SECRET
11/GS/GP



Sweden

May 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

SECRET

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090019-6

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

The basic unit of the NIS is the *General Survey*, which is now published in a bound-by-chapter format so that topics of greater perishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters—Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the *General Survey* coverage may be bound into one volume.

Supplementing the *General Survey* is the NIS *Basic Intelligence Factbook*, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key statistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations.

Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those previously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid.

A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the *Inventory of Available NIS Publications*, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.

Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the *General Surveys* can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.

The *General Survey* is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

WARNING

The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be released or shown to representatives of any foreign government or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1.

For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official purposes to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey.

Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification/control designations are:

(U/OU) . . Unclassified/For Official Use Only
(C) . . . . . Confidential
(S) . . . . . Secret

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090019-6

This Section was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by November 1972.

SWEDEN

CONTENTS

This General Survey supersedes the one dated September 1967, copies of which should be destroyed.

FIGURES

Government and Politics

A. Introduction (U/OU)

The Scandinavian countries have evidenced a long political stability almost unique in continental Europe. As the principal nation in the Scandinavian area, Sweden has often set the pace for the social and economic innovation that has made for the regional political steadiness.

A number of determinants associated with modern Swedish society have helped form the popular penchant to support reformist rather than revolutionary solutions to national problems: the population is exceptionally homogeneous and universally literate; there are no seriously divisive social issues; popular participation in the government processes at the local level has a tradition going back to the Viking days. Additionally, Sweden is the natural leader in the Nordic area—in size as well as in wealth—having a gross national product almost as large as that of the four other Nordic countries combined. And only the Swedes, through a combination of good luck and a strong military establishment, have been able to adhere to the common Nordic dream of neutrality.

The Swedish political system has very recently evolved into a form of pure parliamentary democracy that has proved consistently workable almost exclusively in the Scandinavian area. The Council of State is directly responsible to the *Riksdag*, a single-house parliament since January 1971. Should the *Riksdag* pass a vote of no confidence, however, the government has the right to call for new elections. Because the earlier bicameral system also featured legislative supremacy, at least by custom, and governments nonetheless proved remarkably stable, the nation enters into a new period of enhanced parliamentary democracy with justified optimism.

Political differences over domestic policy are minor and are concerned primarily with the extent to which the government should guide the economy and with the scope of government-supported welfare programs. The narrowing of political differences, however, has not been accompanied by a consolidation of political parties. Five parties, including the Communists, have been represented on the ballot in parliamentary elections during the past 25 years. These parties, in general, represent the interests of particular economic and social groups. The moderate Social Democratic Party (SAP) has been dominant since the early 1930's, governing alone since the end of World War II with the exception of a 5-year period in the early and mid-1950's.

At the peak of its popularity in the 1968 elections, when support from erstwhile Communists disenchanted by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia enabled the SAP to win more than 50% of the popular vote, the party chose as its new leader the flamboyant Olof Palme. Although a capable politician, Palme has on occasion offended moderates by his intemperate criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam and Cambodia—even while reclaiming a few apostate leftwing SAP votes. And his aloof intellectualism has been unfavorably contrasted with the warm, outgoing

personality of his mentor and predecessor, Tage Erlander. In the 1970 elections the Social Democrats' share of the vote dropped by almost 5%. High taxes and inflation have plagued the Palme government, but thus far it has avoided a crisis by accepting the support of the Communist Party, in order to muster a majority over the bourgeois opposition.

Like its neighbors, with whom, in the Nordic Council, it has totally integrated its social policy, Sweden is committed to creating a social democracy in order to redistribute the national wealth and achieve social and economic security for all its citizens. An all pervasive welfare system has virtually eliminated individual privation. Uniquely, this welfare state has coexisted with an economy that is still 90% in private hands. The lack of serious social and economic grievances, coupled with the high order of political sophistication evidenced by the average citizen, makes Sweden a poor target for subversive activity. Non-Communist political leaders, the great majority of trade union leaders, and the press have cooperated to make the public aware of past Communist aims and tactics.

Ideologically aligned with the democratic West, Swedish political leaders are nevertheless strongly committed to pursuing a policy of nonalliance and neutrality. Sweden does not interpret this policy as precluding cooperation with other European countries through membership in a number of regional organizations, but it declines to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and wishes to avoid full membership in the European Communities (EC) for the time being. Government leaders are wary of EC membership, fearing that it would compromise Sweden's neutrality and would destroy its chances of avoiding involvement in any eventual major European conflict. Swedish defense policy has been based on the maintenance of armed forces of sufficient strength to deter aggression or to hold off an invasion attempt long enough for Western military forces to provide aid. Thus, despite a jealously guarded freedom of action and occasionally vehement criticism of U.S. actions in Southeast Asia, successive Swedish governments have predicated national survival ultimately on NATO, specifically U.S. power. Although many Swedes believe that the Soviet Union no longer poses a threat to Western Europe, the nation as a whole tends to be wary of the traditional enemy that wrested Finland from the Swedish crown in 1809. Common ties of history and culture which bind Sweden and Finland are reinforced by the belief of many Swedes that Finnish independence is of paramount importance to Sweden's own security.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (U/OU)

Sweden is a constitutional monarchy with a democratic, responsible, parliamentary system of centralized government, based on universal suffrage. Although the locus of power is in the unicameral legislative branch, the executive, i.e., the Council of State acting in the King's name, retains more authority than is usual in such systems. The judiciary is free and independent, but its authority is less important than that of the other branches, primarily because it lacks the right of judicial review of legislation.

As elsewhere in Northern Europe, civil service personnel are generally competent, responsible, honest, and highly respected. Depending on their rank, they are counted among the middle and upper social groups; most of those in the higher echelons possess an academic degree. Initial appointment to career positions is based largely on performance in competitive written examinations. Public servants are personally liable for their official actions, and corruption is rare.

1. Constitutional system

The Swedish political system rests on four fundamental laws. The Instrument of Government or Constitution of 1809—the oldest document of its type still in force in Europe—defines the various national governmental bodies and their powers and duties. The second fundamental law, the Act of Succession of 1810, secured the throne for one of Napoleon's marshals, Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, and his male heirs. The *Riksdag* Act of 1866 transformed the centuries-old representative assembly with its four separate estates of nobles, clergy, burghers, and peasants into a bicameral parliament. Most provisions of the act still govern procedure within the present parliament. The fourth fundamental law, the Freedom of the Press Act of 1949 (an outgrowth of public reaction to the brief period of limited press control exercised during World War II as the result of German pressure), updated laws which were promulgated in 1766, 1810, and 1812 to establish basic safeguards for liberty of the press.

Amendments to any of these four basic documents require the passage of a bill by majority vote of the *Riksdag* on two successive occasions, with an intervening election to insure that the people have an opportunity to express their will. Such a time-consuming procedure capped the years of debate

leading to the reforms of 1970 that are intended to streamline the government. The principal features of the reforms were the introduction of a one-chamber parliament and the synchronization of elections so that national, provincial, and local contests all come due at the same time every 3 years. The old bicameral system was slow and required the consent of both chambers in order for the *Riksdag* to arrive at a decision. Furthermore, the Upper House, with 8-year terms and one-eighth of its members standing for election every year, was considered cumbersome. In January 1971 the first session of the new *Riksdag* convened.

The *Riksdag* is vested with the power to remove the government or an individual member of the Council of State immediately by a vote of no confidence. The only defensive move open to the government in such a case is to announce new elections within a week. The implementation of these reforms puts Sweden in step with the growing number of democracies in Western Europe which have embraced the idea of a directly elected unicameral legislature more responsive to the electorate.

Throughout some hundred-odd years of political experimentation, French constitutional influence has been evident. Thus, in 1970, Sweden moved from a more intricate "separation and balance of powers" political structure first elaborated by the 18th century rationalist Montesquieu to a system of lower house legislative supremacy practiced with only marginal success in France (and subsequently elsewhere) from 1877 to 1940 and from 1944 to 1958. The latter basic system has, however, worked relatively well in neighboring Scandinavian countries—a reflection in part of the more socially attuned pragmatism associated with the Nordic societies.

Although for the moment the Act of Succession remains intact, it has already been the subject of debate aimed at the very least toward a reduction of many of the traditional, *pro forma* acts of the crown. Under a constitutional reform bill to be presented to the *Riksdag* in 1973 and to become effective in 1975, the monarchy would be retained, but the King would have no voice in determining national policies.

Although the Constitution contains no formal bill of rights, traditional Swedish respect for individual rights and liberty is given effective expression in ordinary law and practice. The Constitution guarantees due process of law, the protection of private property, the inviolability of the home, and freedom of conscience and religion. The right of petition and freedom of speech and organization are not explicitly defined in the fundamental laws or in single pieces of legislation, but these principles are consistently observed in practice. With the introduction of the recent reforms Sweden has signaled its intention to enhance the "egalitarianism" it proudly considers to be its modern way of life.

2. Executive

a. Monarchy

The monarch must be a male member of the House of Bernadotte, not married to a commoner, and professing the pure Evangelical Lutheran faith as adopted and explained in the unaltered Augsburg Confession and in the Resolution of the Uppsala Meeting of 1593. The present Swedish King, Gustav VI Adolf, was born on 11 November 1882 and has reigned since 1950. The heir apparent is Crown Prince Carl Gustaf, the King's grandson, who was born in 1946 and attained his majority in 1971 when he became regent at age 25. As regent he is entitled to govern in the absence or incapacitation of the King. Carl Gustaf's father, the son of the present monarch, was killed in an airplane accident in 1947.

The King has influence but no real political power. According to the Constitution he is head of state, and as such his duties are many and varied, although by custom they have become largely ceremonial. Constitutionally the King has the power to make final executive decisions after consulting with the Council of State (*Statsrad*) or cabinet. In practice the King defers to the decisions of the cabinet, and the executive power is exercised by the King-in-Council (*Konungen i statsrad*), a procedure whereby the cabinet operates in the King's name. The King, nevertheless, can exercise some influence through giving advice to members of the cabinet and through his prerogative, albeit *pro forma*, to appoint the cabinet. Before naming a new Prime Minister, the King confers with the outgoing incumbent, the leaders of the non-Communist parties, and the speakers of the *Riksdag*, thus insuring the appointment of a cabinet which can work with the *Riksdag*. The King's signature must appear on all bills except those dealing with finances and appropriations before they can become law, but they must be countersigned by a minister who thereby assumes responsibility to the *Riksdag*. The King is constitutionally empowered to dismiss the cabinet or dissolve the *Riksdag* at any time. By tradition, however, he does not do the first, and he dissolves the *Riksdag* only at the request of the Prime Minister. Technically, the King has the power to veto a decision already approved by the cabinet, a power now rarely, if ever, exercised.

In addition to his cabinet responsibilities, the King appoints various other government officials, grants pardons, convenes the *Riksdag*, and opens the January session. He appoints and receives ambassadors, makes treaties, declares war, acts as commander-in-chief, and represents the Swedish state abroad.

The powers of the crown, already largely curtailed in practice, are likely to be further reduced. Proposed constitutional amendments are aimed at depriving the King of power to appoint the cabinet, a duty which some members of the *Riksdag* would transfer to its speaker. Another proposed amendment would exclude the King from all cabinet meetings. If adopted, such constitutional changes would for all practical purposes eliminate the monarchy and pave the way for the creation of a republic under presidential rule. The vast majority of Swedes have indicated that they wish to retain the monarchy, however, and such changes are not likely to come about without popular support.

b. Council of State

Executive power rests with the Council of State and the party or parties it represents. The Prime Minister is dominant, because he selects the other ministers, who are then formally appointed by the King. Furthermore, if the Prime Minister is incapacitated or resigns, the rest of the cabinet must also resign. The Prime Minister is usually the leader of the political party in power. With the exception of the ministers without portfolio, all ministers are generally members of the *Riksdag*, to which the cabinet is responsible. Ministers are entitled to address the *Riksdag*, even if they are not members. Since World War II all heads of ministries have been Social Democrats (Figure 1).

In addition to the 12 ministries, the present cabinet includes six ministers without portfolio: two legal consultants, and one consultant each for family affairs, educational matters, civil service, and foreign policy.[1] In January 1969 the Ministry of Industrial Affairs was formed to coordinate the activities of the official "economic units." These formerly semiautonomous government components are responsible for such diverse activities as the production and allocation of energy, technical development, atomic energy development, and the management of state-owned companies. The ministry channels government funds to these various enterprises, which still retain a significant measure of autonomy.

[1]For a current listing of key government officials consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.



FIGURE 1. Structure of the government (U/OU)

Major executive decisions regarding the preparation of legislation, the execution of laws, and the issuance of decrees are made in cabinet meetings presided over by the Prime Minister. The weekly sessions of the King-in-Council are merely the formal registration of these decisions. The King is informed in advance about the most important matters, more as an act of courtesy than anything else.

In contrast to other Western European governments, the Swedish ministries, with the exception of Foreign Affairs and Justice, do not directly administer national laws. They are small units, usually with no more than 100 persons, including the clerical staff. Their function is to aid the King-in-Council in



FIGURE 2. Stockholm Cultural Center. The new *Riksdag* is temporarily located in these facilities. (U/OU)

preparing legislation for presentation to the *Riksdag*, and for handling relations with it, and issuing executive orders to central administrative agencies. These semiautonomous agencies, which are usually headed by career civil servants, directly administer national laws. They operate independently of the ministries, deriving their authority by statute rather than from directives of the responsible ministry. Their routine administrative work includes the inspection and control of subordinate offices, and they sometimes act as administrative courts of appeal. Decisions, rulings, and regulatory decrees issued by the agencies may be invalidated by the cabinet or by the Supreme Administrative Court, but not by the individual ministers.

3. Legislative

The Swedish *Riksdag*, dating from 1435, is one of the oldest enduring parliaments in the world. The early *Riksdag* was composed of representatives from the four estates, but the *Riksdag* Act of 1866 dissolved this system and created a bicameral legislature, with the Upper House composed of representatives elected by provincial and local councils and the Lower House elected directly by voters in the constituencies. The bicameral system lost much of its "separation and balance" purpose with the advent of universal sufferage in 1921 and the subsequent full development of parliamentary government. Mounting agitation for the elimination of the Upper House, prompted in good measure because of its cumbersome, staggered mode of election, bore fruit in 1970. The government approved a constitutional reform that replaced the bicameral arrangement with an expanded unicameral legislature. The reconstituted single chamber has 350 seats, just 34 less than the combined strength of the previous houses. The elections in September 1970 were the first held for the new *Riksdag* and marked the concomitant adoption of a new electoral system under which elections for all parliamentary seats as well as for provincial and local offices are held concurrently every 3 years.

The first session of the single chamber *Riksdag* convened in January 1971 (Figure 2). Of its 350 members, 310 are elected from the 28 districts or constituencies on the basis of population. The remaining 40 seats—the so-called compensatory seats—are awarded on the basis of total national returns and tend to favor the major parties (see below, under Electoral Procedures). Candidacy to the *Riksdag* is open to all Swedish citizens who are 20 years of age on election day and who are registered voters.

Annual sessions of the *Riksdag* generally occupy 7 months. The first session convenes in early January and recesses in June. After this break the *Riksdag* reconvenes in October for a short fall session that usually ends before the Christmas holiday. The government has the right to dissolve the *Riksdag* and call for extraordinary elections. Such action, which in the past had been resorted to only infrequently, is facilitated by the new constitutional reforms.

The *Riksdag* is permitted to continue to work for as long as 5 months after the date for new elections has been set. If it is out of session during this interval, the Prime Minister may reconvene it. During the interim between the call for new elections and actual election, the terms of office for members remain in force and are terminated only when the newly elected representatives actually begin their tenures.

The *Riksdag* may censure the cabinet or any one of the ministers by calling for a vote of confidence. In calling for such a vote, the member must have the support of at least 10% of the *Riksdag*. The reasons for questioning an individual minister are never stated, and the voting issue is described by simply stating the minister's name. The motion is tabled until the second meeting after the one in which it is introduced, and the motion is subject to a vote not later than at the third meeting after the one in which it was introduced. The charge may be directed against the Prime Minister or against an individual minister. The entire cabinet must resign if an absolute majority votes against the Prime Minister. An absolute majority is also required to censure an individual minister, but only the minister in question is required to resign. In both cases, however, the Prime Minister has the right to decide within 10 days if the *Riksdag* is to be dissolved and if new elections are to be held.

Under the old bicameral system every member of the *Riksdag* was entitled to express his opinion on the floor without fear of interruption. It was not possible, however, to avoid a legislative decision by filibustering or otherwise prolonging debate. Parliamentary rules governing such conduct have long been detailed and specific. Because of the marked increase in size of the new parliament, some restrictions have been imposed on the time allowed for debate, in the interest of providing an opportunity for all members to speak. The speaker may suggest that during a particular session the *Riksdag* decide beforehand just how long each speaker is permitted to hold the floor. In such instances the limitations apply to all speakers, including ministers and party leaders.

Perhaps the most important single characteristic of the *Riksdag* is its system of standing committees, which number 16. The Committee of Supply, which deals with government appropriations, is the largest, with 45 members, followed by the Committees on the Constitution and Taxation (Ways and Means), with 27 members each. The other committees have 17 members each. *Ad hoc* committees to address special questions may be formed. The chairmanship and composition of the committees are distributed among all the parties; representation is usually in proportion to strength. Cabinet ministers are not permitted to be present at committee meetings but may be called upon to provide information to the committees. The speaker of the *Riksdag* and the three deputy speakers are also nominated through interparty agreements and are decided upon by a voice vote in the *Riksdag*, unless a secret ballot is requested by any one member.

During the first 15 days of each session every member is entitled to introduce motions on any subject. When government bills are introduced, members have from 10 to 15 days to offer amendments before the bills are referred to committee for thorough discussion. Committees often invite written comments on motions or occasionally hold closed door hearings on government bills. After a second reading, further amendments or adjustments may be made and then reconciled in committee. A bill must be passed or rejected on the third reading.

It is not possible to kill bills in committee, because all of them must be reported out of committee to the *Riksdag* in plenary session. Only rarely, and reportedly never for political reasons, is a bill held over and referred to the next session.

4. Judicial system

Swedish jurisprudence, which traces its origins to Old Norse common law, was first codified nationwide in the National Legal Codes of King Magnus Eriksson (c.1350). New codification, the General Code of 1734, was prompted by concepts of Roman law and by influences of the Enlightenment introduced by increased contacts with Europe south of the Baltic. Although complete penal and criminal procedure codes were included, they were almost immediately subject to revision because of the continuing strong influence of the Enlightenment. Most notable were the impact of the Italian criminologist Beccaria, the British jurist Blackstone, the French political philosopher Montesquieu, and the evolving German criminal law theories. British penology, relatively advanced for the period, also left its mark. Although continental influences continued to be felt in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, reformist impulses, indigenous and from across the North Sea,

remained stronger. Such influences, incorporated piecemeal for nearly a century, were definitively integrated into Swedish jurisprudence in the Penal Code of 1864 and the criminal procedure codes which shortly followed. Subsequent measures curtailing harshness were largely inspired by the Swedes themselves and may be seen in the reforms to the Penal Code adopted in 1890 and 1921, the latter abolishing the death penalty. The most signal advances in enlightened court procedure and penology, however, have been made since the early 1940's, when Sweden began to lead the world in the whole field of social welfare.

The independence of the Swedish judiciary from executive and legislative interference is assured by the constitution. The Justice Ombudsman (*justitieombudsman*) and the Chancellor of Justice—a high-ranking official attached directly to the cabinet, which the constitution refers to in this connection as the Royal Chancery—watch the courts for instances of judicial corruption and prosecute individual judges for malfeasance. Most judges are appointed by the King-in-Council, and all may serve until retirement at the age of 65. *Ad hoc* juries are used only in cases relating to freedom of the press.

a. Courts

There are three levels of ordinary courts: the courts of first instance, the courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court. Until 1971 the courts of the first instance comprised 120 state-financed district courts in rural areas and small towns and 30 locally financed city courts in the larger cities. As a result of a reorganization that came into effect that year, several district and local courts were merged to reduce the total number of courts of the first instance to 108; the ultimate goal is to consolidate to 100 such courts. Those that are amalgamated are presumably financed jointly by the state and urban community. All civil and criminal cases are initially tried in the courts of first instance. Each district court has a judge who is assisted by 18 citizens elected by the local councils. These laymen deliberate on questions of law as well as evidence and can, by unanimous vote, overrule the judges. The principal official in the local lower court system is the president or chief magistrate, who is assisted by a number of other judges and judicial trainees. Minor cases may be heard by a single judge, whereas a panel of seven to nine judges hears the most serious cases. A decision requires a majority vote of the judges or, in the event of a tie, the decision of the one presiding judge prevails.

An appeal from a court of first instance goes to one of the six courts of appeal, located in Stockholm, Gotegorg,[2] Malmo, Jonkoping, Umea, and Sundsvall. Each court has a presiding judge, a varying number of associate and assistant judges, and two or more division heads who are also qualified judges. Each division specializes in certain types of civil and criminal cases and is normally composed of five of the court judges. Four are sufficient to decide a case provided three of them agree.

The Supreme Court (*hogsta domstolen*) is the court of final appeal in most instances. It is composed of 24 justices, 21 of whom form three panels of seven justices each. As few as five justices may hear a case. Decisions by the court are made by majority vote. In case of a tie, the vote of the presiding justice is deciding in civil cases. In criminal cases a tie results in acquittal, or if the disagreement is over the severity of the sentence, the lightest sentence proposed. The Supreme Court as such does not review national legislation for constitutionality; however, the Law Council, operating outside the court system and made up of three justices from the Supreme Court and one justice from the Supreme Administrative Court, reviews governmental legislative proposals for constitutionality before their submission to the *Riksdag*. The council's opinion is only advisory but is almost always followed by the government.

The Supreme Administrative Court is one of several special courts designed to protect the individual citizen against bureaucratic abuses of authority. Its 16 members handle cases sent up by lower administrative authorities (including the ombudsmen) for final decisions and also cases on appeal from the central administrative agencies which involve alleged abuse of power by administrative officials against private citizens. Theoretically, the National Court of Impeachment tries cabinet ministers and members of the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court for malfeasance or failure to carry out their duties, but it has not been convened since 1854. The Labor Court, consisting of two jurists, two representatives each from the Federation of Trade Unions (LO) and the Swedish Employers Confederation (SAF), one representative from the Central Organization of Salaried Workers, and one member representing the public, settles disputes arising from labor-management contracts. Other special courts are the water rights, land partition, and expropriation courts.

[2]For diacritics on place names see the list of names at the end of the chapter.

Judges of the courts of first instance and courts of appeal are law school graduates who attain their positions after 15 to 20 years of experience in the judicial civil service. Most Supreme Court justices are also chosen from the judicial civil service, but prominent attorneys and law professors are occasionally appointed to the high court bench. In terms of salary and prestige the justices of the Supreme Court and the presiding judges of the six courts of appeal rank highest. The division heads of the courts of appeal are next in importance. District court judges and city court chief judges generally enjoy equal distinction.

b. Penal system

The Swedes share with their Scandinavian neighbors the most enlightened penal system in the world. In the post-World War II period there has been a strong movement for uniformity in criminal law and in prison systems throughout the Nordic area.

Confined persons in Sweden may not only receive visits from relatives and friends but are given frequent furloughs to visit their homes. Long-term inmates are sometimes afforded the opportunity of spending several days during the summer with their spouses in pleasant accommodations rented from the state at cost by the spouse. The regular prison facilities are generally adequate to handle the prison population comfortably, and treatment of inmates is humane. The amount of psychiatric care available, however, is considered inadequate, and authorities are striving to remedy this. Only prison guards assigned to maximum security areas carry firearms. Swedish penologists are loathe to risk inflicting bodily harm on inmates in their custody, a "punishment," they rationalize, for which there would be no justification within the law.

In 1968 about 8,000 persons were given probationary sentences for crimes punishable by imprisonment. Another 10,000 were given prison terms, many for only a few months. The number of inmates in Sweden at any given time is about 5,000 in a total population of over 8 million. There are some 3,100 prison employees, or nearly one staff member for every two prisoners. Many criminals, particularly young people, are given institutional treatment for 6 to 8 weeks and then placed under a supervisor who is similar to a probation officer. The supervisors, who number some 10,000, are selected, well adjusted, and respected individuals who act as big brothers to minor lawbreakers and first offenders. They get a symbolic payment, about US$5 a month, for their efforts.

All fines except for drunkenness and disorderly conduct are set in a fixed number of units called "day-fines," a holdover in terminology from an earlier era when the poor had to pay imposed fines in daily installments. The contemporary day-fines range in number from one to 120, depending upon the seriousness of offense. A maximum of 180 day-fines may be imposed if several crimes are punished concurrently. The amount of a single day-fine varies, depending avowedly on the offender's ability to pay. This amount is then multiplied by the number of day-fines imposed, largely predetermined in the penal code by the nature of the specific offense. A single day-fine may vary in amount from SKr2 to SKr500.

Sweden, like other Scandinavian countries, has no juvenile courts. Child welfare boards, elected by the local councils, deal with all cases of socially maladjusted and delinquent juveniles under 15 years of age; they are also empowered to deal with juveniles between 15 and 17 whose cases call for special corrective measures. Offenders aged 18 to 20 years may be remanded to care under the Child Welfare Act, even though the regular correctional system is responsible for offenders after they reach their 18th birthday. The child welfare boards afford advisory assistance, admonish the parents, and supervise the child's regime under preventive procedures. Taking a child into custody for social care is the last resort. Institutions for child care are administered locally by public authorities or, in certain instances, privately. Youth welfare schools for lawbreakers are operated by the state.

5. Provincial and local government

The marked responsiveness of government to the governed in Sweden—a typically Scandinavian phenomenon—stems in important measure from the traditional vitality of the provincial and local councils. Nonetheless, during the almost four decades of Social Democratic political domination, the central government has steadily encroached on purely local prerogatives. This erosion of local autonomy, opposed by the other parties and perhaps by a majority of the electorate, and a probable campaign issue in the 1973 elections, showed signs of easing in early 1972.

Of the national government agencies, the Ministry of Interior exerts the widest range of influence over the provincial and local governments. It prepares national legislation affecting them and considers appeals which arise from decisions or actions of local officials; at the provincial levels it supervises the National Police, the firefighting and civil defense systems, and the administration of the comprehensive national health programs. Other ministries with extensive local authority are Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs,

Finance and Economy, and Social Affairs. Both the Justice Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice are empowered to investigate the activities of provincial and local government officials and prosecute or arrange for prosecution for dereliction of duty.

For administrative purposes, Sweden is divided into provinces and towns, boroughs, and rural communes. All are responsive to their respective constituencies.

a. Provincial government

Each of the 24 provinces (*lanner*), is headed by a governor (*landshovding*); the city of Stockholm has special status and is administered by a governor general. Each governor is assisted by an administrative staff—the provincial executive board and the Office of the Governor General in Stockholm. The governors and top officials of their staffs, although appointed by the King-in-Council, follow the directives of the Ministry of Interior, to which they are in most cases responsible. The governors act as the principal agents of the national government, insuring that national laws are carried out and that national interests and property are protected. The provincial executive boards administer and supervise a variety of activities, including tax assessment and collection, civil defense, social welfare, firefighting, roads and traffic control, and police. The provincial chief of police is directly responsible to the board and is considered a board official. The police chiefs of Stockholm, Gotcborg, Malmo, and Norrkoping are independent of the provincial chiefs of police but are responsible to the provincial board, or in the case of Stockholm to the Office of the Governor General.

Each province is governed by a council; densely populated Kalmar is divided into two administrative areas. Provincial councils are elected every 3 years on a proportional representation system by all citizens 18 years of age and over. Each council selects an executive committee of at least five members who may be members of the council or brought in from outside. This committee prepares and administers the budget, manages property, prepares an annual report of government activities for the council, and represents the council between sessions. It must approve all matters to be brought before the council except when the board calls a special session of the council. Special meetings of the council may also be called by the members, the executive committee, or the King-in-Council. Procedures are similar to those of the *Riksdag*. Legislative proposals may be made by the governor, the provincial board, the council itself, or individual members. Council decisions are considered to be ordinances, not laws. Provincial council legislation deals principally with health and care of sick, vocational and adult education, and social welfare. The densely populated cities of Goteborg, Malmo, and Norrkoping are governed by semiautonomous city councils that deal directly with the national government, maintaining only limited ties to their respective provinces. Greater Stockholm is governed by a joint city and provincial council of 100 popularly elected members. It appoints a board of 12 aldermen from its own members to supervise administrative functions. This council also elects nine directors to head the city departments—finance, property, social welfare, cultural and educational matters, industry, city employees, hospitals, suburban planning, and housing and construction.

b. Local government

In 1970 the basic units of local government accounted for 848 local administrative councils. In 1946 the *Riksdag* approved a proposal to consolidate the many sparsely populated rural communes into larger ones, a process which continues gradually. The 2,281 communes which existed in 1952 had been reduced to 624 in 1970 by a process of merger and consolidation. In addition to the communes, 132 towns and 92 boroughs have elected local governments. The process of consolidation aims at achieving an efficient proportion of population in every local unit by 1975. Industrial development and expansion could cause shifts in population that will require additional restructuring of the local governments after 1975, but the basic framework will have been developed.

Each local government is headed by a council, elected on a proportional representation basis by all citizens 20 years of age and over, with a membership ranging from 15 to 60. The council appoints an executive committee consisting of five to 11 members; it prepares the agenda for council meetings, administers property, directs administration, and generally protects local interests. The council also appoints other committees to deal with elections, construction, civil defense, health and care of the sick, and other community interests. Local as well as provincial governments may levy taxes; they may also borrow money with the approval of the national government. With the consent of the King-in-Council, heavily populated areas within a rural commune have been formed into special communities; these units remain part of the rural communes but have councils of their own to deal with special problems created by their urban characteristics.

In order to handle the growing duties of local governments more efficiently, many communes have joined to form cooperative associations. Since 1957 these associations have been empowered by law to create councils and executive committees from among their members. An association functioning as a council may not levy taxes but may request financial contributions from the participating governments. In addition to these associations, communities may form special associations to further cooperation in regional planning, traffic direction, and civil defense.

C. Political dynamics (C)

Significant social and economic factors have contributed to the stable evolution of Swedish politics in the present century. Noninvolvement in external wars for a century and a half, the exceptional ethnic homogeneity of the population, and a decentralized and diversified industrial base of the economy have helped foster a spirit of cooperation and pragmatism. Political compromise has become normal in the effort to avoid any disruption of orderly socioeconomic growth. Although recent developments have introduced some instability into the political system, the traditional pattern still holds for the most part.

This stable parliamentary government matured only during the past four decades. As elsewhere in Europe, modern political parties developed in Sweden in the latter 19th century along essentially class lines and engaged in somewhat the same class struggles. The fundamental domestic issues of the past—the nature and extent of parliamentary government, extension of the suffrage, the respective roles of government and free enterprise in the economic system, and the institution of state-directed social welfare—were largely resolved by the early 1930's. The cooperative effort in governing Sweden has provided a model for the other Nordic countries.

Since the mid-1950's the non-Communist political parties have broadened their platforms, each one attempting to attract the floating vote, chiefly of farmers, small businessmen, and the growing group of white-collar workers. A system of proportional representation in national and local elections, while tending to disfavor the smaller parties, distributes the seats broadly in accordance with the popular vote. Major and sudden changes in the strength of the significant parties tend to be rare, as are radical shifts in public opinion. On the other hand, in line with the rising tide of revolt among many Swedish youths, they tend not to follow traditional voting patterns but to shift to more extreme positions on the right and particularly the left.

There are five major political parties: the Swedish Social Democratic Workers Party—usually called the Social Democratic Party, drawing most of its support from the workers; the Center Party (CP), supported primarily by white-collar workers and farmers; the Liberal Party (FP), representing for the most part the middle class; the Moderate Coalition Party (MP—often called the Conservatives), supported principally by the upper social and economic sectors of the population but with some middle class backing; and the small Party of the Left-Communist (VPK), made up of workers with a sizable admixture of professional and intellectual groups and gaining support among youth. During the 1920's and early 1930's no combination of parties with a parliamentary majority proved possible, and consequently the government rotated among the Social Democrats, Liberals, and Conservatives, each making compromises in order to gain office and to get legislation enacted. By 1932, however, the Social Democratic Party had gained sufficient popular support to enable it to become dominant, and for the next four decades it governed alone or in coalition with the Center Party, or, as during World War II, in a national coalition with all the other non-Communist parties (Figure 3). The comprehensive social welfare legislation in force today was enacted over the past four decades, frequently with the support of the Liberal and Conservative opposition in return for compromises on other issues. Between 1957 and 1968 the SAP governed alone without majority parliamentary support. As a minority government it frequently had to rely on its majority in the Upper House or occasionally on the support of the Communists in the Lower House. In 1968 the Social Democrats won an absolute majority, but their numerical supremacy disappeared in the 1970 elections. In the new *Riksdag* the Social Democrats have been able to muster a majority on most issues with the support of one or more of the bourgeois parties (Moderate Coalition, Liberal, Center).

Minor parties have played a limited role in Swedish politics. The only such party of any significance in the last 15 years is the Christian Democratic Union (KDS), a rightwing splinter group whose principal objective is an expanded role for Christianity in Swedish everyday life. It appeared in the 1964 elections and received 1.8% of the vote but no seats. It was still active in the 1970 election, and while improving on its 1968 returns (in the expanded electorate) by 0.3%, was unable to do any better than its initial showing of 1.8%. The maverick Bourgeois Rally Party in southern Sweden

FIGURE 3. Governments since 1932 (U/OU)

PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT	PRIME MINISTER	TENURE
Social Democratic	Per Albin Hansson (S)	Oct. 1932 Mar. 1936.
Agrarian*	A. Pehrsson-Bramstorp (A)	Mar. 1936 Sep. 1936.
Social Democratic and Agrarian	Per Albin Hansson (S)	Sep. 1936 Dec. 1939.
Social Democratic, Agrarian, Liberal, and Conservative.**	Per Albin Hansson (S)	Dec. 1939 Aug. 1945.
Social Democratic	Per Albin Hansson (S) (Died in office; succeeded by Tage Erlander Oct. 1946.)	Aug. 1945 Oct. 1951.
Social Democratic and Agrarian	Tage Erlander (S)	Oct. 1951 Oct. 1957.
Social Democratic	Tage Erlander (S)	Oct. 1957 Oct. 1969.
Social Democratic	Olof Palme (S)	Oct. 1969 present.

S = Social Democratic.
A = Agrarian.
*Became the Center Party in 1958.
**Became the Moderate Coalition Party in 1969.

managed to take three parliamentary seats in 1964, but two of these eventually reunited with their original parties. The tiny Communist League for Marxists-Leninists (KFML) participates in elections but received a scant 0.4% of the vote in 1970.

1. Social Democratic Party

a. Membership and electoral strength

The Social Democratic Party, founded in 1889, is Sweden's largest party in terms of popular support and actual membership. Since 1917 it has regularly polled more votes in national elections than any other party, and after 1914 it consistently held the largest number of seats in the Lower House of the *Riksdag*. In the 1970 elections the Social Democrats obtained 45.3% of the popular vote, down from their all time high in 1968 (Figure 4). In size the party is almost four and a half times larger than its nearest competitor; its 1967 membership of some 886,000 was 11.2% of the total Swedish population that year. More than 70% of the Social Democrats' strength is the trade union movement, but the party also has considerable support among white-collar workers and small businessmen and, to a lesser extent, among intellectuals.

The landslide victory of the Social Democrats in 1968 was in good measure attributable to the efficient organization of the election campaign, which had been stimulated by the heavy losses sustained in the local elections in 1966. All parties campaigned vigorously, however, resulting in a Swedish election record: 89% of the eligible voters cast their ballots. Nearly all of the 620,000 young people eligible to vote for the first time participated and were probably attracted to the modern, progressive Social Democratic platform. The impact of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which occurred less than 4 weeks before the election, clearly deterred many who would normally have voted Communist. Most of these disenchanted leftists shifted their votes to the Social Democrats.



FIGURE 4. Trends in voting since 1944 (U/OU)

FIGURE 5. Party seats in the *Riksdag*: Lower House, 1944–68; unicameral, 1970 (U/OU)

YEAR	SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC	LIBERAL	MODERATE COALITION*	CENTER**	COMMUNIST	OTHER	TOTAL
1944.....	115	26	39	35	15	0	230
1948.....	112	57	23	30	8	0	230
1952.....	110	58	31	26	5	0	230
1956.....	106	58	42	19	6	0	231
1958.....	111	38	45	32	5	0	231
1960.....	114	40	39	34	5	0	232
1964.....	113	42	32	35	8	***3	233
1968.....	125	34	32	39	3	0	233
1970.....	163	58	41	71	17	0	350

*Formerly the Conservative Party; became the Moderate Coalition Party in 1969.
**Formerly the Agrarian Party; became the Center-Agrarian Party in 1957, and the Center Party in 1958.
***One deputy subsequently joined the Liberals and one the Conservatives.

In 1970 the Social Democratic Party lost its majority in the *Riksdag*, partly because the apostate Communists who had defected to the Social Democrats in 1968 returned to their party fold (Figure 5). The Social Democrats attributed their bad showing to a lackluster campaign and voter apathy; they pointed out that a lower percentage of voters turned out than in the 1968 elections. They found it necessary to tailor some controversial legislation to suit the Communists in order to assure a majority of support in parliament. While the bourgeois parties still lack the real cohesion necessary to unseat the Social Democrats, as evidenced by the latters' success in gaining occasional support from the Center Party, the bourgeois parties have moved closer together since November 1971 in the face of Prime Minister Palme's confrontation politics.

b. Organization and leadership

The SAP is the best organized of the non-Communist political parties. Discipline has been generally well maintained despite the increase in internal strains during the past few years. The highest authority is the party congress, made up of 350 delegates elected by the members by a system of proportional representation. Theoretically the congress is the highest policymaking body; because it usually meets only once every 3 years, however, most of the actual power, except the election of all principal national officials, rests in the hands of the national and executive committees. The national committee, made up of 28 members selected by the congress, meets regularly once a year as the highest authority between congresses. In this capacity it makes policy regarding all aspects of party activity. The national committee selects seven of its members, who must be Stockholm residents, to act as the executive committee. This body meets at least once a month and has the primary function of carrying out decisions of the congress and national committee. Its seven members are the SAP chairman and secretary, who are *ex officio* members; the chairman of the LO, with which the SAP has close ties; the executive director of the Central Organization of Salaried Employees (TCO); and three top party leaders in the cabinet, other than the chairman. The head of the party chairs its parliamentary group and also serves as the Prime Minister. The secretary is responsible for executing party policies and decisions and coordinating all national activities. The national organization is duplicated on the district and local levels. District committees act as liaison between national headquarters and the labor communes, which are the basic units for recruiting and training members and propagandizing the electorate. These communes also set up special party associations in residential areas and clubs in places of work; their main function is to counteract Communist activity through political propaganda.

To train future leaders the SAP uses the Workers Educational Association, organized by the party and the LO in 1912, to complement the regular school system and provide general education. The Swedish Social Democratic Youth Association (SSU) provides young people with more practical training in party and national affairs. The SSU, which was organized in 1917, is the second largest and most influential political youth group in Sweden and had some 72,000 members in 1972. In addition to being a source of future party leaders, the SSU is a vehicle for conducting educational and propaganda activities within the party and among the electorate. At the

congress in 1970, the SSU was chided for being a debating society and out of touch with the workers. Trade unionist leader Arne Geijer warned the congress that his powerful labor organization, a major component of the LO, would establish a competing socialist youth group from among its 400,000 young workers, but this threat appeared to be stemmed following the SSU Congress in June 1972.

As Erlander's confidant and protege for 15 years, Palme acted as the stalking horse for the party's leftwing. A sharp critic of U.S. policies in Southeast Asia, Palme contributed to the increasing strain in Swedish-U.S. relations by marching alongside a North Vietnamese diplomat in a demonstration against the United States in February 1968. This gesture endeared him to leftwing elements but caused disquiet among much of the party's leadership and rank and file. The sweeping victory of the Social Democrats in September 1968 and the certainty of his succession to the leadership led Palme to try to improve his standing with the more conservative trade union and middle class members. In the months before the congress in 1969, Palme stressed the theme of unity among conflicting elements in Swedish society and tried to soften the more radical image that had characterized his political style since 1965.

Strengthened by the Social Democrats' majority in parliament and their unanimous endorsement of his policies, Prime Minister Palme gained a sense of confidence. The initial disenchantment began a few weeks after he assumed office, when Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson riled Swedish businessmen by presenting long-range plans to aid North Vietnam as concrete measures to be taken in the near future. Palme was forced to quiet the clamor and conciliate local commercial interest by downplaying Nilsson's remarks. Although Palme succeeded in mollifying more conservative opinion, his image as a champion of leftwing causes was tarnished. The 2-month long wildcat strike in December 1969 by miners in the state-owned iron mines in Norrbotten threatened to spread to other industries. The strikers' grievances, not all economic, included charges of indifference on the part of the government as well as the unions to the welfare of the miners. Palme condemned the strike, thus further alienating labor militants, but acknowledged that the workers' complaints had some validity. Leftist supporters became even more dissatisfied when Palme reacted to the announcement of U.S. military operations in Cambodia by delivering only a mild rebuke. His seeming abandonment of leftist causes probably contributed to Communist gains in the 1970 election.

Growing unemployment and business failures continued to plague Palme through 1971, and in the fall he was forced to release government funds for investment. This move appeased business interests and was designed to get the economy through the winter with the expectation that production and employment would improve with the normal cyclical upturn in the spring. The Social Democrats are pledged to maintain Sweden's high standard of living, and unless Palme can improve the domestic economy, the authority of the leaders may be sharply challenged by more radical elements within the party.

c. Program and policies

The Social Democrats in Sweden, like those in other Scandinavian countries, abandoned their purely Marxist doctrines of class warfare and socialization of the means of production at an early date and developed into a moderate, reformist party. This change was effected under moderate leaders, who found it necessary to compromise and cooperate with other parties in order to establish universal suffrage, parliamentarianism, and an advanced system of social security and welfare. It became apparent that the party had to broaden its membership base to include traditionally middle class groups if it were to continue in power. The party adopted government-administered social and economic programs which have sought to maintain a mixed economy, in which private enterprise would remain dominant, but publicly owned companies would operate most public utilities and certain basic industries.

The question of the extent of state intervention in the economy is still an issue in Sweden, but only the Communists and a handful of radical Socialists support nationalization of all privately owned industries and business enterprises. Approximately 93% of Sweden's total industrial production remained in private hands in 1970. Only about 200,000 workers, 6% of the total gainfully employed labor force, were employed [redacted] government-owned or government-controlled firms. The formation of the Ministry of Industrial Affairs in 1969, however, presaged some measure of increased official initiative in managing the economy. The first major project of the new ministry was the formation and operation of additional state-owned industries. But plans to buy up failing small businesses proved so costly that they had to be drastically modified.

Because the SAP has been dominant for many years, a number of party policies have become government policy. At home the party has supported social welfare and insurance programs as a means of raising the

living standards of lower income groups, and programs for increasing the income of the rural population to attract its support. It has also backed changes in the school system in an effort to bring educational facilities above the elementary level within the reach of larger numbers of the lower income groups. The party program continues to place greatest emphasis on traditional goals, such as maintaining full employment, raising the standard of living of lower income groups, and increasing productivity in order to enable Sweden to compete in world markets. These relatively noncontroversial goals have the support of most Swedes, whereas some of the party's more recently enunciated proposals—such as increased government planning and control over banking and industries—have been sharply attacked and are likely to face considerable opposition.

One of the most crucial problems facing the party, and a potential threat to its dominant position in Swedish political life, is the continuing high rate of inflation. The "temporary" price freeze instituted by the government in October 1970 remained in effect until January 1972. Plant closures and unemployment reached serious proportions in the winter of 1971-72. A tax reform bill adopted in May 1972, which gives relief to lower and middle income groups by increasing pay roll taxes for the employer, threatens to prolong unemployment difficulties.

In foreign affairs the SAP supports Sweden's traditional policy of nonalliance and neutrality. The party reflects the views of the overwhelming majority of Swedes, who remain opposed to membership in NATO, despite the fact that Sweden identifies itself with the other Western democracies. The Social Democrats are also opposed to full membership for Sweden in the EC because of the political and military ties to the Western alliance entailed by membership. Nevertheless, the government recognizes the reality of economic dependence on the EC countries as markets for Swedish products and is prepared to negotiate a treaty providing for an industrial free-trade arrangement that would protect many economic interests of Sweden without requiring it to assume political obligations that would compromise its neutrality. The attitudes of party leaders and the rank and file toward the U.S.S.R. do not differ markedly from other segments of Swedish society. Despite certain ideological affinities between social democracy and communism, most party supporters remain suspicious of Soviet intentions toward the non-Communist world and are repelled by the atmosphere of coercion and fear that characterize life in the Soviet Union.

Since the early 1960's domestic political considerations have impelled the SAP to assume a more neutral stance in its foreign policy. Young activist members of the leftwing, restless over what they regarded as a trend to the right by the SAP, criticized the leaders for their stand on a number of foreign policy issues. In mid-1965 the more radical element began to press for an independent, "Social Democratic" foreign policy that would alter the party's traditional commitment to nonalignment and reluctance to criticize either the East or the West and lead to a more vigorious approach to foreign policy issues. As international opinion began increasingly to focus on Vietnam, there was growing pressure on the party leaders to adopt an anti-U.S. position on this issue. In order to forestall possible defections from its leftwing to the Communists, the SAP leaders decided to placate the left on foreign policy issues, while advocating a middle-of-the-road approach to domestic problems. This was an effort to minimize opposition from its moderate labor following. At first, the move to the left was limited to public remarks by prominent government leaders. In January 1969, however, the Swedish Government became the first Nordic country to recognize North Vietnam, placing a considerable strain on relations with the United States. After Palme became Prime Minister, the government sought to dissociate itself from the strident anti-Americanism of the party's leftwing that had clouded bilateral relations. The ebb and flow of anti-Americanism have since been subject to the degree of fighting in the combat zone. With the intensification of the Vietnam war in the spring of 1972, leaders in the *Riksdag*, led by the Prime Minister, stepped up their harsh criticism of the United States.

There is considerable division within the party regarding the size and mission of national defense forces. Most members hold that Sweden should maintain sufficient forces to deter a potential aggressor, but there is also widespread sentiment that military expenditures should be reduced in order to permit further expansion of social welfare benefits. Indeed, Swedish military commanders predicted a significant reduction in the effectiveness of the military as a result of inadequate defense appropriations passed by the *Riksdag* in June 1972.

d. Press and finances

Since the demise of the morning daily *Stockholms-Tidningen* in 1966, the Malmo morning daily *Arbetet* (Labor) has been the principal organ of the Social Democratic Party. The Stockholm daily *Aftonbladet* represents the views of the leftwing and has the larger

circulation. In addition to these two leading dailies, the party publishes a number of small daily newspapers throughout Sweden, the majority of which are owned by the trade unions in the LO and operate in the red. The LO and the SAP subsidize many of the papers. The party's chief source of income is membership dues, which vary in amount in different parts of the country. Another source is payment to the national committee by the labor communes and the party district committees, which carry on organizational work at a local level with one committee to each district. They assess extra dues for election campaigns and special drives.

2. Center Party

a. Membership and electoral strength

The Center Party was originally established as the Farmers' Union in 1913, subsequently took the name Agrarian Party, and then, in 1957, became the Center-Agrarian Party in order to appeal to nonrural elements; its present name was adopted a year later. From 1944 to 1964 the party generally ranked fourth in popular appeal, although it moved to third place in terms of seats won in the national elections of 1948 and 1964. It incurred its greatest electoral losses while cooperating with the Social Democrats from 1951 to 1957, after which it made steady though modest gains. In the provincial and local elections of 1966 the party won 15.2% of the total vote compared with 13.4% in 1964. Its successes at the polls continued in the national elections of 1968 and 1970. It is the second party in terms of electoral support and third in size of membership, with approximately 120,000 members in 1969. No longer only a farmers' party, the CP derives much support from office and factory workers.

b. Organization and leadership

The structure of the Center Party is somewhat similar to that of the Liberal and Moderate Coalition Parties (see below), but its tighter organization is more like that of the Social Democrats. The highest authority, the annually assembled national convention, elects the party chairman and two vice chairmen, who sit *ex officio* on the national committee. The national committee, most of whose members are elected by the district organization, prepares the agenda of the national convention and advises the eight-member executive committee. This committee—principally through its appointed secretariat—directs the affairs of the party between conventions. Four members of the executive committee are elected by the national committee and four by the convention, to which it is responsible. On the district and local levels the national organization is reflected in smaller scale replicas. The basic unit of party organization is the local section.

The Center Party relies heavily on its auxiliary organizations to supplement and expand its activities. The Center Party Youth Association is the largest of all the politically based youth groups, with some 90,000 members in 1969. It has won a considerable following among rural youth through educational and recreational activities—including study courses, lectures, and sports and travel facilities—and provides training for future party leaders. Educational activities are also conducted by the the Center Women's League, which had 60,000 members in 1969, and by its student organization, the Swedish Rural Student Association. Party propaganda work is promoted by a special press association.

A change in the party leadership occurred in June 1971, when the 70-year-old Gunnar Hedlund stepped down after serving for 22 years as head of the party. His protege and successor, the 44 year-old Thorbjorn Falldin, inherited a clear title to head any eventual bourgeois coalition that may result from the 1973 elections. On the basis of the last two elections party fortunes appear to be rising, and as opposition leader in the *Riksdag*, Falldin is likely to be an important leader on the political scene. His parliamentary experience is equal to Palme's, both leaders having entered the *Riksdag* in 1958. Moreover, Hedlund's retirement 2 years before the next election has given Falldin ample time to establish himself with the electorate.

c. Program and policies

Since 1958 the domestic program of the Center Party has been designed mainly to expand its appeal beyond farming groups. The program emphasizes the need to find a balance between the concentration of economic power in private and public spheres, the need for individual enterprise, and the promotion of decentralized self-government as a means of protecting the individual from the "experts" and "society planners." The program also maintains that all "small enterprise" rather than just the small farmers should be protected and favored. In practice, party leaders continue to favor the farmers' interests, advocating increased government subsidies to supplement agricultural income and improved rural living conditions, expanded credit facilities, and reduced taxes on lower incomes. The party favors social welfare and security programs, but wants to impose limits on government expenditures for them.

In foreign affairs the Center Party strongly supports the traditional Swedish policy of neutrality and nonalliance. The party's aversion to the Common Market reportedly contributed to Palme's decision to seek something less than full membership in it. Although the party tends to be isolationist, the leaders and the rank and file are equally strong in support of democratic ideals and identify Sweden with the Western European and American democracies. Members have been inclined to question increased defense expenditures, but once convinced of such a need, they have gone along with the other non-Communist parties in supporting the reorganization and modernization of the defense forces, in contrast to some of their Norwegian and Danish counterparts. On the Vietnam issue, the party has tended to take a middle-of-the-road position.

d. Press and finances

The Center Party has no newspaper which is read on a nationwide scale. Its leading organ is the Malmo-published *Skanska Dagbladet* (Skane Daily News), which has a relatively small circulation. In 1969 the party published only 18 daily newspapers throughout Sweden. Because the party keeps the sources of its funds confidential, there are no estimates of its financial status. The local sections keep about 20% of the dues collected and forward the remainder to the district organizations, which, in turn, keep 80% of the amounts received and forward the balance to higher units.

3. Liberal Party

a. Membership and electoral strength

The Liberal Party, organized in 1934 by the merger of the Enlightened People's Party and the Swedish Liberal Party, has been one of the principal opposition parties throughout most of the postwar era. Its electoral support has varied from about 15% to 20% of the popular vote. In size the Liberals rank fourth among the parties, with a 1969 membership of about 100,000. Support comes from disparate elements—basically middle class but often with conflicting interests—including white-collar workers, small businessmen, small farmers, professional groups, and some financial and industrial interests. Its most dependable supporters are members of nonconformist Protestant sects and the temperance movement.

b. Organization and leadership

In some structural aspects the Liberal Party is similar to the SAP. Its lines of authority, however, are not nearly as clearly defined; it is probably the most loosely organized of the Swedish parties. The highest authority is the national party convention, which is composed of 360 delegates and meets every 3 years. All but seven of the delegates are elected by the district party organizations on a proportional basis. The convention includes four representatives of the party's parliamentary group, and one representative each of the youth, women's, and press associations. A 68-member advisory council, chaired by the national chairman and including 10 members elected by the national convention and a representative of each of the district organizations and of the two special Stockholm districts, meets once a year to make decisions on matters not taken up by the convention. The 27-member national committee, which consists of the chairman, secretary, 22 members elected by the national convention, and the chairmen of the youth, women's, and press associations, meets at least three times a year. Activities of the executive committee are determined by the national committee, and it names special committees to collaborate on recruitment, organization, and propaganda.

The national committee selects nine of its members to form the executive committee, which, together with the secretary, carries out the decisions of the national committee, the advisory council, and the convention, and directs the day-to-day activities of the party between conventions. The national organization is duplicated on the district and local levels in much the same way as that of the SAP, except that the basic units at the lowest level are designated "local sections," and propaganda activity is carried on mainly by the district organizations.

The Liberal Party depends to a great extent on auxiliary organizations to supplement its own activity in training party leaders. The most important of these organizations is the Liberal Youth League (FPU), established in 1934. The FPU plays an important role in carrying on general educational as well as propaganda activities. The party maintains a women's organization, the Liberal Women's Association, and the Liberal Student Association.

The Liberal Party is headed by chairman Gunnar Helen, who succeeded Sven Weden in 1969 when he retired because of poor health. One of the primary problems facing Helen when he took charge was the increasingly radical tone of the youth organization, which threatened to destroy the unity of the party. The results of the 1970 elections suggest that Helen may have succeeded in taking some of the sting out of the vocal youth group and placating more conservative elements. The known friendship of the

chairman toward the United States, however, makes him vulnerable to further criticism from the dissident element of the party.

c. Program and policies

The Liberals have had difficulty developing a program on which their heterogenous supporters could continue to unite, once the goals of a parliamentary democracy and universal suffrage were attained more than a half century ago. Since World War II the platform in domestic affairs has been designed to attract a broad spectrum of voters and in general does not differ greatly from that of the SAP, except that the Liberals put more stress on restricting intervention by the state in the economy. The party supports a comprehensive system of social and economic security, along with opportunities for education and vocational training; it has generally backed Social Democratic efforts to eliminate gross inequalities in the distribution of income through taxation and social welfare programs. The Liberals have accepted the supplementary retirement pension system as a scheme "that has come to stay," although they oppose the turnover or value added tax (which contributes to the revenue needed for financing the social welfare programs) as unnecessary and call instead for less lavish spending. They also favor profit-sharing in industry, a shorter working period during the year through either longer vacations or more free Saturdays, and the promotion of rural development by official support for light industrial and commercial development in the countryside. Policies regarding foreign and defense matters have reflected differences among the factions. Platforms in recent years have been purposefully broad and vague in stating objectives. On foreign policy the Liberals advocate cooperation with other peoples to promote international order and peace and to increase international trade. Party leaders support the traditional nonalliance and neutrality policy. A small wing, however, consisting mostly of urban and military elements, has long advocated Swedish membership in NATO. The party is divided over the issue of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, despite the fact that some leaders are strong supporters of U.S. policy in general. The radical leftwing minority, including members of the FPU, has vociferously criticized the United States, and the Liberal Student Association vigorously championed Swedish recognition of North Vietnam. The Vietnam issue appears to have become a distraction which has diverted various elements of the party from focusing on special objectives, such as disestablishment of the church and dissolution of the monarchy.

In military matters the Liberals have consistently favored a strong defense but have supported reductions in the military budget in line with their support for fiscal discipline across the board. Despite fairly general agreement among leaders and many of the rank and file that greater defense efforts were necessary, both the Liberal and Center Parties reluctantly went along with the government's decision in 1967 to maintain defense spending at existing levels in order to permit an expansion of various social welfare programs. Although the decision of the Liberals may have stemmed in part from a desire to placate the party's antimilitarist youth, it more significantly reflected the practical politics that have become a tradition in Sweden.

d. Press and finances

The two leading dailies supporting the Liberal Party, the Stockholm-published *Dagens Nyheter* and *Expressen*, are the most widely read of all Swedish newspapers; the *Goteborgs-Posten*, another Liberal paper, has the fourth largest circulation. In addition, the party published more than 40 other dailies throughout Sweden in 1969. The Liberal press, for the most part, is strong enough financially to be independent politically and put its major emphasis on news.

The party, however, has chronic financial difficulties and has to rely heavily on voluntary contributions; special fund-raising drives and lotteries are conducted to meet election campaign expenses. The national convention sets the amount that the electoral district associations must pay each year to the national organization from membership dues. Similarly, payments must be made to the district association by the local sections.

4. Moderate Coalition Party

a. Membership and electoral strength

The predecessor of the present Moderate Coalition Party was formed in 1935 through the amalgamation of two conservative parliamentary groups, one in each house of the old *Riksdag*. Originally known as the Conservative Party, its name was changed to the *Hogerpartiet*, or Party of the Right, in 1952. Then in 1969 it became the *Moderatasamlingspartiet*, or Moderate Coalition Party. Prior to 1948 the party ranked second in electoral strength, but during most of the postwar era it trailed the Liberals in terms of popular support. In recent years the Moderates have declined further and are now the smallest of the nonsocialist parties in terms of parliamentary representation. Its fairly extensive organization has

enabled the party to enroll some 200,000 members, making it the second largest political grouping in the country. The Moderates obtain their principal support from estate owners and large farmers in rural areas and from industrialists and employer groups in the cities. Additionally, some upper level professionals, high-ranking military officers, and much of the clergy of the Church of Sweden may be counted among the party's supporters.

b. Organization and leadership

The structure of the Moderate Coalition Party closely resembles that of the Liberal Party. Its national party convention, which meets every 3 years, elects the executive committee, which consists of the chairman, two vice chairmen, and 10 other members. The advisory committee includes the entire executive committee, in addition to 10 elected representatives, as well as representatives from other party organizations. The district organization is the prime local authority.

The most important auxiliary organizations supplementing party activities, especially educational and propaganda work and the training of future party leaders, are the Moderate Youth Association, with approximately 35,000 members, and the Moderate Women's Association, with some 55,000 members (both figures as of 1970). A significantly large proportion of party voters are women. The Swedish Moderate Student Association, organizationally independent of the party, is the largest political student organization in the country.

The Moderate Coalition Party has experienced considerably more turnover in leadership over the past 20 years than most other Swedish political parties. The present leader, Gosta Bohman, is the fourth since 1950. Bohman, born in Stockholm in January 1911, succeeded Yngve Holmberg in November 1970, when he was blamed for party losses in the 1970 elections. Bohman has been a member of the *Riksdag* since 1958.

c. Program and policies

Moderates historically have been the chief opponents of socialism and the SAP. The party has been the principal exponent of a strong defense force and protective tariffs for industry and agriculture. It supports social security and welfare measures for humanitarian reasons, although it opposes the use of these programs as a means of redistributing income. It stands for the reduction of government expenditures, particularly for social welfare, so that corporate, inheritance, and income taxes may be lowered. The party, however, has been minimizing demands for a reduction in social welfare benefits, because its past position on this issue contributed to election losses. With an eye to broadening their appeal among the electorate, the Moderates have urged the creation of a "universal property-owning democracy," i.e. every Swede to be a homeowner. The party maintains that this objective is obstructed by confiscatory tax rates, which make it difficult to accumulate savings for the purchase of a home, and by the government's housing program, which emphasizes the construction of apartments instead of individual homes. Although the party supports educational reform and expansion, some of its followers are apprehensive over the inevitable lowering of academic standards in a thoroughly democratized upper secondary and university system. The Moderates are the principal defenders of the monarchy and the established Lutheran State Church; many have never accepted the *fait accompli* of the welfare state.

In foreign affairs the party officially supports Sweden's policy of neutrality and nonalliance, but strong elements have advocated joint defense measures with Norway and Denmark, and a minority, particularly the military, favors membership in NATO. The Moderates have consistently advocated greater defense expenditures. On the Vietnam issue, the party and its press have supported the U.S. position.

d. Press and finances

The chief newspapers supporting the Moderate Coalition Party are the *Svenska Dagbladet*, published in Stockholm, and the *Syd Svenska Dagbladet Snallposten*, published in Malmo. In addition, 43 other party dailies were published in 1969—the largest number of newspapers for any Swedish party. The Moderate press, like the Liberal press, is self-supporting. Most Swedish advertisers prefer the papers that cater to the affluent upper and middle classes rather than the Social Democratic press, which is aimed principally at the working class. The party depends largely on private donations to finance its operations and campaigns. The method of collecting and forwarding membership dues from the local to the national level of the party is similar to that employed by the Liberal Party.

5. Party of the Left-Communist

a. Membership and electoral strength

The Swedish Communist Party was formed in 1921 by Social Democratic leftwing dissidents, made up

largely of syndicalists, anarchists, and other contemporary radical labor elements. At its congress in May 1967, the party changed its name from *Sveriges Kommunistiska Partiet* to *Vansterpartiet-Kommunisterna* (Party of the Left-Communist, VPK). In its effort to win more Socialist support, the party may eventually drop "Communist" from its title altogether. It is the smallest of the Swedish political parties in terms of both popular support and membership. Its performance in national elections since World War II has been spotty and shows a general decline over the prewar period. The 1968 elections were held shortly after the Czechoslovak crisis and resulted in a sharp setback for the Communists, who got only 3.0% of the vote and lost five seats. The VPK recouped some of its losses in 1970, however.

Communist strength is centered primarily in the urban industrial areas of Stockholm, Gavleborg province, and Goteborg and in mining communities in the province of Norrbotten in the north. Supporters are mainly unskilled workers in the lumber, mining, metal, construction, and transportation industries. The party also receives scattered support from white-collar workers, professionals, and intellectuals. Membership dropped sharply from an estimated 65,000 in 1944 to approximately 17,000 in 1970. Support at the polls is considerably greater, however, and the VPK polled over 236,000 votes in the 1970 election. The VPK has been unable to capture control of any of the national trade unions, and its members dominate only about 80 of the approximately 9,000 union locals in Sweden.

b. Organization and leadership

Theoretically, the organization of the VPK is similar to that of the other Swedish parties. Actually, power rests in the hands of a few leaders, who maintain discipline by forcing strict subordination of members to the hierarchy. The supreme organ is the congress, which is supposed to meet every 3 years and in theory, at least, decides all fundamental questions of policy and organization. The congress also elects the 35-member central committee, known since 1964 as the party board, which theoretically supervises national activities. The party board chooses the chairman and the other eight members of the executive committee, which contains the top leaders and controls the day-to-day activities. There also appears to be a secretariat, but little is known about its composition. The control commission, selected by the congress, audits party administration and finances and recommends disciplinary action against members who violate regulations. Below the national level are 28 districts, corresponding to the 28 electoral districts, each with a convention as the policymaking body and an executive board. Next are the workers' communes, the principal local units, mainly in urban areas. Their function is to coordinate fundraising, propaganda, and training activities of the overt units—factory clubs and residential associations—and the operations of the semi-clandestine cells, each consisting of three to 10 members.

The party's chief auxiliary organization, the Leftist Youth League, became virtually defunct in 1971 following its takeover by pro-Chinese elements who seceded from the party the year before to form the Marxist-Leninist Struggle League (MLK). The MLK supports the Communist League of Marxist-Leninists (KFML), another breakaway group that was formed in 1967. The VPK has no official women's organization, but the women's secretariat in headquarters operates through various front groups.

The VPK has been headed by chairman Carl Henrik Hermansson since January 1964, when he succeeded Hilding Hagberg, a confirmed Stalinist, who as chairman had followed the Moscow line closely for nearly 13 years. Hermansson, born in 1917, is considerably younger than much of the old guard. As leader of the revisionist faction, composed chiefly of younger Communists, Hermansson's immediate problem was to arrest the decline in the popular appeal of the Communists, which had reached a low point in the 1962 local elections. He addressed himself to "rejuvenating" the party and giving it a "new face." Early in 1964 the Communists adopted a policy designed to convince the electorate that they were a bona fide Swedish party independent of Moscow's control, left-socialist in political orientation, and committed to supporting democratic institutions. The success of the new tactics was evident in the gains made by the Communists in the elections of 1964 and 1966, which appeared to mark the end of the political isolation experienced by them throughout much of the postwar era.

After sustaining great losses in the 1968 election, Hermansson managed to restore momentum and captured 17 seats in the 1970 elections and a pivotal balance between leftist and bourgeois forces in the *Riksdag*. Hermansson has an attractive personality and gives the impression of being representative of the new breed of Communists who now control the party. His bourgeois background—he is married to the daughter of one of the country's biggest shipyard owners—appeals to many persons who would otherwise decline to support a leftist party.

Hermansson's tactics have aggravated frictions previously existing within the party between the old-guard Communists, who wish to maintain close dependence on Moscow, and the younger revisionist elements, which have rebelled against what they consider outmoded and ineffective policies. But the new principal opponent of Hermansson's moderate policies has been the small pro-Chinese leftwing centered in Goteborg; this group has accused Hermansson of transforming the party into an appendage of the Social Democratic Party. Despite gains in 1970, Hermansson remains under attack by more radical dissident elements in the party. If the party should adopt a more radical platform at the next congress, there may be changes in the leadership, with youthful, dissident elements increasing their influence.

c. Programs and policies

A new party program adopted by the congress in October 1972 was couched in stronger, more revolutionary language than the program adopted in 1967. Previously the party had called for abolition of the value added tax, reductions in military expenditures, and opposition to Common Market membership. The new program calls for complete abolition of the armed forces, formation of a people's militia, which would replace the police, and destruction of secret files belonging to the Security Police. The party would also nationalize commercial banks, large companies, and important industries, and confiscate extensive industrial holdings in the name of the people. The party was compelled to advocate more radical solutions to a variety of problems in order to prevent dissident elements from stealing the limelight on popular issues.

The party has undertaken a number of foreign policy initiatives, mainly on Southeast Asia, but it has been unable to derive great advantage from this issue because of the government's decision to recognize Hanoi and increase aid to Vietnam. In all probability Vietnam will continue to fade in importance as a foreign policy issue in Sweden, and the focus will shift to issues closer to home, such as membership in the Common Market. The VPK advocates independence from both Moscow and Peking. Despite its announced intention to avoid choosing sides in the ideological dispute between the Soviet and Chinese parties, the VPK sharply condemned Moscow for the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

d. Press and finances

The VPK has only one daily newspaper, *Norrskensflamman*, which is published in Lulea and had a circulation of only 3,400 in 1969. Its central organ is *Ny Dag*, published twice weekly in Stockholm. Virtually the same edition is circulated in Goteborg and Western Sweden twice weekly under the banner *Arbetar-Tidningen*. The party publishes a theoretical quarterly called *Socialistisk Debatt*, which, like its other publications, has experienced financial difficulties. In the past the annual losses sustained by the Communist press have approached US$200,000, and the VPK has resorted to special membership assessments to keep its newspapers on the street. In addition to dues, the party has solicited contributions from the East Germans, as well as the Soviets, and has established domestic commercial ventures to raise additional revenue.

6. Pressure groups

Swedish pressure groups representing special occupational and economic interests have achieved semiofficial status through performing a number of functions for the government. The most important are the LO, the TCO, the SAF, the Federation of Swedish Industries, the National Farmers Union, the Consumers Cooperative Union, and some associations among educators and religious leaders. It has become customary for the government to name representatives of these groups to the agencies that regulate activities affecting their interests. In addition, these groups are given opportunities to express their views to members of the cabinet, government agencies, and parliamentary committees in connection with proposed legislation. As a result of these institutionalized channels, lobbying in the U.S. sense has become largely unnecessary.

7. Electoral procedures

Under an electoral reform instituted in 1970, local, provincial, and national elections are held concurrently every 3 years. The responsibility for printing the ballots devolves upon the parties. Each party hands out three ballots: a yellow one for the *Riksdag*, a blue one for the provincial slate, and a white one for the local candidates. Blank pieces of appropriately colored paper may also be used by voters, who simply write in the name of the party and list their preferred candidates. As there are five major parties, each voter is offered a minimum of 15 ballots (factions within parties and new parties can sometimes increase the number of ballots).

The name of the party is printed at the top of the ballot and a number of candidates slightly in excess of the total number of seats available in the province or

locality, and the designated number of *Riksdag* seats apportioned to the voting district are listed on the appropriate ballots. The voter marks only his party's ballots and checks the candidates in order of preference. Voters may cross out names of candidates of whom they disapprove and, if they desire, may write in the names of candidates of their choice. Otherwise the voter simply selects the candidates in his order of preference. The ballots, marked in secret, are put in envelopes and dropped in boxes marked *Riksdag*, provincial council, and local council.

The 350 members of the *Riksdag* represent the 28 electoral districts. The number of representatives elected from each district is based on population and is subject to reapportionment every 3 years. Sparsely populated Gotland sends only two representatives to the *Riksdag*, while Stockholm city has 36. Proportional representation is a fundamental aspect of Swedish politics, and although it may appear complex and cumbersome compared to the simple win-lose system in the United States, it assures that all parties of any significant size will be represented in the government. The formula for auditing the results is called the weighted-odd number method. The total votes polled by each party in a particular district are divided by 1.4, which has the effect of preventing the rise of very small parties. The party with the highest number of votes gets the first seat, and its total is divided by three. The second seat is awarded to the party with the next highest number of votes, and then its total is divided by three. As the system progresses, the diminishing totals of successful parties are divided by five, then seven, then nine, and so on, until all the apportioned seats are filled. Only 310 of the *Riksdag* seats are awarded in this manner.

The 40 remaining seats are called compensatory seats and are allotted by determining the number of seats each party would have won if the entire country had been considered as a single constituency. Applying the weighted odd-number method to these national totals, it is determined that the more popular parties would, nonetheless, have received more seats and, to compensate for their losses under the constituency tabulation, each party is awarded an appropriate share of the 40 seats.

In order to prevent the proliferation of small parties which might detract from the effectiveness of the major parties, a barrier of 4% of the national vote or 12% of a district vote must be realized in order for a party to receive any seats. The cut-off point is controversial, because a party that receives 4% of the national vote automatically qualifies for 14 seats in the *Riksdag*, while one that receives 3.9% gets no seats.

The extent to which the Swedish population participates in elections compares favorably with voter turnout in other Western European democracies. Among the Scandinavian countries participation is about the same as in Denmark and Norway, but less than in Iceland. A record was set in the 1968 national elections, when 4,862,000 voters, out of an electorate of 5,445,000, or 89.3%, cast ballots. By lowering the voting age to 20 for the 1970 elections, new voters obtaining eligibility in 1970 increased the electorate to 5,643,000, but only 4,976,000, or 88.2%, participated. Current legislation before the *Riksdag* would lower the voting age to 18, a measure which is expected to result in increased votes for the Social Democrats.

D. National policies (C)

Swedish political life during the past four decades has been characterized by a relatively wide measure of agreement among the non-Communist parties on basic domestic and foreign policy questions. The traditional policy of armed neutrality and nonalliance as it has evolved during the past century and a half remains the cornerstone of foreign policy and commands the support of the Socialist and the non-Socialist parties, except for a minority among the Moderates and Liberals. On domestic issues fundamental disagreements among the parties remain, but they concern not so much the goals as the pace and scope of social and economic programs which have been developed by a succession of governments dominated by the Social Democrats.

1. Domestic

Probably the dominant characteristic of Swedish political life, especially with regard to domestic policy, has been the tendency toward compromise and the effort to develop a broad consensus among the political parties. This has been particularly true of social and economic development during the past several decades and represents a melding of long-held Socialist views with the more liberal ideas held by some of the bourgeois parties. Swedish governments during this period have placed highest priority on maintaining full employment, sustained economic growth, price stability, and the achievement of self-sufficiency adequate in the event of war. The setbacks suffered by the Social Democrats in recent elections, however, reveal widespread voter dissatisfaction with the growing inflation and ever-higher taxes, thus necessitating some reordering of the priorities in the domestic program. Unemployment, while not a

serious problem by U.S. standards, reached a seasonal high of nearly 4% in early 1972 and elicited official concern.

In order to control inflation, while trying to achieve virtually full employment, the government continues to emphasize industrial expansion. Although the private sector still accounts for over 90% of the industrial output, government planners make their influence felt by channeling public investment into areas which contribute directly to achieving the national goals of full employment and industrial growth—construction, transportation, communications, and the development of hydroelectric and nuclear power facilities. In 1966 the Social Democrats managed to pass legislation establishing a government investment bank which provides capital to private companies, thus competing with private lending institutions and increasing the government's role in the private sector. Special tax provisions which allow companies to set aside up to 40% of their profits in a tax-free reserve further enhance governmental influence in industry. About one-third of this reserve may be used after 5 years, but the remainder may be used only with government permission. Authorization is given when the Labor Market Board, a state agency, determines that the economy needs a boost, as it did in 1958, 1962, 1967, and 1971.

Rising food prices, perhaps the most disturbing aspect of inflation, prompted direct popular action reminiscent of less tranquil periods in Swedish history. Boycotts of meat and milk were widespread and effective in February 1972. Without a significant role in agricultural production the government seemed able to do little but to manipulate the few remaining agricultural subsidies and to ease or eliminate restrictions on foreign imports.

While the ever mounting taxes are hardest on the large middle class, they are needed to finance the comprehensive but still expanding social welfare system. Already one of the most pervasive and generous in the world, the social policy of the government ranges over a broad field, including social insurance, comprehensive health care programs, family and child welfare, public relief, and labor placement and protection. Recent reforms in the already enlightened penal system have commanded world attention. The last major reform in conventional social welfare was the enactment in 1959 of a compulsory retirement pension program for all workers to supplement the existing old-age pensions. The program provides retirement income equivalent to about two-thirds of the average pay over a worker's highest paid 15 years.

Perhaps the domestic issue on which the Social Democrats have been most vulnerable is the chronic housing shortage that has plagued Sweden throughout the postwar period. Housing construction was markedly stepped up in 1965, when the goal was set for the construction of 1 million new dwellings over the next decade. The government encouraged builders to step up housing production by offering incentives, such as advantageous financing, tax concessions, and priority procurement of materiel. About 82,000 new units were constructed in 1966; by 1968 the goal of 100,000 units annually was exceeded, as it was in the 2 following years. Having achieved its immediate objectives in housing, the emphasis is now shifting toward providing more spacious dwellings for growing numbers of Swedes. The Moderates, for example, anticipate that rising expectations in an essentially free economy will bring an increased demand for home ownership; about 50% of urban residents still rent their apartments.

The importance of foreign trade—it accounts for approximately one-fourth of the gross national product—is an underlying factor in efforts to maintain international exchange stability. The government accords national treatment to foreign firms operating through incorporated Swedish subsidiaries, but maintains strict control over foreign acquisition and exploitation of natural resources and the operation of certain services. Sweden's eventual relationship with the EC, which absorbed 28% of its total exports in 1971, is of great national concern. At present, the government is pledged to seek a relationship with the EC consonant with Sweden's neutrality.

2. Foreign

Despite their neutral position, most Swedes identify themselves with the ideals and aspirations of Western liberal democracy. They are repelled by the repressive policies which have characterized the Communist regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

In the late 1940's Sweden was faced with a fundamental decision on the question of retaining its traditional policy of nonalliance or seeking security in a larger defensive grouping, such as NATO. After intensive public debate, it was clear that majority opinion favored continuation of the policy of neutrality. Subsequent efforts on the part of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark to join in a Scandinavian defense alliance came to naught when the latter two countries decided to join NATO. Despite its position outside NATO, Sweden has taken a favorable view toward the organization and has regarded it as a deterrent to Soviet aggression against members and

nonmembers alike. The division of Scandinavia between members of NATO and neutral nations has handicapped to some extent Sweden's policy of expanding the traditionally close ties which have existed among them. While Danish and Norwegian membership in NATO precludes close cooperation in the political and defense fields, this has been offset to some degree by the wide range of common policies pursued by these countries in the economic, social, and cultural fields. This cooperation has been expanded to include, for example, common membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Nordic Council, free movement of Scandinavian nationals within the area, and the trend toward reciprocity and harmonization of policies covering a wide range of activities, particularly in the labor and social welfare fields. Aside from the value of promoting close ties among the Scandinavian countries, the Swedish Government considers that these ties have great significance, because they enable Finland to strengthen its connections Westward in a manner least likely to arouse Soviet suspicion and opposition. In line with the high priority Sweden places on maintaining an independent Finland on its frontiers, Swedish statesmen believe that the nation's policy of neutrality and nonalliance affords it some leverage in alleviating some Soviet pressures on Finland.

Next to its Scandinavian ties, Sweden attaches greatest importance to membership in the United Nations, which it joined in 1946. A staunch supporter of the United Nations, Sweden provided the organization with its second secretary general, the late Dag Hammarskjold, and is an active participant in a wide range of the organization's activities. It is a strong supporter of the U.N. peacekeeping activities and has provided troops for this purpose in Cyprus, the Middle East, and the Congo. Sweden has also been in the forefront in promoting disarmament. As a respected neutral, Sweden has sought to provide responsible leadership for the smaller nonnuclear states by seeking ways to persuade the major powers to take meaningful steps toward disarmament. The problems of the former colonial areas are followed with great interest, and Sweden has been a strong advocate of aid and assistance to the less developed countries. The government takes the position that the United Nations should administer aid programs and favors the eventual termination of bilateral assistance agreements. Sweden supports the principle of universal membership in the world organization. On questions involving the former colonial areas, it has frequently sided with the Afro-Asian nations. Although occasionally at odds with the United States on a number of issues facing the United Nations, Sweden usually has sought to play a useful, humanitarian role in the world body.

Sweden has been a strong supporter of several nonmilitary regional organizations and has viewed membership in them as consistent with its policy of nonalliance. Stockholm maintains close relations with its Nordic neighbors, with which it cooperates in a wide range of economic, social, and cultural problems. Most joint enterprises have been conducted under the auspices of the Nordic Council, which Sweden helped to found in 1952. Sweden is also a member of the Council of Europe and maintains missions to the EC and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in Brussels, and to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in Luxembourg. Sweden was a charter member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and remains a member of its successor, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In addition, Sweden is a member of some 20 other international organizations dealing with trade, transportation, communications, energy, finance, science, and health.

The creation of the Common Market in 1957 and its subsequent development have necessitated major revisions in traditional Swedish trade policies. Swedish leaders have tended to view the EC with suspicion, fearing that its policies would be discriminatory and harmful to commercial interests, and that it would eventually divide Europe into two competing trade blocs. The EC also presents a difficult political choice: Sweden must weigh the economic importance of retaining access to the large markets of the recently expanded organization against the possibility that closer ties to the EC would require Sweden to accept certain elements of the Rome Treaty that would compromise its traditional neutrality. Sweden was able to offset some of the economic impact of the EC by joining EFTA in 1960, but the outlook for that organization is uncertain in view of the decision in 1972 of three of its members—Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom—to join the EC. More than 50% of Sweden's imports and exports are subject to EC tariffs as a result, and unless the *Riksdag* ratifies the draft free trade agreement with Brussels, the Swedish economy will suffer. One alternative that has been considered is to revive the Nordic Economic Union (NORDEK) concept.

A major preoccupation of Swedish foreign policy is the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet Union, but this goal has tended to be elusive because

of the tensions in Europe engendered by the East-West struggle. Sweden's concern about relations with the U.S.S.R. derives essentially from its proximity and overwhelming military preponderance in the Baltic area. In the early post-World War II period and at the height of the Cold War, Soviet-Swedish relations were little more than formally correct and were characterized by periods of extreme chill. Notable were developments such as the Wallenberg case (the Swedish diplomat who disappeared during the Soviet "liberation" of Budapest in 1945 and subsequently died in a Soviet prison), the destruction of Swedish reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic in 1952, and the frequent seizure by the U.S.S.R. of Swedish fishing vessels. During the intervening years there have been brief periods of relative relaxation, but more usually periods of tension, as occurred in the wake of the Hungarian uprising, Khrushchev's threatening actions against Berlin and Finland, revelations of Soviet espionage in Sweden, and the Cuban missile crisis. The Swedes were optimistic when the more pragmatic and businesslike team of Brezhnev and Kosygin assumed power, but hopes were dashed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. Seasoned by the ups and downs in relations with Moscow during the postwar era, the Swedish Government continues to try to reach practical agreements which would be mutually profitable and contribute to maintaining Northern Europe as an area removed from direct involvement in the competition between East and West. A series of governmental, military, and labor union exchanges delayed since 1968, has served to supplement these efforts.

In direct contrast to the climate of fear and suspicion which has generally characterized Sweden's relations during the emergence of the superpower next door, relations with the United States have for the most part been relatively good. Fostered by the emigration in the latter 19th century of more than a million Swedes to the United States, where they settled and prospered, this rapport was further strengthened by U.S. military involvement in World War II and subsequent economic aid to Europe after the war. Relations began to take a downward trend in the mid-1960's, as Swedish opinion became increasingly critical of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Sweden's inclination to regard itself as the "conscience of the world" and the vehement denunciations of the United States by Swedish public figures and the media led to a further deterioration in relations in 1968 and the decision to recall the U.S. Ambassador. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia later that year, along with signs that Sweden was facing a growing number of serious domestic problems, led to an easing of the previously sharp attacks on the United States. Although its official line may not on occasion reflect the basically friendly feelings of Sweden toward the United States, most Swedes continue to regard U.S. military strength as the principal deterrent to moves by Moscow against NATO and other non-Communist countries.

The Vietnam conflict provides the main source of friction between the United States and Sweden. While most of the government's condemnation of the United States is couched in terms of relieving the suffering of the Vietnamese people, the extreme bias of the Swedish protests suggests that the Social Democrats are primarily concerned with encouraging leftist support on other issues. However, the government would probably wish to avoid allowing relations to deteriorate to a point that would again cause disruption in the normal, ambassador level representation. The Social Democratic administration may continue to use criticism of U.S. policy as a means of furthering its own objectives. A case in point was Prime Minister Palme's criticism of U.S. tariff increases in 1971. Stringent efforts to control inflation in Sweden caused increase unemployment and plant closures and engendered significant opposition to the Social Democratic programs. Palme countered domestic opposition by criticizing alleged changes in U.S. trade policy, to which he attributed Sweden's economic ills. The charges had little basis in fact but gave the government time to review its own domestic policy, which was subsequently altered. Such practical politics have not prevented the Swedes from supporting U.S. initiatives in the United Nations and other international bodies.

Sweden has derived much favorable publicity from its association with the Nobel Prizes. First awarded in 1901, the monetary awards are presented to individuals who have served humanity best in the five fields of physics, chemistry, physiology or medicine, literature, and peace. The latter prize is awarded in Oslo, while the ceremonies for the other four awards are held in Stockholm.

Foreign policy formulation in Sweden is the responsibility of the cabinet in general and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in particular. The minister is obliged by law to consult with the Foreign Relations Council of the *Riksdag*, which is composed of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the *Riksdag*, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the King, who presides. The council meets approximately six times a year or when a serious foreign policy issue requires an extraordinary session, and meetings are always held *in camera*.

3. Defense

As in the other democracies of Western Europe, the military establishment is clearly subordinate to the popularly elected civilian government. Although military officers frequently attempt to influence and mold public opinion on matters relating to defense, they have little direct influence in making national policy. Defense policy is formulated by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who is appointed by the Minister of Defense, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs Committee, consisting of the commanders of the three armed services and the Chief of the Defense Staff. Traditionally defense matters are regarded as being above narrow partisan interests. The non-Communist parties have cooperated openly in formulating defense policy, but this pattern was broken in May 1972, when the Social Democrats used Communist support to push through a pared-down 5-year defense plan with all three bourgeois parties in opposition.

The main objective of defense policy is to keep Sweden's military strength at a level high enough to convince any potential aggressor that an armed attack would be extremely costly. This policy assumes that Swedish authorities would have sufficient warning to mobilize the defense forces, and that invasion would be only a part of a larger invasion of Scandinavia and the NATO countries. In this event Sweden would expect to receive aid from the NATO powers.

The government faces the difficult problem of meeting the rising costs in the politically important social welfare sector of the budget by instituting cutbacks elsewhere, with defense expenditures the most likely target. There is evidence that the government will try to hold the line in the face of rising defense costs and will avoid an actual reduction in defense expenditures. In order to provide for the procurement of modern weapons in a period of inflation and rising costs, Sweden may resort to such measures as reducing the conscription period—a cost-cutting device currently being considered by a number of other Western European countries. Savings in training could be diverted to the aircraft industry for research and development of new generation aircraft. The recent conclusion of an agreement on Berlin, the conclusion of the agreements of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, together with the marked easing of tensions in Europe, have strengthened the hand of domestic critics who oppose "unnecessary expenditures" on the military.

Sweden has one of the most elaborate civil defense systems in Western Europe, having a higher per capita expenditure for this purpose than any other non-Communist country. Government planning assumes there will be no capitulation to the enemy and calls for the speedy evacuation of nonessential persons from likely urban target areas. Those remaining in the cities would be given refuge in large conventional shelters as well as in the reinforced basements which are required in every school, hospital, factory, office building, and apartment building. In the 14 largest cities enormous community shelters capable of accommodating over 2 million persons have been built underground, with 50 feet or more of solid rock cover. The shelters are designed to permit them to be used for storage and other purposes during peacetime and are capable of being quickly converted to shelter use in an emergency (Figure 6). In addition, special underground control centers have been established to assure functioning of the various government agencies under wartime conditions.

Military expenditures for 1971-72 reached US$1.2 billion, or about 11% of the central government budget and 3.8% of the gross national product (GNP). Estimates for fiscal 1973 indicate that the proportion of funds allocated for defense purposes will decline. The following tabulation shows the percentage of the GNP budgeted for defense in selected West European countries in 1970:

Belgium	3.1
Denmark	2.8
Germany	3.8
Netherlands	3.9
Norway	3.9
SWEDEN	3.7
United Kingdom	5.8

NOTE—NATO percentages were taken from State Department/INR/Research Study/RSGS-4/ 14 March 1972. The percentage for Sweden is based on approximate defense expenditures.

E. Threats to government stability (S)

1. Discontent and dissidence

Sweden's stable and open society offers few opportunities for the growth of subversive organizations capable of presenting a serious threat to the state. The absence of deepseated social and economic grievances, universal literacy, and a standard of living second to none in Western Europe have contributed to the development of a socially and politically stable society in which all political parties except the Communists are committed to democratic principles. Nevertheless, the growing spirit of detente between



FIGURE 6. The *Katarinaberget* bomb shelter in Stockholm can hold 17,000 people. Used as a garage, it has also a drive-in bank and a gasoline station. (U/OU)

East and West has caused an increasing number of Swedes to believe that the Soviet threat has diminished. The growing radicalization of Swedish youth has caused the government to modify its former cool attitude toward the Soviet Union. At present this trend does not appear to present a threat to democratic institutions in Sweden.

2. Communism

The Party of the Left-Communist is the only well-organized group with any potential for undermining the security of the state. However, its strength in the *Riksdag* is far below the level that would afford the party even a remote chance of gaining a formalized voice in government councils. Furthermore, its extralegal subversive potential tends to be neutralized by the awareness of the government, organized labor, and most of the general public to the tactics and objectives of the Communists. The popular support enjoyed by the Communists dropped drastically after World War II, and the party still attempts to persuade the electorate that it is not a tool of Soviet interests and that it is a bona fide Swedish political party committed to change through legal political processes. For a discussion of the overt role of the party see above, under Political Dynamics.

The party has always placed highest priority on attempting to infiltrate organized labor in order to be able to disrupt the economy and weaken the strong ties between labor and the Social Democratic Party. National, provincial, and local governments are relatively free of Communist infiltration. A considerable number of Communists have entered the civil service, from which they are not excluded, but there is no evidence that they have attained higher level positions. Although the party has representatives in the *Riksdag*, they have been denied access to classified information relating to national defense and foreign policy on the grounds that their political loyalties are suspect and that it would be inappropriate to disclose information affecting Sweden's security to members of a subversive organization. By concerted action of the non-Communist parties, the Communists have been denied membership on parliamentary committees dealing with sensitive subjects; when foreign policy is debated in the *Riksdag* classified information is not made available to Communist representatives. Tight security practice is believed to have kept Communist infiltration within the defense establishment to a relatively low level. Communists entering the armed services through the draft are placed in nonsensitive posts, and known party members are barred from officer training. Background investigations for employees of the defense establishment and in other sensitive areas are conducted by the police in cooperation with the counterintelligence arm of the

Defense Staff. Individuals in highly sensitive positions are subject to periodic investigation by the Security Police, which was responsible for the detection of master spy Colonel Stig Wennerstrom in 1963.

The trade union movement, which is closely associated with the Social Democratic Party, remains a primary target of Communist penetration. As of 1964 the Swedish Communist Party had reportedly succeeded in infiltrating some 2,000 party members into the trade unions, with the objective of obtaining information on the Social Democratic Party's plans and activities. Communist penetration has been greatest in the unions representing the forest, mining, metal, construction, and transportation workers. Communist control, however, has been limited to approximately 80 of the more than 9,000 trade union locals affiliated through various federations with the LO. The party has not succeeded in capturing any of the 29 national federations affiliated with the LO, nor has it obtained representation on the general council or executive board of the LO.

In its continuing effort to attract new members, the Communist party relies heavily on front organizations for the dissemination of propaganda in behalf of its own causes and those sponsored by the Soviet Communist Party. These fronts are composed largely of Communists and fellow travelers and are designed to enlist the support of non-Communists who are sympathetic to the Communist position on certain issues. The two most important fronts are the Swedish Peace Committee and the Association for the Promotion of Cultural and Economic Relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union. The Swedish Peace Committee, founded in 1949 as a local branch of the Communist-dominated World Peace Council, was the host in Stockholm for two congresses of the council—the meeting in 1950 that launched the Stockholm Peace Appeal and a 1954 conference for the relaxation of international tensions. In 1966 it was host for a meeting in Stockholm of Communist and pacifist groups to launch "a world campaign to stop the war in Vietnam." In recent years such activities have been overshadowed by the activities of the Swedish Vietnam Committee, which includes several extremely leftwing Social Democrats. The Association for the Promotion of Cultural and Economic Relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union is a friendship society with the avowed purpose of promoting contacts between the two countries through exchanges of artists, scientists, students, and members of labor, sport, and women's organizations. It also conducts Russian language courses and serves as the chief agency for distributing noncommercial Soviet films. The association reportedly serves as a channel for funds provided by Communist countries to the Swedish Communist party.

3. Extremist groups

Sweden's traditional tolerance of activity by individuals representing a wide range of the political spectrum has led to a proliferation of extremist groups of marginal importance on the national political scene. Most of these groups are comprised of leftwing theorists who have split off from the Communist party for reasons of ideology, or quasi-fascists bitterly opposed to Sweden's brand of social democracy.

After splitting off from the Communist party, many of the left extremists have subdivided over the Sino-Soviet split. The KFML, a recognized political party that received only 0.4% of the vote in 1970, split in 1970. The pro-Maoist element formed the KFML(r); the "r" stands for revolutionary. The same year the Clarte Federation, a Swedish branch of the French Clarte movement founded in 1919 to promote understanding between Socialist parties, subdivided and formed a more orthodox Communist faction called the Clarte M-L (for Marxist-Leninist). The United National Liberation Front Groups heads the liberation movements and is believed to have been involved in the more violent anti-American protests in Sweden over the Vietnam issue. Students for a Democratic Society, the MLK, the Trotskyite Federation of Revolutionary Marxists, and the Anarchists Federation of Sweden are all part of the extreme left. Most of these organizations try to influence students, conscripts, and trade union members, and nearly all of them publish propaganda tracts. Their membership and scope of operations are very small, and they pose virtually no threat to government stability. The same is true for the various rightwing organizations which have been credited with occasional anti-Semitic acts. Three of the most prominent organizations among the Fascist groups are the Neo-Swedish Movement, the Nordic National Party, and the Liberal Union Party.

Sweden has had far more trouble from emigre groups to which it offers asylum than from its native extremists. Of particular concern are the violence-prone Yugoslav emigres, who assassinated the Yugoslav Ambassador in Stockholm in 1971 and reportedly placed a bomb on board a Yugoslav airliner before it departed Stockholm for Belgrade in 1972. Such terrorist activities are alien to the Swedes and may cause the government to reconsider its liberal policy of accepting exiles, particularly those who advocate violence as a means of redressing grievances.

F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

1. Police

The maintenance of law and order is facilitated by the relative stability of social and economic conditions. The police are honest and efficient. Although subject to fairly frequent evaluations and criticism by the public and the news media, they enjoy a greater measure of respect than do their colleagues in almost any other Western European country outside of Scandinavia.

Traditionally more decentralized than elsewhere in Europe, the police system, because of "increasing problems attending the maintenance of public order in a complex, modern, industrialized nation," was fully nationalized only in 1965. Centralized coordination was required because of the growing geographic mobility and acute problems of road traffic control (Sweden ranked third among the nations of the world in per capita automobile ownership, with 28 automobiles per 100 population in 1969) and the complexities inherent in modern crowd control and crime detection and prevention. The openness of the government process, as well as some built-in restraints at both the national and the local levels, assures protection from possible police abuse.

At the national level a command group plans and coordinates all police efforts. The National Police Board, consisting of the Chief of the National Police, his deputy, and six lay members appointed by the King-in-Council, heads the command group. All policy decisions must be approved by the board, and the activities of the command group are under the constant scrutiny of the Minister of Justice. By constitutional law all domestic official plans and documents, except the few that may be classified "secret" for limited, specified reasons, are public property and are available to the press. Local police chiefs are directly accountable to the national authority and in administrative matters to the provincial governor.

Under the Chief of the National Police are three special assistants or chiefs, each heading a separate department (Figure 7). Police Bureau I of Department A has nationwide responsibility for the planning and coordination of surveillance activities and the protection of life and property. Specifically, it has jurisdiction over vehicular traffic, civil armed guards, patrol activities, alien control, and social police work. Contingency planning for utilization of the entire police force, the armed forces, and the civil defense establishment in the event of war is coordinated through this bureau. Police Bureau II has national jurisdiction over the criminal police, including those concerned with both the suppression and detection of crime. The National Homicide Commission, under the jurisdiction of this bureau, coordinates and supervises countrywide investigative procedures in instances of difficult murder cases and serious violent crimes. The bureau also maintains contact with INTERPOL. The two bureaus of Department B are responsible for technology and training, and Department C is concerned with administrative and legal matters.

In keeping with the gradual centralization of the police, an amalgamation of local police authority has developed since the early postwar years, when there were 700 semiautonomous police districts. By 1962 the number of districts had been reduced to 562, with a total of 909 police stations. In 1970, Sweden had reduced administration to 119 police districts, with just over 590 police stations. Each of the districts is headed by a chief constable.

Police chiefs in the provinces and Stockholm coordinate all protection, surveillance, and criminal work among the districts under their jurisdiction. Additionally, both men and horses of the special mounted police divisions for riot and general crowd control stationed in Stockholm, Goteborg, and Malmo may be transported rapidly to any place of potential need. An exception to the general pattern of enhanced public security has been the demonstrations since the latter 1960's by both resident foreigners and Swedish nationals against certain foreign embassies in Stockholm. The Swedish Government has responded by contracting with a private organization to furnish guards, equipped with radios, at important intersections throughout embassy row. Their job is to radio for regular police in the event of a spontaneous demonstration or attack.

Another relatively serious disruption of public order occurred in 1970, when dissident youths in Stockholm and other principal cities rampaged through the business districts, vandalizing and looting stores. The rioters took advantage of a nationwide 2-day "sick out" occasioned by police dissatisfaction with the practice of assigning junior officers to temporary positions of authority without commensurate increases in salary. Successful bargaining between the Police Union and the authorities—probably helped by the disorders—quickly resolved the problem.

Technical and training facilities are of a high order. The National Institute of Technical Police in Stockholm is responsible for technical criminal investigation and research for the courts, public







by the National Central Bureau of Statistics in Stockholm, contains detailed and comprehensive figures on nearly all aspects of economics and social affairs. The *Yearbook of Nordic Statistics 1970*, published by the Nordic Council, provides a comparative statistical frame for all the Nordic countries. Stockholm's Enskilda Bank publishes a ready reference called *Some Data About Sweden* (1970-71), with charts and graphs of various business indicators. For worldwide comparisons the *UN Statistical Yearbook* includes entries on Sweden in nearly every category. Biographical information on many Swedish personalities is found in *Vem ar det* (1971), the Swedish Who's Who.

Chronology (u/ou)

800-1060

Swedish Viking expeditions head eastward. Rurick founds Russion state at Kiyev (about 862).

829-1160

Christianity comes to Sweden.

1157-1293

Conquest of Finland takes place.

1397

The Union of Kalmar brings the kingdoms of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark under one crown and endures desultorily until c. 1520.

1435

The first parliament (*Riksdag*) is convened, comprising representatives of the mobility, clergy, burghers, and peasants.

1523

Sweden becomes an independent national state under Gustav Vasa as King.

1630-48

Sweden battles with brilliant success in the Thirty Years' War, losing King Gustavus Adolphus at the battle of Lutzen in 1632.

1809

Sweden surrenders Finland to Russia.

June

Sweden obtains a new constitution, the Instrument of Government, the first of four fundamental laws on which the present political system is based.

1810

August

Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's marshals, is proclaimed heir-apparent to the Swedish throne by the *Riksdag;* he assumes the crown in 1818 as Charles XIV John.

September

The Act of Succession, the second fundamental law, is adopted, confirming the Bernadotte line on the male side as heirs to the throne.

1814

January

Denmark is forced to cede Norway to Sweden by the Peace of Kiel. A 2-month war with Norway, Sweden's last, brings Norway into union with Sweden.

1866

January

The Riksdag Act, the third fundamental law, is adopted, replacing the old representative assembly with its four estates by a bicameral body.

1882

Swedish emigration (constituting 20% of mean population between 1860 and 1930) to the United States reaches its peak.

1889

April

The Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party is founded.

1905

May

Union with Norway is dissolved.

1914-18

Sweden maintains neutrality in World War I.

1919

Universal suffrage is attained with granting of vote to women.

1920

March

The first Social Democratic cabinet is formed under Hjalmar Branting.

1932

October

The Social Democrats become the ruling party and form a government under Per Albin Hansson.

1939-45

Sweden maintains neutrality in World War II.

1946

November

Sweden joins the United Nations.

1948

April

Sweden becomes a charter member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, later the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

1949

The Freedom of the Press Act, the fourth fundamental law, updates previous laws safeguarding liberty of the press.

1952

March

Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland create the Nordic Council (joined by Finland in 1955).

1960

March

The *Riksdag* ratifies Swedish membership in the European Free Trade Association.

1961

December

Sweden applies for associate membership in the European Economic Community.

1966

September

The governing Social Democratic Party suffers a sharp setback in the provincial and municipal elections.

1967

May

The International War Crimes Tribunal, sponsored by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, convenes in Stockholm purportedly to investigate the extent and nature of "U.S. aggression in Vietnam."

1968

February

Olof Palme, Minister of Education, marches alongside North Vietnamese diplomats in an anti-American demonstration in Stockholm.

September

Social Democrats win a clear majority in elections for the *Riksdag*.

1969

January

Sweden recognizes North Vietnam.

October

Palme succeeds Tage Erlander as chairman of the Social Democratic Party and assumes leadership of the government.

December

Miners in Kiruna begin 2-month long wildcat strike.

1970

September

In first elections under electoral reform, Social Democratic Party loses clear majority but retains control of government.

1971

January

New unicameral *Riksdag* convenes for first session.

1972

January

Housewives demonstrate against high food prices.

June

U.N. Environmental Conference is held in Stockholm.

December

Sweden ratifies free trade agreement with the European Communities. Sweden recognizes East Germany.

Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	SWEDISH	ENGLISH
ABF	*Arbetarnes bildningsforbund*	Workers Educational Association
CP	*Centerpartiet*	Central Party
DFFG	*De Forenade [illegible]ipperna*	United National Liberation Front Groups
FP	*Folkpa[illegible]*	Liberal Party
FPU	*Fol[illegible]bund*	Liberal Youth League
KDS	*[illegible]ing*	Christian Democratic Union
KF	*[illegible]*	Consumers Cooperative Union
KFML	*[illegible] Marxist-[illegible]*	Communist League of Marxists-Leninists
LO	*Land[illegible]*	Federation of Trade Unions
MLK	*Marxist-[illegible]kampforbundet*	Marxist-Leninist Struggle League
MP	*Moderatasamlingspartiet*	Moderate Coalition Party
RLF	*Riksforbundet Landsbygdens Folk*	National Farmers Union
SAF	*Svenska arbetsgivareforeningen*	Swedish Employers Confederation
SAP	*Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti*	Swedish Social Democratic Workers Party (Social Democratic Party)
SIF	*Sveriges industriforbund*	Federation of Swedish Industries
SKP	*Sveriges Kommunistiska Partiet*	Swedish Communist Party
SSU	*Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdomsforbundet*	Swedish Social Democratic Youth Association
TCO	*Tjanstemannens Centralorganisation*	Central Organization of Salaried Employees
VPK	*Vansterpartiet Kommunisterna*	Party of the Left—Communist

Places and features referred to in this Chapter (U/OU)

	COORDINATES	
	° ′N.	° ′E.
Göteborg	57 43	11 58
Jönköping	57 47	14 11
Kiruna	67 51	20 13
Luleå	65 34	22 10
Lund	55 42	13 11
Malmö	55 36	13 00
Norrköping	58 36	16 11
Stockholm	59 20	18 03
Sundsvall	62 23	17 18
Umeå	63 50	20 15
Uppsala	59 52	17 38

SECRET

SECRET