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IMPROVING INTERAGENCY COORDINATION FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR AND BEYOND

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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**IMPROVING INTERAGENCY COORDINATION FOR THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR AND BEYOND**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 4, 2006.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 4:10 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA**

Mr. WELDON. The committee will come to order.

Chairman Hunter is on his way. He should be here shortly. I will fill in until he arrives, along with our good friend, the ranking member.

We welcome our witnesses, the Honorable Thomas O'Connell, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Department of Defense; Admiral Giambastiani, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Redd, USN, Director For National Counterterrorism Center; and Ambassador Henry Crumpton, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today; and thank you for your service especially during this critical time of our country.

As we fight the global war on terror, we face a determined, adaptive and ruthless enemy. Since this war began, President Bush and other senior leaders have repeatedly said that to preserve our freedom in the face of such an enemy, we must use all the instruments of our national power, such as diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and military elements.

Given this committee's particular focus on our armed forces, we would add that this effort cannot involve only or even primarily America's military services. Simply put, the fronts of engagement are so vast, no one agency can fight this war alone. So it follows that to effectively employ all of America's instruments of national power the organizations involved, from cabinet agencies to other nondefense agencies, must collaborate and cooperate as seamlessly as possible. But, to quote one recent witness, interagency coordination is, quote, "both essential and lacking," end quote.

Many other Administration officials, military leaders and non-government experts have echoed this assertion. In fact, DOD's recent Quadrennial Defense Review notes this deficiency in its section devoted to achieving unity of effort. To illustrate this challenge, it cites the relationship in the field between DOD's combatant commanders and the State Department's chiefs of missions, concluding that people from the two agencies must expend consid-

erable effort on a case-by-case basis to act together in support of operations. The result, according to QDR, is that commanders and chiefs of missions lose agility in the face of an adaptive adversary. Fleeing targets are missed, and risk to U.S. interests and those of our partners increase. We look forward to the witnesses commenting on this particular issue.

Experts cite various factors as to why joint collaborations are ultimately unresponsive, cumbersome and slow. They point, for example, to the different legal authorities, philosophies, cultures and missions that guide each agency.

Today, this committee looks forward to the witnesses' assessments regarding the state of interagency coordination, the progress being made to address particular areas of concern and how an appropriate Congress might help.

This committee wants to be as supportive as possible in achieving the goal of seamless interagency coordination. If the way we are currently arranged is not flexible or responsive or comprehensive enough to meet this war's front line demands—and that appears to be so—we must critically examine our interagency relationships. Then we must make the necessary strategic and institutional changes to eliminate the stovepipes that restrict resources, information and expertise.

The longer that we wait to address the root of this national security challenge, the more difficult it will be to fix. We should therefore ensure in all proper haste that we can use instruments of national power as easily and effectively as situations on the ground demand.

I want to particularly thank Chairman Hunter and Ranking Member Skelton. It was seven years ago that this committee first proposed standing up a national collaborative center. In fact, in November of 1999, we first proposed that that capability be established linking together 33 agencies. It took us in 2003 to announce the establishment of the terrorist threat integration center (TTIC). The TTIC was proposed by this committee two years before 9/11 happened. In fact, we put language in three successive defense bills calling for the military to move toward a collaborative capability. So this committee will take a back seat to no one in our effort to push forth collaboration; and I want to thank our leadership for moving that agenda along, including our previous chairmen, Chairman Spence and Chairman Stump.

Now let me turn to my good colleague, the gentleman from Missouri, for any remarks he would like to make. Ike Skelton is recognized.

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Good afternoon, Secretary O'Connell and Admiral Giambastiani, Admiral Redd and Ambassador Crumpton. We thank you for being with us.

Smart people have been talking about improving interagency coordination for a long time. A little voice says 1899. Okay. But our experience in Iraq and in the war on terror have demonstrated the necessity of getting it right.

Gentlemen, the Secretary of State this past week said we made thousands of tactical errors in Iraq. Tactical errors are the ones made at the lowest level, by unit-level soldiers and by the civilians in the villages. And while I have the deepest respect for the Secretary, I think our greatest successes have been at the tactical level, where our brave young soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines and other government agency personnel and coalition partners have actually made it work without the benefit of a clear strategy or interagency planning from here in Washington.

Our future efforts must be focused at the strategic level and, I have been saying for some time, have not deployed the civilian capacity needed in Iraq to help rebuild their institutions effectively. The State Department, though, has done better in recent weeks. We lost valuable time and we paid a price for theirs and others missing expertise in setting up or attempting to help the Iraqi government set up.

American military has served admirably, including the reconstruction missions. But we have real talent in the civilian ranks that hasn't been fully used and must be. For the war on terror, strong interagency capability is no less critical.

Our terrorism subcommittee under Chairman Saxton and Mr. Meehan held a hearing on just this topic that we are on today almost five years after 9/11. It is not clear to me that our government is doing all that it can to defeat al Qaeda or capturing bin Laden. We need all instruments of national power working as seamlessly together to achieve that goal.

Today, we have a highly empowered military. In particular, our Special Operations Command is the most capable it has ever been; and it is getting more so.

This Congress has granted extraordinary authority to build partnerships in the field that will help take down terrorist networks, but without an empowered interagency process that is working in concert, our military can't fully achieve its goals. This is borne out by other publications.

For all these reasons, it is time to start the discussion about the actions needed to advance the ball. We do have some experience in Congress along these lines. Our current structure for national security was, as you know, set up by the National Security Act of 1947 when Harry Truman was President. It was no mean feat to pass that reform and establish a National Security Council at the Air Force after the Second World War at the very start of the Cold War.

In addition, you know, I was able to work on the reform of the Defense Department that ended up being passed as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. At the time, people said it didn't need to be done. Others said it was too hard to do. Others said it would destroy individual services and devastate the Nation's defense and warfighting capabilities. Even once the bill passed, the changes didn't take place all at once and there was continuing resistance within the military. But, 20 years later, we have implemented almost all of it and almost all of it has been successful. It works.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act included changes in the personnel system, assignment policy, promotion requirements, professional military education institutions, as well as organizations and lines

of command and control. We disrupted a lot of fiefdoms over these last 20 years to ensure success.

Almost five years after 9/11, people are saying that the inter-agency differences in culture, problems with communication, difficulties with integrated planning, and operations still haven't been resolved to the extent they must be.

Our forces in the field as well as those who will be asked to operationalize our future national security strategies deserve better. We want to know here in Congress how we can help.

We need your insights, gentlemen, if it is sweeping change such as a new National Security Act or Goldwater-Nichols-type reform is necessary to get this interagency integration right. We can't experiment on this. We have to get it right the first time.

What issues should we take on first and why? How can Congress help ensure that our folks in the field, whether they are in the military or intelligence or State Department, get the training and education and the leadership they need? I take a page from the 9/11 Commission report. Who do you think should be the quarterback? In Goldwater-Nichols, we put the combatant commanders in charge of operational planning and directing operations. Who is going to be in charge to integrate the interagency operations effectively?

These are difficult questions. Such reforms will be more difficult than any government reform has been to date. It will be especially difficult for Congress because these topics cross jurisdictional lines. But somewhere someone has to start the ball rolling.

We appreciate your help, Mr. Chairman, in this regard. Thank you.

Mr. WELDON. I thank the distinguished gentleman.

Without objection, the entirety of the witnesses' prepared statement will be entered into the record.

We will go right down the line and start with Secretary O'Connell.

We deeply appreciate your appearance here. The floor is yours. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS W. O'CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary O'CONNELL. Thank you, Congressman Weldon. Distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify about Improving Interagency Coordination for the global war on terror and Beyond. We must bring all elements of our national power to bear in this struggle against global terrorism, and we can do so only through effective interagency coordination at every level. To maximize your time for questions, I will submit my statement for the record and just give a brief oral summary.

Improving interagency coordination has been a goal of our government for decades. Congressman Skelton mentioned 1899. I had it pegged at 1947. But, in any event, this has produced a system that generally works well in crisis. However, it preserves agency equities in a way that sometimes make mundane policy changes difficult.

Granted, changes in policy should not always be easy. But the key to success is to ensure that all affected areas of the government have ample opportunity to present the President the best advice available in a timely manner.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report accurately states that we are in a long war that is irregular in nature. This long war is characterized by dispersed global terrorist networks with radical aims that threaten the United States, our allies, and our way of life. The nature of this long war requires the United States Armed Forces to adopt unconventional and indirect approaches to ultimately prevail in this struggle; and it places a premium on interagency operations, the kind of missions we need to undertake to make interagency coordination more important today than ever before.

We need effective interagency processes to develop for our diplomatic operational and intelligence efforts to be successful. Cooperation across the Federal Government must begin in the field; and, at an operational level, we are doing a lot. I just returned from Iraq where I saw very effective interagency efforts at the tactical level. I think you would be extremely proud of the efforts that were being made there on behalf of the interagency.

At the strategic level, DOD has partnered with State to coordinate and deconflict combating terrorist activities, synchronize efforts and provide a mechanism for monitoring progress and solving terrorist-related challenges by region. These have now been transferred to the National Counterterrorism Center, and it is there that much of our most recent progress in interagency coordination is taking place.

The interagency process we have today can work well under crisis. But, even with all our efforts, the global war on terror (GWOT) presents coordination challenges not previously faced by the National Security Council (NSC); and there clearly is work to be done.

In conclusion, we strongly urge Congress to provide our civilian sister agencies the resources requested in the President's budget to develop capabilities to deploy quickly and effectively in response to contingencies. U.S. service men and women need their civilian colleagues' expertise in the field. We cannot succeed without the help of our partner agencies and Congress.

And I would like to thank this committee and Congress for your emphasis on this vitally important issue. I have read previous testimony taken by this committee, and I think you are making excellent progress in moving ahead on interagency issues.

I welcome your questions.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary O'Connell can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Mr. WELDON. Admiral, the floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF ADM. EDMUND P. GIAMBASTIANI, VICE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. NAVY**

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, and other distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon.

First, though, on behalf of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and their families, thank you for your continued bipartisan support.

In my almost 40 years in uniform, I have experienced two events that have truly transformed the Department of Defense. The first was a move to the all-volunteer force in 1973, mandated by Congress. The second, of course, as already mentioned, was the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Goldwater-Nichols, as stated, proves its value as a model for improving integration among disparate but related organizations that share a common goal. DOD's experience in implementing Goldwater-Nichols provides us with particular insights into the challenges ahead as we seek to expand that success throughout the Federal Government.

I would like to make three brief points, and I will truncate them. Obviously, there will be more detail in the record.

The first one, I want to briefly review actions already under way to improve interagency efforts both at the national level and within DOD. At the national level, most of our effort has been focused on what I would call military support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction activities. That is an acronym—as always in the Pentagon, we have one—called SSSTR, but we won't use that again here today, but I mention it. NSPD-44, which is management of interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization at national security Presidential directive.

Frankly, we in DOD have taken steps to implement this through a directive that was signed out by our Deputy Secretary of Defense back in November. Perhaps most importantly, this directive—and I think most importantly—this directive establishes stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations, the military support to them, on a par with combat operations. That is very important, and we have written four joint operational concepts, of which this is one of the pillars. So it is on a par with combat operations within the Department.

In addition, DOD has been looking more broadly at interagency requirements. Better integrating DOD's capability into the national effort, as you have already heard, and, as you also have mentioned, was in the Quadrennial Defense Review which I had the pleasure of co-chairing the effort with this with Deputy Secretary Gordon England. The QDR concluded that we in DOD needed to do more to share expertise, planning, training and professional development and education with our partners in the Federal Government and also with key allies and friends. To ensure DOD's senior leaders don't lose sight of our progress, we have directed the development of a roadmap tracking our efforts to build partner capabilities. This roadmap is currently being staffed but will be publicly available as soon as we have approved it.

These efforts will build on actions already under way.

As a former combatant commander of almost three years, I directed intense and substantial support to the State Department's effort to stand up the Coordinator For Reconstruction and Stabilization commissioned in July of 2004. In my view, this stabilization coordinator is a huge step forward in our national ability to

develop concepts, experiments and exercise together, in addition to helping us execute and build interagency capabilities that are an important part for our civilian workforce.

Second and very briefly, though we are making progress, improving integration at various agencies is, in my view—not surprising, as yours—an area ripe for further transformation. The global war on terror is primarily a communications, cultural, political, economic, diplomatic war, with obvious security and military components. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, most of the key activities for success are beyond the uniformed military. Security is a prerequisite, but other agencies must step up to solidify progress.

Most of our interagency counterparts are beginning to take steps to build capabilities within their own departments. However, at the federal level, we do not yet have the appropriate structure, authority or tools to effectively integrate executive branch actions in the global war on terror. As always, it is harder to identify these problems—or to identify problems than it is to identify solutions. I don't have a significant number of solutions, but hopefully in our testimony today we will elaborate.

Final point, we have a long road ahead, in my view. The first step is an ongoing dialogue. I hope this hearing is just the beginning of our work together to realize the full potential of this very complicated, complex, integrated interagency process.

Goldwater-Nichols taught us that we need multiple pressure points to sustain forward momentum. Formal players and processes are key, not only inside the federal departments but congressional committees, as you have already stated. Congress clearly has a critical role to play. I would encourage you to develop strategies to find a way through this complex issue of committee jurisdiction and span of control so that the executive and legislative branches can move forward in tandem.

As we work this issue through the QDR roadmap process I have already spoken about, DOD will propose legislation that will further enhance our ability to work more effectively with the Department of State, with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), for example. We greatly appreciate your support of these requests, as they allow us to begin to change culture, processes and action on the ground in support of our counterterrorist policies.

That is why a wide-ranging conversation is needed, in my view, to include experts out in academia and the think tanks. The work begun by the Center for Strategic and International Studies on beyond Goldwater-Nichols is an example of this work.

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Giambastiani can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

Mr. WELDON. Admiral Redd.

**STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JOHN SCOTT REDD, DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, U.S. NAVY (RET.)**

Admiral REDD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Skelton, distinguished members of the committee. I also appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.

As the President has stated on numerous occasions and as the title of this hearing indicates and recognizes, we are at war.

Some aspects of this war are very familiar to us. Like the Cold War, it is likely to be a long war. I hope I am proven wrong, but I suspect my grandchildren will be adults before the end of this conflict is in our wake. Also, like the Cold War and its struggle against communism, this war has a very strong ideological content.

But in many ways this is a very different war. The ideological dimension is framed in religious language by the terrorists, who justify their actions through reference to faith. The enemy is not a defined state but a shadowy group of individuals. Some of these are closely bound together to recognizable organizations, others are loosely networked, and some may even be individuals who act virtually on their own.

However one chooses to characterize the nature of the enemy and the war, one thing is clear. To win the war, the United States and its allies must bring all elements of national power to bear on the problem. That, in a nutshell, is why the National Counterterrorism Center was established.

Before I expand on that theme, however, let me first say that the performance of our men and women in uniform continues to be superb. Having spent 36 years in a Navy uniform myself, that doesn't surprise me. I can tell you, however, after eight months as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, I can also report that the other departments and agencies who are involved in the war on terror are also performing superbly. We are winning many battles that the public likely will never know about which are critical to our war effort.

Let me now briefly review with you, if I can, the role that NCTC is playing and will play in the global war on terror.

As you know, NCTC is a new organization, just over a year old. As mandated by the legislation which established us, NCTC performs at base two critical functions. In a sense, as director, I wear two hats.

One of those hats involves a familiar role. That is the role of intelligence. In that hat, I report to Ambassador John Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, or DNI.

The second hat, which is more appropriate or directly appropriate to what we are talking about today, involves a new and I believe revolutionary role. That is the responsibility for conducting strategic operational planning for the global war on terror for the entire United States government. In that hat, I report to the President.

In short, in military terms, NCTC is responsible for producing the government's war plan for the war on terror and the intelligence annex which supports and underpins it.

Again, given the topic of today's hearing, I would like to focus more on the planning role, but let me first review very briefly the intelligence role.

The DNI has recently designated the National Counterterrorism Center as its mission manager for all counterterrorism intelligence. In that role, he will look to us to integrate all Intelligence Community efforts in counterterrorism, including collection, analysis and production. We are building that capability today.

In the area of analysis—intelligence analysis—the law designates NCTC as the primary organization not only for integrating but also for analyzing all counterterrorism analysis.

Today, the National Counterterrorism Center produces a full set of analytical products ranging from strategic analyses for the President and senior policymakers to tactical warning reports for the operators.

We are also in the information sharing business. In fact, I would submit that NCTC is a model for the U.S. government's classified information sharing. In that sense, in a tactical level, NCTC runs a 24/7 high-tech operation center that is in constant touch with the counterterrorism community, ensuring that everybody has the latest threat information.

We are also responsible for the government's central database of known and suspected terrorists. This all-source repository contains more than 300,000 entries, representing over 200,000 unique identities. This database is the ultimate source of the various watch lists, such as the no-fly list.

Finally, we collect intelligence information and analysis on 28 different government networks and distribute it on line to over 5,000 counterterrorism analysts in the community around the world.

That is a very short summary of what I believe is a growing and highly sophisticated intelligence operation.

Let me now turn to our second fundamental mission, which is more apropos to today's hearing in the sense of strategic operational planning.

In my view, strategic operational planning fills a long-existing gap in government—and maybe it goes back to 1899—certainly one that has been present—the gap has been present for most of my four decades of government service.

Simply put, the White House has long been in the business of developing broad strategy policy. At the other end of the spectrum, the cabinet departments and agencies have been responsible for conducting operations in the field. What has been missing is a piece in between, a piece between policy and operations. That need has become even more obvious as we prosecute the global war on terror. Strategic operational planning is designed to fill that gap, as the Congress knows, because you established it. The goal of strategic operational planning is straightforward. Simply put, it is designed, as has been mentioned, to bring all elements of national power to bear on the war on terror.

Our charter in this regard is simple in description but extremely complex in execution. Basically, it involves three phases.

First, there is a planning process. This involves taking our national counterterrorism strategies and policies and translating them first into strategic goals, then into objectives and finally into discrete tasks. Those tasks are then to be prioritized and assigned to the departments and agencies, with lead and partner respon-

sibilities defined. This process is not a unilateral drafting exercise by NCTC. It is, rather, an interagency effort involving literally hundreds of departmental planners working under our leadership.

The second phase involves what the legislation describes as “interagency coordination of operational activities.” that has been alluded to here today. That involves coordination, integration and synchronization of departmental operations.

The final phase involves an assessment process. NCTC is charged by the President with monitoring, evaluating and assessing the execution and effectiveness of the plan and recommending changes where needed.

The bottom line is that this is to be a continuing iterative process, and there is great value in that process. As General Eisenhower once said and once noted, plans are nothing; planning is everything.

Mr. Chairman, that is a quick summary of the NCTC and our role in the global war on terror. We are in many ways a work in progress as we take on significant new responsibilities while continuing to perform ongoing tasks. As we often say, we are building an airplane while we are flying it. That said, I believe we have already made significant and measurable progress since our inception. We are fixing problems identified after 9/11 that the American people expect to be fixed. I believe we are providing a true value add which will only grow over time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Admiral.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Redd can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]

Mr. WELDON. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR HENRY A. CRUMPTON, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Congressman Weldon, Ranking Member Skelton, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will summarize my formal written statement and ask that you include my full testimony in the record.

Mr. WELDON. Without objection.

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Wars of the 20th century taught us the need for joint operations rather than separate Army, Navy, or air operations as manifest in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 9/11 taught us that we cannot afford to act as independent agencies. Our success against the enemy largely derives from our mastery of joint highly integrated operations that unify all the elements of national power into a coherent hold.

The strategy I outlined here today of building regional partnerships to confront transnational threats and working at the intersections of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security embodies the transformational diplomacy Secretary Rice outlined in her January 18th speech at Georgetown University.

The State Department is deeply committed to this regional comprehensive interagency approach. What we need to make it work is unity of effort as much as unity of command.

My personal commitment to interagency operations derives from my experiences working in many embassy country teams, being detailed to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) after the August 1998 bombings, and working hand in hand with U.S. military in Afghanistan immediately after September 11, 2001.

There, small groups of intelligence officers working closely with military and local partners developed an integrated strategy that killed or captured enemy leadership, denied terrorists safehaven and ultimately replaced the networks we destroyed with infinitely better institutions and the potential for a better future.

In general terms, al Qaeda and affiliated forces, the terrorist group which currently poses the greatest threat to the U.S., its allies and partners, represent a multi-layered threat. Our effort, therefore, is structured in multiple levels: a global campaign to counter al Qaeda, a series of regional cooperative efforts to deny terrorists safehaven, and numerous national security and development assistance operations designed to build liberal institutions, support the rule of law, and enhance our partners' capacity.

Key to this strategy is that we work with or through partners at every level, whenever possible.

How, in practical terms, do we accomplish this? Our ambassadors, as the President's personal representative abroad, are uniquely poised to bring all the elements of U.S. national power to bear against the terrorist enemy.

The interagency country teams, they oversee, develop strategies to help host nations understand the threat and to strengthen host government political will and capacity.

There are other examples of interdependent interagency teams working at local levels, such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs, operating both in Afghanistan and Iraq. As part of the State Department's transformational diplomacy, 100 slots, with more to follow, have been shifted to areas of counterterrorism concern.

But as I noted earlier, we need more local or national bilateral programs. With that in mind, we have worked with our interagency partners to develop regional strategies. For example, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative is a multi-year strategy aimed at defeating terrorist organizations throughout northern Africa. DOD, U.S. European Command (EUCOM)—specifically, State, USAID and others—contribute to this regional effort.

We are broadening this approach through a Regional Strategic Initiative, RSI, program designed to develop flexible networks of interconnected country teams. My office is working with ambassadors in key terrorist theaters of operation to assess the threat and devise interagency strategies and recommendations. These recommendations are key to promoting cooperation between our partners in the war on terror, between, as an example, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, as they look at terrorist safehaven in the Sulawesi Sea or between Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, Niger, Chad and Mali as they seek to counter the Group Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC).

We have had three regional conferences this year. More are scheduled for the coming months. These conferences are chaired by a regional group of ambassadors, with the Washington interagency

representatives in attendance. This, of course, includes representatives of the geographic combatant commanders, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Special Operations Command and, of course, the National Counterterrorism Center.

The State Department's Office of Political and Military Affairs has assigned political advisers to all the combatant commanders, and this program is growing.

Within my office, there are more active duty and reserve military officers detailed to our operations directorate than there are State Department officers. Moreover, we are also working with diplomatic security, USAID, the entire intelligence community, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of Treasury and others to integrate our efforts. These Washington-based interagency efforts in our Regional Strategic Initiatives must intersect to provide the best global strategic perspectives and resources with the best field perspectives and implementation.

In sum, terrorists exploit political, ethnic, communal, and economic grievances. Bringing terrorist leadership to justice, denying terrorists safehaven and addressing the conditions they exploit are key. This is the case on a policy level also. Our counterterrorism agenda and our freedom agenda are linked in real and strategic terms. It is also true on a practical level.

We are working well in improving our cooperation in Washington. However, our best means of countering the multilayered terrorist threat is via coordinated networks of interagency teams operating under the ambassadors' authority; and we in Washington must support our ambassadors in the field because they can integrate diplomacy, intelligence, military power, economic assistance and the rule of law against the enemy.

This need for interagency operations goes far beyond mere coordination or cooperation. It demands that we plan, conduct, and structure operations from the very outset as part of an intimately connected whole-of-government approach. We are not there yet, but we have made progress.

Mr. Chairman, that completes the formal part of my remarks; and I welcome your questions or comments.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crumpton can be found in the Appendix on page 53.]

Mr. WELDON. We want to thank all four of you for your outstanding service for your country as well as for your testimony today. We will note for the record that Admiral Giambastiani has a commitment, a hard time of 6 p.m. that he has to leave, so I will just advise my colleagues that we will adhere to that commitment.

Just one question to start off; and I guess, Admiral Redd, perhaps you are the one to answer this question.

One of the concerns I have had for—first of all, the work that you are doing, to me, is the most critical work, to protect the national security of this country that we have in America. It is absolutely the number one priority to have this integration of capabilities and this coordination and collaboration between agencies. As I said, it has been a key priority of this committee since back in the late 1990's, both in terms of words and hearings and by action that we

took in—my recollection is three successive defense bills before 9/11 to have this capability in place.

One of the concerns I had during the 1990's was that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was not using open source information as a part of their national intelligence estimates; and oftentimes you can get some of the best information involving terrorism or terrorist activities from open source, non-U.S. based data. So my question to you, Admiral Redd, is does the NCTC now have a non-U.S.-based open source capability and are we using that perhaps for—you talked about the classified systems that we have. And I am not talking about a U.S. database. I am talking about non-U.S. open source information and who is doing that, those assessments, if it is in practice and in place?

Admiral REDD. First of all, let me say, obviously, I agree with your comments. I came back into government after being retired for about eight years for that reason. Before I came to the National Counterterrorism Center, I was the executive director of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission; and one of our recommendations was exactly on that subject, as you may recall. That is, that the use of open source, particularly as the world has changed and we fight terrorism, open source is absolutely critical.

One of our 74 recommendations, of which the President accepted I think 72, was to create, to establish an Open Source Center (OSC). That has now been done, and the Central Intelligence Agency is where it resides. And, yes, we use that information routinely.

All of my analysts have the ability to go online. We have the OSC. The President's daily brief on occasion will have an Open Source Center item. So that well-recognized need I would say has been implemented and implemented pretty effectively. We use that. In fact, the whole Intelligence Community receives that now.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

The chairman is going to have a number of questions when he arrives, so I am going to defer to the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Admiral Redd, in listening to your testimony, let me ask you a basic question; and we will get to the subject at hand in just a minute. Would you tell us, is the goal of the insurgency in Iraq the same goal as the al Qaeda terrorist?

Admiral REDD. Is the goal of the insurgents in Iraq the same goal as the al Qaeda terrorists?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral REDD. There is certainly a strong congruence there.

Mr. SKELTON. Just say yes or no; and then give me the reasons, please.

Admiral REDD. Let me ask you one question then, sir. When you say al Qaeda, you mean al Qaeda central leadership? I would say there is about a 90 percent overlap.

Mr. SKELTON. You mentioned that it was a religious thing in your testimony. Is the insurgency in Iraq a religious—have a religious purpose?

Admiral REDD. A good part of the motivation, I would submit to you, sir, in the insurgency in general in Iraq as well as the terrorists, both the foreign and the indigenous, certainly use a religious motivation as their rationale for much of what they do.

Much of the discussion we see, as you know, and there has been some things in the press recently about, for example, about Zarqawi and his relationship with Zawahiri, there has been a discussion over the religious motivation for that. So I would say there is clearly an element of that, a dimension of that which is pretty strong, yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Admiral Giambastiani, the QDR emphasizes the importance of interagency capacity; and General Pace, as you know, has spoken before this committee about the need to develop and reward civilian experts that will complement the military side and also spoke about the need for coordinating interagency planning.

Your testimony, Admiral, focuses narrowly on existing training and equipping authorities and on supporting the State Coordinator For Reconstruction Securities, also known as SCRS. Admiral, why doesn't the Defense Department have much broader recommendations in light of what was said in the QDR, on the one hand, and General Pace on the other?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I understand your question, why doesn't the Department have broader recommendations like General Pace has suggested, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. And the QDR. It is a two-fold thing. And for the recommendations that follow the words of General Pace and the QDR.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I am still a little bit confused—

Mr. SKELTON. Let me try again. The QDR emphasized the importance of interagency capacity.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Correct.

Mr. SKELTON. General Pace has spoken before this committee about that, about the need for coordinated interagency planning. But your testimony focuses narrowly on existing train and equip authorities and on supporting the state Coordinator For Reconstruction and Security. Where are the broad recommendations that are referred to in the QDR and referred to by General Pace?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Sir, what I would tell you is, rather than repeating everything that has been written in here from page 83 through 92, which I am incredibly familiar with, having helped put this together for 6 months, I did not repeat everything that was in here. However, I would tell you that this unity of effort section I am firmly committed to everything written in here.

In fact, what we are doing, as I mentioned in my testimony, is that we have put—we are putting together a roadmap or what we say is called building partner capacity. In that roadmap for building partner capacity there is a whole section in here that talks about strengthening interagency planning and operations, and then the other half is how we deal with our international allies and partners.

That is why I didn't put it in here. It is implied, but I did not restate it.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. HEFLEY [presiding]. Thank you, gentlemen.

Right after 9/11, there was big criticism about lack of cooperation between the various agencies and particularly the various intelligence agencies. And I guess from your testimony, although you

talk about what you are doing and you are trying to coordinate and you are making progress in certain areas, if you asked me to walk out of here right now and tell someone that, yeah, we have overcome that and there is a sharing of information and the agencies are working together, I wouldn't be able to do that.

I guess I want—my question is, should I be able to do that? Should I be able to walk out of this room and say, yeah, I am really excited that our various agencies, including the intelligence agencies, the defense agencies, the State Department and on and on and on are really working together as a team now and don't have the proprietary attitude that they have had in the past, the stove-pipe attitude that they have had in the past? What should I tell people if I leave the room with this?

Admiral REDD. Let me give you two very concrete examples, if I could, which I alluded to on the intelligence side.

The first is this database. Pre-9/11, there were four or five different database of suspected terrorists. They were spread among at least four departments. They were disconnected, and they were incomplete. Today, there is a consolidated database which we keep at NCTC which is all source, highly classified, goes into the most sensitive information we have from every intelligence agency. We take an unclassified extract of that, ship it to the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center, and that then becomes the single basis for the no-fly list, the visa list that Customs uses, all the other, the Border Patrol, et cetera. So that is a very concrete major change.

The second thing has to do just in intelligence, if you would, which has to do with sharing intelligence. Again, before 9/11, very often the way you saw—from my experience, the way you saw a sensitive piece of information or even a piece of analysis from another agency which was hand-carried to you as a hard copy and usually very time late.

We take in at NCTC today on those 28 networks, many of which are classified and connect to all the intelligence agencies and many agencies not part of the intelligence community, we bring in all of their intelligence. We take in their documented or—I am sorry—their disseminated intelligence. That may be a final analysis piece done for a policy level. It may be an intelligence report on something which has great tactical and immediate value. We take that, put it up on one Web site called NCTC On-Line, or NOL; and that is available to analysts throughout the community. Right now, it is more than about 5,500.

So if you are cleared and you know you do have a pipe, the beauty of it is you can come to that website for whatever your pipe is. Whether it is JWICS at classified defense level, SIPRNET, FBINET, whatever agency you are in, you can come in. So an analyst from, for example, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) or Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and State can come in, pick a subject and see what every other agency has written about that, and it is available instantaneously, they can search and shred it.

So those are two very concrete things and very positive things that have changed since 9/11.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Redd, we appreciate the fine work that you do as the director for the National Counterterrorism Center.

There has been talk about maybe placing the National Counterterrorism Center within the National Security Council. Do you feel that this would just create another bureaucracy and not strengthen the intercommunication coordination? How do you feel about that?

Admiral REDD. Well, two things.

First of all, I think it is good to make a distinction. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, in my 40 years in government there has always been sort of a gap. There has been strategy and policy done rightly by the White House, by the National Security Council, operations by the Department.

What has happened over the years is there is a natural tendency, because that planning piece has been missing—in the past, it has been easier perhaps to get passes, just like we used to do in the military. We used to do, Army, you go here; and, Navy, you go here. But as we get more and more involved in this sort of internet transnational operation, there is a need for a planning process.

I would submit that you want to have a bit of an air gap, if you will, between those. Policy and strategy done up here, and planning done at the NCTC. Operations, obviously, continue to be done by the departments and agencies. So I think that is kind of the way you want to do it.

At the end of the day, though, Congressman, you know the authority that the NCTC has, the authority that the National Security Council has, whether it is writing policy, whether it is coordinating operations, derives from the United States. So, ultimately, the goal is that we can get as much of the coordination done at a lower level, closer to the operators, but in those events or those instances where you can't get that done, then you kick it up sometimes to the National Security Council and ultimately, if it is required, up to the President.

Mr. ORTIZ. This is a question for all of you, and maybe you could give me a little input. Would you support increasing the legal authorities and bureaucratic resources available to the National Security Council?

Admiral REDD. The question is, would you support the additional resources to the NSC?

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, sir.

Admiral REDD. You want to take a shot at that, Admiral?

I think the NSC, sir, I would comment in terms of authorities, because it derives its authorities from the President and probably has a pretty good handle on what resources it needs. I personally don't see a need to increase that, but I would let the NSC speak for themselves, sir.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I think, as you know, Congressman Ortiz, we send a number of military personnel and DOD civilians to the National Security Council to support the National Security Adviser and the staff; and we continue to do that. As a matter of fact, we are just recently detailing a Navy one star over to the national security division there, so I would tell you we are involved in this constantly.

I am not aware of any additional requirements that they have asked us for. I did receive a call on this one individual, and we go work them right away when we need to.

So that is all I am aware of, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As we look back and begin to where we began to see the threat change, there were some people in Washington, in the Pentagon and the Congress, who thought that we might want to begin to change the construct of our national security force. By national security force, of course, most of us were thinking in those days of the Department of Defense and CIA and intelligence-gathering apparatus.

But not much happened for a long time. If you look back to the middle 1980's, things were quiet; and, after some years, 1990, Secretary Cheney came here and said he had good news and bad news. He said, the good news is the Soviet Union is going to go away. He said, the bad news is the threat isn't. It is just going to change. And the institutions in this town didn't change much until something happened in 2001 to make us change.

Shortly after 2001, a retired Army Colonel by the name of Doug MacGregor wrote a book about how to transform the Army. It was called *Transformation Under Fire*, and the book talked about changing the divisional structure to brigade combat team structure. It talked about making us more mobile, and it said that we were going to get this done essentially because 9/11 mandated that we get it done.

So we have been talking now about how to change. Over the past several years, we have been talking about the necessity of coordinating other agencies with DOD and intelligence collection; and I would make the same point that MacGregor makes about the Army.

We don't have a choice. We need to do these things; and, as painful as they may be institutionally, we need to get them done. And I would just like to ask you what you think we ought to do in order to really start this ball rolling. And I might say that we means all of us. Because we are talking about changing the Administration, and so we need to work with the Administration.

As partners in this change that we have to do, how would you each suggest that we proceed?

Why don't we start with you, Admiral Giambastiani?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you, sir.

I might mention—Congressman Ortiz, I hate to do this—but we recently sent our number one analyst—I forgot about this—my best analyst, a senior executive service (SES), on a request by them for a one-year assignment. I lost this person for one year as of the first of February.

Congressman Saxton, I am sorry to use the time there, sir, but, very quickly, I will tell you, first of all, the best time to transform, in my personal view, is when you are doing something that requires it.

For example, we are in this global war on terror now. There is no doubt in anybody's mind, for example, in those Army brigades,

battalions out in our armed forces, the need for transforming in the middle of operations right now. The impetus is clear. They understand it. I think the people that participate back here also understand this necessity for transmission, and what I will tell you is that there is a variety of ways that we can start.

One of them is, I already told you, is that we think inside of the Department there are things we need to do. For example, we are working with other agencies to provide planners. We have seven planners right now over working for Admiral Redd at the NCTC. Plus, we have 20 intelligence personnel assigned over there from—27 from DOD that I am aware of.

In addition, we are currently looking at how we can increase this planning capability in other agencies, which are very important.

So we are looking with the State Department on not only what we have there now, but how to increase the planners. These are at the level of day-to-day planning and operations levels. We also are working on what we call joint interagency coordinating groups and how to embed them in our combatant commands to help tie together U.S. interagency operations overseas at the combatant commander level. Clearly there is a need for those at a higher level within the government. But the planning functions that I talked about and that Congressman Skelton mentioned before are incredibly important in each one these departments.

What I would suggest for you is that when you all mandated Goldwater-Nichols 20 years ago, as a result of this we have created in the Department with your authority a number of institutions such as a Joint Forces Command and a Joint Warfighting Center to do joint organize, train and equip. One of the questions you would ask yourself is what dedicated organizations out there wake up every single morning with the people in them and worry about how to do interagency organize, train and equip? You have created NCTC, the National Counterterrorism Center as an institution that worries about planning and intel integration on a daily basis, but there are broader institutions than that, I would suggest, as one parallel.

Admiral REDD. I would add, I think, the instructive that when the Congress wrote the legislation a little over a year ago, that when the term “strategic operational planning” was used, nobody was quite sure what it meant. It took half a year to figure out what it meant.

I think that is sort of indicative of where we have come from, the planning in the context the way the military did it. And my last job on active duty was as a J-5, the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy. We grew up in a culture of planning, but it is different in every agency.

So putting this together, this SOP, strategic operational planning together, has been pretty interesting. For example, we have—as the Admiral indicated, we have a number of people from DOD. My head planner is sitting right behind me, an active duty two-star officer. We have had over 200 people in from the other agencies around the government, and writing is one of our major plans, for example. Part of that is an education process, but a lot is getting people to say common picture, we are going to start with the same common operational picture in military terms, and here is what we

mean by planning, and here is where you come together, and that process, to use the Eisenhower quote again, is so incredibly valuable.

Now, I think you remember from the legislation Jack Bauer does not live at NCTC, we don't do operations. We are precluded from directing operations, although we do interagency coordination. There may be a time that we may look at a next phase, which is sort of a Goldwater-Nichols, too, and the whole government, but, again, the analogy is we are building an airplane while we are flying it right now.

The strategic operational planning is going to bring a tremendous value, and in some ways already has, to the government.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I could add one other thing, Mr. Saxton. Another one of these types of institutions where you build a culture of this interagency jointness culture on a day-to-day basis is National Defense University on the educational side. Congressman Skelton has been such a strong supporter of these types of institutions and our war colleges.

One of the ways is to potentially look at that as a National Security University. We have an awful lot of interagency and state folks who attend there, and others, but one potential is that.

Another way is to embed a culture of lessons learned across the different departments. This is very important, and we have worked extensively in the interagency right now with Homeland Security Council, with the National Security Council to embed a broader lessons learned culture, one that actually looks at what and critiques what problems we have. So you can build that culture of jointness.

Secretary O'CONNELL. Congressman Saxton, if I could, a few observations on jointness and things we are doing differently today. I have counternarcotics as one of my portfolio missions, as you know, and I like to look at our Key West counternarcotics elements commanded by a coast guard officer as a potential model for how we do some of these future interagency operations. It doesn't get a lot of attention because the just, quote, drugs, but I think that model is springing up elsewhere and is being effective particularly in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and some of the searches against high-value targets.

We are transforming how the military does foreign assistance. We have got to be more agile in terms of how we train and equip and help other nations to build capacity, and I think it is noteworthy that Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense have agreed on a joint way forward that I think is going to be very helpful to the department and to our allies.

We have little problems all over the place that we are trying to solve by putting specific task forces against them. One is intelligence on narcotics poppy in Afghanistan. We have teamed with the Brits and DEA to put a cell in London that I think will produce good results against that problem set. Similarly, threat financing is something that we in the Department do not have a lot of expertise on, but we have found that by working with Treasury and working with State and also Justice, the Attorney General, we can put some elements of our military power against that particular target, and we are finding our way through that because we are

truly not expert. But without our interagency partners, we would have really no chance in being successful there.

So those are just a few ways that I think we are moving in the right direction, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Yes. Admiral Giambastiani, this afternoon I sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman asking specifically about the vision for the suggested National Defense University to become a National Security University, and seeking the recommendation in concert with the mission of the National War College and the College of Armed Forces. I will supply a copy of that letter to you. Good. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, sir.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. As always, sir, we are ready to discuss it, and General Pace will talk to you, as I will. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I thank you for being here. There is one comment before a couple of questions. A couple of you mentioned the issue that we have on this side of the table, which is we have got some jurisdictional problems, too, and I agree with that 100 percent. I recollect Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testifying here. I recall Secretary of State Powell testifying here. We have never had Secretary of State Rice testify before this committee, and yet I think everyone in the country is aware that we have got some real issues in terms of who does what in Iraq, and yet we don't look into that.

Some time ago I had suggested, I don't remember if it was to Chairman Hunter or a previous chairman, that I thought our subcommittees ought to have a bit of a geographic overlay; that the subcommittee on terrorism would also have some kind of geographic responsibility for Asia, and the other subcommittee might have responsibilities for Latin America, just so that we would force ourself to look at a total picture. It was another great idea that went straight to hell. That happens sometimes. I thought it would help.

It is not in your interest today, but we have a problem, as you may know. The veterans committee has jurisdiction over the GI bill for veterans. This committee has jurisdiction over the GI bill for our reserve components troops, and we—because we can't get together, our reserve component guys who qualify are getting hurt in the process and being treated poorly, but that is an issue we have to work out. So we have got some issues with regard to our jurisdiction.

One of the issues that came up, Ambassador Crumpton, is throughout the testimony there is a lot of references to partnership and cooperation and all this kind of thing. When I think about the football huddle, they don't work by partnership or cooperation, they work by who calls the play. Ambassador, you specifically mentioned the ambassador. You put a lot of emphasis on the ambassador being the play caller.

A few years ago I was in Sierra Leone right as the U.N. forces were moving in to take over after the rebels were pretty much defeated, and we had at that time three U.S. troops there providing training. One of them was a Marine, and he was a typical tough Marine, but he was so exasperated because when he had flown into

the country on a helicopter, in his words, a little old lady, I think it was a robust retiree who found a second career, and he said literally was wearing a neck collar because she was having some problem. They landed in Freetown. They come off the helicopter. She is picked up because she worked for some private citizen, and she is whisked off 60 miles away in Sierra Leone. He is forbidden—and the ambassador could not do anything about these regulations—he was forbidden from staying anywhere overnight except in Freetown because of the orders that had come from other Marines outside of the country. There was a very great frustration.

We got that worked out after I got back, but it brought home to me while the ambassador may be a direct representative of the President, there is not, as you know, a clear chain of command.

Do you have any comments on what role our ambassador should have? It is one thing to say they represent the President, but there is a lot of people that have lines of authority that the ambassador cannot cut through. What is your comment on that?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Sir, I think of the examples where we are having some counterterrorism (CT) success, where we have got strong ambassadorial leadership in the field, where they are able to lead and able to pull together interagency teams.

In terms of empowering ambassadors, I think the effort we are making through this regional strategic initiative is a step in that direction because it helps them partner better with the combatant commanders, who are basically organized in regional teams. Also, I think we empower them through linking them closely to NCTC, the operational planning that is being done there. NCTC is doing some great work, and we have detailed some of our people into the strategic operations planning entity. But you have got to bring that to the field, and you have got to bring the field back to Washington in terms of recommendations and in terms of implementation. I think that is how we empower the ambassadors.

What I would like to do, in fact, is I would like to bring them back to Washington in the near future and have them meet with members of Congress and explain their perspectives, their challenges, and how we can all work more closely together.

Dr. SNYDER. Would you give three or four specific examples from Iraq, from our experience in Iraq the last three years where we have had a failure of interagency cooperation that we wish we had done better on? Some very specific examples, please, that may or may not have been corrected.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I could address your comments on the chain of command for that Marine first. The chain of command for the Marine happens to be from the President down through the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commander, and he has a chain of command underneath. So I just want to make clear that is the military chain of command. There is no other chain of command. I think that is very important for all of us to understand that.

The second thing is if I could take this question for the record, I would be happy to submit it for you, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. All right. That subjects us to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) scrubbing, but that is okay, I guess.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 79.]

Dr. SNYDER. Let me make a comment. If I might respond to what you said about the Marine. One of three U.S. troops in the country, only three, and it means with that being the chain of command, without having some kind of delegation to the ambassador or something, that it means an individual troop is going to have to somehow go up the chain of command when he is only one of three troops in a designated country.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I don't know the specific example well, but what I would tell you, if it was a member of the embassy team, that is one issue. If he is put in as an individual augmentee, that is a different situation on who his command is. If he went in as part of the embassy team, which is directed out of the Marine Corps headquarters, that is one issue, but generally for all military it is as I described it.

Dr. SNYDER. I understand.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your testimony.

Admiral Redd, you said that we are winning many battles that the public likely won't know about. Is that because we are not telling them because they are classified? What did you mean by that?

Admiral REDD. Because they are classified. Because they are classified.

Mr. KLINE. I won't ask you now in this venue, but I hope we will have the opportunity to learn what some of those battles were and see if we can't declassify some of that for the people to know. It is unfortunate that you all, all of us are engaged in a war, global war, against Islamist extremists and winning battles and don't even know we are fighting them. If you can get back to me with a way we might be able to do something about that.

Admiral Redd, you mentioned in the context of the strategic planning effort that you work it down to discrete tasks. Does that mean that you are tasking other agencies, that you have employees there that come from other agencies? What does that mean that you are giving discrete tasks?

Admiral REDD. NCTC—this is not an NCTC-originated thing. We provide the leadership, but, for example, we have maybe 100, 200 planners from State Department, DOD, different parts. They come together. So this is an interagency effort which we provide the venue and leadership and some of the connectivity.

What I referred to is taken directly out of legislation. Take the strategy and policy, break it down to goals, next to objectives, then to discrete tasks. Once we get to that task, which in some ways gets to some of the issues we have heard here today, and say, okay, that is a task which by legislation and by common consent or, if necessary, the President's final decision, that is a task that, say, State Department should have the lead on, and everybody understands that, but DOD and CIA or another department should be in support. So just, A, defining the task, saying who has got the lead and who is in support is a pretty major thing.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. Let me see if I understand this right. Obviously if it gets to the President, the President could order every agency, I understand that. But as a working matter when you are assigning—finding and assigning a discrete task, that is being accepted and acted on as an assignment, it is being done?

Admiral REDD. It is being accepted as that is the plan, and that is what it is going to be, and in many cases—this is a work in progress, by the way, but in the plans—

Mr. KLINE. I understand, but we are trying to get to the point, you have seen the question asked in a number of different ways, who is the quarterback, who is calling the plays?

Admiral REDD. We just sent you a thing called a National Strategy for Combating Terrorist Travel, and that is a classified document. We hope we get an unclassified version. In there it breaks it down, and we see those objectives and tasks and the lead. The lead may be in many cases State; may be Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or FBI with that. Those are done. At the end of the day, that plan was taken to the White House, to the National Security Council, for final blessing, so all the agencies voted, and the President made the decision.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you.

Admiral Giambastiani, you said in your testimony, and you have addressed a couple of times here, the road map, which will be ready soon. Forces may ask what is soon? If you can answer that. Are we talking about weeks, months?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. We figured we would be completed with a road map within six months of the issuance of the QDR report. We are two months along, and we not only have this road map, but we have seven others.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. That is good. Thank God for global positioning systems (GPS).

On this road map, this interagency road map, this is addressing more than intelligence interagency. This is Department of Agriculture (USDA), State, USAID, all that; is that correct?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir. There is, again, two main components of it. One of them is to build partner capacity with the interagency partners inside the U.S. Government.

Mr. KLINE. But all of them.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, sir.

And the second part is to build capacity with international allies and coalition members.

Mr. KLINE. Perfect. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much.

I think this issue of interagency coordination that we all kind of jumped into as part of the committee QDR was an eye-opener, so I appreciate your being here.

I wanted to continue, Admiral Giambastiani, for a second on the National Defense University and just to be sure that that is not necessarily including a name change to National Security University without all that must go along with it. So partly could you discuss the extent to which it is mostly semantic, and perhaps some

of that is somewhat superficial, and whether or not it really represents a real change in the way we train people?

I would also like you to address whether there are some intended consequences here, because I think that NDU has done such an incredible job in training our future military leaders, and I am wondering if there would be some—I don't know if I call negative consequences, but certainly some change that we might take away from that role that NDU has really used so well. Could you please comment on that, and I will have some other questions.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. First of all, as you point out, this is, once again, a complex issue. We have worked extensively with Mr. Skelton over a lot of years because of his tremendous interest in this area, and he knows this subject backwards and forwards.

If I were to look at the National Defense University and how we evolved to this point, there are various components over there, the National War College. We have the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, for example. We have the Joint Forces Staff College, which is down in Norfolk, Virginia. There is a series of components that work there for the president of NDU, who then reports to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

There are no—first of all, it is such a complex issue that there are no end states that we have come up with right now. These are thoughts on how to build dedicated organizations inside the federal government that not only perform what NDU is designed to perform for the military and for the Department of Defense, but our military officers in the joint culture; that this is complex enough where this is not something we certainly would do overnight, and there have been no decisions made on it.

But the point is, and I think Congressman Skelton brought it up in his letter, you bring it up now, there are potentially unintended consequences about diluting and reducing the effectiveness of that with regard to what our military officers do. So this is not something that is going to happen overnight. There is quite a bit of de-liberation. But I would tell you that is an honest and forthright effort to try to help and work with the rest of the interagency to build this joint culture that Congress has been so effective in instituting here over this past 20 years with Goldwater-Nichols. The question is how can we then bring the joint culture to the interagency without diluting it inside DOD. That is a substantial question to answer.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I appreciate that, and I think at the state level as well at one of the hearings it was interesting to talk about the kind of staying power of the military in Iraq versus the staying power of the State Department, because we can't put some of those same requests really on our diplomats, on our ambassadors there. That probably plays into it as well in terms of the training and how you can assure that the kind of investment that is being made there would also be carried through at different levels.

I don't know whether you would like to comment.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I could add another one, Mrs. Davis. We have outside of the National Defense University tried to extend this through a series of training events, exercises, not just in the education realm. We have created a joint task force commander training course inside the Department of Defense called PIN-

NACLE. What is interesting about this is it is designed for our two- and three-star military officers who are going to be joint task force commanders, but I created this down with my staff at Joint Forces Command about a year and a half ago, almost two years ago now, and we have had a series of these courses, and we have had State Department reps there every time at the senior level. The current Ambassador to Albania was my first State Department rep. We have had very senior people out of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Coast Guard is always there. It is primarily designed for our U.S. military joint task force (JTF) commanders, but because so much of their job is to work in an allied and interagency way, you must, in fact, include those folks.

And what I would tell you is we have also extended to other members within the interagency our CAPSTONE course for brand new flag and general officers, which we have had around now—I attended it back in February of 1994. And I would tell you there is an extension of these to try to bring these on. So it is not just the educational piece that is important, it is a very comprehensive piece across the board.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. My time is up, but I certainly appreciate what you are doing and how important that is not just to our homeland security, disaster preparedness, as well as to national security.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gibbons.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Let me ask for a very brief answer on this question from each of you.

Knowing that in the global war on terror nearly every instrument of national power is going to be applied to the global war on terror, in each of your mind which agency should take the lead role in the global war on terror domestically, and then abroad as well? Very briefly.

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Internationally, I believe that when you look at all the instruments of statecraft and how that is pulled together, I think the ambassadors are uniquely poised, as I noted, but it also depends on where we are. If you are in a combat environment, as Iraq, clearly the military has the lead. In most other countries when you talk about pulling this together, I think that falls upon the ambassador.

Bear in mind, sir, that counterterrorism policies and operations are not planned or executed in a vacuum, they are part of broader geopolitical concerns, and that must be factored into the implementation of these policies. I will defer to others regarding the lead in the domestic field.

Admiral REDD. I am going to maintain my honest broker role. That is something very hard right now. At the level you described, at the 200,000-foot level, it is a very difficult answer. When you break it down to the 20,000-foot or 50,000 level, it becomes a little more obvious in many cases.

Mr. GIBBONS. Who is taking the lead role domestically?

Admiral REDD. Law enforcement today would probably say the FBI, the Department of Defense, and if it is otherwise than that, Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. GIBBONS. Admiral.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Sir, with regard to the homeland, I would concur with what Admiral Redd just told you on the homeland side. With regard to obviously the war zones, it is clear where we work these, and we have a chain down through the Department of Defense. When we have a chief of mission, for example, in a non-war-zone area, the chief of mission and the combatant commander work closely together. Who is the lead?

Specifically for what the military does, it is the President through the Secretary of Defense, and we work in close coordination or integration, depending on the situation, with the State Department is the best thing I can tell you right now.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. O'Connell.

Secretary O'CONNELL. I, of course, agree with the Vice Chairman. There are gray areas. The interagency is discussing it. It would be quite a different issue if you were operating, let's say, in a Jordan how you might deal with that particular government, as opposed to the problems that might be posed in Somalia where there is no viable government or no representation.

Mr. GIBBONS. Let me go back to Mr. Redd, since you have got—Admiral Redd. We have just gone through the Zacarias Moussaoui's trial, and it has been reported that somewhere along the line the FBI agent in charge of that investigation attempted numerous times, and I have been told up to 70 times, to obtain a warrant to search the hard drive of his computer, but yet he was denied. What went on there? Why was that an issue?

Admiral REDD. Congressman, in all honesty I don't know the answer to that. I can pass that to the FBI or have somebody get back to you. That was well before there was an NCTC. I don't know the answer.

Mr. GIBBONS. Prior to 9/11, right?

Admiral REDD. Yes, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. Let me in the brief time I have left go back down the aisle and start with Mr. O'Connell. Name the three core competencies you would expect each agency to contribute to the global war on terror. Just three. I don't want a litany of 20, just 3. Top three.

Secretary O'CONNELL. Agility, honesty, and professionalism.

Mr. GIBBONS. Admiral.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. What I would say is that each of these agencies are going to have to learn and bring an ability to do integrated planning with the rest of us. They will have to be able to do the manning and resourcing necessary to conduct interagency operations, some would say expeditionary; and their ability to conduct operations in a joint interagency way as we move forward; and, finally, to share information in a way that is useful across the entire government and potentially with our allies and coalition members.

Mr. GIBBONS. Admiral Redd.

Admiral REDD. I would give you the same three qualities I would expect in a topnotch leader: Vision to understand the significance of what they are doing, excellence to do it well, and teamwork. Work together.

Mr. GIBBONS. Ambassador.

Ambassador CRUMPTON. First and foremost, virtue. That includes knowing ourselves and knowing our partners in the interagency. Second, leadership through partnership, through teamwork, and, third, understanding the global battlespace and all of our foreign partners and how we can best work together.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, gentlemen. My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. General Wayne Downing is quoted in the *New York Times* on the 31st of last month, and I will read the quote to you. It regards his new classified study for the Secretary of Defense. I will read his quote to you, and I will ask each one of you individually if you agree with what he said or if you disagree with what he said, and if you wish to add additional comments after you state whether you agree or disagree, you may do so.

General Downing said this: "Over the years the interagency system has become so lethargic and dysfunctional that it materially inhibits the ability to provide the vast power of the U.S. Government on problems. You see this inability to synchronize in our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, across our foreign policy, and in our response to Katrina."

Ambassador Crumpton, agree or disagree?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. I disagree, and I have got great respect for General Downing, worked with him closely for years, but I think the interagency system is not lethargic and dysfunctional. I think it needs improvement, and we are working toward that end both in the field and here in Washington.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Admiral Redd.

Admiral REDD. I had lunch with Wayne about a week ago.

Mr. SKELTON. I didn't ask about lunch. Do you agree or disagree?

Admiral REDD. I disagree with him, for the basic same reason Ambassador Crumpton gave to you. There has been a lot of progress. It could be better, but I think it has gotten much better, if you will. I can remember 20 years ago, and we have come a long way since then.

Mr. SKELTON. Admiral.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I disagree, and I disagree because he said it has become more lethargic. In my experience it has actually become more active. That doesn't mean it is anywhere near where it should be.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Secretary.

Secretary O'CONNELL. I agree with the fact that General Downing was uniquely placed to make that observation, but it was some time ago, but he was fulfilling a critical role in the interagency.

But I would agree with Admiral Giambastiani that there have been significant improvements. Every week I sit with people like Ambassador Crumpton, General Schlessler behind me, other assistant secretaries from Treasury, people from the FBI, assistant directors, and we work through very, very difficult issues that are not just difficult for the interagency to look at, but are difficult for our deputies and sometimes our principles to come up with the right recommendation for the President.

A simple issue like manpads or shoulder-fired air defense weapons, the policy on those goes from everything to the FBI, State De-

partment, across the Defense Department, Treasury. All those work together to try to come up with the best recommendation for the President. I think the system is better than when General Downing was in his previous position, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask each of you this question: Can you give us a concrete example where another agency worked well and an example where it did not work well and what we learned from those examples?

Ambassador Crumpton.

Ambassador CRUMPTON. The first example of working well is in the spring of 2002 in southern Afghanistan where a CIA source identified enemy movement out of a village predicted at dawn. U.S. Navy responded with a P3 surveillance aircraft over that village; therefore, the mission was handed off to a CIA-operated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which in turn was able to inform a ground team consisting of CIA Special Forces and Afghans that interdicted the enemy convoy which left that village, which brought time for a Navy SEAL team to deploy and, working with that UAV platform, interdict and destroy an enemy convoy.

Mr. SKELTON. Can you give us an example where the inter-agency—an example where it did not work well?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. If you look at Iraq, if you look at how we sought to work through a number of issues both political and military, including intelligence, I think there are examples there of where the interagency failed.

Mr. SKELTON. Admiral Redd.

Admiral REDD. The example I would give you of success is one which I can't state a lot about in the open forum, but one you will certainly appreciate. First of all, it has a characteristic which is the area where we think that the interagency or NCTC has a particular role. This is in the issue of the use of the Internet by the terrorists and how to counter that. It is an instance where no one agency is a big dog, if you will, has the ability or authority to do it, but all of them rely on each other. And in this particular case the interagency has come together in a very effective, which, again, most of it classified, but a very effective way so everybody that needs everybody else is able to get those authorities together.

I guess I would take a little bit of what Ambassador Crumpton said on the negative side. I was Ambassador Bremer's deputy in Baghdad for about two and a half months. Somebody said bureaucracies do things well the second and subsequent times. That was the first time we tried to run a country in about 50 or 60 years, and it was a slow start and one of the hardest things I have had to do.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. On the successful example, I would use any number of provincial reconstruction teams inside Afghanistan. I think in general they have been a success. In fact, they have been such a success that NATO is coming in and taking this example, and they are, in fact, taking over many of the provincial reconstruction teams around the country and have been doing this for a period of two and a half years now where the idea was conceived inside the United States with the USAID representatives, State Department, other international folks embedded in them.

I could give you specific examples of road construction and many others, and I would be happy to talk to you about them, but in general the concept of using these reconstruction teams has been very successful, and that is why it is being carried forward.

On the negative side I would tell you that I think we have gone through fits and starts of police training in particular inside both Afghanistan at an international and national level inside the inter-agency, and we wound up having to take over police training here in the Department of Defense as a lead agency within the government here about four months ago, and we are now using the same techniques for training the police as we are doing and have been doing for a good period of time with the Army where we are embedding training teams and the rest. So that was not a success, not successful.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Secretary.

Secretary O'CONNELL. I think an area where we can look back and reflect that the interagency may have done a better job was with the assessment of the condition of the Iraqi infrastructure. I think that it was considerably weakened. I was not in the office then, but I looked at that as a member of industry, and I think perhaps certainly the interagency came up short.

I would say there was a whole rank of successful interagency activities that take place every week within the counterterrorism subgroup, just recently a very deliberative process, I think, with a successful conclusion to designate Al Manar as a terrorist entity. A lot of work, lot of research and efforts by not only people in State, in Treasury and in law enforcement to come up with that recommendation for the President. That is a small example of something that takes place every week, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, gentlemen, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

One of my responsibilities on our committee QDR was to look at catastrophic disasters and the interplay between the military and state and local government. And I know you were asked something similarly about who is in charge and how could we better plan for that. When you think about those disasters, could you give a kind of grade, I guess, in relationship perhaps to the core competencies that you discussed earlier? Are we in a place that you think that we have taken hold of those and that you think that the military is able to integrate and plan with our national and State and local authorities, or are we at a real beginning stage with that? How would you change it? What would you do?

Secretary O'CONNELL. Let me start quickly with not commenting on the domestic, because that is not my portfolio. Assistant Secretary Paul McHale and Ambassador Giambastiani would be better to comment.

Overseas we have had a process that we have worked on with the combatant commanders, foreign consequence management, where let us say you had a disaster like in India that took place again. There are certain things that the combatant commander may be able to offer and may be able to use immediately to mitigate the effects of that disaster. He has certain authorities, of course, some going back to the Secretary, to take what actions he

can in conjunction with the host government to use U.S. forces, resources and other applications to try to mitigate that particular type of disaster.

The same would be true of let us say a nuclear release that might be inadvertent. Those things that could be used by the combatant commander overseas would be used not only for protection of U.S. personnel, but for the protection and safety of the indigenous population. We have those procedures in effect.

It is very difficult to protect what is going to be next or how it will unfold, but at least we think about it and we do work on it. In fact, we are planning an exercise in the next month and a half with each combatant commander to do a tabletop on that.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Would you—just to follow up quickly, would you say the same thing about the control and prevention of infectious diseases? Where are we in relationship with that globally?

Secretary O'CONNELL. Let me tell you something that I can address from the Special Forces point of view. A Special Forces non-commissioned officer in the field with a foreign armed force can be a very, very effective tool for change. We have an AIDS program where some of these Special Forces, not just the medics, instruct foreign militaries on how AIDS is spread, what it can do to the country, and basic sanitation and other medical procedures. It has been very, very effective. We have seen measurable reduction in areas where the armed forces have received that training, and we will continue to do it.

That is just a small example, and I could go on with things like sanitation, a lot of the work that the civil affairs people do, and, in fact, a lot of the information that we can spread to our psychological operations elements to put out information to indigenous populations. So it is something we do, I think, with a great deal of pride and a great deal of skill.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. On the coordination of the military with federal, State and local.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. What I would say is that our ability to coordinate has improved greatly in my experience as a combatant commander who had to train troops for about three years before I came to this current job eight months ago.

In response to disaster relief and civil authorities, let me tell you why I say this. The creation of the Northern Command under a general or an admiral on the first of October, 2002, brought great focus to this. Prior to that time, and I arrived at the time that this occurred, U.S. Joint Forces Command, my old command, had to do this, but it is was more of a collateral duty than it was a full-time duty. And the joint chiefs came together, the Secretary of Defense, and we said we need a dedicated organization so that we can, in fact, focus our ability to do homeland defense, work with local authorities, work with the National Guard and the rest in a way that is concerted and have an organization that wakes up every single day thinking about that.

So that was a very important piece; in addition to that, creating a whole series of capabilities, quick-reaction forces, ready reserve forces, trained forces for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear. And in addition, there is a good section in the Quadrennial Defense

Review that talks about in addition to our render safe to work with law enforcement agencies and local officials, for potential weapons of mass destruction. In addition, we have been conducting exercises. Just a couple of weekends ago I was at the Old Executive Office Building, now the Eisenhower Building, working on a smallpox exercise. That is the second in a series of these very large exercises that we have been doing.

So I would tell you that we are working very hard to coordinate and integrate federal actions so that we can integrate better with state and local. There is a lot of work to be done here.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Do you want to comment, Admiral Redd?

Admiral REDD. I don't have a comment.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SCHWARZ [presiding]. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. One quick follow-up question, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Crumpton, you heard Mr. Giambastiani's discussion about the chain of command in the military. You are the Department of State guy. How is this supposed to work? You have the ambassador directly representing the President. So let us suppose Center for Disease Control (CDC) has somebody in the embassy that is to work on avian flu. Does the ambassador have any chain of command over that, or does the Secretary of Commerce have somebody in the embassy working on economic-related issues, or the trade ambassador working on trade-related issues? Do all the secretaries claim the chain of command is directly from the President to that secretary, down through? Tell me how this is supposed to work in terms of coordination within a country.

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. If anyone from any U.S. government agency is assigned to an embassy and is accredited to that particular country, they are part of the country team. They all work directly for the ambassador.

Dr. SNYDER. Does that apply to military people also?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. As an example, the defense attache, he answers to the ambassador. When you have circumstances like Iraq, like perhaps Somalia, where U.S. military deploys its people, in those environments they do respond, they do follow the command of the regional combatant commanders and then in turn to the President.

Dr. SNYDER. But when it comes to the military situation, there must be a lot of gray areas. We go from—you mentioned two countries, Somalia and obviously a war in Iraq, and then you have taken a country that is completely at peace with the defense attache. But we must have military people floating in and out of countries, perhaps following up on leads that you have given, perhaps not, but those people would still stay under—they would have to—let me say it another way. Unless there was a formal relationship in which the Secretary of Defense said this person is part of your embassy team, the ambassador would not have any authority over that military person passing through the country; is that a fair statement?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. No, sir, he would have authority. He has to give country clearance for any U.S. government official to enter his country.

Dr. SNYDER. Including the military.

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Yes, sir.

I have an operations directorate I referred to in my prepared remarks. We facilitate that travel, working very closely with the special operations community and working with our ambassadors, embassies overseas to facilitate their travel and support their mission.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being here, Secretary O'Connell, Admiral Giambastiani, Admiral Redd, Ambassador Crumpton. If there are no further questions from the committee, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 4, 2006

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 4, 2006

Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee

The Honorable Thomas W. O'Connell
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Special Operations / Low-Intensity Conflict

April 4, 2006

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify about Improving Interagency Coordination for the Global War on Terror and Beyond. We must bring all elements of our national power to bear in this struggle against global terrorism, and we can only do that through effective Interagency Coordination at every level.

Improving Interagency Coordination has been a goal of our government for decades, certainly since the National Security Act of 1947, and most likely even before that time. The current structure for Interagency Coordination is the result of much hard-won integration, capped most recently by National Security Policy Directive (NSPD-1): "Organization of the National Security Council (NSC) System." All this effort has produced a system that works well in crisis, but that still preserves Agency equities in a way that sometimes makes more mundane but critically important changes in policy difficult. Of course changes in policy should not always be easy: the key is to ensure that all affected areas of the government have ample opportunity to present the President the best advice available in a timely manner.

The Interagency's current process is organized with six regional and fifteen functional Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs), like the Counterterrorism

Security Group, of which I am a member. The PCCs feed issues to the Deputies Committee for review and eventual decision by the Principals Committee. This process ensures diversity of inputs and enables cross-talk among the various Federal Departments and Agencies. PCCs, chaired by the NSC staff, serve to address individual priorities but better fusion of priorities across Departments/Agencies must still occur, and that is the proper role of the Deputies Committee. Once an interagency position is reached, recommendations can properly be made to act in accordance with our national policies. But we now recognize a need for greater integration before issues enter the NSPD-1 process. We need to better integrate our strategic planning and our operations in the field.

The recently published 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) accurately states that we are in a long war that is irregular in nature. This long war is characterized by dispersed, global terrorist networks with radical political aims that directly and indirectly threaten the United States and our Allies and our way of life. The nature of this long war requires the U.S. Armed Forces to adopt unconventional and indirect approaches to ultimately prevail in this historic struggle. The nature of this kind of enemy places a premium on Interagency Operations. Today's challenge is different in kind but similar in scale to the challenge presented by the Cold War – requiring major shifts in the strategic concepts for national security and the role of military power. The kinds of missions we need to undertake make interagency coordination more important today than ever before – and need interagency processes to develop.

Cooperation across the Federal Government must begin in the field with the development of shared perspectives and a better understanding of each Agency's

role. At an operational level, we are doing a lot. We have adopted interagency augmentees at various levels to reinforce cooperation. Such augmentation has contributed much in the past, particularly in our military Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs), and is currently adding great value to our operations in Iraq. More recently, Joint Interagency Coordination Groups have been established within each combatant command to function as a coordination and advisory staff to develop and coordinate Global War on Terror (GWOT) operations with other government agencies. In turn, we at OSD and the Joint-Staff are forging stronger linkages among planners in the Military Services and the Combatant Commands to ensure operations better reflect the President's National Security Strategy.

To support improved interagency coordination, DoD has sought to improve the synchronization of internal activities relating to the GWOT. The President has designated USSOCOM the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks. In this role, Commander US Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) leads a global collaborative planning process leveraging other combatant command capabilities and expertise integrate DoD strategy, plans, intelligence priorities, plan campaigns against designated terrorist networks. Moreover, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has been allocated the role of lead Joint Force Integrator, responsible for recommending changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to improve the integration of Service, Defense Agency, and Combatant Command actions with interagency capabilities.

At the strategic level, DoD has partnered with State to integrate regional priorities at the interagency through the regional action plans to combat terrorism. These plans serve to coordinate and de-conflict combating terrorism activities, synchronize the efforts of the various agencies and provide a mechanism for monitoring progress in solving terrorist related challenges by region. These have now been transferred to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and it is there that much of our most recent progress in Interagency Coordination is taking place.

The interagency process we have today can work well under crisis, but even with all our efforts, the GWOT presents coordination challenges not previously faced by the NSC and there clearly is work to be done.

Through the QDR, the Defense Department developed several recommendations to help realize the vision of unified effort by all elements of national power. We cannot make these things happen on our own, but we know the benefits would be great. Our recommendations include the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities. The planning guidance would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies. We will also strongly urge Congress to provide our civilian sister agencies the resources requested in the President's Budget to develop capabilities to quickly and effectively deploy in response to contingencies – U.S. servicemen and women need their civilian colleagues' expertise in the field. We will provide better support to civilian agencies at home by further opening DoD training to the Department of Homeland Security and others and by supporting their planning

efforts. These are just a few of our initiatives to build true, coordinated interagency capabilities. We think such changes are critical for our chances of success in the long war. But we cannot make them real without the help of partner agencies and Congress.

I would like to thank this Committee and the Congress for your emphasis on this vitally important issue. Your continued interest will be invaluable as we continue the War on Terror.

I welcome your questions.

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Committee

**STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL E. P. GIAMBASTIANI, USN
VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**BEFORE THE 109TH CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

4 APRIL 2006

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House Armed Services
Committee

Chairman Hunter, Mr. Skelton, and other distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. First though, on behalf of all Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and our families, thank you for your continued bipartisan support. That support has been exemplified this past year by Congressional visits to our troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world; visits to those hospitalized; your funding for operations; your support of transformation and recapitalization initiatives; and the improved pay and benefits you have provided to our Service members and their families.

I am especially pleased to be here to speak about interagency coordination, a critical issue. In my almost 40 years in uniform, I have experienced two events that have truly transformed the Department of Defense:

- The move to an All-Volunteer Force, mandated by Congress in 1973; and
- The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Goldwater-Nichols' success proves its value as a model for improving integration among disparate but related organizations that share a common goal. DoD's experience in implementing Goldwater-Nichols provides us with particular insights into the challenges ahead as we seek to expand that success throughout the Federal Government.

I want to make three main points about improving interagency cooperation, and then I look forward to engaging in a dialogue with you on where we go from here.

First, I want to briefly review actions already underway to better improve interagency efforts, both at the national level and within DoD. At the national level, most of our effort has been focused on military support to stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) activities. National

Security Presidential Directive-44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," set the State and Defense Departments on track to unify their SSTR efforts.

DoD has taken steps to implement NSPD-44 through the DOD Directive on military support to SSTR operations, signed out on November 28, 2005. Perhaps most importantly, this Directive establishes SSTR operations as a core military mission, on par with combat operations. This builds on the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept, which joined joint concepts on Major Combat Operations, Homeland Defense and Strategic Deterrence. As a Combatant Command, Joint Forces Command led the SSTR effort.

DoD has also been looking more broadly at interagency requirements. Better integrating DoD's capabilities into the national effort was a key topic of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR. The QDR concluded that we in DoD need to do more to share expertise in planning, training, and professional development and education with our partners in the federal government and with key allies and friends. To ensure DoD's senior leaders don't lose sight of our progress, we have directed the development of a roadmap tracking our efforts to build partner capabilities. This roadmap is currently being staffed, but will be publicly available as soon as it is approved.

These efforts build on actions already underway both outside and inside DoD. As a Combatant Commander, I directed intense and substantial support to the State Department's effort to stand up the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), commissioned in July 2004. S/CRS is a huge step forward in our national ability to develop concepts, experiment, and exercise together, and to build interagency capabilities that are particularly important for the civilian workforce.

We also have a great model that has been operational in Southern Command since 1994, when an existing military Joint Task Force combating the drug trade in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific was transformed into a Joint Interagency Task Force called JIATF-South. This unique task force is composed of joint, interagency, and international personnel, including members from all of the military services, many US Federal law enforcement agencies, a large number of intelligence agencies, and liaison officers from 13 countries.

Second, though we're making progress, improving the integration of various agencies is, in my view, an area ripe for further transformation. The Global War on Terror is primarily a communications, cultural, political, economic, and diplomatic war, with strategically-important security and military components. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, most of the key activities for success are the responsibility of organizations beyond the uniformed military. Security is a prerequisite, but other agencies must step up to solidify progress.

Most of our interagency counterparts are beginning to take steps to build capabilities within their own departments. However, in my judgment, at the Federal level we can improve upon our structure, authorities, and tools to more effectively integrate executive branch actions in the Global War on Terror. As always, it is harder to identify solutions than problems, and I don't know what all of the potential solutions might be.

There are, however, areas where you can help. Section 1206 of the FY06 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the Secretary of Defense to build the capacity of foreign countries to conduct counterterrorist or stability operations. We thank you for your support for this key provision, but more needs to be done. I believe Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Edelman will testify before you on this issue on Friday.

I also appreciate your help with Section 1207 of the FY06 authorization bill, which enhances interagency cooperation by authorizing the Secretary of Defense to transfer funds to the Secretary of State for the purpose of facilitating reconstruction, security or stabilization assistance to a foreign country. This is another key step toward helping us work together more effectively with both our interagency and international partners.

Finally, I ask for your support for the FY07 request for State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization office. As mentioned earlier, this is a critical capability to help us build our capacity and break out of our traditional stovepipes.

My third and final point is that we have a long road ahead. The first step is an ongoing dialogue; I hope this hearing is just the beginning of our work together to realize the full potential of a truly integrated interagency process. Goldwater-Nichols taught us that we need multiple pressure points to sustain forward momentum.

"Formal" players and processes are key, and Congress in particular has a critical role to play. I would encourage you to develop strategies to find a way ahead through the complex issues of committee jurisdiction and span of control so that the executive and legislative branches can move forward in tandem.

As we work this issue through the QDR roadmap process, DoD will propose legislation that will further enhance our ability to work more effectively with the Department of State and US Agency for International Development (AID). We would greatly appreciate your support for these requests, as they allow us to begin to change culture, processes, and action on the ground in support of our counter-terrorist policies.

We should not stop there; we also have to think about our national assets. Only 18 percent of our GDP is generated by the federal government. Therefore, when we think about applying all of our national capabilities, we also have to consider elements outside of government. That is why a wide-ranging conversation is needed, to include experts in think tanks and academia – the work begun by the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Beyond Goldwater-Nichols is just one example of type of work that can help.

Those are the three points I wanted to make to begin our discussion:

- We are making some progress;
- Further transformation is required; and
- We all have a part in finding the solution

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here. I look forward to your questions, and to continuing to work with you on this critical issue.

Statement for the Record
Before the House Armed Services Committee

The Honorable John Scott Redd
Director, National Counterterrorism Center
Vice Admiral, United States Navy (Ret.)

April 4, 2006

Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Skelton, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and address an issue of critical importance to our national security.

As the President has stated on numerous occasions – and as the subject of this hearing recognizes – we are at war.

Some aspects of this war are familiar. Like the Cold War, it is likely to be a long war. Although I hope to be proven wrong, I expect that my grandchildren will be adults long before this conflict is in our wake. Also like the Cold War and its struggle against communism, this war has a strong ideological content.

But in many ways this is a very different war. The ideological dimension is framed in religious language by the terrorists, who justify their actions through reference to faith. The enemy is not a defined state but more often a shadowy group of individuals. Indeed, there are numerous incarnations of the terrorist threat that endanger our Nation.

First, of course, al-Qa'ida remains our preeminent concern. Although we have made significant progress in eliminating much of al-Qa'ida's leadership and disrupting its ongoing operations, the organization continues to plot against the Homeland.

Second, other Sunni terrorist groups have been inspired by al-Qa'ida and have largely adopted al-Qa'ida's premise that the United States is the root of most of the problems affecting Muslims. These groups constitute a significant threat to our allies and interests abroad, and may attempt to extend their geographical reach.

Third, and one of our greatest long-term concerns, is the emergence of new jihadist networks and cells that are unaffiliated with al-Qa'ida or other terrorist organizations. These grassroots or "homegrown" elements may draw inspiration from al-Qa'ida but operate independently, with little or no centralized guidance and control. They may exist under the radar for years, known only to a small circle of members. As a result, they represent a serious challenge for the Intelligence Community. Their existence raises new questions about how we can draw close to the communities from which these extremists may arise and understand the complex forces that give rise to their violent ideologies.

However one characterizes the nature of the enemy and the war, one thing is clear. To win the war, the United States and its allies must bring all elements of power to bear on the problem.

That, in a nutshell, is why the National Counterterrorism Center was established.

With your permission, I would like briefly to review with you the role the National Counterterrorism Center – or NCTC -- is playing and will play in the Global War on Terror.

As you know, NCTC is a new organization, just over a year old. We began life almost three years ago as the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. Since then, our role has been dramatically expanded, primarily by the legislation which established us, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (or IRTPA, for short).

Today, NCTC performs two critical functions in the war on terror. In a sense, as Director I wear two hats.

One of those hats involves an important - albeit familiar – role: That of Intelligence. In that hat, I report to Ambassador John Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence. More recently, as his Mission Manager for Counterterrorism, I serve as his focal point for all intelligence matters relating to Counterterrorism.

The second hat involves a new and, I believe, revolutionary role. That is the responsibility for conducting Strategic Operational Planning for the Global War on Terror for the entire U. S. Government. In that hat, I report to the President.

To summarize in military terms, we are responsible for producing the government's plan for the Global War on Terror, and the Intelligence Annex that supports it.

Let me review briefly that first hat, our intelligence role. In particular, let me highlight three aspects of our intelligence and information functions: Analysis, Information Sharing and Mission Management.

In the area of Analysis, the IRTPA expanded our responsibilities substantially. In addition to integrating all counterterrorism analysis performed by the Intelligence Community, NCTC was assigned the primary role for actually performing CT analysis. That assignment derives logically from the law's mandate that NCTC be the one place where all sources of counterterrorism intelligence, both foreign and domestic, from across the IC and CT communities, come together. Indeed, our analysts have access to an unprecedented number of classified networks, databases and intelligence sources. This rich information base provides them with a unique ability to scrutinize the terror threat and “connect the dots” in a comprehensive fashion never before possible in the US Government. This, in turn, results in a product set ranging from strategic CT analysis for the President to tactical threat reports that assist the warfighter and first responders at the State and Local levels.

The second aspect of our intelligence operation is information sharing.

I would argue that NCTC is the U.S. Government's model for information sharing.

Beginning with the current threat, NCTC runs a 24/7 high-tech operations center. Three times a day we chair a secure video-teleconference with the key players in the Intelligence Community, ensuring all have the latest threat information. This is augmented by near-continuous cross-talk among watch standers throughout the IC.

NCTC also serves the CT community by compiling the U.S. Government's central data base on known or suspected international terrorists. Designated the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, or TIDE, this database contains all source highly classified information provided by members of the Intelligence Community such as CIA, DIA, FBI, NSA, and many others. Today, there are more than 300,000 records in TIDE. When aliases and transliteration issues are taken into account, this represents over 200,000 unique identities. From this classified TIDE database, an unclassified extract is provided to the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center. That information, in turn, is used in compiling various watch lists such as the TSA's No-Fly list, State Department's Visa and Passport Database, Homeland Security's Boarder System, and FBI's NCIC (National Crime and Information Center) for state and local law enforcement. This represents a major step forward from the pre-9/11 status of multiple, disconnected, and incomplete watchlists throughout the government.

The final example of information sharing involves what is arguably the most effective classified website in the world – what we call NCTC Online, or NOL. Essentially, we collect intelligence information and analysis from 28 different government networks which come into NCTC and post it on a single website, NOL, where it is then accessible by individual agencies. Thus, planners and analysts at headquarters or forward deployed in theaters worldwide can go online and immediately find all disseminated intelligence on a given subject, published by DIA, CIA, NSA, FBI, DHS and the rest of the IC. Today we provide access to this wealth of information to approximately 5,000 CT appropriately-cleared analysts around the world. Currently NOL contains approximately 5 million intelligence products. Prior to 9/11, such "one stop shopping" for CT intelligence was unavailable to the IC.

The third aspect of NCTC's intelligence function is CT Mission Management. This is a new, formal assignment by the DNI that grew out of a recommendation from the President's WMD Commission. Among the Mission Manager's many tasks are responsibility for understanding the needs of our customers, improving the quality of collection and analytic efforts; closing key information gaps that prevent us from understanding terrorist threats; and making the best use of our CT intelligence resources.

That summarizes our Intelligence mission.

Let me now turn to our second fundamental mission, that of Strategic Operational Planning.

When the term Strategic Operational Planning – or SOP - first became public in the IRTPA, I think it is fair to say few people could have given a coherent definition of what the term meant. Indeed, one of the first orders of the day was to put together an inter-agency effort to hash out what it was and how we would do it.

As has become clear, SOP serves to fill a long existing gap in government, one that has been present for most of my almost four decades of government service. Simply put, the White House, in the form of the National Security Council and, more recently, the Homeland Security Council has been in the business of developing broad strategy and policy. At the other end of the spectrum, the Cabinet Departments and Agencies have been responsible for conducting operations in the field. That dual apportionment of roles has been the norm for most of my lifetime. What has been missing is the piece in between policy and operations, a concept not unfamiliar to the military. That need has become even more obvious as we prosecute the Global War on Terrorism. Strategic Operational Planning is designed to fill that gap.

The goal of Strategic Operational Planning is straightforward: To bring all elements of National Power to bear on the war on terrorism in an integrated and effective manner. By all elements of national power, we mean the sum of our nations diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security and law enforcement activities.

NCTC's charter in this regard is simple in description and extremely complex in execution. Basically, it involves three phases.

First, there is a planning process. This involves taking our national counterterrorism strategies and policies and translating them first into strategic goals, then into objectives, and finally into discrete tasks. Those tasks are then to be prioritized and assigned to departments and agencies, with lead and partner responsibilities defined. This process is not a unilateral drafting exercise by NCTC. Instead, it is an interagency effort, involving hundreds of departmental planners working under our leadership. This phase is well underway.

The second phase involves what the IRTPA describes as "interagency coordination of operational activities." This involves the coordination, integration and synchronization of departmental operations. We are just beginning this phase of strategic operational planning, but have already made significant contributions in certain compartmented areas.

The final phase involves an assessment process. NCTC is charged with monitoring, evaluating and assessing the execution and effectiveness of the plan and recommending changes where needed.

The bottom line is that this is an iterative process and there is great value in that process. As General Eisenhower once noted, "Plans are nothing, planning is everything."

That summarizes our second major mission, Strategic Operational Planning.

For completeness, I should also tell you what we don't do at NCTC.

First, we do not, as a rule, deal directly with State, local and tribal authorities. We are charged to support the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security, who do have that remit.

Second, in our Strategic Operational Planning hat, we do not direct the execution of counterterrorism operations. We do not have command authority. That is the province of the Departments and Agencies, not ours. As Secretary Rice has noted, our role is somewhat analogous to that of the Joint Staff. That is, we coordinate and advise the President, but we are not in the chain of command.

In summary, NCTC is a truly "joint" team. All but a handful of our people are on assignment from other government organizations. We believe that is a significant strength, just as the implementation of Goldwater Nichols has been a decided boon in the Defense Department. Although growing, we are small, numbering just over 300 government employees today. We also are, in many ways, a work in progress as we take on significant new responsibilities while continuing to perform ongoing tasks. As we often say, we're building an airplane while we're flying it. That said, I believe we are providing a true value add which will only grow over time.

I would like to close by noting that across the Intelligence Community, on both sides of the foreign and domestic intelligence divide, there are many accomplishments in which we can justly take great satisfaction. After 36 years of Government service, I am accustomed to witnessing the dedication of our men and women in uniform around the globe. I am pleased to report that the same dedication to duty and excellence is on display every day within the greater counterterrorism community. We have many miles yet to travel, our race is not run—but it is clear to me that we are making substantial progress in our war against the terror threat.

Thank you for your attention. That completes my statement.

Testimony by Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton

Coordinator for Counterterrorism

House Armed Services Committee

**Improving Interagency Coordination for the Global War on Terror and
Beyond**

April 4, 2006

Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Skelton, Distinguished Members of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will summarize my formal written statement and ask that you include my full testimony in the record.

I am delighted to have an opportunity to brief you on the State Department's role in this issue of vital importance to the national security of the United States. The very title of this hearing indicates that you believe, as I do, that we must have a comprehensive government strategy, employing all the elements of U.S. national power – domestic and foreign, to win this war on terrorism.

Today, I would like to offer our perspective of the rapidly evolving terrorist enemy, the global battlefield, and our field-driven, interagency strategy to address this threat.

The Enemy

In general terms, Al Qaida and affiliated forces – the terrorist group which currently poses the greatest threat to the United States, its allies and partners — represent a multilayered threat. They operate on four levels: global, regional, national, and local. We must engage this enemy on all levels simultaneously. Moreover, the enemy exhibits many of the characteristics of an insurgency, one that aims to overthrow the existing world order and replace it with a reactionary, authoritarian, transnational entity. This enemy collects intelligence, employs denial and deception, uses subversion, wages propaganda campaigns, engages in sabotage, and, of course, embraces terror as a defining tactic. This is a generational struggle. Defeating it will require stamina, focus, interagency coordination, and a global response executed regionally, nationally, and locally.

We must attack the enemy "threat complex" in three strategic areas:

First, terrorist leadership: Due in large measure to the success of the United States and its partners, Al Qaida's core leadership is dead, incarcerated, or on the run. It no longer plays the central recruiting and command role it once did. This success means that we face a more diffuse, less capable, but in many ways more dangerous enemy than we did in October 2001. There are the dangerous remnants of the al Qaida leadership, but now also regional leaders such as Zarqawi in Iraq.

Second, we must eliminate terrorist safehaven. There are three basic types of enemy safehaven:

- *Physical safehaven* – these are failed or failing states, under-governed areas and state sponsors who provide places for terrorists to hide, train and organize. Many of these safehavens are on borderlands between national boundaries, for example in the Sulawesi Sea littoral or the Afghan-Pakistan border. Denying safehaven in these areas, therefore, requires a regional strategy.
- *Cyber-safehaven* – terrorists increasingly rely on the Internet to communicate, recruit, train, fund raise and plan attacks. Dealing with this safehaven at the same time as we advance our deeply held values of freedom of speech and the free flow of information poses difficult legal and practical challenges. Yet, we must contest the enemy in this area because of their growing presence and sophistication in using the internet.
- *Ideological safehavens* – These are belief systems, ideas and cultural norms that either encourage violent extremism or keep communities from denying support to terrorists or speaking out against terror. These small areas of ideological refuge often surface with individual leaders or single institutions, then spread within the cracks of society. The Finsbury mosque in London is one example.

Finally, and most challenging, we must address the underlying conditions that terrorists exploit. These include geo-political issues or ethnic struggles such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, which have been aggregated into a perception – even if it is false – that the Muslim world is disrespected and aggrieved. Al Qaida exploits local grievances, communal conflicts, and economic injustice. Al Qaida offers empty promises, but promises that resonate nonetheless. Poverty and tyranny does not cause terrorism, but terrorists exploit a sense of helplessness for which economic prosperity, liberal democracy, and hope all offer real, if sometimes distant, answers.

A Strategy for Defeating the Enemy

Countering this multi-layered threat requires calibrated application of all the elements of U.S. national power: diplomacy, information, intelligence and covert action, economic power, military power, and the rule of law. How we calibrate and orchestrate these tools of national power – most of which are international in focus, but some of which require domestic efforts – is the key. We must also build trusted networks that undermine, marginalize and isolate the enemy, displace terrorist networks from the societies on which they prey, and empower legitimate alternatives to extremism. We must act over an extended time-frame, to isolate the threat, defeat the isolated threat, and prevent its re-emergence. Domestically, we must build resistance to radical influences that wish to harm the American people.

Our effort is structured at multiple levels - a global campaign to counter Al Qaida and associated networks; a series of regional cooperative efforts to deny terrorist safehavens; and numerous national security and development assistance operations designed to build liberal institutions, support the rule of law and enhance our partners' capacity to resist the threat and address the conditions that terrorists exploit - all focused on unique local conditions. Key to this strategy is that we must work with or through partners at every level, whenever possible.

How, in practical terms, do we accomplish this? Internationally, our Ambassadors, as the President's personal representatives abroad, are uniquely poised to bring all the elements of U.S. national power to bear against the terrorist enemy. The interagency Country Teams they oversee develop strategies to help host nations understand the terrorist threat and strengthen host government political will and capacity to counter it. Bilaterally, some of these interagency programs have proven highly successful. Last month, the Department of State, USAID, and PACOM orchestrated a campaign of public diplomacy, assistance development, and civil-military operations in Jolo, a long time Abu Sayyaf safehaven in the center of the southern Philippines' Sulu Archipelago, to undercut the enemy presence. Moreover, this local effort demonstrated to the local population that they can have a future free from terrorism.

There are other examples of interdependent interagency teams working at local levels, such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams operating in Afghanistan and Iraq. As part of the State Department's transformational diplomacy strategy, 100 slots, with more to follow, have been shifted to areas of CT concern; many of these slots will be for local deployment, outside the traditional capital cities, often in concert with U.S. military deployments.

But as I noted earlier, we need more than local or national bilateral programs to root out transnational safehavens. With that in mind, we have worked with our interagency partners to develop regional strategies. For example, the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative is a multi-year strategy aimed at defeating terrorist organizations by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and reinforcing our bilateral military ties. EUCOM, State, USAID, and others contribute to this regional effort.

We are broadening this approach through a Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), a program designed to develop a flexible networks of interconnected Country Teams. My office is working with Ambassadors in key terrorist theaters of operation to assess the threat and devise interagency strategies and policy recommendations. These strategies are key to promoting cooperation between our

partners in the War on Terror – between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, for example, as they deal with terrorist transit across the Sulawesi Sea; or between Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, Niger, Chad, and Mali to counter a GSPC enemy recruiting and hiding in the desert which sits astride their national borders.

We have had three RSI conferences this year, and more are scheduled for the coming months. These conferences are chaired by a regional group of Ambassadors, with the Washington interagency representatives in attendance. This, of course, includes representatives of the Geographic Combatant Commander, plus Special Operations Command.

Flexibility is a requirement. Our terrorist enemy is highly adaptable. Defeating him requires both central planning and field authority to amend plans in the course of implementation. We must also apply resources quickly, and with specific focus. We can achieve this agility by generating an interagency consensus, a shared “diagnosis” of the strategic situation in a given region. Using this common perspective, networked country teams can then self-synchronize efforts across multiple diverse programs that would otherwise be too complex for central coordination.

Our Chiefs of Missions’ strategy sessions have produced some recommendations on other issues which I understand are also of interest to Members of the Committee, such as deployment of State personnel to conflict

zones, and cross training with other agencies. For example, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group and Joint Interagency Task Force (West) in Iraq are effective. My office is working with the Pentagon to assess whether State Department representation on those bodies could contribute to regional integration and serve as a model for future interagency cooperation. The State Department's Office of Political-Military Affairs has assigned Political Advisors to all the Combatant Commanders and this program is growing. Within my office, there are more active duty and reserve military officers detailed to our operations directorate than State Department officers. Moreover, we are also working with the Diplomatic Security Bureau, USAID, the intelligence community, Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury and others to integrate our efforts.

I believe that our best counterterrorism strategies will come from field-driven interagency cooperation, relying on the local knowledge and experience of the inter-agency professionals, from a range of agencies, and deployed in strategic areas throughout the world.

Here in Washington, the National Counterterrorism Center is tasked to serve as a center for joint intelligence and joint operational planning, ensuring that we unify our counterterrorism efforts across the government. The NCTC has made great strides in improving terrorist threat information sharing, and is beginning to

coordinate joint operational planning and strategy. Interagency groups such as the Counterterrorism Security Group and the CT Technical Assistance Support Group, also share information and develop policies to counter terrorist threats, drawing on the capabilities and expertise of each government agency. Key USG agencies dealing with threats meet by secure videoconference three times a day to share current information and develop responses to any perceived threat to the U.S. or its interests.

These Washington based interagency efforts and our Regional Strategic Initiatives must intersect, to provide the best global strategic perspectives and resources with the best field perspectives and implementation.

The Way Forward

Wars of the 20th century taught us the need for joint operations rather than separate army, navy, or air operations. 9/11 taught us that we cannot afford to act as independent “stove-piped” agencies; our success against the enemy largely derives from our mastery of joint, highly integrated operations that unify all elements of national power into a coherent whole. The strategy I outlined here today - of building regional partnerships to confront transnational threats and working at the intersections of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security - embodies the transformational diplomacy Secretary Rice outlined in her January 18 speech at Georgetown University. The

State Department is deeply committed to this regional, comprehensive interagency approach. What we need to make it work is unity of effort, as much as unity of command.

My personal commitment to this interagency approach derives from my experience working in many Embassy country teams, being detailed to the FBI after the August 1998 bombings, and working hand-in-hand with the U.S. military in Afghanistan immediately after September 11, 2001. There, small groups of intelligence officers worked closely with the military and local partners to develop an integrated strategy that killed or captured terrorist leadership, denied terrorists safehaven, and ultimately replaced the networks we destroyed with infinitely better institutions and the potential for a better future.

In sum, terrorists exploit political, ethnic, communal and economic grievances. Bringing terrorist leadership to justice, denying terrorists safehaven and addressing the conditions that terrorist exploit so that those we eliminate are not replaced by scores more requires us to use all the elements of national power. This is the case on a policy level - our counterterrorism agenda and our Freedom Agenda are linked for real and strategic reasons. It is also true on a practical level. We are working well and improving our cooperation in Washington. However, our best means of countering the multilayered terrorist threat is to engage coordinated networks of interagency Country Teams operating under the

Ambassador's Chief of Mission authority to bring to bear diplomacy, intelligence, military power, economic assistance, law enforcement and rule of law capacity building, and the power of what America stands for against the terrorist enemy.

This need for inter-agency operations goes far beyond mere coordination or cooperation. It demands that we plan, conduct and structure operations - from the very outset - as part of an intimately connected whole-of-government approach. We are not there yet, but we have made progress.

Mr. Chairman, that completes the formal part of my remarks and I welcome your questions or comments.

**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD**

APRIL 4, 2006

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. The 2006 QDR Report emphasized the importance of interagency capacity and unity of effort. General Pace has spoken before the HASC both about the need to develop and reward civilian expertise that will complement the military, and the need for coordinated interagency planning and responses to complex contingencies.

The VCJCS's testimony for hearing focused narrowly on existing and desired train and equip authorities and on supporting the State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Given the QDR's emphasis and General Pace's statements, does the JCS have broader recommendations?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you for the opportunity to share three of the broader recommendations I [and the JCS] believe are necessary to achieve our goal of "unity of effort." Consistent with the recommendations of the QDR and with General Pace's suggestions before this committee and elsewhere, these three involve change beyond DOD alone.

First and foremost, I believe the Executive and Legislative branches must together develop a new USG capability that allows us to prepare for, plan, and execute whole-of-government operations in the 21st century security environment. To do this, we should bring together the executive and legislative branches in a bipartisan, cooperative effort that examines the complete range of possibilities for change to our interagency processes and stays together in partnership to implement the measures that make the most sense for the nation.

Second, planning is the integrating function. Planning is the activity that brings together the key stakeholders to formulate whole-of-government goals and objectives that, in turn, direct every activity of the departments and agencies of government toward the desired end. We must institutionalize a planning capability throughout the USG. Currently, this capability is mature and resident only in our military forces. I am very interested in developing ways in which we can grow this capability outside our military—which is just the kind of thing that we need to address collaboratively across the USG. That leads me to the third broad recommendation.

The mechanism for institutionalizing a new planning capability and for growing skilled civilian planners is the same—education and a career track that rewards performance in this field. Professional education as a core element of one's career development program is the key enabler to institutionalizing all of the new interagency capabilities we seek. It is time for the idea of a profession in national security to reach its full potential. We recommend a national security professional development and education system that encompasses the appropriate departments of the federal government in a way that leverages our successful post-Goldwater-Nichols experience with our integrated joint officer management and joint professional military education programs.

Mr. SKELTON. Admiral Giambastiani testified that we should be considering elements outside government when we discuss interagency improvements. Explain. What is the JCS doing to advance this notion?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. When I think about applying all of our national capabilities, I am often led to entities outside the federal government. I am interested in developing ways for the USG to be more inclusive in how it plans, prepare for, and execute stabilization, security, transition & reconstruction (SSTR) operations and similar operations within the US, such a Hurricane Katrina-like response. SSTR operations provide a good baseline for development because they intrinsically require more capability than is available within any single government.

The Department and the Joint Staff are advancing this work principally through the QDR Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) Roadmap and the work of United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The BPC Roadmap explicitly directs the Department to work with nongovernmental organizations and the private sector to develop more effective ways to collaborate during planning, preparation, and execution activities. One example of this effort is the development of recommended guidelines for civil-military relations in non-permissive environments, compiled by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the United States Institute for Peace, and the NGO umbrella organization InterAction.

USJFCOM, partnering with the Department of State, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), has used the Multinational Interagency Group experiments to work out process and organizational solutions. These solutions enable and encourage information sharing and coordination of effort across the international interagency community (coalition partner civilian governmental agencies) as well as the broader community of international organizations including NATO, the EU, and the UN.

Several recent humanitarian operations, including tsunami relief, Hurricane Katrina, and the Pakistani earthquake have advanced our interagency coordination skills. *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned* recommends that federal response better integrate the contributions of NGOS and the private sector into the broader national effort—reinforcing the QDR’s same recommendation for the Department of Defense.

We must carry our discussion on ‘interagency’ improvements beyond ‘governmental’ improvements. The improvements we seek will be fully realized when non-governmental organizations and the private sector craft common operational goals and align execution to achieve those common goals.

Mr. SKELTON. At the hearing, Admiral Giambastiani gave a concrete example of interagency successes. He did not give an example of interagency failure. Please give one example of a recent interagency failure and then give lessons learned from the examples of success and failure. How are “lessons-learned” institutionalized among the JCS staff? Does the JCS staff coordinate lessons-learned with other organizations? Does JCS staff coordinate on other organizations’ lessons?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. While the United States possesses the most capable and responsive government in the world, there are clearly many opportunities for improvement, particularly in the area of interagency coordination. Last summer’s Hurricane Katrina strike highlighted many areas that deserve our attention.

White House and Congressional Reports on the federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina noted that the planning process for domestic crises within the federal government needs significant improvement. Additionally, these reports recommended DOD support the development of enhanced operational planning capabilities within DHS and FEMA in order to better predict detailed requirements and plan for specific actions needed to respond to future disasters.

DOD is actively engaging DHS and other interagency partners to improve pre-crisis planning, preparation, and response capabilities. Prior to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, DOD initiated a process to assign Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) and five-member Defense Coordinating Elements (DCEs) in each of the ten FEMA regional offices. The DCOs/DCEs will enhance interagency coordination of the military resources supporting crisis responses by providing a single DOD point of contact at a deployed federal Joint Field Office and current FEMA regional offices.

Additionally, in coordination with DHS, FEMA and DOT, DOD has developed 18 pre-scripted Requests for Assistance (RFAs) to expedite the provision of DOD support to civil authorities during a disaster response. These RFAs address DOD support for transportation, communications, public works and engineering, mass care, housing and human services, resource support, public health, and medical services.

DOD has also deployed planners to conduct vulnerability assessments in the Gulf Coast states with emphasis on Louisiana. This assessment effort was integrated into an interagency effort led by FEMA. DOD operations and logistics planners are assisting DHS with the development of response plans for the 2006 severe weather season. The resulting DHS plans will focus on the provision of logistics to an area impacted by a major or catastrophic disaster.

The post-Hurricane Katrina initiatives described above demonstrate both how DOD is working to enhance its performance, based upon the findings derived from the Department’s internal lessons learned processes, as well as how DOD is assisting and supporting its interagency partners with their issue resolution efforts.

Finally, the Joint Staff J-7 is tasked to oversee the CJCS’s lessons learned program. Lessons are institutionalized within the DOD by the establishment of lessons learned programs by the Services, Combatant Commands, Combat Service Agencies, and other DOD agencies.

While DOD does not coordinate lessons learned with other organizations we can share data with them. DOD is developing the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) that will more efficiently and effectively permit the sharing of observations, findings, recommendations and lessons learned between the Services, Combatant Commands, Combat Service Agencies, and other DOD agencies. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, DOD is expanding its working relationships to link with the DHS and numerous disaster response and interagency organizations. In time, JLLIS will be linked to these organizations via the Internet. Although, the

DOD does not coordinate on other organizations' lessons, we can mine the data as it becomes available.

Mr. SKELTON. What interagency issues does the JCS believe Congress should take up first and why? What elements in legislation would be necessary for JCS or new national security partners (domestic or foreign), to improve interagency capacities to respond to current and future national security complex contingencies, challenges and opportunities? What about within JCS?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Areas where the Congress could help immediately include:

Providing the legal impetus and financial resources that will enable the USG to sustain the momentum it has generated thus far in developing a capability to plan for and conduct stabilization & reconstruction operations. The Stabilization & Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2006 and the authorities provided in the Senate version of the FY07 NDAA (sections 1206, 1207 and 1208) have our strong support. All of the investment in the stabilization & reconstruction field is transferable to other operational and functional areas. We can not afford to have that set back this far into our work by the loss of legitimacy that a fourth pass on these bills would likely signal.

Investing in human capital for the long term. The resources required for many of our interagency partners to begin developing civilian deployable expert capacity should be high on the list of things needing attention. We also need to enable our interagency partners to build into their structure rotational assignments of personnel for formal education, training, and interagency duty. This is linked to my previous response on broader recommendations and bringing together the executive and legislative branches in a collaborative effort to examine the complete range of possibilities for change to both our interagency processes and our national security workforce. The JCS advocates commencing this work as soon as practical.

Adjusting authorities to remove barriers and facilitate cooperation between agencies. The recent legislation enabling budget transfer between DOD and DOS for stability operations was an excellent start. We need further legislation that encourages and rewards interagency cooperation, especially in the area of security assistance.

With a longer horizon, Congress should consider expanding the Quadrennial Defense Review to a Quadrennial Security Review. By mandating a requirement to include a broader Quadrennial Security Review, Congress would create one of the levers that can move the national security community of the USG to integration. A Security, rather than a Defense Review, could generate the intellectual capital needed to guide the nation's investments in our future Inter-Agency capabilities.

Mr. SKELTON. In order to improve the interagency process and operations, does the JCS believe a government change on the order of a new National Security Act (since 1947 Act was government's response to the Cold War) or a second Goldwater-Nichols-like reform is necessary? If not, why not? If so, what should be the scope of that effort (what changes to personnel systems, organizational structure, command and control arrangements, acquisition, etc. are necessary)?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yes, I think it is time for a sweeping change on the order of Goldwater-Nichols. The scope of what is called for in meeting our national security requirements in the 21st Century requires an unprecedented degree of USG coordination and synchronization—indeed it demands integration. We need new legislation to integrate the efforts of civilian components, to integrate civil-military strategy development and planning, and to develop a whole-of-government approach to contingency response that international partners would be willing to utilize.

The major changes needed fall into the categories of strategic alignment; planning; organization, to include command & control arrangements; and personnel. However, the full scope of the effort ought to be developed by the executive-legislative partnership. Without a comprehensive, across-government approach, we will not achieve the changes required to succeed in the new security environment.

Strategic Alignment: The process by which the departments and agencies of the USG formulate policy, develop strategy, and plan for contingencies must lead to unity of purpose toward achieving the nation's strategic goals and enable unified action during execution. Some of the ways to achieve this include: a Quadrennial Security Review and preparation and implementation of National Strategic Planning Guidance, which would inform the USG of the President's contingency priorities and convey his direction on how to prepare for those contingencies.

Planning: The process by which the departments and agencies of the USG formulate policy, develop strategy, and plan for contingencies must also lead to unity of purpose toward the nation's strategic goals and enable unified action during execution. Interagency planning must become institutionalized in the USG. The Goldwater-Nichols like work should consider all the dimensions of developing and sustaining this capability.

Organization: It may be time to look at the equivalent of a *Unified Command Plan* for the government as a whole. As the *Unified Command Plan* establishes the geographic areas of responsibility, missions, responsibilities, functions, and force structure for the combatant commands, the Goldwater-Nichols like reform effort ought to consider how this unified global approach might provide a model for the USG as a whole.

Personnel: As stated earlier, the USG needs an interagency culture and personnel system that brings about results as profound and important as the original Goldwater-Nichols Act did in establishing today's joint military force. Investment in human capital is the *sine quo non* of success in this endeavor.

Mr. SKELTON. In the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act the CINCs (now COCOMs) were given direction of military forces in the field. In testimony, Ambassador Crumpton said in states which we are at war and in non-states (state with no recognizable ruling/sovereign authority), military leaders should be the "quarterback" for interagency plans and operations. In states with which the U.S. is not at war, he asserted that the Ambassador is and should be the "quarterback". By analogy, one might then assume departments/agencies in Washington would perform the mission to organize, train, and equip (as do military services) to provide forces/personnel and have administrative control over them, while the military or ambassador "quarterback" have tactical/operational control of forces/personnel in the field (for example, some have suggested that USAID should organize, train and equip AID personnel to serve in the field under some other department's/agency's direction). Does the JCS agree this is a workable construct for interagency planning and operations in the field? If not, provide an alternative suggestion for a chain of command/command relationships.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. In principle, Ambassador Crumpton's proposal is one of a number of potentially workable constructs for operations. General Pace and I agree that this subject needs to be addressed with a level of effort commensurate to the preparation of the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

The analogy between Services as force providers to the unified commands and Departments/Agencies of the federal government providing personnel to unified interagency task forces with "quarterback" responsibility and authority seems to be valid. A well understood military analogy is that of the "supporting" and "supported" commanders. Routinely, for operations around the world, a Combatant Commander (COCOM) with the lead responsibility is designated the "supported" COCOM and other Combatant Commanders are designated as "supporting" COCOMs. As CDR USJFCOM, I was most frequently a "supporting" COCOM and we measured our effectiveness by how successful we could make the "supported" COCOM. A similar understanding of the "supported" and "supporting" roles and an embrace of the military culture that employs them can be useful as we attempt to build unity of command and unity of effort in our interagency operations.

I would like to see a national-level concept for unified action developed and, within that concept, the organizational structures and "command" relationships can be thought through, tested, evaluated and experimented at the national level. This is something entirely new. We do this all the time at United States Joint Forces Command for things like the "Military Support to Unified Action" concept, which is currently in development. But military support is only a part of the highest order concept, the concept that describes how the USG—and its universe of partners—will act in the future security environment.

Mr. SKELTON. In testimony, Admiral Redd compared the NCTC to the Joint Staff; it does strategic operational planning and assigns tasks for CT operations but does not have command authority. First, does the government need an organization like the Joint Staff or NCTC for broader interagency planning and assigning of roles and missions, or do we already have a government organization that can perform this role? Second, does the government then need a command structure like that of the regional and functional COCOMs to actually command/direct personnel in the field to fulfill interagency tasking?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I believe the USG does need an organization that can conduct strategic operational planning and assign tasks and activities to USG departments and agencies for broad efforts in the war on terrorism.

Mr. SKELTON. Last year the DOD and SOCOM insisted they needed additional funding and authorities to lead the military fight in the GWOT. The special authorities granted have never been used. According to the New York Times (NYT), General Downing's classified report criticized the DOD and NSC bureaucracy for "not creating ways to answer Socom's [sic] real-time needs, forcing the command to navigate plodding bureaucratic channels whenever it wanted to adjust course." This makes fighting an agile enemy impossible. What has been done by the DOD and NSC to remedy this?

At the hearing, Admiral Giambastiani disagreed with General Downing's reported findings and seemed to indicate that his information was "dated". Explain that point of view further considering it is a recent report and that "Pentagon officials" interviewed by the *New York Times* seemed to agree with these findings?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify the testimony I gave at the hearing.

During our thorough review of General Downing's Special Operations Force Assessment, it became apparent that many of the assertions made in the report were issues that no longer required further attention. The Quadrennial Defense Review had addressed nearly all of the resource and funding issues raised in the report to the full satisfaction of US Special Operations Command. Many other recommendations in the report had already been completed or were in the process of being completed. Many, but not all had been initiated by USSOCOM. Additionally, we are currently addressing a small number of issues raised in the report, in coordination with USSOCOM, with specific Action Plans designed to get us to an effective solution.

Additionally, the Chairman has instituted a process to report and monitor the top three staffing priorities from all of the Combatant Commands, to include USSOCOM, to ensure their highest priorities received the appropriate level of attention.

Mr. SKELTON. A January 2006 CRS Report on Homeland Security and the establishment of NORTHCOM to fight terrorism at home claims, "questions remain concerning interagency relationships and information sharing."

a. Given NORTHCOM HQ, the Domestic Watch Center (with links to the Homeland Security Operations Center), Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters North, Joint Task Force Headquarters North, Joint Task Force Civil Support, Task Force East—Consequence Management, and a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (consisting of 46 agencies), the assignment of 65 DOD personnel to DHS Headquarters, NORTHCOM's provision of planning and liaison personnel assigned to DHS regional components, emergency assignment of NORTHCOM senior military officers to regional FEMA headquarters, and the NORTHCOM assignment of military officers to the operations centers of components of DHS to coordinate tactical operations, why do problems with interagency coordination persist (e.g., Katrina)?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center (formerly the Domestic Warning Center) in conjunction with NORAD-USNORTHCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group, works with interagency partners to enhance collective capabilities. They continue to work the challenges associated with interagency and intergovernmental coordination with literally hundreds of different federal, state, local, tribal and non-governmental agencies and organizations as a priority effort.

Interagency coordination is more than a command challenge—it is a multi-agency challenge which will take long-term consistent attention and effort to solve. Progress has been made, but much still needs to be done. We see the following as essential if we are to eliminate most of the problems with interagency coordination in the homeland security and homeland defense arena:

- Additional agency representatives at each homeland security and homeland defense agency
- A standardized interagency training and certification program
- An interagency common operating picture
- Full communications interoperability across all levels of government
- A collaborative and cooperative planning effort to support homeland security and homeland defense
- A fully funded and robust National Exercise Program

Mr. SKELTON. Is there a problematic redundancy or duplication of effort among these numerous organizations?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. There is a duplication of effort among these organizations because the scope of homeland defense and civil support is so broad. Redundancy of effort, while at times inefficient, can also reduce risk. Having the lead primary agency publish plans identifying how and when DOD support will be provided and employed (clear tasks and purposes) will lead to better interagency coordination and planning. Primary agencies are developing a better understanding of the limits of their capabilities and are identifying the point at which they will likely ask for DOD support. As these points are defined, redundancy or duplication will be reduced.

USNORTHCOM routinely assesses and exercises command elements and components to look for ways to enhance operations and mission capabilities. However, considering USNORTHCOM's continuing and increasing mission requirements (e.g., pandemic influenza, border security, 2006 hurricane season support, etc.), any consolidation of their headquarters and/or component elements will be carefully consid-

ered because mission failure in the homeland is not an option. Seeking efficiencies within limits, however, also makes sense.

Mr. SKELTON. It appears that there is a lot of management overhead that does not perform very well. Could that be reduced while at the same time robbing operational capacity?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. USNORTHCOM is optimized to serve as an operating headquarters to direct defense of its Area of Responsibility and to execute Defense Support of Civil Authorities, when directed. The USNORTHCOM Concept of Operations and Battle Staff Standard Operating Procedures reflect lessons learned from Joint Forces Command Millennium Challenge 2002 as well as a series of exercises leading to full operational capability evaluation in October 2004. USNORTHCOM's standing Joint Task Forces and component commands similarly reflect lean commands focused on the highest priority mission set. USNORTHCOM is careful of "dual-taskings" and the importance of collaboration to ensure efficiency. They use the Defense Readiness Reporting System to maintain a monthly assessment of readiness to perform joint mission essential tasks.

Mr. SKELTON. What measures have been put in place or planned to improve NORTHCOM's and its partners' interagency planning and operations deficiencies?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Key measures include the establishment of a National Exercise Program with participation from the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, other National Response Plan-associated organizations, as well as state, local and tribal government agencies. In addition, USNORTHCOM has established an Interagency Coordination Officer training and certification program to standardize and formalize the training, capabilities, and credibility of its personnel.

USNORTHCOM has also implemented the following initiatives outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review and Building Partnership Capabilities Execution Roadmap:

- Detailing personnel to other agencies to support those agencies' efforts to build their planning and deployment capabilities
- Expanding DOD planning and training programs to civilian planners
- Developing an Interagency National Security Officer corps designed to develop a cadre of government personnel knowledgeable and more capable in interagency communication and coordination
- Promoting DOD participation in the National Exercise and Evaluation Program and the National Security Exercise Program

Mr. SKELTON. b. How far has NORTHCOM progressed in building relationships with state, local and tribal levels?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. USNORTHCOM's primary interagency focus is at the federal level; however, they have a continuing program of interagency engagement and enhancement with regional, state, local, and National Guard partners. USNORTHCOM has cultivated relationships at the state and local levels and with non-governmental organizations through their Joint Interagency Coordination Group.

Mr. SKELTON. Has there been sufficient variety in exercise localities to test the relationships and the system of planning and operational coordination?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. USNORTHCOM continues to look for ways to increase participation by regional, state, local, and tribal agencies in the National Exercise Program to strengthen our nation's response capabilities.

To date, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have planned and/or conducted exercises in/with 27 states, 9 of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions, 4 Canadian Provinces, and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. Over 150 federal, state, local and multinational agencies and non-governmental organizations have participated in NORAD and USNORTHCOM exercises. Each year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD sponsor five large-scale exercises and over 30 smaller exercises. Exercise scenarios have simulated a wide range of homeland defense and civil support challenges, to include: threats from all domains, missile defense, consequence management operations, nuclear counterproliferation, protection of critical infrastructure, maritime interception operations, bioterrorist attacks, other weapons of mass destruction attacks, and natural disasters. USNORTHCOM also integrates potential disaster scenarios, such as pandemic influenza, into their training and exercises.

Mr. SKELTON. Have no-notice or short-notice exercises been planned in such a way to really test communications and operational capacity?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Deployments of Quick Reaction Forces and Rapid Response forces have been exercised in 2004 and 2005 Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises. However, we have not implemented, nor do we have funding to support, any full no-notice or short-notice exercise programs to respond to the broader

range of possible incidents such as the 15 Department of Homeland Security Threat Scenarios.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. O'Connell's (DOD) testimony asserted that military JIATFs are a model for integrated operations. Is there an example of a JIATF that has a broader number of agency subscribers and a broader mission that is having success in the field? To what can their success be attributed? Can JCS make a recommendation on how to adopt/adapt this model more broadly and at more levels to enhance interagency planning and operations?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Mr. O'Connell is precisely correct when he asserts that JIATFs provide a model of the synergistic possibilities of close interagency coordination. I offer the following example of just such an organization.

JIATF-South is a Combined, Joint, Interagency Command consisting of representatives from eleven foreign countries, all U.S. Armed Services (including the USCG) and the DOD intelligence agencies, the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS), plus the Central Intelligence Agency.

With USG agency representatives and International Liaison Officers under one director, JIATF-South serves as a model for interagency and international cooperation. The entire team is focused on a common goal, ensuring unity of command and effort. Manned and led by personnel from the various agencies and countries with a counter-drug mission, the JIATF organizational structure embodies the force-multiplying effect of a task force.

The JIATF model, focused on long-term improvement of international or domestic cooperation and capacity building, can: (1) maximize scarce U.S. resources; (2) integrate military, intelligence, and law enforcement activities; (3) facilitate execution of the WOT by building host-nation capacities to address transnational threats; (4) maximize partner nation and/or interagency cooperation; and (5) support Combatant Command Security Cooperation objectives and broader USG objectives.

Mr. SKELTON. What is the division of responsibility between the NCTC's strategic operational planning component, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC)?

Admiral REDD. The NSC and HSC staffs are responsible for organizing and managing the process whereby policy and strategy are developed and approved. NCTC does not make strategy or policy, but works closely with NSC and HSC to ensure that the appropriate plans are developed to implement the policies and strategies that emerge from the NSC and HSC. Under the terms of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), NCTC is responsible for conducting strategic operational planning for Counterterrorism (CT) activities. To do this, NCTC leads an interagency planning effort to develop strategic goals, objectives and sub-objectives, and ultimately, tasks that are assigned to a lead agency or department in support of the national strategy.

Mr. SKELTON. At the hearing, Admiral Redd gave a concrete example of interagency success. He did not give as concrete an example of interagency failure. Please give one example of a recent interagency failure and then give lessons learned from both the examples of success and failure. How are "lessons learned" institutionalized in the NCTC organization? Does NCTC coordinate your lessons-learned with other non-Intelligence Community (IC) organizations? Does NCTC coordinate on other non-IC organizations' lessons?

Admiral REDD. You may recall the pre-election threat of 2004 during which the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (before NCTC), the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of State (DOS) all provided threat warnings to U.S. policy- and decision-makers. All three reports reached different conclusions, and due to the variance between the three reports, U.S. officials were left to interpret the information and draw their own conclusions. With respect to lessons learned, NCTC has subsequently established a line of community products that speak with a single voice for threat warning, while offering U.S. officials alternative views and perspectives.

The CT community is continually examining its processes and refining its practices to become more effective, and indeed more efficient, in fulfilling its important mission. Our collective effort in the information-sharing realm is a case in point, where multiple agencies and departments have worked to ensure the dissemination of more information, at lower classification levels, to relevant federal, state, and local officials. An important focus of this work has been to better manage the handling of threat reporting to ensure that actionable intelligence gets to those who need it in a focused and coordinated fashion. These efforts have led to important improvements in interagency coordination and dissemination practices, and better communication with the law enforcement and homeland security communities.

While NCTC and our community partners work on nearly a daily basis to improve processes based on lessons learned, we are also establishing a formal lessons learned capability. NCTC's Mission Management (MM) Directorate has recently

launched the first of our lessons learned studies, focused on the IC's counterterrorism support to the Torino Winter Olympics. This effort involves outreach not only to multiple agencies and departments of the IC, but also U.S. Government (USG) entities more broadly to capture best practices and develop recommendations to improve IC support to future special events. For this effort, our MM Directorate has collaborated with the Directorate of National Intelligence's (DNI) Lessons Learned Center and partnered with the Center for the Study of Intelligence. The results of the Torino study will be shared broadly within the IC, and we will be working with our interagency Counterterrorism Advisory Group to develop plans for future lessons learned studies, which can be focused on interagency shortfalls and problem areas. We will continue to reach out to the IC and beyond, as necessary, to improve our counterterrorism efforts, and to support lessons learned studies conducted by others upon their request.

Mr. SKELTON. What interagency issues does the NCTC believe Congress should take up first and why? What elements in legislation would be necessary for the NCTC or new national security partners (domestic or foreign), to improve interagency capacities to respond to current and future national security complex contingencies, challenges and opportunities? What about within the NCTC?

Admiral REDD. The IRTPA provided the DNI and NCTC with a number of tools to improve interagency capabilities to respond to national security contingencies, challenges, and opportunities. Examples range from NCTC's USG-wide strategic operational planning responsibilities for the global war on terror to the DNI's budget and tasking authorities. A number of USG-wide information sharing initiatives are also underway. I believe we need to assess the effectiveness of these tools before we consider additional far-reaching legislative initiatives. The Administration has made some more modest proposals, however, in its FY 2007 intelligence authorization submission.

At this point in time, Congress can provide the greatest assistance by ensuring that NCTC and its partners have the resources (including facilities and personnel) to facilitate NCTC's fulfillment of its statutory responsibilities and the USG success in the War on Terrorism.

Mr. SKELTON. In order to improve the interagency process and operations, does the NCTC believe a government change on the order of a new National Security Act (since the 1947 Act was government's response to the Cold War) or a second Goldwater-Nichols-like reform is necessary? If not, why not? If so, what should be the scope of that effort (what changes to personnel systems (clearances), organizational structure, command and control arrangements, acquisition, etc. are necessary)?

Admiral REDD. The IRTPA was a fundamental reorganization of the IC, close, if not equal, in magnitude, to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols reform in the Department of Defense. The DNI now has substantial authority to effect change in the areas of personnel, acquisitions, and security across the IC. For example, the DNI recently adopted a joint duty directive for the IC, making service in more than one element of the IC a requirement for certain promotions and positions.

In addition, as authorized by the IRTPA, the NCTC is responsible for "strategic operational planning" to develop interagency counterterrorism plans that integrate all instruments of national power. This mission represents a bold and unprecedented approach to integrating the efforts across the full spectrum of Executive Branch departments and agencies for countering terrorism. NCTC's Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning's (DSOP's) efforts to develop interagency plans have already involved hundreds of departmental planners and will have far reaching and long lasting implications for how the United States executes the War on Terrorism.

In light of the significance of these new authorities and responsibilities, it is important to allow time to evaluate their effectiveness before consideration of additional significant government restructuring.

Mr. SKELTON. In the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act the CINCs (now COCOMs) were given direction of military forces in the field. In testimony, Ambassador Crumpton said in states with which we are at war and in non-states (states with no recognizable ruling/sovereign authority), military leaders should be the "quarterback" for interagency plans and operations. In states with which the U.S. is not at war, he asserted that the Ambassador is and should be the "quarterback". By analogy, one might then assume departments/agencies in Washington would perform the mission to organize, train and equip (as do the military services) to provide forces/personnel and have administrative control over the [n], while the military or ambassador "quarterback" or have tactical/operational control of forces/personnel in the field (for example, some have suggested that USAID should organize, train and equip AID personnel to serve in the field under some other department's/agency's direction). Does the NCTC agree this is a workable construct for interagency planning and op-

erations in the field? If not, provide an alternative suggestion for a chain of command/command relationships.

Admiral REDD. We defer to DOS and other agencies/departments who have personnel stationed abroad regarding the roles and responsibilities for Ambassadors in the field. However, we can note that your analogy regarding command relationships, applied more broadly, also bears on the work we have underway in strategic operational planning. In this role, as defined in the IRTPA, we are producing the government's blueprint for the War on Terrorism, integrating all instruments of national power and influence. In this capacity, NCTC is leading a major interagency effort to develop a counterterrorism roadmap and coordinate the efforts of dozens of USG entities. While NCTC is leading this important planning effort, its role does not extend to directing the actual execution of other departments' and agencies' counterterrorism activities. Instead, these organizations appropriately retain the mandate based on their statutory responsibilities, and necessary flexibility to carry out relevant tasks and activities—benefiting from NCTC's planning leadership.

Mr. SKELTON. In testimony, Admiral Redd compared the NCTC to the Joint Staff; it does strategic operational planning and assigns tasks for CT operations but does not have command authority. First, does the government need an organization like the Joint Staff or NCTC for broader interagency planning and assigning of roles and missions, or do we already have a government organization that can perform this role? Second, does the government then need a command structure like that of the regional and functional COCOMs to actually command/direct personnel in the field to fulfill interagency tasking?

Admiral REDD. As recommended by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, and as Congress recognized by authorizing the NCTC in the IRTPA, the Executive Branch needed an organization modeled on the Joint Staff to develop interagency plans that integrate all instruments of national power for countering terrorism.

The Commission did not recommend that the NCTC have any command authority with respect to "strategic operational planning," and the IRTPA states explicitly that the NCTC does not have authority to direct the execution of operations. The Executive Branch is currently developing the "strategic operational planning" process in order to fulfill the Commission's vision and Congress's mandate. Accordingly, a new Executive Branch command structure is not needed at this time.

Mr. SKELTON. What relationship does the NCTC have with NORTHCOM?

Admiral REDD. The NCTC Operations Center (NCTOC) has continuous daily contact with the NORAD/NORTHCOM (N/NC) Operations/Intelligence Watch (OIW) in Cheyenne Mountain; the teams on duty have a threat-related conversation with the OIW at least once every 12 hours. In addition, NCTC directly supports NORTHCOM during real-world aviation and maritime operations.

Specifically:

NORTHCOM personnel access the *NCTC Situation Report* (SITREP) and *Threats to US Interests Worldwide* (Threat Matrix) through NCTC Online on a daily basis.

NORTHCOM participates in a nightly NCTC-chaired video teleconference with national-level operations and watch centers to discuss potential terrorist threats.

NCTC works with the NORTHCOM J7 and J2 in planning NCTC participation in their exercises and interacts with NORTHCOM during exercises hosted by another command.

DOD is included in the development of interagency counterterrorism plans by NCTC's Strategic Operational Planning Directorate. As a result, NORTHCOM's views are represented in the formulation of strategic operational plans.

NORTHCOM and NCTC regularly participate in visits to each other's locations to collaborate on issues of common concern.

Mr. SKELTON. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently testified before the House Armed Services Committee to the following:

"The Goldwater-Nichols legislation established a system of incentives and requirements to foster Jointness among military officers. We need to find similar ways to encourage interagency expertise. Rewarding interagency work experience, education, and training will facilitate better synergy between departments. Likewise, we need and should reward individuals and agencies that rapidly deploy and sustain civilian expertise in tandem with our military. Shared deliberate and crisis planning capacity among our interagency partners will also improve our Nation's readiness for contingencies."

Are there issues that Congress could help resolve on deploying non-volunteer civilians to complex contingencies and war zones including health and life insurance issues and medical care relative to any injuries sustained in theater on return to CONUS?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. The Department of State already has numerous opportunities and incentives for building interagency experience among our Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel. We currently have approximately 165 permanent details to 28 agencies, including 50 details to the Department of Defense. Additional details are established on an ad hoc basis. Through new requirements for promotion into the Senior Foreign Service, members of the Foreign Service are especially encouraged to spend at least one year of their mid-level career on detail to another agency.

The Department also offers approximately 138 opportunities for long-term training at 30 institutions, such as the National Defense University, the various other War Colleges and Commands, Princeton, Harvard and other academic institutions to promote interagency relationships.

Additionally, the core mission of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at State (S/CRS) is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy. S/CRS has been charged with leading the coordination of USG stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Currently, S/CRS staff come from the State Department, USAID, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Army Corps of Engineers, Joint Forces Command, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Treasury Department.

In response to your ultimate question regarding benefits for civilians deployed to war zones, we have been carefully assessing this issue for some time. We appreciate the language in the Supplemental that provides additional personnel authorities related to Iraq and Afghanistan (Sections 1602 and 1603). Another issue that we have been striving to resolve is how the Worker's Compensation System cares for covered employees injured in war zones, especially upon return to the United States. We will continue to discuss improvements with our colleagues at the Department of Labor, which administers the program.

Mr. SKELTON. At the hearing, Ambassador Crumpton gave a concrete example of an interagency success. He did not give as concrete an example of an interagency failure. Please give one example of a recent interagency failure and then give lessons learned from both examples of success and failure. How are "lessons learned" institutionalized in State? Does State coordinate lessons-learned with other organizations? Does State coordinate on other organizations' lessons?

Ambassador CRUMPTON.

- Just a few months before the 9/11 attacks, in summer of 2001, an eventual hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar, a Saudi national, had his U.S. visa renewed. Despite intelligence dating back to late 1999 and early 2000 that linked him to al-Qaeda and the 1998 embassy bombings, Mihdhar was not on the State Department's "watch list." If he had been, he would not have been issued the visa. The failure to include him on the watch list is attributable to mistakes made by several agencies and was a harsh lesson learned that the USG's multiple watch lists needed to be consolidated, so that all pertinent information regarding a suspect individual could be readily accessible by those who needed it to protect the United States, our interests, and our friends and allies. This effort is ongoing. We learned that it is not enough for each agency individually to be doing its job; but that those efforts have to be woven together into a seamless counterterrorism effort.
- From the positive example I cited at the hearing, we have learned the importance of having all elements of statecraft coming together, both in the field and in Washington. During that incident in the spring of 2002, in southern Afghanistan, a CIA source identified enemy movement out of a village, predicted at dawn. U.S. Navy responded with a P-3 surveillance aircraft over that village, but could not take on the mission. Therefore, the mission was handed off to a CIA-operated UAV that, in turn, was able to inform a ground team consisting of CIA, special forces and Afghans, who initially intercepted the enemy convoy as it left the village, which bought time for a Navy Seal team to deploy from Bagram and, working with the UAV platform, destroy the convoy.
- The lessons from our mistakes and successes are factored into our calculus as we work to create new policies or further existing ones. This is how we work with other agencies, as well as how we approach international bilateral and multilateral relations and negotiations.
- As an example of how these lessons have been institutionalized, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) includes individuals from other bureaus within the State Department, the CIA, FBI, DOD and DHS as well as on loan from the government of one of our closest allies in the War on Terror. These staff members work closely with others in S/CT, and are also in constant contact with their home agencies and organizations.

- We also work with the Foreign Service Institute on developing curriculum on counterterrorism issues, including assisting with case studies.
- We engage in interagency outreach, as well as extensive speeches and seminars. I regularly speak in interagency for a, such as the Joint Military Intelligence College, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), U.S. government-sponsored think tanks, and others. I, of course, also lead interagency teams in Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) conferences and in bilateral exchanges.
- In addition, S/CT is represented, including at senior levels, in numerous interagency policy coordinating committees and working groups. These working groups meet daily, weekly or biweekly to discuss counterterrorism and homeland security issues of concern, as well as current and ongoing policies to target the terrorist threat.

Mr. SKELTON. In order to improve the interagency process and operations, does State believe that a government change on the order to a new National Security Act (since the 1947 Act was government's response to the Cold War) or a second Goldwater-Nichols-like reform is necessary? If not, why not? If so, what should be the scope of that effort (what changes to personnel systems, organizational structure, command and control arrangements, acquisition, etc., are necessary)?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Thank you for seeking our views on these important questions. I do not think it would be appropriate for me to propose independently to Congress or to comment on large-scale governmental reform, since that reform would possibly involve large parts of the Department as well as other agencies within the federal government. Looking for ways that we can improve is a constant and on-going process. For example, I participate regularly in interagency meetings where we often discuss and frequently implement ideas to improve the interagency process. In addition, the State Department routinely expresses its views on possible or pending legislation at the appropriate time and through appropriate channels, in coordination with other interested executive branch agencies. We are not in a position at this time to offer comments on possible legislation, which would have wide-ranging effects within the executive branch.

Mr. SKELTON. What interagency issues does State believe Congress should take up first and why? What elements in legislation would be necessary for State or new national security partners (domestic or foreign), to improve interagency capacities to respond to current and future national security complex contingencies, challenges and opportunities? What about within State?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Thank you for your support on these important issues. In September of this year, the Administration released "9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges". This report is a comprehensive review of what has thus far been accomplished and what remains to be done in the area of national security in the era after the 9/11 attacks. While this document does not specifically address possible Congressional action, I believe it does establish quite clearly what, as a nation, our priorities should be. While I do not have specific suggestions at this time, I am confident that the State Department and other interested executive branch agencies will continue to make clear our legislative priorities to Congress as specific needs and issues arise.

Mr. SKELTON. In the 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act, the CINCs (now COCOMs) were given direction of military forces in the field. In testimony, Ambassador Crumpton said in states with which we are at war in and in non-states (states with no recognizable ruling/sovereign authority), military leaders should be the "quarterback" for interagency plans and operations. In states with which the U.S. is not at war, he asserted that the Ambassador is and should be the "quarterback." By analogy, one might then assume departments/agencies in Washington would perform the mission to organize, train and equip (as do military services) to provide forces/personnel and have administrative control over them, while the military or ambassador "quarterback" or have tactical/operational control of forces/personnel in the field (for example, some have suggested that USAID should organize, train and equip AID personnel to serve in the field under some other department's/agency's direction). Does State believe this is a workable construct for interagency planning and operations in the field? If not, provide an alternative suggestion for a chain of command/command relationships.

Ambassador CRUMPTON.

- The role of the Ambassador in overseeing interagency planning and operations in the field has been and continues to be a workable framework. As the President's personal representative to a foreign government, the ambassador depends on elements of his country team or personnel who are temporarily assigned, from many agencies, to perform tasks for which they are uniquely qualified. The Ambassador, as Chief of Mission, synchronizes the work and relationships among all USG person-

nel in the Mission to ensure that our foreign policy goals are met. For instance, U.S. military civil affairs teams sent to countries to improve basic infrastructure would be part of a broader outreach to the host nation.

Mr. SKELTON. In testimony, Admiral Redd compared the NCTC to the Joint Staff; it does strategic operational planning and assigns tasks for CT operations but does not have command authority? First, does the government need an organization like the Joint Staff or NCTC [to do] the broader interagency planning and assigning of roles and missions or do we already have a government organization that can perform this role? Second, does the government then need a command structure like that of the regional and functional COCOMs to actually command/direct personnel in the field to fulfill interagency tasking?

Ambassador CRUMPTON.

- With regard to the first question, at this time, NCTC's current role is the best approach.
- Regarding the second question, COCOMs and ambassadors already have a strong interdependency which has been demonstrated in a variety of countries throughout the world. We believe the best solutions to current challenges come from our respective representatives in the field, with support and policy guidance from Washington when needed. The current Regional Strategic Initiatives we have undertaken demonstrates this approach, recognizing that defeating all aspects of terrorism is directly linked to establishing and maintaining strong international, as well as interagency, partnerships.

Mr. SKELTON. According to the *New York Times*, the Downing report also criticizes "Pentagon civilians, the military's Joint Staff, the regional war-fighting commanders and the NSC staff for not adjusting their organizations to expedite SOCOM's new CT missions." The report says the senior civilian and military leaders tolerate a system that is not "responsive, flexible, agile" or global. In addition, according to author Thom Shanker's sources, despite Unified Command Plan direction to SOCOM, there is "a tremendous duplication of effort" in the government and that SOCOM "does not have the power to do what it has been assigned." What has been done to remedy these problems?

(a) Is there resistance to SOCOM's role (MLEs?) at embassies from State Department and Military Attaches as reported? Why does this perception exist?

(b) If so, what is the solution to this problem?

Ambassador CRUMPTON.

- My office, the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, works closely with SOCOM and the entire Special Operations Community to assist in introducing their skills into various parts of the world. Their role is appreciated and there is no resistance. Further details regarding SOCOM's remedies should be addressed by DOD.
- We are in constant dialogue with SOCOM to establish MLE support requirements in a framework along the same lines as arrangements pertaining to other non-DOS entities under Chief of Mission authority.

Mr. SKELTON. How can the government better tie resource allocation to strategic priorities? Can Congress or the President incentivize agencies to participate better in interagency processes through budgetary mechanisms? How can the government better reward agencies that share and integrate?

CSIS has suggested an annual NSC(HSC)/OMB review to assess whether spending on National Security matches the President's National Security Strategy priorities. Do you concur that this might be a viable way to improve the linkage of resources to priorities?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. The government can better tie resource allocations to strategic priorities by making such ties the basic issue in allocation decisions. Information for such decisions is already sent to Congress each year as required by the Government Performance and Results Act. In the case of the Department of State the annual Performance Summary is a joint interagency plan with the US Agency for International Development. If the Congress and OMB began to cite data from the annual performance summary as the reason for allocation decisions, this would better reward and thereby "incentivize" agencies to greater focus on strategic priorities as well as participation in integrated programs.

An NSC (HSC)/OMB review of spending on the National Security Strategy (NSS) could be part of this effort, once an interagency planning layer of goals and metrics were added that would facilitate linkage and assessment of individual agency contributions to the NSS.

Mr. SKELTON. What is the State Department's relationship with NORTHCOM?

Ambassador CRUMPTON.

- State provides an experienced Senior Foreign Service Officer as Political Advisor (POLAD) to the Combatant Commander. The Department also provides a mid-level Foreign Service Officer to NORTHCOM's Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG).
- The Combatant Commander visits the State Department and Embassies in his AOR regularly for policy consultations.
- NORTHCOM's extensive Theater Security Cooperation program includes Canada and Mexico and is closely coordinated with the State Department's Offices of Mexican and Canadian Affairs.
- Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N), a NC component has an intelligence officer in Embassy Mexico City's intelligence fusion cell.
- Embassy Mexico City's Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) is composed of NORTHCOM officers.
- Embassies Ottawa and Mexico City, and State officers participate in NORTHCOM and national exercises together, particularly relating to Homeland Defense and the roles of Canada and Mexico.
- NORTHCOM participates in the State Department-led initiative to draft standard procedures to accept international donations which can include military-to-military as a result of extensive policy and operational cooperation during Hurricane Katrina.
- NORTHCOM hosts ranking State Department visits, e.g. I should be visiting July 17. State also hosts NORTHCOM visits, e.g. MG Volcheff, Chief of N-NC J-5, visited the Department on June 14.
- Because of the significance of its Homeland Defense Mission, NORTHCOM regularly hosts ranking foreign visitors outside its AOR in support of our common foreign policy goals and frequent International Visitor Program participants from other AORs.
- NORTHCOM supported State, the co-lead negotiator, in the recent NORAD renewal negotiations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. Would you give three or four specific examples from Iraq, from our experience in Iraq that last 3 years where we have had a failure of interagency cooperation that we wish we had done better on? Some very specific example, please, that may or may not have been corrected.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Interagency cooperation has not failed in Iraq; however, in some areas it is sub-standard. First, though, there are multiple examples of superb interagency integration and cooperation, for example:

Threat Finance: Threat Finance Exploitation Unit (TFEU) consists of NSC, DOS, DOD, Treasury, DEA, FBI, NSA, CIA, and DHS. TFEU's purpose is to impact financial support of terrorist, insurgent, and narcotic financing. Action officers meet weekly exchanging information and intelligence. Coordinated efforts allow access from the collection and analysis nodes to the operator on the ground streamlining the collection, analysis, and reporting process.

High Value Individuals (HVI): JIATF HVI consists of DOD, DOS, Treasury, FBI, DHS, and CIA. The Task Force targets former regime leaders supporting the insurgency and terror acts inside and outside Iraq.

Border Security: DHS Border Support Teams deployed to Iraq last summer to support DOD's request to provide training and mentoring of the Iraqi border control system.

The President directed a comprehensive integrated approach in the *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. Interagency organization and actions for Iraq are formalized in both structure and process, which applies all elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. This is executed through the *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq's* Eight Strategic Pillars that help the Iraqi people build a nation at peace with its neighbors and create an ally in the War on Terror with a representative government. This government will respect the human rights of all Iraqis and build security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists. The structure consists of an interagency working group for each of the strategic objectives. These working groups report to the Iraqi Steering Group, which in turn, reports to the Deputies and Principles Committees. The process is a combination of working group meetings and

monitoring and assessing our progress toward the goals established for each strategic objective.

The Department of Defense is organized differently than other departments. In Iraq, General Casey (MNF-I Commander) reports to General Abizaid (CENTCOM Commander), who reports to the Secretary of Defense. The military services provide and support forces assigned to CENTCOM. Subordinate military units are designed to deploy, and their Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are trained for the tasks they perform in Iraq. All are guided by joint and service doctrine for tasks across the full spectrum of operations. Depending on the level and type of unit, the various echelons of military command in Iraq operate at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The organizational result is unity of effort.

Contrast this with non-DOD agencies assigned in Iraq. They are assigned to the Chief of Mission, who reports directly to the Secretary of State. Because subordinate elements of the departments are not designed to deploy, individual and organizational preparation and support is different. Because operations in Iraq are "non-standard" for non-DOD organizations, there is no equivalent doctrinal guide for operations.

I must emphasize these are not criticisms, they are simply observations.

Uniformed members of the Department of Defense deploy wherever and whenever they are needed. In Iraq, if a mid-level expert in a particular specialty is needed, he or she may be called upon to deploy to meet a requirement for a one-year period. This is not the case with civilian government employees, even in wartime. If a mid-level DOD Civilian employee is needed in Iraq, he or she does not have to go. In some agencies those who do agree to deploy, do so for limited periods (four months, six months). Relationships are everything when acting as a hands-on advisor to Iraqis. Therefore, longevity, experience, and credibility count.

Again, I must emphasize, these are not criticisms, they are simply observations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. Some independent experts have encouraged the creation of a Quadrennial National Security Review, similar to DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review, though at an interagency level. Do you think such an effort would help us better coordinate our assets of national power? Would such an effort help you and your agency better meet our nation's strategic goals?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review provided the Department of Defense the opportunity to balance the needs of our ongoing struggle with longer-term requirements to enhance security in a rapidly changing world. A similar government-wide approach to interagency coordination could potentially help the United States develop and coordinate all elements of national power.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Some independent experts have encouraged the creation of a Quadrennial National Security Review, similar to DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review, though at an interagency level. Do you think such an effort would help us better coordinate our assets of national power? Would such an effort help you and your agency better meet our nation's strategic goals?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. We see value in a formal interagency strategic planning and review process tied to departmental performance planning and budget formulation and execution. Such a process would regularly assess developments in the national and international security environments and their implications for Executive Branch Department budgets and program priorities. During such a review, investment strategies and program performance would be assessed against evolving requirements of the security environment. The frequency with which such a review should be conducted would need to be studied.

The Secretary has taken significant steps in this regard with respect to her interagency foreign assistance reform initiative. The intent of this reform is to ensure that we are strategically allocating foreign assistance resources to our priority security goals, assessing performance against those goals, and making adjustments as necessary. We are also taking concrete steps to widen and deepen State-Defense collaboration consistent with the Secretary's Transformational Diplomacy initiative by expanding exchange and education programs, improving interagency security strategy development processes, expanding the number of foreign policy advisor positions on military command staffs; and we are working closely with OSD in search of other similar opportunities for cooperation.

An expanded interagency review process might improve the ability of the Chief Executive to apply the most appropriate instruments of national power to our national strategic challenges.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ISRAEL

Mr. ISRAEL. You can't just press a button or pass a bill that says "better inter-agency coordination". It requires a change of thinking and culture, which requires training and education, which is best provided as part of PME. What needs to be done to incorporate and deepen curricula offerings on interagency coordination?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The Department of Defense has continued to make strides in implementing new and bolstering existing curricula on interagency coordination. I welcome the opportunity to share these changes in the hope that other Departments and Agencies can learn from our success.

Joint Publication 3-08: "Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Non-governmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations" 17 March 2006 provides the doctrinal foundation for Professional Military Education (PME) curricula regarding interagency coordination. Initial feedback on this publication from the Non-Governmental Organization community is very positive.

Recent updates to the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (Dec. 2005) and Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy (Oct. 2005) have new or expanded Learning Areas/Objectives on interagency operations. These policies provide the foundation for required joint education curricula.

Finally, in accordance with the Chairman's policies, each PME institution is required to fulfill appropriate joint learning objectives. The Joint Staff J-7 visits each intermediate and senior service college regularly to assess their compliance with CJCS learning objectives.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. I represent Guam. Guam is neighbor to some of the world's most troublesome potential hotspots. Tensions across the Taiwan Strait and the on-going situation with North Korea are of significant concern to my constituents, as they are for many Americans. Policies aimed to manage their problems require inter-agency coordination and execution. For instance, a humanitarian disaster caused by the collapse of North Korea is certainly a possible scenario for which the United States should plan. With regard to authorities provided by current law and the amount of appropriated funds for these types of activities, how difficult would it be for U.S. government to coordinate and execute an inter-agency response to a massive humanitarian problem like the collapse of North Korea? What is your level of comfort with our government capability to plan for something like this? I am particularly interested in whether the current Department of Defense contingency plans for North Korea were developed and coordinated with agencies outside the Department of Defense? You may know that Guam was host to Vietnamese refugees during and after the war in the country. Also, in 1996, Guam was host to nearly 6,500 Kurdish refugees fleeing fighting in northern Iraq between the two main Kurdish factions. Guam stands ready to assist again, but I am concerned that our planning for inter-agency responses to massive humanitarian or other problems is lacking.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral, you mention that civilian agencies operating in Iraq need to "step up and solidify progress" in areas that are key to success. Can you please expand upon that comment and define what those key areas are and comment on whether commanders in the field believe the civilian agencies responsible for that progress have adequate human and other resources on the ground in order to achieve success in those areas. If the civilian agencies do not have adequate resources in the field, to what extent do military forces fill in the gaps that may exist?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. What I meant by my comment was that several areas of economic reconstruction have lagged behind the political and security progress that has been made to date.

For example, over 275,000 Iraqi Security Forces have been trained since the end of major combat operations. The Iraqis have elected a transitional government; written and ratified a constitution, conducted permanent elections, and recently inaugurated a permanent government. However, we have not seen the same progress in areas such as oil production and exports, electricity power generation and distribution, unemployment, and others.

I have not received specific comments from field commanders about civilian resources, but these are challenging areas that Departments and Agencies other than the Defense Department are better suited to handle. It is more appropriate for the Department of State and US Embassy Baghdad to provide an answer regarding resources in the field.

Ms. BORDALLO. Are there lessons regarding inter-agency operations on the ground that this committee and the Congress can learn from our Iraq experience? I raise this issue with you after having read a Friday, March 3, 2006, Washington Post article entitled "Iraqi Security for U.S. Teams Uncertain". The article refers to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) initiative that the embassy in Iraq and MNF-I are pursuing. The article explains that State Department officials had hoped that U.S. military would take responsibility for ensuring the safety of the dozens of diplomats, aid workers and other specialists intended to staff the new outposts, which, when announced last fall, were billed as an important initiative for rebuilding the country. The article describes the Pentagon as reluctant to take the mission of securing these civilian workers. Has this situation been resolved, and what was the result?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the great work being done by the PRTs. These are the kinds of efforts that will have lasting, positive effects on countering ideological support for terrorism.

The article you mention describes the security situation encountered during the initial "proof of concept" for PRTs. Security for all seven active PRTs is now a joint Department of State and Department of Defense effort and appears to be quite effective.

PRTs are a civil-military effort led by the Department of State with extensive support from U.S. and Coalition military forces. The first three Iraq PRTs were proof-of-concept teams subject to a 30- and 60-day operational assessment. Only one proof-of-concept team had military movement/security teams, which consisted of two movement security teams. The 60-day assessment (9 March 2006) found that movement security was inadequate.

Each PRT is tailored for the province in which it operates, but all have a movement/security team consisting of approximately 40 military/DOS Protective Security Detail personnel organized into three teams. These teams provide concurrent movement and local security for three separate groups of PRT members. Nineweh, Tamim and Babil each have two military movement teams and a DOS Protective Security Detail. Baghdad and Al Anbar have three military movement teams. The UK and Italy provide their own military security for their PRTs in Basrah and Dhi Qar.

