

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (translation)

Deponent: KAWABE, Torashiro

I, KAWABE, Torashiro, state under oath as follows:

1. I was in Berlin from December 1938 until February 1940 as Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy, with the rank of Major-General. Mr. OSHIMA was Ambassador from October 1938 until October 1939.
- 2 - 1. In October 1938, I was appointed Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Germany succeeding Lt. General OSHIMA. Prior to my departure from Japan, I was briefed by various persons at the General Staff Office in Tokyo on various subjects concerning my new duties. At that time, I heard explanations as to intelligence and counter-intelligence activities in Berlin against Soviet Russia from Lt. Col. USUI who had been in Berlin, from May 1937 until January 1938, exclusively in charge of these matters under Military Attache OSHIMA, and had returned to the General Staff in



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Tokyo thereafter. He told me that from his own experience no appreciable results could be expected from these activities.

2 - 2. After my arrival in Berlin in December 1938 I heard explanations from Col. MANAKI, who succeeded Lt. Col. USUI and was exclusively in charge of this work from the summer of 1933 under Military Attache OSHIMA.

Through what I heard from USUI and MANAKI I learned the following facts:

- (a) It was very difficult for us Japanese to find able Russians in Europe for this purpose;
- (b) The Germans were not necessarily in sympathy with the White Russians or their organizations with which the Japanese side had been maintaining contact up to that time;
- (c) It was particularly difficult for us Japanese to prepare any Anti-Soviet activities from Europe as a base and prospects of useful results in the future were also slim;
- (d) The expense for the Japanese intelligence organs in Berlin amounted to no more than 300,000 yen annually including personal expenses.

I might add here that as regards counter-intelligence activities, only study and planning in consideration of wartime were laid down by the Chief of the General Staff; however, it was strictly forbidden to put them actually into effect in peace time.

2 - 3. I, like my predecessor OSHIMA, left Col. MANAKI entirely in charge of these matters. I received reports from him, but never transmitted them to Ambassador OSHIMA. This was because the Ambassador had



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no relation whatsoever with this matter within scope of his official duty. Furthermore Ambassador OSHIMA, in fact, did not touch upon these matters and never asked me questions about them.

2 - 4. I met several times with the White Russians concerned. I found out that they were either nothing but anti-Soviet ideologists, like Bamard who was at that time staying in Switzerland for recuperation, or professionals who used to demand money from us by presenting impractical and fantastic anti-Soviet plans.

2 - 5. I knew that Lt. Col. USUI had bought a house at Falkensee in the suburbs of Berlin, and had turned it over to Col. MINAKI. I knew also that a few White Russians were quartered there; they were engaged in a small scale printing of anti-Soviet pamphlets, but I do not know what became of those pamphlets.

2 - 6. I have absolutely never heard from anyone that OSHIMA or any other Japanese army officers sent anti-Soviet pamphlets into Soviet territories by balloons from Poland, or that they bought a motor-boat to bring such papers into the Crimea across the Black Sea, or that they sent Russians into Soviet Russia for the purpose of assassinating Stalin. Any such matters were completely unknown to me.

3 - 1. When I arrived in Berlin as Military Attache in December 1938 Ambassador OSHIMA was engaged in negotiations with the German Government regarding a Japanese-German-Italian treaty. From this time, until the negotiations were terminated, around August 1939, I, together with the



Naval Attache participated in frequent conferences within the Japanese Embassy and discussed this matter, Ambassador OSHIMA acting as leader. During these negotiations, Ambassador OSHIMA always gave the matter most careful consideration and often called the Embassy staff, the Military and Naval attaches together for consultation and study.

3 - 2. As to the reasons why the Japanese Government and the central army authorities wished for the conclusion of this treaty, Ambassador OSHIMA often told us as follows:

At that time the China incident was unexpectedly expanding without any prospect of an early termination, and all eager Japanese efforts for settlement had been of no avail. Moreover, both the Japanese Government and the army circles felt themselves threatened by the powerful armament of Soviet Russia. They wanted, therefore, by concluding this treaty with Germany and Italy, to improve the diplomatic position of Japan with the ultimate purpose of bringing the China incident to the earliest possible end, and, at the same time, to be prepared for any attack from Soviet Russia. I never heard from OSHIMA that Japan intended or desired to utilize this treaty after its conclusion as a means of initiate or wage aggressive war against other countries. Neither have I ever heard from anyone that OSHIMA planned or desired anything of this nature.

3 - 3. In February 1939, Mr. ITO, Nobufumi, accompanied by an officer from both the Army and the Navy, arrived in Berlin bringing the instructions of the Japanese Government regarding this treaty. I, together with the higher



Embassy staff and the Naval Attache, was present when envoy ITO gave the explanations to the Ambassador. The purport of this instruction was to limit to Soviet Russia the object of Japanese Military assistance, to be given to Germany and Italy on the basis of the treaty. This was at variance to what OSHIMA had already communicated to Germany upon instructions of the Government, namely that although Japan considered Soviet Russia as the primary object of this proposed treaty, Britain and France would also be included as secondary objects. Facing this situation, OSHIMA cabled his opinion to Tokyo that, in view of the progress up to that time, Germany might become distrustful of Japan if he transmitted to Germany the changed Japanese view as instructed, and, moreover, would never accept the proposal.

3 - 4. According to Exhibit No. 2230, Ambassador OSHIMA told the German Foreign Minister on 27 May 1939 that "the War Minister requested OSHIMA by wire to hold off until later against ARITA in order not to disturb the discussions among the various quarters in Tokyo. The Army is firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly and even at risk of a cabinet overthrow." Concerning this I have the following recollection:

According to my memory, it was about the middle of May 1939, I dispatched a telegram from Berlin to Tokyo stating that Japan must clarify her position as to whether she was going to conclude the treaty with Germany and Italy or not, and that to continue in the ambiguous attitude of that time would only invite the contempt of foreign countries. Thereupon I received from War Minister ITAGAKI a telegram to the effect



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that: "The matter of the Japan-Germany-Italy treaty is now under earnest discussion within the cabinet, and, as the atmosphere is turning favorable to its conclusion, we had better remain silent for the time being. I have no thought whatsoever of overthrowing the cabinet." I told Ambassador OSHIMA of this telegram.

On this 27th day of Oct., 1947,  
at Tokyo.

Deponent: KAWABE, Torashiro (seal)

I hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,  
at Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) SHIMANOUCHI, Ryu

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(signed) KAWABE, Torashiro (seal)