

Exhibit 2893

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Def. Doc. No. 1401-M-1

From Nomura to Toyoda
29 August 1941
No. 756

In reference to my telegram No. 752,

I had a talk with Hull yesterday evening, the 20th, about the agenda of meeting and other things. The gist is as follows:
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(a) A really serious situation would result if the meeting should, because of the uncompromising attitude of either of the two heads as to some point or other, fail to produce an agreement. It is therefore desired that the negotiations should be brought to a conclusion in outline before the two heads meet, and that only the final decision (Hull used the word "ratification") should be left to the meeting. (With respect to this point, please refer to the latter part of my telegram No. 703.)

(b) Generally speaking, it is necessary to bring the previous talks up to date, and the Secretary of State repeatedly said that the adjustment of Japanese-American relations would be difficult apart from the China problem, which is one of the chief subjects for discussion.

(c) The Secretary of State said that, though Japan requests that the United States should simply use its good offices to restore peace between Japan and China, the Government of the United States does not want to affect Sino-American relations unfavorably in improving Japanese-American relations, and that it does not wish to have China explode (as the Secretary put it) through the conduct of the American Government. He explained further that such are the reasons that the American Government deems it necessary to be familiar with the basic points of the Sino-Japanese negotiations thoroughly and to persuade China to concur in them, and that this question requires, after all, the placating of Japan and China and making Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the Netherlands agree, which is indeed a hard task for the United States.

(d) Concerning the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China I replied that there was nothing new beside what I had told him. As regards the question of the right of self-defence, I repeated my usual contentions. However, I explained further that I believed that Prince Konoe must be confident of a successful settlement of the question, since he had determined to meet Roosevelt. Hull, however, stated that the existing understandings would not suffice, and insisted on having a clear-cut statement of intention of the Japanese Government.

We accordingly request that further instructions be given, upon reference to my telegram No. 540, concerning the decision of the Government with respect to the questions of the withdrawal of forces and of the right of self-defence.

As to the present question, please let Colonel Iwakuro, who has returned to Japan recently, inform you in detail.

(e) In connection with the practical arrangements in case an agreement is reached concerning the meeting of the two heads, I suggested, as my personal opinion, the following:

(1) The Japanese Government desires to choose the Hawaiian area for the place of meeting, but, if the President finds it difficult to go there for geographical reasons or because of constitutional difficulties, and suggests instead Juneau which lies halfway between Tokyo and Washington, it is believed that the Tokyo Government will consent to the idea.

(2) As for the date of meeting, we suggest fixing it for 21-25 September.

(3) The proper number of attendants is considered to be about twenty, consisting of delegates from the Foreign, War and Navy Ministries as well as the Embassy. But it can be smaller.

(4) Prince Konce will come to the place of meeting on board a warship, and it will take about ten days.

(5) Mutual consultation is required as to its announcement, and it is proper, in my private opinion, to announce it soon after the departure of Prince Konce.

The Secretary of State said that he would consult with the President upon these points. Generally speaking, the Secretary is very prudent and cautious in dealing with the present project, and seems to be giving careful consideration to it from every side. It appears that the meeting of the responsible heads will not be realized unless both sides practically accord in their opinions.