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MISSION # 36 RANGOON "FESTOONERY 2"  
11 February 1945

2-5239-65

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By *SP* NARA Date *12/6/05*



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Deputy C. of S. P & A	
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Deputy C. of S. T. M. & E.	
A. G.	

# XX BOMBER COMMAND



## Tactical Mission Report

No. 36

DATE 11 FEBRUARY 1945

GENERAL OF THE ARMIES H. H. ARNOLD

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\* Mar 45 15 \*  
\* Date Initial \*  
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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB and C  
APO 493

TACTICAL MISSION

REPORT

Field Orders No. 36

Mission No. 36

TARGET: DUMP "F", RANGOON AREA

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Prepared by:

Intelligence Section

XX Bomber Command

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\* 8 Mar 45 F.S.M. \*  
\* Date Initials \*  
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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB and C  
APO 493

8 March 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 11 February 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington, 25, D.C.

1. UNITS PARTICIPATING: The four Bombardment Groups of the XX Bomber Command were directed by Field Orders No. 36 to participate in a medium-size daylight strike on D-day against Supply and Storage facilities in the Rangoon, Burma, Area. Groups, their locations and their Commanding Officers were as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>
40th	Chakulia	Colonel W.H. Blanchard
444th	Dudhkundi	Colonel A.L. Harvey
462nd	Piandoba	Colonel A.F. Kalberer
468th	Kharagpur	Colonel J.V. Edmundson

2. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Attack No. 36.

b. Target Specified:

- (1) Primary: Dump "F" Area, directly north of Victoria Lake and one and three quarter miles south of Mingaladon Airfield at 16°51'30"N - 96°09'00"E (XX Bomber Command Target Chart No. 41).

3. STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS:

a. Importance of Target:

(1) Primary: The several supply dumps north of Rangoon are believed to contain 50 to 55 per cent of all the Japanese ammunition stores in Burma, and of these, Dump "F" is reported to be the most important. Destruction of supplies already in Burma would present a serious problem to the Japanese, particularly in view of the bombing of railroad bridges and the attacks against shipping that are being carried out at the present time in and near Burma.

b. Details of Planning:

(1) Operational Planning:

(a) The attack was conducted at the request of the Strategic Air Force, which approximately one hour after our forces bombed, again struck the same target with 79 B-24's and fighter escort. It was a change in the employment of VLR aircraft, in that the target was a supply dump. However, it was the opinion of the Strategic Air Force that the Japanese effort in Burma would be more seriously affected by large scale attacks against their communications and supplies than against other military installations.

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(b) The plan for this mission differed from previous missions in that no secondary or last resort targets were specified, and that if the primary target could not be bombed visually, bombs were to be returned to base. This decision was made in view of the fact that there were no suitable secondary or last resort targets for the bomb load carried, and because the primary target does not offer a sufficient radar return to insure any degree of success of radar bombing.

(c) Another change from previous missions was that each Group had an individual over-water assembly point. This innovation was an experiment to determine the feasibility of assembly over water. Group and Wing Assembly Points and Initial Point were specified as follows

40th Group - 18°15'N - 92°00'E  
444th Group - 18°15'N - 92°45'E  
462nd Group - 18°50'N - 92°50'E  
468th Group - 19°00'N - 92°00'E  
Wing (GWA Point) - 17°35'N - 94°35'E  
Initial Point - (Town of Atkok) 17°13'N - 95°04'E

(2) Determination of Bomb Load:

(a) The Field Orders specified that each Group would set up 15 aircraft. Planes of the 40th and 468th Groups were to carry a maximum load of M-47 Incendiary Bombs, clustered six to a station and fused instantaneous nose. Planes of the 444th and 462nd Groups were to carry a maximum load of M-81 Frag Bombs, clustered two to a station using the M-12 cluster adapter, fused instantaneous nose and non-delay tail.

(b) The target, Dump F, located north of Rangoon, was reported to be the most important of several Japanese supply dumps and ammunition storage areas in Burma. Ammunition and stores are widely dispersed in Dump F over an area approximately 4500 x 3600 feet. Much of the enemy material is concealed below palm trees and heavy underbrush, some of it is stored in revetted areas. With the exception of a small motor pool, information on the exact type and location of stores was lacking. Analysis of the target by Operations Analysis Section resulted in the recommendation that the first half of the striking force be employed to cover the area with fragmentation bombs and the second half be employed to blanket the area with a scatter type incendiary bomb. The bombs selected were the M-81 Frag Bomb and the M-47 Incendiary Bomb, both of which were fused to detonate on impact, or in case they hit obstructions such as trees, to produce an air burst just above the ground, thus maximizing the area affected by any one detonation.

(3) Bombing Data:

(a) The pressure altitude prescribed for bombing was as follows: 40th Group - 20,000 feet, 444th Group - 18,000 feet, 462nd Group - 19,000 feet, 468th Group - 21,000 feet. In each case bombs were to be released electrically in minimum train. The method of bombing was with 12 plane formations in which the C flight was in high position and behind A flight. Elevating the C flight is not necessary when releasing the M-81, but it is a necessary precaution when employing the M-47, because of this bomb's excessive trail angle. Bombs were to be released on the range and deflection sighting of the leader. The axis of attack was 110° magnetic. The aiming point specified was the center of the supply and storage dump, denoted as "Dump F".



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(b) In an attempt to increase the number of aircraft bombing in formation, as well as to exert a greater measure of control of the time over the target of successive formations, a procedure, recently devised by Operations Analysis and Chemical Warfare Sections, for marking assembly points and lead aircraft was employed. In accordance with standard operating procedure, each Group was assigned a separate assembly point. The field order then specified that the 468th and the 444th Groups would mark their Group Assembly Points with six 100 pound M-47A2 (WP filled) bombs clustered with special adapters and fused one each, beginning with 7 seconds and on up 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 seconds. Lead aircraft dropped (WP filled) smoke grenades while circling Group Assembly Point. Similarly, the 462nd and the 40th Groups were to mark their Group Assembly Points with six 100 pound M-47A2 (WP filled) bombs clustered with special adapters and fused at 7 seconds delay. Lead aircraft dropped (WP filled) smoke grenades while circling Group Assembly Points. The four Groups were to be under the control of a Wing Commander furnished by the 444th Group and a common time of departure was prescribed for leaving the Wing Assembly Point.

4. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION (See Annexes A and K):

a. Take-off:

(1) Take-off times were not specified. Instead, time to leave the Wing Assembly point was set at 110519Z.

(2) Take-off was accomplished on D-day as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>A/C Airborne</u>	<u>First A/C Off</u>	<u>Last A/C Off</u>
40th	15	0220Z	0238Z
444th	15	0230Z	0251Z
462nd	15	0227Z	0249Z
468th	14*	0156Z	0217Z
Total	59	0156Z	0251Z

\* A/C No. 530 of the 468th Group did not take-off because the number 3 engine cut out. Mag point had burned.

(3) Weather at all bases was clear with visibility ranging from 2 to 20 miles.

b. Route Out:

(1) The route out was from base to Group Assembly Points to the Wing Assembly Point (GWA Point - 17°35'N - 95°35'E) to the Initial Point (Town of Atkok - 17°13'N - 95°04'E) to the target north of Victoria Lake.

(2) Three aircraft deviated from the briefed route to the target. All three planes returned early to bases, two jettisoning bombs and one returning bombs.

c. Primary Target:

(1) Of the 59 aircraft airborne, 56 bombed the Primary Target with a total of 4947 M-47's (170.7 tons) and 1898 M-81's (242.7 tons). The first formation bombed at 0503Z and the last at 0547Z. Bombing altitudes varied between 17,400 feet and 21,280 feet. The axes of attack were quite constant, varying in Group averages from 108° to 126° magnetic. The attack was carried out by 4 formations consisting of 13, 14, 14 and 15 aircraft.

242  
171  
413



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(2) Operations Analysis had suggested in the briefing that the fragmentation bombs would be dropped first, and the incendiaries last. Actually, the incendiaries were dropped first and the fragmentation bombs second; the error was caused by an omission in the Field Orders.

d. Target of Opportunity:

One aircraft dropped 10 M-81's on the Primary Target at which time 54 bombs hung up due to a malfunction; these were later dropped on Hmawbi Airfield.

e. Route Back:

The route back as specified in the Field Orders was from the target to 18° 16'N - 94° 20'E and then to the Base area. There were no deviations from the planned route.

5. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT (See Annex B):

a. Moderate and accurate heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered by all 56 aircraft bombing the Primary Target; fire was experienced from 0502Z to 0547Z at altitudes of 18,000 to 22,200 feet (T) under CAVU conditions. Fire was Continuously Pointed and no enemy aircraft were reported on parallel courses.

b. No B-29 was lost due to enemy anti-aircraft but 29 aircraft sustained minor damage (53 percent of total B-29's bombing the Primary Target). It was reported by crews that anti-aircraft encountered over the area was stronger than that at Anshan although not as intense as that over Yawata.

c. All aircraft reported black bursts while eight observed white flak; in addition, four simultaneous bursts of grey flak were observed. There were no smokescreens, balloons or ground-to-air rockets. It is believed that the Jap had prior warning of the attack, based on RCM intercepts of early warning radar signals. Anti-aircraft fire, however, was not radar controlled.

6. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION (See Annex C):

a. Enemy air opposition was very weak. Ten B-29's were attacked by a force estimated at eight Tonys and one Oscar. One B-29 sustained major damage while preliminary claims list three enemy fighters damaged. The enemy made nine single plane attacks and three coordinated attacks, for a total of fifteen encounters.

b. Twelve encounters occurred in the primary target area, and three on the route back from the target. Of those in the target area, nine encounters took place before bombing, and three after bombs had been dropped.

c. Jap pilots were aggressive and skillful; enemy fire was encountered in all but one of the attacks, an unusually high percentage. The three coordinated attacks (by two Tonys in each instance) were well timed and executed.

d. Frontal approaches, low, predominated.

e. There was a slight tendency to concentrate attacks against the lead elements of the formations.



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f. There were no aerial bombing or rocket attacks or unusual tactical developments.

7. WEATHER (See Annex D):

a. The weather was excellent for formation flying and precision bombing.

b. Metro winds were generally rated as good.

8. COMMUNICATIONS (See Annex E):

a. Bombs away messages were received on 100 per cent of the aircraft bombing the Primary Target, and position reports at 400 miles from base were received from 100 per cent of the aircraft (57) reaching that point. In addition, 3 abort messages, 1 attack message and 2 convoy sighting messages were handled.

b. The frequencies remained in use for approximately seven and one-half hours. Static level was practically nil. There was no fading and signal strengths were excellent through-out the mission. No jamming attempts or deceptive tactics on the part of the enemy were reported. One violation of transmission security occurred.

c. Radio beacons were utilized by 36 aircraft, while no requests for D/F facilities were made on this mission.

d. A total of seven equipment malfunctions was reported.

9. RADAR (See Annex F):

a. The radar equipment was used primarily as an aid to navigation and bombing on this mission. The target was definitely a visual target; however, a sufficient number of terrain features were identifiable on the radar scope to provide considerable aid in making the bomb run.

b. Radar scope photography was satisfactory and a number of excellent bombing run pictures were obtained.

c. Radar equipment was maintained at the high operational percentage of past missions.

10. RCM (See Annex G):

a. Eight RCM search aircraft, each with a bottom mount D/F antenna, participated in this mission. The RCM observers searched for early warning radar enroute to and from the target, and for radar fire control equipment while in the target area.

b. Only three early warning radar intercepts were recorded, two in the Rangoon area, and one in the Cape Bluff area (18 00'N - 94°30'E).

c. There were no intercepts with radar fire control characteristics.

d. No enemy counter measures were reported.

e. There were no equipment malfunctions.



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11. CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY (See Annex H):

a. The mission was accomplished without special incident in regard to gunnery. Attacks in the target area were aggressive, resulting in damage to one B-29; our preliminary claims are three enemy aircraft damaged.

b. There were four malfunctions of CSFC equipment, and four malfunctions of 50 - caliber machine guns.

c. Total number of rounds fired was 12,485, of which 6585 rounds were used in test firing and 5900 rounds in combat.

12. CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS (See Annex I):

a. On Mission number 36, the following number of cameras were installed in airborne aircraft: K-18 10, K-20 11, K-22 17, K-17 4, K-24 2 and K-35 7. Of these, only 2 K-20's and 1 K-17 were in aircraft failing to bomb the Primary Target. Due to transfer of units and personnel complete information is not available on malfunctions and numbers of useable negatives, but the following useable negatives were definitely obtained: K-18 82, K-20 152, K-22 135, K-24 139 and K-35 5.

b. Quality of photographs was fair to good.

13. LOSSES AND DAMAGE (See Annexes J and M):

a. Battle Losses and Battle Damage: There were no battle losses; one B-29 sustained major battle damage (by enemy air action) and 29 aircraft sustained minor battle damage (by enemy antiaircraft).

b. Operational Losses and Damage: There were no operational losses. The only case of operational damage occurred when a bomb tore the bomb door of a B-29 due to a double sling hanging up. This aircraft also sustained minor flak damage.

c. Missing Aircraft: None.

14. FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT (See Annexes K and M):

a. Of 59 aircraft airborne, 56 bombed the Primary Target. The three aircraft which did not bomb the Primary failed to do so because of mechanical difficulties; there was one propellor and governor failure, one oil system failure and one engine failure due to a broken rocker arm.

b. Overall averages of fuel consumption for the 1579 mile flight were as follows: average - 3510 gallons; maximum - 4000 gallons; minimum 2800 gallons. Statistics by Groups were: 40th average 3650, (maximum 4000; minimum 3310), 444th average 3845 (maximum 3800, minimum 2970), 462nd average 3365 (maximum 3835, minimum 2800), and 468th average 3540 (maximum 3700, minimum 3360).

15. TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (See Annex L):

a. Dump "F" was well cratered especially in the central area. About 75 small hutments and 35 small miscellaneous buildings were destroyed. Seven or eight small hutments with blast walls were destroyed, and at least ten others damaged. Post-strike photography shows at least 4 large fires burning among buildings of the Mental Hospital, probably gutting about ten buildings and damaging five others.



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Damage to Dump "A" was not extensive, with only 10-15 small hutments and several revetted buildings being destroyed. Approximately 15 small and two large buildings were destroyed in Dump "K". Hits on the Basein Railway Workshops were also scored.

b. Since the post-strike photography was obtained after the attacks of both the XX Bomber Command and the Strategic Airforce, no distinction in damage is possible, and all statements of damage refer to the joint attack.

*R. M. Ramey*  
R. M. RAMEY  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,  
Deputy Commander

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ANNEX

A

EXECUTION OF THE MISSION

- I - Information on Take-offs
- II - Details of Routes
- III - Track and Vertical Flight Path \*
- IV - Bombing Data \*\*
- V - Bomb Loading
- VI - Disposition of Bombs
- VII - Formations Flown
- VIII - Navigation Report \*

\* Prepared by Staff Navigator

\*\* Prepared by Staff Bombardier

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

I -- INFORMATION ON TAKE-OFFS

Mission No. 36

11 February 1945

Group	First A/C Off	Last A/C Off	Elapsed Time	No. A/C Taking Off	Average Take-off Interval
40th	110220Z	110238Z	18 min.	15	72 sec.
444th	110230Z	110251Z	21 min.	15	84 sec.
462nd	110227Z	110249Z	22 min.	15	88 sec.
468th	110156Z	110217Z	21 min.	14	90 sec.
Over-all	110156Z	110251Z	55 min.	59	56 sec.

II -- DETAILS OF ROUTES

A. Routes Planned

	40th	444th	462nd	468th
Base	Chakulia	Dudhkundi	Piardoba	Kharagpur
Group Assembly Point	18°15'N - 92°00'E	18°15'N - 92°45'E	18°50'N - 92°50'E	19°00'N - 92°00'E
Wing Assembly Point	17°35'N - 94°35'E			
Initial Point	Town of Atkok - 17°13'N - 95°04'E			
Target	Dump Area Directly North of Victoria Lake			
Route Back Check Point	18°16'N - 94°20'E			
Base	Chakulia	Dudhkundi	Piardoba	Kharagpur

B. Deviations From Planned Routes

1. 40th Group:

- a. A/C 757, shortly after take-off from Chakulia at 0229Z, was unable to change the propellor pitch on the No. 1 engine because of the propellor governor being stuck; the aircraft circled the field and landed at 0243Z, returning its bombs.

2. 444th Group:

None.

3. 462nd Group:

- a. A/C 3560 flew the briefed route to 21°23'N - 89°50'E where it became necessary to feather the No. 3 propellor because of a broken rocker arm; bombs were jettisoned at this point and the aircraft returned directly to Piardoba.

4. 468th Group:

- a. A/C 417 flew as briefed to 19°40'N - 91°00'E where it turned back due to loss of oil pressure in the No. 2 engine. A course of 304° True was flown directly to Kharagpur. Bombs were jettisoned at 20°00'N - 90°50'E.

A-I -1

A-II-1


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
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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

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CONSOLIDATED SPECIALISTS MISSION REPORT  
OF STAFF BOMBING OFFICER

Date Prepared: 14 February 1945

Field Order No. 36

Date of Mission: 11 Feb

1. Each Group had one large formation bomb the primary target. Weather was C.A.V.U. and all bombing was accomplished visually. The 40th and 468th Groups dropped the M-47-A2 incendiary bombs and the 444th and 462nd Groups dropped the M-81 fragmentation bombs.

2. Reported malfunctions of bombing equipment:

40th Group - #420 - two clusters of bombs in rear bomb-bay and fourteen clusters in forward bay did not release electrically and were immediately salvaged. Cause: Unknown.

444th Group - #533 - five clusters of M-81 bombs failed to release and were jettisoned. Cause: M-12 adapter fouled carrying lugs of B-10 shackle and prevented release.

#559 - two clusters of M-81 bombs failed to release and were jettisoned. Cause: M-12 adapter fouled carrying lugs of B-10 shackle and prevented release.

462nd Group - #728 - entire bomb load was released about a minute before formation leaders bombs were dropped. Cause: Undetermined as equipment ground checked O.K.

#463 - from ten to fourteen bombs released O.K. electrically and rest of bombs hung in racks. Aircraft was in a turn at bombs away which might be a contributing factor to the bombs hanging up. Remainder of bombs were salvaged near an airfield. Cause: Unknown. Equipment ground checked O.K.

#476 - eight bombs failed to release electrically and were immediately salvaged. Cause: Bombardier reports one of the arming wires stopped the complete movement of the arming arm on the shackle and stopped the release sequence of one rack.

#540 - nine bombs hung in racks in rear bomb-bay. Several attempts to salvo was necessary to clear bombs from racks. Cause: Unknown.

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468th Group - #660 - several stations failed to release electrically but racks were cleared over the target by salvo. Cause: Broken wire to bomb racks was found.

#445 - bombs in left side of front bay failed to release electrically and were salvoed. Cause: Unknown. Equipment ground checked O.K.

#532 - one bomb dropped from top station and adapter cable hung on lower station. This bomb was later lifted from the station by hand and dropped.

#500 - right racks in front bay failed to release electrically and bombs were salvoed. Cause: Unknown. Equipment ground checked O.K. In addition, two arming wires were missing and believed caused by the arming wires being too small.

#858 - all four top stations in the front bay and two top forward stations in rear bay failed to release on intervalometer and were toggle out. Cause: Unknown, although believed to have been caused by bombardier failing to set enough bombs on intervalometer.

3. Assembly of aircraft at the Group assembly points was greatly facilitated by the use of the M-47-A2 W.P. filled bombs. It was recommended that a fuze setting of ten or twelve seconds be used as the seven second delay allows the bombs to detonate too close to the aircraft performing the release.

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IV - BOMBING DATA (Continued)

For times of bomb release, bombing altitude, axes of attack and indicated air speeds at all targets, see Section VII, FORMATIONS FLOWN, this Annex, in which details by individual aircraft are given.

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V - BOMB LOADING\*

Mission No. 36

11 February 1945

Load per A/C and * Type Bomb	40th		444th		462nd		468th		Total			Load per A/C (pounds)
	No. A/C	No. M-47	No. A/C	No. M-81	No. A/C	No. M-81	No. A/C	No. M-47	No. A/C	M-47	M-81	
184 M-47	13	2392					11	2024	24	4416		12,714.4
182 M-47							1	182	1	182		12,576.2
180 M-47							1	180	1	180		12,438.0
178 M-47	2	356					1	178	3	534		12,299.8
72 M-81			14	1000					14		1008	18,424.8
70 M-81			1	70					1		70	17,913.0
64 M-81					14	896			14		896	16,377.6
62 M-81					1	62			1		62	15,865.8
Total	15	2748	15	1078	15	958	14	2564	59	5312	2036	Ave M47-12657 Ave M81-17367

\* Two types of bombs were used, (1) the M-47A2 (actual weight 69.1 pounds) incendiary bomb, clustered 6 to a station, fused instantaneous nose and (2) the M-81 (actual weight 255.9) fragmentation bomb, clustered two to a station using the M-12 adapter, fused instantaneous nose and non delay tail. Above data does not include 24 special M-47A2's used to mark Group Assembly Points, and smoke grenades used by lead aircraft.

VI - DISPOSITION OF BOMBS

Disposition of Bombs	40th		444th		462nd		468th		Total			Total Tonnage
	A/C	M-47	A/C	M-81	A/C	M-81	A/C	M-47	A/C	M-47	M-81	
All Targets	14	2564	15	1058	14	894	13	2383	56	4947	1952	420.4
Primary tgt	14	2564	15	1058	14	840	13	2383	56	4947	1898	413.4
Tgt of Opp*					C	54			C		54	7.0
Jettisoned			A	14	1-D	64	1-E	181	2	181	78	16.2
Returned	1	184	A-B	6					1	184	6	7.4
Total	15	2748	15	1078	15	958	14	2564	59	5312	2036	444.0

\* Hlawga Airfield - (16° 15' N - 96° 05' E)

- A. A/C 533 dropped 62 M-81's on the PT but 10 hung up due to a mechanical failure and later were jettisoned.
- A. A/C 559 dropped 62 M-81's on the PT but 10 hung up due to a mechanical failure and 4 were jettisoned.
- B. A/C 559 returned its remaining 6 bombs to base.
- C. A/C 463 dropped 10 M-81's on the PT, 54 bombs hanging up due to a malfunction; these were later dropped on Hmawbi Airfield.
- D. A/C 560 returned early due to a broken rocker arm in the No. 3 engine.
- E. A/C 532 dropped 183 M-47's on the PT, one bomb hanging up due to a mechanical failure and was jettisoned.
- E. A/C 417 returned early due to loss of oil pressure in the No. 2 engine; 180 M-47's were jettisoned.

A-V -1

A-VI-1

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No. of A/C - 14                      Axis of attack - 108°M  
No. releasing - 14                    IAS - 195 mph  
Time of release - 0539Z              Bomb load - 2564 M-47  
Method - visual                       Bombs dropped - 2564 M-47  
Altitude - 20,000'I to 21,280

\* A/C 740 released 25 seconds early and A/C 846 dropped on A/C 740. A/C 846 then had difficulty in remaining in formation after opening bomb bay doors and scattered the formation. It was instructed by the formation commander to leave formation. It finally took its place to the extreme left.

NOTE: The third formation over was formed as below one and one-half minutes before bombs away. A/C 590 developed mechanical trouble, however, resulting in the formation at bombs away, as shown in the succeeding diagram.

462nd Group - 1 1/2 minutes before bombs away.

Y 711  
Y 540            Y 898  
Y 590                    Y 454  
Y 450            Y 503            Y 463    Y 904            Y 502  
Y 476            Y 838                                    Y 386  
Y 728  
Third (462nd Group at  
bombs away)                            Y 711  
Y 540                    Y 898  
Y 454  
Y 450                                    Y 904            Y 502  
Y 476            Y 838  
Y 728                                    Y 386  
Y 590  
Y 503            Y 463\*

No. of A/C - 14                      Axis of attack - 108°M  
No. releasing - 14                    IAS - 195 mph  
Time of release - 0541Z              Bomb load - 894 M-81  
Method - visual                       Bombs dropped - 840 M-81  
Altitude - 19,000'I to 19,420

\* A/C 463 dropped 10 M-81 bombs on PT and 54 on Hlawga Airfield at 16° 58'N - 96° 05'E.

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Fourth (444th Group) X 492  
X 897 X 464  
X 451 X 724 X 723  
X 533\* X 559\*\* X 496 X 861 X 524 X 378  
X 270 X 375 X 277

No. of A/C	- 15	Axis of attack	- 113°M
No. releasing	- 15	IAS	- 193 mph
Time of release	- 0547Z	Bomb load	- 1078 M-81
Method	- visual	Bombs dropped	- 1058 M-81
Altitude	- 17,400'I to 18,700		

\* A/C 533 dropped 62 M-81 bombs on PT and jettisoned 10.

\*\* A/C 559 dropped 62 M-81 bombs on PT, jettisoned 4, and brought back 6.

A-VII-3

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Auth: CG XZ BC

Initials: lll

Date: 11 Feb 45

HEAD QUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF  
STAFF NAVIGATION OFFICER

Date Prepared: 14 February 1945

Field Order Number 36

Date of Mission: 11 Feb 45

1. In the strike against the supply dumps in the Rangoon Area, Navigation presented no problem. In experimenting with an over water assembly point, considerable success was achieved. The points were approximately forty five (45) miles apart and two distinctive types of smoke markers were used. Although this test did not conclusively indicate that assembly over a water point, without reference to terrestrial landmarks, was entirely practical, it appears that with favorable navigation conditions, a fair degree of accuracy can be predicted even at large distances from base.

a. Average Navigation times out and back were as follows:

	<u>NAV. TIME OUT</u>	<u>NAV. TIME BACK</u>	<u>ASSEMBLY TIME</u>
40th Group	3h 18m	3h 49m	23m
444th Group	2h 56m	3h 31m	09m
462nd Group	3h 03m	3h 50m	13m
468th Group	2h 50m	3h 19m	16m

b. The following Navigational aid work was reported:

	<u>CEL LOP'S</u>	<u>RADIO FIXES</u>	<u>QDM'S</u>
40th Group	33	9	0
444th Group	25	0	0
462nd Group	11	9	0
468th Group	36	5	0

c. Forecast winds were very good except velocity was slightly high. Computed winds were as follows:

	<u>HALFWAY OUT</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>HALFWAY BACK</u>
40th Group	5000' 266° 20k	20,000' 266° 30k	13,000' 278° 26k
444th Group	4000' 270° 12k	18,000' 270° 30k	10,000' 295° 25k
462nd Group	6500' 280° 22k	19,000' 260° 30k	12,000' 275° 34k
468th Group	14,000' 274° 29k	21,000' 277° 32k	17,000' 280° 37k

d. Although this mission was flown under practically CAWU conditions, where Radar aid was not essential, radar cooperation was again good.

2. No special comments were furnished by the Groups regarding the mission.

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By su NARA Date 12/6/05



S E C R E T

ANNEX

B

ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT

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* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Flak Officer *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *
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S E C R E T



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\*\*\*\*\*  
\* SECRET \*  
\* By Auth of the C.G. \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* 19 Feb 45 *FAV* \*  
\* Date Initials \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
Intelligence Section  
APO 493

19 February 1945

PRELIMINARY REPORT

ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

MISSION NUMBER 36, (DAYLIGHT), 11 FEBRUARY 1945

Primary Target - RANGOON DUMP AREA, Secondary Target -  
None, Target of Last Resort - None

A. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED

1. RANGOON - MINGALADON DUMP AREA (16°51'N - 96°09'E)

Moderate and accurate heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered by all aircraft (56) bombing the area from 0502Z to 0547Z at altitudes of 18,000 to 22,200 feet under CAVU conditions. Fire was continuously pointed and no enemy aircraft were reported on parallel courses.

The following table shows aircraft over the area in relation to fire encountered.

Table I: Heavy Antiaircraft Fire Encountered, RANGOON - MINGALADON

Formation	1	2	3	4	Total
Number of Aircraft	13	14	14	15	56
Bomb Release Time	0502-03Z	0538:30Z	0541Z	0546-47Z	0502-47Z
Time HAA Encountered	0501-05Z	0537-40Z	0540-45Z	0544-49Z	0501-49Z
Altitude (True) Feet	22,200	21-21,400	20-20,500	18-19,500	18-22,200
Undercast	CAVU	CAVU	CAVU	CAVU	CAVU
Accurate:*					
Struck	2	8	9	12	31 (28%)
Rocked	-	3	11	4	18 (16%)
Within 150 feet	1	14	12	7	34 (31%)
Inaccurate:*					
Outside 150 feet	10	14	1	2	27 (25%)
Intensity of Flak:*					
Meager	13	-	-	-	13 (23%)
Moderate	-	10	1	10	21 (38%)
Intense	-	3	12	7	22 (39%)
Number of Bursts:					
At one instant	6-8	4-10	4-15	4-12	4-15
Overall Total	40-80	50-150+	35-200	150-200	35-200
Deviations:*					
Above	2	9	6	9	26 (23%)
Level	9	14	13	14	50 (44%)
Below	9	11	6	12	38 (33%)
Ahead	-	4	9	10	23 (25%)
Abreast	4	11	11	6	32 (34%)
Behind	10	10	7	11	38 (41%)
Left	2	8	8	12	30 (31%)
In Line	2	6	8	11	27 (27%)
Right	10	12	9	10	41 (42%)

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By *su* NARA Date *12/6/05*



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\* Numbers refer to aircraft reporting in the affirmative while percentages have been determined for the total number of reports in one section as above, level, or below

Additional detailed information for each of the 4 formations follows:

Formation #1: (468th Group) "The flak began to appear about a minute before bombs away, to the right and behind and way below. It climbed up toward the formation and was almost level about three minutes later, but still to the right and a little behind." Gun flashes were observed from the vicinity of C.F.I.C. site #30 and from the RANGOON City Area.

Formation #2: (40th Group) "All antiaircraft bursts observed were reported to be black. Fire throughout the whole encounter was continuous pointed with tracking being easily recognized by the "train" pattern of bursts. Initial bursts were encountered about 1 1/2 minutes before bomb release time and continued without let up until 0540Z, time that the last aircraft in formation broke off to the left after the strike photo run. The greatest intensity of bursts encountered came about one-half minute before to one-half minute after "bombs away". ...The first guns to engage our formation were off in altitude by about 2,000 feet, but quickly corrected until bursts were for the most part level.

Formation #3 observed fire directed against #2 and reported that "bursts were all through the formations with none outside its limits. Just after #2 dropped its bombs there was one very large white burst in the center of the formation. The burst was 5-10 times as large as the ordinary black AA and had many long streamers." This was probably phosphorous AA as no air-to-air bombing attacks were reported.

Formation #3: (462nd Group) "Several aircraft reported intense barrage of Automatic Weapons fire bursting below the formation at about 10-12,000 feet, while one aircraft reported 4 simultaneous bursts of light gray flak just off its wing. Aircraft in the rear of the formation reported that there was not one single burst of AA outside the limits of the formation. All aircraft reported hearing shells burst as well as the fragments bouncing off the aircraft. Flak was concentrated in formation from 1 minute before bombs away until 3 to 4 minutes afterwards. Most aircraft reported 3 to 4 simultaneous bursts every few seconds in the same relative position."

Formation #4: (444th Group) "One aircraft reported that two single bursts, 1 black and 1 white were fired a few seconds before the main concentration appeared. These were thought to be ranging shots."

From photo cover up to 2 February 1945 (W.I.S., E.A.C. #24, Section V) the city of RANGOON and MINGALADON A/D are known to be defended by 50 heavy AA guns which are capable of engaging aircraft bombing the Dump Area at 16°51'N - 96°09'E. The briefed axis of attack followed the recommendations resulting from an analysis of this known gun defense, but

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even with this disadvantage, plus a turn to the left after bombs away, the Japanese provided accurate and maximum fire volume. Aircraft were engaged as soon as they came in range and opposition continued while aircraft remained within the fire envelope. As aircraft penetrated the defense the intensity of the fire increased as a result of more guns becoming active. Although no aircraft were lost to flak, considerable damage was sustained. Further attacks directed against this area will have to utilize a greater variety of headings, altitudes above 21,000 feet, with aircraft over the area in the minimum time in order that flak damage or loss does not increase. It was reported by crews that opposition encountered over this area was better than that at ANSHAN although not as intense as that over YAWATA. This mission is evidence that the Japanese can employ their antiaircraft artillery effectively, although the RANGOON area has always had a reputation for good flak opposition.

All aircraft reported black bursts while 8 observed white flak in addition to the light gray bursts reported by Formation #3. Heavy AA fire started on an average of 1.4 minutes before bombs away and stopped 2.4 minutes after bomb release, reference Table I.

There was no possibility of radar controlled fire through R.C.M. intercepts or undercast conditions.

B. SMOKESCREENS, BARRAGE AND HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOONS, GROUND-TO-AIR ROCKETS

None reported.

C. BLACKOUT

None - daylight mission.

D. DAMAGE FROM HEAVY ANTLAIRCRAFT FIRE

Following ground examination it was found that 29 aircraft sustained minor flak damage, or a total percentage of 51.8 of those aircraft over RANGOON, as follows:

Table II: Heavy Flak Damage over RANGOON (CAVU conditions)

<u>Formation</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>True Altitude</u>	<u>Heading</u>	<u>Classification</u>
1	460	468th	22,200'	126°M	Minor
2	420	40th	21,280'	113°M	Minor
2	505	40th	20,800'	109°M	Minor
2	541	40th	21,280'	109°M	Minor
2	542	40th	21,280'	108°M	Minor
2	587	40th	21,280'	106°M	Minor
2	579	40th	21,150'	117°M	Minor
2	740	40th	21,280'	110°M	Minor
3	450	462nd	20,100'	108°M	Minor
3	904	462nd	20,100'	108°M	Minor
3	476	462nd	20,100'	108°M	Minor
3	502	462nd	20,100'	108°M	Minor
3	454	462nd	20,100'	108°M	Minor
3	838	462nd	20,100'	108°M	Minor
3	386	462nd	20,100'	108°M	Minor
3	540	462nd	20,200'	108°M	Minor

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<u>Formation</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>True Altitude</u>	<u>Heading</u>	<u>Classification</u>
4	270	444th	18,400'	111°M	Minor
4	378	444th	19,000'	109°M	Minor
4	451	444th	18,800'	110°M	Minor
4	464	444th	19,000'	108°M	Minor
4	492	444th	18,800'	113°M	Minor
4	496	444th	19,000'	116°M	Minor
4	524	444th	19,700'	113°M	Minor
4	533	444th	19,000'	110°M	Minor
4	559	444th	18,800'	110°M	Minor
4	723	444th	19,500'	110°M	Minor
4	724	444th	19,000'	115°M	Minor
4	861	444th	19,000'	113°M	Minor
4	897	444th	19,000'	114°M	Minor

Damage in relation to altitude can be broken down into 4 distinct levels, Table III, which unfortunately does not represent a true comparison as formations appeared over the target at decreasing altitudes (rather than increasing altitudes as briefed) and the opposition had sufficient time to apply the necessary corrections to initial deviations. These factors would decrease the probability of damage at higher altitude for the first formation and increase the probability at lower altitudes for following formations. There is a good indication from the resultant damage, however, which roughly approximates the computed relation between damage and altitude. Generally speaking the probability is known to double for each 5,000 foot decrease in altitude for flight levels above 15,000 feet.

Table III: Damage in Relation to Altitude and Time.

<u>Formation</u>	<u>Number of A/C Damaged</u>	<u>Altitude Level</u>
1	1	22,000'
2	7	21,000'
3	9	20,000'
4	13	19,000'

E. WARNING NETS

It is believed that the Jap had prior warning of the attack against RANGOON from R.C.M. intercepts of early warning radar signals. However, no enemy fighter attacks were made prior to 0536Z and no enemy sightings were reported occurring prior to 0539Z, or from 34 to 37 minutes following the first bomb release time.

*Frank L. Scott, Jr.*

FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Chief, Intelligence Section.

B-I-4

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

ANNEX

C

ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* Operational Intelligence Unit \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

I. JAPANESE FIGHTER TACTICS - MISSION NO. 36.

TARGET: Supply Dump Near Mingaladon A.F., Burma.

TIME: Day Mission.

DATE: 11 February 1945.

1. Enemy air opposition was very weak with a force estimated as eight TONYS and one OSCAR opposing only two of the four Groups participating in the mission. Jap pilots made nine single plane attacks and three coordinated attacks (a combined total of fifteen encounters) against ten B-29's. Two TONYS and the OSCAR are claimed as damaged on a preliminary basis, and one B-29 sustained major damage.

2. Twelve of the encounters occurred in the primary target area and three on the route from the target (about 200 miles NW of the PT). Of those in the target area, nine encounters took place before bombing, and three after bombs had been dropped. Air opposition extended over a 26 minute period in the target area (from 0539Z to 0605Z), while attacks on the route back from the target occurred at 0548Z, 0606Z and 0608Z. Altitudes varied from 14,300 to 19,000 feet in the target area, and were 14,300, 16,000 and 20,000 in the case of the route back encounters. (See Table No. 1)

3. Although the number of attacks was small, Jap pilots did a good job qualitatively. Ten attacks were closed to 300 yards or less, four of which broke off at 100 yards; the remaining two broke away at 500 yards and 800 yards. The Jap fired in all except one attack, an unusually high percentage. On three occasions, two TONYS (possibly the same two aircraft in each case) executed coordinated attacks in trail against the front quarters of B-29's, closing to about 200 yards in each instance. It was believed that one of these coordinated attacks resulted in damage to a B-29.

4. Eleven of the twelve attacks were made against the front quarter. Three attacks were high, two were level and seven were low. (Details shown in Table No. 1)

5. B-29's fired in all of the attacks, in all cases at 700 yards or more except in one instance where fire was opened at a distance of 400 yards. Three enemy fighters were claimed as damaged on a preliminary basis.

6. There appeared to be a slight tendency to concentrate attacks on the lead elements of the formations in this particular mission, although the number of attacks was too small to draw any definite conclusions. Six of the twelve attacks were against planes of the lead element, the others being scattered throughout the formation.

7. There were no aerial bombing or rocket attacks. Nothing new or unusual from the standpoint of tactics or aircraft was reported.

8. A summary of aircraft which were sighted but did not attack is shown in Table No. 2.

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By 80 NARA Date 12/6/05



Table No. 1 - Details of Attacks

A/C No.	Type E/A	Direction of Approach	Level of Approach	E/A Opened Fire (yds)	E/A Closed To (yards)	B-29 Opened Fire (yds)	E/A Claims	Location of Attack	Altitude (feet)	Time(Z)
492	TONY(2)*	12	level	400	200	400	no	PT	18,000	0543
897	TONY	11	low	800	100	1000	damaged	PT	18,000	0544
897	TONY	11	low	800	300	1000	no	PT	18,000	0544
559	TONY(2)*	1	level	800	200	700	damaged	PT	18,000	0545
711	OSCAR	12	low	1000	100	1200	damaged	PT	19,000	0539
590**	TONY(2)*	12	low	600	200	800	no	PT	19,000	0539
904	TONY	1	low	1000	500	1500	no	Route Back	16,000	0548
502	TONY	12	high	600	100	1500	no	PT	15,000	0555
898	TONY	12	high	no	300	1000	no	PT	16,000	0605
386	TONY	12	low	700	100	1500	no	PT	14,300	0605
386	TONY	5	low	1200	800	1200	no	Route Back	14,300	0606
540	OSCAR	12	high	1000	300	1500	no	Route Back	20,000	0608

\* Coordinated attacks -- \*\* Attack resulting in damage to B-29.

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Table No. 2 - Enemy Aircraft Sightings

<u>A/C No.</u>	<u>No. E/A</u>	<u>Type E/A</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Distance</u>
579	3	S/E	0559Z	RANGOON	10,000	2 miles
420	5	S/E	0606Z	RANGOON	20,000	1500 yds
505	1	S/E	0605Z	RANGOON	On ground	4 miles
542	1	TONY	0545Z	RANGOON	10,000	2 miles
542	3	S/E	0700Z	18°50' N - 93°23' E	20,000	8 miles
740	1	S/E	0544Z	RANGOON	20,000	3000 yds
804	4	S/E	0546Z	RANGOON	17,000	2 miles
407	1	Unidentified	0541Z	RANGOON	2,000	10 miles
587	3	S/E	0536Z	RANGOON	12,000	2000 yds
888	2	S/E	0537Z	RANGOON	12,000	1½ miles
271	2	TOJO	0537Z	RANGOON	15,000	4 miles
271	1	S/E	0545Z	RANGOON	12,000	2 miles
541	2	OSCAR	0538Z	RANGOON	10,000	2 miles
---	1	S/E	----	RANGOON	---	2500 yds
---	2	OSCARS	----	RANGOON	---	1000 yds
---	2	TONYS	----	RANGOON	---	1700 yds
904	1	OSCAR	----	---	15,000	1500 yds

C-I-3

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

ANNEX

D

WEATHER INFORMATION

- I - Weather Information
- II - Chart - Weather as Forecast and as Encountered
- III - Synoptic Map

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* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* Weather Section *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *
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S E C R E T



SECRET

I - WEATHER INFORMATION

Mission No. 36

11 February 1945

	As Forecast	As Encountered
Base at Take-Off	Clear. Visibility 6 miles.	<u>KHARAGPUR</u> : Clear. Visibility 2-3 miles in haze and smoke. Wind calm. <u>DUDHKUNDA</u> : Clear. Visibility 20 miles. Wind calm. <u>PIARDOBA</u> : Clear. Visibility 4 miles in haze and light smoke. <u>CHAKULTA</u> : Clear. Visibility 6 miles. Wind calm.
Route Out	Scattered cumulus, base 3000' top 5000'. Scattered cirrus above 25,000'. Visibility 20 miles	2-3/10 cirrus at 25,000' entire route. Scattered very thin stratus southeast of base increased to 8-9/10 along coast and then became scattered stratocumulus off-shore. Stratocumulus at 4000' and an occasional isolated swelling cumulus to 10,000'. Clear beyond Burma coast.
Target Area	3/10 stratocumulus at 4000'. Widely scattered small patches of altostratus at 14,000'. Scattered cirrus above 25,000'. Visibility 10 miles in haze. Pressure at target: 29.84 inches. Mean temperature surface to 21,000': 9 Deg C.	3/10 cirrostratus. Visibility 20 miles.
Route Back	No change.	1/10 cirrus at 25,000'. Few scattered cumulus, tops to 5-6000' over islands along Burma coast. Slight increase in activity at 19-20 deg north, 92 deg east, with 4-6/10 cumulus or unstable altocumulus, tops 10,000'. From there on, 1-3/10 cumulus to 7-8,000' degenerating into 1/10 stratocumulus at 3000' along Bengal coast.
Base on Return	Clear.	<u>KHARAGPUR</u> : Clear and unrestricted. Wind calm. <u>DUDHKUNDA</u> : Clear. Visibility 10 miles. Wind calm. <u>PIARDOBA</u> : Clear. Visibility 8-10 miles. Wind WNW - 3. <u>CHAKULTA</u> : Clear. Visibility 10 miles. Wind calm.

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Authority NND 760063

By 80 NARA Date 12/6/05



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A. Winds Aloft - Forecast

Altitude	Base to 19 Deg	19 Deg to Target
1,000'	280/15K	300/10K
5,000'	270/25K	270/17K
10,000'	270/40K	260/15K
15,000'	270/45K	260/27K
20,000'	270/50K	260/50K
21,000'	270/52K	260/32K
25,000'	270/60K	260/40K

B. Winds Aloft - Encountered

Altitude	92 Deg	91 Deg	90 Deg	Target
3,000'		300/15K		
5,000'			266/20K	
13,000'	278/26K			
14,000'	270/33K			
15,000'		320/20K		
18,000'	275/35K			
19,000'		260/30K		260/30K
19,500'	280/45			
20,000'				266/30K
21,000'				260/30K

C. Target Temperatures

As Forecast

Altitude	Temperature
1,000'	26 Deg C.
5,000'	17 Deg C.
10,000'	10 Deg C.
15,000'	1 Deg C.
20,000'	- 7 Deg C.
21,000'	- 9 Deg C.
25,000'	-17 Deg C.

As Encountered

Altitude	Temperature
3,000'	21 Deg C.
19,000'	- 7 Deg C.
21,000'	- 8 Deg C.


D-I-2

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


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 XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 WEATHER AS FORECAST


MISSION NO. 36




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
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FOR EYES ONLY

10TH PHOTO TECH. UNIT



S E C R E T

ANNEX

E

COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* Communications Section \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
NND 740120  
By CD/MT NARS, Date Oct 21 1975

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 760063  
By 82 NARA Date 13/6/05



SECRET

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* SECRET \*  
\* Auth: CG, XX BC \*  
\* Initials: W.P. \*  
\* Date: 15 Feb 45 \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALISTS MISSION  
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS (RADIO) OFFICER

Date Prepared: 14 February 1945      Field Orders No: 36

Date of Mission: 11 February 1945.

PART I

1. Based on the greatest number of such messages which could be received (i.e. one per aircraft) the following percentage figures indicate the number of aircraft accounted for by bombs away and position reports when 400 miles out, which were transmitted by aircraft:

a. Bombs Away:

	<u>40thGp</u>	<u>444thGp</u>	<u>462ndGp</u>	<u>468thGp</u>	<u>Total</u>
No. of a/c from which msgs could be expected:	14	15	14	13	56
No of msgs received:	1	1	1	1	4
No of a/c accounted for by msgs:	14	15	14	13	56
Pct. of a/c accounted for by msgs:	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

b. Position Reports at 400 Miles from Base:

No of a/c from which msgs could be expected:	14	15	14	14	57
No of msgs received:	1	1	14	2	18
No of a/c accounted for by msgs:	14	15	14	14	57
Pct. of a/c accounted for by msgs:	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

-1-

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Authority NND 760063

By 82 NARA Date 12/6/05



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c. Attack, convoy sighting and abort messages handled:

	<u>40th Gp</u>	<u>444th Gp</u>	<u>462nd Gp</u>	<u>468th Gp</u>	<u>Total</u>
Abort Messages:	1	0	1	1	3
Attack Messages:	0	1	0	0	1
Convoy Sighting:	0	1	1	0	2

PART II

2. 462nd Group had one (1) aircraft contact Strategic Air Force Air-Sea Rescue Station, 8YQ, when it experienced an engine failure. As its further transmissions involved a violation of transmission security, full details appear in Part III below.

PART III

3. There was one (1) violation of transmission security reported by the 462nd Group. An aircraft of the 462nd Group had contacted the Air-Sea Rescue Station (8YQ) to inform them that his number 1 engine was feathered and there was a possibility that number 2 engine would go out. The aircraft was referred to the call sign of an aircraft on patrol. Contact with the patrol aircraft was effected; however, the aircraft in trouble was suspicious, so in an attempt to authenticate, the patrol aircraft was asked, in the clear, for the "Response Letter" to the "Challenge Letter of the Day". The patrol aircraft rightly refused to answer.

PART IV

4. Takeoff was at approximately 0230Z and the frequencies remained in use until approximately 1000Z or a total of seven and one-half (7½) hours. Static level reported was practically nil, the maximum reported being W-2. There was no fading encountered and the signal strengths were excellent throughout the mission. This was undoubtedly due to the relatively short distances flown on this mission.

5. There was no attempted jamming or deceptive tactics on the part of the enemy reported:

PART V

6. Statistical data on the radio aids to navigation is as follows:

a. Radio Beacons:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Power</u>	<u>No of A/C Reporting</u>	<u>Average Initial Contact</u>	<u>Extreme Initial Contact</u>
Chakulia(AF)	1200W	14	350	600
Khargpur(GK)	1200W	9	380	600
Fiardoba(ML)	2000W	13	231	400

b. Radio Ranges:

Dum Dum (CM)	400W	1	600	600
--------------	------	---	-----	-----

c. D/F facilities: No requests for D/F facilities were made on this mission.



SECRET

d. Air-to-air homing was utilized as follows:

- (1) The 40th Group did not use air-to-air homing. Formation was formed visually.
- (2) One (1) aircraft of the 444th Group transmitted homing signals for 25 minutes and 5 aircraft homed successfully at an average distance of 25 miles.
- (3) One (1) aircraft of the 462nd Group transmitted homing signals for 20 minutes at 5 minute intervals, and 13 aircraft homed successfully at an average distance of 50 miles.
- (4) One (1) aircraft of the 468th Group transmitted homing signals for 10 minutes, but, as was later determined, the low frequency oscillator was out of calibration. Therefore, no homing was accomplished and the formation was formed visually.

7. The following malfunctions were reported by the various Groups:

a. 40th Group:

- (1) A/C 501 - Pilot's microphone button became inoperative and a hand microphone was substituted during flight.

b. 444th Group:

- (1) A/C 375 - The radio compass sense antenna was broken in flight and was substituted for by using a jumper wire connection to the command antenna from the radio compass.
- (2) A/C 492 - Command transmitters became inoperative and repair could not be effected during flight. Cause undetermined.

c. 462nd Group:

- (1) A/C 711 and A/C 505 - the Radio compass sense antenna broke during flight and was substituted for by using a jumper wire connection to the Command antenna from the radio compass.
- (2) A/C 5386 - The hand microphone and transmittin. key at the Radio operator's position became inoperative; cause undetermined. Further CW traffic was sent using the test key of the AN/ART-13 transmitter.
- (3) A/C 728 - Output of the BC-348 receiver at the radio operator's position was blocked when the pilot used the SCR-522 transmitter; cause undetermined.

d. 468th Group:

- (1) A/C 660 - low frequency oscillator out of calibration. Not repairable in flight.



S E C R E T

ANNEX

F

RADAR

I - Radar Information \*

Section A - Navigation and Bombing  
Section B - Scope Photography  
Section C - Serviceability

II - Radar Tables \*

Table A - Bombing Data  
Table B - Photographic Results  
Table C - Serviceability  
Table D - Malfunctions

III - Radar Photograph Analysis Charts \*\*

\* Prepared by Radar Section, XX Bomber Command

\*\* Prepared by Target Intelligence Unit,  
XX Bomber Command

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Authority NND 760063

By 82 NARA Date 12/6/05



SECRET

SECRET  
.Auth: CG XX B  
.Initials Q.A.  
.Date: 16 Feb 45  
.....

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION  
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND RADAR OFFICER

Date Prepared 16 February 1945 Field Orders Number 36  
Date of Mission 11 February 1945

I - Radar Information

A - Navigation and Bombing

1. The primary target on this mission was definitely a visual target. Although the target, Dump area north of Victoria Lake, Rangoon, Burma, was not identifiable on the radar scope, sufficient number of terrain features were identifiable to permit the use of the radar equipment as an aid to bombing. Victoria Lake did not appear on the radar scope; however the Hlaing River was recognizable.

2. Many new radar operators were used on this mission and operated the radar systems satisfactorily.

B - Scope Photography

1. Sixteen (16) radar scope cameras were installed for this mission, and a number of excellent photographs were obtained tracing the bombing run.

2. One set of photographs taken at the assembly point clearly showed a number of aircraft in the altitude hole.

C - Serviceability

1. The operational serviceability of the radar systems was maintained at the high operational percentage. Ninety-three (93) per cent of the systems were operational over the target. Only two (2) systems were completely inoperative and these systems were inoperative before take-off.

2. There were no malfunctions of auxiliary equipment.

- 1 -

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II - Radar Tables

A - Bombing

Total A/C Bombing - - - - - 56  
 Total A/C Bombing Ammunition Dumps (P.T.) Visually - 56-a

NOTE: a - One A/C bombed P.T. with part of its load and targets of opportunity with the rest.

B - Photographic Results

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462d Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No. Cameras Installed	3		3		6		4		16	
K-35 Cameras	3		2		-		-		5	
K-24 Cameras	-		1		6		4		11	
No. Cameras in Abort, Early Return & Missing A/C *	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	25	1	6
No. Cameras Completing Mission *	3	100	3	100	6	100	3	75	15	94
No. Cameras in Radar & Camera Malfunction A/C #	1	33	-	-	-	-	1	33	2	13
Sets Pictures Returned #	2	67	2	67	6	100	2	67	12	80
No. Negatives Returned	39		42		139		16		266	
Sets Pictures Useable**	2	100	2	100	6	100	2	100	12	100
Sets Pic. Tracing B. R.**	2	100	2	100	3	50	2	100	9	75

\* Percentage based on cameras installed.  
 # Percentage based on cameras completing mission.  
 \*\* Percentage based on sets of pictures returned.

C - Serviceability

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462d Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
A/C Airborne	15		15		15		14		59	
A/C Reporting	15		15		15		14		59	
APQ-13 Operative Just After Take-Off*	15	100	14	93	14	93	13	93	56	95
A/C Bombing	14		15		14		13		56	
A/C Reporting Bombing *	14		15		14		13		56	
APQ-13 Operative over Target #	12	86	14	93	14	100	12	92	52	93
APQ-13 Unrepairable Failures:										
Completely Inoperative#	0	0	1	6	0	0	1	8	2	4
Partially Inoperative#	2	14	4	27	2	14	1	8	9	16
Total	2	14	5	33	2	14	2	16	11	20
APQ-13 Repaired in Flight	1		0		0		1		2	
Auxiliary Equipment Failures *	0		0		0		0		0	

\* Percentage based on Aircraft reporting.  
 # Percentage based on Aircraft Reporting bombing.  
 \*\* Percentage based on Aircraft Reporting.



S E C R E T

D - Malfunctions

DATA	40th Group	444th Group	462nd Group	468th Group	Total
<u>Between Take-Off and Target</u>					
Completely Inoperative:					
Bad Synchronizer	-	1	-	-	1
No Crystal Current	-	-	-	1	1
Partially Inoperative:					
Selsyn Phasing Irregular	1	-	-	-	1
Pressurization Difficulty	1	-	-	-	1
Low Range	-	1	-	-	1
Modulator Leaked Oil, Transmitter Current Reduced	-	-	1	-	1
Azimuth Stabilization Cut	-	-	1	-	1
Total Completely Inoperative	-	1	-	1	2
Total Partially Inoperative	2	1	2	0	5
<u>Total</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>
<u>Between Target and Landing</u>					
Partially Inoperative:					
Azimuth Stabilization Erratic	-	1	-	-	1
Inverter Voltage Irregular	-	1	-	-	1
<u>Total</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2</u>
<u>Repaired in Flight</u>					
Inverter Changed	-	-	-	1	1
Replaced Fuse in JB-40	1	-	-	-	1
<u>Summary, APQ-13 Malfunctions</u>					
Completely Inoperative	-	1	-	1	2
Partially Inoperative	2	4	2	1	9
Repaired in Flight	1	-	-	1	2
<u>Total Malfunctions</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>13</u>
<u>Malfunctions of Auxilliary Equipment</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>



A/C 500 11/2/45  
A/C 460 11/2/45


ALL SWEEPS 20 MILES  
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED

SECRET

RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS


RANGOON AREA-BURMA

MISSION NO. 36




HEADING 125° MAG.

ALTITUDE 21,000'




HEADING 118° MAG.

ALTITUDE 21,000'




HEADING 118° MAG.

ALTITUDE 21,000'



HEADING 118° MAG.

ALTITUDE 21,000'



PREPARED BY RADAR INTELLIGENCE, TARGET UNIT, INTELLIGENCE SECTION -

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By 80 NARA Date 12/6/05





SECRET

RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS


RANGOON AREA-BURMA

MISSION NO. 36

R 82.2 SHEET D



HEADING 109° MAG. ALTITUDE 21,000'




HEADING 110° MAG. ALTITUDE 21,000'



ALTITUDE 21,000'



HEADING 115° MAG. ALTITUDE 21,000'



HEADING 111° MAG. ALTITUDE 21,000'

SWEEP 10 MILES

BY RADAR INTELLIGENCE, TARGET UNIT, INTELLIGENCE SECTION - XX BOMBER COMMAND

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

G

RCM INFORMATION

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* RCM Section \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

SECRET  
Auth: Dep Com 20 AF  
Initials: MAP  
Date: 19 February 45

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB & C  
APO 493

19 February 1945

SUBJECT: RCM Report - Combat Mission No. 36, Rangoon,  
Burma, 11 February 45 - Daylight.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force,  
Washington 25, D. C.

A. General

Eight RCM search aircraft, each with a bottom mount D/F antenna, participated in this mission. The RCM observers searched for early warning radar enroute to and from the target and for radar fire control equipment while in the target area.

B. Results

1. There were three enemy radar intercepts made on this mission which undoubtedly furnished the Japanese with prior warning and information of the impending attacks. However, the first group made no radar intercepts until after leaving the group assembly point enroute to the wing assembly point.

A. 80/485/40 Rangoon radar: All RCM observers monitoring this band logged this radar site. As noted on previous missions, the first intercept was made abruptly and at no time did the radar sweep. This constant condition of not sweeping suggests that the radar transmitting antenna is of the "Flood Light" type with a directional receiving antenna.

Three rough sets of cuts locate this radar site as follows:

95°45' E 16°47' N  
95°52' E 16°37' N  
96°03' E 16°49' N

This radar site remained in operation at all times while the aircraft were in the target area.

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B. 100/750/40: Two observers reported this Mk 1 Model 1 radar site. The radar would track for short intervals and then search or go off the air. This procedure made D/F'ing difficult. Rough cuts suggest that the radar site may be located in the Cape Bluff area (94°30'E 18°00'N).

C. 68.7/499/40: Intercepted by one observer for eight minutes from 93°46'E 18°02'N to 94°14'E 17°47'N. This is probably the radar site previously reported to be located in the Rangoon area (69/500/40).

2. No intercepts were made with radar fire control characteristics.

3. IFF signals were logged in the target area.

C. Enemy Countermeasures

The usual CW interference from the allied station "LDO" was encountered.

No intentional jamming or interference was reported.

D. Equipment

No equipment malfunctions encountered.

The wide band Balun C2113 was tested by two observers. The nulls were sharp and the attenuation was not appreciable when compared to the low frequency Balun.

FOR THE DEPUTY COMMANDER:

*Leo I. Herman*  
LEO I. HERMAN  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Actg. Adjutant General

-2-

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Authority *NND 760063*

By *80* NARA Date *12/6/05*



S E C R E T

ANNEX

H

CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY

```
* * * * *  
* Prepared by: *  
* Staff Gunnery Officer *  
* XX Bomber Command *  
* * * * *
```

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
AFC 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT  
OF STAFF GUNNERY OFFICER

Date Prepared: 15 February 1945      Field Order Number 36  
Date of Mission: 11 Feb 45

1. The mission directed by Field Order No. 36 was accomplished without special incident in regards to gunnery. Reports indicate that approximately nine enemy fighters were encountered. The attacks were more aggressive than on previous missions to this target area. Several attacks were pressed to within 100 yards and as a result one of the B-29's received damage to one engine.

2. The mission is considered as satisfactory from the gunnery standpoint. All guns were test fired.

3. The following statistical data is submitted:

	<u>40th</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>
Ammunition used test firing	2395	1490	1360	1340
Ammunition used in combat	30	700	5170	0
Malfunctions of C.F.C. equipment	1	0	0	3
Total turrets on mission	75	75	75	70
Malfunctions of cal. 50 MGS	1	1	1	1
Total cal. 50 MGS on mission	180	180	180	162
Total airplanes (included in report)	15	15	15	14
Total percent malfunctions all groups.	CFC 1%	cal. 50 MGS nil.		

H - I - 1

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By 80 NARA Date 12/6/05



S E C R E T

ANNEX

I

CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

S E C R E T



SECRET

I - CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Mission No. 36

11 February 1945

	<u>K-18</u>	<u>K-20</u>	<u>K-22</u>	<u>K-17</u>	<u>K-24</u>	<u>K-35</u>
No. cameras airborne	10	41	17	4	2	7
No. in A/C failing to bomb tgt.	0	2	0	1	0	0
No. in A/C bombing target	10	39	17	3	2	7
No. photographing target	6-A	17-A	13-A	A	2	7
Failure to photograph - mechanical	1-A	A	0	0	0	0
Failure to photograph - other	A	13-A	3-A	A	0	0
No. useable negatives	82-A	152A	135A	A	139	5-A

A. Data incomplete due to transfer of units and personnel.

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SECRET



S E C R E T

ANNEX

J

AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

I - AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

Mission No. 36

11 February 1945

A. Aircraft Losses

1. Battle Losses:

None.

2. Operational Losses:

None.

3. Missing Aircraft:

None.

B. Aircraft Damage

For details of battle and operational damage by aircraft,  
see Consolidated Mission Statistical Summary, Annex M, Table V.

J-I-1

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By su NARA Date 12/6/05



S E C R E T

ANNEX

K

FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

- I - Functioning of Equipment
- II - Performance Data \*

\* Prepared by Staff Flight Engineer

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Authority NND 760063

By 82 NARA Date 12/6/05



S E C R E T

I - FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

Mission No. 36

11 February 1945

- |  |       |
|--|-------|
| 1. A/C Airborne  | 59    |
| 2. Less A/C failing to bomb primary target - mechanical  | 3     |
| a. Jettisoned Bombs                                      |       |
| (1) A/C 3560 (462nd) - broken rocker arm<br>#3 engine.   |       |
| (2) A/C 417 (468th) - loss of oil pressure<br>#2 engine. |       |
| b. Returned Bombs  |       |
| (1) A/C 757 (40th) - unable to change prop pitch         | _____ |
| 3. A/C bombing primary target                            | 56    |

K-I-1

S E C R E T



SECRET

CONSOLIDATED SPECIALIST  
MISSION REPORT OF  
STAFF FLIGHT ENGINEER

SECRET

Auth: CG, XX BC  
Initials *WJ*  
Date 16 Feb. 45

Date Prepared: 16 February 1945

Field Order Number 36  
Date of Mission: 11 Feb 45

1. The summary of the performance of the aircraft participating in this mission is given in the attached table.

2. Bomb loads were limited only by space. The variation in bomb loads was due to the type and size of bombs carried.

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Authority *NND 760063*

By *80* NARA Date *12/6/05*



SECRET  
SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE  
F.O.#36  
PRIMARY TARGET

Group		Overall	40th	444th	462nd	468th
*No. of A/C		56	14	15	14	13
Time to Target		3:00	3:09	2:56	3:04	2:50
Total Time		6:54	7:14	6:56	6:58	6:26
Fuel Carried	Ave.	5220	5400	5020	5080	5400
	Max.	5400	5530	5200	5400	5400
	Min.	4600	5370	5100	4600	5400
Fuel Burned	Ave.	3510	3650	3485	3365	3540
	Max.	4000	4000	3800	3835	3700
	Min.	2300	3310	2970	2800	3360
Burnable Reserve	Ave.	1710	1750	1525	1715	1860
	Max.	2200	2150	2030	2200	2040
	Min.	850	1300	850	1224	1700
**Air Miles		1579	1632	1591	1548	1510
Ground Miles		1508	1545	1531	1423	1381
**Gal/Air Mile		2.24	2.20	2.14	2.17	2.30
***Bombing Alt.		19700	20000	18000	19000	22200
Starting Cross Weight	Ave.	129040	127640	131346	128804	128125
	Max.	133730	128340	132780	131039	129333
	Min.	126047	126047	129755	126719	127296
Weight of Bombs	Ave.	15200	12880	18280	16330	12870
	Max.	18280	12880	18280	16340	12880
	Min.	12740	12880	18280	16230	12740
No. of Bombs	M-47	88.8	184	0.4	0.4	183.4
	V-81	35.2	0	71.6	63.9	0.4

\* Aircraft bombing primary target and returning to their home base for which logs were available.  
 \*\* Accuracy of air miles is questionable due to difficulty in determination.  
 \*\*\* Pressure Altitude.

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 Authority NND 760063  
 By SP NARA Date 12/6/05



S E C R E T

ANNEX

L

TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

```
* * * * *
*   Prepared by:   *
*                 *
*   Target Intelligence Unit *
*                 *
*   XX Bomber Command *
*                 *
* * * * *
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Authority NND 760063  
By 82 NARA Date 12/6/05



C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
Intelligence Section  
APO 493

4 March 1945

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT NO. 43

TARGET: Dump "F", Rangoon-Mingaladon Area, Burma. (16° 51'N - 96° 09'E).

GENERAL STATEMENT:

This report relates to a daylight attack on the Japanese Rangoon-Mingaladon Dump area on 11 February 1945. The attack was conducted jointly by units of the XX Bomber Command (56 aircraft) and the Strategic Air Force (31 B-24s of 7th Bomb Group and 48 aircraft of the R.A.F.). The XX Bomber Command attack was accomplished by 4 formations between 0503Z and 0547Z hours dropping a total of approximately 415 tons of bombs. The Strategic Air Force attack was reported to have been accomplished between 0656Z and 0712Z hours dropping a total of approximately 255 tons of bombs. Assessment of damage was derived from photography obtained by the 444th Bomb Group, XX Bomber Command at 1013Z hours on the same day as the attack.

The 1st formation over (444th Group, 13 aircraft) dropped M-17 IB which fell mostly in open ground in a long narrow pattern approximately 5000' east of the Aiming Point (center of Dump "F" area, see attached annex). The 2nd formation (40th Group, 14 aircraft) placed its pattern of M-47 IB squarely on the Mental Hospital and the extreme N area of the Dump. Numerous hits occurred on the buildings of the Hospital. Three aircraft of this formation released early securing hits on the Insein Railway Workshops and in Dump "A". The 3rd formation (462nd Group, 14 aircraft) dropped a "split-pattern" of the M-81 Frag Bombs in Dump "A" which is approximately 1 1/2 miles NW of Dump F. The last formation over (444th Group, 15 aircraft) also dropped the M-81 bomb obtaining a "split-pattern", 2 elements of which fell in the target area and 2 others of which fell just NW of the Dump. The "split-patterns" are probably attributable to the excellent ballistics characteristics of this particular bomb rather than any looseness of formation.

Since the post-strike photography was obtained after the attacks of both the XX Bomber Command and the Strategic Air Force, no distinction in damage is possible and all statements of damage refer to the joint attack.

Dump "F" was well cratered especially in the central area. Approximately 75 small hutments and 35 small miscellaneous buildings, several housing vehicles, were destroyed and at least 10 others damaged. About 7 or 8 small hutments with blast walk were destroyed and 3 others damaged. The post-strike photography shows at least 4 large fires burning among buildings of the Mental Hospital, smoke from which largely obscures detail. A report by C.P.I.C., S.E.A. No. FM(S) 468 based on photography one day later, states 10 buildings of the Hospital were gutted and 5 others were damaged. Damage to Dump "A" was not extensive, only 10-15 small hutments and several revetted buildings were seen destroyed. Approximately 15 small and 2 large buildings were destroyed in Dump "K". Several other items of damage outside of Dump "F" were noted notably to the east where 15 small residences were destroyed and just west of the Hospital where several more were damaged or

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destroyed. XX Bomber Command post-strike photography did not cover the Insein RR Workshops but a report by C.P.I.C., S.E.A. No. FM(S) 482 lists considerable damage. An office, the Main Store, the Apprentices Quarters and the Engine Shop were destroyed. The Station Building, Millwright Shop, Boiler Shop and Smithy were severely damaged.

REFERENCES: (1) C.P.I.C., S.E.A. Preliminary Damage Assessment Reports Nos. FM(S) 480, 482, and 486.

WEIGHT OF ATTACK:

XX Bomber Command;

- (1) 40th Bomb Group - 14 A/C - 2564 M-47A2 IB.
- (2) 444th Bomb Group - 15 A/C - 1058 M-81 Frags.
- (3) 462nd Bomb Group - 14 A/C - 840 M-81 Frags.
- (4) 468th Bomb Group - 13 A/C - 2383 M-47A2 IB.

Strategic Air Force;

- (1) 7th Bomb Group - 31 B-24s - 1612 x 69 lb IB.
- (2) R.A.F., 355 Sqdn - 12 A/C - 114 x 1000 G.P.T.D.
- (3) R.A.F., 356 Sqdn - 12 A/C - 114 x 1000 M.C.T.D.
- (4) R.A.F., 99 Sqdn - 12 A/C - 120 x 500 M.C.T.D.
- (5) R.A.F., 215 Sqdn - 12 A/C - 161 x 500 G.P.D.T.  
1 x 500 G.P.L.D.

PHOTOGRAPHY: (1) Strike Photos, 5MB36, 11 February 1945, quality and scale varied.  
(2) XX Bomber Command Mission 5MR23, 11 February 1945, scale approximately 1:12,500, quality excellent (smoke obscured).

ANNEXES: (1) Mosaic with Bomb Pattern Delineations.

DETAILS

1st Formation;

Group	; 468th
No. of A/C	; 13
Time of Release	; 0503Z
Axis	; 126° M
Altitude	; 21,000' I
Bombs dropped	; 2383 M-47 IB

Because of the large trail of this type of bombs no impacts were recorded on the strike photos. Bombs were still observed in flight over the target area indicating that the fall of bombs would be "over". This is further substantiated by a calculated point of impact of the M-47 bomb from the point of release which gives an impact point about 5000' E of the AP (approximately center of Dump "F"). Strike photos of the 2nd formation show a considerable area of ground disturbance W of the AP, not observed on photos of the 1st formation, which it is believed was caused by the bomb fall of the first formation. This area is delineated by a series of dots and dashes in Annex 1.

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2nd Formation;

Group ; 40th  
No. of A/C ; 14  
Time of Release; 0539Z  
Axis ; 100° M  
Altitude ; 20,000' I  
Bombs Dropped ; 2564 M-47 IB.

By turning several of the K-18 cameras (9" x 18" photo) lengthwise in the aircraft several sets of strike photos were obtained showing bomb impacts of the 2nd Formation. The pattern obtained was centered on the central and southern sections of the Mental Hospital and on the extreme northern area of Dump "F". Numerous hits on buildings of the Hospital were obtained. This area is delineated on the Annex by a solid line with single cross-hatching. Also seen on these strike photos was a large plume of black smoke emanating from the west-central side of the Hospital. This appears to have been a screening attempt since no hits in the Hospital area are believed to have been obtained by the first formation. Furthermore the smoke was emanating from an open area of the Hospital Grounds and no buildings were afire.

Two small groups of bombs were observed on photos taken during the early stages of the bomb run. Both groups appear to be incendiaries and are believed to be those falling from three aircraft of this formation reporting early releases. One group of these bursts occurred just E of the Insein RR Works and another just NW of the Works. Unfortunately the bursts show only on the extreme edge of the photo and hits within the Works cannot be confirmed, but it is believed that the destruction wrought is due to these bombs. Both areas are delineated on the Annex by a solid line with dots therein.

3rd Formation;

Group ; 462nd  
No. of A/C ; 14  
Time of Release; 0541Z  
Axis ; 108° M  
Altitude ; 19,000' I  
Bombs Dropped ; 840 M-81

The bombs from the 3rd formation fell in Dump "A" in 4 large and 1 small patterns. The "split-patterns" are probably attributable to the excellent ballistic characteristics of this particular bomb rather than any looseness of formation. Several secondary explosions were observed indicating hits on ammo or fuel dumps. This area is delineated on the Annex by a solid line with double cross-hatching.

These strike photos show several fires raging in the Insein RR Shops. Several other fires to the E of the yards in the northern and eastern sections of Dump "A" were also noted.

All of the Mental Hospital was obscured by a large billowing smoke column.

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4th Formation:

Group : 444th  
No. of A/C : 15  
Time of Release: 0547Z  
Axis : 113° M  
Altitude : 18,000' I  
Bombs Dropped : 1058 M-81

Like the 3rd Formation this last Formation which also dropped M-81 bombs obtained a "split-pattern". One element of the pattern fell just W of the Hospital, one fell in the SE corner of Dump "K", one fell in the SW corner of Dump "F" and the remaining element fell squarely in the center of Dump "F". Three large secondary explosions were noted on the strike photos indicating hits on Ammo or Fuel. All of the Hospital and a considerable area to the W and NW was obscured by smoke. The areas of bomb fall are shown on the Annex by a solid line.

DAMAGE:

Post-strike photography for this mission was obtained at 1013Z hours. Since the elements of the Strategic Air Force attacked approximately 1-2 hours following the XX Bomber Command attack, this photography shows damage wrought by both attacks.

(A) Dump "F":

The central area of this Dump is seen to be well cratered and at least 6 fires were still burning. It is difficult to assess damage resulting from fragmentation bombs. Wooded areas and underground shelters further complicate assessment but the following damage is visible:

- (1) Approximately 75 small hutments were destroyed.
- (2) Approximately 7 hutments with blast walls were destroyed and 3 others damaged.
- (3) Approximately 35 small miscellaneous buildings, several housing vehicles, were destroyed and at least 10 others were damaged.
- (4) Damage is apparent to several of the inter-connecting Dump area roads.

(B) Mental Hospital:

This former Hospital has been reported by ground sources to be used for storage of supplies. The XX Bomber Command Post-strike covers shows 4 or 5 large fires still raging among the buildings the smoke from which largely obscures detail. Preliminary D.A. Report No. P.M.(S) 486 issued by C.P.I.C., S.E.A. on the basis of photography on the day following the attack list 10 buildings gutted and 5 others damaged.

(C) Dump "A":

Damage to this Dump does not appear to be extensive, only 10-15 small residential type buildings and several heavily rotted huts are seen destroyed.

(D) Dump "K":

Two large and 15 small buildings were destroyed in the extreme SE sector of this Dump.

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(E) Insein RR Workshops;

This Station was not covered on the XX Bomber Command post-strike but a preliminary D.A. Report by C.P.I.C., S.E.A. (No. PM(S) 482) lists considerable damage. An office, the Main Store and the Engine Shop were destroyed. The Station Building, Millwright Shop, Boiler Shop and Smithy were severely damaged. In addition the Apprentices Quarters were destroyed.

(F) Other Damage;

Approximately 15 small residential type buildings adjoining Dump "F" on the E were destroyed and several similar buildings just W of the Hospital suffered damage.

*Frank L. Scott, Jr.*  
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Chief, Intelligence Section

PREPARED BY: TARGET UNIT  
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

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ANNEX I  
D.A. REPORT NO.43  
RANGOON MINGALADON AREA  
TARGET UNIT, XX B.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

462ND B.G.  
14 A/C  
840 M-81

TADAGY

WAREHOUSES

TADAGALE RR. STA.

40TH B.G.  
14 A/C  
2564 M-47A2

A/A & S/L SITES NORTH OF THIS LINE ARE CLASSIFIED IN THE MINGALADON AREA. THOSE SOUTH OF THIS LINE ARE CLASSIFIED IN THE RANGOON AREA.

468TH B.G.  
13 A/C  
2383 M-47A2

YEGU RR. STA.

TAP DUMP

DUMP F

RANGOON - MINGALADON AREA  
(ROADS & RAILROADS)

PRODUCED BY PHOTO RECCE FORCE  
INTERPRETATION BY 17AAPPID & 7PTS NOV. 1944  
40PR 4MDIII 21 OCT. 44

PROJECT NO. 116 NEG. NO. [ ]

SCALE IN YDS

0 500 1000  
RESTRICTED

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Thirty Six  
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Table I and II - Aircraft Participating \*

Group	Mis- sion No.	Field Order No.	** A/C Sched- uled	A/C Taking Off	Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Designated Primary Target								Time Of First Takeoff	Time*** Of Latest Return	Average Time of Flight***	
					Total No.	Percent	Reason								A/C Bombing Primary	Airborne A/C Not Bombing Primary
							Mech.	Pers.	Wea.	Not in Form.	Misc.	Unknown				
40th	36	36	15	15	1	6.6	1					0220Z	0953Z	7:15	0:14	
444th	36	36	15	15								0230Z	1023Z	6:56		
462nd	36	36	15	15	1	6.6	1					0227Z	1013Z	6:58	1:49	
468th	36	36	15	14	1	7.1	1					0156Z	0840Z	6:26	3:05	
TOTAL	36	36	60	59	3	5.1	3					0156Z	1023Z	6:54	1:42	

\* Mission was run from Rear Area Bases; Tables I and II consolidated because there was no Rear to Forward Area Movement.  
 \*\* Field Order #36 required each group to set up 15 aircraft for mission.  
 \*\*\* Excludes A/C which landed at other fields.

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Table III - Bombing Runs

Group	No. of A/C Bombing	Target Bombed	Time of Release		Altitude of Release		Visual Bomb		Radar Bomb		Blind Bomb		On The Leader			A/C Dropping On	
			Earliest	Latest	Highest	Lowest	A/C Sight- ing For		A/C Sight- ing For		A/C Sight- ing For		Visual	Radar	Blind	AFCE	Manual
							R&D	Range	R&D	Range	R&D	Range					
40th	14	Rangoon	0539Z	0539Z	21280	20000	1						13			1	13
444th	15	Rangoon	0547Z	0547Z	18700	17400	1						14			1	14
462nd	*14	Rangoon	0541Z	0541Z	19420	19000	1						13			1	13
468th	13	Rangoon	0503Z	0503Z	21000	21000	1						12			1	12
TOTAL	56	Rangoon	0503Z	0547Z	21280	17400	4						52			4	52

\* Includes one aircraft which dropped 10 bombs on F.T. and 54 on Target of Opportunity.  
 Primary Target - Rangoon.

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Table IV - Bomb Loading & Disposal

Group	* Type of Bombs	Bomb Loading on A/C Airborne in R. A.				On Targets		Bomb Disposal		
		Fusing		Average No. Loaded	** Total Loaded	Rangoon	Opportunity	Jettisoned	Returned	Unknown
		Nose	Tail							
40th	M-47 A2	Inst	N.D.	183.2	2748	2564			184	
444th	M-81	Inst	N.D.	71.9	1078	1058		14	6	
462nd	M-81	Inst	N.D.	63.9	958	840	54	64		
468th	M-47 A2	Inst	N.D.	183.1	2564	2383		181		
TOTAL	M-47 A2	Inst	N.D.	90.0	5312	4947		181	184	
	M-81	Inst	N.D.	34.5	2036	1898	54	78	6	

\* M-47 A2 Bomb, Incendiary - 100% - Actual weight 69.1 pounds.  
 AN-M 81, Fragmentation Bomb - 260% - Actual weight 255.9 pounds.  
 \*\* Excludes 30 - 100% M-47 A2 (WF Filled) Bombs dropped to indicate group assembly point.  
 Twelve carried by 40th Group (2 A/C - 6 each), 6 carried by one A/C in each of the other groups.  
 In accordance with Field Order.

NOTE: Bomb weight information supplied by Ordnance Section, XX Bomber Command.

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Table V - Aircraft Lost and Damaged

Aircraft Lost

NEGATIVE REPORT

Aircraft Damaged

Major Damage

<u>Group</u>	<u>A/C Serial Number</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>A/A</u>	<u>Own Guns</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
462nd	24590	X				Left wing, #1 prop, #1 engine and nacell dorsal fin, pilot's window, upper forward turret and fuselage.
TOTAL		1				

Minor Damage

<u>Group</u>	<u>A/C Serial Number</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>A/A</u>	<u>Own Guns</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
40th	24579		X			Hole in trailing edge of right flap.
	24740		X			Left outer wing panel, right front bomb door inside.
	24587		X			Hole in upper forward part aft bomb bay.
	63505		X			Shroud on #4 inboard turbo; engine nacelle and wing.
	24542		X			Flak hole in inner skin of left forward bomb bay.
	63420		X			Right aileron.
	24541		X			#3 outboard turbo and #2 inboard side nacelle.
			7			
444th	63378		X			Hole in left wing.
	24861		X			Wing
	24723		X			Horizontal stabilizer.
	24492		X			#1 nacelle and skin aft of rear door.
	24464		X			#2 cowl flap, horizontal stabilizer, loading edge of fuselage.
	24897		X			Top wing skin above flap.
	63559		X			Right side of rudder.
	65270		X			Rudder.
	24524		X			Hole in #3 ring cowl.
	63451		X			Skin near fuselage.
	63496		X			Holes in wing and fuselage.
	63533		X			Bombardier moon window. Bomb door, leading edge left forward fuselage.
	24724*		X		X	Flak hole in rudder fabric, own bomb tore door due to double sling hanging up
			13		1	

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TABLE V - cont'd

Minor Damage

<u>Group</u>	<u>A/C Serial Number</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>A/A</u>	<u>Own Guns</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
462nd	63386		X			Leading edge of wing between #3 and #4 nacelle.
	63502		X			Right hand outer wing panel leading edge.
	24904		X			Leading edge of right wing and hole in center left wing.
	63540		X			Horizontal stabilizer, and elevator, right wing flap. Fuselage, #2 nacelle, left inboard tire and right scanner's blister
	63454		X			Leading Edge of wing, and tank panel.
	63450		X			Underside left wing.
	24838		X			Vertical fin, and leading edge of left wing
	63476		X			Hole in flaps.
			8			
468th	63460		X			Nose section.
			1			
TOTAL			29		1	

\* Hit by both anti-aircraft and other.

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Table VI - Attacks & Passes by Enemy Aircraft

DIRECTION	ALTITUDE															
	HIGH				LOW				LEVEL				TOTAL			
	40th	444th	462nd	468th	40th	444th	462nd	468th	40th	444th	462nd	468th	40th	444th	462nd	468th
0800																
0900																
1000																
1100						2								2		
1200			3				4			2			2		7	
0100							1			2			2		1	
0200																
0300																
0400																
0500							1								1	
0600																
0700																
TOTAL			3			2	6			4			6		9	

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Table VII - Personnel Losses

Crew Position	Killed				Missing				Seriously Wounded				Slightly Wounded				Total Casualties				Total Participating			
	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468
Pilot																					16	15	15	16
Co-Pilot																					15	15	15	14
Navigator																					15	15	15	15
Bombardier													1		1		1		1		15	15	15	14
Flt. Engr.																					15	15	15	14
Radar																					15	15	15	14
Radio																					15	15	15	14
CFC Spec																					15	15	15	14
Right Gnr																					15	15	15	14
Left Gnr																					15	15	15	14
Tail Gnr																					15	15	15	14
R C M																								3
Others																					4	8	10	6
TOTAL													1		1		1		1		170	173	175	166

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Table VIII - Expenditures of Ammunition and Claims Against Enemy Aircraft

Group	Ammunition Expended Per Plane In Combat Firing					Total Expended	Claims Against Enemy Aircraft					
	Upper Front	Lower Front	Upper Rear	Lower Rear	50 Cal. Tail		Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged	Per 1000 Pounds Expended in Combat		
										Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
40th	2	0	0	0	0	30	0	0	0	0	0	0
444th	7	11	0	26	2	700	0	0	2	0	0	2.86
462nd	120	81	1	51	87	5120	0	0	1	0	0	.20
468th	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	33	24	1	20	23	5850	0	0	3	0	0	.51

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Table IX - Gasoline Loading and Consumption

Group	Average Gross Weight Per Plane Before Rear Area Takeoff	Average Gals Gas Loaded Per A/C Before Rear Area Takeoff	Average Gallons Consumed on Mission		Average Gallons Remaining in A/C After Mission	
			Per Aircraft Bombing Primary	Per Aircraft Not Bombing Primary	Per Aircraft Bombing Primary	Per A/C Not Bombing Primary
40th	127523	5391	3644	400	1747	5000
444th	131353	5020	3416		1604	
462nd	128874	5073	3361	900	1717	4100
468th	128125	5400	3518	1680	1882	3720
TOTAL	128983	5218	3483	993	1733	4273

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Table X - Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Primary Target

A/C Serial Number	Specific Mechanical Malfunction	Other Reasons	Local Action To Prevent Recurrence
<u>40th Gp.</u>			
24757	During takeoff #1 Prop Governor stuck at 2650 RPM. The RPM was reduced by using the feathering switch, but immediately went back up again because the Prop Governor would not hold normal RPM then returned to the field.		Replaced Governor. U.R. #45-93 submitted
<u>462nd Gp.</u>			
63560	Broken rocker arm #4 cylinder #3 engine.		Changed #4 cylinder. U.R. #45-95 submitted
<u>468th Gp.</u>			
63417	Lost #2 engine. Internal failure.		Engine changed. U.R. #45-102 submitted.

Scheduled Aircraft Failing to Become Airborne

468th Gp.  
63530 Mag point burned on left mag #3 engine.

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Table XI - Engineering Malfunctions

Part I - Engineering Malfunctions Preventing Airborne A/C From Bombing Primary

	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT.					
Engine Failure				1	1
Broken Rocker Arm			1		1
PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS					
Governor	1				1
TOTAL	1		1	1	3

NOTE: For details, see Table X - "Summary of A/C Failing to Bomb Primary".

Part II - Engineering Malfunctions Not Preventing A/C From Bombing Primary

	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT.					
Engine running rough			1		1
Turbo Supercharger and/or Turbo Control System	2	1			3
Intercooler and/or Control System			1		1
Magneto				1	1
Blown Cylinder	1				1
PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS					
Governor	1		2		3
Governor Oil Leak			2		2
OIL SYSTEM					
Oil Leaks			1	1	2
Oil Temperature Regulator	4				4
Oil Pressure Low		1			1
FUEL SYSTEM					
Fuel Pressure High		1			1
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM					
Generators		2			2
E. C. System			1		1
INSTRUMENTS					
Carb Air Temp Gage		1	2		3
Cylinder Head Temp Gage	1			1	2
Rear Oil Press. Gage			1	1	2
Fuel Press Gage			1	1	2
Tachometer		1	1		2
Airspeed Indicator			1		1
Manifold Pressure Gage			1		1
MISCELLANEOUS					
Pressurization			1	1	2
Hydraulic System		1			1
Bomb Racks		1	1		2
TOTAL	9	9	17	6	41

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Table XII - Utilization of Useful Load  
 (Based on A/C Bombing P.T.)

Group	No. of Ground Miles	Number of A/C Considered	Type of A/C	Av. Gross Weight at Takeoff For Mission	Aver Basic Weight of A/C	Aver. Useful Load	Aver. Number ** of Bombs Loaded	Aver Weight * of Bombs Loaded	Aver Weight of Gas Loaded at 6 Pounds Per Gal	Average Miscellaneous Weight
40th	1545	14	Center Wing Tanks	127644	74898	52746	M-47 A2-184	12714	32344	7688
444th	1531	15	Center Wing Tanks	131419	75335	56084	M-81 71.9 M-47A2 .4	18419	30120	7545
462nd	1423	14	Center Wing Tanks	128813	74906	53907	M-81 63.9 M-47A2 .4	16371	30471	7065
468th	1381	13	Center Wing Tanks	128175	75009	53166	M-47A2 184	12714	32400	8052
TOTAL	1508	56	Center Wing Tanks	129071	75042	54029	M-47A2 88.9 M-81 35.2	15156	31293	7580

\* M-47 A2 Bomb Incendiary-100# Actual Weight 69.1 Pounds.  
 AN-M 81 Fragmentation Bomb-260# Actual Weight 255.9 Pounds.  
 \*\* Includes 30-100# M-47A2 (WP filled) Bombs dropped to indicate group Assembly Point. 12 carried by 40th Group (2 A/C-6 each), 6 carried by one A/C in each of the other Groups in accordance with Field Order.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

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