

AMAU, EIOI (2530)

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(19)

Check and see if the Home  
Ministry operated any civilian  
internment camps

NO. 123456789  
12/15/1944

Date: 17 June 1947

Report of Investigation Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Inv. Div. No.  
2530

CRD No.

Report by: Lt. Daniel F. Resendes

Title: Eiji AMAU

Synopsis of facts: Eiji AMAU born 19 August 1887, Tokushima-ken Prefecture. Major positions Japanese Government, President Bureau of Information, 1943-1944, Vice Foreign Minister, 1941. House Arrest.

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DETAILS:

At Tokyo:

This investigation is predicated upon a request of the Honorable Lord WRIGHT, President of the International War Crimes Commission.

Eiji AMAU was a career diplomat. He is a graduate of the Kobe Higher Commercial School. He completed a post graduate course at the Tokyo Higher Commercial School, passed the Higher Civil Service Examination in 1912. The same year he entered foreign service. He served successively as eleven-Consul at Antung and Sydney (1912-1919) and as Attache (1916) and subsequently secretary of the Japanese Embassy in London (1916-1919). In 1919 he was attache to the Japanese Delegation to the Versailles Conference; he was a member of the Peace Treaty Executive Commission in Paris. The next year he was sent to Berlin as Commissioner to execute the Versailles Treaty. The same year he became Secretary to the Legation at Berne, Switzerland and the next year he was attached as secretary to the Tokyo Foreign Office. From 1921-1922 he was a member of the Japanese Delegation to the Washington Disarmament Conference. In 1922 he became a member of the Joint Settlement Committee of the Shantung Question, as well as of the Conference for Abolition of Postal Agencies in China at Peking. From that year until 1927 AMAU served in China as Consul General at Canton (1923) and Harbin (1925) and as First Secretary at the Peking Legation (1927). From 1929 till 1933 he was a Counsellor at the Moscow Embassy.

In September 1933 AMAU became Director of the Bureau of Information of the Foreign Office. While holding this post, on 17 April 1934, he made

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the famous "hands off China" statement. This statement has since been known as the "AMAU Declaration". AMAU attacked the activities of Great Britain and the United States in China and stated: "Japan will take the sole responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia." One source reports, that a member of the Foreign Office has since stated, that it was a "confidential policy, prepared in the Asiatic Bureau." Source continues that someone gave the press a tip. Subsequently questions were put to AMAU, who did not realize that the policy was confidential, AMAU, according to source, created a furor in the Foreign Office by giving it out, and it produced serious international repercussions.

In April 1937 he was named Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Switzerland. While occupying this post, he was named Director of the Japanese Office of the International Conference at Geneva and Japanese Representative to the International Commission of the Opium Question. In September 1939 he succeeded SHIRATORI, Toshio as Ambassador to Italy. He arrived in Rome from Berlin on 15 November 1939. During AMAU's tenure of office, on 27 September 1940, Italy joined the German-Japanese Alliance. According to one source AMAU was one of the best-known foreign envoys in Italy. In November 1940, he was succeeded to his post by HORIKIRI, Zembei. Back in Japan, he spent a year touring the country, surveying home conditions. From July 1941 until October 1941 AMAU served as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs under Admiral TOYODA, Tajiuro in the third KONOE Cabinet. A report of 20 August 1941 states, that he was appointed a member of the China Affair Damage Investigation Commission. On 22 October 1941 he was succeeded as Vice Foreign Minister by Hawuhiko NISHI.

On 20 April 1943, AMAU succeeded TANI, Masayuki as President of the Bureau of Information. According to one source, AMAU promised on 21 May 1943, a "propaganda war victory." Radio Tokyo broadcast on 7 July 1943, that AMAU was among those who have been named councilors of a new dormitory provided by SASAKI, Kyuji for the use of overseas students. The next day same source broadcast, that during a meeting of the Board of Information, he outlined the objectives of the Board in wartime. On 14 July 1943, AMAU addressed the Imperial Rule Assistance Association's Fourth Central Cooperative Council, which convened in Tokyo that day. The following October 23rd Tokyo Radio carried a declaration by him on the establishment of the "Provisional Government of India." On 16 November he addressed the opening session of the Greater East Asia Press Conference in Tokyo. In the January session of the House of Representatives, AMAU declared, that the "Thought front was equally important with the armed war front. On the 17 March 1944, he was listed as one of five government members of the National Movement Liaison Headquarters. On 15 April 1944 he was a representative at the Tripartite Technical Commission which met that day at Premier TOJO's official residence. On 18 July 1944 AMAU resigned as President of the Bureau of Information. When the TOJO Cabinet resigned, he was succeeded by OGATA, Toketora. On the 22nd of December 1944 AMAU addressed the Japanese Youth Corps Conference on "World Developments and the Greater East Asia War." On 27 June 1945 AMAU was named Vice President and Director of the Protocol Enforcement Department of the Dai Nippon Koakai (Great Japan New Asia Society).

He made an address at the inauguration ceremony, held that day in Marunouchi Hall in Tokyo. A Tokyo Radio report of the next day also mentions him as chairman of the Board of Directors of the organization. According to one source AMAU is associated with Toshio SHIRATORI and a pro-Axis group with close army connections. AMAU holds the second class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.

The following information is contained in an analysis of Documentary Evidence No. 4064, dated 4 August 1941. Persons Implicated: AMAU. Crimes to Which Document Applicable: Conspiracy for Aggression against Russia, Thailand, Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. Summary of Relevant Points as follows:

1. Telegram from THOMAS, Bangkok, 6 Aug 1941.

The Japanese military Attache in Bangkok stated that military action against Thailand would cause conflict with Britain or the United States. An attack on the Netherlands E. Indies would only be possible after occupation of Siam and a line up on the Burma-Malaya frontier. It would be better to wait till Germany threatened India from the west. An attack on North Sakhalin and Vladivostok might be more advantageous to Germany and need less forces. As Thailand is dependent upon imports from the Allies, it is better for it to stay neutral with a secret leaning towards Japan. Thomas says this shows that Japan will avoid open conflict with Britain and America as long as this is economically possible. Japan can be assured of Thailand's friendship by her recognition of Manchukuo, settling of trade accounts, and non-agreement to an Anglo-American offer of a guarantee of independence.

2. Telegram from THOMAS, Bangkok, 8 Aug 1941.

Movements of Japanese and Thai troops up to the frontier of Thailand.

3. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 9 Aug 1941. The economic reaction from America, Britain and China to Japanese advance on Indo-China forces Japanese economic circles to recognize the need for a state-controlled economy. The enemies of the New Order and the activist foreign policy point out that Japan is obtaining war materials under the disguise of a conciliatory policy. Japan is still dependent on the import of oil from the Netherlands East Indies. NOMURA is trying to keep trade with America going. It is clear from many examples that Japan is trying to avoid a conflict with the U.S. and fears that any further step may lead to war.

The proportion of Japan's military preparations suggest that she is in a position to oppose a military power like Russia. According to the military attache in Manchuria, forces are lining up in three places in the direction of Vladivostok, Blagoveshchensky and Chita. The new Chief of Army (air forces), General DOIHARA, declared that the Russian Far East Army has been strengthened. The army has decided for an action and the air forces are obtaining the necessary informations for an attack. On the other hand, the Navy is more interested in Thailand. OTT warned of the dangers of scattering Japan's forces.

SHIRATORI, who is otherwise keen on a speedy entry by Japan into the war, is also concerned over the sacrifice involved. An excuse for war must be sought, he affirmed, in giving demands to Russia respecting North Sakhalin, military security for the sea provinces, and perhaps other Far Eastern territories, as well as a break with Chungking. Refusal of these demands would provide the excuse. OTT has warned against any negotiations with the Russians, who are past masters at protracting such negotiations to give time for their (the Russian) position to be improved. TOYODA has categorically denied the existence of any negotiations. Japan has not got the leadership to resolve to oppose encirclement by eliminating the Soviet Union as its first opponent.

4. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 9 August 1941. Details of the disposition of Japanese forces in Korea and Manchuria. About thirty division

will ostensibly have been moved up by the end of August. Any decision to move on Russia is dependent upon German successes, and ITAGAKI has stated that another advance in the south, e.g., into Thailand, is beyond Japan's powers at the moment. Japan's economy is cramped by American pressure. OTT considers a speedy decision to enter the war against Russia essential. Japanese activity in China is small as ever, progress is being made in the occupation of Indo-China.

5. Telegram from Thomsen, Washington, 11 Aug 41.  
United Press report on statement of WAKASUGI in English.

6. Telegram from THOMSEN, Washington, 12 August 1941.  
The question arises, as military threats are being used against Japan, of how much strength Australia, the Netherlands East Indies and Britain have to attack Japan with.

Australia. One division in Singapore, and 60,000 insufficiently equipped troops. Air forces divided between Singapore and Australia.

Netherlands East Indies. A limited number of Curtisses and Brewsters, and some obsolete Curtisses and Martins.

Singapore. Probably not so strong as has been made out. Its core is one English and one Australian Division and 500-800 planes.

The allies are probably content to stave Japan off as long as possible.

7. Telegram from WAGNER, Hsinking, 13 Aug 1941. The population of Manchukuo is anti-Japanese throughout. Vice Foreign Minister and Propaganda Chief MUTO have both assured him that Japan wants neither a war with Russia or the southeast. Her duty in accordance with the Tri-Partite Pact is to keep up the tension in the Pacific.

8. Note on Baron HIRANUMA, signed by BOLTZE, Berlin, 14 Aug 1941. As Premier in 1939 he showed himself to be "difficult and bureaucratic" in the negotiations over the military pact. After being relieved of office by Prince KONOYE he again became President of the secret state council.

As Home Minister in 1941 he represented a "conservative, cautious and reserved policy." He was an opponenet of MATSUOKA who was "too full of ideas and too much orientated to Europe" for him. He feared his activities would embroil Japan in the European conflict.

In the present Cabinet he is Minister without Portfolio. Among his adherents in the Cabinet are TANABE, IWAMURA and YANAGAWA. He is founder of the SUYODAN. The attempt on his life was probably made by young officers, who hoped thus for a more active policy on the part of the government. He was well received in liberal financial and economic circles, as in the Second KONOYE Cabinet, he successfully opposed state socialist measures. His attitude to Germany was always positive. He expressed his joy at the conclusion of the Three Power Pact.

9. Note, signed by BOLTZE, 15 August 1941, about AMAU, the newly appointed Vice Foreign Minister.

The following information is contained in an Analysis of Documentary Evidence No. 4065, dated 1 Oct 1941. Persons Implicated: AMAU. Crimes to which document applicable: Aggressive warfare. Summary of Relevant Points: Contains, among others, the following items:

1. Telegram from HEMMEN, Paris, German Armistice Delegation for Commerce. 1 Oct 1941. Report on the disposition of 5,000 tons of Indo-Chinese rawrubber, sent to the U.S. Further export to America of raw rubber would not be permitted by Germany and Japan.

2. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo. 20 Oct 41. Report on negotiations in Washington, which KONOYE had initiated. No Japanese government is able to make palatable to the people and the army the demands on which the U.S. bases its negotiating.

3. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo 4 Oct 41. Report from the Japanese government has protested Britain and Iranian action in denying the Japanese the use of code telegrams from Teheran and have applied similar restrictions on the Iranian Minister here. The Japanese legation in Teheran was accused of harboring a German which was not true. Further, the Iranian Government and British circles claimed that the legation was giving asylum to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who is a dangerous anti-British agitator. The foreign office confidentially tells me that the Grand Mufti had actually found sanctuary in the legation for awhile, but has now fled. OTT told the Foreign office that the Germans did not want the Grand Mufti to fall into the hands of the Russians or English and asked the whereabouts of the Mufti. However, the Foreign Office didn't know.

4. Telegram from Ott, Tokyo, 4 October 1941. Report on Japanese sentiment, which OTT describes as disillusionment at not gaining a clear victory in China, a resulting feeling of weakness, the feeling of being surrounded by enemies. The recognition is spreading, however, that Japan's aims are not to be obtained by doing nothing. The opinion of the army leadership (War Minister TOJO, Chief of General Staff SUGIYAMA and Director of political Division OIKAWA, is as follows: The Three Power Pact has the inherent aim of conquering the British Empire and a new distribution of power in Europe and East Asia. After Russia has been beaten, the most important thing would be to resume contact of the Axis powers over Siberia and to concentrate our entire energy in fighting England everywhere. As no Japanese attack on the Russian Far Eastern Army can be expected before spring, there are two ways of reopening the Trans-Siberian Railroad. One way would be to utilize the capture of Moscow to press the rest of Russia to cooperation - and Japan, at the proper moment, could apply pressure on Russian imports in the Far East. On the other hand, there could be an attack on Siberia from East and West next spring, which Japan could undertake despite her problems in China. Independent of the time of year is a Japanese attack against the Anglo-Saxon position in the South.

OTT states that he is repeating the confidential statements of the War Minister, made in the presence of the Chief of Staff, to OTT. They show how the leadership feels about a war against Russia. Furthermore, they show that the plans against the South, which have to be borne by the Navy in the main, are not complete and thorough. Because of this and due to the fact that there is no strong leadership, it is probably that the present government will try to postpone the action in the South. An activation of Japan can be most easily achieved if the possibility of operations of a common goal, such as Siberia on a combined attack on the Near and Far East, can be made clear technically and militarily. OTT suggests that, after proper preparations, the attempt is made to advocate that the Commission, which was formed by the Three Power Pact at Japan's insistence, concern itself with common military, economic and political problems. The feeling that they are not being consulted bothers the Japanese, especially their egoism.

The statements of the military leaders above refrain from mentioning America and speak only of England as the main enemy. Japan would only attack America as a last resort. In the negotiations here MATSUOKA insisted on defining attacks in the sense of Article III of the Pact. The feeling that a conflict with America is inevitable is gaining.

4. Telegram from WOHLTAT and OTT, Tokyo 6 Oct 41. Report from WOHLTAT in which he argues that Germany should continue the flow of heavy machinery to Japan in exchange for raw materials from the Far East. Due to Anglo-Saxon measures, Japan now feels herself weak, and activist circles are hoping for the reopening of the Siberian Railroad to a friendly industrial power, Germany. OTT adds that circles in Japan, which favor an understanding with America, are pointing to the fact that no economic help could be gained if Japan remains in the Axis camp. Thus, if Germany could send material aid to Japan, it would strengthen activist forces here.

5. Telegram from ABETZ, Paris. 6 Oct 1941. State Secretary BENOIST-MECHIN told ABETZ that difficulties regarding Japan are mounting daily in Indo-China. Though Japan, with a few exceptions, is keeping to the military clauses of the agreement, she is more and more endangering French political and economic sovereignty. Though DARLAN has been in favor of meeting Japan's terms, his judgment has now been doubted by the French government, because of Japan's aggressive action against French sovereignty, and a stiffening of French political and economic opposition to DARLAN's policy is consequently feared.

6. Telegram from RITTER, Special Train, 8 Oct 1941. A proposal to open up a route from Japan to Germany via, the waters north of Siberia. In order to achieve this, the cooperation of Japan and complete secrecy are most essential. RITTER asks OTT to give this information to the Japanese Foreign Minister in a confidential manner. The proposal should be carried through by the German Naval Attache and a small group of Japanese Navy officers.

7. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo. 9 October 41. Report that the threat of restricting the propaganda activities of belligerent nations in Japan has now been actualized. OTT told the Vice Foreign Minister AMAU he would not voluntarily retreat from his stand on propaganda which is in the interest of the Three Power Pact. AMAU answered that the verbal note represents the decision of the cabinet and cannot be changed. However, the Japanese authorities have decided for a policy of furthering the Three Power Pact, and will therefore take over German propaganda interests themselves. OTT believes that he will be able to influence the Japanese public, with the help of friends in the government, who share that viewpoint, and also publicly are against the restrictive measures. He will look for new ways of disseminating embassy propaganda.

8. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 11 Oct 41. OTT believes that the matter of opening up a route via northern Siberian waters would better be taken up with the proper Navy people, instead of with the Foreign Minister.

9. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo 11 October 1941. A report by OTT on the Navy plans. The Navy has recently won a lot of prestige and the naval air arm has been able to gain much experience in China. Since the Anglo-Saxon influence in the Navy is still very considerable, it was especially important to utilize politically the embassy's personal friendships in Navy circles. A comparatively fast change has occurred. Young



officers feel that an attack on the Anglo-Saxons is inevitable. In order to remain a great power Japan must attack the Dutch East Indies. It was consequently a clever move on the part of the group under KONOYE that they termed the probably unsuccessful negotiations with the United States as final, after the failure of which Japan can pursue its aims with greater assurance.

The Navy believes it has reached its maximum power and is ready to do its part in Southern operations. Concerning the fluctuation of the strategic attack plans, OTT has already reported. Plans mentioned are: Surprise attack on Singapore, either before or after occupation of Thailand, occupation or by passing of the Philippines, blockade of Singapore with attack on Borneo and Sumatra. In this indecision, there is a weakness. A direct attack of Singapore is now considered impossible because of the increased British strength there. After the occupation of Siam, a land and sea blockade of Singapore can be affected. At the same time, the Philippines must be taken. Despite difficulties, the securing of cover in the flanks will secure the occupation of British and Dutch Oil regions in Borneo and Sumatra. It is doubtful whether the areas can be held for a long time against Anglo Saxon pressure. Consequently, it is important to know how the Axis powers intend to operate after conclusion of the war in Russia, and whether or not they will be able to supply arms to Japan against the United States, after the collapse of England. I have emphasized Japanese participation in the final blow against Russia and Germany's approval of bold Japanese plans in the South. In order to activate the Japanese allies, it would be best to agree on a common plan against the Anglo-Saxons.

10. Telegram from THOMSEN, Washington, 11 Oct 1941. THOMSEN believes that American policy will have to change since Japan's national spirit has been aroused and will not be contained by the ABCD powers.

11. Memo from GAUS, Berlin. 11 Oct 1941. The Japanese Ambassador in Vichy, KATO, asked GAUS about future operations against England and expressed the fear that Germany would conclude a compromise peace with England. Ambassador OSHIMA thought that it was important to renew the Anti-Comintern Pact. He telegraphed to Tokyo about it several times, but received no answer. If a big event would be made of the renewal, it would have a great political effect.

12. Memo from WEIZSAECKER, Berlin. 14 Oct 1941. The attacked article shows Japanese concern not to miss her connection with the great political developments. Perhaps this uncertainty is the best way of getting Japan into the war.

13. Memo from the DNB representative, Berlin, 13 Oct 41. Germany's successes point to a quick Russian collapse, the KOKUMIN SHIMBUN says, England might yet make peace with Germany, and to regain what she has lost in Europe, will try to make up for it in the Far East. America would join England's advance. The difficulties facing Japan in creating the Greater East Asia Sphere would increase. Japan should not remain behind the development of the world.

14. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo. 15 Oct 1941. Report that the Japanese occupation of Indo-China is not proceeding without friction. The controversy concerns the handling of the Chungking Consul, relinquishing of certain airplanes, confiscation of quarters and warehouses, the spreading of Japanese anti-French propaganda among the native population, and so on.

The Japanese government intends to increase her occupation army to 40,000 troops. The Japanese government has the intention to force through several demands through its army there. After the fait accompli have been in effect, former Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA will go to Saigon presumably to discuss the Indo-Chinese problem.

OTT has the impression that neither side is willing to let it come to an open conflict. The Japanese government wants to protect the picture of a treaty defense to the outside, and a conflict would lower the country's economic value.

The following excerpt was received from the Civil Censor Detachment dated 2 April 1946, re Emiji AMAU, Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan. Written by AMAU to Eiji and Taihei AMAU, 753 Kichijoji, Tokyo, Japan:

AMAU states "Our country that was built in a century's toil of blood and sweat has finally crashed. We lost the war, but we will rise again, if the men with the spirit of Yamato unite once again. We lost the war, our hills and rivers are invaded, but, may we have not lost Yamato's spirit."

The following statements were made by TANAKA, Ryukichi (General) re Eiji AMAU on 25 March 1946:

"Q. Let's go on to Eiji AMAU.

A. We were together in Peking in 1917. He had long been connected with the diplomatic field with America, England and Russia. He was probably in Russia at the time of the Manchurian Incident. In 1933 he became Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office, at which time the famous AMAU statement was made. This statement concerned the policy of keeping Asia for the Asiatics.

Q. Did he make that statement of his own accord?

A. Yes, he made it of his own accord.

Q. The Foreign Minister did not authorize him to do it?

A. It was without the influence of the military, and he made it on his own accord.

Q. Was he disciplined for it?

A. No, he was not reprimanded for this act as his reputation was good at the time. I believe he went to Italy as Ambassador. I believe he did not have much to do with the Tri-partite Pact. He came back from Italy in 1939 and did nothing in particular. He became Chief of the Information Bureau in the TOJO Cabinet in 1940, and held this post until the fall of the TOJO Cabinet.

Q. Do you know of anything he did while he was President of the Board of Information.

A. Yes, he was responsible for the propaganda program. Since the fall of the TOJO Cabinet he has been a man of leisure. He is now in Sugamo Prison.

Q. Did he plan the radio addresses to the allied forces during 1942 and 1943?

A. He did broadcast to the Allies many times.

Q. Did he broadcast to the allied soldiers in the field?

A. Any propaganda aimed at the soldiers was the responsibility of the army and navy. He was not much of a diplomat; he was very anti-American and anti-British.

Q. Did he hire Tokyo Rose?

A. Yes, I believe so.

Q. Do you have anything else to add about AMAU?

A. No, I haven't except he is "peanuts".

The following is an excerpt from the Document No. 822, dated 14 March 1946 re ANAU, Eiji:

"Crime to which Document Applicable: Manchurian Incident. Summary of Relevant Points: p. 72 Foreign Office announcement concerning AMAU statement. "Japan will oppose all economic and trade negotiations by foreign powers with China if she considers such negotiations detrimental to peace and order in East Asia".

The following is an excerpt received from the Civil Censorship Detachment dated 13 February 1946, from Chosho YOSHIDA, Osaka, Japan to Eiji AMAU, Sugamo Prison. YOSHIDA states: "Great changes have been brought to the world. Our ignorant misbehaviour has been exposed and Japan is undergoing a reformation. I am not down-hearted because I believe that the results of the reformation will appear after ten or twenty years. Such phrase as 'cooperation of the military! the government and the people' came into existence because the militarist looked down upon the people as slaves. If they considered the people as equals it wasn't necessary to make such phrases. They would merely have said, 'cooperation of the people'. I am not accusing you of anything just 'I pray for your good health'."

Biographical History of Eiji AMAU follows:

Date of Birth: 19 Aug 1887

1912 Jul 7 Graduated from Post-graduate course of the Tokyo Higher Commercial School.  
1912 Oct 16 Passed the examination for diplomats and consuls.  
1912 Nov 15 Appointed Vice-consul and granted 7th Grade in the higher Civil Service.  
Given 7th Grade Salary and stationed at Antung China.  
1913 Jan 30 Given the 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade.  
1914 Sep 18 Given and allowed to wear the Chinese 5th Grade Decoration.  
1914 Nov 24 Transferred to Sydney and paid the 4th Grade Salary.  
1915 Jul Paid the 3rd Grade Salary.  
1916 Apr 1 Paid ¥ 120 for service in the Affairs of 1914 and 1915.  
1916 Dec 26 Promoted to the 6th Grade of the Higher Civil Service.  
1917 Jan 31 Promoted to the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade.  
1917 Jun 31 Appointed as Eleven Diplomat; Transferred to England as the 3rd Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, London.  
1918 Jun 28 Paid the 2nd Grade Salary.  
1918 Dec 29 Paid the 1st Grade Salary.  
1919 Jan 20 Transferred to Switzerland.  
1919 June 30 Promoted to the 5th Grade in the Higher Civil Service  
1919 Aug 11 Promoted to the 6th Court Rank, Junior Grade.  
1920 Jan 10 Appointed as member on the Peace Treaty Execution Committee and relieved of the same on February 24, 1921.  
1920 Feb 28 Promoted to the 2nd Secretaryship of the Legation.

1921 Feb 16 Appointed Secretary at the Foreign Office, Tokyo and served in the 2nd Secretaryship of the European and American Bureau.  
 1920 Nov 1 Given a 5th Class Decoration of the Order of the Sacred Treasure. Paid ¥700 for services in the Affairs of 1915-20.  
 1921 Sep 27 Appointed as Secretary attached to the plenipotentiaries sent to the Washington Conference.  
 1921 Dec 26 Promoted to the 4th Grade in the higher civil service.  
 1922 Jan 20 Promoted to the 6th Court Rank, Senior Grade.  
 1922 Jul 19 Appointed as Secretary to the Joint Committee to settle the Shantung Affairs.  
 1922 Jul 26 Appointed as secretary attached to the Negotiating Committee concerning the communication between Japan and China.  
 1923 Mar 23 Appointed as Consul-General. Promoted to the 4th Grade of the higher civil service; Granted 2nd grade salary.  
 1923 Mar 23 Transferred to the Kwang-tung. Granted 1st grade salary.  
 1923 Jul 23 Held an additional post as Secretary of the government General of Formosa and served in the Foreign Affairs Section (Formosan Government-General). Promoted to the 4th grade of the higher civil service.  
 1924 May 15 Decorated with the 4th Class Order of the Sacred Treasure for services at the Washington Conference.  
 1924 Aug 18 Promoted to the 3rd grade of the higher civil service.  
 1925 Sep 15 Promoted to the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade.  
 1929 Mar 14 Transferred to Harbin, Manchuria.  
 1928 Aug 24 Appointed 1st Secretary of the Legation and stationed in China. Promoted to the 3rd grade of the higher civil service.  
 1921 Sep 12 Appointed 1st Secretary of the Embassy and transferred to the U.S.S.R. and ordered to act as councillor.  
 1929 Dec 28 Promoted to the 2nd Grade of the higher civil service. Ordered to Russia. Received 3rd class pay.  
 1931 Feb 11 Decorated with the 3rd class Order of the Sacred Treasure  
 1933 Jun 2 Appointed Chief of the Intelligence Dept. of the Foreign Office. Promoted to the 2nd grade of the higher civil service.  
 1933 Jun 14 Appointed Manager of the International Tourist Bureau.  
 1933 Sep 9 Appointed member of the Inquiry Committee of Cultural Enterprises in China.  
 1934 Jul 3 Promoted to the 1st grade of the higher civil service.  
 1934 July 16 Promoted to the 4th Court Rank, Junior Grade.  
 1935 Apr 1 Paid an additional salary of ¥ 600 a year.  
 1934 Apr 29 Given the second class Order of the Rising Sun for service in the Affairs of 1931-1935.  
 1937 Apr 28 Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, stationed in Switzerland and ordered additionally as Chief of the Japanese Affairs Bureau in the International Council of the League of Nations.  
 1938 Mar 9 Decorated with the 2nd Class Order of the Sacred Treasure.  
 1938 Mar 28 Appointed Japanese member on the Opium Committee of the League of Nations and relieved of the same November 9, 1938.  
 1939 Aug 1 Promoted to the 4th Court Rank, Senior Grade.  
 1939 Sep 30 Appointed Ambassador Plenipotentiary and stationed in Italy. Relieved of the same at his own request, March 14, 1941.  
 1941 Apr 2 Promoted to the 3rd Court Rank, Junior grade.  
 1941 Apr 29 Decorated with the 1st Class Order of the Rising Sun for service in the China Affairs.  
 1941 Aug 15 Appointed Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs.

1941 Aug 19 Appointed member of the Inquiry Committee on Damage in the China Affairs. Appointed as Councillor of the Cabinet Planning Board. Appointed as Councillor of the Research Institute on the General Mobilization of the National Spirit.

1941 Aug 29 Appointed as member of the General Mobilization Council. Appointed as Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau. Appointed as member of the Valuation Committee on funds placed by the Japanese Government in the North China Development Co. Ltd., and the Central China Promotion Co. Ltd.

1941 Sep 5 Appointed a member of Management Committee on Government Loans. Appointed as member of the Management Committee on Foreign Exchanges. Appointed as temporary member of the Special Funds Adjustment Committee. Appointed as member of the Custom and Tariff Investigation Committee.

1941 Sep 25 Appointed as member of the Overseas Colonization Committee.

1941 Sep 30 Appointed as promoter of the East Asia Marine Transportation Co. Ltd.

1943 Apr 20 Appointed President of the Intelligence Dept. Appointed manager of the Greater East Asia Construction Committee.

1943 Jun 15 Appointed a Government Commission for the Diet.

1944 Jul 22 Resigned the Presidency of the Intelligence Dept.

UNDEVELOPED LEADS:

The Tokyo Office - At Tokyo - Will report and follow disposition of Subject.

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Page 1

The Japan Year Book 1943-44 Pages 1049 to 1051

THE ASSEMBLY OF GREATER EAST ASIATIC NATIONS

JOINT DECLARATION ADOPTED ON NOVEMBER 6, 1943

"It is the basic principle for the establishment of world peace that the nations of the world have each its proper place, and enjoy prosperity in common through mutual aid and assistance.

"The United States of America and the British Empire have in seeking their own prosperity oppressed other nations and people. Especially in East Asia, they indulged in insatiable aggression and exploitation, and sought to satisfy their inordinate ambition of enslaving the entire region, and finally they came to menace seriously the stability of East Asia. Herein lies the cause of the present war.

"The countries of Greater East Asia, with a view to contributing to the cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate toward prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination, and assuring their self-existence and self-defense, and in constructing a Greater East Asia in accordance with the following principles:

"1. The countries of Greater East Asia through mutual cooperation will ensure the stability of their region and construct an order of common prosperity and well-being based upon justice.

"2. The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the fraternity of nations in their region, by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence and practicing mutual assistance and amity.

"3. The countries of Greater East Asia by respecting one another's traditions and developing the creative faculties of each race, will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater East Asia.

"4. The countries of Greater East Asia will endeavor to accelerate their economic development through close cooperation upon a basis of reciprocity and to promote thereby the general prosperity of their region.

"5. The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of the world, and work for the abolition of racial discriminations, the promotion of cultural intercourse and the opening of resources throughout the world, and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind."

COPY

The Assembly of Greater East-Asiatic Nations was officially opened at 10 a.m. on November 5, 1943 in Tokyo. Attending this great conclave of nations were the Representatives of the six independent nations of Japan, China, Thailand, Manchoukuo, the Philippines, and Burma. Also present was Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the Provisional government of Azad Hind, as Observer.

Representing the united will of the one billion people of East Asia, the 46 Representatives, Associates, and Observers arrived at the scheduled time on the morning of November 5 and entered the ante-chamber of the imposing Imperial Diet Building, exchanging cordial greetings with each other.

In the center of the chamber were tables laid out in the shape of a squared horseshoe and above the blue woolen cloth covering the tables were the flags of each of the nations spread beneath a plate of glass, designating the seats of the Representatives lined up in the order of the Japanese alphabet.

The conference was opened at 10 a.m. with an address delivered by Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo, the Representative of Japan. Nominations for Chairman were begun and through a motion by Prince Wan Waithayakon, the Thai Representative, Prime Minister Tojo was unanimously elected to the chair.

With Prime Minister Tojo, as Chairman of the Assembly, seated at the head of the squared horseshoe, to his right were Representative of China, President Wang Ching-wei, Prime Minister Chang Ching-hui, the Manchoukuo Representative and Prime Minister Ba Maw, the Burmese Representative. To Prime Minister Tojo's left were His Royal Highness Prince Wan Waithayakon, the Thai Representative; President Jose P. Laurel, the Representative from the Philippines; and Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind and Observer to the Assembly. Behind each of the Representatives were the Associates.

The conference concentrated on the statement of active opinions concerning fundamental measures for the successful prosecution of the War of Greater East Asia and the construction of Greater East Asia. Only the Representatives were given voice and it was decided that the Representatives would speak in Japanese alphabetical order.

During the morning session, only Prime Minister Tojo and President Wang were scheduled to speak, but the proceedings progressed so rapidly that Prince Wan Waithayakon, the Thai delegate's speech, originally scheduled for the afternoon, was finished during the forenoon and that the noon recess came 40 minutes earlier.

The afternoon session opened at 1 p.m. The first speaker was Prime Minister Chang Ching-hui of Manchoukuo. He urged the need for Greater East Asia's unity as it was felt by Manchoukuo, the Senior State in the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The next speaker was Dr. Jose P. Laurel, the Philippine delegate, who exhibited his brilliant eloquence.

The session came to a recess at 3 p.m. and was resumed 20 minutes later. Prime Minister Ba Maw, the Burmese Representative, expressed the unflinching resolve of the new-born State.

This completed the speeches by the delegates of the six participating nations and the session adjourned at 4:30 p.m.

The second day session began at 10 a.m. November 6, in the same chamber, attended by all the representatives, associates and observers. It began with a proposal being made by Prime Minister General Tojo, the Japanese Representative. After an earnest exchange of opinions among the Representatives, a recess was called at 11:50 a.m.

**Joint Declaration Approved** With the recess being ended at 0:40 p.m. Prime Minister General Tojo rose at 0:45 p.m. and reread to the Assembly the draft of the Joint Declaration, which was welcomed with great applause. He then asked the Representatives to stand if they approved the draft, to which request the Representatives of the six nations stood up as one man, accompanied by surging waves of thunderous applause. The time was 0:55 p.m.

Flashlights popped and newsreel cameramen ground away to record for the eyes of all future generations to come this epochal and glorious moment of Asia, this united will of the one billion people of Greater East Asia. The Joint Declaration (text on the first page of this section carrying) in it the supreme faith of the peoples of Greater East Asia for world peace, was immediately announced by the Assembly Secretariat.



Doc. No. 2339 C

After the unanimous adoption of the historic Joint Declaration, Dr. Ba Maw, Head of State of Burma, rose to give an inspiring address in reference to Indian problems.

Tracing the history of British oppression on India and Burma, the Burmese Chief Executive, with his brilliant eloquence, emphasized that "without India's freedom, there can be no freedom for Asia." Himself being a man who had experienced the cruel oppression by the British, Head of State Ba Maw's address was marked by warm sympathy toward the oppressed masses of India and by his firm determination to drive out Anglo-American influences completely from the region of East Asia.

The Burmese representative was followed by Mr. Bose, who also expressed his staunch resolve never to lay down arms before India in India's own.

The converences reached its highest pitch as all the Representatives of the six participating nations and the attendnats listened intently to the stirring address of the energetic Indian leader.

After the 30-minute speech by Mr. Bose and its Chinese and English translation, Prime Minister Tojo rose to proclaim Japan's readiness to place the Andaman Islands and Nicobar Group under the jurisdiction of the Azad Hind Government. The statement made a profound impression on the whole assembly.

Prime Minister Tojo then delivered another brief message in the capacity of the Representative of Japan in the Assembly, expressing his thanks to the Representatives and Associates of the participating nations as well as the Observers for their full cooperation in the proceedings of the Assembly.

He was responded to by President Wang Ching-wei, Chinese Representative, who on behalf of all the Representatives and Associates attending the function, expressed congratulations on the successful conclusion of the historic conference.

Prime Minister rose again to declare the adjournment of the conference and, thus, the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations came to a brillitantly successful end at 3:17 p.m.

Representatives, Associates and Observers In connection with the epoch making Assembly, the following announcement has been issued by the Board of Information:

"The countries of Greater East Asia which have been striving vigorously for the attainment of their common objective on the firm basis of neighborly friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation have decided, in order to carry on frank discussions among their representatives concerning the successful prosecution of the War of Greater East Asia and the plan for the construction of Greater East Asia, to hold an Assembly of Greater East-Asiatic Nations in Tokyo.

"The names of the representatives, associates and observers are as follows:

## Japan

## Representative:

His Excellency General Hideki Tojo Prime Minister

## Associates:

His Excellency Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, Minister of the Navy, His Excellency Mr. Kazuo Aoki, Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs  
His Excellency Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
His Excellency Mr. Naoki Hoshino, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet  
His Excellency Mr. Eiji Amai, President of the Board of Information  
His Excellency Mr. Shun-ichi Matsumoto, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs  
His Excellency Mr. Kumaichi Yamamoto, Vice-Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs  
His Excellency Mr. Shin-ichi Kamimura, Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
His Excellency Major-General Kenryo Sato, Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, Ministry of the Army  
His Excellency Vice-Admiral Takazumi Oka, Director of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Ministry of the Navy  
His Excellency Mr. Shimpei Takeuchi, Director of the Bureau of General Affairs, Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs

*Aman*

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Doc. No. 219P (22)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 41

UNOFFICIAL STATEMENT BY THE JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE,  
April 17, 1934

The following is an English translation unofficially issued by the Japanese Foreign Office of the unofficial statement issued by the Foreign Office on April 17, 1934, known as the "Aman Statement":

Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, her views and attitude respecting matters that concern China, may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations; but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia.

Japan has been compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations because of their failure to agree in their opinions on the fundamental principles of preserving peace in East Asia. Although Japan's attitude toward China may at times differ from that of foreign countries, such difference cannot be evaded, owing to Japan's position and mission.

It goes without saying that Japan at all times is endeavoring to maintain and promote her friendly relations with foreign nations, but at the same time we consider it only natural that, to keep peace and order in East Asia, we must even act alone on our own responsibility and it is our duty to perform it. At the same time, there is no country but China which is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in East Asia. Accordingly, unification of China, preservation of her territorial integrity, as well as restoration of order in that country, are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows that these can be attained through no other means than the awakening and the voluntary efforts of China herself. We oppose therefore any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan: We also oppose any action taken by China, calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents are bound to acquire political significance. Undertakings of such nature, if carried through to the end, must give rise to complications that might eventually necessitate discussion of problems like fixing spheres of influence or even international control or division of China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and at the same time would have the most serious repercussion upon Japan and East Asia. Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade, as long as such negotiations

Br. Ex. 41

benefit China and are not detrimental to the maintenance of peace in East Asia.

However, supplying China with war planes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and to disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

The foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from the policies she has pursued in the past. But, on account of the fact that positive movements for joint action in China by foreign powers under one pretext or another are reported to be on foot, it is deemed not inappropriate to reiterate her policy at this time.


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AMAU, Eiji.

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File No:

Subject: AMAU Eiji, Internee in Sugamo Prison

Note  
No.

From: G-2

To: Legal Section

Date: 19 JUN 1947

(Attn: Invest. Div.

CIS/OD:TPD/mc

Lt. Col. R. E. Rudisill)

Info Copy to: IPS (Attn: Invest. Div.

Mr. E. P. Monaghan)

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1. Curriculum vitae of AMAU Eiji (TAB A) shows him to have been a career man in the consular and diplomatic corps, whose broad experience in the foreign service brought him to the post of Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, during the mid-thirties, whose diplomatic career culminated in his appointment as Ambassador to Italy from 1939 to 1940, and whose Foreign Ministry Information Bureau experience made him a natural choice for Chief of the independent Cabinet Information Bureau in 1943 and 1944.

2. Evaluation of AMAU in ONI's "Biographies of Prominent Japanese", published 15 September 1945, appears as TAB B.

3. Evaluation of AMAU at the time of his arrest in December 1945 appears as TAB C.

4. Charges contained in these documents are:

a. "Author of 'AMAU Statement' (warning other Powers to keep hands off China) of April 17, 1934".

b. "Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, July (August)--October 1941."

c. "In September 1942, he was appointed President of the Information Board, and he resigned this post along with the rest of the TOJO Cabinet in July, 1944."

d. "As of June 1945, AMAU was Vice-President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the DAI NIPPON New Asia Association, which replaced the East Asia Development Headquarters of the IRAA."

e. "Close associate of SHIRATORI (Toshio)."

f. "Close army connections."

5. Investigation of AMAU shows that:

a. On 17 April 1934, as Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, AMAU issued to the press the so-called "AMAU Statement" concerning a Japanese sphere of influence in China, which has been quoted and requoted in practically every book on Japanese foreign relations since that day. This seems to constitute the basic charge against AMAU. It

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would appear that decisions as to whether or not AMAU should be indicted as a war crimes suspect rests primarily on the determination of the degree of the man's personal responsibility for the statement and its effect upon Japan's relationship with other powers.

(1) The Information Bureau was at that time a division of the Foreign Ministry. Official description of the Bureau, of its duties and of the duties of its chief appears in the GAIMUSHO NENKAN (Foreign Ministry Yearbooks) of the period (TAB D), which state:

"Within this Information Department one person will be appointed by the Emperor as Chief of the said department, who will administer the duties of this department under the orders of the Minister of Foreign Affairs."

(2) AMAU himself, under interrogation, has explained the set-up of the Information Bureau through the years, his connection with it and his relationship to the "AMAU Statement" as per TAB E (1-7). He states emphatically that the policy which he voiced was the policy of the Foreign Office.

(3) The Japanese press of the time, in commenting on the incident, did not call the release the "AMAU Statement". It ignored AMAU as a factor in the case and called it an "informal announcement of the Foreign Office".

(4) In commenting on the statement, the Japan Weekly Chronicle of the day likewise laid the responsibility for the statement squarely at the door of the Foreign Ministry. The wordy discussions in the issue of 26 April 1934 are pointed up by the opening sentence of an article entitled "What Next", which says:

"If, in issuing an unofficial statement on the government's China policy, the situation of the Foreign Office was to secure the world's reaction, the maneuver has been eminently successful". No mention, much less accusation, of AMAU is contained in the articles.

(5) An OSS report, of which the source is unknown, says:

"On April 17, 1934, (AMAU) made the notorious 'Hands Off China Statement'. A member of the Foreign Office has since stated that it was a confidential policy, prepared in the Asiatic Bureau. Someone gave the press a tip, and questions were put to AMAU, who did not realize that the policy was confidential."

(6) Wilfred Fleisher, long editor of the Japan Advertiser and believed to have been a witness at the issuance of the statement, says in his "Volcanic Isle" (TAB F):

"AMAU quite unconsciously and accidentally became famous overnight. -- Little realizing the importance his words might have and

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devoid of the sense of news values his predecessor possessed, AMAU picked up a sheaf of telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Office and Japanese envoys abroad, and read out a dispatch from Vice-Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu to the Japanese Minister to China, Akira Ariyoshi".

"AMAU himself had never anticipated the reaction his statement created. He was astounded. He seemed, however, to thoroughly enjoy the limelight into which he had been projected, and if he was censured by both Foreign Minister Hirota and Vice-Minister Shigemitsu, as he undoubtedly was, he was praised and congratulated by many outside the Foreign Office who concurred in the views he had unwittingly given publicity".

(7) Ambassador Grew's diary ("Ten Years in Japan") considered the question of AMAU's responsibility a draw (TAB G). His entry dated 28 April, 1934, reads:

"Whether or not HIROTA (the Premier) approved the issuance of the statement is unessential, for the statement accurately expresses the policy which Japan would like to pursue".

b. AMAU was appointed Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs on 22 July 1941. This was in the nature of a new deal in the Foreign Office in that it is generally accepted as a fact that the 2nd KONOYE Cabinet resigned on 18 July for the express purpose of ousting MATSUOKA Yosuke from the post of Foreign Minister. It is likewise a generally accepted fact that the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet through its Foreign Ministry made a definite desperate last effort to negotiate the difficult situation with the United States. AMAU himself, explains the situation as per (TAB H):

"He was appointed Vice-Minister to assist Admiral TOYODA (Teijiro) for the negotiation (with the United States) in August."

AMAU's statement as a negotiator is supported by NAGASAKA Keiichi in his article "New Information Board Chief AMAU", published in the July, 1943, "Contemporary Japan" (TAB I):

"In this capacity (Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1941) he (AMAU) greatly assisted Foreign Minister Admiral Teijiro TOYODA in conducting negotiations with America with a view to reaching an agreement for the settlement of the China Affair".

c. AMAU was appointed Chief of the Information Bureau in April, 1943, not September, 1942, and remained in this post until July 1944. The Bureau had been made an independent board under the Cabinet in 1940. AMAU was a natural candidate for the post because of his past experience in such a job under the Foreign Ministry. His own explanation of the position and of his appointment appears in TABs E-1 and J.

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By: [Signature]  
CSD Letter, May 3, 1972  
NARS Date: 5-18-79

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A disinterested evaluation of his qualifications appears in TAB I. A typical example of the type of wartime effusion which the position called for is shown in his speech before the General Assembly of Greater East Asiatic newspapers in Tokyo, published in the 17 November, 1943 Nippon Times.

d. On 27 June 1945, the DAI NIPPON Asia Development Association, otherwise referred to as the DAI NIPPON New Asia Association, was formed to replace the KOA SOHOMBU (Rise Asia General Headquarters) which had died with the parental Imperial Rule Assistance Association. This organization was described in the 28 June 1945, Nippon Times as per TAB K. AMAU became Vice-President and Chief of its Board of Directors.

e. SHIRATORI and AMAU were contemporaries in the consular and diplomatic service. Both were at one time or another associated with the Information Bureau. AMAU succeeded SHIRATORI as Ambassador to Rome in 1939. This sort of specious evidence is apt to link the two names in any description of either career, but is neither here nor there in proving that the two were "close".

f. It has been frequently said that views expressed by AMAU such as the famous "AMAU Statement", were pleasing to the Army. The policy of the Japanese Government, of which AMAU was official spokesman at two periods of his life, was heartily influenced by military policy. But to derive from such evidence that AMAU, the diplomat and Information Board Chief, had "close" army connections, however, is platitudinous conjecture.

g. The charge that AMAU was an "ardent nationalist" is an editorial broadside, which would be difficult to prove in court. Such evidence as is contained in TAB E and in TABs K (Background: China's Condition - Japan's Condition) and M (Views on Foreign Policy) show that AMAU was a patriotic nationalist but do not prove that he played a pre-dominant part in the "planning and execution of an aggressive war".

6. AMAU's connection with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was only a minor one which was due to his position in the Foreign Office and in the Information Bureau:--

October 1940-1941	-----	SANYO (Councillor)
April 1943-July 1944	-----	SANYO (Councillor)

7. In summary, the issue presented by the AMAU case is one of definition of responsibility for the actions of an individual in a totalitarian bureaucracy. Decision regarding AMAU must be made, in accord;

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ance with the overall "war crimes policy of SCAP", on the basis of interpretation of:

- a. The importance of the AMAU Statement and the degree of AMAU's personal responsibility therefor.
- b. AMAU's importance as a diplomatic and Information Board Chief in the overall picture of Japan's "planning of the war".

8. Unless the prosecution phase of the trial now in process at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East has produced definite evidence sufficient to constitute a basis for indictment of AMAU, G-2 recommends his release without preference of charges.

- TAB A - Curriculum Vitae of AMAU Eiji
- TAB B - Extract from "Biographies of Prominent Japanese"
- TAB C - Evaluation of AMAU at time of arrest
- TAB D - Extracts from Foreign Ministry Yearbooks
- TAB E (1-7) - AMAU on the "AMAU Statement"
- TAB F - Extract from "Volcanic Isle"
- TAB G - Extract from "Ten Years in Japan"
- TAB H - AMAU on 3rd KONOYE Cabinet's Foreign Ministry
- TAB I - "New Information Board Chief AMAU"
- TAB J - AMAU on Information Bureau 1943-44
- TAB K - DAI NIPPON Asia Development Association
- TAB L - AMAU on Sino-Japanese conditions
- TAB M - AMAU's views on Foreign Policy

*for ASDB*  
C.A.W.

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NARS Date: 8-18-75

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
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Lt. Col. R. E. Rudisill)

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4. Charges contained in these documents are:
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A disinterested evaluation of his qualifications appears in TAB I. A typical example of the type of wartime effusion which the position called for is shown in his speech before the General Assembly of Greater East Asiatic newspapers in Tokyo, published in the 17 November, 1943 Nippon Times.

d. On 27 June 1945, the DAI NIPPON Asia Development Association, otherwise referred to as the DAI NIPPON New Asia Association, was formed to replace the KOA SCHOMBU (Rise Asia General Headquarters) which had died with the parental Imperial Rule Assistance Association. This organization was described in the 28 June 1945, Nippon Times, as per TAB K. AMAU became Vice-President and Chief of its Board of Directors.

e. SHIRATORI and AMAU were contemporaries in the consular and diplomatic service. Both were at one time or another associated with the Information Bureau. AMAU succeeded SHIRATORI as Ambassador to Rome in 1939. This sort of specious evidence is apt to link the two names in any description of either career, but is neither here nor there in proving that the two were "close".

f. It has been frequently said that views expressed by AMAU such as the famous "AMAU Statement", were pleasing to the Army. The policy of the Japanese Government, of which AMAU was official spokesman at two periods of his life, was heartily influenced by military policy. But to derive from such evidence that AMAU, the diplomat and Information Board Chief, had "close army connections", however, is platitudinous conjecture.

g. The charge that AMAU was an "ardent nationalist" is an editorial broadside, which would be difficult to prove in court. Such evidence as is contained in TAB E and in TABs K (Background: China's Condition - Japan's Condition) and M (Views on Foreign Policy) show that AMAU was a patriotic nationalist but do not prove that he played a predominant part in the "planning and execution of an aggressive war".

6. AMAU's connection with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was only a minor one which was due to his position in the Foreign Office and in the Information Bureau:--

October 1940-1941	-----	SANYO (Councillor)
April 1943-July 1944	-----	SANYO (Councillor)

7. In summary, the issue presented by the AMAU case is one of definition of responsibility for the actions of an individual in a totalitarian bureaucracy. Decision regarding AMAU must be made, in accord-

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SECRET



**SECRET**

AMAU Eiji, Internee in Sugamo Prison

G-2

Legal Section  
(Attn: Invest. Div.)

19 JUN 1947  
CIS/OD:TFD/mc

Info Copy to: IPS (Attn: Invest. Div.)

1  
cont'd

ance with the overall "war crimes policy of SCAP," on the basis of interpretation of:

- a. The importance of the AMAU Statement and the degree of AMAU's personal responsibility therefor.
- b. AMAU's importance as a diplomatic and Information Board Chief in the overall picture of Japan's "planning of the war".

8. Unless the prosecution phase of the trial now in process at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East has produced definite evidence sufficient to constitute a basis for indictment of AMAU, G-2 recommends his release without preference of charges.

- TAB A - Curriculum Vitae of AMAU Eiji
- TAB B - Extract from "Biographies of Prominent Japanese"
- TAB C - Evaluation of AMAU at time of arrest
- TAB D - Extracts from Foreign Ministry Yearbooks
- TAB E (1-7) - AMAU on the "AMAU Statement"
- TAB F - Extract from "Volcanic Isle"
- TAB G - Extract from "Ten Years in Japan"
- TAB H - AMAU on 3rd KONOYE Cabinet's Foreign Ministry
- TAB I - "New Information Board Chief AMAU"
- TAB J - AMAU on Information Bureau 1943-44
- TAB K - DAI NIPPON Asia Development Association
- TAB L - AMAU on Sino-Japanese conditions
- TAB M - AMAU's views on Foreign Policy

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C.A.W.

5

**SECRET**

Curriculum Vitae of AMAU Eiji

Curriculum Vitae of AMAU Eiji

- 1887, 19 Aug - Born in Tokushima Ken, son of AMAU Kumeya, merchant
- 1912, Jul - Finished post-graduate course at Tokyo Higher Commercial School
- 1912, Oct - Passed Diplomatic and Consular Service Examination
- 1912, Nov - 1914, Nov - Vice-Consul in Antung, China
- 1914, Nov - 1917, Jun - Vice-Consul in Sydney, Australia
- 1917, Jun - 1918, Jun - Attache at Embassy in London, England
- 1918, Jun - 1919, Jan - 3rd Secretary at Embassy in London
- 1919, Jan - 1920, Dec - 3rd Secretary at Legation in Geneva, Switzerland
- 1920, Jan - 1921, Feb - Member of Committee for Execution of the Peace Treaty
- 1920, Dec - 1921, Feb - 2nd Secretary at Legation in Geneva
- 1921, Feb - 1921, Sept - Secretary of Foreign Ministry, Tokyo; concurrently assigned to 2nd Section of European and American Affairs Bureau of the Ministry.
- 1921, Sept - Appointed Attendant to Minister Plenipotentiary to Washington Disarmament Conference
- 1922, Jul - Appointed Attendant to Delegate to Sino Japanese Conference (Shantung Question) at Peking, China
- 1923, Mar - 1924, Mar - Consul-General at Canton, China
- 1923, Jul - 1925, May - Concurrently Junior Secretary assigned to Foreign Affairs Section of Secretariat of Formosan Government
- 1924, Mar - 1927, Aug - Consul-General at Harbin, Manchuria
- 1927, Aug - 1929, Sept - 1st Secretary at Legation in Peking, China
- 1929, Sept - 1929, Dec - 1st Secretary at Embassy in Moscow, Russia

1929, Dec - 1933, Jun	- Councillor at Embassy in Moscow, Russia
1933, Jun - 1937, Apr	- Chief of Information Bureau of Foreign Ministry
1937, Apr - 1939, Sept	- Minister Extraordinary to Switzerland
1939, Sept - 1940, Sept	- Ambassador to Italy
1941, Mar	- Resigned from Diplomatic and Consular Service
1941, Jul - 1941, Oct	- Vice Foreign Minister
1943, Apr - 1944, Jul	- Chief of Cabinet Information Bureau

Extract from "Biographies of Prominent Japanese"

Extract from ONI's "Biographies of Prominent Japanese" of 15 September 1945

"Eiji AMAU - Former Ambassador and former President of the Cabinet Board of Information.

"AMAU was born August 1887 in Tokushima Prefecture. He graduated from Kobe Higher Commercial School, then did post-graduate work at the Tokyo University of Commerce in 1912, passing the diplomatic and consular service examination the same year. He has served as student-consul at Antung and Sydney, 1912-1916; secretary at the London Embassy, 1916-1919; member of the Peace Treaty Executive Commission, Versailles Peace Conference in Paris, 1919; in Berlin as Commissioner to execute the Treaty of Versailles, 1920; secretary, Foreign Office, 1921; member of delegation to Washington Disarmament Conference, 1921-1922; member, Joint Settlement Committee of Shantung Question, July 1922; Consul-General, Canton, 1923; Consul-General, Harbin, 1925; First Secretary to Japanese Legation, Peking, 1927; First Secretary, Moscow Embassy, 1929; Director, Foreign Office Intelligence Bureau, 1933-1937; Minister to Switzerland and Director of Japanese Bureau for International Conferences, Geneva, 1937-1939; Ambassador to Italy, 1939; appointed Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 1941. In September 1942 he was appointed President of the Information Board, and he resigned this post along with the rest of the Tojo cabinet in July 1944. As of June 1945, AMAU was Vice-President and chairman of the Board of Directors of the Dai Nippon New Asia Association, which replaced the East Asia Development Headquarters of the IRAA."

Evaluation of AMAU at time of arrest

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Evaluation of AMAU, Eiji at time of Internment - Dec 1945.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By *JL*, NARS Date *3-18-75*

AMAU Eiji

Career diplomat. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, July-October, 1941. Succeeded Tani as President, Bureau of Information under Tojo. Foreign Office spokesman 1933-37. Author of "Amu Statement" (warning other Powers to keep hands off China) of April 17, 1934. Ardent nationalist. Reported associate of Shiratori. Close Army connections.

He qualified under Paragraph 7-b of Joint Staff Basic Directive for Post Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper of 3 Nov 1945.

Arrested 12 December 1945 Sugamo Prison

~~SECRET~~



D

Extracts from Foreign Ministry Yearbooks

Extracts from GAIMUSHO NENKAN (Foreign Ministry Yearbook),  
1932-1933

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION  
OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

\*\*\*\*\*

Article IX.

An Information Department will be established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of administering duties concerning Information. Within this Information Department one person will be appointed by the Emperor as chief of the said Department who will administer the duties of this Department under the orders of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUB-DIVISION REGULATION

Article 15.

The Information Department will administer matters concerning Intelligence.

Article 16.

There will be 3 sections within this Information Department.

- 1st Section: Administration of the abovementioned information matters concerning China, Siam, Honkong and Macao.
- 2nd Section: Administration of information matters concerning various countries, (other than these mentioned above) their overseas colonies, their territories and their neighboring countries.
- 3rd Section: Administration of General Affairs within the Information Department.

\*\*\*\*\*

Source: GAIMUSHO NENKAN (Foreign Ministry Yearbook),  
1934-1935

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION  
OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS .

\*\*\*\*\*

Article IX.

An Information Department will be established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of administering duties concerning Information. Within this Information Department one person will be appointed by the Emperor as chief of the said Department who will administer the duties of this Department under the orders of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUB-DIVISION REGULATION

Article 15.

The Information Department will administer matters concerning Information.

Article 16.

There will be 3 sections within this Information Department.

1st Section: Administration of matters concerning News Agencies

2nd Section: Administration of matters other than the above mentioned.

3rd Section: Administration of General Affairs within the Information Department.

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1-7 AMAU on the "AMAU Statement"

INFORMATION BUREAUS  
IN THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT - AMAU Eiji

At the time of the Versailles Conference, Japanese diplomacy was severely criticized as its efforts in the Shantung Affair was defeated and its proposal for racial equality was disregarded. Japan, for the first time, realized the lack of an Information Bureau such as other powers had; hence an Information Bureau was created in the Foreign Office in accordance with public demand. Foreign Minister Count UCHIDA, Yasuya appointed Baron IJUIN Hikokichi (Ambassador at Rome and one of the Japanese Delegates to the Versailles Conference, who had just returned home) as first Chief of the Information Bureau.

After Baron IJUIN Hikokichi resigned, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs concurrently held the post of the Chief of the Bureau. TANAKA Tokichi, who was Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and later President of the CHUGAI SHOGYO SHIMBUN, was the first of these concurrent Chiefs. The first independent Chief of the Bureau was Marquis KOMURA. SAITO Hiroshi, later Ambassador to Washington, succeeded KOMURA. The third Chief was SHIRATORI Toshio, who was sent to Sweden as Minister as a result of his quarrel with ARITA, Foreign Vice-Minister. AMAU Eiji took SHIRATORI's place, followed by KAWAI Tatsuo and SUMA Yakichiro.

After the Manchurian Incident, Japanese military power was in ascendancy. About that time the Army and Navy Ministries created their own Information Bureaus, the Army under the name CHOSA-BU (Investigation Bureau) including SHIMBUN-HAN (Press Section) and the Navy under the name FUKYU-BU (Propagation Bureau). The Chiefs of these organizations were always officers of influence:-

The successive Chiefs of the Army's CHOSA-BU were:

- Lieutenant General HAYASHI Katsura (Son-in-law of the late Baron OKURA Kihachiro)
- General OKAMURA Yasuji
- General NISHIO Toshizo
- Lieutenant General TANI Hisao
- Major General KUDO Takeo (Deceased)
- General TOJO Hideki
- General YAMASHITA Tomoyuki

The successive Chiefs of the subsidiary SHIMBUN-HAN were:

Lieutenant General SUZUKI Teiichi  
Lieutenant General HOMMA Masaharu  
Lieutenant General NEMOTO Hiroshi

The successive Chiefs of the Navy FUKYU-BU were:

Rear Admiral SEKINE Gumpei  
Rear Admiral SAKANO  
Rear Admiral NODA

These organizations were established under the TOSUI-BU (Supreme Command Headquarters). Expenses were included in the accounts of the TOSUI-BU, were not accounted for independently in the yearly budget submitted by the government to the Diet and were not subject to the Board of Audit. As they were not proper Government organs, they were not announced in the Government Gazette or subject to approval by the Privy Council.

The chiefs and staff of these institutions were nominally appointed to other posts (because the information bureaus were not recognized government organs) and they were working in reality under other capacities. This informality gave a wider scope to their activity.

The principal function of the Foreign Office Information Bureau was to disseminate news to Japanese and foreign newspapermen. However, the information organizations of the Army and Navy Ministries disseminated news to newspapermen as well as propagandized preparedness for emergencies and in many cases disseminated foreign news which was not under their jurisdiction but was under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office Information Bureau. Under the pretext of awakening the Japanese people to prepare for the "Crisis of 1936" the Army advocated the continental policy of northward expansion, while the Navy favored denouncement of naval treaties and southward expansion. Both cried for increase of military budgets. Therefore, there was constant friction between the Foreign Office Information Bureau and the Army and Navy Bureau.

The aim of the Foreign Office Information Bureau was:

1. To make known to the world the Japanese Foreign Policy in accord with the spirit of the Imperial Rescript issued in 1933, at the time of the withdrawal from the League of Nations and in accordance with the address of Foreign Minister

HIROTA in the Diet in 1934.

2. To disseminate as much international news as possible to the Japanese public.

The Foreign Office Information Bureau had to steer a dangerous course.

Since the Militarists dominated Japanese politics and greatly influenced foreign policy -- (the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Tri-Power Alliance, for example), there were three ways open for the Foreign Ministry and its Information Bureau to deal with them:

1. To oppose.
2. To obey blindly and entirely support their policies.
3. To work with them and to attempt to influence policy by subtle guidance.

The first course was impossible because the militarists were too powerful. The second would lead to ruin. The last course was therefore the only one open, but it was by no means an easy task to deal with those Army and Navy organs. Only frequent changes of their chiefs of the organs relieved AMAU of unbearable pressures.

For a long time it was the desire of the Army and Navy to control information matters by abolishing the Foreign Office Information Bureau and by establishing an independent Information Bureau in the Cabinet which they could control. In 1937 they therefore, proposed to establish a Committee of Information in the Cabinet comprised of representatives of the Army, Navy and other departments; military, naval and other government officials held many meetings to discuss this proposal. AMAU fought it but he was overwhelmed by a 13 - 1 vote. As a result AMAU was sent to Switzerland as Minister. He was succeeded by KAWAI in April 1937.

The Information Committee within the Cabinet (NAIKAKU JOHO IIN KAI) was established on September 29, 1937, composed of representatives of all departments of Government including the Army and Navy. The first President (concurrently Secretary of the Cabinet) was YOKOMIZO Koki, who later became Governor of Okayama and Kumamoto prefectures and became President of the KEIJO NIPPO in Seoul during the war. The Committee soon afterwards became the NAIKAKU JOHO-BU. (the Cabinet Information Department).

When MATSUOKA was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1940 the Foreign Office Information Bureau was abolished and the Cabinet Information Department became the Information Bureau with a "Shin-nin-kan" (official appointed like a Cabinet Minister or an Ambassador personally and directly by His Majesty the Emperor) as its chief. Successive presidents of the Bureau were:

ITO Nobufumi	1940-Oct 1941 (2nd and 3rd KONOYE Cabinets)
TANI Masayuki	Oct 1941-Apr 1943 (TOJO Cabinet)
AMAU Eiji	Apr 1943-Jul 1944
OGATA Taketora	Jul 1944-Apr 1945
SHIMOMURA Hiroshi	Apr 1945-

During the terms of ITO and TANI, the Bureau of Information had five Bureaus, two of which were headed by Army and Navy officers with a number of Army and Navy officer members. At the same time the Army and Navy still retained their own information organizations within their ministries.

While TANI was president, OKUMURA Kiwao was Vice-President and TOKUTOMI Ichiro, KANOKOGI Kazunobu, TANI and OKUMURA (all from the same province, Kumamoto-Ken) were members. During this period the GENRON HOKOKU KAI as well as many other patriotic societies were formed.

The Cabinet Information Bureau was reorganized in April 1943 when AMAU was appointed as President of the Board succeeding TANI. As a result of the reorganization, all military and naval officers were withdrawn. Instead, a Council Room was established in the Bureau in which the Army and Navy were formally represented by a Colonel and a Captain respectively. Besides, Army and Navy representatives were present at the weekly conferences of the Bureau.

After the outbreak of the war, the Army and Navy established the DAI HONEI HODO BU (Information Department of Grand Imperial Headquarters) and all news concerning the war was exclusively handled by them.



## A NEW ORIENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY.

By AMAU Eiji

The turning point in Japan's Foreign Policy in recent years is the Manchurian Affair.

The Manchurian Incident occurred on April 18, 1931.

The Japanese Government proposed to the Chinese Government to solve the question by negotiation between those two countries on October 10th and at the same time it made to the League of Nations a proposal by which Japan expressed her intention to withdraw her troops after the fundamental agreement had been reached with China. But the proposals were both rejected.

The League intervened in the affairs. The United States of America cooperated with it (different from its present policies on Greece, Indonesia, Syria and Lebanon).

The independence of Manchukuo was declared on March 1, 1932 and Japan recognized her on September 15, the same year.

The League Assembly adopted its report on the Lytton Commission on February 24, 1933 and Japan gave notice to the League of her intention to withdraw from the League on March 27, the same year.

An Imperial Rescript was issued the same day which stated among other things that:

"Now, Manchukuo having of late being founded, our Empire deemed it essential to respect the independence of the new state and to encourage its healthy development, in order that the sources of evil in the Far East may be eradicated and an enduring peace thereby established. Unhappily, there exists between our Empire and the League of Nations a wide diversion of views in this regard and it had devolved upon us to cause our Government to take, upon mature consideration, the necessary steps for the withdrawal of our Empire from the League.

"By quitting the League and embarking on a course of its own in accordance with convictions and faith of our Empire, our Empire does not mean that it will stand aloof in the extreme Orient, nor that it will isolate itself thereby from the fraternity of nations. It is our desire to promote mutual confidence between our Empire and all other Powers and to make known the justice of its course throughout the world.

"It was made clear by the Imperial Rescript that Japan differed in opinion from other Powers on the question of maintenance of peace in East Asia and therefore she 'embarked on a course of her own'".

Of course, it was Japan's policy "to advance international peace" and "to promote mutual confidence between Japan and all the other Powers and to make known the justice of its course throughout the world", but she would pursue her own policy on the question of East Asia if she differed from other Powers in that regard.

It was really a new orientation on our policy on Foreign Affairs.

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY MR. HIROTA'S OFFICE

BY MR. HIROTA

I was appointed Chief of the Information Bureau of the Department for Foreign Affairs in June 1933. The Manchurian affair was a question of "this or that" as far as Japan was concerned at that time. As the Japanese Ambassador is quoted to have said to Mr. Stimson on January 5, 1933 "The Manchurian Incident must be regarded as closed. The Japanese Cabinet could survive in peace." ("Peace and War" published by the State Department of the United States of America.)

Then Mr. Hirota, Foreign Minister, delivered an address at the 65th Session of the Imperial Diet on January 29, 1933 in which he clearly announced an important orientation of our Foreign Policy.

First Mr. Hirota demanded the United States of America to understand that Japan should "serve as the only corner-stone for the edifice of the peace of East Asia and bear the entire burden of responsibility". Secondly, Japan demanded the United States of America to understand that "if only America could clearly perceive the actual condition of the Orient and realize Japan's role as a stabilizing force in East Asia, the ever existing might and friendship between the two people was bound to disappear". Hugh Ross wrote that Mr. Hirota invited America in his speech, to perceive the actual condition of the Orient and realize Japan's role, where-in that Japan, the only corner-stone of the peace of East Asia, bears the entire burden of responsibility.

It was an address which was regarded, according to the reports we got, as an epoch-making history of our Foreign Policy and received with utmost attention in foreign countries, particularly it must have brought special significance to the United States of America as her government had been very active and vigilant and the press also very receptive on the question of Manchuria and the East Asia.

The Minister spoke many other things that:

The Japanese Government was obliged to serve notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations on the 27th of March last year because the

APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF OF INFORMATION BUREAU

SPEECH OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER

REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN HULL & HIROTA

AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF MR. HIROTA'S SPEECH

by AMAU Eiji

I was appointed Chief of the Information Bureau of the Department for Foreign Affairs in June 1933. The Manchurian Affair was a question of "Fait accompli" as far as Japan was concerned at that time. As the Japanese Ambassador is quoted to have said to Mr. Stimson on January 5, 1933 "The Manchurian Incident must be regarded as closed. No Japanese Cabinet could survive in Japan". ("Peace and War" published by the State Department of the United States of America.)

Then Mr. Hirota, Foreign Minister, delivered an address at the 65th Session of the Imperial Diet on January 23, 1934 in which he clearly enunciated an important orientation of our Foreign Policy.

First Mr. Hirota demanded the United States of America to understand that Japan should "serve as the only corner-stone for the edifice of the peace of East Asia and bear the entire burden of responsibilities". Secondly, Japan demanded the United States of America to understand that "if only America would clearly perceive the actual condition of the Orient and realize Japan's role as a stabilizing force in East Asia, whatever emotion might yet linger between the two people was bound to disappear". Hugh Byas wrote that Mr. Hirota invited America in his speech, to perceive the actual condition of the Orient and realize Japan's role, wherein that Japan, the only corner-stone of the peace of East Asia, bears the entire burden of responsibilities.

It was an address which was regarded, according to the reports we got, as an epoch-making history of our Foreign Policy and received with utmost attention in foreign countries, particularly it must have brought special significance to the United States of America as her government had been very active and vigilant and the press also very sensitive on the question of Manchuria and the East Asia.

The Minister spoke among other things that:

"The Japanese Government was obliged to serve notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations on the 27th of March last year because the

the Manchurian Incident and the questions regarding the state of Manchukuo showed that there was no agreement between Japan and the League on the fundamental principles of preserving peace in East Asia.

"Manchukuo has been making steady progress along all lines of her constructive work. Moreover, a decision is about to be made on the establishment of a monarchical regime which will go far to solidify the foundation of Manchukuo as a young independent nation. This is a matter of congratulation not for Manchukuo alone but for the peace of the Orient and the peace of the world".

The Japanese Government has serious responsibility for the maintenance of peace in East Asia and have a firm resolve in that regard. But what is most essential in the matter is the stabilization of China herself. Our Government sincerely hopes for the political and economic rehabilitation of China. We hope that she will be enabled to unite with Japan in performing the obvious mission of both Japan and China to contribute through mutual aid and cooperation to the peaceful development of their respective part of the globe.

Should China appreciate our true motives and give tangible proof of same on her part, Japan would be glad to reciprocate and meet her more than half way in a spirit of good will.

It may be definitely stated that between Japan and the United States of America there exists no question that is intrinsically difficult of solution. Far from having any thought of picking a quarrel with America, Japan fervently desires American friendship. At the same time, I am confident that the United States will not fail to appraise correctly Japan's position in East Asia.

It is hardly necessary to reiterate that Japan is actuated by no ulterior motive other than her desire to establish an enduring peace in East Asia. Therefore, if only America will clearly perceive the complicated and peculiar condition of East Asia and realize Japan's role as a stabilizing force in East Asia whatever emotional feelings may yet linger between the two people is bound to disappear.

We should not forget for a moment that Japan is serving as the only corner-stone for the edifice of peace in East Asia, bears the entire burden of responsibilities. It is this important position and these vast responsibilities in which Japan's diplomacy and national defense is rooted."

In view of the importance in nature, the whole address was broadcast or sent by telegram in full to all parts of the world from which public opinion on or reaction to the address was reported in detail from time to time to us.

I always thought no Government had been more active and positive in executing its functions than the State Department of the United States of America. My observation did not miss the mark.

How attentive and vigilant it had been on foreign affairs particularly on the Far Eastern question was recently testified by the official document issued by it in January 1943 under the title of "Peace and War". Not a single subject would have been passed unnoticed if it might have been anything to do with her or if it might have affected her interests. It never failed to take appropriate measures in order to safeguard its rights and interests. Sometimes it made criticisms, or comment upon, sometimes it demanded explanations about, or sometimes it made demarche upon an action or utterances of other government or that of an official of a foreign government. The American press also would not have fallen behind in responding to the attitude or the measures taken by its Government. The Government, the press or the public would not have been silent unless they would have approved it. It would be so with matters much less important than speeches of a Foreign Minister at the Diet. Particularly such as important address as Mr. Hirota's would have been carefully and minutely scrutinized by the Government and the public of the United States of America. However, the address was received very calmly and favorably in the United States of America. Neither criticism nor unfavorable reaction was reported on the part of the American Government and in the press. It gave the address tacit approval. It recognized it. It recognized that Japan served as the only corner-stone for the edifice of the peace of East Asia, bearing the entire burden of responsibility, for maintenance of peace and order in that district. It recognized that Mr. Hirota's speech would be served as a base upon which the relation of the United States of America and Japan should be regulated. By the way, reviewing the United States' Foreign Policy in "Peace and War" the State Department has made clear its disagreement with speeches and utterances of foreign, and particularly Japanese government or people whenever it has wished to do so, but nothing has been said about the above-mentioned speech in the report. About a month later, there was an exchange of notes between the Government of the United States of America and Japan. I quote them from "Peace and War":

"The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Koki Hirota, in a message delivered to Secretary Hull on February 21, 1934, stated that no question existed between the United States and Japan which was fundamentally incapable of amicable solution and emphasized that Japan had no intention whatsoever of making trouble with any other power.

Secretary Hull replied on March 3, 1934 that it was the

fixed intention of the United States to reply in the prosecution of its national policies upon pacific processes; that if there should arise any controversy between the United States and Japan, this Government would be prepared to examine the position of Japan in a spirit of amity and of desire for peaceful and just settlement. He expressed the hope that it might be possible for all countries interested in the Far East to approach every question arising between or among them in such spirit and manner that these questions might be regulated or resolved with injury to none and with definite and lasting advantage to all."

Mr. Hull stated that "If there should arise any controversy between the United States and Japan, this (U.S.A.) Government would be prepared to examine the position of Japan in a spirit of amity and of desire for peaceful and just settlement." That meant that there was so far no controversy between the two countries on the position of Japan, but if there should arise any controversy in the future, the United States Government would examine the position of Japan in a spirit of amity etc.

If the United States of America had had any objections to Hirota's speech, it would have made some reservation on it. If there had been any controversy between these two states they would have touched on it. But there was no remark or reservation on it. What was the position of Japan? It had just been made clear by Mr. Hirota in his address. The notes had been recognized by the United States of America.

It is to be reminded that Japan was often designated in the United States of America or other parts of the world as "a stabilizing force of East Asia", an expression which had been used for the first time by a well-known American Statesman.

## FUNCTIONS OF THE CHIEF OF THE INFORMATION BUREAU.

## INSTRUCTIONS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

## STATEMENT

## SECOND STATEMENT

## NATURE OF STATEMENTS

by AMAU Eiji

It was the principal function of the Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office to clarify the foreign policy of Japan to the public. I was used to meeting, as a rule, the Japanese correspondents, twice every day and the foreign correspondents, three times or four times a week. Sometimes a written statement was published at a certain time which had been fixed beforehand. But usually the spokesman explained a policy or an intention of the Foreign Office at his interview with the correspondents. Once it was decided by the Foreign Office to make known a certain policy or intention, it was left generally to the discretion of the spokesman as to when, how or in what way it might be treated.

Concerning the statement in question, what it stated was the policy of the Government which had been formulated upon the Imperial Rescript and the speech made by Mr. Hirota, Foreign Minister at the Diet on January 23, 1934. It was the intention of the Foreign Office also to clarify such formulated policy to the world. The Japanese representatives abroad had been informed of such concrete policy concerning China and at the same time, instructed to make it known as fully as possible to all parts of the world. The instruction ran as follows:

## I.

It has been manifested several times that (1) the present conditions in China are so extremely abnormal that the ordinary regulations of International Law or International customs can hardly be applied to them and it is not so easy as the Europeans and the Americans in general think to improve her conditions and that (2) taking into consideration such circumstances Japan's prestige and power are to be the only base upon which peace can be established in that district. Consequently Japan is naturally to be the principle factor as regards the International questions regarding China, particularly I (Hirota) emphasized on item (2) mentioned above in a speech at the Imperial Diet on the 23rd January last.

You are instructed, therefore, to enlighten hereafter as heretofore, in all parts of the world, on the above purport. At the same time, it is important to deal tediously with the complete problems relating to the China questions in the lines already mentioned. As a consequence of authority to the above principle we may receive some disadvantages in the eminent future in obtaining concession or on other matters, but we must endeavor to attain the ultimate object of our diplomatic policy having the main aim in the far reaching situation in the Far East.

## II.

It is needless to state that it is essential to have complete cooperation between the Foreign Office in Tokyo and its representatives abroad. You are instructed to clarify thoroughly the above sense in all directions of the world.

I thought it might be appropriate to pronounce our policy in Tokyo first rather than it might be explained by our representatives in different places abroad at different times and then our representatives would make supplementary remarks upon it if it was deemed necessary. Moreover, there was earnest desire and demand among our people, particularly among the press circle that in view of the movement in China and the attitude or action of foreign people toward China, our policy should be more clearly known to the public in order to avoid complications and embarrassment which might be created out of ambiguity of our policy.

On April 17, 1934, I spoke, therefore, informally and mostly in reply to questions, to the Japanese correspondents a gist of what it had been intended to make known to the public. I spoke verbally and it was reported in different words or expressions but the following article was almost to the point.

"Japan was compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations in March last year because of their failure to agree in their opinions on the fundamental principles of preserving peace and order in East Asia. It goes without saying that Japan is endeavoring at all times to maintain and promote her friendly relation with foreign nations but her views and mission may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations respecting matters that concern East Asia.

Japan shares naturally with the nations of East Asia the responsibility of maintenance of peace and order in East Asia. Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission of maintaining peace and order in East Asia and she has to endeavor first of all to maintain peace and order with China in order to fulfill her mission.

Consequently unification of China, preservation of her territorial



integrity as well as restoration of order in that country are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows that this can be attained through no other means than the awakening and voluntary efforts of China herself. It would be intolerable to us, therefore, if China tries to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan if she takes any action calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers in the name of technical or financial support at this particular moment as the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents are bound to acquire political significance.

Undertakings of such a nature if carried through to the end may give rise to establishment of a sphere of influence or lead to international control or division of China which not only will be a great misfortune for China but have serious repercussion upon the security of East Asia and consequently Japan. Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade. Such actions as are detrimental to peace and order in East Asia is objectionable to us, for example, supplying China with warplanes, detailing military advisers to China or contracting a loan to provide for political uses would obviously tend to allianate friendly relations between Japan and China and Japan and other countries, and to disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan cannot overlook such projects.

The foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from the policies she pursued in the past but on account of the fact that positive movement have joined actions in China by foreign powers under one pretext or another are reported to be on foot. It is deemed not inappropriate to reiterate her policy at this time".

Soon after I had finished my press interview, I saw Mr. Shigemitsu, Vice-Minister, and Mr. Hirota, Foreign Minister, and reported to them of it. They approved what I had done.

I had interviews with the Japanese correspondents twice every day. The morning interview was reported in the evening edition of the papers and the interviews of the afternoon, in the morning edition of the following morning. There was ample time always to make arrangements if necessary, with the press about the treatment of news which I gave out to them.

It was not unusual at that time to stop reporting what I had said at my press conference, or to prevent them from publishing it if it had already been printed either by arrangement with an editor of the press or by means of censorship in case it was deemed absolutely necessary to do so. But in this case I did not take any steps as I had received no directions from my chief.

The next morning the Japanese press reported it, in general, favorably

and with approval. Finding, however, that some of the criticism from abroad seemed to be based upon misunderstanding or misinformation, I further explained it at the regular press conference with foreign correspondents on April 20th, which was reported in the "Japan Advertiser" as follows on April 21st:

Statement Based on Hirota's Words.

"Japan has no desire to deviate from the Open Door Principle or Existing Treaty.

Denial that the unofficial statement of the Japanese policy regarding foreign assistance to China issued on Tuesday implies deviation from the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity in China or from existing treaties was voiced by the Foreign Office Spokesman at yesterday morning's press conference. What it does mean is that Japan objects to any action by other powers that may lead to disturbance of peace in East Asia.

This spokesman expressed surprise to the unfavorable reaction to the statement. It was nothing more, he said, than a reassertion of portions of the Foreign Minister, Koki Hirota's speech to the Diet on foreign policy on January 23, and that speech was cordially received abroad. He pointed specifically to the following piece of the speech:

'We should not forget for a moment that Japan serving as the only corner-stone for the edifice of peace of East Asia bears the entire burden of responsibility'.

United States will understand:- I am confident that the United States will not fail to appraise correctly Japan's position in East Asia. ----If only America will clearly perceive the actual conditions of the Orient and realize Japan's role as a stabilizing force in East Asia.

The Japanese Government has serious responsibilities for the maintenance of peace in East Asia and has a firm resolve in that regard.

Translating orally from a typed memorandum in Japanese, the spokesman asserted that Japan has no intention to interfere with the independence of China or its vested rights. It wants China to achieve unification and prosperity. As regards Manchukuo it wants others to recognize the fair and just actions of that country. It has no territorial ambitions even there, Japan because of her geographical position is in a position to share profits if China united and prospered. But unity and prosperity must be attained by China's own awakening and endeavors and not by the selfish exploitations of others.

Responsibility Shared:- Japan has no intention to interfere with

the rights of third powers, the spokesman continued. If they engage in trade and other transactions with China for the benefit of the Chinese, Japan will welcome their activities. It has no desire to deviate from the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity in China or from the existing treaties. Japan objects to having other powers, regardless of the form or pretext, take any action that may lead to disturbance of peace and order in East Asia. Japan shares the responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia with the other Asiatic countries, particularly China. The time has passed, he concluded, when the other powers or the League of Nations will exercise their policies for the exploitation of China.

Pressed for the reason for issuing the statement at this time, the spokesman declared that its aim was to give the world a clear conception of Japan's position in East Asia.

Its essence had been sent to Japanese diplomatic representatives abroad before it was made public here, he said. No instructions were sent regarding the use to which the information might be put, this being left to their discretion."

On the other hand, being afraid that my statement might affect friendly relations between the United States and Japan, and therefore, my retention of the present position be a hindrance to our endeavor to improve the relations of these two countries, I again saw Mr. Hirota and Mr. Shigemitsu, and told them frankly that I would like to give my Minister no embarrassment on account of the statement and I would receive any punishment or resign my post quite willingly if it were deemed fit or convenient to do so. They also said that they were entirely in accord with me and they would also resign if I were to do so.

On April 20th, the following instruction was cabled by Mr. Hirota to the Japanese representatives abroad:

"Regarding the unofficial statement of the spokesman of the Foreign Office, we have been making supplementary explanations in the following sense in order to clarify it. He explained in the same way replying to the questions at the regular press conferences of foreign correspondents on April 20th.

1. Not only has Japan no intention to impair the independence or integrity of China, but she desires wholeheartedly that China may maintain her integrity, achieve her unification and promote her prosperity. However, her integrity, unification and prosperity must be attained, as a matter of principle, by her own awakening and natural development.
2. Japan has no intention to impair vested interests of third powers

in China. Japan welcomes economic dealings with third powers with China as it will ultimately bring benefit to China. It goes without saying that Japan does not desire that China may act against the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity. Japan respects the existing treaties concerning China.

3. However, Japan must object to any action which may be taken under whatever form it may be, by other powers in collective form and which is detrimental to peace and order in East Asia. Japan is responsible with China and other Asiatic countries for maintenance of peace and order in East Asia. It is unbearable that other powers or the League will make use of the China question for executing of their selfish purposes behaving as if they were judges at a tribunal".

The statement was nothing but the concrete policies formulated, upon the principles which had been enunciated by the Foreign Minister at the Diet. It was an application but not a deviation from the established principle. Those who were well aware of the conditions in Japan at that time, knew this matter quite well, for example Mr. Hugh Byas, correspondent of the London Times and the New York Times for a long time in Japan, had a long article in the New York Times Magazine of August 26, 1934 under the title of "Japan's Destiny As She Sees It" in which he said nothing about the statement but solely referred to the speech of the Foreign Minister. The statement was made in order to preserve peace and security in the Far East.

EXCHANGE OF NEWS AMONG JAPAN,  
UNITED STATES & GREAT BRITAIN

MR. HIROTA'S ADDRESS BEFORE THE  
JAPANESE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE.

by AMAU Eiji

On April 25, 1934 taking advantage of the visit of Mr. Grew, American Ambassador, who happened to call on the Foreign Minister on other matters, Mr. Hirota referred to the statement and explained to him that the Japanese Government did not ignore the Nine Power Treaty and of course it respected the principle of the open door and equal opportunity. Not only did it not object to any kind of trade of other peoples with China but it would welcome it as far as it was bona fide. However, it seemed to him, he continued, that various people in various parts of the world had recently been maneuvering to sell things to China or advance loans to her with other intention and he was afraid that such affairs might affect the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia. Considering her geographical relations with China, he said it was quite natural that Japan could not be unconcerned with such actions. Mr. Grew answered that he fully understood his explanation.

The same day, the British Ambassador, Sir Francis Lindley called on Mr. Hirota and inquired about the views of the Japanese Government concerning the recent informal statement of a Foreign Office official. The Ambassador explained the British position from the standpoint of existing treaties and acquainted the Minister with the statement made by Sir John Simon in parliament to the effect that while the British Government believed the statement in question to have been issued because of apprehension of danger from certain actions on the part of foreign powers, to the peace in the Orient, the integrity of China and the friendly relations between Japan and China, such apprehension should not arise from the policy of the British Government as Great Britain in fact was avoiding any measure likely to create such a danger. Mr. Hirota expressed his appreciation of this assurance on the part of the British Foreign Secretary and set forth the views of the Japanese Government relative to the unofficial statement by the Foreign Office official. He emphasized the point that if only in view of the geographical position, Japan of all powers has naturally the greatest concern not comparable to that of any power distantly situated for the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia.

On the 26th, Mr. Grew called on Mr. Hirota and asked him to receive the English translation of the "Informal" statement. Mr. Hirota answered that as it had already been explained, it was not a formal statement, but it was the reports of what the official in charge had spoken, mostly

in answers to questions, at his regular interview with the Japanese correspondents, and therefore, there was no official translation. However, he promised him to send the translation of the report of what had been explained by the same official and appeared in newspapers about April 21st as he thought it might be well to clarify the position of the Government. The copy of the explanation sent to the American Ambassador was as follows:

"Japan has never infringed upon Chinese independence or interest, nor has she the slightest intention to do so. In fact, she sincerely desires the preservation of territorial integrity of China and her unification and prosperity. These desires, should fundamentally speaking be attained by China herself through her self awakening and voluntary efforts.

Japan has no intention to trespass upon the rights of other powers in China and bona fide financial and commercial activities will rebound to the benefit of China which is quite welcome to Japan. She, of course, subscribes to the principle of the open door and equal opportunity in China. She is observing scrupulously all existing treaties and agreements concerning that country.

However, Japan cannot remain indifferent to anyone's taking action under any pretext, which is prejudicial to the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia, and in view of her geographical position is of vital concern. Consequently she cannot afford to have questions of China exploited by any third party for the execution of a selfish policy which does not take into consideration the above circumstances."

On April 26, the same note was sent to the British Ambassador. Delivering it to Sir Francis Lindley, a Foreign Office official remarked that Mr. Hirota thought that the position of Japan had been fully clarified by his conversation with him yesterday and by the explanation just handed to him. The Ambassador said that it was quite clear to him and he thought therefore no reply was to be expected.

On April 29, Mr. Grew presented a note to Mr. Hirota stating that:

"The relations of the United States with China, with Japan, and with other countries were governed by the generally accepted principles of international law and the provisions of treaties could lawfully be modified or terminated only by processes prescribed or recognized or agreed upon by the parties to them; that no nation could, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where there were involved the rights, the obligations; that the United States sought to be duly considerate of the rights, obligations, and legitimate interests of other countries, and it expected on the part of other governments due consideration of the rights,

obligations, and legitimate interests of the United States".

Mr. Hirota delivered an address at the Governors' Conference on May 4, 1934 in which he said among other things:

"The Foreign Policy of the Japanese Government is already well known to you all, as I spoke in detail on the subject in the opening session of the Diet in January this year. This policy has not since been altered in any respect whatsoever.

Following the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents there was discovered unfortunately the existence of wide diversion of view between Japan and other powers concerning the affairs of East Asia. ----- However that step (withdrawal from the League of Nations) was one that Japan had purpose to take in order that we might fulfill our mission and responsibilities in East Asia.

No affront to the powers was intended nor did we mean to impair wilfully our friendly relation with them. Regarding this above position of Japan in East Asia, we must try to obtain a better understanding with other powers and promote out friendly relations with them. Japan has no wish to remain aloof in East Asia and to maintain an attitude of antagonism toward other powers. She has no intention to trespass upon their treaty rights and interests. On the contrary "Universal brotherhood" is what we sincerely desire and our Foreign policy is guided by that desire.---

Now, while endeavoring, as I have said, to further our friendly relations with other countries, we should not forget the mission of our country in East Asia. What is that mission? It is the obligations that Japan must bear in common with other East Asia states for the maintenance of peace and order in their part of the globe. The very significance of Japanese existence as a great power lies essentially in our awareness and acceptance of this mission. And the more we realize this mission, the clearer becomes the magnitude of our responsibility and the need of utmost effort on our part.

Japan sincerely desires the preservation of integrity of China, her unification and her prosperity and progress, but the attainment of these desires is fundamentally a matter that should be left to China's own self awakening and voluntary efforts. What is termed gratuitous assistance of outsiders from selfish standpoint will not, I believe, help China realize her aspirations. It would, of course, be impossible for Japan to remain indifferent to any such action of a third party as will complicate Sino-Japanese relations or any act of conspiracy against the peace and order of East Asia. The acts and schemes on the part of China herself against Japan are fully expected to cease.

It is gratifying that the more recent developments in China seem to

indicate that China is gradually coming to comprehend our true motives so that our two countries appear to be nearer to arriving at a fundamental understanding relative to our relations. In this regard, I think, we should redouble our efforts so that we may really secure happiness for both China and Japan, and the two countries may together contribute abundantly to maintain peace and order in East Asia. I need not repeat that Japan without question fully respects all treaties and engagements subsisting between her and other powers and she has no thought of trespassing upon their rights and interests under existing treaties. Moreover, we have no objection whatsoever to exchanging views if necessary with each individual powers regarding treaty rights and interests. But in view of the fact that on question of East Asia our views were, as I have said, rejected by the powers in Geneva of the League of Nations which forced our decision to withdraw from the League. It would surely be unwise to reproduce a situation as was encountered in the League meeting. We will therefore, hold on to our responsibilities and try to promote understanding with other powers concerned.

The development of Manchukuo to us is a matter of serious concern and it is very necessary that Manchukuo is afforded most generous assistance and support in order to enable her to achieve further progress and achievement. We are all gratified that the country is rapidly progressing with the machinery of government along all lines.

While we must safeguard our rights and interests in Manchukuo we should be extremely careful not to commit any act which may in any way weaken the independence of the country because such an act is not to our contravention nor policy.

As for the execution of our foreign policy as described above, it goes without saying that the labors of government authorities should have the support of the entire nation. As the preliminary for that is a propagation of a wide knowledge concerning the foreign relation and the position and mission of our country is of paramount importance. I ask that you will try to guide and instruct various civilian organizations toward a full realization of the purpose.

I hope I have made clear to you the object of Japanese foreign policy. Yet, in view of the radical changes, the world is undergoing politically and economically, I believe that we shall encounter in our foreign relations not a few difficulties in the future, though fortunately our path at present is more or less uneventful, we therefore, should never be off our guard."



REACTION IN THE POWERS  
by AMAU Eiji

Soon after the statement had been made public, the Minister sent instructions to the representatives abroad asking them to report as fully as possible, the press comments on, or reactions to it.

The statement was reported in Japanese papers on April 18, 1934.

Almost all of them commented favorably. Some endorsed it, some approved it and some even commended a more positive policy on the following days. However, as some reaction began to be reported later from abroad, mostly from the United States some of them began to be cautious on the question.

Perusing the foreign press comments we find the following:

CHINA

The Chinese press in China which was generally unfavorable in its comments on the statement, began to criticize it more extensively about the 20th of April or after, upon hearing of press reaction of the United States and other foreign powers. Its tone of comment was incoherent at first but it was put in tune gradually with that of the American or the British press. It has become also gradually quiet with the same time as the American and British press, (about the time of Sir John Simon's statement at the parliament or Mr. Grew's presentation of an aide Memoire).

It is to be noted that some Canton press made use of it as their attack on the Nanking authorities for their failure in handling diplomatic affairs, as for example, their tacit recognition of territorial sovereignty of the "Puppet Manchukuo" while some of the Chinese press, particularly that of the Canton press, accused foreign countries, above all, Great Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R. for "their ignorance and disunity on the Far Eastern affairs". Many papers commented that it was absolutely necessary to solve the Manchurian question in order to improve China's relation with Japan.

The English written papers in China were generally in similar line as the Chinese ones but some of them, for example, the Shanghai News, The Canton Daily Sun, etc., commented favorably supporting the statement.

RUSSIA

The U.S.S.R. which had the greatest territorial interests in East Asia, was singularly quiet. Its press treated it lightly and was silent (contrary to expectation of some foreign press).

#### GREAT BRITAIN

Next to the U.S.S.R., Great Britain was considerably concerned with her territorial interests in East Asia.

The statement was reported in the press but almost all of it was reticent at first only reporting reaction in the United States and China. A few papers, mostly liberal and labor, which had always been critical of Japan's China Policy made comment as usual, but their tone was rather calm, compared with that of the American press.

Most of the papers generally began to report it more prominently and about April 24th or after, but their tone was still mild and prudent and not excited while the Daily Mail, the Morning Post, the Evening News and other conservative press generally commented favorably, particularly the Daily Mail had editorials three times approving the statement and supporting Japan's policy. The London Times did not comment until May 1st.

The public which had been cool and quiet, seemed to understand more fully the real intention and aims of Japan upon learning of the interview of their Ambassador in Tokyo with the Japanese Foreign Minister, and hearing the statement of Sir John Simon, Foreign Secretary, at the Parliament that he was satisfied with the explanation made by the Japanese Foreign Minister and that he thought the incident was closed. This statement of Sir John Simon was reported prominently in the evening edition of the press of the same day and in the morning edition of the following days. All papers except one or two, were content with the explanation of Japan and made comment accordingly.

It is noteworthy that the party organs opposing the Government made use of it as an attack upon the Government policy while other important papers including the Times and the Daily Telegraph were principally concerned for safeguarding their treaty rights and commercial interests in their comment. It is interesting that many Canadian papers commented favorably. (No report from Australia).

#### UNITED STATES

The strongest reaction was reported from the United States where almost all papers criticized it unfavorably. The reasons given may be as follows:

- a) It would interfere with the Chinese Sovereignty and it would make Japan China's protector.
- b) It would be the Monroe Doctrine of East Asia.

- c) It would violate the Nine Power Treaty and the principles of open door and equal opportunity.

However, some commented favorably for the reasons that:

- a) It was quite natural for Japan to give warning to foreign powers which were helping China to prepare a war against Japan and Japan's intention was not to make a disturbance but to avoid war by publishing a statement.
- b) Japan had no intention to violate the rights and interests of other powers in Asia or of other Asiatic countries by drawing attention of other powers for the purpose of maintaining peace in the Far East, as she had the treaty right to do so.
- c) Japan had no intention to interfere with trade of other powers in China or their commercial dealing with China.
- d) It was proved that though peace had often been threatened in East Asia, it was always maintained by vigilance and guardianship of Japan. Therefore, such warning as Japan had given was necessary in order to prevent outbreak of war in East Asia.

The presentation of an Aide-Memoire made by the American Ambassador to the Japanese Foreign Office was generally approved by the American press, but a number of them criticized it as follows:

- a) It was not just and advisable to accuse Japan as if she were summoned to a judicial court because she had the treaty right to draw attention of other powers.
- b) The commercial relation of the United States with Japan was much more important than that with China.
- c) It was not wise for the United States to be made a "cat's paw" of Great Britain and France in spite of the fact that the United States has no such great commercial or political interests in China.
- d) It was nothing but "An open door to war" that an unjustifiable and threatening note was sent.

All the press ceased to deal with the matter and became quiet about the 14th of May of the same year.

#### FRANCE

Almost all the French press had very favorable comment on the

statement and approved or supported it. A few of them criticized it but their tone was generally moderate and their attitude cool. Particularly it seemed that the delivery of the text of the statement made by the Japanese Ambassador to the French Government had created more favorable impression upon the French public. The Temps, for example had favorably changed its tone after that.

#### GERMANY

The German press generally paid great attention to the statement, reporting it under the title of "Japan's Supremacy in East Asia", "The Japan Monroe Doctrine", "The Hirota Doctrine" etc. The principal papers commented objectively, referring to the relation of Japan with Great Britain, the United States the U.S.S.R. and other powers.

#### OTHER COUNTRIES

The tone of the press comment or the way of reporting news concerning the statement in other countries differed according to the interests they had in East Asia. For example, we saw unfavorable reaction in the Dutch press on account of their having colonies in Asia or in the press of Central or South America on account of their antagonism to the Monroe Doctrine.

It would be noteworthy that many Belgian and Canadian papers approved it and commented favorably.

The U.S.S.R. so to speak, an Asiatic country, having vast territories in Siberia and Central Asia and sharing a common frontier with China for thousands of miles, although she had not adhered to the Nine Power Treaty. Great Britain had great area of territories in Asia and considerable interests in trade and investment in China while her vast territories of Dominion surrounded the Pacific Ocean with the United States. France had also a great area of her territories in East Asia. As to the United States it was regarded at that time that her interests in East Asia were great but not so fundamental as that of the British Empire or sometimes others. Some American papers even recognized it (The Philadelphia Record of May 21, 1934 said for example the United States had no such great political or commercial interests in China as Great Britain or France), although I myself fully recognized her interests have been rapidly growing in that region.

However, the French press was in favor of the statement while the Soviet one was quiet and the British was not so excited as the American. Why? The contrast was supposed to be due to the fact, according to the telegrams received from abroad that the United States was more directly interested in the affairs concerned and other states were not "Indulged in selling arms or advancing political loans to China".

EXPLANATION TO OFFICERS

Reaction seemed to indicate in which way the wind was blowing. It is natural that the more the statement hit on interested points, the stronger the reaction seemed to be reflected.

The informal statement was what had been intended to be known to the public. As it was stated above, it was nothing but the concrete policies formulated as an application of the principle which had been suggested by the Foreign Minister at the Diet and a declaration from which it had been carried out by the Japanese Government in recent years, but it was quite unfortunate that it had been somewhat misunderstood in the United States as it was shown in its press.

THE JAPANESE MONROE DOCTRINE

The informal statement was sometimes called the 'Japanese Monroe Doctrine' by the Americans.

They seem to be apt to use this term 'The Monroe Doctrine' in different meanings.

As far as I know, when Viscount Ishii, Japanese Envoy to the United States delivered a speech in New York on 29 September 1917 saying that Japan would endeavor to safeguard the sovereignty and independence of China, some of the American papers and Americans called it the 'Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine' or 'the Japanese Monroe Doctrine'. The New York Herald Tribune for example commenting on the informal statement, reminded of the speech of Viscount Ishii as 'The Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine' in its editorial of 12 April 1918.

During the First World War and after some foreign writers began to pay attention to the new ideology 'Asia for the Asians', 'The East Asia Monroe Doctrine', 'The Japan Monroe Doctrine', etc., which were remarks were pronounced by Japanese or other politicians or scholars. But as someone said, 'There was no Monroe in Japan, and therefore, no 'Monroe Doctrine' in Japan'.

If the American Doctrine aimed at preserving peace in that district, it would be of the same objective as the informal statement because it aimed to maintain peace in the Far East. If the American doctrine aimed to eradicate the cause of disturbance of peace, it would be the same purpose as the Japanese statement.

Our statement was made for the purpose of preventing disturbances of peace or outbreak of war. It was for defensive purposes.

History shows that peace was disturbed in East Asia on account of interferences of foreign powers with the Far Eastern affairs. If the Far Eastern affairs had been left to those people, there might

## EXPLANATION TO CRITICISM

by AMAU Eiji

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History shows that peace was disturbed in East Asia on account of interference of foreign powers with the Far Eastern Affairs. If the Far Eastern affairs had been left to those people, there might

not have been any disturbance of peace in that district.

Rivalry of foreign powers to obtain concessions in China, creation of spheres of influence, leased territory or division of China, etc., were the causes of unrest in China or East Asia.

Now China was reported to be preparing a war with the assistance of foreign powers. The anti-Japanese movement was running high. It was really in a dangerous condition. As incense fire might be ignited to a conflagration.

The statement was made under such circumstances in order to draw attention of the parties concerned for the purpose of preserving peace and order in East Asia.

We had no intention to interfere with international affairs of China, much less to dominate over her. It is clear beyond doubt that it is quite impossible to over-rule her. Nor had she any intention to disturb the relation of other powers with China or to interfere by force with other powers, but she only desired to keep peace in East Asia. East Asia is our home. The East Asian affairs are to us a question of life or death. We wanted to safeguard our life and our home. We wanted to prevent an outbreak of fire in our house. As Ambassador Saito was reported to have remarked in Chicago on May 21, 1934, "It was in the nature of a protective measure taken only in a diplomatic way. Prevention was always preferable to cure".

It was also reported that Japan's policy also had been somewhat misunderstood in the United States. Some took "The Japanese Formula" as intention on the part of Japan to exercise overlordship over neighboring nations and territories or to claim "Superior interests in Eastern Asia". However, as the Japanese Ambassador in the United States protested it was not the meaning of the formula. We claimed nothing but what was to be derived from our geographical position in the Far East.

Every country has its own geographical position. Nobody can alter the geographical position of a country. The Ishii-Lansing Agreement recognized that territorial propinquity would create special relations between countries and therefore the United States recognized Japan's special interests in China. The agreement has been since abolished, but the geographical position of Japan or China cannot be altered.

Japan is situated in the Far East, and therefore, has particular interests there which are different from other countries not situated in the same position as she.

This is the same with other countries. The United States, for example, may have its particular interests arising from her geographical position she occupies, such as the Carribean districts.

It was expressed in the statement that we were concerned with peace in East Asia where we had particular interests. Of course, we respect the rights and interests of other powers in that district.

Neither overlordship nor superior rights, but natural sequence induced from our geographical position in East Asia that we expressed in the statement.

#### THE NINE POWER TREATY - THE PRINCIPLE OF OPEN DOOR.

The Nine-Power Treaty was concluded for the purpose of "stabilizing conditions in the Far East" and the statement was made in order to prevent disturbance of conditions in the same region. Both had the same objective.

By the Nine-Power Treaty, the contrasting powers other than China, of the treaty agreed "to refrain from countenancing action inimical to the security of friendly states" and the statement gave warning about such action.

It was beyond doubt that neither the statement was in contradiction to the treaty nor we had any intention to ignore the treaty rights of other powers. However, having learned that there seemed to be some misunderstanding about it, I fully explained about the statement on the 20th April at our press conference with foreign correspondents, while the Foreign Minister himself clarified the American and British Ambassadors on occasion of his meeting with them.

It was a fact, however, that there was strong current of opinion for revising or abolishing the Nine Power Treaty in my country at that time for the reasons that:

- a) China had not yet been united and her condition becoming worse, while she had failed to fulfill her obligations regulated in the Washington Nine Power Treaty and Resolutions.
- b) The fundamental conditions were changed in East Asia since the Treaty had been concluded.
- c) Though the U.S.S.R. was not a party to the Treaty, her position could not be ignored as she had been greatly changed.
- d) Our public opinion grew to feel more and more seriously



that collective intervention of other countries in the East Asian affairs under the pretext of an application of the Treaty was not only ineffective but rather harmful for the maintenance of peace in that region.

On the Manchurian question, many foreign countries most of which had none, or if any, little interests there but simply followed some big powers, intervened collectively, in the affair and put pressure upon Japan in the name of the League, Japan consequently was obliged to withdraw from the League. Many Japanese were then afraid that foreign powers could continue to do the same under the name of the Nine Power Treaty in the affairs of East Asia. Japan's interests in East Asia were vital to her. It would be intolerable to her if other powers would abuse the Treaty for the sake of their interference with the East Asian affairs. This might be the opinion of the majority of Japanese people at that time.

We stood, however, against renouncement of the Treaty.

Not only in Japan, but in other parts, were there bitter criticism of this Treaty. Dr. Sun Yat Sen himself complained of it because China, being assured by other powers of their respect of her sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity was treated as a colony. He, therefore, resented the Treaty.

The London Times pointed out as it was quoted above, that the administrative integrity had never been exercised by the Chinese Central Government since the Nine Power Treaty had been signed and suggested that it would not be the immediate business of the British Foreign Office to defend it in its editorial of January 11, 1932. Thus the British Government did not adhere to the American proposal suggested by Mr. Stimson to send a note to Japan and China (Stimson Doctrine). It showed, however, its attitude to revise it if necessary.

However, we assured in our statements to respect the treaty. Only we saw necessity to give warning to the public in order to maintain stability of China as well as peace and security in East Asia for which the treaty was concluded. This was done because the conditions of East Asia including Japan were in danger of being disturbed on account of the actual situation in China and the action and attitude of other foreign powers.

We did not intend to raise a legal argument concerning the Treaty but just to express our feeling generally and therefore it should be interpreted in accordance with and not in contradiction to, the letter and spirits of the treaties.

We assured also to respect the Principle of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity in China.

In reality, it was not Japan but the League that closed the Chinese door to Japan. On February 24, 1933, the Assembly of the League adopted a report declaring that the Chinese boycott subsequent to the Manchurian Incident was a legitimate means of reprisal in the light of International Law and thus virtually closed China to Japanese trade. Japan did not shut her door but she herself was shut out.

Japanese trade was competing favorably with that of other powers in many parts of the world which were far from Japan, and consequently Great Britain and other powers began to plan various measures in order to prevent Japanese goods from entering their territories in violation of the commercial treaties. Japan was fully confident that she would compete with and beat other powers in trade and commerce in China which was in a position much more advantageous to her than to them. The principle of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity was really welcomed by Japan.

It was particularly stated, moreover, in the statement that Japan would not interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance and trade and she only would object to such action as it would be detrimental to peace and order in East Asia.

Extract from "Volcanic Isle"

Extract from "Volcanic Isle" by Wilfred Fleisher, 1941 - pages 258 - 263.

In the meantime the Foreign Office had appointed a new spokesman, Eiji Amau, who had just returned to Japan from a period of service as counselor of the Japanese Embassy at Moscow at a time when Russo-Japanese relations were particularly strained in the wake of Japan's invasion of Manchuria. Amau had been subjected to all the annoyances with which the Soviets were capable of treating unwelcome visitors: perpetual shadowing, forced isolation, and diplomatic procrastinations and evasions.

After Shiratori, Amau came as something of a letdown for the correspondents. Amau undoubtedly had contacts outside the Foreign Office, but he was above all a Foreign Office official and took orders from the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was nominally the chief officer in charge of press relations and who was then Mamoru Shigemitsu, now ambassador in London.

Amau was cheerful, almost always smiling, seemed to enjoy himself immensely in his new role, cracked jokes with the correspondents, and having his Soviet days close behind him, engaged in frequent verbal tilts with Alexis Naghi, the Tass correspondent, which often went to bitter lengths and provided lively entertainment for the other correspondents. Naghi was a sharp-witted man who loved arguing, with a dictionary in mind in which seemed to be pigeonholed all sorts of facts covering the widest variety of subjects and people. Naghi was recalled to Russia in 1936 and disappeared. Visitors who have since passed through Moscow and inquired for him have been told that he is working at the headquarters of the Tass agency but they have never been able to contact him directly.

Amau quite unconsciously and accidentally became famous overnight. It happened on the evening of April 17, 1934, when he was holding one of his regular press conferences with Japanese newspapermen. Little realizing the importance his words might have, and devoid of the sense of news values his predecessor possessed, Amau picked up a sheaf of telegrams lying on his desk, consisting of messages exchanged between the Foreign Office and Japanese envoys abroad, and read out a dispatch from Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Mamoru Shigemitsu to the Japanese minister to China, Akira Ariyoshi. This statement, which later became known as the Amau statement, pointed to Japan's "special position in China" and warned foreign powers not to assist the Chinese or interfere in their affairs.

The statement was translated from the Japanese by the JAPAN ADVERTISER and appeared in the American newspaper on the following morning. It was then picked up and cabled abroad by foreign correspondents. The Foreign Office, on Amau's instructions, took the ADVERTISER's version, made some slight alterations in the English, and issued it in mimeographed form to a limited number of foreign newspaper correspondents. Later when the Foreign Office disowned the Amau statement it made frantic efforts to recover these mimeographed copies from the correspondents.

Amau's statement created an immediate sensation abroad, and the American and British ambassadors both asked Foreign Minister Koki Hirota to explain it, pointing out that it was contrary to Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty and her repeated professions of observing the Open Door and respecting the integrity of China. Mr Hirota was compelled to retract the statement a week later by assuring the two ambassadors that Japan had not "the slightest intention" of infringing on China's territorial integrity.

Although the Amau statement dates back to 1934, it is still of interest today. As corrected and issued in mimeographed form by the Japanese Foreign Office, it read as follows:

Owing to the special position of Japan in its relations with China, doctrines advocated by Japan concerning China may not agree with the ideas of foreign nations, but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost efforts in carrying out its mission in East Asia and fulfilling its responsibilities. Japan was compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations because Japan and the League failed to agree about Japan's position in East Asia, and although Japan's attitude toward China may differ from other countries, such differences cannot be avoided due to Japan's special position and mission.

Japan is endeavoring to maintain and enhance its friendly relations with foreign nations, but Japan considers that to keep the peace and order in East Asia it must act single-handed and on its own responsibility. Japan considers that no other country except China is in a position to share that responsibility with Japan.

Accordingly, the preservation of unity in China

and restoration of order in that country are two objectives ardently desired by Japan for the sake of peace in East Asia. History shows that unity and restoration of order can only be attained by waking up China.

Japan will oppose any attempt of China to avail itself of the influence of some other country to repel Japan, as this would jeopardize the peace of East Asia, and will also oppose any effort by China to resist foreigners by bringing other foreigners to bear against them. Japan expects foreign nations to give consideration to the special situation created by the Manchuria and Shanghai incidents (the Japanese Manchurian invasion in 1931 and the Japanese fighting in Shanghai in 1932) and to realize that technical or financial assistance to China must attain political significance. Acts of this kind must give rise to complications which might necessitate discussion of problems such as fixing zones of interest or even international control or division of China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and have the most serious effects upon East Asia and ultimately upon Japan.

Japan must therefore object to such undertakings in principle, although it will not object to any foreign country negotiating individually with China regarding propositions of finance or trade, as long as these propositions are beneficial to China and do not threaten the maintenance of order in East Asia. If such negotiations threaten to disturb peace in East Asia, Japan will be compelled to oppose them.

For example, supplying China with war planes, building airdromes and detailing military instructors or advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to separate Japan and other countries from China and would ultimately prove prejudicial to the peace in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

The foregoing attitude should be clear from the policies Japan has pursued in the past, but due to the fact that gestures for joint assistance to China and other aggressive assistance by foreign countries is becoming too conspicuous, it is deemed advisable to make known the foregoing policies.

Amau himself had never anticipated the reaction his statement created. He was astounded. He seemed, however, to thoroughly enjoy the limelight into which he had been projected, and if he was censured by both Foreign Minister Hirota and Vice-Minister Shigemitsu, as he undoubtedly was, he was praised and congratulated by many outside the Foreign Office who concurred in the views he had unwittingly given publicity to.

But, as spokesman, Amau became extremely cautious from that time on. He kept his smile and his good humor at press conferences, but he would ward off questioners by turning questions back on them. It was with relief that he abandoned the difficult task of spokesman in 1937, to become minister to Switzerland and later ambassador to Italy. Amau's career in Rome was cut short when he was recalled last August in the wholesale purge of the Japanese diplomatic service under the present Konoye cabinet.

Extract from "Ten Years in Japan"



Excerpts from "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew" -- AMAU Eiji.

April 28, 1934.

"These are days of political intensity. Indeed, in our job the interesting situations and work come in cycles; we pass through periods of comparative calm, with more or less routine duties to perform, and then quite suddenly something breaks and we are busier than bees. Ever since the statement of Foreign Office spokesman Eiji Amau on April 17, the political pot has been boiling; long telegrams out and in; ambassadors, ministers, charges d'affaires, press correspondents constantly coming in for information or diagnosis of events; there is little rest. Amau at least has given the press correspondents plenty of occupation while the diplomats have been spending thousands of dollars on telegrams. I told Amau at a dinner the other night that we were all going to send our telegraph bills to him, to which he replied that that would be all right because he would naturally get a rake-off from the Ministry of Communications for stimulating the telegraph service. It is difficult these days to judge whether Amau is regarded in Japan as an enfant terrible or a hero; it rather depends on whether you seek opinions from the camp of the moderates or that of the chauvinists.

"The first reaction of the Japanese press to Amau's original statement was one of unqualified approval, but when the unfavourable repercussion began to come back from abroad, some of the papers, while approving without qualification the doctrine that Japan has the sole responsibility for the 'preservation of peace in the Far East,' agreed that the wording of the statement was a little awkward. It will be noted that the statement given me by Hirota on the 26th differed from Amau's statement. According to the unofficial translation of the statement of the 17th, Amau said:

'This country considers it only natural that, to keep peace and order in East Asia, it must act singlehanded and upon its own responsibility. In order to be able to fulfil this obligation, Japan must expect its neighbour countries to share the responsibility of maintaining peace in East Asia, but Japan does not consider any other country, except China, to be in a position to share that responsibility with Japan.'

"In the official translation of the 26th the wording is modified:

'However, Japan cannot remain indifferent to anyone's taking action under any pretext which is prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order in East Asia for which she, if only in view of her geographical position, has a most vital concern. Consequently, she cannot afford to have questions of China exploited by any third party for the execution of a

Excerpts from "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew" -- AMAU Eiji.

selfish policy which does not take into consideration the above-mentioned circumstances.

"Amau, in his statement of the 17th, is further reported to have said:

'Japan will oppose any attempt of China to avail herself of the influence of some other country with the idea of repelling Japan, as this would jeopardize the peace in East Asia; and it will also oppose resort by China to any measure intended to 'resist foreigners by bringing other foreigners to bear against them.' Japan expects foreign nations to give consideration to the special situation created by the recent Manchurian and Shanghai incidents, and to realize that the undertaking of joint operations in regard to China, even if they be in regard to technical or financial assistance, must eventually attain political significance for China. Undertakings entailing such significance, if carried through to the end, must give rise to complications that might even necessitate discussion of problems like fixing zones of interest or even international control or division of China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and at the same time would have the most serious effects upon East Asia and, ultimately, Japan.

'Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although it will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China in regard to propositions of finance or trade, as long as those propositions are beneficial to China and are not likely to threaten the maintenance of order in East Asia. If such negotiations are of a nature that might disturb peace and order in East Asia, Japan will be obliged to oppose them.

'For example, supplying China with warplanes, building aerodromes in China, and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to separate Japan and other countries from China and ultimately would prove prejudicial to the peace of East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

'The foregoing attitude should be made clear by the policies followed by Japan in the past. But, due to the fact that gestures for joint assistance to China and for other aggressive assistance, by foreign countries, are becoming too conspicuous, it is deemed advisable to make known the foregoing policies.'

"There has been much conjecture regarding the reasons for the issuance of Amau's statement of April 17. I endeavoured to define those

Excerpts from "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew" -- AMAU Eiji

reasons in our telegrams and in our last dispatch to the Department, based chiefly on the theory that Japan was becoming restive at the cumulative evidence of foreign activities in China. Furthermore, approval of the doctrine that Japan alone is responsible for the maintenance of peace in the Far East would give Japan added claims to naval parity in the forthcoming naval conference, and would also enable her to dominate China. Amatau had been pressed by the Japanese newspaper correspondents for comment on these various matters and Shigemitsu finally agreed to his giving out the substance of an instruction already sent to Ariyoshi, Minister to China.

"Whether or not Hirota approved the issuance of the statement is unessential, for the statement accurately expresses the policy which Japan would like to pursue. While there has been criticism of the phraseology, the substance of the statement seems to have the unqualified approval of practically all Japanese, and Hirota, in the present state of public opinion, could not repudiate the statement and remain in office. The net result of the statement will probably be: (1) an intensification of the feeling of isolation that has prevailed since the Manchurian campaign; (2) a furtherance of the Army and Navy campaign to prepare for the 'crisis' of 1935-36, and (3) the development of patriotic feeling to such an extent that no Japanese Government will be able to compromise with the powers in case of decided differences in viewpoint regarding policies towards China or with respect to naval ratios."

April 29, 1934.

"Fortunately I was at home when Mr. Hull's aide-memoire on the question of foreign assistance to China came in. It was decoded at 5 and typed at about 5:30. In spite of its being Sunday and the Emperor's birthday I immediately wrote a personal letter to Hirota asking if he could see me urgently. He replied by telephone, setting the hour at 6:30, and I was therefore able to deliver the document without delay. He read it slowly and carefully and then asked me what portion or portions I considered the most important. I replied that I did not feel that I ought to try to interpret it and that the text seemed to me to be quite clear. He merely remarked that Amatau's statement had caused 'great misunderstanding' and said that he would reply after studying our aide-memoire in due course. He was perfectly friendly and showed no surprise or disapproval. In my opinion the aide-memoire is wholly admirable, absolutely called for by the circumstances, drafted in masterly fashion, perfectly clear in substance, moderate and friendly in tone.

"It seems to me that after all that has passed, Sir John Simon appears to have accepted a little too readily Hirota's assurances that

Excerpts from "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew" -- AMAU Eiji.

Japan intended to respect the Nine-Power Treaty, and his statement to the House of Commons to the effect that he was satisfied with those assurances may cause certain elements of the British public to feel that something more was called for and desired. At any rate, we have registered our own position with complete clarity. I think that the Department's 'rush' instruction to me to present the aide-memoire at the earliest possible moment was probably to forestall another pious statement which it was reported that the Foreign Office would issue to the press to-morrow. Evidently it did forestall it because on the following day Amau announced to the press that there would be no further statement for the present. Whatever the other nations may think or do, we shall have their (perhaps grudging) respect. I am very happy about it."

December 27, 1934.

"Perhaps this gives the impression that we at the Embassy are developing something of an 'anti-Japanese' complex. This is not the case. One can dislike and disagree with certain members of a family without necessarily feeling hostility to the family itself. For me there are no finer people in the world than the best type of Japanese. I am rather inclined to place Hirota among them; if he could have his way unhampered by the military I believe that he would steer the country into safer and saner channels.

"One of these friends once sadly remarked to us: 'We Japanese are always putting our worst foot foremost, and we are too proud to explain ourselves.' There has been and is a 'bungling diplomacy'. They habitually play their cards badly. While it is true that the military and the extremists are primarily responsible for the 'bungling diplomacy' of Japan, the Japanese as a race tend to be inarticulate, more at home in action than with words. But the military and the extremists know little and care little about Japan's relations with other countries, and it is the desire of people like Shiratori, Amau, and other Government officials to enhance their own prestige at home and to safeguard their future careers by standing in well with the military that brings about much of the trouble. Perhaps we should be grateful that they so often give their hand away in advance."

February 12, 1937.

"This afternoon Alice, having a cold and feeling poorly, stayed at home while I did the family duty by going to a reception at the Chinese Embassy, and it was worth while because it gave me an opportunity for a long and intimate conversation with Amau. Amau said that he thought that Japanese-American relations had undergone a great change in the

Excerpts from "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew" -- AMAU Eiji.

last two or three years and that Japan's attitude towards America was very different from that of three years ago. He said that there were really no important issues pending between us at the present time and he thought it very significant that the speech which the Minister for Foreign Affairs is about to make in a few days is going to state that Japan desires the most friendly relations with both the United States and Great Britain; so far as the United States is concerned he will stop right there, but so far as Great Britain is concerned he will continue to the effect that current controversies can be settled by diplomatic negotiations. In other words, said Amau, the absence of comment with regard to the United States would indicate that there are no prime issues worth mentioning.

"I said I thought that this situation was in large measure due to Mr. Hirota and his efforts in curbing the Japanese press, which had caused so much trouble in times past in its bitter comment about the United States; these comments were repeated by correspondents to America, and of course the American press took them up there, causing a vicious circle all around. Amau then told me of his own efforts in this direction and how in the weekly meetings with representatives of Japanese journals he had tried to influence the editorial writers to lay off bickering with the United States. In this respect he had been rather successful. I told Amau that although I had ascribed the credit for our improved relations to Hirota I knew very well that he himself had had an important hand in this development. I mentioned the press report about Shiratori as possible Vice-Minister, but Amau brushed Shiratori aside, saying that he wanted war with Soviet Russia and would therefore certainly not fit into the present regime. I said I thought that Japan was at present in a very critical position and that she really stood at the parting of the ways; Amau agreed with me and said that this was why a moderate cabinet had been appointed at the present time. On the whole this conversation seemed to me significant because Amau emphasized so distinctly the fact that the present cabinet is moderate and it looks at present very much as if this might prove to be the case."

February 21, 1941.

"Plenty of dust has been stirred up by Matsuoka's reported offer to Mr. Eden to mediate for peace in the European conflict; the press abroad was full of it and questions were asked in the House of Commons. My original guess as to how the thing happened eventually proved correct and Matsuoka told me the whole story on February 26. It appears that in the face of criticism of Japan's action in mediating in the Thailand-Indo-China dispute, Matsuoka wrote a memorandum to Eden,

Excerpt from "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew" -- AMAU Eiji.

through Shigemitsu in London, in which, in the course of a long exposition, he said:

'Lastly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Matsuoka) would like to make it clear that Japan, deeply concerned as she is with an early restoration of peace, is fully prepared to act as a mediator or to take whatever action calculated to recover normal conditions, not only in Greater East Asia but anywhere the world over.'

"What actually happened was that Ishii, deputy spokesman of the Information Bureau, ran across this memorandum in the Foreign Office and gave out certain parts of it to the press, in precisely the same way that Amau had given out one of Hirota's instructions to the Minister in China in the celebrated 'Amau Statement,' and in both cases the publicity was given without the prior knowledge or approval of the Minister. Matsuoka told me that he had been very angry with Ishii and had issued to him 'a severe warning,' but that, of course, Ishii's face had to be saved in public. However, the harm had been done and it was considerable. Matsuoka said that the British had used it to imply that Germany was in bad straits and needed peace, which was the last thing he had intended to convey. At this point in our talk he got much stirred up and his eyes became bloodshot with suppressed anger."

AMAU on 3rd KONOYE Cabinet's Foreign Ministry

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AMAU on The 3rd. KONOYE Cabinet's Foreign Ministry.

The Second KONOYE Cabinet resigned and the Third KONOYE Cabinet was formed in July 1941. Mr. MATSUOKA, Foreign Minister, resigned and Admiral TOYODA Teijiro was appointed Foreign Minister in the Third KONOYE Cabinet. The new cabinet was formed in order to continue negotiations with the United States. I was appointed Vice-Minister to assist Admiral TOYODA for the negotiations in August.

At the beginning of October of the same year, we received a reply from Mr. HULL to our proposal. The Prime Minister and his colleagues concerned were going to meet to discuss on the negotiations and Prince KONOYE asked the foreign minister of his opinion on the prospect of the negotiations - whether he thought there would be any prospect of coming to an agreement or not.

Thereupon, we presented our view on the negotiations, emphasizing the necessity of coming to an agreement and explaining why we should avoid a war at any cost. Here are the two documents describing our opinion.

About the 14th of October, I decided to see General TOJO War Minister, by consultation with my Minister to ask his reconsideration. I saw him about 10 o'clock at night and talked with him about two hours. I insisted upon concluding an agreement with the United States by making concession on the question of withdrawal of our troops from China for which I went to see him. I had so hot a talk with him that twice he said to me that I had better go home, during my conversation. I left him about midnight.



"New Information Board Chief AMAU"

Extract from "Contemporary Japan", July 1943.

NEW INFORMATION CHIEF AMAU

By Kei-ichi NAGASAKA

"When the Tohjo Cabinet was reorganized in April last, Mr. Eiji Amau was appointed President of the Board of Information. The new information chief, because of his brilliant past records, appears to be well qualified for handling all weighty official statements and interpreting the cardinal policies of the Government. From 1933 to 1937, he was director of the now defunct Information Bureau of the Foreign Office, and during this period he successfully discharged his duties as the diplomatic spokesman of the Government. In 1934, he leaped into international prominence by issuing what is generally called the Amau declaration on non-recognition of third Power interference in purely East Asiatic affairs. Taking strong exception to the technical assistance rendered to China by the League of Nations and the economic and military aids given to General Chiang Kai-shek by the Governments and interested quarters of Britain and the United States, spokesman Amau made an epochal statement on April, 17, 1934. It, in part, reads:

'Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, her views and attitude respecting matters concerning China may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations; but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia.....We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan; we also oppose any action taken by China calculated to play one Power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire political significance.....Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to the maintenance of peace in East Asia. However, supplying China with warplanes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political use, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.'

Extract from "Contemporary Japan", July 1938.

"The Amai declaration frankly and without any diplomatic frills pointed out that to Japan the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in East Asia was of vital need, and, at the same time, requested foreign nations not to implement measures construable as harmful to the cause of Sino-Japanese harmony. London and Washington strongly resented the interpretation contained in the Amai declaration of the China policy of Tokyo. By way of registering its protest, the American Government on April 30 sent a note to the Japanese Government and specifically drew the attention of the latter to the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty. It would not be fallacious to say that Mr. Amai through his outspoken declaration unveiled the portrait of Japan's independent China policy, which thenceforward aimed at restoring stable cordial relations between the two neighbouring countries.

"Prior to the outbreak of the current Pacific war, Japan did everything in its power to seek a solution of all pending Far Eastern issues in an endeavour to meet the just demands of Britain and the United States, as well as to effect an understanding with Chungking, thereby facilitating the return of peace in China. Animated by such a noble motive, the Japanese Government opened negotiations with the American Government. But the latter, spurning the good intention of the former, submitted a provoking proposal, with the result that Japan was reluctantly obliged to enter into a state of war with Britain and America as the only recourse left to settle diverse Sino-Japanese differences without the intervention or mediation of third Powers. Now that the Anglo-American interference in greater East Asia has been reduced, regardless of the contrary proclivity of Chungking, the independent China policy of Japan, so ably outlined by Mr. Amai in 1934, has started functioning in a fairly smooth manner by receiving the required support of the Nanking Government.

"Diplomatically speaking, the Amai declaration was made in the nature of a warning to Britain and America, which nations had been persistently scheming to hinder the growth of genuine Sino-Japanese harmony. They unnecessarily feared that, in the event of a Sino-Japanese accord being reached, their special rights and interests in China would suffer a great deal. This apprehension on their part was merely hypothetical, especially when the Amai declaration conveyed no such idea. It is regrettable that a section of public opinion in Japan, desiring to conciliate America at any cost, vehemently criticized the Amai declaration as a piece of inopportune statement. On top of this, certain influential circles went so far as to cold-shoulder it, for they attached prime importance to the policy of 'go slow' in dealing with the United States. Nevertheless, the new turn in the China policy, on the whole, came to be accepted in the country as a settled fact.

Extract from "Contemporary Japan", July 1938.

"In April, 1937, when Mr. Naotake Sato assumed the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau was promoted Minister and assigned to Switzerland. During his stay in Berne, he made a detailed study of the international situation, being comparatively free from heavy diplomatic work. In September, 1939, when Admiral Nomura joined the Abe Cabinet as Foreign Minister, Mr. Amau was made Ambassador to Rome. In this new role, Mr. Amau displayed marked ability in strengthening the structure of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Then, with the assumption in the second Konoye Cabinet of the post of Foreign Minister by Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, former president of the South Manchuria Railway Company and primemover in leading Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, Mr. Amau as Ambassador to Rome made no small contribution to reinforce further the Axis unanimity of purpose. He, in conjunction with Mr. Saburo Kurusu, then Ambassador to Berlin, brought about the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance Pact among Japan, Germany and Italy. By virtue of this agreement, the major credit for which must be given to Mr. Matsuoka, Berlin and Rome acknowledged Japan's leadership in East Asia, while Japan recognized the leadership of Berlin and Rome in Europe, and thus the Axis solidarity was cemented to strive for organizing a new world order in replacement of the status quo policy of the Anglo-American nations.

"Mr. Amau retired for a short while from diplomatic service in February, 1941; but, with the formation of the third Konoye Cabinet, he was recalled to take charge of the office of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this capacity he greatly assisted Foreign Minister Admiral Teijiro Toyoda in conducting negotiations with America with a view to reaching an agreement for the settlement of the China affair. In October, 1941, the Konoye Cabinet tendered its resignation and General Hideki Tojo, who was War Minister in that Cabinet, organized a new Ministry. Consequent upon the organization of the Tojo Ministry, Mr. Amau resigned from the office of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Premier General Tojo resumed negotiations with the United States and dispatched Mr. Kurusu as special envoy to Washington for the purpose of assisting Ambassador Nomura in effecting a mutually acceptable rapprochement with the Roosevelt administration. Since the attempt failed, on account of President Roosevelt's dictatorial attitude, the war in greater East Asia eventuated as a natural development.

"Until his appointment as President of the Board of Information, Mr. Amau remained somewhat inactive. A few months ago, he accepted the post of chief of the neighbourhood association department of the National Service Association--a post which he is still retaining with the object of scrutinizing closely the wartime life of the nation. Now that he has become the information chief, it is popularly expected that he will not only invigorate the thought warfare structure of Japan, but also will

Extract from "Contemporary Japan", July 1938.

speed up the dissemination of accurate informations concerning the latest activity pertaining to the construction of a greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere. In addition, because of the perfect understanding existing between him and Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu, Foreign Minister, it is obvious that the Board of Information and the Foreign Office would function as one well-knit organization to yield greater good to wartime diplomacy and information service of the nation.

"Born a second son of a wholesale fertilizer merchant of Tokushima, Shikoku, Mr. Amau, after graduating from the Kobe Higher Commercial School, prosecuted his post-graduate studies at the Tokyo Higher Commercial School. In 1912, he entered the service of the Foreign Office and successively served as consul at Antung and Sydney, embassy secretary at London and legation secretary at Berne. After that he came back to the Foreign Office as a secretary of the European and American Affairs Bureau. During the time of the Washington Conference, he acted as one of the staff members of the Japanese delegation. Then followed his appointment as consul-general at Canton and Harbin and secretary to the Japanese Embassy in Peking. Subsequently, he served twice as charge d'affairs in Moscow, from whence he was transferred to the Foreign Office to become director of the Information Bureau. From this list of posts he has had held, it is apparent that Mr. Amau in his early career received a sound training to educate himself as an astute diplomat. Perhaps that is why he was later assigned to Rome as Ambassador, where he offered his best service for the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance Pact. In recognition of his ability, he has now been entrusted with the administration of the information set-up of the Government.

"At the time when Mr. Amau was spokesman of the Foreign Office, he exhibited a keen sense of diplomatic judgement in issuing statements and in replying to questions put by newspaper correspondents of foreign countries. He was always ready to help them in appreciating the policies of Japan and give them informations as impartially as possible. When subjected to a barrage of questions tinged with suspicious motive, he would maintain his equanimity with a broad smile and reply wittily, thereby disarming the suspicion of the questioners. On the other hand, in voicing the reasonableness of the contentions of Japan, he would take a firm stand and present plainly the viewpoints of this country. In liberal circles of those days he was known as the enfant terrible of the Foreign Office. It may be that he nourished a militant complex being influenced by such militant diplomats as Mr. Kumataro Honda and Mr. Kenkichi Yoshizawa, under both of whom he served as secretary respectively at London and Peking. It is certainly a fact that Mr. Amau is a man of strong character. At this time of super-emergency confronting the Japanese people a man of his calibre cannot but be welcomed.

Extract from "Contemporary Japan", July 1938.

"Immediately after Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, British and American correspondents posed a number of questions to Mr. Amai for the purpose of ascertaining the future moves of this country. The day was cold and a severe biting wind was blowing. To the astonishment of the Anglo-American newspapermen, they found all the windows of Mr. Amai's room wide open. They started shutting the windows, whereupon the spokesman remarked: 'The windows have just been opened. Please leave them open for a while to have more fresh air. It is good and as healthy as the open door policy you people so fondly advocate.' This wisecrack elicited a roar of hearty laughter and incidentally the Anglo-American correspondents received their answer in parable. Under cover of such an enjoyable joke, Mr. Amai took the occasion to declare that Japan was following an open door policy, and that it would follow the same policy in the future for the healthy progress of East Asia. It will be refreshing to know that the Amai declaration of 1934, which was scathingly attacked by Britain and the United States, in a way tried to safeguard the legitimate special privileges and interests of foreign Powers, and for that reason it naturally sought the execution of a genuine open door policy in East Asia through Sino-Japanese collaboration and consultation. Japan parted company with the League of Nations, because Geneva, taking shelter behind non-realistic issues, flatly refused to give its assent to the operation of a Sino-Japanese open door policy in East Asia.

"Today, Mr. Amai in the capacity of the new information chief has been called upon to play a notable part in promoting the 'open door' policy of Japan for the regeneration of intercountry homogeneity in greater East Asia. Britain and America devised their own plan of open door in China mainly to shut out the natural evolution in Sino-Japanese cordiality. They played both East Asiatic neighbours. The Nine-Power Treaty was concluded not for the benefit of China, but for depriving Japan of the means to foster Sino-Japanese amity. This agreement hampered the activity of Japan in regard to the promotion of East Asiatic stability. It is, indeed, fortunate that the present Tokyo-Nanking combination has receded the London-Washington open door policy to the background and has simultaneously accelerated the consummation of the long-standing ideal of independent East Asiatic 'open door' doctrine cherished by the nations of this part of the world. Mr. Amai, who has all along manifested opposition to alien interference in East Asiatic affairs, has now been provided with powerful administrative authority to add his weight to the task of constructing the envisioned regional 'open door' in greater East Asia."

AMAU on Information Bureau 1943-4

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AMAU Eiji's Appointment as President of the Board of Information-1943.

When the TOJO Cabinet was formed in October 1941 and the war broke out in December 1941, TOGO Shigenori was Foreign Minister and TANI Masayuki was President of the Bureau of Information (Tani was not a Cabinet member).

TOGO resigned on account of the establishment of the Ministry of Great East Asia in September 1942.

The Army was contemplating the establishment of a central bureau to deal with Chinese affairs after the China Incident occurred. The Foreign Office was strongly against it. The Foreign Minister (General UGAKI) resigned in protest when the establishment of the Central Independent Office for Chinese Affairs was proposed at the Cabinet meeting at the time of the KONOYE Cabinet in September 1938. However, the China Affairs Board was set up in November 1938. During the time of the TOJO Cabinet, there was a rumor that a plan to aggrandize the China Affairs Board to a ministry was being considered in the government as well as in Army and Navy circles. Those who had connections with the Foreign Office drew attention of Foreign Minister TOGO to this matter as early as the beginning of 1942. However, the Foreign Office did not evidently expect that there might be a sudden change.

The proposal of the establishment of the Great East Asia Ministry was made about the middle of September 1942. The Foreign Office opposed. TOGO resigned but was appointed member of the House of Peers in September. The Great East Asia Ministry was established in September 1942 and TANI was appointed as Foreign Minister and concurrently President of the Information Bureau.

The Foreign Office and the Bureau of Information were the most closely related to each other in their functions and history. It is, therefore, essential that the Foreign Minister and the President of the Information Bureau should work harmoniously.

The Information Bureau was established by aggrandizing the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office. It was traditional that the President was selected from the Foreign Office officials. Therefore, it was the strong desire of the Foreign Office that this tradition be kept.

On the other hand, there was demand by the public that a Foreign Minister and a President of the Information Board should be of such types of men as those who could do fine team work with each other and that if the suitable men could not be found, it would be better that both posts should be occupied by one man.

It was not unnatural, therefore, that TANI occupied both posts.



However, it was found that it was too much for one man to do both jobs, particularly in war time. Voices had been raised more and more strongly that different men should be appointed to the different posts, particularly rumors were running high after the special session of the Diet of March 1943 that a full time President of the Information Bureau should be appointed.

The TOJO Cabinet was reshuffled in April 1943. The four ministers (Foreign, Home, Agriculture & Forestry, Education) were changed and one new Minister without portfolio appointed. SHIGEMITSU Mamoru was appointed as Foreign Minister, TANI as Ambassador to China and AMAU Eiji as President of the Information Board. (AMAU was not a Cabinet Member). The public seemed to have received the impression (and the press also reported in such sense) that the scope of the selection had been widened and the men of real capacity had been chosen as regards the Foreign Minister and the President of the Information Bureau. (If AMAU's memory is correct).

Since AMAU came back from Europe at the end of 1940, there occurred always rumors of AMAU to fill the presidency whenever there was a rumor of the change of a president of the Board of Information. As a matter of fact, as early as the beginning of 1941 one of the members of the Second KONOYE Cabinet sounded out AMAU of his intention for the post of president of the Board when there was a rumor of the change of it just after AMAU had been dismissed by MATSUOKA. Of course AMAU replied negatively.

When AMAU was offered the post of the President of the Board in April 1943, he was assured that the reorganization of the Board would be executed (by which all Army and Navy officers would be withdrawn from the Board) and the Vice-President (OKUMURA) would be changed. AMAU consulted with two or three of his senior colleagues who recommended him to accept it.

AMAU was then under the impression that TOJO or some of the Government people had consulted with or sounded out some of the Foreign Office men and found that there would be no other suitable person available than AMAU for it and also that whatever feeling TOJO might have had by his hot discussion with AMAU at the time of the Japanese-American Negotiations in October 1941 seemed to have faded away by the necessity.

Though bitterly against war, AMAU thought that he had to do his best in accordance with the Imperial Rescript after the outbreak of war to bring the war to a conclusion as satisfactory as possible to Japan. He knew also quite well that it was a sentiment of the whole Foreign Office that the post of President should be retained by a Foreign Office man both for the sake of the country and of the Foreign Office. AMAU was appointed President and MURATA (Home Office man) as Vice-President in April 1943.

About the time of Saipan, TOJO was rumored of considering of reshuffling of the Cabinet again in Spring of 1944. AMAU was intimately informed

from various directions that besides some of the Cabinet members he himself would be changed according to rumors (even some names were mentioned). ANAU had once expressed his willingness to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet to leave the post for reason of ill health in February 1944.

The TOJO Cabinet failed on account of the reorganization of the Cabinet and other matters and resigned in July 1944.

DAI NIPPON Asia Development Association

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Extract from NIPPON TIMES, 28 June 1945

ASIA DEVELOPMENT BODY INAUGURATED WEDNESDAY

New Association to Replace Headquarters  
Under Rule Aid Organ Recently Dissolved

The Dai Nippon Asia Development Association was inaugurated at a ceremony held on Wednesday morning at the Marunouchi Kaikan with Greater East Asiatic Affairs Minister Shigenori Togo and representatives from the War, Navy and Foreign Affairs Ministries and the Board of Information attending. This new organ will take the place of the Asia Development Headquarters of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which was dissolved recently in line with the progressive dissolution of the mother organization.

Taking the place of the Asia Development Headquarters, the Dai Nippon Asia Development Association will engage in the spreading and promotion of the idea of Asiatic development in line with the situation. It will strive to strengthen the solidarity of the East Asiatic peoples and engage in powerful thought war in line with the armed hostilities.

With the completion of the selection of the governing personnel, the structure and members, the new organ was launched on Wednesday. General Iwane Matsui, retired, is President and Eiji Amau, former President of the Board of Information, is Vice-President and concurrently Chief of the Board of Directors. Advisors to the organ are Admiral Baron Kiyokazu Abo, retired, Hachiro Arita, former Foreign Minister, Kazue Shoda, member of the House of Peers, Rikuro Takagi, Admiral Sankichi Tatekawa, retired, former Ambassador to Soviet Union, Iichiro Tokutomi, noted writer, Kumataro Honda, former Ambassador to China, Rentaro Mizuno, member of the House of Peers, General Jiro Minami, president of the Dai Nippon Seijikai, and Kenkichi Yoshizawa, former Ambassador to French Indo-China.

Takashi Mori, former Counsellor to the Japanese Embassy in Brazil, is Chief of the General Affairs Bureau, and Mr. Amau is Chief of the Promotion Bureau and concurrent President of the Board of Directors and Business Manager. Vice-Admiral Eijiro Kondo, member of the House of Representatives, will serve as Chief of the Training Bureau.

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