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
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MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN STARK

Stark's
Independent Command

AT

Bennington

By HERBERT D. FOSTER WITH THE COLLABORATION
OF THOMAS W. STREETER

WITH

REMINISCENCES OF GENERAL STARK

ELD. JAMES RANDALL

GEN. JOHN STARK

ROBERT R. LAW

THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON

DR. WILLIAM O. STILLMAN

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The Battle of Bennington

By DR. WILLIAM O. STILLMAN

The following extracts are taken from an address delivered by Dr. Stillman before the New York Historical Association at its annual meeting in the court house at Lake George, August 16, 1904. The parts omitted consist mainly of his plea for a monument in New York state to commemorate the battle.—*Editor.*

TO-DAY is the anniversary of an heroic battle of the American Revolution, which marked the turning point in that memorable contest which has stood for so much in the annals of the world. For the first time the untried and untrained settlers, fighting for home and liberty, prevailed decisively against the veteran legions of Europe. Hitherto this had been deemed an impossibility. It is the conquering of such impossibilities which always brings glory.

As the result of the bloody conflict on the banks of the Walloomsac on that "memorable day," the Americans captured according to the statement of General Stark, their commander, in his report to General Gates, dated August 22, 1777, seven hundred prisoners (including the wounded) and counted two hundred and seven of enemy dead on the field of battle. Stark stated his own losses to have been "about forty wounded and thirty killed."

When we consider that Burgoyne gave one thousand and fifty as the total British force engaged in this battle under Cols. Baum and Brayman, and that the Americans captured or killed over nine hundred men, and seized several hundred muskets and all the British cannon, the overwhelming character of the victory is apparent. Its importance was, however, greater in its moral than in its immediate physical effects.

Lord George Germain, the British Minister in charge of the war in the States, characterized Burgoyne's raid toward Bennington as "fatal" to the English and pronounced it as "the cause of all the subsequent misfortunes." General Burgoyne, in his review of the evidence produced at the inquiry before the House of Commons (see *A State of the Expedition from Canada*, as laid before the House of Commons, by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, published London, 1780, page 108) indignantly denies the force of this charge, saying that it was "a common accident of war, independent of any general action, unattended by any loss that could affect the main strength of the army, and little more than a miscarriage of a foraging party." He scouts the idea that it could "have been fatal to a whole campaign." General Burgoyne seems to have forgotten that he had written to Lord George Germain, long before, a letter marked "private," from his camp at Saratoga, under date of August 20, 1777, in which he said, "In regard to the affair of Saintcoick (Walloomsac), . . . Had I succeeded, I should have effected a junction with St. Leger, and been now before Albany. . . . Had my instructions been followed . . . success would probably have ensued, misfortune would certainly have been avoided. I did not think it prudent, in the present crisis, to mark these circumstances to the public so strongly as I do in confidence to your Lordship." There is more to the same effect.

If this stroke of fortune brought consternation to the English it brought hope and happiness to the Colonists. "One more such stroke," said Washington when informed of the defeat of the royalists, "and we shall have no great cause for anxiety as to the future designs of Britain." In writing Putnam he expressed the hope that New England would rise and crush Burgoyne's entire army. It is a curious instance of Washington's almost prophetic instinct that he had been longing for just this sort of a misfortune to seize the enemy, for on July 22, 1777, he had written to General Schuyler: "Could we be so happy as to cut off

one of his (Burgoyne's) detachments, supposing it should not exceed four, five or six hundred men, it would inspirit the people and do away much of their present anxiety. In such an event they would lose sight of past misfortunes, fly to arms and afford every aid in their power."

The battle on the Walloomsac aroused a patriotic furor throughout the states. Jefferson called it "the first link in the chain of successes which issued in the surrender at Saratoga."

Within three days General Schuyler wrote Stark: "The signal victory you have gained, and the severe loss the enemy have received, cannot fail of producing the most salutary results." Within a week the bells were ringing in Boston and Philadelphia, and the whole people devoutly gave thanks for this interposition of Divine protection. St. Leger, the British general beleaguering Fort Stanwix on the far off Mohawk, also heard of it, and in spite of his bloody victory at Oriskany Creek, slunk off to the St. Lawrence. His dream of conquest and of the occupancy of Albany was ended. The gifted Baroness Riedesel, in Burgoyne's camp wrote: "This unfortunate event paralyzed at once our operations."

The effect of this great victory, on the Continental soldiers, was marvelous. The brave and daring Vermont troops, under Cols. Warner and Herrick, were emboldened to attack the royalists at Lake George Landing, with the result that the vessels were captured which might have afforded Burgoyne's army escape to Canada. Recruits began to flock to the Federal army on the upper Hudson. The New England troops soon joined them. The British depots of supplies of provisions were sought out and raided. Gradually the condition of the king's army grew more and more desperate. A thousand men lost at Walloomsac reduced their forces from 7,000 to 6,000, and the 4,000 Continental soldiers facing them was rapidly increased under the benign influences of success to nearly 17,000 men (16,942 as given in General Gates' statement of October 16, 1777).


It will thus be seen that the battle on the Walloomsac was undoubtedly the turning point of British success in America. It gave the prestige and caused the delay of a month in Burgoyne's movements, which were necessary to make Gates' army strong enough to resist him. It made possible the great victory at Saratoga which determined the destinies of a continent and is ranked along with Marathon and Hastings as one of the fifteen great battles of the world.

* * * * *

The naming of battles goes largely, like the naming of babies, by favor and accident. At the Bennington anniversary on the year following the contest, the occurrence was referred to by the secretary of the celebration as the "battle at Bennington," and it soon passed into history as such. Bennington was the nearest large settlement and the plans for defense centered there. There were no large towns near at hand in New York. Had a celebration been held near the scene of the strife in this state soon after this event, I doubt not it would have been christened the Battle of Walloomsac," just as Oriskany was named after the adjacent stream and Saratoga after the village close to which that fight occurred. It is a curious thing that neither Stark nor Burgoyne were accustomed to refer to the battle as that of Bennington. Stark several times characterized it, as I have indicated in the title selected for this address, as the "battle at Walloomsac," and Burgoyne more than once has referred to it as the "affair at Saint Coicks Mill," or plain "Saint Coicks," which was the spot where the first skirmish began and last fight ended.

While New Hampshire furnished the commanding general, the sagacious and brave Stark, and more than half the troops, Massachusetts and Vermont divided the remaining part not so very unequally between them. New York furnished the battle field and a very considerable

sprinkling of men besides. It should be borne in mind that every available man from that part of New York State was with the main American army before Burgoyne. Poor New York at this period was distracted. She was



being ground between the upper and nether millstones at Saratoga and New York. King George III, on July 20, 1764, by royal decree had declared that what is now Vermont was part of the Province of New York. Before that it had been by common consent considered a part of New

Hampshire. From 1765 to 1777 there had been a most bitter legal war, oftentimes threatening serious bloodshed, between the people of this section and the authorities in New York, who regarded the revolt against the King's grant as unwarranted. It was a sadly mixed quarrel with varying right and wrong on our part.*

On January 15, 1777, Vermont declared her independence and soon after adopted her present name, having first chosen New Connecticut, which was soon abandoned. She was therefore in a state of open rebellion against New York, and had declared herself a fourteenth State, which was not, however, as yet recognized by the other thirteen of the United States.

In spite of this New York treated her with marked consideration. Colonel Warner and his regiment of Vermonters, which were a regular part of the Continental army, were ordered by General Schuyler, of New York, to protect his home territory, in an order previous to July 14, 1777. On July 15, General Schuyler sent to Colonel Warner an order for clothing for his troops in Vermont, of which they were very much in need, and also \$4,000 for their pay, which was all he could spare from his depleted treasury. On July 16, General Schuyler in writing Ira Allen, Secretary of the Vermont Council of Safety, stated that he had ordered Colonel Simmonds (who had some 400 or 500 men under him) from Massachusetts to his assistance. On the same date General Schuyler wrote to Colonel Warner, "I am this moment informed by Captain Fitch that the New Hampshire militia are marching to join me. It is (not) my intention, much as I am in want of troops, that they should come hither, as it would expose the country in that quarter to the depredations of the enemy. I therefore enclose you an order for them to join you." Thus the gallant Stark, whose name was even then a thing to conjure with, through

*See Vermont Grants, Vol. 5 of *Granite State Magazine*.

the generosity of New York's wise General, the noble Philip Schuyler, came to the rescue of Vermont and saved the day at Walloomsac. Local differences were forgotten in the desire for the common good. Stark and Warner soon after the battle joined the main continental army on the Hudson. The services of Col. John Williams and his party, from New York State, who offered their services to Vermont at the time of the fight should not be forgotten.

I have ventured to devote some little attention to the relation of New York to this famous battle, with an explanation of conditions which should make clearer the important part she played and the powerful forces which controlled and limited her action. Her position has been at times misunderstood if not misrepresented.

These were truly times which tried men's souls. The territory involved in the war was honeycombed with treachery and defection. A straw was liable to turn the tide either way at this pivotal moment. If Baum had retired on his reserves at the proper time it is doubtful whether Stark's forces could have overcome the enemy before Burgoyne had given reinforcements in force as promised.

If Baum's expedition had been delayed two or three days, Stark would in all probability have joined Schuyler and success would have crowned the British efforts. If Baum had pushed rapidly forward two days sooner, he would have found the patriots unprepared, have secured his provisions, and have completed his raid to Connecticut and Albany with success. St. Leger would not have been frightened off on the Mohawk, and Burgoyne would have forced his victorious march to Albany as anticipated. The destinies of a Continent were in the balance, and fortune and chance were playing a desperate game. Conditions were so bad that when the Vermont Council made its appeal to New Hampshire for assistance there was a perceptible chance of the entire state going over to the royalists. The Vermont Council used these significant

words: "Our good disposition to defend ourselves and make a frontier for your State with our own cannot be carried into execution without your assistance. Should you send immediate assistance we can help you, and should you neglect till we are put to the necessity of taking protection '(from the King's government)' you readily know it is in a moment out of our power to assist you." The die would have been cast. Vermont would have been obliged to have sworn allegiance to the English king or have been given over as the spoils of war to plunder. Sections had already accepted such protection.


Such was the condition of things when the battle on the Walloomsac was fought. Truly great events turn on small hinges. Shall we, the inheritors of the benefactions of these auspicious happenings, refuse to erect a monument in gratitude and patriotism to mark the spot where despotism in this favored land received a fatal blow and liberty became for our valiant sires something more than a hopeless dream.



CATAMOUNT TAVERN

Stark's Independent Command at Bennington

By HERBERT D. FOSTER, with the Collaboration of THOMAS W.
STREETER

N THE 18th of July, twelve days after the Americans abandoned Fort Ticonderoga, there was laid before the General Court of New Hampshire a vigorous appeal to aid "the defenceless inhabitants on the frontier" of Vermont, who "are heartily disposed to Defend their Liberties . . . and make a frontier for your State with their own." "You will naturally understand that when we cease to be a frontier your state must take it," was the shrewd hint with which Ira Allen closed his letter. Seldom has there been made a speech with clearer vision and more immediate and lasting effect than was made on that day by Speaker John Langdon. In four ringing sentences, he put "At the service of the State" his worldly goods of those days—"hard money," "plate," and "Tobago Rum." Then he added this prophecy:

"We can raise a brigade; and our friend Stark, who so nobly sustained the honor of our arms at Bunker's Hill, may safely be entrusted with the command, and we will check Burgoyne."

With this pledge and prophecy, New Hampshire began her share in the campaign which made Bennington and Saratoga possible. On that same day the first part of the prophecy was fulfilled by the election of John Stark as Brigadier General. Before a month had passed, "our friend Stark" had fulfilled the remainder; he had raised a brigade, and he had "checked Burgoyne" at Bennington.

How the Battle of Bennington was won is an interesting tale; but it has been told often and well, by the victors, by the vanquished, by the critics of both, and finally by the critics of one another. The object of this paper, therefore, is not to describe the battle, but rather to show how there came to be an American force at Bennington capable of fighting any battle.

A score of the participants in the battle, and more than a score of the participants in what we may venture to call the campaign of Bennington, have left us fragments of the story. These fragments, printed and unprinted, have been collected by the writers of this article and put together into a daily record from the pen of the participants—American, British, and German. These contestants reveal, in their sequence, the actions and motives of both parties in the struggle. Their combined daily record sheds somewhat more of the white light of truth, or at least the gray light of history, on the causes and results of Stark's Independent Command, which proved such a vital factor in the campaign. From the participants we may hope to glean a clearer and therefore juster idea of why the independent command was granted by New Hampshire; second, how it enabled Stark to carry out the sound strategy once planned by Schuyler, always approved by Washington, and fortunately insisted upon by Stark and the Vermont Council; and third, how it was regarded by Stark's fellow soldiers and citizens, by the Continental officers, and by Congress.

On the 18th of July, after John Langdon's speech, New Hampshire, under extraordinary circumstances took unusual action which gave rise to much discussion and criticism. The General Court appointed "the Hon^{ble} William Whipple Esq." and "the Hon^{bl} John Stark Esq." Brigadier Generals, and voted "that the said Brigadier Generals be always amenable for their conduct to the General Court or Committee of Safety for the time being." It is the omission that is significant: Stark was not made

"amenable" to Congress, to the officers of the Continental Army, or to continental regulations.

The reasons which led New Hampshire to give Stark this independent command are set forth clearly in an unpublished letter of Josiah Bartlett, written a month after the battle was fought. Bartlett was a member of the General Court which appointed Stark, and of the New Hampshire Committee of Safety which gave him his instructions; and after the Battle of Bennington, he was sent to advise Stark. Bartlett was also a Colonel in the New Hampshire militia, had twice represented his state in Congress, and later was to serve her as a Chief Justice and as Governor. Because of his intimate knowledge of state affairs, his wide experience, and his sound judgment, the following opinions are entitled to unusual confidence.

"I am much Surprized to hear the uneasiness Expressed by the Congress at the orders given him, [Stark] by this state; I think it must be owing to their not Knowing our Situation at that time. The Enemy appeared to be moving down to our frontiers and no man to oppose them but the militia and Col. Warners Regiment not Exceeding 150 men, and it was impossible to raise the militia to be under the Command of Gen^{ls} in whom they had no Confidence, and who might immediately call them to the Southward and leave their wives and families a prey to the enemy: and had Gen^l Starks gone to Stillwater agreeable to orders; there would have been none to oppose Col Baum in carrying Gen^l Burgoine's orders into Execution: No State wishes more Earnestly to keep up the union than New Hampshire, but Surely Every State has a right to raise their militia for their own Defence against the Common Enemy and to put them under such Command as they shall think proper without giving just cause of uneasiness to the Congress. As to the State giving such orders to Gen^l Starks, because he had not the rank he thought himself entitled to, (which seems to be intimated) I can assure you is without foundation and I believe never

entered the mind of any of the Committee of Safety who gave the orders; however I hope by this time the Congress are convinced of the upright intentions of the State and the propriety of their conduct. . . .”

No more convincing statement of the reasons for granting the independent command could be given to-day. The only query is: do the facts substantiate Bartlett's statements as to the causes and results of the independent command?

The statement as to the lack of confidence in the generals of the Northern Department is only too amply substantiated. “The people are disgusted, disappointed and alarmed,” wrote the New York Council of Safety on the 27th of July, to the New Hampshire Committee of Safety. To General Putnam even more explicitly they wrote: “The evacuation of Ticonderoga appears to the Council highly reprehensible . . . absurd and probably criminal.” “I . . . agree with you,” replied the Chairman of the New Hampshire Committee, “that the loss of Ticonderoga, in the manner it was left, has occasioned the loss of all confidence, among the people in these parts, in the general officers of that department.” The investigations by Congress, the letters of Washington, John Adams, Samuel Adams, Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., Van Cortlandt, and of less known soldiers and civilians show that the distrust was deep and widespread. Schuyler himself, the commander of the Northern Department, finding himself at Fort Edward “at the head of a handful of men—not above fifteen hundred,” and “the country in the deepest consternation,” wrote to Washington: “what could induce the general officers to a step which has ruined our affairs in this quarter, God only knows.” The loss of confidence was the more dangerous because known and reckoned on by the enemy. Philip Skene, Burgoyne's Tory adviser, wrote to Lord Dartmouth on the 15th of July: “The men want confidence in their officers and their Off^{rs} in their men.” “The King,” says Walpole, “on receiving the

account of taking Ticonderoga, ran into the Queen's room crying, 'I have beat them! beat all the Americans!'

There may have been much prejudice and misunderstanding involved in the distrust of the general officers, and in the case of Schuyler there undoubtedly was, for he has been amply vindicated as a brave and capable officer accomplishing a thankless task under peculiarly difficult circumstances. The distrust was, however, so widespread and ineradicable, and the danger so pressing, that decisive measures had to be adopted.

With Stark's acceptance of an independent command, the situation changed at once. The enthusiasm was so great that the rapidity of recruiting and enlisting seems almost incredible. On the very day of Stark's appointment, Captain McConnell of Pembroke, a delegate to the Assembly, "engaged" for the service. The next day, the 19th of ~~August~~ ^{July}, he, and Captain Bradford of Amherst and Captain Parker of New Ipswich, some sixty miles from Exeter, had recruited three companies of 221 men. The news swept up the Merrimack valley on Sunday the 20th of July, through Hudson and Hollis, Londonderry and Epsom, Loudon and Boscawen, to Salisbury, fifty-eight miles distant from Exeter, where Ebenezer Webster, father of Daniel Webster, raised his company of fifty-four men.

"As soon as it was decided to raise volunteer companies and place them under the command of Gen. Stark, Col. Hutchins [delegate from Concord] mounted his horse, and travelling all night with all possible haste, reached Concord on Sabbath afternoon, before the close of public service. Dismounting at the meeting-house door, he walked up the aisle of the church while Mr. Walker was preaching. Mr. Walker paused in his sermon, and said—'Col. Hutchins, are you the bearer of any message?' 'Yes,' replied the Colonel: 'Gen. Burgoyne, with his army, is on his march to Albany. Gen. Stark has offered to take the command of the New Hampshire men: and, if we all turn

out, we can cut off Burgoyne's march.' Whereupon Rev. Mr. Walker said—'My hearers, those of you who are willing to go, better leave at once.' At which word all the men in the meeting-house rose and went out. Many immediately enlisted. The whole night was spent in preparation, and a company was ready to march next day." There must have been many similar scenes on that Sunday of recruiting, for before it ended seven companies of 419 men were enlisted.

On the third day of recruiting, seven more companies, numbering 390 men, volunteered under Captains from Chester and Pelham in the southeast; from Lyndeboro; and then, on the other side of the watershed, from Rindge, from Walpole and from Charlestown, one hundred and ten miles to the northwest on the Connecticut; and from Plymouth nearly as far distant on the northern frontier. Five more companies numbering 252 men, enlisted on the next day, the 22nd of July, under Captains from Hopkinton, Gilmanton, and Sanbornton in the Merrimack region, and from Gilsum and Chesterfield in the southwest in the Connecticut basin. On the 23d of July, two companies enlisted under Captains from Chesterfield in the southwestern corner and from Hanover on the northwestern frontier; and on the following day the last of the twenty-five companies was recruited.

In these six days of recruiting, from the 19th to the 24th of July, 1,492 officers and men had enlisted to serve under Stark, and many of them had already begun their march to join him. The number of volunteers is the more remarkable, if we remember that in the sparsely settled state, with its scattered hamlets, most of them settled in the last generation, there were only 15,436 polls, according to the returns of that year. This would mean that nearly one man in ten of a voting age volunteered. In many of the towns more than ten per cent. of the males over sixteen years old volunteered. In half a dozen towns taken at random in different sections of

the state, there enlisted on an average over fifteen per cent. In Chesterfield, out of 221 males over sixteen, twenty-one volunteered, or $9\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; in Hanover, 9.8 per cent.; in Concord, over ten per cent.; in Swanzey, 12 per cent.; in Candia, 25 per cent.; and in Salisbury under Captain Ebenezer Webster, forty-one men volunteered, or over 36 per cent. of the male population over sixteen years old.

Three facts explain this almost incredible swiftness of enlistment: first, the spreading of the news through the return of the delegates from the three days' session at Exeter; second, the payment of "advanced wages"; and third, the eagerness to enlist under Stark. The people, especially the militia, may have suggested such action and consequently may have been expecting some such news; this is at least a plausible hypothesis which makes intelligible the rapid enlistment immediately on the return of the representatives like Col. Hutchins of Concord, and Matthew Patten of Bedford. There were nearly 1,500 men like Thomas Mellen, who said: "I enlisted . . . as soon as I heard that Stark would accept the command of the state troops." The militia knew that Stark and the State of New Hampshire meant business, and they gave a business-like response.

The promptness of enlistment is matched and doubtless aided by Stark's characteristic rapidity of movement. On the 18th of July, Stark was appointed at Exeter. On the 19th, he received from the Chairman of the Committee of Safety, the following instructions;

"STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, Saturday, July 19th, 1777.

To Brig^d Gen^l Jn^o Stark,—You are hereby required to repair to Charlestown, N^o 4, so as to be there by the 24th—Thursday next, to meet and confer with persons appointed by the Convention of the State of Vermont relative to the route of the Troops under your Command, their being supplied with provisions, and future operations—and when

the troops are collected at N^o 4, you are to take the Command of them and march into the State of Vermont, and there act in conjunction with the Troops of that State, or any other of the States, or of the United States, or separately, as it shall appear Expedient to you for the protection of the People or the annoyance of the Enemy, and from time to time as occasion shall require, send Intelligence to the Gen^l Assembly or Committee of Safety, of your operations, and the manoeuvres of the Enemy.

M. WEARE."

While his Brigade was enlisting, Stark was crossing the State to the appointed rendezvous at Charlestown on the Connecticut River. He probably kept his appointment there on the 24th of July; on the 25th he was certainly at a point only two or three days distant by post from Manchester, Vermont, and other letters would indicate that this point was Charlestown. On the 28th he "forwarded 250 men to their relief," that is to the Vermont militia at Manchester. On the 30th, he wrote from Charlestown: "I sent another detachment of [f] this day." For his swiftly gathering force, he had to provide "Kettles or utensils to cook our victuals as the Troops has not brought any," cannon and their carriages, bullets, and even "bullet moulds, as there is but one pair in town." As he prepared to cross into Vermont, he thoughtfully asked the New Hampshire Committee for "Rum . . . as there is none of that article in them parts where we are a going." By the 2d of August, two weeks after his appointment, "he had sent off from No. 4, 700 men to join Colo. Warner at Manchester," and intended to "follow them the next day (. . . Sunday) with 300 more; and had ordered the remainder to follow him as fast as they came into No. 4" [Charlestown]. His last recorded acts before leaving the state were provisions for the physical and spiritual welfare of his troops in letters from Charlestown on the 3d of August to his "Chirurgion," "Doc^r Solomon Chase" of

Cornish, and to the Brigade Chaplain, "Rev. Mr. Hibbard at Claremont," a graduate of Dartmouth in the class of 1772.

On the 6th of August, Stark was in the Green Mountains at Bromley, near Peru, Vermont, sending back word to Charlestown "to fix them cannon . . . for your defence . . . forward, with all convenient speed, all the rum and sugar . . . get all the cannon from Walpole." Swiftly as Stark and his brigade moved forward, he seems to have forgotten nothing necessary for the troops at the front or for those left behind to guard the stores. He was a "good provider" as well as a good fighter. The rum he secured from his friends; the cannon he captured from the enemy.

On the 7th of August, he had crossed the Green Mountains and joined Warner and General Lincoln at Manchester near the western border of Vermont. In twenty days Stark had more than fulfilled the first part of Langdon's prophecy—he had not only raised a brigade, he had also equipped his volunteers, and marched them across two states. Two days later, the 9th of August, he was at Bennington, where within a week he was to realize the remainder of Langdon's patriotic vision and "check Burgoyne." It is not surprising that this characteristic swiftness and energy of Stark attracted volunteers and infused hope and an entirely new spirit into the troops of all the region.

The contrast with Burgoyne's slow progress made Stark's rapidity seem the more striking. When Stark was appointed at Exeter, Burgoyne was at "Skeensborough House," on the present site of Whitehall, New York. By the time Stark had crossed New Hampshire and mustered his troops on the Connecticut River, Burgoyne had marched only twenty-eight miles southward to Fort Edward on the Hudson. While Stark was crossing Vermont, and organizing his brigade at Manchester and Bennington, Burgoyne and his army were delaying at Fort Edward where they remained until the 14th of August.

It was two weeks before the British army, hampered by the untiring efforts of Schuyler and by the difficulties of transportation, were able to advance seven miles down the Hudson to Fort Miller.

A clear understanding of the position of the combatants on the 7th of August is necessary to comprehend the later plans and movements. Of the American forces, on the 7th of August, Stark was at Manchester, Vermont, with Warner and Lincoln; Schuyler, who had been gradually withdrawing southward before Burgoyne's slow advance, had been since the 4th of August at Stillwater on the Hudson, "about twenty miles west of Bennington." The British forces were situated as follows: Burgoyne was at Fort Edward, twenty-five to thirty miles north of Schuyler; St. Leger, slowly moving down the Mohawk valley to join Burgoyne, had been delayed by the siege of Fort Stanwix, and on the 7th of August, the day after the battle of Oriskany, demanded the surrender of the Fort and received a sturdy refusal. Bearing in mind these positions of the four commanders on the 7th of August—Stark at Manchester, Schuyler at Stillwater, Burgoyne at Fort Edward, and St. Leger at Fort Stanwix—we are prepared to discuss Schuyler's two different plans of campaign, and the strategic value of Stark's independent command.

Schuyler, until the 4th of August had approved the plan of retaining troops at Manchester or Bennington to fall upon Burgoyne's rear. On the 15th of July he therefore sent reinforcements to Warner. Two days later, he ordered the Massachusetts militia "to march to the relief of Colo. Warner and put themselves under his command. He is in the vicinity of Bennington." The 19th of July, he urged the New Hampshire militia to "hasten your march to join" Warner who "has intelligence that a considerable body of the enemy will attempt to penetrate to Bennington." On the 29th of July, Schuyler sent General Benjamin Lincoln of Massachusetts "to take command on the Grants." In his letter of this date to Warner, Schuyler

expressed his hopes that "the Body under General Stark will be respectable"; and that General Lincoln . . . will be able to make a powerful diversion." His letter of the 16th of July to Warner is worth quoting in full as a clear exposition of Schuyler's original plan.

"Fort Edward, July 16, 1777.

To Colo Warner

Sir I am this moment informed by Capt Fitch that the New Hampshire Militia are marching to join me. It is not my intention, much as I am in want of troops, that they should come hither as it would expose the country in that quarter to the depredations of the Enemy: I therefore enclose you an order for them to join you if none are arrived, you will send express for them. I hope when they come you will be able, if not to attack the Enemy, at least to advance so near as to bring off the well affected and to secure the Malignants.

I am Sir

Your most hum: Serv

PH SCHUYLER"

Schuyler communicated this plan to Washington on the 21st and 22d of July and received the following approval of his measures:

"You intimate the propriety of having a body of men stationed somewhere about the Grants. The expediency of such a measure appears to me evident; for it would certainly make General Burgoyne very circumspect in his advances if it did not wholly prevent them. It would keep him in continual anxiety for his rear . . . and would serve many other valuable purposes."

Washington continued to urge the retention of troops on the Vermont border, even after Schuyler abandoned the plan. On the 16th of August, the very day when Stark's victory at Bennington demonstrated the wisdom of the advice of the Commander-in-Chief, Washington wrote to Governor Clinton of New York:

“From some expressions in a letter, which I have seen, written by General Lincoln to General Schuyler, I am led to infer, it is in contemplation to unite all the militia and continental troops in one body, and make an opposition wholly in front. If this is really the intention, I should think it a very ineligible plan. An enemy can always act with more vigor and effect, when they have nothing to apprehend for their flanks and rear, than when they have. . . . If a respectable body of men were to be stationed on the Grants, it would undoubtedly have the effects intimated above, would render it not a little difficult for General Burgoyne to keep the necessary communication open; and they would frequently afford opportunities of intercepting his convoys. . . . These reasons make it clearly my opinion, that a sufficient body of militia should always be reserved in a situation proper to answer these purposes. If there should be more collected, than is requisite for this use, the surplusage may with propriety be added to the main body of the army. I am not, however, so fully acquainted with every circumstance, that ought to be taken into consideration, as to pretend to do anything more than to advise in the matter. Let those on the spot determine and act as appears to them most prudent.”

Now it was exactly in accord with this sound and repeated advice of Washington, and in pursuance of the original plan of Schuyler himself, that Stark and the Vermont Council of Safety, “those on the spot,” proposed to act. Schuyler, on the other hand, abandoned this plan of a flank attack, when he found the enemy pressing closer upon the main body of his own army. He thereupon ordered all the militia on the Vermont frontier to join him at Stillwater on the Hudson. Consequently, when Stark arrived at Manchester, Vermont, on the 7th of August, he found that his own brigade had, without his knowledge, been ordered to Stillwater and had begun their preparation for the march.

The first evidence of Schuyler's change of plan is on the 3d of August, the day when St. Leger appeared before Fort Stanwix or Schuyler. By that time, Schuyler was aware in general of this approach of hostile troops from the west down the Mohawk valley on his left flank. He also keenly realized that Burgoyne was "making every exertion to move down" the Hudson to attack the American center. Schuyler therefore on the 3d of August, "the generals having unanimously advised" him, fell back from Saratoga to Stillwater and on the next day called in the militia stationed in Vermont, on his right flank. On this 4th of August he wrote to Lincoln, who was then at Manchester:

"In all probability he [Burgoyne] has left nothing at Skenesborough, except what is so covered that it is not probable that your moving that way without artillery would give him any Alarm. I must desire you to march your whole Force, except Warner's Regiment and join me with all possible Dispatch."

Five days later, on the 9th of August, Schuyler asked the Vermont militia also to join him, as Burgoyne's "whole force is pointed this way" and as "there is no great probability that force will be sent your way until he shall have taken possession of this City" [Albany]. Schuyler writing from Albany was not well informed; he did not know that on the very day he wrote this, Baum received his instructions from Burgoyne and started on his march toward Bennington. Schuyler did not realize the effect of his own wise policy of devastation and obstruction of the country through which the British army had to pass. He was deceived by Burgoyne's pretence of a movement down the Hudson. He failed to put himself in Burgoyne's place and see that the British, retarded by the obstacles in their front and by the difficulty of getting stores from their rear, would naturally attempt by a flank movement to capture the horses, cattle, and provisions at Bennington, twenty-five miles away. It was "those on the spot," Stark

and the Vermont Council of Safety, who did realize both the likelihood of such an expedition and the possibilities of a counter-movement by the American militia stationed at Bennington.

The critical period of the campaign preceding the battle of Bennington is the week from the 7th to the 13th of August. In this week was decided the question whether the militia should all march to Stillwater, according to Schuyler's new plan; or whether they should remain on the Vermont border to execute the flank attack originally planned by Schuyler and advocated by Washington, Stark, and the Vermont Council. Within this week Stark arrived at Manchester, assumed command of his brigade and marched to Bennington; with the aid of the Vermont Committee of Safety, he convinced Schuyler and Lincoln that the militia should not march directly to Stillwater, but should rather prepare for the attack on the enemy's flank; therefore on the 13th of August, Stark was "on the spot" and ready to begin this attack when Baum appeared eighteen miles from Bennington. This question and its settlement are manifestly of supreme importance. Yet with all its importance the question of the plans and movements of all three generals has never been set forth with completeness in any one of the many accounts of the battle or the campaign. This can now be done in the light of documents recently printed or discovered.

By the 12th of August Schuyler appears reconverted to his original plan of attacking the enemy's flank and rear. The following explanation of the change is given in a sketch of Stark published the year of his death, in Farmer and Moore's Collections. This sketch of Stark was based on an account by Stark's son-in-law in *N. H. Patriot*, May 15, 1810, and on particulars given by Stark's oldest son Caleb, who had been an adjutant in the Northern army, and who after the battle had carried to his father a message from General Gates.

"General Schuyler opened a correspondence with Stark, and endeavored to prevail on him to come to the Sprouts. The latter gave him a detail of his intended operations, viz., to fall upon the rear of Burgoyne, to harrass and cut off his supplies. General Schuyler approved the plan and offered to furnish him with five or six hundred men more to carry it into execution."

The correspondence substantiates this statement; and indicates that Lincoln aided in bringing Stark and Schuyler into agreement on the basis of the original plan of a flank movement. From the 7th to the 10th of August, Lincoln was with Stark at Manchester and Bennington and corresponding with Schuyler. On the 12th, Lincoln was with Schuyler at Stillwater and wrote to Washington: "I am to return with the militia from the Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and the Grants, to the Northward, with a design to fall into the rear of Burgoyne." On the 14th, Lincoln wrote Stark from Half Moon, a few miles below Stillwater: "Your favor of yesterday's date, per express, I received on the road to this place. As the troops were not on the march, I am glad you detained them in Bennington. Our plan is adopted. I will bring with me camp kettles, Axes, ammunition and flints . . . You will please ts meet us, as proposed, on the morning of the 18th. If the enemy shall have possession of that place, and in your opinion it becomes improper for us to rendezvous there, you will be so good as to appoint another, and advise me of the place. . . ."

Finally, the statements of the Patriot article of 1810, and of Farmer and Moore's Sketch of 1822 are fully confirmed by the Trumbull Papers, published in 1902, and by an unprinted letter discovered in the present investigation. Schuyler transmitted to Lincoln on the 15th of August a letter received from Stark and added this endorsement: "You will see his determination and regulate yourself accordingly." "Gen. Lincoln is moved this day, with about 5 or 600 from our little army to fall in and co-oper-

ate with Starks," wrote Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., from Albany, on the 17th of August.

This plan of attacking Burgoyne's rear and flank from Vermont must have been discussed by Stark and Lincoln when they were together between the 7th and 10th of August. Schuyler's letters show that he reverted to this original plan between the 9th and 12th of August. Now this is just the time when Lincoln and Stark at Bennington were corresponding with Schuyler, and when Lincoln went in person from Stark to Schuyler. On the 12th of August, then, while Schuyler and Lincoln were together at Stillwater, Schuyler wrote to Warner a letter marked "secret":

"A movement is intended from here with part of the Army to fall in the enemy's rear. You will therefore march your regiment and such of the militia and ranging Companies as you can speedily collect to the Northern part of the Cambridge District in this state where the troops from hence will be there to join you, so as to be there on the 18th at farthest."

This gives the details of the plan which, as we have seen above, Lincoln communicated to Washington on the same day and from the same place. Further details of the same plan are given in Schuyler's letter of the following day, the 13th of August, to Lincoln:

"You will please to take command of the Troops that are now on the way from Bennington and march them to the East Side of Hudson's River to the Northern parts of Cambridge, where Col. Warner has orders to join you. Should you on your arrival at that place find it practicable, by coup de main, to make an Impression on any post the Enemy may occupy, you will, if there is a prospect of success, make the attempt."

To this same plan of a combined flank attack, Lincoln evidently referred in his letter of the 14th of August, quoted above, in which he wrote Stark:

"Our plan is adopted . . . meet us as proposed . . . If the enemy shall have possession of that place . . . appoint another."

Finally, the agreement of the three generals on the plan is indicated in Schuyler's letter on the day of the battle of Bennington, the 16th day of August, to the Massachusetts council:

"Lincoln . . . was at ten this Morning at Half Moon . . . and is by my orders,—going to join General Stark and try to make a diversion and draw off the Attention of the enemy by marching to the Northern parts of Cambridge, Vt. [New York] . . . Happily I have assurances from General Stark that he will not hesitate to do what is required."

Unfortunately Schuyler and Lincoln agreed upon this flank attack too late to aid Stark in its execution. On the 16th of August they were still twenty miles away, on the banks of the Hudson, Schuyler planning "to make a Diversion and draw off the Attention of the enemy," and Lincoln just starting with 500 or 600 men—on the very day when Stark won the battle of Bennington, before reinforcements from the Continental army on the Hudson could reach him."

On the 9th of August, Stark marched to Bennington instead of proceeding directly to Stillwater. On the same day Burgoyne played into his hands by detaching Baum on the expedition toward Bennington to "try the affection of the Country; to disconcert the Councils of the Enemy . . . and obtain large supplies of Cattle, Horses & Carriages." On the day he received these instructions from Burgoyne, Baum marched from Fort Edward southward to Fort Miller. Two days later he set out from Fort Miller to Saratoga. The 12th, he moved from Saratoga to Battenkill, on the east side of the Hudson, and here halted to receive fresh instructions from Burgoyne. On the 13th, Baum slowly marched sixteen miles in twelve hours from Battenkill to Cambridge, which was on the direct road to

Bennington and only eighteen miles distant from it. On this day, "thirty provincials and fifty savages" of Baum's force came into collision with two small bodies of Americans and so gave warning of the nearness of the British. "Long before sunrise on the 14th," Baum's "little corps was under arms" with the "intention to march at once upon Bennington"; but he was delayed "at the farm . . . of Sankoik" on "the northern branch of the Hosac," where the retreating Americans had broken down the bridge. He therefore "bivouacked at the farm of Walamscott, about four miles from Sankoick, and three from Bennington." On the 15th, Baum finding his outposts again attacked, sent back for reinforcements, and fortified a position on a height to the left of "the farm of Walamscott." A few sentences from the stirring "Account of the Battle of Bennington," by Glich, give a clear-cut picture of the engagement as viewed by the Germans from their intrenchments:

"The morning of the sixteenth rose beautifully serene. . . . Colonel Baume . . . some how or other persuaded to believe, that the armed bands, of whose approach he was warned, were loyalists . . . found himself attacked in front and flanked by thrice his number . . . whilst the very persons in whom he had trusted, and to whom he had given arms, lost no time in turning them against him. . . . When the heads of the columns began to show themselves in rear of our right and left . . . the Indians . . . lost all confidence and fled . . . leaving us more than ever exposed. . . . An accident . . . exposed us, almost defenceless, to our fate. The solitary tumbril, which contained the whole of our spare ammunition, became ignited, and blew up. For a few seconds the scene which ensued defies all power of language to describe. The bayonet, the butt of the rifle, the sabre, the pike, were in full play, and men fell as they rarely fall in modern warfare, under the direct blows of their enemies. . . . Col. Baume, shot through the body by a rifle ball, fell mortally wounded, and all order and

discipline being lost, flight or submission was alone thought of."

From the letters of Baum and the picturesque account of Glich, we must turn, for the American story, to the terse dispatch of Stark to the New Hampshire authorities, written two days after the battle:

"The 13th I was inform'd that a party of Indians were at Cambridge . . . I detached Col^o Gregg with 200 men under his command to stop their march. In the evening I had information by express that there was a large body of the enemy on their way with their field pieces. . . . The 14th I marched with my Brigade & a few of this States' Militia, to oppose them and to cover Gregg's retreat. . . . About four miles from the Town [Bennington] I accordingly met him on his return, and the Enemy in close pursuit of him, within half a mile of his rear. . . . I drew up my little army on an eminence in open view of their encampments, but could not bring them to an engagement. I marched back about a mile, and there encamp'd. . . . The 15th it rain'd all day; I sent out parties to harrass them.

"The 16th I was join'd by this States' Militia and those of Berkshire County; I divided my army into three Divisions, and sent Col. Nichols with 250 men on their rear of their left wing; Col^o. Hendrick in the Rear of their right, with 300 men, order'd when join'd to attack the same.

"In the mean time I sent 300 men to oppose the Enemy's front, to draw their attention that way; Soon after I detach'd the Colonels Hubbard & Stickney on their right. wing with 200 men to attack that part, all which plans had their desired effect. Col^o Nichols sent me word that he stood in need of a reinforcement, which I readily granted, consisting of 100 men, at which time he commenced the attack precisely at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, which was followed by all the rest. I pushed forward the remainder with all speed; our people behaved with the greatest spirit & bravery imaginable: Had they been Alexanders or Charleses of Sweden, they could not have behaved better.

The action lasted two hours. . . . I rec^d intelligence that there was a large reinforcement within two miles of us, on their march, which occasion'd us to renew our attack. But luckily for us Col^o Warner's Regiment came up, which put a stop to their career. . . . We used their own cannon against them. . . . At Sunset we obliged them to beat a second retreat. . . .

"I have 1 Lieut. Col^o since dead, 1 major, 7 Captains, 14 Lieut^s 4 Ensigns, 2 Cornets, 1 Judge advocate, 1 Barron, 2 Canadian officers, 6 sergeants, 1 Aid-de-camp & seven hundred prisoners;—I almost forgot 1 Hessian Chaplain."

In his tactics on the battle field, Stark showed the same qualities he had displayed in the general strategy of the campaign—quick insight and decision, followed by deliberate and stubborn action. At Bennington, just as at Bunker Hill and Trenton, Stark was quick to see the importance of flank movements, and cool in carrying them out. He was "as active in attack as he had then been obstinate in defense." Because he had insisted on the plan of a flank movement in the campaign preceding the battle, Stark had a force on the spot ready to oppose Baum and "check Burgoyne."

The battle of Bennington was won by the militia of New Hampshire, Vermont and Massachusetts, under the command of Stark. As we have already seen, Lincoln was at Half Moon on the Hudson the day of the battle, and was not in time, therefore, to return and co-operate with Stark and Warner. Stark and his troops would likewise have been unable to return to Bennington, had he allowed them on the 7th of August to march to Stillwater as they had been ordered to do before he arrived at Manchester and "chose to command himself." That there was any respectable force at Bennington capable of offering resistance to Baum is due to the resolute good sense of Stark and of the Vermont Council of Safety, and to the terms of the independent command given Stark by the State

of New Hampshire. Had Schuyler's orders of the 4th and 9th of August to Lincoln and the Vermont Council been carried out, the militia would have been on the Hudson more than twenty miles away, when Baum approached Bennington. The facts, then, as told by the participants fully substantiate the statement of Josiah Bartlett quoted at the beginning of this paper:

"Had Gen^l Starks gone to Stillwater agreeable to orders; there would have been none to oppose Col. Baum in carrying Gen^l Burgoyne's orders into Execution."

It is evident that Stark's fellow citizens and fellow soldiers of New Hampshire and Vermont understood the situation and had some substantial reasons for feeling that the independent command was justified both by the conditions which preceded it and by the results which followed.

The unfavorable judgment of General Lincoln and of the Continental Congress remains to be discussed. The usual statement is that Stark, on his arrival at Manchester, was ordered by Schuyler to march to Stillwater and refused to do so. Two facts which seem to have escaped notice show this statement to be a somewhat misleading half-truth. In the first place, Schuyler's orders were not to Stark; they were transmitted directly by Lincoln to Stark's brigade of militia without Stark's knowledge. Second Stark eventually acted in harmony with Schuyler; he started to march to the appointed rendezvous at Cambridge on the 13th when he received word that the enemy were already there; and on the 16th of September he did march to Stillwater, but he marched via Bennington, and after carrying out the flank attack desired by both Schuyler and Washington.

Of the relations between Lincoln and Stark at Manchester, Vermont, on the 7th of August, we have three accounts: one by Lincoln in a letter to Schuyler transmitted by the latter to Congress; one in a letter by Captain Peter Clark of Stark's brigade; and a newspaper account, which appeared in Stark's lifetime, "collected from the

papers and conversations of the General by his son-in-law, B. F. Stickney, Esq." Stark's own account, contained in a letter written the 7th of August and acknowledged on the 12th by the New Hampshire Committee of Safety, cannot now be found. The nearest approach to Stark's story is therefore the version which appears to have been given by Stark to his family and published by his son-in-law in the *Concord Patriot*, May 15, 1810, twelve years before the general's death. This is also quoted verbatim in the "Biographical Sketch" published in the year of Stark's death in "Farmer and Moore's Collections," and stated by them to be based on particulars given by Stark's oldest son Caleb and his son-in-law, Stickney. This contemporary family account is as follows:

"He [Stark] found the advantage of his independent command immediately upon his arrival at Manchester, for the packs of his men were paraded as for a march. He enquired for the cause, and was informed Gen. Lincoln had been there and had ordered them off to the Sprouts, at the mouth of Mohawk river. He sought for, and found Lincoln, and demanded of him his authority for undertaking the command of his men. Lincoln said it was by order of General Schuyler. Stark desired him to tell Gen. Schuyler that he considered himself adequate to the command of his own men, and gave him copies of his commission and orders."

This family version is corroborated by the testimony of one of Stark's captains, Peter Clark, of Lyndeboro, New Hampshire, who wrote his wife as follows:

"Manchester [Vt.], August 6, 1777.

. . . We have made us tents with boards but this moment we have had orders to march for Bennington and leave them, and from thence we are to march for Albany to join the Continental Army, and try to stop Burgoyne in his career. . . .

August 7, 1777.

A few minutes after I finished my letter there was a considerable turn in affairs by reason of Gen.^l Stark arriving in town. The orders we had for marching was given by General Lincoln—what passed between Lincoln and Stark is not known but by what we can gather together, Stark chooses to command himself. I expect we shall march for Bennington next Sabbath and where we shall go to from there I cannot tell.”

It was entirely natural for Stark to “choose to command himself” the brigade which he had raised, and which he had been commissioned to command. It was also inevitable that the sturdy and quick tempered old Indian fighter should have felt affronted, when he found that his volunteer militia had been ordered off without his knowledge, and moreover that the order had been given by one of the men who had been made a major-general when Stark was passed over, the previous February, by Congress. Consequently, a strong personal feeling inevitably cropped out in the conversation between Lincoln and Stark; and this personal element was naturally emphasized in the following account sent by Lincoln to Schuyler.

“Bennington, Aug.st 8.th 1777.

Dear General

Yesterday Gen.^l Stark from New Hampshire came into camp at Manchester—by his Instructions from that State It is at his option to Act in Conjunction with the Continental Army or not. He seems to be exceedingly soured and thinks he hath been neglected and hath not had Justice done him by Congress—he is determined not to join the Continental Army untill the Congress give him his Rank therein—his Claim is to command all the Officers he Commanded last Year as also all those who joined the Army after him. Whether he will march his Troops to *Stillwater* or not I am quite at a loss to know—

but If he doth it is a fixed point with him to act there as a Seperate Chor and take no orders from any officer in the Northern Department saving your Honour for he saith they all were *Either Commanded by him the last year or joined the Armeiy after him* Its very unhappy that this matter by him is carried to so great a length especially at at (sic) time when Every exertion for our Common Safety is so absolutely Necessary I have Good Reason to believe if the State of New Hampshire were Informed of the Matter they would give New and Very different Instructions to Gen.^l Starkes. The Troops from the Massachusetts are Collecting here I don't know what Number may be Expected. I suppose the Rear will be up tomorrow night at farthest I am Dear Sir with Regard and Esteam your most Obed.^t Humble Servt B. Lincoln."

To Lincoln's letter Schuyler made immediate and tactful reply. "You will please to assure General Stark that I have acquainted Congress of his situation, and that I trust and entreat he will, on the present and alarming crisis, waive his right, as the greater the sacrifice he makes to his feelings, the greater will be the honor due to him." Lincoln forwarded this letter to Stark with the generous endorsement: "I can only subjoin my entreaties to his that you will not now, when every exertion for the common safety is necessary, suffer any consideration to prevent your affording him all the succour in your power."

These three letters of Lincoln and Schuyler constitute the evidence left by them as to any lack of harmony with Stark. There is no reference to it by Schuyler in his defence before the court martial; none by Stark after the missing letter of the 7th of August; and none by Washington in his correspondence. Stark and Schuyler knew and valued each other, and Lincoln acted honorably and tactfully.

We have already seen that Schuyler was reconverted to the plan of a flank attack and planned to send Lincoln

to aid Stark in carrying it out. Stark also on his part shared the readiness to co-operate with Lincoln and Schuyler in a flank movement toward the Hudson. He began his march before the battle of Bennington and completed it after winning the victory. On the 8th of August, Stark advanced half way to Stillwater, marching some twenty miles southwest from Manchester, Vermont, to Bennington. On the 13th, Stark was preparing to continue his march, apparently to Cambridge in pursuance of the plan agreed upon with Lincoln, when news came of the approach of Baum. On the 13th, says Captain Peter Clark, "the whole Brigade was paraded to march to Still Water and while under arms the General, received intelligence that there was a large body of the Enemy coming to destroy the stores at Bennington, whereupon the Brigade was dismissed." On receipt of Stark's letter of the same day, Lincoln replied: "As the troops were not on the march, I am glad you detained them in Bennington. . . . If the enemy have possession of that place . . . [i. e. Cambridge] appoint another." The credit for this wise delay at Bennington Stark generously gave to the Vermont Council of Safety, with whom he evidently acted in fullest harmony. Two days after the battle, he wrote to the *Hartford Courant* as follows:

"I received orders to march to Manchester and act in conjunction with Col. Warner. After my arrival at that place I received orders from Major General Lincoln pursuant to orders from General Schuyler, to march my whole brigade to Stillwater, and join the main army then under his command. At the same time requested the whole of the militia (by Gen. Schuyler's order) of the State of Vermont to join him and march to Stillwater as aforesaid. In obedience thereto I marched with my brigade to Bennington on my way to join him, leaving that part of the country almost naked to the ravage of the enemy. The Honorable the Council then sitting at Bennington were much against my marching with my Brigade, as it was raised on

their request, they apprehending great danger of the enemy's approaching to that place, which afterwards we found truly to be the case. They happily agreed to postpone giving orders to the militia to march."

Congress was not so well informed of the situation as were Schuyler and Lincoln and the Vermont Council. The action of Congress was therefore neither particularly intelligent nor timely. The letter of the 8th of August from Lincoln to Schuyler describing his meeting with Stark, already quoted above, was forwarded by Schuyler to Congress. Upon that body it made naturally an impression that was both unfavorable and false. The impression was unfavorable, since the letter so strongly emphasized the personal grievances of Stark and his criticism of Congress. The impression was false, because, while not stating definitely the reasons for the actions of New Hampshire, the letter would give the casual or prejudiced reader the false idea that New Hampshire gave Stark the independent command because he felt he "hath not had justice done him by Congress." In justice to Lincoln it should be remembered that he wrote under personally irritating circumstances a personal letter intended for Schuyler and not for Congress. A more careful perusal of Lincoln's letter shows that it gives merely Stark's personal attitude; it was not intended to give and it did not give any indication of the reasons which led New Hampshire to give Stark his independent command. The cause of New Hampshire's action was not a private grievance, but a public necessity. To understand it we must turn from the personal grievance described by Lincoln to the facts testified to by Josiah Bartlett and now printed for the first time. Unfortunately it was upon Lincoln's letter that contemporary judgment of New Hampshire's action was based, and later writers have started from this false basis. The impression which that letter made upon a New Hampshire delegate in Congress is shown in the following shrewd comments appended by George Frost to a copy of

Lincoln's letter which he forwarded to the New Hampshire authorities.

"The foregoing letter was Sent by Gen.^l Lincoln to Gen.^l Schoyler and by P. Schoyler to Congress which is Very alarming to Congress that Gen.^l Starkes should take Occasion to Resent any Supposed Affrunt by Congress to him when his Country lays at Stake. at the same time would take notis that we shall loos the benifet of our troops being put in the Continentall pay Except the Measures are alterd, and woud also observe he don't refuse to put himselfe under Gen.^l Schoyler who is Recarled from that command and Congress has given the Command of the Armeey to Gen.^l Gates, w^{ch} I suppose Gel. Starkes knew not of at that time. as to the promotion of Officers in the Armeey the Congress went on a new plan agreed on in Baltimore (at the Raising the as it Called Standing Armeey) that Every State Should in Some measure have their proportion of Gen.^l Officers according to the Troops they Raised by which Reason som officers was superseded or as they call affronted."

Under the misleading impression derived from Lincoln's letter to Schuyler, Congress on the 19th of August; three days after Stark's indendent instructions had enabled him to render effective aid "to the common cause," passed the following vote of censure, in complete ignorance of the victory at Bennington:

Resolved, That a copy of general Lincoln's letter be forthwith transmitted to the council of New-Hampshire, and that they be informed, that the instructions which general Stark says he has received from them are destructive of military subordination and highly prejudicial to the common cause at this crisis; and therefore that they be desired to instruct general Stark to conform himself to the same rules which other general officers of the militia are subject to whenever they are called out at the expence of the United States."

In the debate on this resolution, the New Hampshire delegates defended her action, on the basis of reasons contained in a letter from Josiah Bartlett. "The militia of that State had lost all confidence in the General Officers who had the command at Tyconderoga . . . they would not turn out nor be commanded by such officers; the preservation of the lives of the inhabitants on our frontiers . . . made such orders at that critical time absolutely necessary; we were not about to justify General Stark for making a demand of rank in the army at that critical time, but we well knew he had a great deal to say for himself on that head, and had . . . distinguished himself, while others were advanced over his head. . . . We informed Congress that we had not the least doubt but the first battle they heard of from the North would be fought by Stark and the troops commanded by him. . . . Judge of our feelings, when the very next day we had a confirmation of what we had asserted by an express from General Schuyler giving an Account of the victory obtained by General Stark and the troops under his command. We believe this circumstance only will make those easy who have been trying to raise a dust in Congress."

The vote of censure by Congress was certainly ill-timed; probably it would have never been proposed had Congress waited one day longer. On the 4th of October, Congress was better informed and passed a vote that was more generous and more just.

Resolved, That the thanks of Congress be presented to general Stark of the New-Hampshire militia, and the officers and troops under his command, for their brave and successful attack upon, and signal victory over, the enemy in their lines at Bennington; and that brigadier Stark be appointed a brigadier general in the army of the United States."

The New Hampshire instructions to Stark were doubtless in theory "destructive of military subordination"; but "military subordination" had to yield to the more imper-

ative necessity of a military force capable of "the preservation of the lives of the inhabitants on our frontiers." At that memorable three days' session in July, 1777, the members of the New Hampshire General Court and of the Committee of Safety were confronted, not with a question of rank, but with the far more vital one of self-preservation. They knew that a brigade could not be raised in face of the universal loss of confidence in the generals of the Northern Department, and of the fear that any militia would be called to the "southward," away from the threatened frontier. They had been summoned in extra session not in response to calls for continental troops but to answer the cry of distress from their Vermont neighbors. They knew that men would volunteer promptly to serve under Stark and that he was admirably fitted by nature and experience to manage such a volunteer militia unhampered by restrictions. They therefore left it to his discretion whether he should join with continental troops or not.

The peculiar instructions giving Stark an independent command seem admirably adapted to meet the peculiar exigencies of the situation. That they were so adapted is proven by the results which followed. Stark's independent command enabled him, first, to recruit a brigade of 1,492 officers and men in six days, and to move forward at once, knowing his volunteers would follow without hesitation; second, to insist on a flank attack, based on sound strategy; third, to reconvert Schuyler to this sound strategy; fourth, to co-operate with militia from Vermont and Massachusetts in retaining at Bennington a force sufficient to check Baum and win the battle of Bennington; and finally to restore confidence and then to march with victorious troops to Stillwater and Saratoga.

Without the independent command, the presence of Stark and his brigade at Bennington was an impossibility. Without Stark and his brigade, the victory at Bennington was impossible. Without Bennington, who can say what a difference there might have been at Saratoga? It is

unnecessary to enlarge upon the importance of the Battle of Bennington; it has been recognized from that day to this by both American and British contestants and historians. It is enough to refer to Washington's estimate of what he called "the great stroke struck by Gen. Stark near Bennington"; and to the judgment of the latest and most epigrammatic of the English historians of the Revolution: "Bennington . . . proved to be the turning point of the Saratoga campaign which was the turning point of the war." To one who examines carefully the records of that day or the judgments of this, Stark's independent command appears a turning point not only in a decisive battle, but also in a decisive campaign, and in an epoch-making movement. To the sober second thought of his day or of ours, Stark's independent command seems warranted by its deep-seated causes and justified by its far-reaching results.

We have followed the story of Stark's campaign as told by participants and contemporaries. It is a tale of swift preparation, strategic delay, and intrepid attack.

Stark "chose to command himself" the army which he had raised himself; but he felt he acted in accord with Schuyler, as well as in fulfillment of the terms of his independent command. The responsibility for granting that command must be shared by the public sentiment which demanded it, the General Court which voted it, and the general who accepted it. The credit for the sound judgment which led to the wise delay at Bennington must be given to Stark and the Vermont Council of Safety. The final accord in plans is due to the wise and eventually harmonious action of Schuyler of New York, and Lincoln of Massachusetts, as well as of Stark of New Hampshire and Warner of Vermont. Schuyler and Stark supplemented each other admirably both in personal characteristics and in manner of conducting a campaign; Lincoln helped to prevent a rupture between them; the Berkshire militia and Parson Allen were just in time for the fighting on which

they insisted; Warner and the Vermont men and supplies and especially the timely reinforcements against Breyman were essential to both the campaign and the final engagement. The final result was so creditable that there was credit enough for all concerned. The plans and preparations of Schuyler and the Vermont Council were essential to Stark's opportunity; Stark's power to take advantage of that opportunity was due to his independent command.

Stark's independent command was in historic harmony with the unfortunate but inevitable conditions which he had to meet; with the task he had to perform; and with the characteristics of the man and his contemporaries. Personal independence and self-assertiveness were the distinguishing characteristics of the frontiersman and Indian fighter, and of his troops whom he so aptly described as "undisciplined freemen . . . men that had not learned the art of submission, nor had they been trained to the art of war." These were also the distinctive characteristics of the frontier life of colonial New Hampshire and Vermont, and of the period of the Revolution. The conditions which necessitated the independent command are much to be regretted; but so also are the conditions which necessitated the Revolution.

The Bennington campaign brings out sharply the strength and weakness of the Revolutionary era, when the newly born American nation was passionately devoted to the idea of liberty, but had not yet learned to understand and love the idea of union. It was in the next generation that a son of one of Stark's captains knit the two ideas together and kindled men's imaginations with the conception of "liberty and union."

In its illustration of the temper of the Revolution lies perhaps the chief value of this story, told by the men of that day, of their month of swift and triumphant campaign, from the 18th of July at Exeter when Speaker John Langdon gave his pledge and prophecy, to the 16th of August when General John Stark fulfilled the prophecy and "checked Burgoyne."

Reminiscence of General Stark

An extract from the diary of Elder James Randall, written in August, 1807.

AUGUST seventh, I arrived at Derryfield, N. H., and dined with General Stark, the Revolutionary patriot, whose name as a hero will ever be dear to Americans. We had much conversation on the subject of religion.

The interview was very interesting to me. I availed myself of the privilege of opening my mind freely, and labored much to show the general my views of the way of salvation, and of the necessity of regeneration. The general, being affected with the remarks, exclaimed, "You are not what formalists and bigots call a Christian!" "And," continued he, "If it were not for four things, which those called Christians hold, namely, anarchy, avarice, superstition, and tradition I should be a Christian." "Why, sir," I replied, "I hate all those things, and yet I am a Christian." The general, in a flood of tears, exclaimed, "God bless you! God bless you!" and said, "I am an old man of eighty years, and shall stay here but a little while, but my wife is younger than I, and will probably outlive me,* and I shall charge her and my son ever to receive you and treat you respectfully."

I thanked him, and gave him the parting hand, but not without shedding some tears.

*Mrs. Stark died in 1815.

General John Stark

By ROBERT R. LAW

This article, as well as "The Battle of Bennington" and "Stark's Independent Command at Bennington," was prepared for and published by The New York State Historical Society. It was written in 1904.—*Editor.*

THE colonists fought the battle of Bennington according to the plans and under the immediate direction of Gen. John Stark. To him history has rightfully given the credit for the success which crowned their efforts, that memorable 16th of August, one hundred and twenty-seven years ago. His name and that of Bennington are united in the minds of all students of history, and to understand the success of the Americans in that famous engagement, one must know John Stark.

What was the character,—the mental and moral qualities—of this pioneer, patriot and partisan leader?

To understand that character, rugged, strong and natural as his own New Hampshire mountains, it is necessary to examine his heredity, environment and training, and those manifestations of his beliefs, and of his likes and dislikes, which were evidenced by his acts and words in the various crises of his life.

It is not my purpose in this paper to give a connected detailed and exhaustive account of General Stark, but rather, by selected characteristic incidents and utterances, make you acquainted with his personality.

The principle which dominated his life was a sturdy and unbending independence, happily tempered by strong common sense and a devotion to duty.

When Congress in the Spring of 1777 failed to give Stark the recognition he believed his services merited,

that spirit of independence led him to resign his commission and return to his home, declaring that an officer who would not maintain his rank and assert his own rights, could not be trusted to vindicate those of his country. Yet, at the same time, his devotion to the cause of freedom impelled him to fit out and send to the front all the members of his family who were old enough to join the army.

This trait of his character, independence, was again manifested, when having accepted the command of the militia, in the summer of 1777, on condition that he should be accountable only to the authorities of New Hampshire, he refused to obey the order of General Lincoln and join Schuyler west of the Hudson. The result at Bennington justified his act of insubordination, and proved both his loyalty and his military wisdom.

This independence, amounting in youth to intolerance of restraint, at the time of the battle of Bennington, had been tempered by the experience of years. He then lacked but a few days of being forty-nine years old, having been born at Londonderry, New Hampshire, August 28, 1728. This attribute of character was his natural possession, both by heredity and environment.

Tacitus says of the inhabitants of ancient Germany, that their love of liberty was so strong that such a thing as obedience was unknown among them. They chose a leader or war chief by universal suffrage, but each individual reserved the right to be master of his own conduct.

It is known that in 1495, the Duchess of Burgundy, widow of Charles the Bold, sent a body of German soldiers to invade England in support of the claim of one of the pretenders to the throne of Henry VII. The invaders were defeated, and those who survived fled to Scotland and were protected by the Scottish king. Among the German soldiers who remained in Scotland were men named Stark, and they are supposed to be the ancestors of General Stark. Be that as it may, his father Archibald Stark, a

native of Glasgow and a graduate of her university, holding religious views differing from those of the reigning monarch, James the First, emigrated with others of like belief, to Londonderry in Ireland.

After a few years' residence there, becoming dissatisfied with the institution of tithes and rents, these Scotch-Irish Presbyterians sought the greater freedom of the New World. They landed in Maine and made their way to the then frontier, establishing a settlement which they named Londonderry, in memory of their place of abode in Ireland.

With such heredity, restiveness under restraint might be expected; and in addition to that, Stark's early life and associations were such as to inspire him with a feeling of self-confidence, and the habit of mind of forming and executing his own plans, rather than of accepting blindly the directions of others. The home of his youth was on the outskirts of the settlements, in constant danger of Indian forays, and where his mother often stood guard with a rifle while the men were working in the fields.*

When he was twenty-four years of age, he was captured by the St. Francis Indians, and won the hearts of his captors by his fearlessness and resource. When made to run the gantlet, he snatched a club from the nearest warrior in the line and laid about him so lustily, that he escaped with little injury, and left many tokens of his prowess on the persons of the Indians, to the great amusement of the old men of the tribe who were spectators. When put at the squaw's work hoeing corn, he cut up the plants and left the weeds, and finally threw the hoe in the

*This statement is not literally true, for while this section of the frontier was frequently threatened with an attack from the Indians, no actual danger came to the settlers about Amoskeag Falls, where the Starks lived. This was due, however, mainly to the vigor with which these sturdy pioneers waged their warfare elsewhere. It may not be out of place to remark that rifles were not in use in the early days of Stark.—*Editor.*

river, thus showing the Indians that he possessed the true idea of the dignity of a warrior, and he was made chief of the tribe.

His early military training was such as to develop and strengthen his love of independent action.

Robert Rogers, the famous leader of the rangers, selected Stark as one of the lieutenants of his company, when it was organized in 1755, for service in the French and Indian War. This was a compliment to the young lieutenant's strength, endurance, woodcraft and fidelity, for none were enlisted in that chosen band but those who knew the woods, and who could be trusted with entire confidence in any situation.

Stark's company was stationed at Fort Edward when the French under Baron Dieskau and the English under Gen. William Johnson fought the battle near this place, September 8, 1755, which resulted in the defeat of the French. Other results of the battle were the death of Col. Ephraim Williams, founder of Williams College, whose monument can be seen in the defile south of this village; the attaching of the names French Mountain and Bloody Pond to familiar features of the landscape, and the title of baronet to Sir William Johnson.

This battle closed the campaign, and Stark saw no more active service till 1757. On January 15, of that year, Major Robert Rogers, with a company of seventy-four rangers, Stark being present as first lieutenant, left their station at Fort Edward and marched to Fort William Henry, where they spent two days preparing snowshoes and provisions for an excursion to Ticonderoga. On the 17th they proceeded down Lake George on the ice, camping that night on the east shore near what is now known as Pearl Point. The weather was so severe and the traveling so difficult that it took the party the next three days to reach a point three miles from Lake Champlain. The next day, January 21, they reached that lake halfway between Crown Point and Ticonderoga. Seeing some

sleds advancing over the ice in the distance, Rogers pursued them and took several prisoners, from whom he learned there was a large force of French and Indians at Ticonderoga. Knowing those who escaped would give the enemy intelligence of his approach, and that an immediate attack would follow, Major Rogers gave orders to his men to retreat as quickly as possible to the place they had occupied the night before, where the fires were still burning, and where they could dry their guns, as it was raining.

After the custom of the rangers, they commenced the march in single file, Rogers in front, Stark in the rear. Suddenly, after a mile had been traversed, on ascending a hill, they found themselves face to face with two hundred men drawn up in the form of a crescent. The straggling line of rangers was not twenty feet from the enemy when they received the first fire. Rogers was soon wounded, and the command devolved upon Stark, who rallied the men and held off the enemy. When some of his men proposed retreat, he threatened to shoot the first man who attempted it; when his gunlock was shattered by a bullet, he sprang forward and wrenched a gun from the dying grasp of a Frenchman, who was shot through the body, and renewed the battle. Thus they continued to fight in snow four feet deep, until the cold January night came on, and the enemy withdrew. Then the retreat of the Rangers began, and at dawn they had reached Lake George. It was impossible for the wounded to go farther on foot, and Stark, with two men, proceeded on snowshoes to Fort William Henry, over the ice, reaching there at evening.

Without stopping to rest, he started back, with a sleigh and a small reinforcing party, reaching his men the next morning, and bringing the party to the fort that evening.

After having marched and fought all one day, then retreated all one night, he travelled on foot and over snow and ice, without stopping to rest, one hundred and twenty

miles in less than forty hours. As a feat of endurance alone, it has seldom been equalled.

In the month of March, 1757, Captain Stark, who was, in the absence of Major Rogers, in command of the rangers at Fort William Henry, gave evidence of his shrewdness and vigilance. While going the rounds the night before St. Patrick's Day, he heard some of the rangers planning to celebrate the occasion. There were many Irish among the regular troops, as well as among the rangers, and Stark foresaw the danger to which the post would be exposed at the close of the day, spent in excess and intoxication.

He therefore gave orders to the sutler that no spirituous liquors should be issued to his rangers, except on written orders signed by himself, and when applied to for those orders he pleaded a lameness of the wrist as an excuse for not giving them. Thus the evening of St. Patrick's Day found the rangers sober, though the regulars had celebrated in the usual way. The French knowing the Irish custom calculated that the garrison would be in no condition to defend the fort, and made a night attack, but were repulsed by John Stark and his ready rangers.

In 1758, Captain Stark in command of a company of Major Rogers' rangers, was a part of that army of 16,000 men who under General Abercrombie and the brilliant Lord Howe, made the disastrous campaign against the French at Ticonderoga.

Ten thousand American and 6,000 English regular soldiers, gathered at Fort Gage, south of this village; their camp extending to the base of the mountains and covering all the level land; and on the evening of July 4 of that year all the stores were loaded into the boats which lined the beach at the head of the lake. At sunrise Saturday, July 5, 1758, the army sailed for the north. There were 900 bateaux, or flat-bottom boats, over thirty feet long, 135 whale boats, besides many large flat-bottomed boats for artillery. The English regular soldiers with their scarlet

coats were in the center, the Americans in blue, when uniformed at all, on either side. It was a beautiful mid-summer day, and Lake George has never before or since seen so imposing a pageant.

With flags flying, bugles and bagpipes playing, it was all the pomp and circumstances of glorious war. When the last boat left the shore, the foremost had reached Diamond Island, and the intervening water seemed entirely covered. When the Narrows was reached and it became necessary to stretch out into lines, the flotilla extended over a space of six miles. Late in the afternoon they reached a point on the west shore where a landing was made, and from whence they left at an early hour Sabbath morning for Ticonderoga. This landing place was called by them Sabbath Day Point, which name it retains to this day. That night Lord Howe called Captain Stark to his tent and learned from him all he knew of Ticonderoga and its surroundings.

Of the death of Lord Howe at the first volley; of the indecision and bad management of General Abercrombie, or "Mrs. Nabby Cromby," as he was derisively called by his men; of the useless sacrifice of life and the failure of the expedition, it is not necessary to speak, except to say that the rangers were the first to advance and the last to retreat, justifying in every respect the confidence reposed in them.

When news of the conflict at Concord and Lexington was received, Stark was at work in his sawmill. Without waiting to go home to put on a coat, he jumped upon a horse, sending word to his wife to forward his regimentals to Medford, and in ten minutes' time was on his way to the front, arousing volunteers at every farmhouse and hamlet. During the years following the French and Indian War, he had been active and influential in urging upon the people of his colony the necessity of military preparation, and the guns at Lexington found him ready for action.

One of the most prominent features of Stark's life is the absolute confidence reposed in him by his soldiers.

The rangers in border conflict, the militia behind the rail fence at Bunker Hill, his men leading the attack at Trenton or storming the battery at Bennington, followed Stark with an unhesitating obedience and a devoted loyalty. He was a plain, blunt man, but they knew his bravery, they believed in his military skill. When General Gage was asked at Boston if the Americans would stand the assault of the royal troops, he replied they would if one John Stark were among them, for he was a brave fellow, and had served under him at Lake George in 1758 and 1759.

His rule of military action was that battles were won by fighting, yet was his zeal tempered by prudence and forethought. When urged to move the men of his regiment forward faster at Bunker Hill, he refused to do so, saying, "one fresh man in battle is better than ten who are fatigued;" and when his men were in line and eager to attack, he made them reserve their fire "until they could see the enemies' gaiters." But when Washington was planning his desperate attack upon Trenton, Colonel Stark's advice in council was, "Your men have long been accustomed to place dependence upon spades and pick for safety, but if you ever mean to establish the independence of the United States you must teach them to rely upon firearms." And to the fighting parson at Bennington who complained of inaction, he said, "If the Lord will once more give us sunshine, and I do not give you fighting enough, I will never ask you to come out again." And his remark later on the same day, in reference to the possible widowhood of Molly Stark, not only made a very worthy woman forever famous in American history, but displayed in an emphatic way, the keynote of Stark's character as a fighting man.

Whether his mind had received the proper training for the grand strategy of war, and the management of large

masses of troops, may be an open question; but in battle where the combatants were within his view, and under the conditions of warfare existing at that day he was a matchless leader.

In person General Stark was of medium height, well proportioned, was smoothly shaven, and of a thoughtful and somewhat severe expression of countenance. In youth he was noted for strength, activity, and ability to endure fatigue.

With these few strokes I have endeavored to draw a portrait of the American leader at Bennington.

Of his subsequent services in the War of the Revolution, I shall say little.

As general in charge of the Northern department, with headquarters at Albany, in 1778, he was a faithful officer; as Washington's representative in New England in 1779 and 1780, soliciting recruits and supplies, the confidence placed in him by the people made success assured; as commander-in-chief of the Northern department in 1781, with headquarters at Saratoga, he restored order and made life and property safe, where before it had been at the mercy of bands of plunderers; and when the war was over he returned to his modest New Hampshire home, honored by all his countrymen, a true Cincinnatus, though as might be expected from our study of his character, a bitter opponent of the Order of the Cincinnati.

His private life was simple and above reproach. He was considered stern and unbending. In the heat of the action at Bunker Hill, it was reported to Stark that his son was killed. He remarked to the person who brought the information that it was no time to talk of private affairs, when the enemy was in front.

Happily the report was untrue, but it illustrates the spirit of the man.

There was another and a tender side to his nature, evidenced by his great love of pets, and by his habitual use of nicknames. He bestowed one of the latter upon each

member of his family, and thus his wife Elizabeth became Molly.

She died when the general was eighty-four years of age. At her funeral the minister in his remarks referred to the general in a complimentary manner. Rapping sharply upon the floor with his cane, the old warrior said, "Tut, tut, no more of that an it please you." And as the funeral procession left the house, too feeble to accompany it, he tottered into his room, saying sadly, "Good bye, Molly, we sup no more together on earth."

Ten years later, on the 8th of March, 1822, at the age of ninety-four, John Stark died. Above the grave of this brave, honest, incorruptible patriot, on the banks of the Merrimack, which he loved so well, stands a fitting monument, a plain shaft of New Hampshire granite, with the simple inscription:

"MAJOR-GENERAL STARK."

Recollections of the Old Hanover Street Church

Extracts from a Paper by DEACON JOHN KIMBALL

The following article was furnished by Mr. Francis B. Eaton a few years ago, with the succeeding note: "In my younger days, when old Derryfield was emerging from its chrysalis state, we country people mostly had formed opinions as to the condition of things here and here-about not much higher than we might have had for the cities of the plain, Sodom and Gomorah. The Parker murder seemed to cap the climax. Mr. Kimball's paper of local interest shows some good New England influences at work in in the foundation of our Queen City of today, and that all was not then so black as it was painted." The author of the "Recollections" was for some time President of the Central Congregational Club of New Hampshire, and the article was read before one of its meetings.—*Editor.*

SIXTY years ago I left my country home in Boscawen and took up my abode in this city. My mother had heard Dr. Wallace preach at a series of meetings held in that town. She earnestly requested me on leaving to be sure to become a regular attendant at the Hanover Street Church under his pastoral care. On the Sunday after my arrival I went to the old church situated nearer Elm Street, then the new church. On entering I was met by Mr. Moulton, the sexton. I informed him I had come to stay awhile and wanted a regular seat. He replied that he would find a seat for me that day and during the week would see if he could secure a regular seat. On the second Sunday I was shown into a pew occupied by an old gentleman and his family. His name was Eben Foster. The pew was the first on the east end of the church next to the pulpit. Mrs. Foster had a sister living in Boscawen, who was an intimate friend of my mother. In order to properly engage in the service it became neces-

sary to procure a Hymn Book, which I found at a book-store on Elm street. I had my name printed in gold letters on the cover. I have carefully kept the book until this time. It is what is known as "Watts's Select." In the first part is Psalms, numbering 150, just the same number as is in the Bible,—written by Dr. Isaac Watts, who has written about 600 Psalms and hymns. Many of them are in use to-day. Dr. Watts was a dissenting clergyman and preached in the city of London about the year 1700. Later he changed to Southhampton. One morning he looked over the arm of the sea which separates the mainland from the Isle of Wight, and beholding its beauty he wrote:

"Sweet fields beyond the swelling flood
Stand dressed in living green;
So to the Jews old Canaan stood
While Jordan rolled between."

Next in the book were Books I, II and III. Later, at the end, were added, "Select Hymns" by different authors, which were inserted to keep the book "up to date."

I had a friend who desired a seat with me. He was from Gilmanton, and as Dr. Wallace prepared for the ministry at the seminary there my friend had known of him. His name was Nehemiah Sleeper Bean. I am glad to know that his respected son is a prominent member of this society.

I had another friend who attended the same church. He occupied a seat in the choir and played a brass instrument to assist in the music. He was from Canterbury, and his father was a deacon in the church there under the pastoral care of the Rev. William Patrick. His name was Thomas Ham. He died last year in Laconia, at the advanced age of eighty-four.

To digress a little, Mr. Patrick was a Scotch-Irish minister from Londonderry. He used "Watts's Select" in his church in Canterbury, and always commenced the ser-

vice in the forenoon by saying, "Let us commence the worship of God this morning by singing to his praise — Psalm." In the afternoon he would say, "Let us resume the worship of God this afternoon in the use of — Hymn of the Selection." During a visit to Constantinople, in 1895, I met his granddaughter, Miss Mary Patrick, a native of Canterbury, who is the distinguished president of the American College for Girls at Scutari. At the installation of President Hadley of Yale College, a few years ago, Miss Patrick was honored by occupying a seat on the platform with the other presidents of American colleges.

I occasionally attended evening meetings, which were held in southwest corner of the church. There was no chapel, as the stove which was used for heating the church was located there. Generally there were not more than twenty or thirty present. Deacon Hiram Brown was usually there. He was a man easily approached and always had a kind word for strangers. He was the first mayor of the city. The last time I met him was in the city of Washington, where he had charge of the grounds around the Executive Mansion during the administration of President Johnson. He gave me a cordial greeting. Another brother was Deacon Baldwin, who generally took charge of the meetings. Had I met him in Canterbury, I should have supposed he would be classed as a Freewill Baptist. When the spirit of the meeting would lag a little, the deacon would sing a hymn commencing,

"Come blooming youth and seek the truth and on to glory go," etc.

He was an earnest, loyal deacon.

On entering the church and walking up the east aisle, I passed the pew of Samuel D. Bell, who was a constant attendant. He was afterwards chief justice of the Supreme court of the state. One of the prominent men who was a constant worshiper was Robert Reed, agent of the Amoskeag Company, a particular friend of the pastor,

also David Gillis, agent of the Manchester Mills, and William G. Means, father of the late Charles T. Means. His voice was frequently heard in the prayer-meetings. I was particularly pleased with Mr. Means, because he was the paymaster on the Amoskeag, where I met him every four weeks. I early made the acquaintance of Frederick Smyth. He was prominent in all church matters. I retained friendly relations with him in the numerous public positions to which he was afterwards called. I was selected to act as one of the bearers at his burial.

During my residence in the city, I met a friend and relative, who attended the Hanover Street Church. She, too, came from Canterbury. Subsequently she became the wife of Dr. William W. Brown. Of her history you are all well informed. She left her property to support the Children's Home.

I will mention only one more, Brother Charles Hutchinson, in whose family I resided. Mrs. Hutchinson was a decided Methodist, so to make all harmonious they attended the Hanover Street Church in the forenoon and the Methodist Church in the afternoon. It was Mr. Hutchinson who invited me to join a Sunday-school class. I was introduced to Mr. Payson, who was a teacher in one of the public schools. His class was in the gallery. Mr. Payson said I must provide myself with a copy of "Bane's Notes on the Gospels," and a question book to match. (Quartermen were not in use then.) I found Mr. Payson to be an excellent teacher. In all my sixty years of Sunday-school life, I never knew a better.

During my stay in Manchester, I became strongly attached to Dr. Wallace. He frequently preached in the South Church in Concord, where he always met with a cordial welcome.

Notes From an Old-Time History

AMONG the American geographies and gazetteers of a hundred years ago, that by the Rev. Jedidiah Morse, a native of Wethersfield, Conn., and for many years a resident of Charlestown, Mass., for a quarter of a century stood at the head. A reader of one of these old-time books finds many interesting comparisons with our present situations. Some of its statements are somewhat startling, for example, where it says in speaking of the rivers and bridges of the state that "A bridge has been erected over Amoskeag falls 656 feet in length and 80 feet wide, supported by five piers. And what is remarkable, this bridge was rendered passable for travelers in 57 days after it was begun."

The history mentions as the principal towns of the state at that time, 1804, the following, with their population: Portsmouth, 5,339; Exeter, 1,727; Concord, 2,052; Dover, 2,042; Durham, 1,126; Amherst, 2,150; Keene, 1,646; Charlestown 1,364; Haverhill, 805; Plymouth, 743.

There was no Manchester in the state at that time, and Derryfield had not risen to sufficient importance to find honorable mention.

Portsmouth is described as the principal town in the state, it being situated about two miles from the sea on the south side of the Piscataqua river. It contained 500 houses and nearly as many other buildings. In a brief sketch of Concord it says: "Concord is a pleasant, flourishing town. The general court of late has commonly held sessions there, and from its central situation and a thriving back country it will probably become the permanent seat of government. Much of the trading of the upper Coos centers in the town."


Speaking of trade and manufacture it says that the inhabitants in the southwestern section of the state generally carried their products to Boston. In the middle and northern section, as far as the lower Coos, they trade at Portsmouth. Above the Lower Coos there were no convenient roads direct to the seacoast. The people on the upper branches of the Saco river found their nearest market at Portland, in the district of Maine, and thither the inhabitants of upper Coos have generally carried their produce. Some have gone in the other direction to New York markets. The people in the country generally manufactured their own clothing and considerable quantities of tow cloth for exportation. The other manufactures were pot and pearl ashes, maple sugar, bricks and pottery and some iron, not sufficient, however, for home consumption, though it might be made an article of exportation.

It is worthy of statement that the eldest son of this pioneer of historians in our country, Samuel Finley Breese Morse, artist and inventor, for some time in his early manhood was a resident of Manchester, and the reader is referred to the article in this volume of "The Art and Artists of Manchester."

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