

Interr. of TOGO, Shigenori
(26 Mar. 1946)

DOC 4119

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

4119

INTERROGATION OF

Shigenori TOGO

Date and Time: 26 March 1946, 0930-1145 hours

Place : Togo Residence, Tokyo

Present : Shigenori TOGO
Fumihiko Togo, son of Shigenori TOGO
Toshiro Shimanouchi, Japanese national, Interpreter
Mr. Roy L. Morgan, Interrogator
Miss Mildred Rich, Stenographer

Questions by Mr. Morgan

Q. Do you recall an alleged loan of three hundred million yen that was supposed to have been appropriated for the Nanking government some time during TOJO's service as premier.

A. After the outbreak of war, around the spring of 1942, I recall the finance minister of the Nanking government coming to Japan regarding a loan; but I do not recall the exact amount.

Q. Have you any information from where the money was obtained to make the loan to the Nanking government.

A. The matter was chiefly handled by the Japanese Minister of Finance, and the loan was to be a credit from the Japanese government. From what I recall, the loan was to be made through the Japanese government by the Bank of Japan.

Q. Do you have any knowledge that the funds might have been appropriated from opium and narcotic sources.

A. I have not heard, nor have I any knowledge, about its relationship with narcotics or opium.

Q. Do you know General Ryukichi TANAKA.

A. Yes, I know TANAKA. When I was Director of the European and American Bureau of the Foreign Office, TANAKA was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, and as Director of the bureau I was in charge of matters relating to Soviet Russia. When TANAKA came to Tokyo and visited me, I emphasized the necessity of demarcating the boundary between Manchukuo and Soviet Russia, to which view TANAKA expressed agreement. Since then whenever TANAKA visited Tokyo he called on me at least once. Thereafter I went abroad as ambassador, and when I returned to Japan Tanaka was Director of the Soldiers Affairs Bureau. Before I became Foreign Minister and during my Foreign Ministership, as well as after my Foreign Ministership, TANAKA used to call on me off and on, and at one time in a discussion we were of the same view in that after I had resigned as Foreign Minister we were of the same view that TOJO must be ousted. And before the termination

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A. (cont'd)

of the war, when I had already set into motion measures or steps toward that end, TANAKA came to me and said that it was necessary to bring the war to a termination. That, briefly, describes the kind of relations I have had with TANAKA.

Q. Did you have a conversation with him around September of last year concerning the September 6, 1941, Imperial Conference.

A. I recall TANAKA visiting me at this house toward the end of September last year, but as we spoke of many things I do not recall whether the decisions of the Imperial Conference of September 6 was among the topics of discussion at that time.

Q. You were not Foreign Minister in September of 1941, but I understood that you had information concerning this particular Imperial Conference which had to do with TOJO and HATO sending a main force to occupy South Indo-China immediately after the September 6 Imperial Conference.

A. The dispatch of military forces to Southwest French Indo-China was decided on July 2, and the actual dispatch of the forces took place in the latter part of July. Since then I have not been informed of troop movements; however, although not exactly I recall TANAKA telling me about the distribution of military forces, which although he was not directly connected with it he was informed, his position being more or less related to the matter, and that is that the distribution of forces had pretty much advanced with Formosa as a base. Although I do not now recall exactly in the conversations I had with TANAKA last September, I recall that the distribution of forces had been advanced with Formosa as a base, at least that is the way I recall the matter.

Q. Did you get this information from TANAKA or from someone else.

A. From TANAKA.

Q. I believe that as a matter of record as to the movement of troops into South Indo-China during the latter part of July, but as to a main force being sent to occupy the country, I understand you to say that you knew nothing about a main force being sent after the September 6 Imperial Conference.

A. I know of the dispatch of military forces to South French Indo-China in the latter part of July as it is on the record, but as to any troop movements since then or after, as you say, the September 6 Imperial Conference, I was neither informed before I became Foreign Minister nor after I became Foreign Minister. TANAKA's information I got after the termination of the war.

Q. During the interrogation of TOJO he made the statement that it was your idea to send KURUSU to help NOMURA in Washington and plan for a diplomatic break, in addition to letting NOMURA know of the new policy of his, TOJO's Cabinet. Is this correct.

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- A. I know of no new policy of the TOJO Cabinet, which you mention in your question, but as to - - - I do not know what it means and, therefore, I cannot say whether it is correct or not. As to sending KURUSU to Washington, it was my idea and when I asked KURUSU whether he would go I obtained his agreement and after that I brought the matter up to TOJO and obtained his agreement. Since KURUSU was an ambassador, procedure required that the approval of the Throne also be obtained, and since such a matter was within the competence of the Prime Minister, KURUSU's permission to go was obtained by the Prime Minister. My verbal instructions to KURUSU explains the purpose of his mission. One, was to assist NOMURA in Washington in the negotiations; and the other was to explain - - - to have KURUSU explain to NOMURA the actual situation prevailing in Japan and to have him take such fresh knowledge for NOMURA, with the assistance of KURUSU, to obtain the understanding of the United States on the Japanese situation, and by such understanding to exert as much effort as possible to bring about a successful termination of the negotiations.
- Q. TOJO states that at the final liaison conference prior to the Imperial Conference of December 1 you expressed your views in favor of attacking the United States and Great Britain.
- A. As I have said on a previous occasion, when the HULL note of November 26 came it was my view, as well as the view of others, in which there was a general agreement, that the note could not be accepted as it involved Japan's self-existence and national honor. However, at the liaison conference I said - - - But even before that studies were already being made as to what to do in case the negotiations failed. My stand was that even in case the negotiations failed, Japan should exercise patience and forbearance and watch the development in the international situation. This view was opposed by TOJO and such others as, SUGIYAMA, TSKADA, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, NAGANO, ITO and KAYA, hoping that there was some way out. Now, these opposed my views and their argument being that it would be a case of gradual exhaustion of whatever stock piles there were in Japanese hands and that no opportunity should be lost in resorting to measures of self defense. This argument of theirs was advanced after a great deal of study and consideration had been given to such points which I advanced before, as the high productive capacity of American industries and the fact that hardly any assistance could be expected from Germany. Such being the case, I had no further data with which to refute or question their argument. And I further emphasized that if we were going to lose this war, then we should accept the American demands even though those demands were unreasonable. To this TOJO, the War Minister, said that there were sufficient chances to win. The Navy Minister, SHIMADA, said that there was no reason for pessimism. Such being the situation which prevailed, my views were over ruled. A strong feeling existed as the result of the demand for total surrender from the outside as well as arguments within that this war would not be lost, while public opinion, at least that which was vocally expressed, favored a strong stand.

Exh 1206A

Excerpt - From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO
dated 26 March 1946 (page 4)

- Q. Did you have the prime responsibility for the contents of the final note delivered by KUNIKIDA and NOMURA on December 7, Washington time, to Hull?
- A. The note was written by the Foreign Office but in accordance with the views expressed in the discussions in the liaison and other conferences and the note was a general summary of those views. Therefore, the Foreign Office and I, as Foreign Minister, cannot take the responsibility. Furthermore, as the matter was related to the question of war, the high command naturally had to be consulted and various matters discussed with them in regard to the note. Such being the case, the government alone cannot take the responsibility, for the high command is also connected with the matter. And that being the case, even within the government, I alone as Foreign Minister cannot take sole responsibility on a matter of such supreme or major importance.
- Q. Would you name the individuals who you would consider as equally responsible with you for the contents of the note.
- A. All members of the liaison conference and even some members of the Cabinet who were familiar with this question.

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

Excerpt - from interrogation of Shigenori Togo
dated 26 March 1946 (page 7)

- Q. Did you say anything to the Emperor concerning the telegram from KURUSU and NOMURA with respect to President Roosevelt?
- A. As I recall, I did not mention that telegram to the Emperor in that the matter had previously been discussed with both KIDO and TOJO, at which time the opinion was that such a step would not contribute toward the satisfactory settlement of negotiations between the two countries, therefore, the matter was not reported to the Throne.
- Q. Don't you think that the Emperor was entitled to know of such a proposal?
- A. The Emperor actually was entitled to ask questions on any or all subjects, but in so far as this particular telegram was concerned the general view within the government was that it was not of a nature that would contribute to a settlement and that, such being the case, it was not worth putting so much weight to and so it was not brought up to the Emperor.

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Certificate of Stenographer:

I, Mildred Rich, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out herewith, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Mildred Rich

Certificate of Interrogator:

I, Roy L. Morgan, certify that on 26 March 1946 Shigenori TOGO personally gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth herein.

/s/ ROY MORGAN

書類四一九號

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）三月二十六日附

東郷茂徳訊問書ヨリ（四頁）ノ抜萃

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問。貴方ハ華盛頓時間十二月七日ニ來栖及ビ野村ヨリ「ハル」ニ手交サレタ最後通牒ノ内容ニ對シテ首タル責任ヲ持ツテキマシタカ。

答。其ノ通牒ハ外務省デ書クニハ書キマシタガ、連絡會議ヤ其ノ他ノ會議デノ討論ノ際ニ述べラレタ見解ニ從ツタモノデ、其ノ通牒ハソレヲ見解ノ全般的摘要デアリマシタ。

從ツテ、外務省並ニ外務大臣トシテノ私ハ、責任ヲ負フコトハ出來マセン。更ニ、專ガ戰爭問題ニ關係シテキタノデ、當然統帥部トモ相談シナケレバナラナカツタシ、通牒ニ就イテ統帥部ト種々ノ討議シナケレバナリマセンデシタ。ソウ云フワケデ統帥部モ此ノ專ニ關係シテ居マシタカラ、政府獨リガ其ノ責任ヲ負フコトハ出來マセン。

事情斯クノ如クデアリマシタノデ、政府内ニ於

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テモ外務大臣タル私一人ガ新カル重且大ナル問
題ノ全責任ヲ引受ルコトハ出来マセン。

問。通牒内容ニ對シ、貴方ト同等ニ責任アルト思ハ
レル人ノ名前ヲ擧ゲテ下サイ。

答。連絡會議ノ全員、更ニ此ノ問題ニ關知シテ居タ
る員モ含ム。

書類第四一一九號

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）三月二十六日附

東郷茂徳訊問書ヨリ（七頁）ノ抜萃

問。貴方ハ「ルーズヴェルト」大統領ニ謁スル來栖、野村カラノ電報ニ就テ、何カ天皇ニ申上げマシタカ。

答。私ノ記憶スル所デハ、其ノ電報ノ事ハ天皇ニ申上げマセンデシタ。ト云フノハ此ノ件ハ先ニ木戸ト東條トノ間ニ討議サレ、其ノ際其ノ様ナ措置ハ兩國間ノ交渉ノ満足ナ解決ニハ何ラ役ニ立タナイトイフノガ見解デアツタノデス。從ツテ其ノ事ハ陛下ニハ報告サレマセンデシタ。

問。貴方ハ天皇ハ斯ル提案ヲ知ルベキデアツタトハ思ヒマセンカ。

答。天皇ハ實際ニ、ドンナ事デモ又スベテノ事ニ就テモ質問ヲスル事ガ出來タノデアリマス。併シ乍ラ、此ノ特別ナ電報ニ關スル限り、政府内ノ一般的見解ハ、其ノ電報ハ問題ノ解決ニ役立つ性質ノモノデハナク、又事情ガソウデアツタノテ其ノ電報ハソレ程重キヲ置ク價值ノアルモノデハナイ、トイフノデアリマシタ。ソレテ其ノ電報ハ天皇ニ呈出サレナカツタノデス。

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速記者ノ証明書

私「ミッドレッド・リッチ」ハ此所ニ陳述セラレタ
訊問ニ私ガ速記者ノ役目ヲ勤メタコト私ガ
前記復問及答辯ヲ轉寫ニタコト及右轉
寫ハ私ノ知識並ニ信心ニ範圍内ニ眞實テ
アルト共ニ正確ナルコトヲ茲ニ証明ニマス

署「ミッドレッド・リッチ」

訊問者ノ証明書

私ロイ・エル・モーガンハ東郷茂徳ガ
一九四六年三月二十六日此所ニ陳述セラレ
タ數個ノ復問ニ對シテ自ラ前記答
辯ヲ存シタコトヲ証明ニマス

署「ロイ・モーガン」

Approved by Fishelby
for court use

5/11/46

Exhibit: A 1206 A