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CAMPAIGN T	and an analysis of the contraction of the contracti	ESTERN GOVERNMI	ENT IN IRAN
AUTI	HORITY: 7 Gran	and high	
TARGET	1.	72 11	41153
Prime Minister M	ossadeq and his gov	ernment	
OBJECTIVES			
Through legal, or	quasi-legal, method	is to effect the fall of	the Mossadeo
government; and		``	
To replace it with	a pro-Western gove	rnment under the Sha	h's leadership.
with Zahedi as its	Prime Minister		
•	implemented in fou	r phases:	
1.	<u> </u>		
to strengthen the S	Shah's will to exerci	se his constitutional p	oower and to sign
those decrees nec	essary to effect the	legal removal of Mos	sadeo as Prime
Minister;			
2. Welded to		ed the efforts of thos	And the state of the state of the state of the state of
The second secon		ward Moseadee, inclusion ward Moseadee, inclusion was a second with the ward was a second with the ward was a second was a	AND A SECTION OF THE PROPERTY
	to accomplish Mossa		
3.		,	disenchant
the Iranian popula	tion with the myth of	' Mossadeq's patriotis	am. by exposing
· . ·		and his manipulation	
•;	his own personal an	· .	
			The second secon

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designed to reveal to Mossadeq and to the general populace that increased economic aid would not be forthcoming and that the U.S. viewed with alarm Mossadeq's policies:

- a. A series of public statements by high U.S. of ficials implying that there was little hope that Mossadeq could expect increased U.S. aid;
- b. U.S. press and magazine articles which were critical of him and his methods; and

absence of the Ame	rica	a Am		dor,	
credence to the impression that the U.S.	had	lost	conf	idence	in
Mossadeq and his government.	٠	. • •	,		

RESULTS

The original D-Day set by CIA misfired when Mossadeq, learning of the plan through when the plan through when

counteraction to neutralize the plan.

was launched in the interim period between the original and final D-Days
to educate the Iranian population to the fact that, in view of the dissolution
of the Majlis (effected by Mossadeq at an earlier stage to prevent its voting

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him out of power) and the Shah's decree removing Mossadeq as Prime
Minister, Mossadeq's continued exercise of the powers of that office was
illegal and that authority to govern the people rested solely and completely
in the hands of the Shah.

The Nationalists and the Communists during this period inadvertently assisted our cause through their premature attempts to promote a republican government. This theme was contrary to the public's opinion, whose sympathies were with the Shah. The Shah's dramatic flight out of the country served to further intensify his people's sense of loyalty to him.

These actions resulted in literal revolt of the population,

The

and security forces juned the populace. Radio Tehran was taken over military, were forced to act in quelling the riots and gained strength on the full mossades was forced to flee on 17 Hug 53 momentum of the situation in support of the Shah:

The ouster of Mossadeq was successfully accomplished on 19 Aug 1953.

NOTE

2. That an adequate amount of U.S. interim economic aid would be forthcoming to the successor government.

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