

VIETNAM

Magazine

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
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FROM OUR READERS

The turnout for the Second Asian Press Seminar was most remarkable this year and I am certain that everyone considers that the Seminar was very successful.

I think that the surprising turnout was not only due to the greater interest in Vietnam among all those concerned, but the feeling that most people had that Saigon is "very safe."

They probably saw photos of the Seminar last year in *Vietnam Magazine* and figured that "if a fat fellow like Shibata (who presumably cannot run very fast) was safe last year, there will be no danger in my going." Even then, some of the observers told me that their wives were worried about "going to wartime Saigon."

Thanks for everything. This year, as last year, I enjoyed my stay in Saigon.

TATSUO SHIBATA
Advisory Editor
Mainichi Daily News
Tokyo, Japan

I receive your *Vietnam Magazine* every month and find it very interesting and informative.

My husband and I have adopted twin girls from the Hoi Duc Anh orphanage in Saigon and they now live with us in England. Angela and Gabrielle (Thu and Tam) are the most beautiful children and we love them dearly. They are so intelligent and we are interested in teaching them as much as possible about the culture and the people of the country of their birth.

Your magazine is helping us enormously to learn about Vietnam and we are very grateful for it.

I feel that it would be rather interesting for the girls to be able to see some large wall pictures of their country e.g. Hue and the ancient buildings there. Would it be possible for you to advise me where I could obtain some, as it seems practically impossible to find anything here in England.

JEAN MARSH
46 Hawthorn Lane
Wilmslow, Cheshire,
England

As you are well aware, we are publishing combined editions of *Jai Hing* simultaneously published in Rajkot and Ahmedabad. We also publish *Amruta* (Women's Weekly), *Pulwadi* (Children's Weekly), *Niranjan* (Social Weekly), *Parmarth* (Religious Weekly), and Wednesday and Sunday supplements.

Publications are printed on Web Offset Rotary which we imported from England.

VIETNAM *Magazine*

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Cover : A typical scene in South Vietnam's lush and fertile Mekong Delta which is home for 6.3 million people. The area is expected to be with no hamlets under Communist control by next year.

We have seen your **Vietnam Magazine** and **Vietnam Newsletter** and request you to send us from time to time materials which are suitable for our above mentioned publications.

YASHWANT SHAH
Jai Hing
P. O. Box 59
Rajkot, India

We are continuing to receive your interesting **Vietnam Magazine** and read it with much interest. Please send us photographs with short texts to enable our agency to distribute them both to the Spanish and Portuguese press.

LUIS B. D. RAMOS
Director
Fiel Information Service
Conde de Aranda 22
Madrid, Spain

People here seem to know nothing or very little about your country and there comes a lot of adverse propoganda against the Saigon government from Communist quarters.

What we actually need about your country is colored slides with some explanations which we could show in our cultural conferences.

Wishing you the best success in your struggle for freedom and justice, we greet you most sincerely on behalf of our Club.

ALBERT WIDNER
Ubatuba Lions Club
Ubatuba, Brazil

We have received several copies of **Vietnam Magazine** and found it very interesting and highly informative. It offers us what we have always wanted to know about Vietnam — its people, traditions, customs, and the country itself — while other publications offer mainly military information. The photography and contents are highly beneficial to the work of our Headquarters.

We would like very much to subscribe to your magazine and will be most grateful if you send us the necessary forms.

NAVY MAHARAGKAGA
Special Group Captain
Royal Thai Forces
Saigon

On behalf of Mayor Sunao Morita and the people of Yuki town, we wish to thank you for sending so many beautiful things for the Vietnamese Pavilion in Yuki.

We think that these examples of your art and culture will interest and impress all who visit the

FROM OUR PRESIDENT

Would you be willing to be a Patron? Your support will assist the Vietnam Council on Foreign Relations in attaining its various objectives, including the publication of **Vietnam Magazine**.

If you decide to participate as a Grand Patron or an Honor Patron you will receive a special scroll, as well as be included in our Honor Roll. To be an Honor Patron a minimum payment of US\$850.00 (or equivalent) required; to be a Grand Patron a minimum payment of US\$425.00 (or equivalent) is required.

If you would like to learn more about our activities, we indeed would be pleased to hear from you.



President
TRAN VAN LAM

pavilion and bring them closer to an understanding of your life and your people.

MOTOSUKE ISHIHARA
Secretary General
Japan Peace Volunteers
Tokyo, Japan

Please continue sending me your interesting publications on Vietnam. I have often received some North Vietnamese propoganda materials and I would like to be able to counter their propoganda and better inform my colleagues and friends of the positive progress in your country.

M. EGGLEER WERNER
Bosquets 10
2740 Moutier
Switzerland

I am extremely grateful for receiving **Vietnam Magazine** and glad that you are imparting information on development activities in your country.

I would appreciate you sending me future issues of your magazine.

H. D. WAGHMODE
Janahit
Waghmode Bldg.
Miraj, India



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With modern equipment and motorizing of the fleet, fish catch is steadily increasing. Citizens of Binh Nhut in Long An cast ballots for own hamlet chief and councilors.



Rationale behind a new theme :





La Chu village miss in Thua Thien and farmer of Phu Linh (right) are happy over results of rice harvest. For the first time, South Vietnam expects to be self-sufficient in rice since 1963. Mechanized agriculture is coming to Vietnam. Thot Not farmer (left) uses tiller as thresher. Tiller was bought by a co-op group that obtained credit from the Agricultural Development Bank on liberal terms.



Self-reliance

In Vietnamese, *tu cuong* means self-reliance. Throughout the Republic of Vietnam this year *Tu cuong* is the "now" phrase on many a lip. The country's 1,100,000 fighting men are becoming more self-reliant on the battlefield, assuming greater defense responsibility as U.S. forces gradually withdraw. Local leaders in the nation's 2,151 villages and 10,522 hamlets are becoming more reliant on their own resources and less dependent on the central government's.

Tu cuong is the rationale behind the decentralization program of the Saigon government, which provides rural villages with their own budgets to spend on development projects and which is now upgrading larger population centers to the status of autonomous cities or "urban villages" with increased administrative powers.

It is the inspiration behind moves to boost Vietnamese exports and replace imports of a number of basic goods with home-manufactured products. It is the justification for new emphasis on loans instead of grants in rural reconstruction as well as industrial development. And *tu cuong* is the popular name for the official campaign that used to be called pacification, a revamped campaign with new directions.

New Phase Launched

In March 1971 this new phase was launched in each of Vietnam's 44 provinces with ceremonies, rallies or seminars, and in Tay Ninh a visiting official aptly summed up the theme: "If 1969 was the

year of pacification and 1970 the year of development, then 1971 must be the year of self-reliance."¹

The pacification campaign, called the revolutionary development campaign and half a dozen other names since the launching of the strategic hamlets campaign 10 years ago, has been given a new name because events have made pacification too limited a goal.

Military pacification has been virtually achieved in most of the countryside, "big-unit" fighting flares only in remote, unpopulated regions, rural development in every province is in full swing, and wider horizons loom.

Growing Security

Greatly increased security for the nation's 17,910,300 citizens permits the focus of attention to swing away from military campaigns and centralized government operations, swinging instead to local community efforts and the development of a sound socio-political structure, undergirded by a viable economy at the grassroots.

The pacification campaign is now officially called the Community Defense and Local Development Plan. It has three objectives: local self-defense, local self-government, and local self-development. To the extent that Vietnam's communities achieve these goals they will attain *tu cuong*.

1. Ngo Khac Tinh, then Minister of Information, addressing 5,000 pacification cadres from Military Region III in Tay Ninh's stadium. (The 1971 campaign started in March instead of January because Vietnam follows the lunar calendar.)

Progress in improving security spectacular

Before any successful pacification campaign, regardless of its name and theme, can be launched in a rural community the people must first be assured of relative security from Communist oppression and terror attack. The progress made in rural development in the past three years has been in direct ratio to the progress made in improving security conditions in the countryside. In the wake of the Communists' 1968 Tet offensive the Saigon government could assure relative security for less than 60 per cent of the country.

Today more than 95 per cent of the people live in communities rated either relatively secure, secure, or completely pacified. In Military Region III, for instance, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army in mid-1968 controlled the majority of the population in the 11 provinces surrounding Saigon. Today they control not one of the 3,475 hamlets in this crucial region.

To the south, in the rich Mekong Delta, the war is not yet over for all of its 6,3 million inhabitants. But security is growing so fast that the highest ranking U.S. civilian there two months ago predicted that 1972 should see all of Military Region IV without any hamlets under Communist control. "By the end of this year," said John Paul Vann, then the MR IV deputy for CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support), "all of the hamlets in the Delta will be at least relatively secure."

Kien Hoa, a Delta province 110 kilometers south of Saigon, remains a trouble spot, but the enemy is obviously on his way out. Last October President Nguyen Van Thieu stopped for lunch at the seaside village of An Thanh, in the province's remote Mo Cay district at the Mekong's mouth. This was no minor news item for the society pages, because Mo Cay is no resort; at that time the district still saw the Viet Cong in control of 25 per cent of the population.

Coming Back to Life

An Thanh itself until a few months earlier had been known to the local people as "Viet Cong Market." But then came its pacification, with central and provincial government personnel and resources moving into the village in the wake of the troops to help the people rebuild their lives — people who had known Viet Cong or Viet Minh control ever since the end of World War II.

President Thieu walked the lanes of An Thanh, stopping to talk to many of the people. He saw the new electric generator installed near the village square, the newly completed eight-bed maternity clinic, the fish market under construction, the bustling traffic on the road, and he listened as the people told him of the revival of trade and the prosperity they were beginning to taste for the first time.

They told him that with the crushing of local Viet Cong guerrilla bands and the rooting out of the

VCI — the Viet Cong "infrastructure," the cadres who had exercised administrative control by terror, confiscatory taxation and forcible recruitment of young and old for guerrilla and labor battalions — An Thanh was coming back to life. Many of the former residents who had fled to government-controlled areas were returning; they were refloating their fishing skiffs and bringing their fallow fields back into production.

Committees of villagers were mapping new self-help projects, the people supplying the manpower and the government the materials. They were recruiting youths and over-draft-age men, as well as females of all ages, for their own unpaid People's Self-Defense Forces, arming them with World War II carbines, M-1 rifles and a few shotguns to insure that the Viet Cong did not try to reinfiltate their village. And they were preparing for the first time to elect their own officials.

Thus President Thieu found in An Thanh another opportunity to see at the grassroots the forces at work that can culminate in the three objectives of the 1971 campaign: local self-defense, self-government and self-development. After decades of Communist domination the people of An Thanh may not be self-reliant yet, but they have taken the road that leads to *tu cuong*.

Freeing the Delta

Speaking of Kien Hoa, the province's deputy chief, Tran Huynh Chau, explained: "Before the Communists' Tet offensive in 1968, at least 60 per cent of the population in this province supported the Viet Cong. But the Communists broke their promise: they violated the cease-fire for the Tet holiday season that they themselves had proclaimed. They have been losing the trust of the people ever since.

Now more than 80 per cent of the population is under government control." Chau agrees with Vann that by 1972 the last of Kien Hoa's Viet Cong-controlled hamlets should be freed — and be rated at least relatively secure.

A determined campaign by the ARVN, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, is crushing the remnants of organized Communist military rule in the U Minh Forest to the south, one of the Viet Cong's last sanctuaries.

Elsewhere in the Delta a village recently was overrun by the VC and a relief column ambushed; there are occasional guerrilla sorties against hamlets, several militia outposts have been overrun, and the VCI has not been completely eliminated. But the growing prosperity of the farmers and the strengthening of government and local armed forces, including the People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF), have made Viet Cong control of the Delta a lost dream.



Peoples Self-Defense Forces member on duty in hamlet.

“The Viet Cong,” says Vann, “have become associated in the people’s minds with hardship and sacrifices. The Saigon government has become associated with military security and the inflow of economic resources. Ideologically, both sides have small support. The people would rather be left alone to pursue their lives.

The result of this ideological disinterest is that the one who controls the population is the one who is stronger. This one is the side that has the guns.” When the people themselves take up guns to protect themselves against the VC, as they are doing in PSDF units throughout the country, they are making an irrevocable commitment to the side most likely to give them a better life.

Major Problem for Enemy

The Communists concede that for them the rice-rich Delta, long considered the “prize” of the war, is a major problem area. A document captured in March 1970 and attributed to General Hoang Van Thai of the North Vietnamese Army states :

“We must admit that the enemy was partially successful in his pacification scheme in the Delta through his capabilities of expanding his sphere of control over the population and the land and of reducing friendly liberated (i.e., VC-controlled) areas. Communist political and military activities in the Mekong River Delta decreased, and the people’s confidence concerning the revolution became weaker.”

A year later, in March 1971, President Thieu estimated that throughout the Delta the Viet Cong controlled only 6, 700 people and 19 hamlets. Even more impressive than statistics, however, is the evidence of pacification’s success as seen by the traveler.

In the Delta, as in the great majority of the nation’s districts, roads once used only by heavily armed military convoys are now traveled by a wide variety of vehicles : tri-lambretta scooters and trucks taking produce to market, civilian buses, passenger cars, and the ubiquitous Honda motorbikes.

It is now possible to drive from Dong Ha, near the Demilitarized Zone in MR I, all the way to Ca Mau at Vietnam’s southern tip in MR IV. In villages the roads pass through, the people are turning from building bunkers to building new markets, fish ponds and schools.

Barbed wire is being removed from pacified hamlets as the infiltration threat wanes. Private investors are expressing their confidence in the security provisions and in the future by building new plants in the provinces.

Self - Defense

While this great increase in national security since 1968 can be attributed in large part to the battlefield successes of the major military units, both Vietnamese and allied, the Saigon government is convinced that national security will continue to grow only if much of the burden is shifted to local forces, only if the first of the 1971 campaign’s objectives, local self-defense, is achieved on a nationwide scale.

Major operations on and beyond the country’s borders with Cambodia and Laos have seriously crippled the ability of the Communists to regain military strength within South Vietnam. With their Cambodian sanctuaries disrupted and their Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos partially severed, the Communists have proved incapable of launching large-scale offensives. These factors, combined with massive recruitment campaigns by all Republic of Vietnam armed services since mid-1967 and a stepped-up training and re-equipping operation under the Vietnamization program, have changed the missions and the roles of Saigon’s security forces throughout the republic.

The regular ARVN units have been freed from territorial defense to operate offensively against main-force Communist units remaining in Vietnam and those operating in Cambodia and Laos. Much of



An Thanh youth buys a morning snack at new market place in village, formerly thoroughly dominated by Communists.

the credit for the increased security that has enabled ARVN to assume the offensive role must go to the territorial forces — the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces, many retrained and all re-equipped.

These troops total more than half the strength of the RVNAF, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. They account for half the enemy killed, and are principally responsible for providing the local security that makes pacification possible.

RF Troops Prove Worth

The soldiers of the RF, recruited and fighting in their home provinces, and the men of the PF, recruited in their home villages for defense of their villages, have shown time and again that they are capable of holding their own against the enemy, including his regular, main-force units.

The RF/PF troops no longer are limited to static defense assignments because local security responsibilities have been assumed more and more by the PSDF units in the wards of crowded cities and the hamlets of rural villages.

In May 1971, according to Le Cong Chat, Vice Minister of the Interior, there were more than four million PSDF members divided into two groups, one group of 1,400,000 responsible for combat assignments and the other group in support roles.

The combatants guarding nearly 4,500 hamlets and wards have been armed with 600,000 individual weapons, rotating them one to the other as the guard changes at their posts. More than 75 per cent of the members have been trained so far.

Emphasis in the latter half of 1971 will turn from recruiting new members to the upgrading of the quality of PSDF units through retraining and re-equipping programs. And the role of the PSDF members will be expanded. In addition to defending their homes, they will be trained to collect information on the VCI, help with local development projects and organize community gatherings.

"The importance of the PSDF cannot be over-emphasized," says a Thua Thien pacification worker. "They now provide the primary defense in the local communities and they are a strong, viable force uniting the people against the enemy. They have a vested interest in the success of pacification and the survival of their government, because in taking up arms against the Communists they made their commitment."

Pacification Cadres

Since the beginning of the pacification program the men responsible for much of the work of expanding self-defense, self-government and self-development in the hamlets have been the cadres sent throughout the country by the Ministry of Rural Development. These RD cadres — trained under the famed revolutionary philosopher, strategist and soldier, Colonel Nguyen Be, at the Vung Tau Training Center — assist the hamlet people in organizing their local defense forces, in preparing for elections and in launching self-help projects.

Originally, when they were grouped in 59-man teams, the lightly armed RD cadres used to take over responsibility for perimeter defense when they moved into a hamlet. Now that work is done by the PSDF. It was the RD cadres who did much of the early training of PSDF members. Currently they share the training mission with whatever military forces may be deployed near a pacified hamlet — ARVN, RF or PF.

Uniformed in black pajamas, the RD cadres for years acted as the paramilitary forces closest to the grassroots; nearly 3,000 of them lost their lives in clashes with the Viet Cong from 1966 through 1969. But with increased security around the country they have worked themselves out of their defense role. As one official explains the change:

"Rural development cadres are not the 59-man, self-contained teams they were at one time. Now the cadres are broken down into 10-man groups working under the operational control of the village chief. Under this leadership the 10-man groups assist the village and hamlet administrative committees to carry out programs aimed at the three national goals: local self-defense, self-government and self-development."

RD Cadres' Help

The RD cadres also contribute their talents to the *Phung Hoang* program to root out the VCI. Under *Phung Hoang*, intelligence data on VCI activities and personnel are fed into district coordinating centers by the RD cadres, by military sources, by the police and often by the people themselves.

When, for instance, a number of independent sources pinpoint a man as an underground "tax" collector for the Viet Cong, he is arrested if accessible, or his description is circulated so police forces can apprehend him. "Neutralizing" the VCI is the job of the police, military, paramilitary, intelligence, propaganda and civic forces cooperating in *Phung Hoang*.

A VCI cadre is neutralized by being persuaded to come over to the government's side, by being



Former Viet Cong soldiers learn to be mechanics at center.

Emphasis laid on rooting out VCI cadres

captured and sentenced to jail, either by a military court or a provincial committee, or by being killed if he attempts to fight his way out when arrest looms. But because the success of *Phung Hoang* is based on the efficient collection and correlation of intelligence data, every effort is made not to kill a VCI cadre; he is more valuable alive as a source of information.

In a typical month (April 1971) *Phung Hoang* centers in all provinces reported 1,958 VCI neutralized, including 816 killed, 541 defecting to the Saigon government's side and 601 given court sentences. Roughly 71,000 VCI have been neutralized since the *Phung Hoang* program was started in 1967, according to President Thieu, but officials estimate there still are more than 63,000 at large in the country, most of them replacements for neutralized VCI. Of them, 34,864 had been identified by name and position as of November 1970.

Police Role

Increasing security also has changed and expanded the role of the National Police. Collecting information on the VCI remains a significant responsibility, but in addition the police are being deployed increasingly in rural areas to perform regular village police work. By February 1971 more than 11,800 policemen had been assigned to 1,800 villages, but the ordinary crime rate in Vietnamese villages traditionally has been low.

The work load remains heavy in the cities as war veterans, student groups and religious factions continue to express dissent via public demonstrations. In Saigon and Qui Nhon recently, quick and effective police action quelled disturbances before violence spread.

Police administration is improving. A new system has been introduced to keep track of persons from the time of arrest through processing, transfer, prosecution and sentencing or release. An accelerated program brought the number of Vietnamese over 15 registered for identification cards to nearly 7,600,000 by March 1971.

One of the biggest problems of the National Police has been recruiting enough qualified personnel. Because the highest priority still is assigned to military recruitment, the police have received a number of relatively uneducated recruits. The recent transfer of 50 field-grade officers from the ARVN to the National Police introduced some new leadership which is expected to improve recruit training. By the end of 1971 total National Police strength should exceed 122,000.

For the remainder of the year the police will put special emphasis on their efforts to identify and root out VCI cadres where they still operate. Provinces known to have the highest numbers of un surfaced VCI will have additional policemen assigned



At community meetings like this the people determine what self-help projects they need; government provides aid.

to them. In some areas descriptions of known VCI cadres will be posted in village markets in an effort to enlist public support in tracking them down.

"Open Arms" Program

Also important to the pacification campaign is the *Chieu Hoi* or "Open Arms" program launched in 1963 to encourage the VC and VCI to turn their backs on Communism and rally to the side of the Saigon government. Air-dropped leaflets, showered by the millions, are the principal carriers of the surrender appeal. Besides reducing enemy ranks, the program provides valuable intelligence information.

Up to the end of 1970, a total of 173,064 *Hoi Chanh* (returnees) had defected to the GVN, the government of the Republic of Vietnam. The peak year was 1969 when 47,023 Viet Cong changed sides. The fighting slacked off in 1970, reducing opportunities for potential *Hoi Chanh* to rally, and the year's total dropped to 32,661. During 1971, 10,524 *Hoi Chanh* had turned themselves in by mid-June, bringing the program's cumulative total to 183,588.

Once an enemy soldier or political cadre has rallied to the government's side, he is reoriented politically and socially so he can re-enter the mainstream of the nation's life. Normally the *Hoi Chanh* stays at the local *Chieu Hoi* center for two months after defecting. There, following an indoctrination course, he is retrained in agricultural skills or learns a trade.

After the *Hoi Chanh* leave the center, half of them go into the military or paramilitary services of the Saigon government. Others work at their new trades in the cities. Many, particularly those

beyond draft age, are resettled in *Chieu Hoi* hamlets of their own where the government assists them in becoming self-supporting.

The *Chieu Hoi* Ministry reported that by May 1971 there were 39 such resettlement hamlets exclusively for *Hoi Chanh* and their families. With no more than 500 in each hamlet, so far 17,280 persons have been resettled, taking ownership of 3,865 housing units. Each hamlet also includes an administration office, a dispensary, a conference hall and a primary school.

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Local Self - Government

The trend in most countries at war is to curtail civil liberties and build strong, centralized governments to insure mobilization, production and financing. But in Vietnam the central government, as a matter of policy dating back several years, has been engaged in a program to restore self-government to the villages.

The ancient tradition of local self-rule, handed down dynasty after dynasty and interrupted only during the reign of President Ngo Dinh Diem, was revived by Decree No. 198 on December 24, 1966. Village councils were given increased authority over budgets, taxes, land transfers, public services and internal legal matters.

The councils were given the right to make decisions in more than a dozen civic areas ranging from school construction to the management of local markets. Officials at higher echelons of government no longer were permitted to tap village budgets or divert local taxes to defray district or provincial expenses.

The powers of local officials were strengthened even further on April 1, 1969, when Decree No. 45 made village councils responsible not only for civil matters but for control of the local Popular Forces platoons, RD teams and the PSDF.

An important part of pacification is the holding of village and hamlet elections when the security situation and internal administration permit. By the end of 1970 only 31 out of 2,151 villages had failed to meet security and other pacification program requirements; all the rest had elected local governments of their own. By 1972 all villages should have held elections.

In 1970 elections also were held to choose members of city councils and provincial councils as the decentralization campaign developed. District con-

stituencies were established at the same time to insure that all areas would be represented in future elections.

Measure of Confidence

One measure of the confidence villagers put in their local leaders was evident in the 1970 elections in some 1,000 villages and 3,760 hamlets. About half of the incumbents were re-elected.

"There seems to be a trend away from the mandarin tradition of choosing elders as village leaders," says a political observer. "Although most of those elected were elder men, there is an increasing number of younger, more progressive men being chosen for office. A number of local militia and RD cadres, and even a few women, were elected to village and provincial councils.

The people are giving recognition to neighbors within the confines of their own villages who have demonstrated an ability and a willingness to serve as public officials. No longer do they look to the landed gentry for instructions on whom to vote for."

With so many new officials in local posts, the greatest emphasis during the remainder of the 1971 campaign will be on improving their effectiveness so the villages can become self-governing in all fields: public administration, economic development, and financial self-sufficiency.

Newly elected officials attend a basic training class at either the National Training Center in Vung Tau or — if they are serving in Montagnard tribal areas — at the National Training Center in Pleiku. (The highlands center at Pleiku teaches the same courses as the Vung Tau center, with slight modifications to meet local conditions, but instruction is in the tribal dialects rather than in Vietnamese.)

Striking Growth

The sprawling center at Vung Tau, located on the coast of the South China Sea some 60 kilometers southeast of Saigon, reflects the striking growth in the role of local government. When Nguyen Be, then a major who had pioneered the principles of revolutionary development as Binh Dinh's deputy province chief, founded the center in 1966, its sole function was to train RD cadres.

They are still trained there, but now the largest number of students are village and hamlet leaders. In 1970 some 4,000 such officials attended courses at Vung Tau. They learned how to organize farmers' cooperatives, to advance mechanization of agriculture, to develop rural electrification and to make the most of government support programs in farm credit and village self-development.

They learned to develop administrative skills in managing village budgets, assessing taxes and registering land for distribution under the land reform program. Along with the RD cadres in training, they listened to lectures on nationalism, community spirit, the organization of hamlets to enable them to resist Viet Cong incursions, improvement of local education and the teaching of hygiene and hamlet sanitation.



Back roads like this one in Thua Thien are kept in repair by the local people, aided by government equipment.

At Vung Tau during 1971 there will be nine one-month courses organized primarily for village and hamlet chiefs. Each class of 500 will learn about budgets, taxation and public information. Two-week courses also will be held for village commissioners in principles of social welfare and cultural development.

At provincial capitals, meanwhile, there will be additional training for 50,000 minor officials and refresher training in general administration. Province and district chiefs also are required now to travel to the villages and hamlets periodically to give on-the-job training to local officials.

Tax Collection

With the villages now responsible for collecting and spending more of the taxes levied on their citizens, officials estimate that by the end of the 1971 program some 200 villages should be completely self-sufficient financially. An additional 300 should be 50 per cent self-supporting and 500 should be capable of meeting 25 per cent of their budgets.

Tax collection is getting new emphasis this year. The Directorate of Taxation in Saigon conducted a national survey in 1970 to identify all who should be carried on the tax rolls and more intensive audits are being conducted to pinpoint evaders. As a result, the tax collection rate is improving: in 1966 some 12,200 million piasters were collected, in 1968 about 19,300 million, and in 1970, 37,300 million.² These levies included registration, excise, indirect and direct taxes.

Self - Development

The third of the three 1971 objectives, local self-development, affects the most people, calls for the largest outlay of financial, material and personnel support, and includes the greatest number of projects. Aimed at improving the people's living standards, the program encompasses virtually all facets of Vietnamese life from agricultural development to public health, education, refugee resettlement, veterans' affairs, highway improvement and many other fields. Within this portion of the campaign the programs currently receiving the most attention are land reform and village self-development.

The land reform program, which has been implemented on and off during the past 15 years, was given new life last year when the Land to the Tiller Act was signed on March 26 authorizing the distribution of more than one million hectares of land to some 800,000 landless farmers.

Privately owned land is deeded to the actual tillers, with the previous owners being compensated by the GVN. This program, when completed, should reduce to zero the percentage of land tenancy, which now is about 60 per cent. Past agrarian reform programs resulted in the distribution of only about 412,000 hectares to 178,200 farmers.

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they worked — an estimated 120,000 hectares. During the 1971 phase 400,000 hectares are scheduled to be distributed. The pace of distribution is being stepped up as more village land registrars and agricultural commissioners are trained at Vung Tau.

Automated data processing of land titles and registers also has speeded up land distribution, first started in August 1970, as well as the compensation of former landlords. Within the next decade some six million Vietnamese — farmers and their dependents — will benefit from this program.

VSD Program

The Village Self-Development Program (VSD), launched in 1969 but in actuality a continuation and an expansion of basic revolutionary development principles followed since 1965, has been defined as a "process by which the efforts of the rural people are united with the government to improve the political, economic and social conditions of the rural communities and to enable the people to fully contribute to national progress."

VSD stresses community initiative and active participation of the people. Since 1969 increasingly more responsibility has been given to village authorities and the villagers themselves to determine their own communal needs and how best to meet them. Since 1970 the villages undertaking VSD projects have been required to match the central government's input of resources with cash, labor or local materials, except in cases where an equal contribution would pose an unusual hardship for the people.

In selecting self-help projects, the villagers have a wide choice. Smaller projects — those costing up to 200,000 piasters and requiring no approval higher than the village council's — have included digging wells, building small bridges and erecting public sanitary facilities, first aid stations, maternity clinics and fish ponds. Large projects — costing more than 200,000 piasters and usually requiring provincial-level approval — have included the building of schools, dams, markets and hospital facilities.

In Phu Khuong district of Tay Ninh province, for instance, the villagers began the program in 1969 with chicken and pig raising projects. The next year they launched a group project that saw the purchase of a tractor, not only for the use of the villagers in the group but for rental to other farmers. This year the people are working on plans for the construction of ice plants and other small industries in what until now has been a completely rural district.

Cooperative Groups

All provinces have sponsored the organization of cooperative groups like these, called People's Common Activity Groups (PCAGs). A PCAG in Ba Xuyen province used VSD funds plus their own contributions to buy an electric generator.

A PCAG in northern Quang Nam province used 26,000 piasters from its VSD fund to help buy a fishing boat and net. A few months later the group had

made sufficient profit to buy another motorized craft, another net and some sophisticated fishing equipment. Members of this co-op now get regular dividends in the form of fish and cash.

Now the VSD program is moving in a new direction. While maintaining most of the guidelines of the 1969 and 1970 programs, this year it is adding a Rural Development Credit Program to spur the organization of communal income-producing projects. Placing income-producing projects on a loan basis, instead of the grant basis still used for the so-called "public use projects," is another step toward the goal of self-reliance.

To get this phase of the program started, all villages will be given an initial fund of 400,000 piasters. Villages with populations exceeding 2,500 will receive an additional 50,000 piasters for every 500 people.

All of these funds may be used for public use projects, such as the construction of a school. But at the discretion of the village council, up to half of these funds may be utilized in income-producing projects, such as the purchase or construction of a rice mill. Since all income-producing projects now are financed on a loan basis, the projects must be cleared through the village's credit committee.

The government has called on various banking corporations to join in the VSD effort. Most prominent in this field is the government-controlled Agricultural Development Bank. Last year the ADB granted loans totaling 5,700 million piasters. This year the total is expected to reach a record 8,900 million piasters. Besides the ADB, a system of rural banks has started operations. There are now six such banks, organized by private groups of loan people but backed by government assistance. In the remainder of 1971 a number of new rural banks will open their doors, and the effort will be encouraged until the nation can count at least 200 such ventures.

Distressed Groups

The pacification campaign's efforts to improve the livelihood of the Vietnamese people include special measures for distressed groups: disabled veterans, orphans and refugees, for example. As of April 1971 the Ministry of War Veterans was paying pensions to 75,700 discharged veterans and 483,390 dependents of dead servicemen, while another 45,000 pension claims were being processed.

All of the veterans except 28,200 retired as over age were suffering from disabilities ranging from 10 to 100 per cent. Physical rehabilitation is provided for them at modern centers in Saigon, Da Nang, Can Tho and Qui Nhon. Vocational rehabilitation — learning new trades or brushing up on pre-war skills — is offered at government schools at Cat Lai and Da Nang. But the veterans' greatest need is housing, and the government has started construction of a scheduled 12,000 housing units for disabled veterans and their families.

The national rehabilitation centers have taken care of the veterans' needs for therapy so well that

Trend of development campaign encouraging

today the majority of patients are civilians. In addition, the Ministry of Social Welfare has a compensation program for civilians who have suffered injury, the loss of a family member or damage to their homes as a result of military operations. Since the program began in 1968 more than 1,300,000 claimants have been paid benefits.

During 1970 the number of orphanages registered with the Ministry of Social Welfare totaled 116 with a population of some 20,000 children, of whom 40 per cent had lost both their parents. An undetermined number of orphans were not being cared for in public institutions; most of them were believed living with friends or relatives, or were being sheltered in unregistered orphanages. The nation also has 104 registered day-care centers providing for another 11,000 children.

Encouraging Trend

One of the most encouraging trends in Vietnam today is the return of large numbers of war refugees to their original homes as security improves. Since the government started paying subsistence and housing construction allowances in November 1968, more than 577,000 refugees have returned to their villages and have received all of their allowances. This trend is significant, and officials consider it a sure index of the success of pacification throughout the country.

Relatively few new refugees were being "generated" by the fighting early in 1970, but beginning in April the first of some 200,000 ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia sought refuge in South Vietnam.

In a well executed program, almost all of these repatriates were rapidly processed in reception centers. Some 150,000 were provided with piaster allowances to assist them in integrating themselves into the national society, and 30,000 chose to become settlers in a government-sponsored resettlement program.

About 250,000 refugees are currently on the rolls of the Ministry of Social Welfare, but it is hoped the majority will be returning to their original communities before the end of the 1971 program.

Economic Progress

The success of the refugee program's "Return to the Village" campaign has helped increase harvests, because lands that had lain fallow while their owners were in refugee camps or temporary housing now have been brought back into production. The government's goals include doubling agricultural production within the next decade and increasing the income of the farmer by at least 35 per cent.

Last year acreage planted to rice rose to 2,430,000 hectares and produced 5,100,000 tons, compared with 4,700,000 tons the previous year from 2,300,000

hectares. This year the planners hope to increase production to 5,800,000 tons, nearly one-quarter of it from newly developed "miracle rice" strains that provide up to twice as much grain per hectare as traditional strains.

Vietnam has had to import rice since 1964, but it appears that there will be no need for such imports in 1972, and the nation once again will be self-sufficient in rice.

Training of farmers in improved rice-growing techniques has been an integral part of the accelerated program. At the National Rice Production Training Center in Bien Hoa province, cadres and technicians who will be going out into the provinces to work with the farmers are receiving intensive four-to six-month training courses. There are also local programs to train farmers, and demonstration plots have been set up in villages and hamlets.

Other measures taken to assist the farmer include the importation of increasing amounts of fertilizer, the provision of low-interest farm loans, the distribution of mechanized agricultural equipment and the increased use of pesticides.

A crop diversification program is well advanced. A feed grains program was started in late 1969 with corn and sorghum. Vegetable production is increasing. Other crops, such as fruits and sugar cane, are good possibilities for widening the base of Vietnam's agricultural economy and getting away from over-dependence on rice.

Fishing is the second main source of income and fish products are the second most popular food item purchased in Vietnam's markets. The government for some time has been encouraging fishermen to modernize their equipment, using nylon nets and motorizing more of the fleet. The fish catch has been steadily increasing, but distribution remains a problem because fish is a highly perishable commodity.

In 1971 four cities — Da Nang, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon and Saigon — will be granted loans to build cold storage facilities and ice-making machines to facilitate storage of local catches and thus to stabilize the supply on the market.

Health and Education

With improved security and gradually increasing rural prosperity, more attention can be paid to the people's health and education. Public health programs are directed at increasing the quantity and quality of medical attention available to the people, encouraging local sanitation and personal hygiene campaigns, and developing prevention and control programs in communicable diseases.

With increased security throughout the nation the medical care program is able to reach a greater number of patients than ever before. Admissions to all Ministry of Health hospitals rose from 526,000 in

1969 to more than 570,000 in 1970. The assignment of Ministry of Defense medical personnel to Ministry of Health hospitals accounted for much of the capability to handle the extra work load.

The number of Vietnamese physicians staffing the 26 provincial hospitals participating in the combined program increased from 40 in 1969 to 137 in 1970, and now the program is being extended to the 17 other provincial hospitals in the country. A total of 3,700 medical personnel from the Ministry of Defense — doctors, nurses, technicians, etc. — were assigned to provincial hospitals and district health services in 1970, almost doubling the number available for civilian care.

Also easing the critical lack of trained physicians in Vietnam is an increase in the number of graduates from Saigon University's medical faculty, now averaging more than 200 a year. Vietnam has one physician for every 10,000 people. The goal over the next 10 years is to provide one for every 5,000. (In comparison, the ratio in the United States is one to 800.)

“Sanitary Hamlets”

In each province this year three model “sanitary hamlets” are being established. “In the latter part of 1969,” says a health worker, “the sanitary hamlet program had its beginning in Tay Ninh province. In Long Qui hamlet a project coordinated by provincial health officials was begun to clean up the hamlet by improving drainage, installing water-sealed latrines in each home and digging wells with sides and base capped in cement.

Much of the credit for this pioneer sanitary hamlet must go to the RD and health cadres who worked with the people for weeks, explaining the need for improving sanitation and instructing them in the construction of latrines.

Seeing the results of this project, Tay Ninh officials sponsored another, and now the province has four sanitary hamlets. They act as models, as pilot projects, and people from surrounding hamlets are copying the measures taken in the sanitary hamlets.”

In primary and secondary education, the mass enrollment goals set for the decade of the 1960s were well exceeded. Twenty-five per cent of all youths in the high school age group are enrolled in the nation's 780 secondary schools, which this year turned out about 18,000 graduates. Eighty-two per cent of all children between six and 11 years of age are enrolled in primary schools. Universities are still short of their goals, but they currently enroll some 50,000 students on seven campuses, and enrollment may top 100,000 within the next three to five years if campus space and faculty shortages can be alleviated. So emphasis is switching from increasing enrollment to improving the quality of education.

12-Grade System

A pilot system of comprehensive education has been started. All public schools are adopting a continuous 12-grade system which is doing much to decrease the number of dropouts that were so fre-

quent when the system was divided into three separate segments: primary, junior high and secondary schools.

Now the transition from primary to junior high schools and from junior to senior high schools is not so marked; there is continuity in learning, and students are more encouraged to go on to higher grades.

In a move towards more decentralization in education, 14 regional sectors were established and their officials were given the power to make most decisions on curricula and teaching methods at the regional rather than the central government level. This permits adaptation of curricula to meet local students' needs, making education more practical and less theoretical.

With the broadening of Vietnam's educational base the planners are paying more attention to another pressing need — a developing economy's requirements for skilled workers. In the remainder of the 1971 program the emphasis will be on improving technical and vocational education. Veterans and refugees will be given priority in enrolling in existing facilities.

New technical schools will be built in An Giang, Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, Vinh Long and Phong Dinh provinces, increasing enrollment in technical schools, public and private, from 52,000 to 62,000 by the end of 1971.

The Future

Much remains to be done in the pacification program — in the hamlets and villages, in the cities, and in the economic and transport infrastructure knitting them all together. Improvement of public works is a constant, on-going campaign.


Major General Cao Hao Hon, chief of the Coordinating Center of the Central Pacification and Development Council, the GVN's agency overseeing pacification, stresses the vital role that the road and bridge-building program plays in pacification, among other public works efforts. Building roads and bridges “extends the lines of communication between the producer and the consumer, the government and the people, among government agencies, and among various communities,” he says.

By the end of 1970 some 2,282 kilometers of highway — approximately 56 per cent of the primary road system — had been reconstructed or upgraded.

In 1971 much of the reconstruction work is being done on a self-help basis with the goal of repairing an additional 3,200 kilometers of national and inter-provincial roads. More than half of the 1,240 kilometers of the railroad's main and branch lines are now operational. In 1970 the railroad carried 720,000 metric tons of cargo, an increase of 35 per cent over 1969, plus 2,400,000 passengers, a 40 per cent increase. Other goals of the 1971 campaign include:

- * Raising Saigon's electricity output by 50 per cent and the provinces' output by 100 per cent;

- * Supporting the formation of more rural electrification cooperatives similar to the three pilot projects presently operating;



Binh Dinh hamlet people build a bridge. The government gave 100,000 piasters which was matched by people.

* Increasing the supply of drinking water, particularly for 100,000 inhabitants of Saigon and 300,000 in the provinces now receiving insufficient potable water;

* Encouraging the formation of a privately owned public transportation system to take the place of the bankrupt Saigon municipal bus company.

While pacification generally is thought of as a campaign with its roots in the rural countryside, it has been extended to urban areas as a matter of necessity, for some 40 per cent of the nation's population now lives in the cities.

Autonomous Cities

A long-range urban development program is part of pacification because studies have shown that the majority of those who moved to the cities as a result of rural insecurity have no intention of returning to their villages when hostilities cease. Many of these people are living in crowded urban slums, where the crime rate is rising and where traffic, particularly in Saigon, is a major problem.

So they may qualify for special programs and so the policy of governmental decentralization can

benefit urban as well as rural areas, the number of autonomous cities recently has been increased. To the original autonomous cities of Saigon, Hue, Cam Ranh, Dalat, Vung Tau and Da Nang have now been added Qui Nhon, Can Tho, My Tho, Nha Trang and Rach Gia.

In addition, some large population centers are being designated as "urban villages." In order to qualify as an urban village, the community's population must be over 20,000, the local economy must be based on commercial and industrial activities, and most of the inhabitants must be salaried rather than earning their incomes from agricultural production.

"Because urban populations obviously have different needs than the rural population, the expansion of the number of autonomous cities and the creation of urban villages will facilitate more logical development planning for these areas," says a pacification official.

Short-range goals in urban planning include preparing zoning maps, improving traffic circulation, increasing the scope of public utilities, building housing units and boosting tax receipts so the cities can become more self-supporting. Thus will the goal of *tu cuong* be achieved in the cities as well as the countryside.

Ranking red defector tells why

Enemy losing the war

By MAI VAN SO

My name is Mai Van So. I have a twin brother named Mai Van Bo. Many of you may have heard of my twin brother, Bo, as he was the North Vietnamese General Representative in France for nine years from 1961 until late December 1970 when he was recalled to Hanoi and replaced in Paris by another cadre.

My brother Bo and I were born on July 1918 in Trung Nhut Village, Thot Not District, Long Xuyen Province, South Vietnam. We have three brothers and one sister still living in Long Xuyen Province. I am married, have two daughters, and I can speak some English and French. Bo and I went to primary school together, and in 1933 we obtained our CEPCI degree (French primary school). At this time our family could not afford the costs for both my twin brother and me to continue our education, so with Bo's agreement, I (as the younger brother by a few minutes) quit school and went to work in order to support Bo's education. This I did from 1934-1945. We realized the value of education, but it was agreed that I would sacrifice mine in order that Bo could further his. Then, in later years, when Bo had become successful, he would be able to repay me for my sacrifice. This, however, was not to be.

Rise in Red Ranks

I will tell you more about my brother Bo in a few minutes, but I would like first to give you a quick outline of my own rise and experience in the Communist ranks.

When the revolution started in August 1945, I moved from Saigon to Can Tho where I joined the Viet Minh Front and was assigned to a munitions workshop. My

technical skills were quickly noted by my Communist superiors, and I assisted in forming munitions workshop and trained many technical cadres. By late 1949 I had been promoted to the rank of deputy battalion commander. During May 1950, I became an official member of the Communist Party. My last position with the Viet Minh was as Deputy Battalion Commander, Assistant Chief of the Thu Bien Munitions Workshop (Thu Bien, Thu Dau Mot and Bien Hoa Provinces), a position I held from 1952 to 1954.

Ordered to Stay

After the Geneva accords of 1954, I was ordered by the Party to stay in South Vietnam rather than regrouping to North Vietnam, and instructed to establish myself as a legal agent in Saigon where I would be contacted later by the Party. In Saigon, I worked as a plumber for the Nguyen Van Thieu Foundry on Phan Dinh Phung Street, but as soon as I had saved enough money I opened my own factory. This factory was called "Viet Hung" and it specialized in castings for sports equipment and also in dies for making bricks and water pipes. My business was very successful, and I quickly became very rich. I completely stopped working for the Party.

Suddenly, in January 1960, I received a letter from Huynh Tan Phat to return to the secret zone. The letter said that the Party needed my skills to produce weapons and ammunition. At this time, enjoying my newly-acquired wealth, I stalled, saying I could not go right away. However, after receiving another letter from Phat,

which threatened me with Party disciplinary measures, I went to the secret zone in August 1960.

Actually, I was very discouraged with the terrorism and compulsory labor methods used by the Communists who disregarded completely my personal opinion or situation. There I met Tam Dao, who was at that time Commander of the Saigon-Cholon Military Region and a member of the Region Party Committee. In February 1961 I attended the presentation ceremony of the Liberation Front of the Saigon-Cholon Region where I met Huynh Tan Phat. Phat was a close friend and schoolmate of my twin brother Bo, and I had known Phat before and during the Viet Minh Resistance. Phat had me promoted to chief of the C-31 machine shop. In early 1964 I was transferred and became chief of the Ordnance Section of the Saigon-Cholon Regional Rear Services Office. In November 1966, I was promoted to the rank of Battalion Commander.

In February 1967, I became very sick and spent the next fifteen months in various Communist hospitals and on convalescence leave. When I returned to duty in May 1968, I was appointed Deputy Chief for Administration of Subregion 1 Rear Services Office. But I quickly got an operational assignment to establish myself as a legal agent, buying medical supplies from smugglers from Saigon.

This operation was successful until May 1969 when I was robbed of about VN\$950,000 which I was supposed to use to buy medical supplies for the next month. I reported the theft and was immediately ordered to stop my operation while the Rear Services Office carried out an investigation.



... I no longer believe in the ultimate victory of the Party.

The thieves were later found and the money returned. However, I was disgusted with my life and with the Party, and I simply moved to another area and made no further contact with my unit.

I had intended to rally, but before I could do so I was captured on 10 December 1969, during an operation of the U.S. 25th Division. Soon after, at my request, I was granted rallier status by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Reds Losing War

The Party had criticized me for becoming a capitalistic property owner and an exploiter of the proletariat while in Saigon from 1954 to 1960. Also, the Party obviously did not fully trust the SVN cadres

and so permitted young, lower-ranking North Vietnamese Party cadres to supervise and give orders to the SVN cadres. The Party spoiled individual initiative by trying to make everyone a machine that would blindly follow Party orders.

Probably the most important reason why I stopped working for the Communists was that I could no longer believe in the ultimate victory of the Party. Instead, I could see that the Communists were already losing the war, especially after the defeats of the Party during the Mau Than Tet offensive.

This view was generally held by almost all cadres and soldiers in the Communist ranks; most of them became angry at the Party's tactics of uselessly sacrificing

troops. For these reasons, the morale of the VC troops has declined to the lowest point.

My Brother Bo

Now that I have given you a brief idea of my life, I would like to return to the subject of my brother, Mai Van Bo.

While in North Vietnam studying medicine from 1940-1945 my brother became a political activist. He gave up his medical studies in 1945 and returned to SVN where he ran the Vanguard Youth Group and also became a leader and founder of the New Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP and some of the other political parties that time outwardly professed many admirable goals such as freedom, democracy, social reform, and independence, but actually they were either a part of the Viet Minh Front or quickly became dominated by the Communists.

I know that my brother Bo, as an intellectual influenced by western civilization, joined the revolution only to struggle for freedom, independence, and to bring a good life to people. He never supported the cruelty symbolized by the Communist revolution. With his noble concepts, I believe he was not a committed Communist at that time, or even when he went back to North Vietnam in 1952.

However, my brother, like many other intellectuals and political leaders, was deceived by Communist lies and schemes and that is why he joined the Party. Of course once you have joined, the Party has you forever, unless you are purged or are willing to risk your life to break away from the Party. I think my brother has been used and manipulated by the Communists.

The Communists obtained my brother's cooperation by giving him high positions and favored treatment, the same way that other revolutionaries from SVN were first attracted into the Communist ranks. First, he was a representative of North Vietnam to the ICC, then later in Hanoi, he was a member of the Board of Directors of Faculty of Medicine. In 1961, he went to France, and stayed there until December of

last year, first in the position of NVN Commercial Representative, then Acting General Representative, and finally General Representative. Because my brother was famous in South Vietnam, the Communists took advantage of his fame and made him a general representative on a panel for developing their regime.

Exploitation

From my personal experience, and from my brother's case, I know that the Communists always exploit people for the Party needs. When necessary, they can treat people very kindly during the exploitation of their talents, but after using them, the Party throws them away like fully squeezed oranges. Consequently, I strongly believe it is now very hard for my brother and sister-in-law to live, and their future will be miserable unless of course the Communists choose to use my brother in another assignment useful to them.

I hope that my brother and sister-in-law can get a better knowledge of the situation in South Vietnam, and wish that they could return to South Vietnam so that our family could be reunited.

As I mentioned before, I think the Communists are losing the war in Southeast Asia. My knowledge is based on facts. Facts that I learned from the many South Vietnamese who regrouped to NVN and returned to SVN in the early and late 1960's, and from my own experience as a long time Party member and ranking cadre in the Communist rear services. My knowledge in this respect covers a wide range of political, economic, and military information.

Worst Blunder

The Communists started losing the war militarily with the advent of the Mau Than Tet (1968) offensive. This Communist attack, this terrible sacrifice of Communist troops, was the worst blunder the Communists could have made, costing the lives of tens of thousands of their cadres and soldiers.

I was in hospital C-2 located in Binh Duong Province, SVN, during the Mau Than Tet offensive.

There I heard from the wounded that some companies had been completely wiped out, that in some regiments and battalions only a few men returned. The hospital was seriously overcrowded, and most of the wounded concluded that if the people (especially the families in NVN) knew that their husbands and children had been killed so uselessly for the sole purpose of bringing the war dramatically to world attention, they would be very angry and very sad.

NVA troops and regroupees had been told, prior to infiltrating SVN, that the Communists occupied three-fourths of the territory of SVN, that more than four-fifths of the South Vietnamese population had been liberated and were supporting the troops, and that they would be greeted warmly.

Aware of Truth

Some of those newly infiltrated cadres told me they thought the war in SVN was over, and that they would not have to fight in SVN. But, the more they encountered the realities of the battlefield, the more they became aware of the truth. The question asked by most of them was, "If the Communists occupied three-fourths of the land and controlled four-fifths of the population, why did they let one-fourth of the land and one-fifth of the population remain unliberated while they had enough strength to complete the remaining work?" In the meantime, the infiltration of men and weapons continued.

Most of these infiltrators were very young, some only 17 years old boys. A great number of them died and were replaced by older men, aged 35-40. As fast as NVN could infiltrate groups of men, they were killed. Misery and death continued to increase, and morale always declined upon arrival in SVN. The older men sent down from NVN, many of whom had four or five children, wanted only to stay in NVN to support their families; they often complained bitterly that the Party had given them no choice but ordered them to infiltrate SVN.

For the regroupees it was even worse. They had left their families

in 1954, expecting to return in about two years. Then, nine years later, their families hear that they finally have returned to SVN, not however to come home to their families, but to be committed to battle and die. Many regroupees had no time or opportunity to see their families again before dying. As the regroupees were killed off, the NVA was thrown into the battle as replacements. NVN first sent the young boys and finally the older men.

Today, the more troops the Communists infiltrate, the more are killed. The Communists eventually will run short of men, and that will be the end, the final military end to the war.

Political Situation

For the Communists, the political situation is bad also. Many have asked the question: "Are the Communists supported by the people of SVN?" Certainly, a handful of the more naive still believe that Communism would bring real independence, freedom, democracy and sufficient food, shelter and clothing to all the people. But this handful are blind to the realities of the harsh conditions in the North, where the Communists are in power.

The vast majority of the people of SVN do not know much about socialism, let alone Communism. But they are not ignorant, nor stupid. They know full well that Communism from the North has brought nothing but suffering, misery and death to the people in the South and they totally reject and resist this aggression: That which NVN Communism promises the Southerners — independence and true democracy — are the very things that NVN would take away from them!

Relatively Free

The southerners know that under the present government of South Vietnam they are relatively free in all respects. They are free to join any religion or any political party, as long as they are legal. They can have land, cows, buffaloes, machines for cultivation, big houses, cars; their children

can be educated; and all they have to do is work for it.

The people themselves determine if they will have an easy and comfortable life by working hard, or a miserable life by being lazy, but they are happy since they decide these things for themselves — the government does not decide for them, as in NVN. The southerners do not need nor want the false promises the North Vietnamese government makes to them through its controlled organizations like the PRG or the NFLSVN.

Economic Situation

The economic situation of the Communists in SVN is becoming very serious. During the resistance against the French, the cadres were self-supporting and had surpluses. Today, in the eastern region that once produced harvests for the Communists, not a single mau of land is now cultivated for them. In spite of all the directives and resolutions ordering local self sufficiency, neither the cadre, nor the local agency nor the people cultivate the land for the Front. The Communists have to infiltrate much of their food supplies. If the infiltration of rice were interrupted the Communists would starve.

Defeat Inevitable

As concerns infiltration of weapons, if twenty per cent gets through, the mission is considered successful, as there is heavy interdiction and disruption of the transportation routes. The Communist losses of their supply bases in Cambodia last year was terribly damaging to the rear services. I can imagine the extent of damage and confusion that initial incursion caused the Communists. Yet, if the full extent of the damage done to the Communists in the recent GVN operation in Laos is ever known, most people, North and South, will know the futility of continued NVN aggression.

The war cannot last much longer — Communist defeat is inevitable.



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Women of Vietnam

At the age of 23, Miss Ngoc Minh is a well-known singer and actress who is equally at home in both the classic and popular repertoire. She has given numerous recitals in South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. Miss Minh made her film debut in the production "This land — my fatherland."

Members of famed Luu Hong dance team. From left: My Ha, Mong Ngoc & Minh Hoa. The team formed in 1969 performs both western & traditional Vietnamese dances. They note that while a Vietnamese audience is more intrigued by the western dances, foreigners appreciate local folk dancing.



This is my home

A Vietnamized Yankee

By TRAN QUOC

The crowd at Maxim's theater-restaurant in Saigon liked the young American tenor with the neatly trimmed mustache. The applause following his western ballad was spirited instead of merely polite.

When he did the North Vietnamese folk song, QUA CAU GIO BAY (about two lovers crossing a bridge in the wind), the audience spontaneously accompanied him with rhythmic clapping.

His way with Vietnamese songs sounded oddly authentic. Whence came such an American?

The answer is that Ted Dutton was born in Dalat in 1947. He's spent most of his life in Vietnam except when he attended Claremont Men's College in California, earning a degree in political science. His parents are missionaries with the Christian and Missionary Alliance and have lived in Saigon since 1939. They have a daughter, 18, and another son, 15. Nowadays their oldest son, Ted, teaches accounting by day and sings by night at Maxim's and occasionally on Vietnamese television.

Beneath his reserved, smiling exterior, there's a hotbed of opinion on Vietnam, the French, the Americans and middle-class Vietnamese.

In the States he's had five years of voice lessons in art songs and arias. He did a lot of church singing and once appeared in Verdi's opera 'A Masked Ball,' given by the Riverside Opera Association, "but that was only a bit part."

When asked about Vietnam's future, he refers to his California college days:

"I was an eternal optimist. But I was also disturbed at how close-



TED DUTTON

minded the students and faculty were. If I didn't agree with them they turned me off. We disagreed about the validity of the Viet Cong as a truly South Vietnamese movement. They were always calling Ho Chi Minh a potential Southeast Asian Tito. My reading indicated he was a hard-line Bolshevik. My main difference with them stemmed from growing up here. I had virulent anti-French feelings. I felt that even Ho Chi Minh had bought a French intellectual bill of goods..."

"I think that the Vietnamese identity is something precious and must be preserved," he added.

He is critical of wealthy Vietnamese who send their children to France and remain here only for profit.

Americans were always saying to him, "Oh, you were here when Saigon was the Pearl of the Orient." He admits that Saigon used to be a beautiful city, but "I'd rather see it the way it is now if the Vietnamese can be their own masters."

As for the Americans, "I've always believed that despite their mistakes, they came in here with fundamentally pure, though ill-informed intentions."

Dutton is awaiting a great leader, a modern-day Tran Hung Dao or Le Loi to appear and lead the country.

"You need a man who has an absolute will to stay in Vietnam and who says we will survive."

Unless a very good offer to sing abroad comes along Dutton is planning on staying.

"I'd rather stay here than go back to the States and pursue a musical career. This is my home. I feel relaxed here."

But in October he'll lose his accounting job because of cutbacks at the American Post Exchange. He'll also be in danger of losing his U.S. citizenship unless he is employed with another U.S. corporation or government agency. The law requires 5 consecutive years either living in the United States or working for a U.S. corporation or agency abroad.

As for romantic or marital plans:

"Vietnamese are always asking me if I prefer Vietnamese or American girls. I say I'll follow my heart."

Grim Consistency

POWs as Pawns

By PHU SI

There is a certain inhuman and grim consistency in the attitude of North Vietnam toward all prisoners of war — its own as well as those it holds.

Worldwide outrage over Hanoi's calculated mistreatment of American POWs has tended to overshadow its utter indifference to the fate of 36,000 prisoners held in South Vietnam.

Of this total, between 8,000 and 9,000 are North Vietnamese regulars. In every sense they are non-persons. Hanoi steadfastly refuses to recognize the existence of these captives. To do so would compromise their fiction that no North Vietnamese are fighting a war of aggression in the South.

It has callously refused over and over again both at the bargaining table in Paris and in the field to accept rosters of detained soldiers offered by the South Vietnamese. It has refused, with two exceptions, even to accept custody of wounded and seriously ill North Vietnamese regulars who in some cases have actually been brought to transfer points — to no avail.

North Vietnam is guilty also of two-way violations of the Geneva Conventions which provide that POWs may send and receive four letters and two cards per month.

While denying this meager solace to the prisoners it holds, Hanoi also refuses to accept tons of mail from their captured troops in South Vietnam to families and relatives in North Vietnam. The cost of this inhuman policy in homefront morale and family anguish apparently does not enter into Hanoi's calculations.

North Vietnamese intransigence on this score extends even to its own refugees on neutral soil. Last summer Hanoi rebuffed attempts



U.S. Navy seaman carries armless, legless North Vietnamese prisoner of war aboard USS Upshur. Prisoner, one of 13, was not accepted by Hanoi.

by the Government of Thailand, working through the Red Cross, to arrange repatriation of some 40,000 Vietnamese refugees and their children. Originally the North Vietnamese had agreed to talks in Bangkok. Then, without explanation, Hanoi changed its mind. Nothing further has been heard.

Hanoi's policy of writing off its captured personnel has always been rigid. But between 1966 and 1968, at least, Saigon was able through unilateral action to repatriate four small groups of prisoners by sending them across the Ben Hai River Bridge inside the demilitarized zone. Since then the North Vietnamese have destroyed the bridge.


About six months ago another initiative by Saigon at the conference table in Paris did result in the repatriation of 62 sick and wounded North Vietnamese war prisoners. Hanoi agreed locally to a brief cease fire along a beach area one kilometer south of the 17th parallel — provided the prisoners were moved ashore from a neutral vessel without escort or formal ceremony of any kind.

The use of POWs as human pawns or political hostages is deeply-rooted in enemy strategy. This fact, indeed, emerged as one of the principal findings of a worldwide trip last autumn by the American astronaut, Frank Borman. He visited 14 countries as a Special Representative of President Nixon and reported back to Washington that all American POWs are "political hostages."


"Time after time, as we dealt with the governments around the world," he said, "I heard the comment that the North Vietnamese consider our prisoners their trump card in negotiations."

Some of these unfortunates, incidentally, have been held under the most degrading conditions longer than any other prisoners of any American war. Yet after more than six years Hanoi has yet to release an official and complete list of detainees in open defiance of the Geneva conventions it signed in 1954.

Hanoi thus matches its contempt for the fate of its own POWs with equally barbarous treatment of the prisoners it holds.




Crippled North Vietnamese POW leaves U.S. Navy ship June 4 after rejection by Hanoi. Below: Group of 13 NVA POW's in Da Nang before rejection.





Home for disabled veterans in Phu Cuong hamlet, Binh Duong province is this Veterans' Village with 150 units.

Veterans' Village



Each veteran and his family is provided a unit like this.

The atmosphere is that of a low-cost housing project in a suburb of a city. There is the unmistakable hum of activity, men at work, the ring of laughter of children, the prattle of housewives at their daily chores.

The compound is modest in size, not too large, enough for comfort. It is home for disabled war veterans and their families. It is the Veterans' Village at Phu Cuong hamlet in Binh Duong province, some 30 kilometers from Saigon.


Typical of several veterans' housing projects being constructed all over the country, that in Phu Cuong was inaugurated last Jan. 12. Others are fast taking shape around Saigon, those in Thu Duc, Phu Tho Hoa, Dan Qui Dong, and Pham The Hien.

The village in Phu Cuong has 150 housing units, neat one-storey abodes built with bricks, cement, and galvanized iron sheets. There is room to build an additional room or two for every unit and the sound of hammer, saw, and plane attests to the fact that many of the occupants are engaged in the endeavor.

Legless, armless or both, the veterans appear spry even on their wheelchairs or while hobbling on crutches. One notices the ready smile for the visitor. Explains To Du Sang: "This we can really call home, thanks to the government and the Ministry for Veterans Affairs. We cannot ask for more."

Sang, 42, served in the army for 18 years until his right leg was amputated after being wounded in action. He is the recipient of three medals from the government.

"My five children are happy like I am over all this. Where else could I have obtained such a home," says Tran At, 48, who is paralyzed from the waist down and who holds five medals after 21 years in the army.



Veteran Son Quest (in wheelchair) in conversation with Tran Kieu (left), in charge of village, and Vuong Van Hoa, village engineer. San Duong gestures with a hand minus one finger while praising government efforts to help veterans. Below: Children look as lunch is readied.



'No really big obstacles'

A Vietnamese - Korean Marriage

Mr. Dyon-Yon-Sang's family typifies one of many happy Korean-Vietnamese marriages in Vietnam today. Dyon, a man in his late forties, came to North Vietnam in 1937 where he completed his education in Hanoi. Seventeen years later, he joined the thousands of refugees to South Vietnam where he met a lovely Vietnamese girl who became his wife and mother of two bouncing youngsters.

By NGOC MAI

"Most long-time Korean residents of Vietnam," said Dyon, "have married Vietnamese girls and settled in this country for good." Asked about the differences between Vietnamese and Korean

girls, Dyon smiled and commented: "Basically, there are no outstanding differences between Vietnamese and Korean women, possibly because both countries have cultures assimilated from the Chinese. The only difficulty in the beginning is the language barrier — but aside from that, there really aren't any big obstacles." South Vietnam, continued our Korean friend, is probably one of the most racially tolerant nations in Asia and to him, like many other foreigners in this country, this country is "home."

Mrs. Dyon, like most Vietnamese housewives, takes good care of her husband and children and prides

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Mr. and Mrs. Dyon-Yon-Sang with the eldest of their two children.

herself in her ability to prepare her husband's favourite Korean dishes. Once a year, they both visit Korea where she picks up the latest recipes from her husband's family. From her Korean lady-friends in Vietnam. Mrs. Dyon is learning to read and write the Korean language which she has learned to speak quite proficiently. The children enjoy the best of both cultures. Like their father they

love both Vietnamese and Korean cooking. are fluent in Vietnamese and later they'll spend some time in Korea for further schooling and language training.

Dyon is one of the leading Korean businessmen in Vietnam. He is Chairman of the Association of Korean Residents in Vietnam, and Vice-Chairman of the Vietnam-Korean Association where his

children join well over a hundred other youngsters of Korean-Vietnamese marriages in studying the Korean language. He is also the founder of the World Buddhist Association for Social Services and he has actively contributed to more than one million piasters (3,640 US\$) for the purchase of books and school supplies along with considerable contributions to about twenty hospitals in the greater Saigon metropolitan area.

Generally speaking, Dyon finds the Vietnamese women more self-reliant than their Korean counterparts in business and social activities. While the Korean women usually limit their role in life to the cares of the household and the education of the children, the Vietnamese fair sex is striking out in politics, social activities and business. Today, there are many Vietnamese women in the Senate, the Lower House and the City Councils of the nation and even more have made a name for themselves as doctors, dentists, lawyers, pharmacists and leaders in business and industry. Undoubtedly, comments Dyon, the war has accelerated the progress of the Vietnamese woman's role in society since most of the nation's young men have joined the colours.

Like any other country fighting for survival against aggression and hosting hundreds of thousands of foreign troops in its midst, the number of mixed marriages have soared. But, comments Dyon, the Asian marriages have a greater chance of success and survival than those of Vietnamese women with Occidentals which often fail due to the radical differences of customs and social backgrounds.

He estimates that during the past decade in which well over fifty thousand Korean troops and technicians came to Vietnam, between six to seven hundred Korean-Vietnamese marriages have taken place. Some have selected to remain in this country. Others have taken their brides back to Korea but no matter where they live, concluded Dyon, husbands and wives are proof of the friendship between two Asian nations that have forged their close ties in a common cause for peace, independence and prosperity.

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
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