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INTERROGATION OF  
YOSHIZUMI, Masao

Date and Time: 5 April 1946, 0945-1140 hours.

Place : Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : YOSHIZUMI, Masao  
Mr. Edward E. O'Neill Interrogator  
Lt. Commander Frank Huggins, Interpreter  
Mr. Shizuma Interpreter  
(Brought by  
General YOSHI-  
ZUMI)

Oath of Interpreter, administered by  
Mr. O'Neill:

Mr. O'Neill : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God,  
that you will truly and accurately inter-  
pret and translate from English into Japa-  
nese and from Japanese into English, as  
may be required of you, in this proceeding.

Lt. Commander  
Huggins : I do.

The informant has known SATO very well in official circles since 1941 and knew him slightly before then. Informant's relations with SATO from 1941 were purely official inasmuch as informant was head of Maintenance and Supply (?) Division and SATO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. Informant was not close to SATO and could add little or no information as to SATO's private views except for the fact that he knew that SATO was a very



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close friend to MUTO and had served as head of the Military Affairs Section in the Military Affairs Bureau when MUTO was its Chief. Informant had no comment on MUTO's viewpoint regarding warfare.

The promotion of SATO to Lt. General at the age of forty-nine was not considered unusual because of rapid promotions at that time, but SATO's assignments in the army, especially that of Chief of Military Affairs Bureau were very favorable.

SATO left the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau in November 1944 and the informant became Chief of the Bureau in the latter part of March 1945, serving until its abolishment at the termination of the war in August, 1945.

In the opinion of the informant the position as Chief of Military Affairs Bureau was a very, very important post. In prestige it ranked fourth in the army, being headed only by War Minister, Chief of Staff, and Inspector General. Actually the Chief of the Bureau reported directly to the Chief of Staff and War Minister and had little or no connection with the Inspector General.

In regard to the rules and regulations of the care of Prisoners of War: The regulations were assembled by the Military Affairs Bureau in Conference with the Prisoners Information Bureau and Chiefs of Staff and then presented to the War Minister for approval. The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was the main figure in the promulgation of these rules and regulations. The policy for the handling of prisoners of war emanated from the Military Affairs Bureau and the actual handling of the prisoners of war was performed by the Prisoners Information Bureau on down through to the Field Commanders. Although the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau participated in the making of the policies for the handling of war prisoners, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was the higher authority as exemplified by the fact that if the Chief of the Information Bureau came to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau with a plan and it was disapproved by the latter the normal procedure would be to forget the plan there and then because of the position



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maintained in the Army by the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau plus the fact that he was always in close connection with the War Minister. However, under such circumstances if the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau was insistent that his plan, disapproved by the Military Affairs Chief, be carried through then both parties would present the matter to the War Minister for determination.

Going on the hypothetical assumption that SATO as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau would have had more influence with TOJO than the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau the informant states that there would be no question as to SATO being the top man in setting the policies for the treatment of war prisoners.

The records regarding the prisoners were kept in the office of the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau and although not actually under the control of the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, they were technically under his control and he had access to them at any time.

When a complaint was received from the International Red Cross as to mistreatment of prisoners of war the following was the procedure in handling the same: The complaint was received in the Foreign Office and referred to the Military Affairs Section, a division of the Military Affairs Bureau. The head of the Military Affairs Section then took the complaint up with the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau and as a result of this conference a plan was drawn up to meet the alleged complaint. This plan was presented to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and if approved by him in turn taken to the War Minister for approval. "The Military Affairs section was the door through which all outside complaints came to the War Minister". Anything of official nature whether prisoners of war or otherwise, would come to the attention of the War Minister through the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. However, the International Red Cross would have the right and could go directly to the Chief of the Information Bureau with a complaint, but in such an instance the Information Bureau Chief would call in the head of the Military Affairs Section and the procedure outlined above would be followed.



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If the complaint of mistreatment resulted from a rule promulgated for the treatment of prisoners of war the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau would ultimately know about the complaint and he would be the man who would make the corrections and amends, if any were made. He would be the man that would start the machinery operating to remedy the situation and only the War Minister would have the authority to stop the same. The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau could give commands in such instances to those who were actually carrying out the rules.

If the mistreatments were known only to the Japanese the information of this mistreatment would be first received by the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau. If the matter was serious he would confer with the Military Affairs Bureau, if not, the Information Bureau would dispose of the matter itself. However, if such mistreatment was widespread or well known the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau should have had knowledge of the same, and having knowledge could have started operations to remedy the mistreatment. For example, where prisoners of war lacked food and no steps being taken to remedy the same the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau could order such remedy even though it might be opposed by the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau. The details of the regulations were controlled by the Chief of the Prisoners Information Bureau; the policy by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.

If a rule was promulgated which per se violated treaty conventions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau would be the first to know of such violation. If a rule was promulgated which did not per se violate treaty conventions but in its application, conventions were violated the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, had he executed due diligence and competence in office, should have known about such violation.

Normally it was not the duty of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau to direct or order other bureau Chiefs but technically the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was the superior officer to the Chiefs of bureaus, such as the Prisoners Information Bureau. It is the



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opinion of the informant that the individual occupying the position of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau during the years 1942, 1943, and 1944 should have had knowledge of any widespread or violent mistreatment of prisoners of war and should have taken steps to punish those responsible, and to insure the non-occurrence of such violations.

Informant states that he did not know TOJO too well -- that he was appointed to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau by General SUGIYAMA.

As to the execution of the Doolittle flyers informant states, on hearsay from a Colonel TAKAYAMA (given name unknown) of the War Ministry, that the determination to try the same was decided upon at a conference between the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister. Informant states that if this is true it was contrary to the usual method of deciding such matters because such a matter would have been decided at a general conference between the War Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.

The informant can be reached through the Japanese Liaison Office as head of the General Affairs Department in the First Demobilization Ministry.