Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11594

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Description of contents

(1) Box no. AG-12

(2) Folder title/number: (15)
560 #1

(3) Date: Mar. 1951 - Mar. 1952

(4) Subject:

Classification	Type of record
400, 615	z

(5) Item description and comment:
Includes Contents List

(6) Reproduction: (Yes) No

(7) Film no. Sheet no.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11594

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HEADQUARTERS
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560

SCAP
1951

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11594

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 560 SCAP TOP SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
	DEPTAR	12 Jan 52	CINCFE	DA 91849: Proposal considered as representing continuation current and past practice (6)
	DIP SEC	24 Mar 52	DA	CX 65764: Prepared take action re abolishment SCAP fishing line (6)

11794—FEC P&PC—4/51—30M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG No. [illegible]

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 560 SCAP TOP SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS	
	CINCFE	7 Dec 51	DEPTAR	C 58890: Re revocation MacArthur Line	(6)
	DEPTAR	29 Dec 51	CINCFE	DA 90678: Re abolition of boundary limiting auth Jap fishing	(6)

18277—FEC P&PC—9/51—30M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG No. [illegible]

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 560 SCAP TOP SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
~~5-23~~	~~COMNAVFE~~ REFILED 560/6-A/TS-P/BK 1/51	~~8 Jul 51~~	~~CINCFE~~	LTR: ~~000113~~ : ~~Transfer of Ships to the Japanese Coast Guard~~
6	CINCFE	28 Nov 51	DEPTAR	CX 58159: Seizure and Confiscation of Japanese Fishing Vessels
	CINCFE	29 Nov 51	DEPTAR	C 58249: Clarifies intended meaning msg CX 58159 (6)
	DEPTAR	1 Dec 51	CINCFE	DA 88575: Interim reply re seizure and confiscation of Japanese fishing vessels (6)

9308—FEC P&PC—1. 51—30M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG No. [illegible]

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 560 SCAP TOP SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
	SCAP	12 Jun 51	COMNAVFE	CX 64750: Auth granted, subj fol restrictions, to install guns and electronic equipmt on Japanese coast guard craft ~~(20)~~ (2)
	COMNAVFE 000106	18 Jun 51	CINCFE	LTR: 000106- Establishment of fishing patrol in East China Sea and Sea of Japan (1)
	CINCFE	30 Jun 51	COMNAVFE	MF: Implementation of plan - establ of fishing patrol in E. China Sea and Sea of Japan - will not be directed at this time ~~(19)~~
	CINCFE	4 Jul 51	DEPTAR	C 66324: Recommend early adoption recom in C-64605 and plans contained JCS 1380/109 (3) ~~(21)~~
~~22~~ 4	CINCFE	7 Jul 51	DEPTAR	C 66536: Active recommendations (protection Jap fishing vessels) suspended pending JCS decision re arming Jap patrol vessels

9308—FEC P&PC—1 51—30M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG No. [illegible]

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 560 SCAP TOP SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
	CINCFE	22 Apr 51	COMNAVFE	MF: Protection of Jap fishing vessels frm piracy (U ~~(19)~~
2 ~~20~~	COMNAVFE	25 May 51	SCAP	250010 Z: Proposal re arming Jap coast guard craft currently under construction
	COMNAVFE	26 May 51	CINCFE	LTR: 00097 Protection of Japanese fishing vessels (U) ~~(19)~~
3 ~~21~~	CINCFE	10 Jun 51	DEPTAR	C 64605: Recommend enunciation 2nd policy JCS 1380/102
	CINCFE	10 Jun 51	COMNAVFE	MF: Ref Protection Japanese Fishing Vessels (U) ~~(19)~~

9308—FEC P&PC—1 51—30M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 115047

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 560 SCAP TOP SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1 ~~19~~	COMNAVFE	12 Mar 51	CINCFE	122348 4: Suggestions to prevent piracy of Japanese fishing vessels by armed Chinese vessels
	CINCFE	15 Mar 51	COMNAVFE	MF: Desire COMNAVFE's plan to arm Jap craft for protection Japanese fishing boats (1) (~~19~~)
	COMNAVFE	25 Mar 51	CINCFE	LTR: Ser 00059 Rearming Japanese Patrol Craft for Fishing Patrol (~~19~~) (1)
	CINCFE	15 Apr 51	COMNAVFE	MF: Req plan for protection Japanese fishing vessels (1) (~~19~~)

9308—FEC P&PC—1 51—30M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11504

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 490).
Revised July 26, 1918.

88 2490

SERIAL NUMBER.	FROM—	DATE.	TO—	SYNOPSIS.

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11594

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HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER
ALLIED POWERS

FILE NO. 560 BOOK NO. #1

SCAP
1951
1952

ADJUTANT GENERALS OFFICE

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GHQ, SCAP-REC
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Filed AG 560 (TS-S)

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NWB:CNS:FAW:WCN:mfw
XXX

24 Mar 52
Unno

DEPT OF ARMY WASH DC.....PRIORITY

INFO: DEPT OF STATE WASH DC.....PRIORITY
DEPT OF INTERIOR WASH DC.....PRIORITY

C 65764

Redeptel 0204002, 2 March concerning date Peace Treaty comes into force. According to DA 90678, 30 Dec, SCAP was advised SCAP fishing line should not be abolished "until shortly prior to coming into effect of the treaty of peace".

SCAP prepared take necessary action. Advise appropriate date line should be abolished.

OFFICIAL:

C.C.B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

APPROVED:

MILES W. BOND
Acting Chief
Diplomatic Section

M/R: This action approved by C/S 21 Mar 52.

Mr. Neville - 26-7953

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

24 MAR 52

AG RECORDS (DS:NWB:CNS:FAW:WCN:mfw)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. [illegible]

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
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(TS-S)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH

TOP SECRET

INCOMING MESSAGE

FEH/cem

TOP SECRET

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

ROUTINE

13 Jan 52

FROM : DEPTAR (G-3) WASH DC

TO : CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

NR : DA 91849

Your proposal contained in Part 3 B, CX 58159, 28 Nov 51 as interpreted in C 58249, 29 Nov 51 is considered here as representing a continuation of your current and past practice. No change in these practices appear nec.

560 (TS-S)

560 (TS-S)

JENKINS

ACTION : G-2

INFORMATION : CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-3, DIPIOMATIC, ECON & SCI, JUDGE ADVOCATE, LEGAL, TRANS

32717

ROUTINE

TOO : 121943 Z
MCN : 50544

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

TOP SECRET

CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

27

Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

COPY No. (6)

21219—FEC P&PC—12/51—465M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11594

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560
(TS-S)

TOP SECRET

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

FFH/cem

DX

ROUTINE

~~800.917~~ (TS)

~~30~~ 27 Dec 51

FROM : DEPTAR (SAOOA) WASH DC

TO : CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

NR : DA 90678

560 (16) (TS-S) 560 (16) (TS-S) 560 (16) (TS-S)

REUR CX 58159 Nov and C 58890 and DA 88575 Dec. State/Army believe that fol considerations militate against your proposed action part 3 A CX 58159 in the immediate future.

1. Public announcement of the abolition of the boundary limiting the authorized Japanese fishing area may prejudice public opinion in certain countries and impede efforts to secure early ratification of the treaty of peace.

2. Although the Far Eastern Commission has never adopted a policy decision concerning fishing, the US Representative has on several occasions under instructions informed the Commission that it was the understanding of the US Govt that should the Supreme Comdr contemplate an extension of the fishing areas, those states asserting a direct concern in the areas would be consulted.

3. Abolition of the limiting boundary is of direct concern to the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea inasmuch as these nations have indicated a desire to conclude bilateral fisheries treaties with Japan. Announcement of the abolition of the boundary would very likely cause these nations to feel that their bargaining position vis-a-vis Japan had been seriously weakened and cause resentment against both Japan and the US. In the case of the Philippines and Indonesia, ratification of the treaty of peace with Japan might be endangered.

In view of these considerations, it is recommended that you withhold action on this proposal until shortly prior to the coming into effect of the treaty of peace. In the meantime, State will

(over)

22330 ROUTINE

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

TOP SECRET

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Paraphrase not required. Handle in correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

(6)

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21219—FEC P&PC—12/51—465M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11504

TOP SECRET

ROUTINE

FROM : DEPTAR WASH DC -- NR : DA 90678 -- 30 DEC 51 -- CONT'D

discuss with those friendly nations principally concerned your intention and the reasons prompting them. Results of these discussions will be relayed to you.

NO SIG

ACTION : G-2

INFORMATION : CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-3, DIPLOMATIC, ECON & SCI, JUDGE ADVOCATE, LEGAL, TRANS

22330

ROUTINE

TOP SECRET

TOO : 291621 Z
MCN : 97380

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11504

TOP SECRET

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560 4 970
(TS-S)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CS/SecDiv/RSL/ao

OUTGOING MESSAGE

7 December 1951

070921

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO: DEPTAR WASH D C . . . . . ROUTINE

C- 58890

For JCS. Urmsg DA 88575. 560 (TS-S)

Estimated date conclusion current fisheries conference 15 Dec 1951. There is no objection to withholding revocation of MacArthur Line until a few days before effective date of Peace Treaty if political implications so indicate. However, it is felt that revocation should be effected as soon after conclusion of fisheries conference as political situation permits in order to force recognition of revocation by other nations as definite SCAP action.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

R. S. HEATON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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G2 Sec Div (Return)
G2 Sec Div OPNS (Return)

AG RECORDS

AG FILE

Reference Radio is DA 88575

Draft approved by CofS 7 Dec 51

M/R: Our radios Nov CX 58159 and Nov CX 58249 sought comments from DA on SCAP proposals to abolish MacArthur Line after fisheries conference concluded, and to file consolidated protest with Soviet Mission Tokyo on seizures of Japanese fishing vessels. This radio answering queries in DA interim reply DA 88575 states no objection to withholding revocation MacArthur Line until few days before effective date of Peace Treaty provided political considerations justify. ESS (Mr Sullivan) and NRS (Mr Neville) concur. (16)

Lt Col Lentz 26-6061

Copy 4

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11504

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
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Filed AG 560
(15-5)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH

TOP SECRET

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET EHD/tjc

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

ROUTINE

1
~~2~~ Dec 51

FROM : DEPTAR (SAOOA OAGO) WASH DC

TO : CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

NR : DA 88575

URMSG Nov CX 58159 (560 15-5) and Nov CX 58249 (560 15-5). This is an interim reply.

1. Proposal contained Para 3 A of CX 58159 under study ref political implications. What is estimated date conclusion of current fisheries conference? Is there any objection to withholding revocation of MacArthur Line until a few days before the effective date of the Peace Treaty if political implications indicate this action desirable even though fisheries conference is concluded within the next month? State Dept now making study of political implications.

2. Comments Part 3 B later.

3. Ref Part 3 C. No objection your filing protest with Soviet Mission Tokyo.

NO SIG

ACTION : G-2

INFORMATION : CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-3, DIPLOMATIC, ECON & SCI, JUDGE ADVOCATE, LEGAL, NAT RESOURCES, TRANS

00441 ROUTINE TOO : 011741 Z
MCN : 90294

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

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Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

28 NH

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20377-FEC P&PC—11/51—155M

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GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560 (15-5)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

SGS H.L/jhs
29 November 51

OUTGOING MESSAGE

2906052

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO : DEPTAR WASH DC . . . . . OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

560 (15-5)

FOR JCS. MYMSG CX-58150.

C-58249 The word "active" in Part III, Para "B" of ref msg was intended to mean "organized" and not to imply that no armed measures would be taken under any circumstances. Reason for no organized military measures is lack of adequate means.

OFFICIAL:

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Security Information

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CIB/CIDA/OPNS/[illegible] AG

28 November 1952

80535

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO : DEPTAR WASH DC. . . . . PRIORITY 4925

INFO: COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN. . . . . ROUTINE (COURIER)

For JCS. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

CX58159

Subject is Seizure and Confiscation of Japanese Fishing vessels. This radio in three parts.

Part I Fishing Boundary and Seizures

A. Immediately after Japanese surrender, fishing by Japanese vessels was restricted to twelve mile limit. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers through Japanese insistance successively expended the limiting boundary of the area authorized for Japanese fishing vessels in 1945, 1946, 1949 and 1950, until now the area encompasses roughly eight million square miles, extending from Northern Japan eastward to international date line, then south to the equator, westward to skirt Northern New Guinea, northward running east of the Philippines and Formosa, thence northeast roughly dividing the Sea of Japan. Around the north of Japan the boundary follows the Japanese three mile limit in several places, causing serious restriction on Japanese fishing and navigation in the area. The limitations and subsequent modifications thereof have been by SCAP directive and they can be altered or abolished completely by the same authority at any time.

B. Referred to by Japanese as "MacArthur Line", the original and subsequent purpose of the "Line" was to restrict Japanese fisheries and prevent encroachment into fishing waters of other powers, while placing no restriction on foreign fisheries. Repeated violations of the "Line" by Japanese fishermen and inability of U.S. and Japanese forces to enforce has resulted in little effectiveness of "Line". Moreover, Soviet authorities in Sakhalin and Kurile Islands have used violation of the "Line" by Japanese fishermen as pretext for seizure and subjected offenders to punitive measures, including imprisonment and confiscation of vessels. Also of some benefit to Soviets is intelligence information obtained from fishermen. During period 1946 to date reports indicate 164 Japanese fishing vessels seized by Soviet craft in waters northern Hokkaido, of which 116 were released, balance 48 confiscated, missing or sunk.

Part II Regarding Corrective Action

A. Cost of employment of U.S. or Japanese armed patrol craft to relieve harrassment is not commensurate with benefits to be expected and such action could lead to aggravated shooting incidents with Soviets.

AG RECORDS

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AG FILE

WD/6

copy 4

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

FROM: CINCFE TO: DEPTAR WASH DC INFO: COMNAVFE G2/CI Div/OPNS/RLM/mc

28 Nov 51

B. Already Communist interest shown by inquiry Communist Diet member on status "MacArthur Line", Prime Minister Yoshida replied on 19 Oct 51. "Line" would be automatically abolished with the coming into force of Peace Treaty. Soviets likely to refuse to recognize "Line" demise through Treaty ratification since they are not party to Treaty. Preferable to abolish "Line" by definite SCAP action.

C. Premature abolishment of "Line" immediately may embarrass Japan, U.S. and Canadian fisheries conferences now in session; however, abolishment of "Line" before Treaty comes into force is prime consideration.

D. Diplomatic protests to USSR re seizures have proven ineffective to date due to lack of conclusive evidence. Desirable, however, to file consolidated protest with USSR prior to "Line" abolishment as a record for such future use as desired by Japanese Government.

E. When plans now under way to augment Japanese floating force are implemented Japanese Government will have more adequate forces to handle the situation.

Part III

This headquarters proposes:

A. To abolish the limiting boundary of authorized Japanese fishing area as soon as practicable after the current fisheries conference now in progress in Japan is concluded and in any event before the Peace Treaty comes into force.

B. To take no active armed measures by U.S. or Japanese floating craft to prevent seizures.

C. To vigorously protest well substantiated seizures by the Soviets and file with the USSR a complete record of seizures prior to abolishment of the "MacArthur Line".

Request your advice soonest.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

This is an original message.

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Declassified E.O. 11652 Section 3 (E)

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Pursuant to instructions CinC to G2, study on this subject was prepared and submitted to C/S recommending conference of interested staff sections to formulate recommendations to CinC re subject. Approved by C/S, 31 Oct 31, conference above held 7 Nov 51 and conclusions and recommendations submitted C/S 8 Nov 51 included stipulation that implementing action on recommendations not taken without coordination of Washington agencies. This radio to DA presents problem and proposed SCAP action for coordination with Dept State and others. Draft approved by C/S 27 Nov 51.

Lt Col Lantz 26-6061

Declassified E.O. 11652 Section 3(E)

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GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560

(TS-5)

(DS/AWJS/WHS/cgf)

7 July 1951

DEPTAR WASH DC.....ROUTINE 070653Z

5446 SCAP NR 22 JUN

C-66536

Hour DA 94743 dated 22 June addressed CINCFE subj seizure Japanese fishing vessels. Active recommendations suspended pending JCS decision re arming Japanese patrol vessels. Planning, however, contemplates possible establishment minimum patrol by U.S. Naval vessels along line in East China Sea extending Southwest from point 35° 00' North and 130° 00' East.

OFFICIAL:

E. B. BURNI
Brig. General, AGD
Adjutant General

APPROVED:

W. J. SEBALD
Chief, Diplomatic Section

Info copies: C/S
G-3
NR
CosNavFe
AG Records

M/R: Approved by C/S 6 July 51 as per check sheet from DS to C/S thru G-3, 3 July 51, subj: "Dept of Army Inquiry re Plans for Protection Japanese Fishing Vessels."

WHS 26-7695

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AG FILE

5 JUL 54

Declassified E.O. [illegible]

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120335Z

CMH, Hq DA
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560
(TS-S)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE GC-P JHK/mh
12 Jun [illegible]

FROM: SCAP TOKYO JAPAN

TO : COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN . . . . . ROUTINE (COURIER)

INFO: CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR TH . . . . . ROUTINE

CNO WASH DC . . . . . ROUTINE

Cx 64750 1560 (TS-S)

1. URMSG 250010 Z May. Proposed prototype installation of guns and electronic equipment on Japanese coast guard craft considered desirable; however, manning by Japanese crews or their participation in testing or tng not favorably considered. Accordingly, authority requested in ref msg is hereby granted subj to the following restrictions:

a. Testing of guns and electronic equipment to be performed by U. S. Naval personnel only.

b. No training of Japanese personnel in the use of guns and electronic equipment is to be conducted in connection therewith.

2. During the period of installation of subj equipment aboard Japanese Coast Guard craft, and until equipment is removed, the craft will be under the operational control of NAVFE as a SCAP agency.

AG Reading

OFFICIAL: APPROVED:

K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

E. K. WRIGHT
Brigadier General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Dist:
C/S
G-2
DS
JSPOG

AG FILE

TOP SECRET

3 (2)

TOP SECRET

FROM: SCAP TOKYO JAPAN TO: COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN INFO: CINCPACFLT
PEARL HARBOR TH, CNO WASH D C GC-P JHK/cmh 12 June 1951

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Reference msg states that CNO has auth COMNAVFE, subject to SCAP approval, to make prototype installation of guns and electronic equipment on 3 Japanese coast guard craft (one each of three types). COMNAVFE proposed to conduct limited tng of Japanese crews in harbor defense duties after installation of equipment with the vessels remaining under MSA control. The equipment would be removed after tng and testing. The project would enable development of complete materiel requirements and plans for a total of 43 craft involved. Current national policy does not authorize the arming of Japanese vessels and manning by Japanese crews. National policy would not be contravened however, and other nations could have no rightful objection if; (1) the craft are placed under SCAP control during the period of installation and testing; (2) testing is conducted by U. S. personnel only and; (3) no training of Japanese personnel in the use of military type equipment is conducted in connection therewith. Msg otherwise self-explanatory. Approved by the CofS 11 June 51, initialled "H". Plans Div Case 5-51-79.

KELLER
26-8643

TOP SECRET

2

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

TOP SECRET
CHECK SHEET

Lt Col Keller
26-8643

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No:

Subject: Prototype Installations of Gun and Electronic Equipment on Japanese Coast Guard Craft

Note No.	From: G-3 To: CofS Date: 5 June 1951
1	1. COMNAVFE has requested approval to make prototype installations of guns and appropriate electronics equipment on one ship of each class (total of three classes) Japanese Coast Guard craft. The Project is authorized by CNO subject to SCAP approval. COMNAVFE assumes that the Japanese Coast Guard will come under US Navy control in the event of general hostilities. The proposed plan is designed to develop complete material requirements and plans for a total of 43 craft involved. The US Navy will bear the cost. After installation COMNAVFE proposes to conduct limited training for Japanese crews in harbor defense duties with the craft remaining under MSA control. The equipment will be removed following this training. 2. The proposal is considered desirable with the exception of the proposed training of Japanese crews. The DS points out that the arming now of the MSA vessels continuing under MSA control would appear to be in violation of current national policy and would very likely precipitate an inopportune and possibly damaging controversy with FEC nations with whom delicate negotiations are currently in progress looking toward an early conclusion of a satisfactory Japanese peace treaty. However, DS feels that these nations could have no rightful objections and that the national policy would not be contravened if these prototype vessels were armed and equipped by SCAP under US Navy control. The DS concludes by recommending that the COMNAVFE plan be adopted with the modification that the vessels, during the period of installation and testing of equipment, be placed under control of the US Navy and be operated on behalf of SCAP rather than the Japanese Government. G-2 commented on the proposed plan and likewise concurred in the proposal with the exception that limited training of Japanese personnel in harbor defense duties not be conducted. 3. It appears to be desirable to grant COMNAVFE the authority requested in Basic, with the exceptions: a. That the Testing of guns and electronic equipment should be performed by US personnel only. b. That no training of Japanese personnel in the use of guns and electronic equipment is to be conducted in connection therewith. 4. It is recommended that the draft proposed message to COMNAVF Abe approved and returned to G-3 for preparation in final form. 2 Incls 1. Ppsd msg 2. M/R E. K. W.

CHIEF OF STAFF
APPROVED
6 JUN 51
INITIALS

6-8/33 F

FEC AGO Form No 37

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8116—FEC P&PC—11/50—100M

G3 TS "A" No 1026. SGS563 G-2 TS 4736

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE GC-P JHK/rn
5 June 1951

FROM: SCAP TOKYO JAPAN

TO: COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN . . . . . ROUTINE (COURIER)

INFO: CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR TH . . . . . ROUTINE

CNO WASH DC . . . . . ROUTINE

1. URMSG 250010 Z May. Proposed prototype installation of guns and electronic equipment on Japanese coast guard craft considered desirable; however, manning by Japanese crews or their participation in testing or tng not favorably considered. Accordingly, authority requested in ref msg is hereby granted subj to the following restrictions:

a. Testing of guns and electronic equipment to be performed by U.S. Naval personnel only.

b. No training of Japanese personnel in the use of guns and electronic equipment is to be conducted in connection therewith.

2. During the period of installation of subj equipment aboard Japanese Coast Guard craft, and until equipment is removed, the craft will be under the operational control of NAVFE as a SCAP agency.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

E. K. WRIGHT
Brigadier General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

CONCURRENCE:
DS WS
NAVFE W A Benson
G-2 Bdlt for RFE

RECOMMEND APPROVAL: E K W
E.K.W.

6-8/33 F

TOP SECRET
SGS 563

cy lin TS 550 (2)

TOP SECRET

G-3 PLANS

GC-P JHK/lg
4 June 1951

MEMO FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Prototype Installation of Guns and Electronic Equipment on Japanese Coast Guard Craft

1. BASIC: COMNAVFE msg 250010Z May, which requests authority to make prototype installation of guns and electronic equipment on one ship of each class Japanese Coast Guard craft currently under construction (43 involved).

2. REFERENCES: a. C/N from Diplomatic Section to G-3, subject as above, dtd 28 May 51.

b. C/N G-2 to G-3, subject as above, dtd 2 June 51.

c. COMNAVFE msg 260122Z May 51.

3. DISCUSSION: a. By Basic, COMNAVFE informs CINCFE that CNO has authorized, subject to SCAP approval, a proposal to make installation of guns and appropriate electronic equipment on one ship, each class, Japanese Coast Guard craft currently under construction. The cost of the equipment and installation is to be borne by the US Navy. NAVFE contemplates limited training of Japanese crews in harbor defense duties after installation of equipment with the ships remaining under MSA control during training; thereafter, the armament and electronic equipment will be removed. COMNAVFE states that SCAP approval of the foregoing will enable development of complete material requirements and plans for the craft involved. The assumption is made that the Japanese Coast Guard will be assigned duties under the US Navy in the event of general hostilities.

b. In ref a the DS considers that the arming now, of MSA vessels continuing under MSA control, would appear to be in violation of current US policy and would very likely precipitate an inopportune and possibly damaging controversy with FEC nations with whom delicate negotiations are currently in progress looking toward the early conclusion of a satisfactory Japanese peace treaty. DS feels, however, that these nations could have no rightful objection, and that the National Policy would not be contravened, if these prototype vessels were armed and equipped by SCAP under US Navy control. The DS therefore suggests that COMNAVFE's basic plan be adopted with the modification that the vessels, during the period of installation and testing of equipment, be placed under and operated by the US Navy on behalf of SCAP rather than the Japanese Government.

c. In ref b, G-2 states that the NAVFE proposal is not a complete plan since the development of vessel potentiality is provided for, whereas organizational and personnel requirements are neglected. G-2 further states however that the possibility of correcting this deficiency at this time is precluded by existing bans. G-2 makes further comments relative to proposed G-2 and COMNAVFE responsibilities towards MSA in this matter and concludes by concurring in the COMNAVFE proposal with the exception that training of Japanese personnel not be authorized.

TOP SECRET

G3 TS "A" No 1026

ea lin TS 550 (2)

d. Current JCS directives prohibit the arming of Japanese vessels, It would appear that even if the vessels were placed under SCAP control during the period of installation and testing, the utilization of Japanese crews in connection therewith would circumvent the intent of the JCS directive. If COMNAVFE were authorized to make the prototype installation of guns and electronic equipment and test the vessels, utilizing US Navy personnel, it is considered that no valid objections could be raised by other governments. This also would appear to satisfy the requirements of COMNAVFE in that it would permit the development of material requirement, plans, and procurement action for the craft involved so that rapid installation could be effected in a general emergency. Undoubtedly, if Japanese crews were permitted to participate in this project the inherent adverse propaganda potential would be employed by governments not sympathetic with US intentions or policy. It is believed that Japanese crews could be trained concurrently with the installation of the subject equipment in the event of a general emergency with no substantial waste of time.

e. Considering the foregoing, it is desirable to grant COMNAVFE the authority to proceed with his proposal, but restricting him from tng Japanese personnel in connection therewith.

4. INDICATED ACTION: Msg to COMNAVFE granting him authority requested in Basic, subject to the following restrictions:

a. Testing of guns and electronic equipment to be performed by US personnel only, and under SCAP control.

b. No training of Japanese personnel in the use of guns and electronic equipment is to be conducted in connection therewith.

5. CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET. Since Basic is so classified per COMNAVFE msg ref c.

6. CONCURRENCE: To be obtained from DS, NAVFE and G-2.

7. RECOMMENDATION: G-3 approve draft proposed msg to COMNAVFE and release to CofS.

8. COMPLETION: This does not complete action on G-3 Plans Div Case 5-51-79.

KELLER
26-8643
CP

G-3 Plans

JHK/cmh

12 June 1951

ADDENDUM TO MEMO FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Prototype Installation of Guns and Electronic Equipment on Japanese Coast Guard Craft

1. Action returned approved by the CofS initialled "H", prepared in final form and fwded to G-3 Admin for dispatch.

2. This completes action on G-3 Plans Div Case 5-51-79.

KELLER
26-8643

(2)

TOP SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

Mr. Mulbar
26-5915

File No:

Subject: Prototype Installations of Gun and Electronic Equipment on Japanese Coast Guard Craft

Note No.	From: G-2	To: G-3	Date: 8 June 1951
1	G2 concurs with draft of proposed message to COMNAVFE. 1 Incl: C/S G3 to CofS, 5 Jun 51 w/2 Incls		

R.F.E.

TOP SECRET
G-2 GHQ FEC
LOG NO. 4236
Copy 1 of 5 Copies

FEC AGO Form No 37

8699—FEC Printing Plant—10/49—50M

G3 TS "A" No 1026

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

Lt Col Keller
26-8643

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No:

Subject: Prototype Installation of Guns and Electronic Equipment on Japanese Coast Guard Craft

Note No.	
	From: G-3 To: ~~DS~~ G-2 Date: 26 May 1951
1	1. Reference is made to COMNAVFE msg 250010 Z May, 1951. 2. From a G-3 standpoint the proposal in reference message is desirable. 3. Request your comments as a basis for appropriate recommendation to the Chief of Staff. for E. K. W. Mr. Mulbar 26-5915
	FROM: G2 TO: G3 DATE: 2 June 1951
2	1. In compliance with par 3 C/N 1, reference is made to COMNAVFE msg 250010Z, dtd 25 May 51. 2. Reference message refers to a total of forty-three (43) craft involved. Assuming that COMNAVFE will utilize all suitable JG-Maritime Safety Agency patrol type craft in event of general hostilities, your attention is invited to the following facts: a. The JG-MSA has presently or under construction a total of one hundred and forty-six (146) patrol type craft. b. Of a above seventy-seven (77) are marginal because of age and/or low speed, but should not be ruled out of planning purposes. c. Of a above sixty-nine (69) are new vessels, in the design and construction of which G2 insisted on reserves of space and buoyancy beyond minimum safety requirements. d. A G2 study of vessels a above resulted in theoretical conclusions as to armament requirements (Incl 1) which it is believed will bear up under tests. Study is enclosed for information only. 3. Reference message proposals are not a complete plan in that these propose development of JG-MSA vessel potential while completely ignoring the JG-MSA organization and personnel potential for attainment of the required state of military readiness to participate in harbor defense and coastal patrol including anti-submarine warfare. Failure to accomplish the latter

TOP SECRET
G-2 GHQ FEC
LOG NO. 41763
Copy 1 of 2 Copies

FEC AGO Form No 37

8116—FEC P&PC—11/50—100M

G3 TS "A" No 1026

TOP SECRET

C1 Dup TS 550 (2) 1

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: Subject:

Note No.	From: G2 To: G3 Date: 2 June 1951
2 (Cont'd)	concurrently with development of vessel potential will result in making available to COMNAVFE in time of emergency a nember of armed vessels with no effective organization to man and operate them.

4. The JG-MSA, guided by G2 since its establishment 1 May 48, is an effective lifesaving and law enforcement organization. It is completely civilian in character and is almost totally unprepared at this time for an assignemnt of a military nature in terms of enabling laws, organizational structure and personnel. In this connection, the following should be borne in mind:

a. Because of the existing ban on JG planning along military lines the JG-MSA has no plans for correction of these military deficiencies.

b. G2 itself has developed plans against such an eventuality as is now proposed in reference message.

5. Present relationships of G2 and COMNAVFE to the JG-MSA are advisory only: in view of existing ban 4a above the following are at present precluded:

a. Development of the JG-MSA organization, vessel and personnel potential to attain a state of military readiness.

b. Insuring the proper and maximum usage of large-scale aid in ordnance (including electronics) equipment and supplies which will be required and which is contemplated.

6. In making comments as a basis for appropriate recommendations to the Chief of Staff, G2 has drawn on its knowledge of the relationships between the U.S. Government, USN, and USCG as they are correlated one with the other. It believes that these latter relationships represent the effective way in which our government discharges its public responsibility for safety and security and may safely be used as a guide for SCAP policy. The following is based in all respects on establishing parallel relationships of GHQ, SCAP and COMNAVFE to the JG-MSA:

a. G2, GHQ to have authority as follows:

(1) To insure the proper and maximum usage by the JG-MSA of all US aid in ordnance (including electronics) equipment and supplies including recommendations on attainment of a state of military readiness.

TOP SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: Subject:

Note No.	From: G2 To: G3 Date: 2 June 1951
2 (Cont'd)	(2) To maintain a close follow-up to determine effectiveness with which the JG-MSA is carrying out those recommendations including application of corrective measures. b. Commander Naval Forces, Far East to have authority as follows: (1) To determine military security equipment requirements of the JG-MSA including on-board allowances of ordnance items. (2) To install all such equipment and orient JG-MSA personnel in its use and maintenance including storage of ordnance items. 7. G2 concurs in the proposals in reference message with the exception of COMNAVFE conducting limited training of JG-MSA personnel in habor defense duties. This does not preclude orientation in the use and maintenance of armament installations. 1 Incl JG-MSA Vessel Data - - - -

TOP SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

Lt Col Keller
26-8643

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No:

Subject: Prototype Installation of Guns and Electronic Equipment on Japanese Coast Guard Craft

Note No.	
1	From: G-3 To: ~~G-2~~ DS Date: 26 May 1951

1. Reference is made to COMNAVFE msg 250010 Z May, 1951.

2. From a G-3 standpoint the proposal in reference message is desirable.

3. Request your comments as a basis for appropriate recommendation to the Chief of Staff.

for Clark
E. K. W.

Mr. Sullivan 26-7695

From: DS To: G-3 Date: 28 May 1951

(2)

1. Although a proposed change in the National Policy, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in J.C.S. 1380/102 on 2 April 1951 and recommended for approval by the Secretary of Defense in a letter dated 26 April 1951, would permit the arming of Maritime Safety vessels manned by Japanese crews, DS is not aware that this policy has as yet been formally adopted.

2. Therefore, in the absence of such a change, arming now of the MSA vessels continuing under MSA control would appear to be in violation of current National Policy and would very likely precipitate an inopportune and possibly damaging controversy with FEC nations with whom delicate negotiations are currently in progress looking toward the early conclusion of a satisfactory Japanese peace treaty.

3. However, DS feels that these nations could have no rightful objection and that the National Policy would not be contravened if these prototype vessels were armed and equipped by SCAP under U.S. Navy control.

4. It is therefore suggested that the basic plan as advanced by COMNAVFE be adopted with the modification that the vessels, during the period of the installation and testing of the military type equipment, be placed under the control of the U.S. Navy and be operated on behalf of SCAP rather than the Japanese Government.

for W.J.S.

TOP SECRET

FEC AGO Form No 37

8116—FEC P&PC—11 50—100M

(2)

G3 TS "A" No 1026

TOP SECRET

G-3 Plans

JHK/rn
26 May 1951

MEMO FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Prototype Installation of Guns and Electronics Equipment on Japanese Coast Guard Craft.

1. BASIC: COMNAVFE msg 250010Z, May, 1951 which informs SCAP that CNO has authorized, subj to SCAP approval, a proposal to make initial installation of guns and electronic equipment on one (1) ship of each class Japanese Coast Guard craft currently under construction.

2. DISCUSSION: a. In Basic COMNAVFE assumes that the Japanese Coast Guard will discharge duties under the US Navy in event of general emergency. Basic also states that the approval of the proposed plan will enable development of complete materiel requirements and plans for a total of 43 craft involved, and that long range aspects of Sonar Procurement make early initiation of pilot installations necessary.

b. The Diplomatic Section and G-2 are vitally interested staff agencies and their comments are required as a basis for appropriate recommentdation to the CofS.

3. INDICATED ACTION: Checknote to DS and G-2 stating that from a G-3 standpoint the proposed action is desirable and requesting comments as a basis for appropriate recommendation to the CofS.

4. RECOMMENDATION: Initial proposed checknotes to the DS and G-2 and release to G-3 Admin for dispatch.

5. Classification: TOP SECRET. Basic is now classified SECRET. However, since prior correspondence on the subject of arming Japanese vessels has been classified TOP SECRET, NAVFE (Capt Farrin) was requested to upgrade Basic. Such action is being initiated.

6. COMPLETION: This does not complete action on G-3 Plans Division Case 5-51-79.

KELLER
26-8643

TOP SECRET

G3 TS "A" No 1026

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH

GHQ, SCAP, FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560
(TS-S)

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET
~~SECRET~~
DEFERRED

TLD/smt

25 May 51

FROM : COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO : SCAP TOKYO JAPAN

INFO : CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR TH, CNO WASH DC

NR : 250010 Z

CNO has authorized subject to SCAP approval a proposal to make initial installation of guns and appropriate electronic equipment on 1 ship each class Japanese coast guard craft currently under construction. Assuming Japanese coast guard will be assigned harbor defense and coastal patrol duties under US Navy in event general hostilities, important to complete planning to extent making prototype installations in 450 ton, 270 ton and 23 meter class craft. Cost equipment and installation to be borne by US Navy. Intend removing armament after installation and testing. Contemplate limited training Japanese crews in harbor defense duties after installations equipment, ships to remain under MSA Op Control during such training. SCAP approval foregoing will enable development complete material requirements and plans for total 43 craft involved. Long range aspects Sonar Procurement make early initiation pilot installations necessary.

NO SIG

ACTION : J-3
INFORMATION : CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, G-4, AG, JSPOG, TRANS

NOTE : This msg upgraded to TOP SECRET from SECRET per auth COMNAVFE msg 260122 Z.
NOTE : This msg recd direct from COMNAVFE via Courier.
ADDED DIST : DIPLOMATIC (28 May 51)
38620

DEFERRED
SECRET

TOO : 250010 Z
MCN : NONE

CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING
TOP SECRET

Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

COPY No. 56

TOP SECRET

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

GHQ, FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560 (13-5)
COPY 13

*045.9 (15-E)

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

CINCFE, APO 500

DATE TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
301445K June 1951	TOP SECRET

PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION	INFORMATION
	ROUTINE	

☐ BOOK MESSAGE ☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE

☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO

REFERS TO MESSAGE:

IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

TO:

COMNAVFE, No 1165

INFO:

(15-3)

1. Ref: a. CINCFE Msgform, AG 560 (10 Jun 51)GC-P, 10 June 51.

b. Letter, COMNAVFE, subj: Establishment of Fishing Patrol in East China Sea and Sea of Japan, 13 June 51.

2. Implementation of plan submitted by ref b will not be directed at this time. It is desired for planning purposes, however, that you submit an estimate of the minimum number of vessels that would be required to establish an effective patrol of the sensitive area southwest of 35° 00' North and 130° 00' East.

Distribution: C/S, G-2, G-3 (return), DS, NRS

M/R:

By ref b COMNAVFE submitted a plan (as directed by ref a) for the patrol of the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan for the purpose of protecting Japanese fishing vessels on the high seas. The CofS directed that the plan be held without action until the JCS has made a decision regarding the arming of Japanese vessels. The CofS further directed assurance be given COMNAVFE that no patrol action has been directed and to obtain from him a statement of the minimum number of vessels that could effectively patrol the sensitive area southwest of 35° North and 130° East. Msg is otherwise self-explanatory. Plans Div Case 6-51-3.

KELLER
26-8643

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
TOP SECRET	

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
	C A Barnes
SYMBOL: AG 560 (10 Jun 51)GC-P / TELEPHONE	OFFICIAL TITLE: C. A. BARNES, Lt Col, AGC, Asst Adj Gen

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-168, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

10472—FEC P&PC—2/51—40M

TOP SECRET

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: *(Originator)*

CINCFE, APO 500

DATE-TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
301445K Jun 51	Top Secret

PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION	INFORMATION
	ROUTINE	

☐ BOOK MESSAGE ☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE

☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO

REFERS TO MESSAGE:

IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

TO:

COMNAVFE, No 1165

INFO:

1. Ref: a. CINCFE Msgform, AG 560 (10 Jun 51)GC-P, 10 June 51.

b. Letter, COMNAVFE, subj: Establishment of Fishing Patrol in East China Sea and Sea of Japan, 18 June 51.

2. Implementation of plan submitted by ref b will not be directed at this time. It is desired for planning purposes, however, that you submit an estimate of the minimum number of vessels that would be required to establish an effective patrol of the sensitive area southwest of 35° 00' North and 130° 00' East.

Distribution: C/S, C-2, C-3 (return), DS, NRS

M/R:

By ref b COMNAVFE submitted a plan (as directed by ref a) for the patrol of the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan for the purpose of protecting Japanese fishing vessels on the high seas. The CofS directed that the plan be held without action until the JCS has made a decision regarding the arming of Japanese vessels. The CofS further directed assurance be given COMNAVFE that no patrol action has been directed and to obtain from him a statement of the minimum number of vessels that could effectively patrol the sensitive area southwest of 35° North and 130° East. Msg is otherwise self-explanatory. Plans Div Case 6-51-3.

KELLER
26-8643

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
Top Secret	

DRAFTER'S NAME (*and signature, when required*)	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
	C. A. BARNES Lt Col, AGC
SYMBOL: AG 560 (10 Jun 51)GC-P / TELEPHONE	OFFICIAL TITLE: Asst Adj Gen

DD FORM 1 OCT 49 173 REPLACES NME FORM 173, 1 MAY 49, WHICH MAY BE USED.

8408—FEC P&PC—12/50—

AG RECORDS
CAB
Jack

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CHECK SHEET~~

(Do not remove from attached sheets) Lt Col Keller, 26-8643

File No: Subject: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels

Note No. | From: G-3 To: CofS Date: 23 June 1951

1

1. COMNAVFE by basic forwards a plan (incl to basic) for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels on the high seas as directed by CINCFE in ref e to attached memorandum for record. The plan provides for the utilization of 18 vessels (10 DD's and 8 PF's). COMNAVFE comments on the plan indicate that it is undesirable inasmuch as it withdraws from support of Korean operations a sizeable proportion of the total destroyer (DD) and frigate (PF) strength available to COMNAVFE.

2. As an alternate solution COMNAVFE recommends that SCAP institute a program whereby the Japanese Government would be permitted to operate a coastal security service utilizing vessels suitably armed and Japanese manned. COMNAVFE recommends other measures involving: (1) The installation of communications equipment on Japanese ships and; (2) A requirement that they operate in groups for mutual protection. Current directives prohibit the arming of Japanese ships and the other recommended measures would appear to be of a passive nature and the probability of their effectiveness is questionable.

3. Notwithstanding the desirability of directing the entire effort of FEC forces to support of Korean operations the other missions of SCAP cannot be totally disregarded. The diversion of 18 ships from Korean operations is excessive and, it is believed, would materially affect the effectiveness of Naval support in Korea; however, it appears that a lesser number could be employed on patrol missions in connection with protection of Japanese fishing vessels and accomplish the following:

a. By their presence in sensitive areas offer a deterrent effect to illegal elements now or hereafter disposed to commit piracy.

b. Give evidence to the Japanese of the good intentions of the US Government and the unfailing interest of SCAP in discharging his responsibilities to the Japanese people.

4. For reasons stated herein and in the attached memorandum for record, it is recommended that the attached proposed message to COMNAVFE directing him to institute two patrols employing a maximum of four vessels at any one time be approved and returned to G-3 for preparation in final form.

6 25/20 S

2 Incls
1. Ppsd msgform
2. Memo for Record

for Lark
E. K. W.

5GS-650

FEC AGO Form No 37

~~TOP SECRET~~

8116—FEC P&PC—11/50—100M

G3 TS "A" No 1068

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: *(Originator)*

SCAP, APO 500

TO:

COMNAVFE, No 1165

INFO:

DATE-TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
PRECEDENCE FOR: ACTION: ROUTINE COURIER	INFORMATION
☐ BOOK MESSAGE	☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE
☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

1. Ref: Letter, COMNAVFE, subj: Establishment of Fishing Patrol in East China Sea and Sea of Japan, 18 June 51.

2. It is desired that COMNAVFE institute patrols earliest generally along routes proposed in the plan submitted by ref letter employing, however, a maximum of four vessels on station at any one time. It is recognized that this course of action falls appreciably short of the desirable; however, it is considered an acceptable minimum effort in support of SCAP's specific responsibility to protect Japanese fishing vessels from piracy on the high seas.

3. It is further desired that COMNAVFE:

a. Furnish SCAP an information copy of the implementing directive when published.

b. Keep CINCFE apprised (timing and frequency of reports as events and experience may indicate) of both the estimated relative efficacy of the patrols and impact thereof upon Korean operations.

Not used for

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
DRAFTER'S NAME (*and signature, when required*)	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
SYMBOL: AG 560 (10 Jun 51)GC-P	TELEPHONE / OFFICIAL TITLE

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-168, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0950, 1 APR 1945, WHICH MAY BE USED.

1042—FEC Printing Plant—2/50—[illegible]

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (*Originator*)
SCAP, APO 500

TO:
COMNAVFE, No 1165

INFO:

DATE-TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
PRECEDENCE FOR: ACTION: ROUTINE / COURIER	INFORMATION
☐ BOOK MESSAGE	☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE
☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

c. Recommend such changes in this directive as experience (i.e, para 3b, above) may indicate.

Distribution:
CofS
G-2
G-3 (return)
DS
NRS

CHIEF OF STAFF
APPROVED
_____
INITIALS ____

RECOMMEND APPROVAL: for Gailey
E.K.W.

Memo for Record

CINCFE by msgform AG 560 (10 Jun 51)GC-P directed COMNAVFE to prepare a patrol plan for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels on the high seas. By reference letter COMNAVFE submitted a plan proposing that patrols, consisting of a total of 9 vessels on station at all times, be instituted in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. COMNAVFE, however, considers that the diversion of any combatant vessels from support of Korean operations is undesirable. CINCFE's intention is to prosecute the Korean war with all available resources, however, his mission in connection with protection of Japanese vessels cannot be totally disregarded. Msg otherwise self-explanatory. Returned approved by the CofS on June 51, initialed " ". G-3 Plans Div Case 6-51-3.

KELLER 26-8643

DRAFTER'S NAME (*and signature, when required*)	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
SYMBOL: AG 560 (10 Jun 51)GC-P / TELEPHONE	OFFICIAL TITLE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET — PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-188, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

1042—FEC Printing Plant—2/50-300M

TOP SECRET

G-3 Plans

JHK/ajh
23 Jun 51

MEMO FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels

1. BASIC: Letter, COMNAVFE, subj: Establishment of Fishing Patrol in East China Sea and Sea of Japan, 18 June 51, which forwards a plan for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels (incl to basic).

2. REFERENCES: a. CINCFE msgform, AG 565 (15 Apr 51)GC-P, 15 Apr 51.

b. COMNAVFE msg 160856Z Apr.

c. CINCFE msgform, AG 560 (18 Mar 51)GC-P, 22 Apr 51.

d. Letter, COMNAVFE, subj: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels, 26 May 51.

e. CINCFE msgform, AG 560 (10 Jun 51)GC-P, 10 Jun 51.

3. DISCUSSION: a. Protection of Japanese fishing vessels has been the subject of much correspondence between CINCFE and COMNAVFE. Such protection is a definite responsibility of SCAP, which must be discharged utilizing resources available to him. At the present time the only resources available to SCAP for this purpose are the US Naval Forces of COMNAVFE. The Japanese Government is prohibited from arming Japanese vessels by the terms of surrender document and SCAP is likewise prohibited from so doing by current JCS directives.

b. On 15 April CINCFE by ref a directed COMNAVFE to submit a plan for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels and at the same time advised that the COMNAVFE proposed plan to utilize Japanese armed vessels manned by Japanese crews was not favorably considered. On 16 April COMNAVFE by ref b advised CINCFE that no US ships could be utilized for this purpose without an unacceptable reduction in the blockade force or carrier task forces. On 22 April CINCFE by ref c reaffirmed the requirement that COMNAVFE submit a plan as required by ref a. On 26 May COMNAVFE, by ref d, advised CINCFE that any plan to be effective would require a minimum of 12 suitable ships with a comparable reduction in the Naval support of Korean operations. COMNAVFE stated he did not believe it was CINCFE's intent to make such a reduction and again recommended that the CINCFE directive be amended to authorize the use of armed Japanese vessels manned by Japanese crews. Since COMNAVFE had not yet complied with the original directive, ref a, CINCFE on 10 June 51 reaffirmed the requirement and directed compliance within 7 days. On 18 June COMNAVFE submitted a plan (incl to basic) which in part provides for:

MEMO FOR RECORD: Continued
SUBJECT: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels

(1) One patrol in the East China Sea and one in the Sea of Japan.

(2) Utilization of a total of 18 vessels (10 DD's and 8 PF's).

(3) Patrol frequencies of 17½ hours for the East China Sea and 47 hours for the Sea of Japan.

c. COMNAVFE in his forwarding letter indicates that the plan is undesirable and provides additional information and comments thereon for consideration prior to his being directed to implement same. Salient features thereof are as follows:

(1) CINCPAC has indicated that no additional Naval forces will be provided COMNAVFE during the duration of the Korean emergency.

(2) The 18 patrol vessels provided for in his plan constitutes 37% of total US patrol type available to COMNAVFE and that the 10 DD's required would reduce the Korean blockade force by 50%.

(3) Vessels on this patrol would have little opportunity for inter-type training and their efficiency would consequently be reduced.

d. COMNAVFE recommends as an alternate solution to the employment of US ships other measures which are as follows:

(1) Require fishing vessels to operate in groups of 6 for mutual protection and equip them with 2-way communication equipment to provide timely warning to shore-control stations if attack was imminent.

(2) SCAP institute a program whereby Japanese Government would be permitted to operate a coastal security service utilizing armed Japanese manned vessels.

e. SCAP's responsibility for the protection of Japanese vessels on the high seas is real and continuing. On 2 separate occasions in recent months the Japanese Government has appealed to SCAP to take such measures as he considered appropriate to protect Japanese vessels, many of which were being seized and confiscated on the high seas. In this connection it is considered that SCAP has an inescapable responsibility and one which requires positive measures, even though they may not be 100% effective due to the required Naval support of Korean operations. COMNAVFE has consistently recommended as an alternate solution the employment of armed Japanese vessels manned by Japanese crews inspite of the fact that SCAP clearly stated on 15 April and reaffirmed thereafter that such was not

Declassified E.O. 11652 Section 3(E)

MEMO FOR RECORD: Continued
SUBJECT: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels.

favorably considered. It is obviously CINCFE's intention to prosecute the war in Korea with all his available sources; nevertheless, he cannot totally disregard his other responsibilities. With respect to the issue at hand, it appears reasonable that a very minimum number of US Naval vessels can be diverted from other operations for employment as necessary to protect Japanese fishing vessels without jeopardizing the effect of Naval support of Korean operations. In view of the foregoing it is considered appropriate to direct COMNAVFE to institute patrols for this purpose fixing the maximum number that will be on station at any one time. In this connection it is considered that one or two vessels in each of the two sensitive areas would accomplish the following: By their presence in sensitive areas offer a deterrent effect to illegal elements now or hereafter disposed to commit piracy; Give evidence to the Japanese of the good intentions of the US Government and the unfailing interest of SCAP in discharging his responsibilities to the Japanese people. Based on NAVFE stated requirements in the plan (incl to basic) for a total of 18 vessels to maintain 9 on station it would appear that a total of not to exceed 8 would be required to maintain 4 on station.

4. INDICATED ACTION: Directive to COMNAVFE to institute patrols in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan along the routes generally as described in the COMNAVFE Plan (incl 1 to basic) employing a maximum of 4 vessels at any one time.

5. RECOMMEND: G-3 initial draft proposed msgform to COMNAVFE and release to CofS for approval.

6. COMPLETION: This does complete action on G-3 Plans Div Case 6-51-3.

Keller
KELLER
26-8643

DPD

Declassified E.O. 11652 Section 3 (E)

TOP SECRET

G-3 PLANS

JHK/lg
29 Jun 51

ADDENDUM TO M/R:

1. DISCUSSION: A memo from SGS to G-3 returned the proposed action with a directive from the CofS to (a) Reassure COMNAVFE that no actual patrol action has been directed; (b) Obtain from COMNAVFE a statement of the minimum number of vessels which could patrol effectively the area southwest of point 35° North by 130° East; (c) Hold without other action until the JCS decision on the arming of Japanese patrol vessels has been received in GHQ. Inasmuch as it cannot be anticipated when JCS action on this matter will be taken it is appropriate to complete action on basic at this time and handle future matters on this subject separately. It is considered desirable to comply with the CofS directive contained in the aforementioned memo by a msgform to COMNAVFE and upon receipt of the desired statement to forward same to the CofS for his information.

2. INDICATED ACTION: Msgform to COMNAVFE reassuring him that no patrol action has been directed and requiring a statment of the minimum number of vessels that could effectively patrol the sensitive area southwest of 35° North and 130° East.

3. RECOMMENDED ACTION: G-3 initial self-explanatory msgform to COMNAVFE and release to G-3 Admin for dispatch.

4. COMPLETION: This can be considered as completing action on Plans Div Case 6-51-3. Future matters in this connection will be handled by separate action.

Keller
KELLER
26-8643
gp

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.3(b)

TOP SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets) Lt Col E.P.Smith 26-8643

File No: **Subject**: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels

Note No.	From: G-3 To: CofS Date: 17 Apr 51
1	1. CINCFE in ref j requested COMNAVFE plan for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels in the East China Sea area, utilizing a minimum number of suitable U. S. Naval vessels. 2. COMNAVFE in basic b states that U. S. Naval ships engaged in current operations provide such surveillance as can be accomplished in the routine performance of their duties. No U. S. ships can be assigned this patrol as a primary duty without unacceptable reduction in blockade force or carrier task forces. 3. For reasons brought out in the Supplemental and Basic Memorandum for Record, it is recommended that the attached proposed self-explanatory msg to COMNAVFE be approved. 1 Incl Ppsd msgform with assoc papers E. K. W.

RECEIVED
21 APR 1951
G-3

SGS 314

8116—FEC P&PC—11 50—100M

FEC AGO Form No 37

G3 TS "A" No 930

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Declassified DRB Records Search

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G-3 Plans

EPS/aj
10 Apr 51

MEMO FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels

1. BASIC: COMNAVFE msg 122348Z Mar 51 info CNO, CINCPACFLT, and COM Seventh Flt which suggests that steps be taken to defend fishing vessels from piracy on the high seas.

2. REFERENCES: See Tab A (attached).

3. DISCUSSION: a. COMNAVFE in basic points out that there have been continuing reports by Japanese fishing companies of the capture of Japanese fishing vessels of unarmed status while engaged in fishing in authorized areas of the East China Sea (numbering 49 vessels since May 1948), and that present naval commitments in the FEC preclude maintaining anti-piracy control with US Navy vessels. NAVFE suggests that steps be taken to permit the Japanese to defend themselves against piracy on the high seas either by a modification of the existing Japanese fishing inspection system such that it be composed of suitable type vessels armed with 50 caliber machine guns invested with the required policy power to protect fishing vessels from piracy or by such other method as is considered practical.

b. In ref b the Japanese government requests that SCAP take appropriate measures for the return of seized vessels and their crews and for the prevention of recurrence of these events.

c. General guidance provided by the CofS on the Basic was that G-3 would prepare a plan in coordination with NAVFE for the arming of suitable Japanese vessels (with the proviso that US personnel be placed aboard) for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels.

d. COMNAVFE in ref d (in reply to ref c) recommends the following interim solution to the problem of protecting the Japanese fishing vessels in the East China Sea from piracy:

(1) Two of the 700 ton and eight of the 450 ton Japanese patrol craft or such other similar vessels as available be temporarily transferred from the Coast Guard Section of the Maritime Safety Agency (now under supervisory jurisdiction of the Public Safety Division of the G-2 Section) to such Japanese Government agencies which would permit the use of these vessels when armed to patrol the Japanese fishing areas in the East China Sea.

(2) That these vessels on patrol be supervised by COMNAVFE through the appropriate Japanese agency in the same

TOP SECRET

manner as the Japanese mine sweepers that are now controlled by COMNAVFE through the Fair Way Safety Office of the Maritime Safety Agency.

(3) That COMNAVFE arm the craft (one 20mm and/or 50 cal machine gun fore and aft) and train the Japanese crew, augmenting the crews as required from selected Japanese ex-naval personnel.

(4) That this project be financed by the Japanese Government.

(5) That US personnel be placed aboard these craft only in the arming of the craft and in the initial training of the gun crews.

e. Dip Section in C/N 2 to G-3, ref e, does not concur in the proposed COMNAVFE plan to arm Japanese vessels for the protection of the Japanese fishing vessels since it regards such a move as politically unwise at this time. The proposed action not only appears to violate basic FEC and JCS directives on Japanese naval disarmament and publicly announced US commitments to its allies, but it could also be expected to cause alarm among certain friendly FEC nations with whom the US is currently endeavoring to reach an agreement concerning the conclusion of a non-restrictive peace treaty which would afford the Japanese maximum opportunity to protect themselves. The political repercussions would be particularly damaging in Australia where a general election campaign is in progress and where the question of the peace treaty and its relationship to a possible resurgence of Japanese militarism has already been deeply injected into partisan politics. To raise the specter of a reborn Japanese "Navy" would be to invite insistence upon restrictive measures in the treaty which would hamper Japanese ability to conduct naval rearmament and would be prejudicial to US long term interests in this area, or might cause a collapse of present US efforts to preclude a treaty in conformity with its concepts. Moreover, since the particular vessels mentioned in COMNAVFE plan were specifically designed and constructed for the MSA whose operations are confined to territorial waters, assignment to what is essentially a naval mission on the high seas would appear to constitute a contravention of SCAP directives and assurances made in the Allied Council for Japan. Dip Section considers that the problem of protection of Japanese fishing vessels should be met in such a manner as will not at this time raise great political considerations and recommends that as an interim measure, until such time as the Japanese may be permitted to rearm, that the fisheries patrol system be augmented to the maximum extent practicable and capable of effectively reporting violations of the fishery boundaries in both directions.

f. G-2 C/N 3, ref f, does not concur in the COMNAVFE proposed plan to use patrol craft of the Japanese Government Maritime Safety Agency since this will paralyze the effectiveness of the organization in life saving and law enforcement, resulting in greater ships lost by disaster than is reported by the few seizures possibly prevented and will require the Maritime Safety Agency to replace with and depend upon inadequate and highly unsatisfactory chartered vessels to perform emergency rescue involving danger to life and property.

g. Govt Section in C/N 4, ref g, does not concur in the proposed plan to arm Japanese vessels and place them under the command of purged ex-career naval personnel for patrol of high seas stating that the consequences of such an action would be naval conflict with the armed vessels of other powers maintaining units in the same waters. Any such action would invite the most violent representations by nations concerned of violation of existing FEC and Allied policy.

h. Ref h directed COMNAVFE to establish a surveillance patrol to prevent interference with Japanese fishing vessels on the high seas and established the general area for the patrol.

i. Ref i is the implementing action in which CINCFE directed CTG 96.5 to establish a surveillance patrol.

j. The action directed by ref h has not been rescinded, but has generally been overlooked due to the requirements incumbent on COMNAVFE as a result of the Korean conflict. While COMNAVFE in Basic states that present naval commitments in the FEC preclude maintaining anti-piracy patrols with U.S. Navy vessels and that it is not desirable to place US personnel on Japanese vessels for control purposes, it is evident that any armed vessel on patrol must be a vessel under SCAP control and manned at least to some extent by American personnel. It appears that the most feasible solution is to request NAVFE's plan to accomplish the protection through the use of suitable U. S. naval vessels. It is not believed that the utilization of minimum number of destroyers (or suitable U. S. vessels) on patrol duty as indicated herein will have a profound impact on the Korean effort. Further, a large percentage of seizures have been in the area of the East China Sea in which NAVFE is currently employed in discharging its responsibility towards Formosa.

4. INDICATED ACTION: A msg to NAVFE not favorably considering the NAVFE proposed plan for the protection of fishing vessels and requesting a plan utilizing U. S. naval vessels in patrolling the East China Sea area.

5. RECOMMENDATION: That the proposed msg to NAVFE be initialed by G-3 and forwarded to the CofS for approval.

6. COORDINATION: Dip Section - as indicated in ref e
G-2 PSD - as indicated in ref f
Govt Sec - as indicated in ref g

7. COMPLETION: This is an interim action and does not complete action on Basic. Plans Div Case 3-51-31B.

Smith

E. P. SMITH 26-8643

TOP SECRET

G-3 Plans

EPS/rn
15 Apr 51

ADDENDUM TO M/R

SUBJECT: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels

Returned approved by CofS 1915, 14 Apr 51. Initial "H". Put in final form and dispatched to AG, 15 Apr 51.

LANDRUM
26-8645

TOP SECRET

G3 TS "A" No 930

G-3 Plans

EPS/aj
17 Apr 51

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels

1. BASIC: b (added).

COMNAVFE msg NR 160856Z Apr 51 which states that no U. S. ships can be assigned the duty of surveillance of Japanese fishing vessels in the East China Sea area.

2. REFERENCES: (See Tab A attached).

j. (added). CINCFE Joint Msgform AG 565(15 Apr 51)GC-P which requested COMNAVFE plan for protection of Japanese fishing vessels in the East China Sea area.

3. DISCUSSION: See Basic Memo for Record

k. (added). In ref j CINCFE requests a plan for implementing patrols for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels utilizing a minimum of suitable U. S. naval vessels and confining surveillance to the East China Sea area.

l. In basic COMNAVFE states that U. S. Naval vessels engaged in current operations provide such surveillance as can be accomplished in the routine performance of their duties. No U. S. ships can be assigned this patrol as a primary duty without unacceptable reduction in blockade force or carrier task forces.

m. Recapitulation of background:

(1) COMNAVFE in basic a recommended that action be taken to provide protection for Japanese fishing vessels.

(2) Guidance from the CofS on basic a was that G-3 prepare a plan in coordination with NAVFE for the arming of suitable Japanese vessels (with the proviso that U. S. personnel be placed aboard) for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels.

(3) The COMNAVFE plan ref d states that the utilization of American personnel on Japanese vessels is not desirable and recommends a plan employing Japanese crews on armed Japanese vessels.

(4) Ref j (reply to ref d) states that the COMNAVFE plan is not favorably considered and requests a plan as outlined in para k preceding.

n. The protection of Japanese fishing vessels is a SCAP responsibility, and has been requested by the Japanese Government (ref b). NAVFE is the appropriate agency to discharge this responsibility. As indicated in the foregoing and the basic Memorandum for Record, it will be necessary to utilize suitable U. S. Naval vessels for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels. It is not considered that COMNAVFE has appropriately replied to ref j, or that if U. S. Naval vessels are not available in the FEC, the necessary number of vessels have been requested from CNO to discharge the existing SCAP responsibility.

o. Altho previous communications on this subject have had reference only to the East China Sea area it is now desired (Gen Wright) not to restrict responsibility for patrolling to a specific area.

4. INDICATED ACTION: A msg to COMNAVFE pointing out the SCAP responsibility for providing protection for Japanese fishing vessels and again directing a COMNAVFE plan.

5. RECOMMENDATION: That the proposed msg to COMNAVFE be initialed by G-3 and forwarded to CofS for approval.

6. COORDINATION: See Basic M/R.

7. COMPLETION: This is an interim action and does not complete action on Basic b. Plans Div Case 3-51-31C. Cross reference to Plans Div Case 3-51-31, 3-51-31A and 3-51-31B.

Smith

E.P.SMITH
26-8643

G-3 Plans

EPS/aj
11 Apr 51

BRIEF OF MEMO FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels

1. BASIC: COMNAVFE msg 122348Z Mar 51 which suggests that steps be taken to defend fishing vessels from piracy in the East China Sea area.

2. REFERENCES: As listed in Tab A (attached).

3. DISCUSSION: a. As a result of a series of communications between COMNAVFE and CINCFE, COMNAVFE proposed a plan for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels which recommended in substance that suitable armed Japanese vessels manned by Japanese crews patrol fishing areas in the East China Sea as anti-piracy protection.

b. The Dip Section, G-2 PSD, and Government Sections all non-concur in the proposed COMNAVFE plan stating that such a move is politically unwise at this time since it not only appears to violate basic FEC and JCS directives on Japanese Naval disarmament and publically announced U.S. commitments to its Allies, but could seriously interfere in peace negotiations dealing with the Japanese Peace Treaty. Additionally, armed Japanese vessels on the high seas could well lead to naval conflict with the armed vessels of other powers maintaining units in the same waters.

c. While COMNAVFE states the present naval commitments in the FEC preclude maintaining anti-piracy patrols with U. S. Naval vessels, and that it is not desirable to place U. S. personnel on Japanese vessels for patrol purposes, it appears that the most feasible solution is to request NAVFE to accomplish the protection through the use of suitable U. S. Naval vessels. It is not believed that utilization of a minimum number of suitable vessels will have a profound impact on the Korean effort. Further, a large percentage of seizures have been in the area of the East China Sea in which NAVFE is currently employed in discharging its responsibility towards Formosa.

4. INDICATED ACTION: Msg to NAVFE requesting action as indicated above.

5. RECOMMENDATION: That the proposed msg to NAVFE be initialed by G-3 and forwarded to CofS for approval.

6. COORDINATION: Dip Section as indicated in ref e.
G-3 PSD as indicated in ref f.
Government Sec as indicated in ref g.

7. COMPLETION: This is an interim action and does not complete action on Basic. Plans Div Case 3-51-31B.

Smith
E.P. SMITH 26-8643
CofS

LIST OF REFERENCES

a. TS Memo CNFE/A4-3 (26) Serial: 00048 from CofS COMNAVFE to ACofS, G-3, subj: Requirements for Patrol Type Naval Craft, dtd 12 Mar 51 in which NAVFE reiterates a recommendation for 15 mine sweepers and 10 PFs (frigates) for mine sweeping and patrol duties by the Japanese Coast Guard. (Not attached).

b. Ltr FOM No 472 (PG) from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to SCAP dated 9 Mar 51 subj: "Seizure of Japanese Fishing Vessels".

c. CINCFE Joint Msgform AG 560 (12 Mar 51)GC-P, 15 Mar 51 which requests COMNAVFE recommended plan for arming suitable Japanese craft to be employed in the protection of Japanese fishing boats.

d. COMNAVFE TS Letter Serial 0059, subj: Rearm Japanese Patrol Craft for Fishing Patrol, dtd 25 Mar 51, which contains COMNAVFE recommended plan for arming Japanese craft for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels.

e. C/N 2 from Dip Section which comments on ref c.

f. C/N 3 from G-2 PSD which comments on ref c.

g. C/N 4 from Government Section which comments on ref c.

h. CINCFE Joint Msgform AG 565 (21 June 50)GC-O to COMNAVFE which directs establishment of a surveillance patrol to prevent interference with Japanese fishing vessels from the high seas.

i. COMNAVFE Msg NR 220513Z June 50 to CTG 96.5 (at sea) which implements ref h.

File : A16-1

Serial : 000186

COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES, FAR EAST
NAVY No. 1165
F.P.O., SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560

JUN 18 1951

(TS-S)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

From: Commander Naval Forces, Far East
To: Commander in Chief Far East

Subj: Establishment of fishing patrol in East China Sea and Sea of Japan

Ref: (a) COMNAVFE Top Secret dispatch 122348Z of Mar 1951 - 560 (TS-S)
(b) CINCFE Top Secret msgform AG 560(12 Mar 51) GC-P of 12 Mar 1951 (15 MAR)(560 TS-S)
(c) COMNAVFE Top Secret ltr ser 00059 of 23 Mar 1951 - (25 MAR) - 560 (TS-S)
(d) CINCFE Top Secret msgform AG 565(15 Apr 51)GC-P of 15 Apr 1951 - 560 (TS-S)
(e) COMNAVFE conf dispatch 160856Z of Apr 1951 - 565 NR SEC
(f) CINCFE msgform AG 560(18 Mar 51)GC-P of 22 Apr 1951 - 560 (TS-S)
(g) COMNAVFE Top Secret ltr ser 00091 of 26 May 1951 - WE HAVE 00097 FILED 560 (TS-S)
(h) CINCFE Top Secret dispatch 101215K of June 1951 (IS MSGFORM) - 560 (TS-S)

Encl: (1) Recommended patrol plan East China Sea and Sea of Japan

1. By reference (a) Commander Naval Forces, Far East suggested that steps be taken to permit the Japanese to defend themselves against piracy on the high seas since the Navy's commitments in the Far East Command precluded maintaining an anti-piracy patrol with U. S. Naval vessels. Commander in Chief Far East in reference (b) requested a recommended plan for arming suitable Japanese craft, and the number required to maintain an effective patrol. Commander Naval Forces, Far East submitted in reference (c) a plan recommending that ten patrol boats of the Maritime Safety Agency be armed for this patrol. In reference (d) this plan was not favorably considered by Commander in Chief Far East, and a plan was requested utilizing a minimum number of U. S. Naval vessels. Commander Naval Forces, Far East advised Commander in Chief Far East by reference (e) that no U. S. Naval ships could be assigned this patrol as primary duty without unacceptable reduction in the blockading or carrier task forces. In references (f) and (h) Commander Naval Forces, Far East was informed that protection of Japanese fishing vessels from illegal seizures is a responsibility of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers which must be discharged by U. S. Naval Forces, Far East and directed a fishing patrol be established, either with current resources available or by additional craft made available by Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet. In accordance with this directive, enclosure (1) and appendices thereto are forwarded herewith as a recommended plan for the establishment of a patrol in the East China Sea and Sea of Japan for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels.

2. Before this patrol plan is implemented, directing the use of U. S. Naval forces, the following additional information is submitted:

a. That the Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet has indicated that he has provided the maximum number of U. S. Naval forces to be employed in the Far East during the indefinite duration of the Korean emergency.

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G3 TS "A" No 1068

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JUN 18 1951

b. There must necessarily be a "calculated risk" limit on the number of vessels employed in the Far East in order that U.S. Naval forces can be deployed in other parts of the world to meet any unannounced Communist aggression.

c. A total of eighteen vessels are required to provide an effective patrol of the fishing area boundary in the East China Sea and Sea of Japan, which would comprise 37% of the total U.S. patrol types available to Commander Naval Forces, Far East. Of this number there are a maximum of eight U.S. frigates which can be made available for this duty from the forces presently assigned Commander Naval Forces, Far East. The other five frigates currently in the Far East have been committed to other duties by directives of Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet. Since there are no other patrol types available, ten destroyers will be required to be withdrawn from Commander United Nations Blockading and Escort Force, reducing the patrol vessels available for enforcement of the Korean blockade by 50%. The number of vessels assigned to this anti-piracy patrol may be decreased if it is acceptable to increase the interval between ships along the patrol route, which would in turn directly decrease the effectiveness of the patrol.

d. That vessels on this patrol would have limited opportunity for inter-type training, thus reducing their efficiency in the event of a general emergency in the Far East.

3. Further, Commander Naval Forces, Far East recommends:

(1) To permit the Japanese fishing vessels to contribute to the prevention of piracy on the high seas, all Japanese fishing vessels operating in the China Sea should be equipped with reliable two-way medium-frequency communication equipment between ships and a central shore-control station, in order to provide early warning of imminent attacks.

(2) That the 800-odd Japanese fishing vessels operating in the East China Sea be directed to remain in groups of six or more for the mutual protection afforded by their numbers.

(3) That until such time as all fishing vessels have radio communications, one vessel in each group be equipped with reliable communication facilities.

(4) That the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, because of the urgent need for increasing the defensive and internal security capabilities of Japan, institute a program whereby the Japanese Government would be permitted to operate a coastal security service composed of vessels with appropriate armament and speed and manned by Japanese crews.

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JUN 18 1951

e. That, as rapidly as possible consistent with adequate training and indoctrination, this Japanese coastal security service take over the patrol.

f. That the patrol be taken over by the Japanese prior to the conclusion of the occupation.

4. Specifically answering paragraph 2 of reference (h), the following is submitted:

a. Alternate Concepts. Any number of alternate concepts can be developed in terms of varying patrol density and time frequency. The plan proposed is considered to utilize the minimum patrol effort consistent with adequate effectiveness. Reduction of numbers of ships required will in turn necessarily reduce the effectiveness of the patrol as it would then be necessary to either (1) increase the patrol interval or, (2) decrease the area patrolled.

b. Impact on current naval effort in Korea. The use of U. S. naval ships for this patrol will necessarily reduce the current naval effort in Korea. The withdrawal of eighteen vessels would require the complete reorganization of the Blockading and Escort Force.

c. Degree of deterrence to piracy. The proposed patrol should be an effective deterrent as it is laid out to cover the East China Sea, Sea of Japan, and La Perouse Strait portions of the fishing zone boundary, with concentrated coverage in the East China Sea area where a majority of the piracy has occurred. If the patrol interval is increased or the area covered by the patrol reduced in order to reduce the number of ships required, it is impossible to estimate the degree of deterrence. It would appear that establishment of Patrol Group B to provide coverage of East China Sea boundary area where most acts of piracy have occurred would afford a considerable degree of protection.

SCAP letter AG 800.217 of 8 July 1949 directed ComNavFE to instruct all vessels under his operational control, during the course of routine operation, to report to General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, any Japanese fishing boats observed outside of the authorized fishing areas. ComNavFE has complied, but as the primary mission of the units assigned to the Naval Force, Japan has been to support the occupation forces, and since 25 June 1950 to support the United Nations' effort in Korea, little success toward preventing the capture of Japanese fishing vessels has been achieved.

5. Insofar as the disparity between available and required forces is concerned, because of the requirements of the current Far Eastern situation, the gap between the forces available and the forces required is now greater than ever before, particularly in patrol types.

C. T. Joy

TOP SECRET

Copy to:
CINCPACFLT (with encl)

(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

PATROL PLAN FOR EAST CHINA SEA
AND SEA OF JAPAN

CONTENTS

1. Basic Patrol Plan.

   a. Organization.

   b. Patrol Area.

   c. Duration of Patrol and Number Ships Required.

2. Diagram of Operational Command.

3. Chart Showing Patrol Area.

4. Chart Showing Area of most Recent Captures.

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl #1

(1)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)

1. TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. Task Force Commander

(1) ABLE Group - ten patrol vessels.
(2) BAKER Group - eight patrol vessels.

b. Vessels assigned this patrol should have a cruising range of at least 3,000 miles at ten knots, and should be equipped with radar and suitable radio equipment. Types recommended as most suitable are PF, PC, or PGM. Since there are no PC's or PGM's available in the Far East, PF's will have to be used initially.

2. GENERAL SITUATION: Because of the many seizures of Japanese fishing vessels in the East China Sea by armed Chinese junks and the threat of seizure by unlawful elements in the Sea of Japan, the Japanese Government has appealed directly to the Allied Powers that appropriate measures be taken by U. S. Naval Forces to protect those fishing vessels.

a. Mission: To prevent the illegal seizure of Japanese fishing vessels within authorized fishing areas in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan, and to enforce the provisions of SCAPIN 2046 (SCAP authorized fishing areas).

b. Assumptions: That illegal seizures of Japanese fishing boats will continue to exist in the East China Sea, the threat of seizure will continue to exist in the Sea of Japan, and that Japanese fishing boats will continue to operate outside the authorized SCAP fishing area unless the area is effectively patrolled. Further, that unlawful elements will continue not to respect the authorized fishing boundaries as established by SCAPIN 2046.

3. THIS FORCE WILL:

a. Patrol the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan in order to prevent attacks and illegal seizure of Japanese fishing vessels (see Tab A).

b. Insure that Japanese fishing vessels operate in authorized areas and do not violate authorized fishing boundaries as established by SCAP.

c. Render assistance as required to Japanese fishing vessels in distress.

4. PATROL AREA:

a. All ships will be based in Sasebo.

b. ABLE Group.

(1) Will commence patrolling at point SUGAR, 34-00N 128-40E, and will patrol the line defined by the following points:

ABLE	33-00N	127-40E
TARE	34-45N	129-10E
UNCLE	40-00N	135-00E
VICTOR	45-30N	140-00E
XRAY	45-30N	145-00E

and return

(1)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b) NARS Date

(2) Total distance of one complete circuit is 2,346 miles. The distance from Sasebo to point SUGAR is 85 miles. Each ship will make one complete circuit, steaming a total of 2,516 miles and remaining at sea for ten and one-half days.

(3) Five ships on patrol at a time will give a patrol frequency of 47 hours, which is considered adequate for this area.

c. BAKER Group:

(1) Will commence patrolling at point ABLE, 33-00N 127-40E, and will patrol ten miles to starboard of line defined by the following points:

BAKER	32-30N	125-00E
CHARLIE	27-00N	123-00E

(2) Total distance of one circuit for BAKER through DOG is 700 miles. The distance from Sasebo to point BAKER is 260 miles. Each vessel will make three complete circuits before returning to port, thereby steaming 2,620 miles and remaining at sea for eleven days.

(3) For an effective patrol of this area, a minimum of four vessels will be required on patrol at one time which, with a speed of ten knots, will give a patrol frequency of 17½ hours.

5. REQUIREMENTS:

a. The total minimum requirements to maintain the patrols discussed in paragraph 4 are eighteen patrol vessels. Nine will be on patrol at all times, two in port with about eighteen days availability, and the remaining seven either enroute to or from the patrol area or in port for a short logistic and upkeep period.

b. Communications will be in accordance with separate Annex. Communication channels will be provided whereby patrol vessels will have a common channel. In addition, a channel will be provided between patrol vessels and fishing vessels, plus one additional channel to provide necessary communications to other U. S. forces.

c. Logistic support, repairs, collection of information, and liaison will be accomplished at Sasebo prior to departing port.

CHAIN OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND-----PIRACY PATROL-----EAST CHINA SEA AND SEA OF JAPAN



B2

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG No.



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11594

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 113094

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 115041

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 115041

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 115094



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 115041

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11594

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. [illegible]



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 11094



A.M.S. 1201

First Edition (AMS 1), 1945; (AMS 2), 1945.

Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers by the Army Map Service (AM); U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
Compiled in 1945 from Long Range Air Navigation Charts, 1:3,000,000, AAF, 1944.
Roads in China are not revised.

L

Cities .....

Small Cities .....

Towns & Villages .....

Boundaries, International

Boundaries, Province (Chi

Railroads .....

Surveyed Streams and Sh

Unsurveyed Streams and

Distance in Nautical Mil

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. [illegible]

MAKURAZAKI

Sata-misaki

NISHINOOMOTE

TANEGA-SHIMA

Ōsumi-gunto

6847

Yaku-shima

425

TŌKARA-GUNTO

440

NANSEI-SHOTŌ

(RYUKYU ISLANDS)

NASE

2293

AMAMI-Ō-SHIMA

2107

Tokuno-shima

Okinoerabu-shima

1648

30°

124° 125° 126° 127° 128° 129° 130° 131° 132° 133°

SHANGHAI TO OKINAWA 440 MILES

SASEBO TO OKINAWA 425 MILES

TOKYO TO OKINAWA 840 MILES

PHILIPPINE

LEGEND

Cities .....

Small Cities .....

Towns & Villages .....

Boundaries, International .....

Boundaries, Province (China only) .....

Railroads .....

Surveyed Streams and Shorelines .....

Unsurveyed Streams and Shorelines .....

Distance in Nautical Miles 620

ALTITUDE TINTS

FEET

12000

6000

3000

1000

0

NOTE: OFFICER
TO THEIR ATTEN

THIS MAP IS

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 115041



Scale 1:4,350,000

MERCATOR PROJECTION
WITH STANDARD PARALLEL 26°30'

NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL MARK HEREON CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND MAIL DIRECT TO THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

UDE TINTS

FEET
12000
6000
3000
1000
0

HEIGHTS IN FEET

THIS MAP IS NOT DESIGNED FOR OPERATIONAL FLYING

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11094



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CTION
LEL 26°30'

RRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME
OF ENGINEERS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FEET

OR OPERATIONAL FLYING

INDEX TO SHEETS



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 115041



ARMY MAP SERVICE, U. S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., 141090
1945
8-45

TO SHEETS

JAPAN

N2630-E12000/2830x3000

STATUS OF FISHING BOATS CAPTURED OR PURSUED IN THE EAST CHINA SEA

(FROM JAN 1951 TO APRIL 1951)



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. ____

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. _____

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11564

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560

TOP SECRET (TS-S)

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

CINCFE, APO 500

DATE TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
101215K Jun 51	Top Secret

PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION	INFORMATION
	PRIORITY COURIER	

☐ BOOK MESSAGE ☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE

☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO

REFERS TO MESSAGE:

IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

TO:

COMNAVFE, NAVY NO 1165

INFO:

560 (TS-S)

Ref: COMNAVFE ltr, subj: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels, 26 May 51.

341 (TS-P)

1. CINCFE is aware (CX 62309 dtd 12 May 51) of the disparity between available and required forces, but notes that this disparity is currently far less than it was on and prior to 25 June 50 and that there has been no change in SCAP's responsibility to protect Japanese fishing vessels from piracy.

2. The requirement for a plan is reaffirmed, and it is desired that the plan be submitted not later than (7 days from DTG, this msg). In view of the limited available means and COMNAVFE's comments in the referenced letter, it is essential that CINCFE be provided a basis for decision; accordingly, it is further desired that the plan include:

a. Several alternate concepts in terms of patrol density and time frequency, and

b. For each alternate concept:

(1) The estimated impact on the current Naval effort in Korea, and

(2) The degree of deterrence to piracy it is reasonable to anticipate.

Officer Courier 10 Jun 51
Hand Carried by Capt R.F. Whitman HQ-yf

TOP SECRET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
Top Secret	

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

SYMBOL	TELEPHONE	OFFICIAL TITLE
AG 560 (10 Jun 51)GC P		

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-168, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

10472—FEC P&PC—2/51—40M

00016

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. [illegible]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560

TOP SECRET (75-5)

ROUTING

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

CINCFE, APO 500

DATE TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
101215K Jun 51	Top Secret
PRECEDENCE FOR: ACTION PRIORITY COURIER	INFORMATION
☐ BOOK MESSAGE	☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE
☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

TO:

COMNAVFE, NAVY NO 1165

INFO:

560 (15-5)

Ref: COMNAVFE ltr, subj: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels, 26 May 51.

561 (15-P)

1. CINCFE is aware (CX 62309 dtd 12 May 51) of the disparity between available and required forces, but notes that this disparity is currently far less than it was on and prior to 25 June 50 and that there has been no change in SCAP's responsibility to protect Japanese fishing vessels from piracy.

2. The requirement for a plan is reaffirmed, and it is desired that the plan be submitted not later than (7 days from DTG, this msg). In view of the limited available means and COMNAVFE's comments in the referenced letter, it is essential that CINCFE be provided a basis for decision; accordingly, it is further desired that the plan include:

a. Several alternate concepts in terms of patrol density and time frequency, and

b. For each alternate concept:

(1) The estimated impact on the current Naval effort in Korea, and

(2) The degree of deterrence to piracy it is reasonable to anticipate.

Officer Courier 10 Jun 51
Hand Carried by Capt R.F. Whitman
HG-4

TOP SECRET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
Top Secret	
DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
SYMBOL: AG 560 (10 Jun 51)GC P	TELEPHONE
	OFFICIAL TITLE: K. B. BUSH, Brigadier General, USA, Adjutant General

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-168, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

10472—FEC P&PC—2/51—40M

00016

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11594

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

ROUTING

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

TOP SECRET

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

DATE TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret
10 June 1951	
PRECEDENCE FOR: ACTION: PRIORITY COURIER	INFORMATION
☐ BOOK MESSAGE	☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE
☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

FROM: (Originator)

CINCFE, APO 500

TO:

COMNAVFE, NAVY NO 1165

INFO:

Dist:
C/S
G-2
G-3 (return)(9)
DS
NRS

Memo for Record:

560 (15 Apr 51)

By CINCFE msgform AG 565 (16 Apr 51)GC-P, 15 Apr 51, COMNAVFE was directed to prepare a plan for implementing patrols for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels in the East China Sea area, utilizing a minimum number of US Naval vessels. COMNAVFE replied in his msg 160856Z Apr that no US ships could be assigned such patrols as a primary duty without unacceptable reduction in blockade force or carrier task force. CINCFE msgform AG 560 (18 Mar 51)GC-P, 22 Apr 51 advised COMNAVFE that protection of Jap fishing vessels from piracy is a SCAP responsibility that must be discharged by NAVFE with forces assigned or additional forces made available by CNO. COMNAVFE was again directed to prepare a plan for implementing patrols to protect Jap fishing vessels; however the area of surveillance was not limited to the East China Sea. In reference a, instant msgform, COMNAVFE advises CINCFE that any paln to be effective would require a minimum of 12 ships with a consequent reduction in Naval support of Korean operations. He states that he has been advised by CINCPACFLT that all operations in the Far East must be conducted by currently assigned forces. COMNAVFE concludes that he does not believe it is CINCFE's intent that COMNAVFE make such a reduction in the Naval effort in Korea and recommends as a solution

560 (15 Apr 51)

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret; PAGE OF PAGES
	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
SYMBOL / TELEPHONE	OFFICIAL TITLE

TOP SECRET

AG 560 (10 Jun 51)GC-P

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-168, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990. 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

10472—FEC P&PC—2/51—40M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11504

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

TOP SECRET

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

DATE-TIME GROUP: 16 June 51	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret
PRECEDENCE FOR: ACTION: PRIORITY COURIER	INFORMATION
☐ BOOK MESSAGE	☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE
☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

FROM: (Originator)
CINCFE, APO 500

TO:
COMNAVFE, NAVY NO 1165

INFO:

Memo for Record (continued)

the arming of Jap vessels of the MSA for use as patrol craft. SCAP has previously made known his decision not to arm Jap vessels. Msg otherwise self-explanatory.

Approved by CofS 9 June 51, initials "H". Plans Div Case No 5-51-78.

KELLER
26-8643

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret	PAGE OF PAGES
DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
SYMBOL: AG 560 (10 Jun 51)GC-P	TELEPHONE
	OFFICIAL TITLE

TOP SECRET

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-168, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

10472—FEC P&PC—2/51—40M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11024

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

ROUTING

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

CINCFE, APO 500

TO:

COMNAVFE, NAVY NO 1165

INFO:

DATE-TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
101215K Jun 51	Top Secret
PRECEDENCE FOR: ACTION: PRIORITY COURIER	INFORMATION
☐ BOOK MESSAGE	☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE
☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

Ref: COMNAVFE ltr, subj: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels, 26 May 51.

1. CINCFE is aware (CX 62309 dtd 12 May 51) of the disparity between available and required forces, but notes that this disparity is currently far less than it was on and prior to 25 June 50 and that there has been no change in SCAP's responsibility to protect Japanese fishing vessels from piracy.

2. The requirement for a plan is reaffirmed, and it is desired that the plan be submitted not later than (7 days from DTG, this msg). In view of the limited available means and COMNAVFE's comments in the referenced letter, it is essential that CINCFE be provided a basis for decision; accordingly, it is further desired that the plan include:

a. Several alternate concepts in terms of patrol density and time frequency, and

b. For each alternate concept:

(1) The estimated impact on the current Naval effort in Korea, and

(2) The degree of deterrence to piracy it is reasonable to anticipate.

AG FILES

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
Top Secret	
DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: K. B. BUSH
SYMBOL: AG 560 (10JUN51)GC-P	TELEPHONE
	OFFICIAL TITLE: Brigadier General, USA Adjutant General

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-168, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

1042—FEC Printing Plant—2/50—30096

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11084

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

DATE-TIME GROUP: 101215K Jun 51 (2 June 1951)	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret
PRECEDENCE FOR: ACTION: PRIORITY COURIER	INFORMATION
☐ BOOK MESSAGE	☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE
☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

FROM: (Originator)

CINCFE, APO 500

TO:

COMNAVFE, NAVY NO 1165

INFO:

Dist:
C/S
G-2
G-3 (return)(9)
DS
NRS

Memo for Record:

By CINCFE msgform AG 565 (16 Apr 51)GC-P, 15 Apr 51, COMNAVFE was directed to prepare a plan for implementing patrols for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels in the East China Sea area, utilizing a minimum number of US Naval vessels. COMNAVFE replied in his msg 160856Z Apr that no US ships could be assigned such patrols as a primary duty without unacceptable reduction in blockade force or carrier task force. CINCFE msgform AG 560 (18 Mar 51)GC-P, 22 Apr 51 advised COMNAVFE that protection of Jap fishing vessels from piracy is a SCAP responsibility that must be discharged by NAVFE with forces assigned or additional forces made available by CNO. COMNAVFE was again directed to prepare a plan for implementing patrols to protect Jap fishing vessels; however the area of surveillance was not limited to the East China Sea. In reference a, instant msgform, COMNAVFE advises CINCFE that any paln to be effective would require a minimum of 12 ships with a consequent reduction in Naval support of Korean operations. He states that he has been advised by CINCPACFLT that all operations in the Far East must be conducted by currently assigned forces. COMNAVFE concludes that he does not believe it is CINCFE's intent that COMNAVFE make such a reduction in the Naval effort in Korea and recommends as a solution

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret	PAGE OF PAGES
	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	
SYMBOL: AG 560 / 10JUN51 / GC-P	TELEPHONE	OFFICIAL TITLE

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-188, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

1042—FEC Printing Plant—2/50—300M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. [illegible]

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: *(Originator)*

CINCFE, APO 500

DATE-TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
101215K Jun 51	Top Secret

PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION	INFORMATION
	PRIORITY COURIER	

☐ BOOK MESSAGE ☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE

☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO

REFERS TO MESSAGE:

IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

TO:

COMNAVFE, NAVY NO 1165

INFO:

Memo for Record (continued)

the arming of Jap vessels of the MSA for use as patrol craft. SCAP has previously made known his decision not to arm Jap vessels. Msg otherwise self-explanatory.

Approved by CofS 9 June 51, initials "H". Plans Div Case No 5-51-78.

KELLER
26-8643

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PAGE OF PAGES
Top Secret	

DRAFTER'S NAME (*and signature, when required*)

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

SYMBOL	TELEPHONE	OFFICIAL TITLE
AG 560 10JUN51)GC-P		

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-168, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

1042—FEC Printing Plant—2/50—30000

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG No: [illegible]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
TOP SECRET
CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets) Lt Col Keller, 26-8643

File No: Subject: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels

Note No. 1 | From: G-3 To: CofS Date: 2 June 1951

1. On 15 April 51, COMNAVFE was directed to submit a plan for implementing anti-piracy patrols for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels utilizing a minimum number of suitable U.S. Naval vessels and confining the surveillance to the East China Sea. On 16 April, COMNAVFE replied that no U.S. ships could be assigned this duty without an unacceptable reduction in blockade or carrier task forces. On 22 April, CINCFE advised COMNAVFE that the protection of Japanese fishing vessels is a SCAP responsibility which must be discharged by NAVFE, utilizing his current resources or additional vessels made available by CNO. The area of surveillance was not limited to the East China Sea in this directive. On 26 May, COMNAVFE advised CINCFE by letter that any plan to be reasonably effective would require a minimum of 12 suitable ships with a consequent reduction in Naval support of Korean operations. CINCFE was also advised that CINCPACFLT informed COMNAVFE that all operations in the Pacific must be conducted using forces currently assigned. COMNAVFE concluded that he did not believe it was CINCFE's intent to make such a reduction and recommended as a solution the arming of Japanese vessels under the MSA* for use as patrol vessels.

2. SCAP has previously decided not to permit the arming of Japanese vessels; neither does CINCFE desire a material reduction in Naval support in Korea. However, since the SCAP mission of protecting Japanese fishing vessels is continuing, and since COMNAVFE has not yet submitted the plan originally directed on 15 April, it is considered necessary to reaffirm the previous CINCFE directives in this matter and to establish an early suspense date so that CINCFE will have a basis for decision. It is to be noted that NAVFE, with a prewar strength of only one cruiser and four destroyers, maintained an acceptable patrol.

3. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that the CofS approve the draft proposed messageform to COMNAVFE and return to G-3 for preparation in final form.

2 Incls
1. Ppsd Msgform
2. M/R with atchd papers

*Maritime Safety Agency ---------- E. K. W. ----------

AG File Cy

EKW

6 4/85

G3 TS "A" No 1025

2411—FEC Printing Plant—4/50—100M
SGS 538

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11094

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: *(Originator)*

CINCFE, APO 500

DATE-TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET
PRECEDENCE FOR: ACTION PRIORITY / INFORMATION COURIER	
☐ BOOK MESSAGE	☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE
☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

TO:

COMNAVFE, NAVY NO 1165

INFO:

Ref: COMNAVFE ltr, subj: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels, 26 May 51.

~~1. SCAP decision not repeat not to arm Japanese vessels is reaffirmed.~~

1. CINCFE is aware (CX 62309 dtd 12 May 51) of the disparity between available and required forces, but notes that this disparity is currently far less than it was on and prior to 25 June 50 and that there has been no change in SCAP's responsibility to protect Japanese fishing vessels from piracy.

2. The requirement for a plan is reaffirmed, and it is desired that the plan be submitted not later than (7 days from DTG, this msg). In view of the limited available means and COMNAVFE's comments in the referenced letter, it is essential that CINCFE be provided a basis for decision; accordingly, it is further desired that the plan include:

a. Several alternate concepts in terms of patrol density and time frequency, and

SGS 538

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DRAFTER'S NAME (*and signature, when required*)	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	
SYMBOL AG ( )GC-P	TELEPHONE	OFFICIAL TITLE

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-188, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0993, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

9673—FEC Printing Plant—11/49—240M

JCS TS "A" No 1025

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11594

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (*Originator*)

CINCFE, APO 500

DATE-TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
2 June 1951	TOP SECRET
PRECEDENCE FOR: ACTION PRIORITY- COURIER	INFORMATION
☐ BOOK MESSAGE	☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE
☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

TO:

COMNAVFE, NAVY NO. 1165

INFO:

b. For each alternate concept:

(1) The estimated impact on the current Naval effort in Korea, and

(2) The degree of deterrence to piracy it is reasonable to anticipate.

Dist:
C/S
G-2
G-3 (return)
DS
NRS

CHIEF OF STAFF APPROVED as amended 6/9/51 INITIALS

RECOMMEND APPROVAL: E. K. W.

GC-P JHK/lg
2 June 1951

MEMO FOR RECORD:

By CINCFE msgform AG565(15 Apr 51)GC-P, 15 Apr 51, COMNAVFE was directed to prepare a plan for implementing patrols for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels in the East China Sea area, utilizing a minimum number of US Naval vessels. COMNAVFE replied in his msg 160856Z Apr that no US ships could be assigned such patrols as a primary duty without unacceptable reduction in blockade force or carrier task force. CINCFE msgform AG 560(18 Mar 51)GC-P, 22 Apr 51 advised COMNAVFE that protection of Jap fishing vessels from piracy

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET

DRAFTER'S NAME (*and signature, when required*)

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

SYMBOL AG 56 ( )GC-P

TELEPHONE

OFFICIAL TITLE

DD FORM 1 OCT 49 173 REPLACES NME FORM 173, 1 MAY 49, WHICH MAY BE USED.

8408—FEC P&PC—12 50—600M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11594

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (*Originator*)

CINCFE, APO 500

TO:

COMNAVFE, NAVY NO. 1165

INFO:

DATE-TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
2 June 1951	TOP SECRET
PRECEDENCE FOR: ACTION PRIORITY-COURIER	INFORMATION
☐ BOOK MESSAGE	☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE
☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

Memo for Record: (Cont'd)

is a SCAP responsibility that must be discharged by NAVFE with forces assigned or additional forces made available by CNO. COMNAVFE was again directed to prepare a plan for implementing patrols to protect Jap fishing vessels; however the area of surveillance was not limited to the East China Sea. In reference a, instant messageform, COMNAVFE advises CINCFE that any plan to be effective would require a minimum of 12 ships with a consequent reduction in Naval support of Korean operations. He states that he has been advised by CINCPACFLT that all operations in the Far East must be conducted by currently assigned forces. COMNAVFE concludes that he does not believe it is CINCFE's intent that COMNAVFE make such a reduction in the Naval effort in Korea and recommends as a solution the arming of Jap vessels of the MSA for use as patrol craft. SCAP has previously made known his decision not to arm Jap vessels. Msg otherwise self-explanatory. Plans Div Case No. 5-51-78.

KELLER
26-8643

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET | PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DRAFTER'S NAME (*and signature, when required*)

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

SYMBOL AG ( )GC-) | TELEPHONE | OFFICIAL TITLE

DD FORM 1 OCT 49 173 REPLACES NME FORM 173, 1 MAY 49, WHICH MAY BE USED.

8408—FEC P&PC—12/50—600M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11504

TOP SECRET

G-3 Plans

JHK/lg
2 June 1951

MEMO FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels

1. BASIC: Ltr, COMNAVFE, subj: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels, 26 May 51..

2. REFERENCES: a. CINCFE msgform AG 565 (15 Apr 51)GC-P, 15 Apr 51, (attached).

b. COMNAVFE msg 160856Z Apr 51, (attached).

c. CINCFE msgform AG 560 (18 Mar 51)GC-P, 22 Apr 51, (attached).

d. Ltr, COMNAVFE, subj: Rearming Japanese Patrol Craft for Fishing Patrol, 25 Mar 51, (attached).

e. CINCFE msg CX 62309 DTG 120251 Z May, (attached).

3. DISCUSSION: a. By ref a COMNAVFE was directed to prepare a plan for implementing patrols for protection of Japanese fishing vessels, utilizing a minimum of suitable US naval vessels and confining surveillance to East China Sea area.

b. In ref b COMNAVFE replied to the CINCFE directive, ref a, stating that US naval ships engaged in current operations provide such surveillance as can be accomplished in the routine performance of their duties, and that no US ships can be assigned this patrol as a primary duty without unacceptable reduction in blockade forces or carrier task forces.

c. By ref c CINCFE advised COMNAVFE that protection of Japanese fishing vessels from piracy is a SCAP responsibility which must be discharged by NAVFE, either with current resources or additional craft made available by CNO, and again directed the preparation of a plan to institute patrols for such protection by utilizing a minimum of suitable US naval vessels.

d. Basic is in reply to the CINCFE directive, ref c, and states that COMNAVFE has investigated the problem, finding that any plan, to be reasonably effective in the accomplishment of the CINCFE directive, would require a minimum of twelve suitable ships. CINCPACFLT has advised COMNAVFE that all operations in the Far East must be conducted using currently assigned forces, hence any ships assigned to such a patrol must be at the expense of the current US effort in Korea. COMNAVFE consequently recommends that the CINCFE directive, ref c, be revised to permit the employment, after installation of suitable armament, of vessels available to the MSA; patrols by those vessels could be under COMNAVFE operational control or such other control as SCAP desires.

TOP SECRET

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CS TS "A" No 1025
SGS 538

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11594

e. It is not CINCFE's intent to denude naval forces engaged in support of Korean operations by assigning a substantial portion thereof to the anti-piracy patrol mission. However, in view of SCAP's responsibility in this matter, suitable protection must be afforded. Current JCS directives preclude the arming of Japanese naval vessels. The alternative of employing Japanese vessels with one or two US naval personnel assigned thereto was considered undesirable by COMNAVFE for reasons stated in ref d. It is believed that COMNAVFE could institute periodic patrols of those waters in which NAVFE forces are not now operating, utilizing a minimum number of ships without jeopardizing the naval effort in Korea. Such periodic patrols would have the deterrent effect required to accomplish this mission. Additional protection is provided as indicated in ref b, where COMNAVFE states that US naval ships engaged in current operations provide such anti-piracy surveillance as can be accomplished in the routine performance of their duties. It is mandatory in any event that COMNAVFE submit his plan together with his estimate of the effect it will have, if implemented, on Naval support of Korean operations so that CINCFE will have a basis for decision.

4. INDICATED ACTION: Msgform to COMNAVFE reaffirming the CINCFE directive contained in ref c and requiring that the plan be submitted 7 days from the DTG, accompanied by an estimate of the effect its implementation will have on the naval effort in support of Korean operations.

5. COORDINATION: G-2 - Col Malone
DS - Mr Sullivan.

6. CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret, since all correspondence on the subject has previously been so classified.

7. RECOMMENDATION: G-3 initial proposed msgform to COMNAVFE and release to G-3 Admin for dispatch.

8. COMPLETION: This does not complete action on G-3 Plans Div Case 5-51-78.

Keller
KELLER
26-8643
GP

DTG
E.O.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11094

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG_____

(03)/WHB/lcj

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560

(TS-S)

PS/S73
00097

MAY 26 1951

TOP SECRET

From: Commander Naval Forces, Far East
To: Commander in Chief, Far East

Subj: Protection of Japanese fishing vessels

560 (TS-S)

Ref: (a) CINCFE Joint Message Form AG-560 (18 March 1951) GC-P dtd 22 April 1951

1. Reference (a) states that protection of Japanese fishing vessels is a SCAP responsibility which must be discharged by Naval Forces, Far East either with current resources or by additional craft made available by the Chief of Naval Operations and directs that Commander Naval Forces, Far East forward a plan for implementing patrols for protection of Japanese fishing vessels by utilizing a minimum of suitable U. S. naval vessels.

2. COMNAVFE has investigated the problem and any plan to be reasonably effective in the accomplishment of the above would require a minimum of 12 suitable ships. Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet has informed COMNAVFE that all operations in the Far East must be conducted using currently assigned forces. Hence, any ships assigned to such a patrol must be at the expense of the current U. S. effort in Korean waters.

3. It is not believed to be CINCFE's intent that COMNAVFE make such reduction in the U. S. Navy effort in Korea. As a possible solution to the problem of protecting Japanese fishing vessels, it is recommended that reference (a) be revised to permit the employment, after installation of suitable armament, of vessels currently available and building for the Maritime Safety Agency; patrols by these vessels could be under COMNAVFE operational control or such other control as SCAP desires.

C. T. JOY

A.G.O. 13
GHQ-FEC
RECEIVED

AG RECORDS COPY
DATE 26 May 51
Action: G-3
Info: —
By: RCH Per:

TOP SECRET

Copy no. 2

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 11594

TOP SECRET

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560
(TS-5)

22 APR 51 ROUTINE (COURIER)

CINCFE, APO 500

COMNAVFE, NAVY NO. 1165

CINCFE Msgform 21 Jun 50 CONFIDENTIAL
CINCFE Msgform 15 Apr 51 TOP SECRET
COMNAVFE msg 160856Z Apr TOP SECRET

References: a. CINCFE Msgform AG 565 (21 Jun 50)GC-O.

b. CINCFE Msgform AG 565 (15 Apr 51)GC-P.

c. COMNAVFE Msg NR 160856Z Apr 51.

Protection of Japanese fishing vessels from piracy is a SCAP responsibility which must be discharged by NAVFE either with current resources or by additional craft made available by CNO. Considering the foregoing, desire plan for implementing patrols for protection of Japanese fishing vessels by utilizing a minimum of suitable U.S. naval vessels.

Distribution:

CinC (2)	G-4
CofS (4)	Dip
G-2	JSPOG
G-3 (return7)	NRS

M/R: 22 Apr 51

Above self-explanatory msg is an interim action on the protection of Japanese fishing vessels. Approved by CofS 4-21-51, initials "H". Plans Div Case 3-51-31C.

E.P. SMITH
26-8643

1 1

K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

AG 560 (18 Mar 51)GC-P TOP SECRET

CY #19 OF 19 CYS

AG Records

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. [redacted]

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

CINCFE, APO 500

DATE-TIME GROUP

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET

PRECEDENCE FOR: ACTION: ROUTINE (COURIER) | INFORMATION

☐ BOOK MESSAGE | ☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE

☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS | CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO

REFERS TO MESSAGE:

IDENTIFICATION | CLASSIFICATION

TO:

COMNAVFE, NAVY NO. 1165

INFO:

References: a. CINCFE Msgform AG 565 (21 Jun 50)GC-O.

b. CINCFE Msgform AG 565 (15 Apr 51)GC-P. - 75

c. COMNAVFE Msg NR 160856Z Apr 51.

Protection of Japanese fishing vessels from piracy is a SCAP responsibility which must be discharged by NAVFE either with current resources or by additional craft made available by CNO. Considering the foregoing, desire plan for implementing patrols for protection of Japanese fishing vessels by utilizing a minimum of suitable U. S. naval vessels.

RECOMMEND APPROVAL: E.K.W.

Distribution:

CinC (2)	G-4
CofS (4)	Dip
G-2	JSPOG
G-3 (return)	NRS

M/R: Above self-explanatory msg is an interim action on the protection of Japanese fishing vessels. Plans Div Case 3-51-31C.

E.P.SMITH 26-8643

CHIEF OF STAFF APPROVED 4/21 INITIALS

RECEIVED 21 APR 1951 GHQ, FEC

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET | PAGE 1 OF 16 PAGES

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required) | RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

SYMBOL: AG 560 (18 Mar 51)GC-P | TELEPHONE | OFFICIAL TITLE: SGS 314

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-168, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

7816—FEC Printing Plant—8-49—

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNBS Ltr

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560
(TS-S)

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

CINCFE, APO 500

DATE-TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
15 April 1951	Top Secret
PRECEDENCE FOR: ROUTINE (COURIER)	INFORMATION
☐ BOOK MESSAGE	☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE
☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

TO:

COMNAVFE, Navy No. 1165 (AG-OX 15 4/6.)

INFO:

References:

a. COMNAVFE Msg 122348Z Mar 51. 560 (TS-S)

b. CINCFE Joint Msgform AG 560 (12 Mar 51) GC-P. 560-(TS-S) DTD 15 MAR 51

c. COMNAVFE Ltr Serial 00059 0059, subj: Rearm Japanese Patrol Craft for Fishing Patrol, 25 Mar 51. 560 (TS-S)

d. CINCFE Joint Msgform AG 565 (21 Jun 50) GC-O.

Proposed plan contained in ref c not favorably considered. Request plan for implementing patrols for protection of Japanese fishing vessels as directed in ref d, utilizing a minimum of suitable U. S. Naval vessels and confining surveillance to East China Sea area.

Distribution: CinC, CofS (4), G-2, G-3(return), G-4, Dip, JSPOG, Compt, Trans

M/R: Above self-explanatory msg is an interim action on ref c which recommends that Armed Japanese vessels with Japanese crews be utilized as protection for the Japanese fishing fleet. Approved by CofS 14 April 51. Initial "H". G-3 Plans Div Case No. 3-51-31B.

AG-GX

DISPATCHED 15 APR 1951 GHQ-FEC A.G.O.

for
for E. P. SMITH
26-8643

DRAFTER'S NAME (and signature, when required)	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Top Secret	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	10
SYMBOL AG 565 (15 Apr 51) GC-P	TELEPHONE	OFFICIAL TITLE K. B. BUSH Brigadier General, USA Adjutant General

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-168, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

6390—FEC P&PC—10/50—50M

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)

TOP SECRET

15APR51

CINCFE, APO 500

ROUTINE (COURIER)

COMNAVFE, Navy No. 1165

References:

a. COMNAVFE Msg 122348Z Mar 51.

b. CINCFE Joint Msgform AG 560 (12 Mar 51) GC-P.

c. COMNAVFE Ltr Serial 0059, subj: Rearm Japanese Patrol Craft for Fishing Patrol, 25 Mar 51.

d. CINCFE Joint Msgform AG 565 (21 Jun 50) GC-O.

Proposed plan contained in ref c not favorably considered. Request plan for implementing patrols for protection of Japanese fishing vessels as directed in ref d, utilizing a minimum of suitable U. S. Naval vessels and confining surveillance to East China Sea area.

Distribution: CinC, CofS (4), G-2, G-3(return), G-4, Dip, JSPOG, Compt, Trans

M/R: Above self-explanatory msg is an interim action on ref c which recommends that Armed Japanese vessels with Japanese crews be utilized as protection for the Japanese fishing fleet. Approved by CofS 14 April 51. Initial "H". G-3 Plans Div Case No. 3-51-31B.

for E. P. SMITH
26-8643

1 1

K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

AG 565 (15APR51) GC-P

TOP SECRET

CJ3 TS "A" No 894

File Reading Copy

Declassified E.O. 12065 Sec. 3.5

TOP SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

Lt Col E. P. Smith 26-8643

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: Subject: Protection of Japanese Fishing Vessels

Note No.	From: G-3	To: CofS	Date: 11 Apr 51

1

1. As a result of a series of communications between COMNAVFE and CINCFE, COMNAVFE proposed a plan for the protection of Japanese fishing vessels which recommended in substance that suitable armed Japanese vessels, manned by Japanese crews, patrol fishing areas in the East China Sea as anti-piracy protection.

2. The Dip Section, G-2 PSD, and Govt Section all non-concur in the proposed COMNAVFE plan, generally, because of the political dangers inherent therein.

3. For reasons brought out in the attached Memorandum for Record, it is recommended that the proposed message to NAVFE, not favorably considering the proposed NAVFE plan and directing the submission of a plan utilizing U. S. naval vessels in patrolling the East China Sea area, be approved.

1 Incl
draft msg and assoc
papers

E. K. W.

4-11
18 F

SGS 287

FEC AGO Form No 37

G3 TS "A" No 894

8116—FEC P&PC—11 50—100M

TOP SECRET

ROUTING

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: *(Originator)*

CINCFE, APO 500

TO:

COMNAVFE, Navy No. 1165

INFO:

DATE-TIME GROUP	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET
PRECEDENCE FOR: ACTION: ROUTINE (COURIER)	INFORMATION
☐ BOOK MESSAGE	☐ ORIGINAL MESSAGE
☐ MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPRECAUTION ☐ YES ☐ NO
REFERS TO MESSAGE:	
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION

References:

a. COMNAVFE Msg 122348Z Mar 51.

b. CINCFE Joint Msgform AG 560 (12 Mar 51)GC-P.

c. COMNAVFE Ltr Serial 0059, subj: Rearm Japanese Patrol Craft for Fishing Patrol, 25 Mar 51.

d. CINCFE Joint Msgform AG 565 (21 Jun 50)GC-O.

Proposed plan contained in ref c not favorably considered. Request plan for implementing patrols for protection of Japanese fishing vessels, as directed in ref d, utilizing a minimum of suitable U. S. Naval vessels and confining surveillance to East China Sea area.

Distribution: CinC, CofS (4), G-2, G-3(return), G-4, Dip, JSPOG, Compt, Trans

M/R: Above self-explanatory msg is an interim action on ref c which recommends that Armed Japanese vessels with Japanese crews be utilized as protection for the Japanese fishing fleet.

CHIEF OF STAFF
APPROVED
4/14
INITIALS

4-11
188

E. P. SMITH 26-8643

RECOMMEND APPROVAL: E.K.W.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
DRAFTER'S NAME (*and signature, when required*)	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
SYMBOL: AG ( )GC-P	TELEPHONE
	OFFICIAL TITLE: DRAFT

NME FORM 1 MAY 49 173 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 11-188, 15 JUN 1945, AND WD AGO FORM 0990, 1 APR 1946, WHICH MAY BE USED.

1042—FEC Printing Plant—2/50—300M

SGS 287

MAR 25 1951

RAN:ll:gld

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 560

(TS-S)

00059

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

From: Commander Naval Forces, Far East
To: Commander in Chief Far East

Subj: Rearming Japanese Patrol Craft for Fishing Patrol

Ref: (a) CINCFE Top Sec ltr AG560 (12 Mar 51) GC-P
(b) ComNavFE Top Sec dispatch 122348Z Mar 51
(c) ComNavFE Top Sec memo ser 00048 of 12 Mar 51
(d) ComNavFE Conf dispatch 090318Z Mar 51

1. Reference (a) requested Commander Naval Forces, Far East, to recommend a plan for arming suitable Japanese craft for protection of Japanese fishing boats. It further requested correlation of these recommendations with those on patrol craft requirements previously recommended by Commander Naval Forces, Far East, in reference (c).

2. Reference (c) concerns Commander Naval Forces, Far East basic recommendations for patrol vessels to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, GHQ, Far East Command. All subsequent recommendations, such as for weather vessels and fishing patrol craft, concern specific uses to which the recommended craft could be assigned, and are not intended to involve additional vessels. Thus, of the ten frigates recommended in reference (c) to be turned over to the Japanese Government, five of these were, by reference (d), recommended for use as ocean weather station vessels. Reference (d) further requested the Chief of Naval Operations to approve the demilitarization and loan of these five vessels to the Japanese Government under SCAJAP control. In the meantime, since almost a year will be required to make the inactivated frigates operable, and since a fishing patrol is required now, the plan submitted in subsequent paragraphs involves the use of Japanese patrol craft now available to the Maritime Safety Agency.

3. The Coast Guard section of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency has, under supervisory jurisdiction of the Public Safety Division, G-2 Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command, two 15 knot, 700 ton, and nine 15 knot, 450 ton radio and radar equipped patrol craft. These types are suitable and recommended for mounting one 20 mm and/or .50 caliber machine gun forward and aft. These mounts are now available at Fleet Activity Yokosuka. Commander Naval Forces, Far East can, with approval of the Chief of Naval Operations, if so directed by Commander In Chief Far East, make these mounts available for installation on board the patrol craft. Installation of the guns could be made at Yokosuka under the supervision of Commander Naval Forces, Far East, or they could be turned over to designated Japanese authorities for installation in Japanese shipyards.

TOP SECRET

COMNAVFE 44 00059

MAR 25 1951

RAN:ll:gld

4. Commander Naval Forces, Far East has supervisory jurisdiction over the Fairway Safety Office of the Maritime Safety Agency. This office operates 27 minesweeping vessels plus an assortment of miscellaneous small craft. Because of their age, slow speed, poor stability, short cruising range, and because they are performing necessary minesweeping in Japanese waters, these craft are neither suitable nor available for fishing patrol duties. However, in the Fairway Safety Office, there are over one thousand Japanese ex-naval personnel. From this group of officers and men, a nucleus could be provided, to augment crews on the patrol craft. This would be desirable in order to have experienced personnel aboard each patrol vessel.

5. At first thought it would appear that the assignment of one or two U.S. naval personnel (qualified in Navigation and Gunnery) aboard each of these armed patrol vessels might be beneficial, it might be argued that Japanese crews could not be trusted implicitly, and serious consideration has been given to so employing naval personnel. If this were done an American interpreter would of course, also be required on each vessel, since if the Japanese Commanding Officer on these vessels could not be relied upon to carry out his mission independently, neither could a Japanese interpreter be trusted. Such American interpreters assigned to the U.S. Navy are not available in this theatre. In addition to the foregoing, the assignment of any U.S. personnel to duty aboard such Japanese patrol vessels is deemed undesirable and is not recommended for the following reasons:

a. Lavatory and head facilities.

b. Messing facilities.

c. Peculiar indigenous menus.

d. Storage facilities for food.

e. Berthing facilities.

Accordingly it is recommended that American personnel not be so employed.

6. The following interim solution to the problem of protecting Japanese fishing vessels in the East China Sea area from piracy, is recommended:

a. Two of the 700 ton and eight of the 450 ton Japanese patrol craft or such other similar vessels as available be temporarily transferred from the coast guard section of the Maritime Safety Agency to such Japanese Government Agency which would permit the use of these vessels, when armed as recommended above, to patrol the Japanese fishing areas in the East China Sea.

b. That these vessels on patrol be supervised by Commander Naval Forces, Far East through the appropriate Japanese Agency in the same manner as the Japanese minesweepers are now controlled, by Commander Naval Forces, Far East through the Fairway Safety Office of the Maritime Safety Agency.

00059

MAR 25 1951

RAN:ll:gld

TOP SECRET

c. That Commander Naval Forces, Far East arm the craft and train the Japanese crews, augmenting the crews as required from selected Japanese ex-naval personnel.

d. That this project be financed by the Japanese Government.

e. That U.S. personnel be employed aboard these craft only in the arming of the craft and in the initial training of the gun crews.

C. T. JOY

Copy to:
CNO
CINCPACFLT