

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 449
(Japanese Intell No. 31)

PLACE: TOKYO

DATE: 26 Nov 1945



Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section
G-2, USFBS.

Subject: Intelligence Instruction in the Army War College.

Person Interrogated and Background:

ANNO, Hideo, Major

In Section D, 2nd Division, General Staff. He lectured several times at the War College.

- 1935 Graduated from Military Academy, assigned to 43rd Infantry Regt. in HIKOKA.
- 1937 With 1st Infantry Regt. in Tokyo.
- 1939 In Kwantung Army, was in North China for two months as company commander.
- 1941 Army War College.
- 1943 Kwantung Army - on army headquarters intelligence staff.
- 1944 To 2nd Section Army Staff Headquarters.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Major R.S. Spilman, Jr. AC
Lt. Comdr. Paine Paul USNR

Interpreter: Major John C. Pelzel, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

Major ANNO reported in response to a request for an instructor in the Army War College. It developed that he was an occasional lecturer and had little knowledge of the courses given in the War College. He was interrogated on the sources of intelligence concerning Russia and, in the main, substantiated information received from other officers previously interrogated.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION:(AMC, 1. MAJOR)

- - - - -

Q. 1. What intelligence training was given at the War College?

A. There formerly was specialized intelligence training but this was dropped in recent years; some years before the war. I don't know the details of the course. In recent years any intelligence training was a part of general courses. No emphasis was placed on the intelligence end. I don't know much about the War College courses.

Q. 2. What intelligence training was given in the communications course?

A. In communications course we had training in radio intercept and radio security. I don't know the details of the course. When I was a student in 1937 the instruction was very general.

Q. 3. What instruction was given in preparing enemy order of battle information?

A. Instruction was that order of battle is gotten by radio intercepts, P/W interrogation, etc., but no details were given. Although in the Staff College general types of sources were mentioned, the details were worked out in the field.

Q. 4. When you were called on to lecture at the War College what subjects did you cover?

A. The principal things were general economic, political and military strength; tactics and locations of units, etc. I gave only 7 lectures of an hour and a half.

Q. 5. What were your principal sources of information concerning Russia in the Headquarters.

A. Principally (1) Communications intercept; almost no others from Japan. (2) Field Army, its sources were communications intercept, TOKUMA KIKAN, spys, captured Russian Spys, observations posts, etc. This was gathered by Kwantung Army and sent to Headquarters. Reports were sent in every 10 days, both written and by telephone. Headquarters had no special agents; those were operated by the Kwantung Army.

Q. 6. Were agents in foreign countries the only headquarters source not available to the Army?

Yes. These were not very satisfactory, but such reports as were received were sent every 10 days and important information was sent by radio. Russian intelligence was the primary responsibility of the Kwantung Army.


Q. 7. Give staff organization of Kwantung Army Staff?

A. (See Chart on Page 3)


R E S T R I C T E D

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (ANOC. H. MAJOR)

Chief of Staff



Chief



In addition a number of officers were attached from time to time. There were sometimes as many as 25 to 30 officers in Section II. Some 20 to 30 civilians and 10 to 12 NCO's were also attached to the second Section.

Q. 8. How much of this staff had primary duty of supervising economic development of Manchuria?

A. A rather large part of the staff. The general section was primarily concerned with military intelligence, terrain intelligence and maps and some economic work. Propoganda section tried to incite many races against Russia by radio, publications, etc. Tokuma Kikan handled undercover agents.

Q. 9. Wasn't the Kwantung Army Staff larger than the staff of other area armies?

A. Yes. This was largely because of the economic duties of the army.