

4. Isn't it true that the IRAA, the IRAPS and the IRA Manhood Corps were dissolved with the full consent of all the military, government and the leaders of these organizations because it was intended that the Dainippon Seijikai would continue the work of these organizations?

5. It is stated that the Dainippon Seijikai was fundamentally different from the IRAPS, the IRAPS having no link with the people and the Dainippon Seijikai having many local branches through which public opinion could be reflected. Do you agree that in this respect the new organization closely resembles the IRAA, which was also a national political movement and had local branches in towns and villages? Do you know that the admitted purpose of the IRAA was to enable public opinion to reach the government through its local branches but that in practice the movement was used to keep a close check on public opinion and propagate the policy of the government? Was there in this respect any difference between the IRAA and the Dainippon Seijikai?

6. Isn't it true that no political parties were allowed to exist apart from the Dainippon Seijikai? Isn't it true that it was publicly admitted that the Dainippon Seijikai was an authoritative movement to lead the people and united behind the government in the prosecution of the war? Isn't it true that the military approved of the creation of this party and of your appointment as president because it was thought that in view of the critical war situation to keep the whole population behind the government?

The above is about all that can be asked on the basis of present information. Further information as to the organization of, the government control of, and the final status of the Dainippon Seijikai will be submitted later in the afternoon.

A. T. Laverge

11 April 1947

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Mr. Frank S. Tavenner
FROM : Mr. D. N. Sutton
SUBJECT : Re: Cross-Examination of the Accused, MINAMI

I. MINAMI's Speech of 4 August 1931 (p. 2 of his affidavit).

1. In this speech MINAMI urged the need for a larger and better army (Exhibit 186, Part I, R. 2209-2210). He opposed limitation of armaments and stated:

"Manchuria and Mongolia are very closely related to our country from the viewpoint of our national defense as well as of politics and economics.

"It is to be regretted that the recent situation in that part of China is following a trend unfavorable to our Empire." (R. 2210).

II. Henry Pu Yi's Letter (p. 7 of affidavit).

1. MINAMI says: "As there was no reason for me to believe the words of such a messenger..." (bottom p. 7 of affidavit).

- a. Why did he disbelieve the messenger whom he states brought in a letter from the former Emperor of China?
- b. Did he at that time believe the letter to be a forgery?
- c. If he did not believe the letter to be spurious, why would he ignore a communication sent him by special messenger from the former Emperor of China?
- d. Did he report the receipt of this letter to the political authorities of Japan?
- e. Why did he later seek to have it certified as authentic?

2. MINAMI stated: "I ignored the letter..." (top p. 9 of affidavit).

Memo to Mr. Tavenner fr Mr. Sutton, subj: Re: Cross-Examination of the Accused, MINAMI, dtd 11 Apr 47 (Cont'd.)

III. Fall of WAKATSUKI Cabinet (p. 11, affidavit).

1. The witness states that the action taken by Home Minister ADACHI caused the Cabinet to resign in December 1931.

2. WAKATSUKI testified (Exhibit 162, R. 1554-1557):

"At this time it was the unanimous sense of the Cabinet that these operations in Manchuria must cease immediately and the aforesaid War Minister General MINAMI agreed to put this Cabinet policy into effect with the Army at once. However, day after day expansion continued and I, the Prime Minister, had various conferences with the aforesaid War Minister, General MINAMI. I was shown maps daily on which the aforesaid General MINAMI would show by a line a boundary which the Army in Manchuria would not go beyond and almost daily this boundary line was ignored and further expansion was reported but always with assurances that this was the final move..." (R. 1556).

"At this time the situation stood thusly: the policy of my Cabinet had never varied on the Manchurian question. My Cabinet had unanimously opposed any expansion by the Army and had, day after day, been unceasing in its efforts to terminate aggressive operations in that territory. Further, the aforesaid War Minister MINAMI had failed to control the Army in Manchuria and had not carried out the unanimous policy of the Cabinet in this matter, therefore, I resigned as Prime Minister and my Cabinet with me." (R. 1557).

989

Miami affidavit

Spec of 8-4-31
Ex 2207.

+ ①

2. Nikolaievsk incident - wife
reference to it: + 5

3. Japan ^{Sept 25} ordered army not to
take part in autonomous movements

What telegrams are referred to herein p. 7

4 Henry Pu-yi's letter Nov 1931

I ignored this letter

with Japan 13)

②
H 17

5 Check + Del of Nov 45

6 actions of Kwantung army

7. Reason for resignation of Wakatsuki
Cabinet was his statement - p. v. (3)
Action of Home Minister caused
resignation?

8. activities as commander Kwantung
ambassador + Manchurian
States of Kwantung ^{League} States
p. 12-3

agreements by Manchukuo with China

9. Ho-Munepi Agreement June 1935
p. 14

10. Dorban - Ching agreement
p. 14

11. Col Torata wanted independence in Manchuria
under Sun. p. 15

12. as Gov of Korea noted as a circle. p. 16
1936-1942

13 Privy Councils - 1942-45 - p 16-17

offered plan for Govt of Korea 1945
which the Home Minister overruled

14 J.R.R.A. ^{Card} p. 17-

~~Dai Nippon Teikoku Kaigi (Japan Political Assoc)~~

W. Horn

differentiates the two operations 6 mo

(La verge)

He mentions (Page 6) a dispatch of a brigade from Korea across the border during this first incident, and says that the Cabinet saw no alternative but to provide the dispatch and the defrayal of expenses accompanying such action.

He mentions the decision communicated to Honjo by himself that the Japanese would not participate in a movement to establish a new government in Manchuria. In this connection he recalls a letter delivered to him by messenger from the Emperor Pu Yi to the effect that he was desirous of effecting a correction of the evil administration of the SHANG Regime in Manchuria. The authenticity of this letter he claims to have been certified at the Imperial Hotel several years later by the Prime Minister of Manchukuo.

He makes excuses for the operations of the Kwantung army "on the spot" in that while having to abide by the "non-expansion policy" it was necessary for them to take measures in self-defense from constant attacks by the enemy. He makes further excuses for dropping of bombs over Chinchow because their aircraft had been fired upon.

He states that when the annual army maneuvers were held in Kyushu under the personal supervision of the Emperor, although it was his duty to accompany His Majesty, he remained in Tokyo with the Emperor's permission as he "had to attend to the ever-changing situation both at home and abroad, and exerted my best efforts to prevent the expansion of the conflict, in close collaboration with government as well as the Supreme Command".

He mentions the "October Incident" and his prompt dealing therewith followed by a resignation of the Cabinet in December.

In 1934 he was "unexpectedly" appointed Ambassador to Manchukuo and Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory, and Commander of the Kwantung Army. This was under the OKADA Cabinet. He claims (Page 12) a mutual understanding between China and Japan relative to Manchukuo in January 1935.

He dwells upon the maintenance of peace and order in Manchukuo by the Kwantung Army and the development of an independent state, including the absorption of Mongolia.

He discussed his tenure as Governor General of Korea succeeding General UGAKI, not as a soldier but as a civilian, from which position he retired 29 May 1942, to accept appointment as a Privy Councillor,

which post he held until March 1935. As such, he objected to the proposal of placing the Governor Generals of Korea and Formosa under the jurisdiction of the Home Ministry for fear of undesirable effects upon colonial administration.

He tells of accepting the leadership of DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI (Japan Political Association), the chief aim of which was to reflect public opinion upon government. He says the reason he was recommended to this position was "I was best qualified to restrain and control the government and the military". In view of the increasingly critical "war situation", he accepted the offer, and "pledging my life to the performance of my task". In less than six months the war was over and the association was dissolved 20 August 1945.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-- Against --

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: MINAMI, Jiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country
I hereby depose as follows.

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

1. I was born on August 10, 1874 at Hiji-machi, Oita Prefecture. After completing the usual course at a military preparatory school and the Military Academy, I was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant of Cavalry in 1895. I took part in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) as a captain of cavalry. At that time ear trouble developed as a result of concussion of cannon fire and for this reason, I have now lost my auditory sense.
2. In 1924, I became Cavalry Inspector as Lieutenant General; in 1926, Commander of the Sixteenth Division; in 1927 Assistant Chief of the General Staff; in 1929, Commander of the Korean Army; and in 1930, a Supreme War Councilor as full General. On April 14, 1931 when the second WAKATSUKI Cabinet was formed, I was appointed Minister of War. The above a period in which the Japanese Army was reduced by four division to carry into effect the decisions of the Washington Conference, and energetic efforts were made in the retrenchment of the national budget. Especially the cabinets formed by the Minseito Party, viz., the KATO, Takaaki Cabinet (June 1924 - January 1926), the first WAKATSUKI Cabinet (January 1926 - April 1927), the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet (July 1929 - April 1931), and the second WAKATSUKI Cabinet above referred to took internally the policy of financial retrenchment and upheld externally the policy of peaceful and conciliatory diplomacy.

Although I was not a member of the MINSEITO, I had a thorough understanding of its policies because General UGAKI, my intimate senior and by whose recommendation I became his successor, had been in office as War Minister for a long time in the Minseito Cabinets ever since the formation of the KATO Cabinet mentioned above. On August 4, 1931, I called the customary conference of Division Commanders in the War Ministry for the first time since I assumed the office of War Minister. The address of instructions which I delivered on that occasion unexpectedly aroused the opposition of a section of the political circles. As it would be clear from a glance at its contents, I gave expression to nothing more than a view natural to a War Minister -- stating that every effort should be made in the training of soldiers to maintain the efficiency of the Imperial Army under the difficult conditions caused by arms reduction. It appears that an issue was created by the fact that some anti-government elements conspired to overthrow the government by intentionally distorting some of my statements. That I was not opposed to arms reduction may be recognized in the light of the fact that in May 1931, I revised the Army Pay Ordinance, with salary reductions ranging from 5.8 % for First Lieutenants to 12 % for Generals, and that I also endeavored even to effect a cut in pensions. I said no more than this: that,

while the European and American powers had swiftly modernised their armaments as a result of World War I, Japan has left her arms in the same condition as they had been in the previous century, and therefore stressed that in order to perfect our national defense with a minimum of arms, we must effect an improvement in quality. That I did not try to inspire a positive policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia may be best illustrated by the fact that, when an incident broke out later, I strenuously maintained the policy of non-expansion to such an extent that I was attacked for being too passive both by the army on the spot and by the people at home. What I said in my speech was that inasmuch as the pending question in Manchuria and Mongolia exceedingly complicated, and inasmuch as Premier WAKATSUKI and Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA had announced their views toward the new situation, the army also on its own part should not fail to give its attention thereto.

4. In the night on September 18, 1931 I was staying as usual in the official residence of War Minister. About 3 o'clock on the morning of the 19th, I was suddenly awakened by an officer on duty in the War Ministry, and handed a telegram despatched by the Special Service Organ in Mukden. The message said that about 10:30 p.m. of the 18th the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway northwest of Mukden had been destroyed by Chinese troops, that our railway guard unit had

been fired upon and that the Second Battalion of the Independent Garrison had started to move to the spot. About an hour later a telegram came from Commander HONJO which said: "Leave Port Arthur at 3:00 a.m. for Mukden." The telegram was simple and the situation was not clear, but as it was evident that a clash had occurred between the regular Japanese and Chinese troops, I immediately called Lieutenant General SUGIYAMA, Vice-Minister of War, Major General ^{KOISO} Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, and Lieutenant ^{Colonel} KUSHIBUCHI, my private secretary, to my official residence to consider steps to meet the situation. At about 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. I reported the incident by telephone to the Premier, and the Foreign, Overseas and Navy Ministers, and to the Premier, I requested the immediate convening of an extraordinary cabinet meeting. Meanwhile the General Staff Headquarters had also received a similar telegram and Chief of the General Staff KANAYA, Assistant Chief of the General Staff NINOMIYA and other responsible members of the Headquarters were in conference. At about 7 a.m. Director KOISO of the Military Affairs Bureau representing the War Ministry went to the General Staff Headquarters for liaison. About 9:00 a.m. the two parties came to an agreement, and decided upon the policy of non-expansion. What we feared more than anything else at the time was whether or not the lengthy railway line, the 200,000

Japanese residents and one million Koreans in Manchuria could be protected with the small Kwantung Army force of 10,000 men in the face of the formidable army of CHANG Hsueh-li numbering 250,000. If the Nikolaievsk Incident involving the massacre of several hundreds of Japanese residents in Nikolaievsk by Russians in 1920 were to be repeated, it would be a serious matter and the army would be charged for negligence in proper performance of its duties to the people. For this reason opinion in the Supreme Command strongly favored the despatch of reinforcements for operational reasons and therefore it took some time before the War Ministry could come to a decision on the non-expansion policy. At an extraordinary cabinet meeting held at 10:00 a.m. the foregoing policy was adopted by the Cabinet, and thereafter the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff in turn reported the decision to the throne, and obtained the Imperial sanction. That afternoon, the Chief of the Army General Staff wired this fact as a Supreme Command order to Commander HONJO of the Kwantung Army and I sent telegraphic instructions on the government policy to the Commandant myself. From this time on, the military operations of the army on the spot came under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army General Staff as an exercise of the prerogative of the Supreme Command. At this time, Lieutenant General HAYASHI, Senjuro, Commander of the Korean Army, reported to Tokyo that the

sending reinforcements to Manchuria admitted of no delay, but a stop order was communicated to him through the Chief of General Staff.

5. In the afternoon of the 21st, while I was engaged in consultation with Premier WAKATSUKI after the conclusion of the Cabinet meeting and all cabinet ministers, had retired, a telegram arrived from the Commander of the Korean Army, reporting that, moved with irresistible sympathy over the fervent requests of the Kwantung Army, he had, at his own discretion, order the Shingishu Mixed Brigade to cross the border. After conferring with the Premier, I reported the border crossing of the Korean Army at its own discretion to a cabinet meeting held in the morning of the following day, the 22nd. The Cabinet, taking into consideration precarious position of the Kwantung Army, saw no alternative, but to approve the despatch of the said brigade and the defrayal of expenses accompanying such action. The Prime Minister immediately reported the affair to the Emperor, the Chief of the General Staff following suit, and the Imperial Order, for the crossing of the border was communicated to the Korean Army by the Chief of the Army General Staff. The cabinet meeting on the same day decided that as the action of the

Kwantung Army was a temporary seizure and not an occupation of Manchuria, no military administration was to be established. This decision was communicated to Commander HONJO by myself. Further, on September 26, the Cabinet passed a decision prohibiting Japanese participation in the movement to establish a new government in Manchuria, and telegraphic instructions to this effect were sent by the Foreign Ministry to Foreign Office organs, in Manchuria and to the Kwantung Army by myself. Such instructions were considered necessary, because we had received reports that movements for the independence of Manchuria had suddenly become active with the outbreak of the incident, and especially that those in favor of restoring the Ching Dynasty had started vigorous activities and we were concerned lest the army on the spot should be dragged into such activities. Later, in the early part of November, a person by the name of TOYAMA, Takeo brought me a letter as a messenger of Emperor HSUANTUNG who had been residing in Tientsin. Although I did not personally talk with him, his message which was conveyed to me through my secretary or officer on duty-I do not remember which-was that: the Emperor HSUANTUNG was desirous of effecting^a fundamental correction of the evil administration of the SHANG regime in Manchuria." As there was no reason for me to believe the words of such a messenger, and especially as it was the government's fixed

policy not to interfere in the domestic affairs of China and I did not favour the proposition, I ignored the letter without replying to the letter of Mr. PU YI.

Not only that, on November 15, I sent telegraphic instructions to the Commander of the Kwantung Army stating that: "While various rumors current about the question of Emperor HSUANTUNG, the Kwantung Army must strictly refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of China, and act with utmost caution." Several years later, when CHENG Hsiang-hsu, Prime Minister of Manchukuo, visited Japan, I called on him at the Imperial Hotel, and showing him the letter in question, asked him whether the letter was genuine or false. CHENG signed the letter certifying that it was the real handwriting of Emperor HSUANTUNG. I have kept this letter to this day as a souvenir.

6. On September 24, the Japanese Government issued its first statement concerning the Mukden Incident. Prior to this announcements on the situation were being issued, about twice a day by our delegation to the League of Nations. Conditions on the spot, however, were not sufficiently clear even to us cabinet ministers. After the incident, seemed to have been settled, a new situation developed with the result the situation was always ahead of the government statement, placing me in a very awkward position. This was because as

as a principle on which the army was established the War Minister could not interfere with military operations. The Kwantung Army, on the other hand, appealed to us that the situation on the spot was such that, while the army in Manchuria had to abide by the non-expansion policy it was unavoidable for them to take necessary measures for self defense in the face of constant attacks by an enemy whose forces were more than twenty times greater than our own and that unless they did otherwise nothing remained for them but self-annihilation. And yet, when a request came from the Kwantung Army for permission to despatch troops to Harbin for the protection of Japanese residents, we not only persuaded the Chief of the Army General Staff and had it flatly rejected, but also succeeded in having the main force withdraw to the railway zone. However, with the withdrawal of our troops CHANG Hsueh-liang's armies, taking advantage of the situation, advanced to the railway zone, causing disturbances in the rear. Consequently in the beginning of October, a reconnaissance flight was made by our aircraft over Chinchou, the headquarters, of the CHANG army. Then the report was received that as the CHANG forces had opened fire, our aircraft had dropped bombs on them. As the flight was made without any previous notification either to the Chief of the Army General Staff or to me, I immediately

issued a severe warning to Commander HONJO. In November MA Chan-shan's army destroyed a railway bridge over the Nonni River and fired on our units ^{which} went to repair it. As MA's troops failed to comply with our repeated warnings, the Kwantung Army decided to repulse them. Later the central military authorities ordered the Kwantung Army to evacuate immediately from TSITSIHAR and this order was effectively carried out. In the later part of November, when a riot broke-out among Chinese troops in Tientsin, a request came from the North China Garrison for reinforcements. Not only was this request refused, but the reinforcement of the Kwantung Army which had advanced to the neighborhood of Chinchow also was ordered to withdraw to the railway zone near Hsinmintun east of the river Tatsiho. About this time, the annual army maneuvers were held in Kyushu under the personal supervision of the Emperor. Although the War Minister had to accompany His Majesty, I remained in Tokyo with the Imperial permission as I had to attend to the ever changing situation both at home and abroad, and exerted my best efforts to prevent the expansion of the conflict, in close collaboration with Government as well as the Supreme Command. I still remember that when we succeeded in preventing the advance of the Kwantung Army to Chinchow the Prime Minister and I, just the two of us together, drank a toast congratulating ourselves on our success at the Premier's official

residence. Such being the case, I can state with the utmost confidence that at least while I was War Minister, there absolutely never was issued a false statement or a breach of international agreements committed, although because of the rapidly changing situation in Manchuria, the statements of the Japanese Government and the actual conditions on the spot were inverted in point of time and therefore were confused.

7. Aside from the many difficult problems in Manchuria mentioned above, I was informed in the middle of October that there were indications of possible disorder among a group of young officers at home. I had these elements immediately apprehended by the Gendarmerie, and had the matter properly dealt with. Because of the moderate policy of the WAKATSUKI cabinet, voices of dissatisfaction against it grew up both within and without Japan. This led the Prime Minister to try to reorganize the Cabinet by a coalition of the Minseito and Seiyukai parties. This attempt failed, however, and the independent action taken by Home Minister ADACHI caused the Cabinet to resign en bloc on December 10 because of disunity in the Cabinet. After my resignation from the office of War Minister, I was given the obscure post of Supreme War Councilor. There was nothing to do except to assemble about twice a year to hear lectures given by the

military authorities. As I had been requested to serve as tutor to the young Prince KAN-IN, I devoted my time to this work, and paid but little attention if any to political and military affairs. Just after three years, on December 10, 1934, I was unexpectedly appointed Ambassador to Manchukuo, and concurrently Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory and Commander of the Kwantung Army, at the recommendation of the OKADA Cabinet.

8. Being installed in the new posts by the personal command of His Majesty, I went to Hsinking, after consultations with Prime Minister OKADA, Foreign Minister HIROTA, Finance Minister TAKAHASHI, War Minister HAYASHI and Justice Minister OBARA, entrusted with the task of having the government's policy thoroughly carried out in Manchoukuo. Not only had the Japan-Manchuokuo Protocol been concluded and Japan recognized the independence of Manchoukuo the previous year, but the Vatican, the Republic Salvador and the Dominican Republic had also recognized her and Manchoukuo was growing as a new-born independent state. In January of the following year (1935), Foreign Minister HIROTA declared in the Diet the policy of amity toward and on February 3, Replies thereto came from General CHIANG Kai-shek, Mr. WANG Ching-wei and Mr. SUN FO, thus bringing about mutual understanding between China and Japan. This was followed by the satisfactory conclusion of various agreements between Manchoukuo and China

relating to customs, postal and telegraphic matters. In March, Manchukuo entered into agreements with Soviet Russia for the navigation of inland waterways and for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railways, and it was agreed to that a committee be appointed for the settlement of the boundary question. His Field Marshal MUTO, the first Ambassador to Manchukuo, was received by the Emperor of that country on the 1st, 11th and 21st of each month, and General HISHIKAWA^R, the second Ambassador, on the 2nd, 12th and 22nd, I, as the third, had the 3rd, 13th and 23rd of each month as my days for regular audiences. During the period between April 2 and April 27, the Emperor of Manchoukuo visited Japan, and was graciously received by our Imperial Family. Thus as Japan and Manchukuo stood on equal footing, it was the policy of the OKADA Cabinet and also my personal conviction that the independence of Manchoukuo should be completely respected and every encouragement given for her healthy growth as a sovereign state. Hence the Kwantung Army made the maintenance of peace and order as its primary function and for this reason I frequently gave them stern instructions not to meddle in politics or do anything injurious to ^{the Prestige} of Manchoukuo. In pursuance of the policy of the government, as soon as I took office, I abolished the Special Service Department of the army and the government of the Kwantung

Leased Territory, and tried my best to simplify the Japanese organs in Manchukuo to every extent possible. During ^{my} tenure of office, there was never a case of Japanese troops crossing the border.

9. In May, 1935, the Japanese Legation in China was elevated to Embassy status and Ambassador ARIYOSHI presented his credentials to President LIN Shen of the Chinese Government. In June, General CHIUNG Kai-shek promulgated the Neighborly Friendship Ordinance which greatly stimulated the growth of friendly sentiments between Japan and China. During the same month, in order to assure peace along the China-Manchoukuo border, the so-called "UMEZU-HO Yin-chin", DOIHARA-CHENG Te-chun" and other agreements were concluded. With regard to these agreements I received reports that they were concluded in an exceedingly friendly atmosphere. Although these agreements were of a local nature, they were concluded with the full approval of the governments of both countries. In July the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Commission was set up to deal with various economic questions on a basis of equality. In August, the Japanese government announced its decision to relinquish Japanese extraterritorial rights in Manchoukuo. This was a serious decision on Japan's part, as she was to return to Manchukuo the rights and interests which she had hitherto enjoyed there. During the same

month, Prince TEH of Inner Mongolia came to Hsinking with a request for an audience with the Emperor. It is believed that the Prince, envious of the sound and peaceful development of Manchukuo, desired to make Inner Mongolia independent following the example of Manchoukuo. As for me, I believe that the independence of Inner Mongolia which Prince TEH was planning was not proper both from the standpoint of substance and time, and always refused his requests for assistance. Lieutenant Colonel TANAKA, Ryukichi, then a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, being well acquainted with the conditions in Mongolia because of his duties, was enthusiastic about the question of Mongolia. Even as late as 1942 he visited me in Tokyo with a request that I become the head of an association for assisting the independence of Mongolia. Of course, I refused to comply with the request. For the same reason, with regard to the North China question also, I only devoted my efforts for the maintenance of peace between China and Manchukuo, in accordance with the directions of the central government, and never at any time did I attempt to engage in political negotiations. I heard that the formation of the Hobei-Chahar regime toward the end of the same year was at the initiative of the Chinese government. On February 26, 1936, an armed insurrection broke out in Tokyo, resulting in the assassination of a number of prominent men. Lamenting over this situation,

I voluntarily requested to be relieved from my office. I was relieved of my post on March 6, and placed on the waiting list on April 18, and was transferred to the reserve list on April 22. Soon after my return to Japan, on August 5, I was unexpectedly appointed Governor General of Korea.

10. I think it was my predecessor as Governor General of Korea, General UGAKI, who recommended me as his successor. I took this office not as soldier but as civilian. As all military affairs were under the exclusive charge of the Commander of the Korean Army, I never handled military matters during tenure of office in Korea. As Governor General, I have nothing to say except that I devoted myself entirely to the elevation of the status and conditions of the Korean people.
11. After my retirement as Governor General of Korea on May 29, 1942, I was appointed a Privy Councilor, which post I held until March 1945. During my tenure of office His Majesty consulted the Privy Council with regard to a proposal concerning the revision of the government organization regulations to place the governor-generals of Korea and Formosa under the jurisdiction of Home Minister, in consequence of the establishment of the Ministry of Greater East Asia Affairs in October 1942. At that time, I was appointed a member of the Investigation Committee of this proposal by the President of the Council. Although I did not utter a

a single word about the Ministry of Greater East Asia tie Affairs, I vigorously opposed the government proposal concerning the office of the governor-general of Korea, on the basis of my personal experience, because I felt apprehensive lest the new measure have various undesirable effects upon colonial administration. However, the proposal was approved over my objection by the majority. I have nothing else to say with reference to my tenure of office as Privy Councillor

12. The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society formed during the KONOE Cabinet by the dissolution of all political parties, gradually lost the confidence of the people, and in its place the DAINIPPON SEIJI KAI (Japan Political Association) was established on March 30, 1945. Unlike the former, the latter was not a government serving organization. The chief aim of the new association was to reflect public opinion upon government, and thereby correct the policies of the government and the military. In this respect, the new organization was fundamentally different from the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, which had no link whatsoever with the people. I was recommended to lead this association by those who used to hold leading position in the former Seiyukai and Minseito Parties because in their opinion I ^{was} best qualified to restrain and control government and the military. Realizing intensely the necessity

of guiding Japanese politics in accordance with public opinion in view of the increasingly critical war situation I accepted the offer, pledging my life to the performance of my task. In order to attain the aims of the new association, I began my work as its head by establishing chapters in prefectures, cities, towns and villages throughout the country, with a view to maintaining direct contact with the people. The expenses of the new society were met by membership fees. No financial support whatsoever was received from the government. In order to hear the true voice of the people, I personally attended the inaugural meeting of local chapters, and as soon as I returned to Tokyo from my trips, I counselled the government and military authorities as to how the people thought and what they wished. Less than six months after the association was formed, the war came to an end and it was dissolved on August 20, 1945.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

On this 8th day of January, 1947

at

Deponent MINAMI, Jiro

I, KONDO, Giichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.

At Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) KONDO, Giichi (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan

Date 27 Mar. 1947

AFFIDAVIT OR STATEMENT

1. Name MINAMI, Jiro

2. In behalf of: Manchurian Phase.

3. Correct Translation: Applicable? Yes () No ()
Approved? Yes () No ()

4. Summary:

The defendant MINAMI began his career in the Army prior to the Russo-Japanese war, and although he claims he lost his auditory sense as a result of cannon fire, he advanced in the Government to the post of Minister of War in 1931.

He claims credit as War Minister for participation in reducing the Army by four divisions, and assisting in promulgating the policy of financial retrenchment and peaceful and conciliatory diplomacy.

His military addresses call for training of soldiers "to maintain the efficiency of the Imperial Army under the difficult conditions caused by arms reduction" (Page 3). He claims credit for revising the army pay ordinance with salary deductions.

He stressed the fact that in order to perfect national defense with a minimum of arms the Japanese should improve in quality on a pace with European and American Powers subsequent to World War I.

He recites notification of Mukden incident, and his request for an immediate convening of an extraordinary Cabinet meeting (Page 4). Opinion in the Supreme Command strongly favored dispatch of reinforcements for operational reasons, and this brought about an extraordinary Cabinet meeting which promulgated the "non-expansion policy" (Page 5). This policy was communicated to Commander HONJO of the Kwantung Army, and thereafter, according to MINAMI, "the military operations of the army on the spot came under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army General Staff as an exercise of the prerogative of the Supreme Command".

- 5. Personnel data: Yes () No ()
- 6. Summary of IPS evidence re witness: Yes () No ()
- 7. Summary of previous testimony of witness: Yes () No ()
- 8. Suggested subjects for cross-examination: Yes () No ()
- 9. Facts and Comment as to rebuttal: Yes () No ()
- 10. Additional remarks: Yes () No ()

He mentions (Page 6) a dispatch of a brigade from Korea across the border during this first incident, and says that the Cabinet saw no alternative but to provide the dispatch and the defrayal of expenses accompanying such action.

He mentions the decision communicated to Honjo by himself that the Japanese would not participate in a movement to establish a new government in Manchuria. In this connection he recalls a letter delivered to him by messenger from the Emperor Pu Yi to the effect that he was desirous of effecting a correction of the evil administration of the SHANG Regime in Manchuria. The authenticity of this letter he claims to have been certified at the Imperial Hotel several years later by the Prime Minister of Manchukuo.

He makes excuses for the operations of the Kwantung army "on the spot" in that while having to abide by the "non-expansion policy" it was necessary for them to take measures in self-defense from constant attacks by the enemy. He makes further excuses for dropping of bombs over Chinchow because their aircraft had been fired upon.

He states that when the annual army maneuvers were held in Kyushu under the personal supervision of the Emperor, although it was his duty to accompany His Majesty, he remained in Tokyo with the Emperor's permission as he "had to attend to the ever-changing situation both at home and abroad, and exerted my best efforts to prevent the expansion of the conflict, in close collaboration with government as well as the Supreme Command".

He mentions the "October Incident" and his prompt dealing therewith followed by a resignation of the Cabinet in December.

In 1934 he was "unexpectedly" appointed Ambassador to Manchukuo and Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory, and Commander of the Kwantung Army. This was under the OKADA Cabinet. He claims (Page 12) a mutual understanding between China and Japan relative to Manchukuo in January 1935.

He dwells upon the maintenance of peace and order in Manchukuo by the Kwantung Army and the development of an independent state, including the absorption of Mongolia.

He discussed his tenure as Governor General of Korea succeeding General UGAKI, not as a soldier but as a civilian, from which position he retired 29 May 1942, to accept appointment as a Privy Councillor.

which post he held until March 1935. As such, he objected to the proposal of placing the Governor Generals of Korea and Formosa under the jurisdiction of the Home Ministry for fear of undesirable effects upon colonial administration.

He tells of accepting the leadership of DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI (Japan Political Association), the chief aim of which was to reflect public opinion upon government. He says the reason he was recommended to this position was "I was best qualified to restrain and control the government and the military". In view of the increasingly critical "war situation", he accepted the offer, and "pledging my life to the performance of my task". In less than six months the war was over and the association was dissolved 20 August 1945.

Document No. 1835-A

9/23/38

From: General MINAMI, Jiro, Governor-General of Korea
To : His Excellency, the Foreign Minister UGAKI, Issei

Sir:

Approximately one year has passed since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Incident. Through the good policy of Your Excellency as Prime Minister at a time when the situation is so extremely grave, the prestige of our country is being enhanced at home and abroad, and I feel it is a matter for congratulations for the sake of our nation.

Ever since the Incident our troops have been invincible, and I believe Hankow, the last capitol of the Chiang Regime, will soon be conquered.

It is natural that the significance of the fall of Hankow, in this Holy War, will have an extremely great influence at home and abroad. I feel there are many measures to be taken by our nation at this juncture, but the most important problem, I believe, is the recognition of a pro-Japanese Regime in North and Central China simultaneously with the fall of Hankow, and to expound it at home and abroad.

The recognition of a pro-Japanese Regime by our country will, internally, convince our people of the progress of our policy in China; and externally, give the Chinese masses a strong suggestion that there is no other way than to get rid of the Chiang Regime and depend on the new Regime, and at the same time the third powers behind Chiang will also fully realize that there is no other way than to approach the pro-Japanese regime in order to protect their own rights and interests. I believe it will have great effect at home and abroad.

I feel Your Excellency has already given individual consideration to various measures to be taken after the fall of Hankow, but it is my wish to have Your Excellency make final judgment on this point.

Yours respectfully,

C E R T I F I C A T E

IPS No. 1835-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages (Japanese), dated 23 September 1938, and described as follows: Letter from Korean Civil Governor-General MINAMI to Foreign Minister UGAKI dated 23 September 1938. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):
Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this

2nd day of April, 1947.

/s/ K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: K. Urabe /s/

Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

8th day of April, 1947.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Henry Shimojima

Investigator, I. P. S.
Official Capacity

DOCUMENT NO. 1055

Processing approved 4/1/47

FROM: MINAMI, Jiro, Governor-General of Korea

TO: UGAKI, Kazunari, Foreign Minister

DATE: . 23 September 1938

Dear Sir:

It has been more than a year since the outbreak of the China Incident. At this national critical moment, you occupy an important position in the Cabinet, and have done a praiseworthy task in planning in the interest of this country, raising her international prestige higher than ever. Herein I sincerely congratulate you on your services rendered to the country.

From the beginning of the Incident, our Imperial forces had frustrated the enemy everywhere they operated, with the result that Hankow - the Chiang Regime's last stronghold - will soon fall into our hands, I think. It is quite natural that the fall of Hankow in this sacred warfare will effect a grave consequence on the situation, internal as well as external.

At this juncture, we can count not a small number of measures to be adopted, but the most important question, I am convinced, is that simultaneously with the fall of the city, we should recognize the pro-Japanese regime to be set up in North and Central China, and should declare it all over the land and to the world. By our recognition of the new pro-Japanese regime, our people may well be shown how to deal with China, and the Chinese masses will also be taught that there is no alternative but to escape the Chiang Government, and rely on the new regime's administration. In consequence, the other powers supporting Chiang surreptitiously from the rear will see that to protect their rights and interests, there is left no other way than to accede to the pro-Japanese regime. Thus, the recognition declaration, I conceive, will have an unprecedented effect on internal and international affairs.

Regarding measures to be taken after Hankow is occupied, I believe you have already prepared them fully, but herein I beg your pardon for my recommending you to take decisive steps in this regard.