willing to sacrifice in the service of collective defense and collective security.

3. Structures

Despite the avid debate of the 1990s which cast Europe’s security dilemma as a choice between collective security and collective defense, both systems can comfortably coexist. States can simultaneously subscribe to both types of security regimes, and the regimes themselves can morph from one into the other. In *Alliance Maintenance and Management in the 21st Century*, John Deni provides one example of such transformation: The Schonbrunn Convention between Russia, Germany and Austria began as a collective defense agreement and transformed into a collective security regime, the “Alliance of the Three Emperors.” The latter regime established the working relationship among the Great Powers in the Balkans until the system’s abject failure caused World War I. ¹²⁶ Southeast Europe since 1991 has traced that Schonbrunn history in reverse. The ugliest decades of the 20th century saw the Balkans atomize into small cultural regions. Marshal Tito’s imperfect collective security arrangement, the SFRY, disemboweled itself. At the conclusion of the conflict, however, the resulting states have begun to re-forge ties based on collective defense interests: anti-terrorism, transnational crime and energy security. Whether one model ultimately predominates throughout

¹²⁵ Dušan Reljić, "A Long Way Towards EU Accession? Membership Perspectives and the Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western Balkan Countries," *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 8, no. 23 (2007), 28, <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue23.pdf> (accessed 18 April 2008).

¹²⁶ John R. Deni, *Alliance Management and Maintenance : Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century* (Aldershot, Hampshire, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 13, <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip078/2007000326.html>.

Europe, at a minimum the examples of Austria, Croatia and Montenegro demonstrate that the ‘either/or’ debate does not adequately capture the priorities of some NATO Partnership states.

Another prevailing theme in the Western literature in the 1990s--an attitude of skepticism pervaded regarding the ability of former communist states to transform their militaries into contributing members of international alliances--is not borne out by the Croatian and Montenegrin examples. As recently as 2003, a RAND corporation study concluded that "Macedonia, Croatia and Albania...have a long way to go before they qualify for NATO membership."¹²⁷ Whether the Balkan nations made rapid progress over the intervening years, or NATO simply revised its standards to reflect a decline in the ‘willingness of the coalitions,’ the change indicates a need to understand better what partner nations hope to gain from membership in alliances.

The three case studies also provide a counterpoint to Vedran Džihič’s conclusion regarding Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Džihič asserts the European Union’s “formal-technical” approach to integration, which focuses on institutional and legal reform, is inappropriate for new member states because it does not adequately promote the representation of minority populations in collective security structures.¹²⁸ While each of the nations faces transnational security challenges related to its minority populations, those challenges are not the primary determinant of public attitudes toward collective security.

The European Security Strategy’s claim that the EU has a comparative advantage (over NATO, the OSCE and United Nations) in the “range of civil and military instruments it can bring to bear on a conflict” does not stand out as starkly in the Balkans as elsewhere on Europe’s periphery.¹²⁹ The wide range of collective security regimes at

¹²⁷ F. Stephen Larrabee, *NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003), 50.

¹²⁸ Overhaus, Marco et. al, "State Building and Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans: Europe's Engagements Twelve Years After Dayton," *Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.De Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 8, no. 23 (15 November 2007), 6.

¹²⁹ Marco Overhaus, "Emerging Security Role: European Security and Defense Policy and the Western Balkans," *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 8, no. 23 (15 November 2007), 39, <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue23.pdf> (accessed 18 April 2008).

work in Southeast Europe provides even small nations with a similar range of civil and military instruments. In fact, the convoluted structure of reporting relationships places the EU, NATO and United Nations rotationally under each other's command. In the process, it blurs the relationship between collective defense, collective security and less formal means of collaboration. In such an environment, states that remain widely engaged and have a coherent agenda can achieve impact in collective security regimes that far outstrips their population, defense budget or ability to contribute to operations.

a. *Legacy Problems*

While the most significant challenges for the transformation of Partnership forces are cultural, conceptual and political, legacy structural problems remain. As NATO's Brigadier General Gerhard Shultz notes, the German national experience was the need to transform from a defensive force based on the logistical assumptions of a homeland defense scenario to an expeditionary force capable of working in other climates and in a constant inter-service environment.¹³⁰

b. *Problems of Scale*

The problem of inadequate staff resources to address integration challenges is not unique to small partner countries. As Phil Kearley, Joint Staff J9, Joint Forces Command notes, even the United States, with the luxury of a large overall defense bureaucracy, faces bottlenecks in some mission, planning and liaison areas. These problems are especially acute in civilian departments that serve auxiliary defense roles, such as the State Department Foreign Service and the Agency for International Development.¹³¹

¹³⁰ BG Gerhard Schultz, German Air Force, NATO ACT IDT Conference, Podgorica, Montenegro 14 May 2008.

¹³¹ Phillip Kearley, NATO Allied Command Transformation, IDT Conference, Podgorica, Montenegro 14 May 2008.

c. The Proliferation of Channels

The result of the proliferation in channels of negotiation between national governments and collective security regimes is not necessarily negative. While it is easy to discount them as cynical attempts to re-negotiate previous commitments and circumvent discussion of politically unpalatable realities, they can serve a few real and constructive purposes. The proliferation of channels can allow government negotiators to parse controversial issues into small components, which can be circulated separately among national parliamentary delegations. The value of that process is not only in "slicing the salami" to find the maximum common position among party fractions, but in the fact that it can break the automatic association between particular issues.

In all three states NATO's administrative and operational decisions have very specific political connotations. Political parties tend to react to NATO International Military Staff proposals in predictable fashion, often with more regard to source than to content. A proposal may meet with a completely different response if it is filtered through the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council than if it is routed to the UN Security Council, European Commission or North Atlantic Council via the Regional Cooperation Council or any of the other partner organizations at work regionally in the Balkans. The downside of such proliferation is that it tends to blur lines of accountability and poses the risk that nations will engage with a collective security regime but later unilaterally re-negotiate their commitments based on a change in perception of the intermediary's character.

d. Challenges of Military Transformation

All three nations provide specific organizational examples that confirm Adam Stulberg and Michael Salomone's assessment that military transformation to integrate into international security arrangements is most likely to succeed when three criteria are met: a "strong national sense of mission, a progressive attitude towards experimentation and where commanders do not have incentives to monitor intrusively and sub-units do not have incentives to shirk directives for change." While each of the three nations has examples of both success in and resistance to military reform, the

common pattern confirms that defense structures and units that existed during the communist era are more resistant to transformation in support of collective security regimes than are those which governments created after post-Cold War democratic reforms were complete.¹³²

4. Operations

In the realm of collective security operations, all three case studies share the same two traits. First, each of the nations has sought to make an operational contribution that exceeds the proportion of military and financial resources they are able to contribute to alliance. While the methods of participation are nationally distinct—Austria providing considerable logistical support in place of combat troops, Croatia through spreading a small cadre of deployable troops across a wide range of UN, EU and NATO operations, and Montenegro by hosting international exercises—their objective is fundamentally the same. The second trait in common between the three case studies is an attempt to achieve a leadership role in regional collective security mechanisms that exceeds their proportion of financial resources devoted to the cause. A cynical observer might ascribe to those actions a desire to substitute diplomatic engagement for substantive contribution, but given the meager national financial resources available for contribution, that may be the only realistic option available to local governments.

B. IDIOSYNCRATIC TRAITS

1. Austria: “Otherness” and Identity

Michal Koran's discussion of the Austrian neutrality concept examines the role of German "otherness" in defining the Austrian Republic's identity. Koran asserts that the nation's perceived need to distinguish itself from Germany after World War II, while formative, did not provide a sufficient basis to explain the affirmative Austrian concept of

¹³² Adam N. Stulberg, Michael D. Salomone and Austin G. Long, *Managing Defense Transformation : Agency, Culture and Service Change* (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 61.

national identity.¹³³ In Austria, the need to participate actively in collective security regimes is central to the national concept of neutrality. The same is not true for Croatia and Montenegro. Croatia shares with postwar Austria a strong impulse to define itself in contrast to its former self and former foes, and furthermore both nations are forced to rely heavily on a tacit security guarantee from NATO. In contrast to Austria, however, Croatia has no buffer zone separating it from potential threats to its territorial integrity, and therefore seeks to formalize its the Article V protection as quickly as possible. Montenegro, in contrast to the other two nations, has arrived at a concept of independence unique in Central Europe. It derives neither from cultural distinction (Montenegrins see neither estrangement nor treason in their legal independence from kindred Serbia), nor from a common-defense relationship with NATO. The varying experiences of the three case studies suggest that the sources of a nation's identity determine both how and how deeply a nation will embrace the concept of collective security.

2. Croatia: Towed by Public Opinion

NATO's newest invitee has undergone dramatic institutional reform in the past seven years, but the most distinct trait that impacts its national engagement with collective security is the Croatian public's ability to compartmentalize divergent priorities. Croatia's defense infrastructure has achieved a remarkable level of interoperability with a range of collective security regimes, from NATO, to EU, to OSCE, despite a convoluted legal structure and often contradictory guidance on strategy.

3. Montenegro: Seeking Reward for Europe's 'Security Entrepreneurs'

Montenegro's experience bears out Stulburg and Salomone's contention that a strong "reciprocal flow of information" between commercial contractors and government ministries will "foster security entrepreneurship on both sides." The heavy role of multi-

¹³³ Michal Koran, "Austrian Neutrality: Burden of History in the Making Or Moral Good Rediscovered?" *Perspectives*, no. 26 (Summer, 2006), 27, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1164920311&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 02 May 2008).

national corporations has provided both a strong demand signal and an organized means for Montenegrin defense policy to be redirected toward regional and international collective security regimes. Montenegro's experience also bears out Stulburg and Salomone's conclusion that a strong corporate role in transformation can "compound the managerial challenge [of defense transformation] by providing cover for recalcitrant agents."¹³⁴ Thus far, the role of commercial actors in Montenegro's military transformation has weighed heavily in favor of engagement with collective security organizations, but it leaves open the possibility that the nation's government will have difficulty controlling the effects of that engagement on its domestic institutions.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

NATO as an organization and the United States as a promoter of integration should make a serious and sustained attempt to understand the true reasons why citizens in the region truly want to join the alliance.

The process of fully engaging the Western Balkans and Austria in Europe's collective security regimes is not merely a matter of filling in the blank spaces on the map between current NATO members. Beyond seeking membership in NATO and the EU, convincing Southeast European nations to contribute actively to collective security operations will require a considerable shift in mindset and an increase in sophistication. As with Europe's Eastern boundaries, the integration of Balkan states into collective security regimes will require NATO's proponents to understand better why those states in particular seek international solutions for transnational security problems. Convincing voters in those nations to support NATO's collective defense mission, specifically for out-of-area operations, will involve a yet-further leap of public diplomacy. The challenge of preserving a coherent identity and consistent missions for Europe's collective security institutions may be greater than any external political pressure. Starting at Vienna and continuing Southeast for hundreds of kilometers sits the most challenging laboratory for addressing these challenges.

¹³⁴ Stulberg, Salomone and Long, *Managing Defense Transformation : Agency, Culture and Service Change*, 196.

The Austrian, Croatian and Montenegrin examples suggest that current EU and NATO efforts to integrate new partners are in two ways misguided: They fail in their methodology and they display nationally inappropriate priorities. The weakness in prioritization is a failure to recognize the greatest security challenges and priorities for Central and Southeast European nations. In the absence of a large regional military power, and given the limited resources of such alliance partners, attempts to promote membership and participation in collective security regimes on the basis of global threats ring hollow. Austria, Croatia and Montenegro do not seek membership in collective security regimes primarily out of concern for terrorism, but from a need to be included in the Western community of economically secure states. Furthermore, the experience of these three states suggests their governments and voting public will not be content to merely seek out a small niche for contribution to out-of-area operations under any collective security regime. Rather, their simultaneous membership in a set of collective security regimes must address the immediate threats of transnational crime, corruption and a loss of sovereignty to social networks of expatriates, often from their neighboring countries. To integrate previously non-aligned states and new democracies substantively into collective security regimes will require a more accurate assessment of the threats they face and a more comprehensive approach for national engagement with public opinion.

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