

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
APO #234  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

PLACE: Tokyo.  
DATE: 29 October, 1945.

INTERROGATION NO. 232

Division of Origin: Military Analysis

Subject: Japanese Army Medical Services.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

- a. Lt General SHIMIZU, Haruji - Chief, Army Medical Materials Main Depot.
- b. Major OKUSHIMA, Shoichiro, - Staff member of the Medical Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry.

Where interviewed: Office of Lt. General SHIMIZU, located at Tokyo-fu, Tokyo-shi, Setagaya-ku, Tamagawa Yoga-machi, #2 chome.

Interrogator: Captain WALTER M. DROZD

Interpreter: Captain PAUL W. LURELL

Allied officers present: Colonel J.F. RODENHAUSER

NOTE:

A list of questions had been prepared for this interrogation. It was difficult however to get direct answers to them. The interrogation therefore, proceeded by outlining the general scope of the information desired and Lt. General SHIMIZU was allowed to develop the subject in his own manner.

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE INTERROGATION:

1. Medical supply requirements in the Japanese Army were computed by the individual armies in the field and those stationed in Japan proper for a period of one year. These requirements were calculated during the year prior to the year when the medical supplies would be used.

2. Those projected estimates were forwarded to the Army Department which compiled these with the estimates of requirements for the armies to be activated during that supply year. After processing, these total requirements were directed to the Medical Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry for approval.

3. The medical supply requirements of the various armies as forwarded to the Army Department were not screened or leveled. Over estimates or underestimates were processed through to the Medical Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry as received.

4. The Japanese Army fiscal supply year started on the 1st of April and ended on the 31st of March of the following year. Total requirements were submitted to the Medical Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry by November of the year previous to the year for which supply was being planned.

5. At the Medical Affairs Bureau the total requirements were screened and adjusted. The governing factors in adjusting these requirements were the availability of raw materials and the allotment of finances for production. This process of adjustment took approximately six months. Approved requirements were then directed to the Chief of the Army Medical Materials Depot Headquarters for procurement.

6. In planning for procurement Lt. General SHIMIZU, Toraji (Chief of the Army Medical Materials Dept Hq) and his staff would estimate the probable stockpiles of Medical Supplies that would be available in the home depots on the 31st of March of the current fiscal supply year. Those probable stockpiles were then allocated against the total requirements, with the difference being procured by contracting with both army and civilian medical supply and equipment factories.

7. In computing requirements a factor of 20 - 30 percent was added to the estimated needs. It could not be established how this factor was determined, however it was explained that losses due to ship sinkings, and the bombing of supply trains etc., were adequately replaced from this contingent replacement factor.

8. Distribution of medical supplies to forces in the field was made in standard type boxes. It was indicated that a standard infantry division plus attached army troops required approximately 1000 such boxes of medical supplies each month. That box containing the medical supplies weighed approximately 30 kilograms or 66 lbs, and the actual weight of the supplies contained in each box was about 55 lbs.

9. A yearly distribution or turn over figure for medical supplies to include overseas shipments and distributions to armies stationed in Japan was estimated by Lt. General SHIMIZU as 1,000,000 boxes, of this quantity 2% was said to have been destroyed by aerial bombardment. In the Tokyo and Osaka areas, Lt. General SHIMIZU estimated that 20,000 boxes of medical supplies were destroyed through aerial bombardments.

10. Allocation of transportation for the distribution of medical supplies was the responsibility of the Army Department. It established an overall plan for the fiscal year wherein shipping space in vessels and trains was allocated for the shipment of medical and other supplies. This plan was revised monthly on the basis of ship space priorities for specific materials. Invariably allocated ship space for medical supplies was out in favor of higher priority items like ammunition and ordnance materials.

11. Lt. General SHIMIZU indicated that the greatest difficulty encountered in the distribution of medical supplies to the troops in the field was shipping. The ever increasing shortage of ships through the period of the war resulted in allocating the ship space originally planned for medical supplies to other higher priority materials.