AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

I. GENERAL

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		April 19/		Time (LZ				Lat.		Long: 29	-9
Mission	Utrike J	lap Pleet	• · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				* ·	(f) Time o	f Return		(Zo
II. OW	N AIRCRA	FT OFFICIA	ALLY COVE	RED BY T	HIS REPOR	Т.			T		
TYPE	SQUADRON	TAKING	NUMBER	ATTACKING	1		D TORPEDO			FUZE, SETTI	NG
(a)	(b)	OFF (c)	ENEMY A/C	TARGET (e)			(f)			(g)	
M-3	VT-45	8	0	8	One Mr.	13 Me	d.6 T	rpedo	12 Fe	et.	
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		70-5					*******				
111 07	THED II C	OP ALLIED	AIRCRAFT	ENADIOVE	D IN THIS	ODEDA	TION	•			
TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	AIRCRAFI	BASE		TYPE	SQUADRO	NUMBER	T	BASE	
6P 1	77-45	7 1	SS SAN JA	CINTO				1			
(a) TYPE	(b) NO.	NO. ENGAGING	RVED OR E	LOCA	(e) ATION OF	T		(f) PEDOES CARRIEL OBSERVED	D;	CAMOUFL.	AGE AND
TIPE	OBSERVED	OWN A/C	ENCOUNTERE	D ENC	OUNTER		ĞUNS	OBSERVED		MARK	(ING
	2										
None			(ZON	E)							
None		•	(ZON								
None				E)							
	nt Enemy N	Aission(s)	(ZON	E)							
Appare Did Any	nt Enemy No Part of		(ZON	E)							
Appare Did Any Encoun	Part of ter(s) Occu	ur in Clouds?	(ZON	E)	cribe Clouds		(BASE	IN FEET, TYPE	AND TENT	HS OF COVER)
Appare Did Any Encoun Time of	Part of	ur in Clouds?	(ZON	E) If so, Desc			(BASE	IN FEET, TYPE (k) Vis			
Appare Did Any Encoun Time of of Sun	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon —	ar in Clouds?	(ZON) (ZON) (YES OR NO)	E) If so, Desc	, OVERCAST; E	ETC.)		(k) Vis	ibility	HS OF COVER	
Appare Did Any Encoun Time of of Sun	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon	ar in Clouds?	(ZON) (YES OR NO) (NIGHT, BRIG	E) If so, Desc	, OVERCAST; E	ETC.)		(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MIL)	
Appare Did Any Encoun Time of of Sun V. EN TYPE NEMY A/C	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon	ar in Clouds?	(ZON) (YES OR NO) (NIGHT, BRIG ROYED OR I	E) If so, Desc	OVERCAST; E	ETC.)	Aircraft I	(k) Vis	obilityOnly).	(MIL)	ES) (d) DAM/
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Appare Did Any Encoun Time of of Sun V. EN TYPE NEMY A/C	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon	rilliance RAFT DESTI	(ZON) (YES OR NO) (NIGHT, BRIG ROYED OR I	E) If so, Descondant Moon; DAY DAMAGED	OVERCAST; E	y Own A	Aircraft I	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MIL)	ES) (d) DAM/
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Appare Did Any Encoun Time of of Sun V. EN TYPE NEMY A/C	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon	rilliance RAFT DESTI	(ZON) (YES OR NO) (NIGHT, BRIG ROYED OR I	E) If so, Descondant Moon; DAY DAMAGED	OVERCAST; E	y Own A	Aircraft I	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MIL)	ES) (d) DAMA
Appare Did Any Encoun Time of of Sun V. EN TYPE NEMY A/C	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon	rilliance RAFT DESTI	(ZON) (YES OR NO) (NIGHT, BRIG ROYED OR I	E) If so, Descondant Moon; DAY DAMAGED	OVERCAST; E	y Own A	Aircraft I	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MIL)	ES)
Appare Did Any Encoun Time of of Sun V. EN TYPE NEMY A/C	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon	rilliance RAFT DESTI	(ZON) (YES OR NO) (NIGHT, BRIG ROYED OR I	E) If so, Descondant Moon; DAY DAMAGED	OVERCAST; E	y Own A	Aircraft I	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MIL)	ES)
Appare Did Any Encoun Time of of Sun V. EN TYPE NEMY A/C	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon	rilliance RAFT DESTI	(ZON) (YES OR NO) (NIGHT, BRIG ROYED OR I	E) If so, Descondant Moon; DAY DAMAGED	OVERCAST; E	y Own A	Aircraft I	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MIL)	ES)
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AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

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REPORT No.

	(a) OWN A/C	(b) SQUADRON	TYPE GI	USE: TYPE ENEMY UN, OR OPERATIO	Y A/C, NAL CAUSE	WHERE HIT self-sealing	ANGLE (List armor, tanks, equipment hit)	(Give Bureau	(e) IT OF LOSS OF serial number o	f planes destroyed)
1	The same	24.								
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				(d)	TION DAT	A FOR PLAN	VES RETURNING			(h)
	VIII. (a) TYPE A/C	RANGE, I	FUEL, AN (c) MILES RETURN	D AMMUNI (d) AV. HOURS IN AIR	TION DAT	A FOR PLAN	VES RETURNING			
	(a) TYPE	(b) MILES	(c) MILES	AV. HOURS	TION DAT (e) AV. FUEL	A FOR PLAN (f) AV. FUEL	VES RETURNING (g) TOTAL A	MMUNITION EXPE	NDED	(h) NO. OF PLAN
	(a) TYPE	(b) MILES	(c) MILES	AV. HOURS	TION DAT (e) AV. FUEL LOADED	A FOR PLAN (f) AV. FUEL	VES RETURNING (g) TOTAL A .30 .50	MMUNITION EXPE	NDED	NO. OF PLAN
	(a) TYPE A/C	(b) MILES OUT	MILES RETURN	AV. HOURS IN AIR	TION DAT (e) AV. FUEL LOADED	A FOR PLAN (f) AV. FUEL CONSUMED	NES RETURNING (g) TOTAL A .30 .50	MMUNITION EXPE	NDED	(h) NO. OF PLAN
	(a) TYPE A/C	(b) MILES OUT	MILES RETURN	AV. HOURS IN AIR	TION DAT (e) AV. FUEL LOADED	A FOR PLAN AV. FUEL CONSUMED Check one bloom	VES RETURNING (g) TOTAL A .30 .50	MMUNITION EXPE	NDED	NO. OF PLAN
	IX. E	(b) MILES OUT	MILES RETURN	AV. HOURS IN AIR	TION DAT (e) AV. FUEL LOADED	A FOR PLAN AV. FUEL CONSUMED Check one bloom	NES RETURNING (g) TOTAL A .30 .50 ock on each line)	MMUNITION EXPE	NDED	NO. OF PLAN RETURNING

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

SPEED, CLIMB, at various altitudes TURNS DIVES CEILINGS RANGE PROTECTION ARMAMENT

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AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

S	B	G	R	B	T

Clouds Over Target (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER) (P) Visibility (CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, EYC.) (Bombing Tactics: Type (CLEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (CLEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (NUMBER) Spacing (FEET) (NUMBER) (FEET) (NUMBER) (FEET) (NUMBER) (NUMBER) (FEET) (NUMBER) (NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET) (NUMBER) (NUMBER) (FEET) (NUMBER) (NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET) (NUMBER) (NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET) (NUMBER) (NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET) (NUMBER) (NUMBER) (FEET) (NUMBER) (NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET) (FEET) (NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET) (FEET) (NUMBER) (FEET)		The state of the s			r rarger(s/-	(Zone
Bombing Tactics: Type				. (e) \	/isibility	2 M1100
Bombs Dropped per Run (NUMBER) Spacing (FEET) Altitude of Bomb Release (FEET) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed Probably Destroyed Damaged (n) NO. HITS On Aiming Point Aiming Point DAMAGE (None, serious, destroyed or serious destroyed or						lone
Number of Enemy Aircraft Fift on Ground. Destroyed (h) AIMING POINT (i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE (i) NO. A/C ATTACKING (ii) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE (k) SQUADRON (iv) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT Aiming Point Serious, destroyed or		Run	Spacing	(FEET)		(1221)
(h) AIMING POINT (i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE (j) NO. A/C ATTACKING BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT Aiming Point serious, destroyed or	Number of Enemy A	Aircraft Hit on Gro	ound: Destroyed	Probably Destroyed_	None	
		DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE		BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	NO. HITS On	DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk
	7.5		77-45	8 Torpedoes	2	Sunk

This very large destroyer which is believed to be of the Takanami class was hit on the starboard side by two torpedoes in quick succession at 1305. One torpedo hit it beside the bridge and the other about amidships. The bow reared high up from the water, the ship appeared to break in half just aft of amidships, it started to slide under the water and a terrific emplosion pushed it up again and then it completely disappeared. By 1310 only survivors and odd pieces of wreekage could be seen on the surface. The attached photographs are all of this one ship. The first one shows it in profile before it was attacked, the second shows it from above with an oil slick on the water probably caused by near misses which VF-45 planes scored with 1000# G.P. bombs and the third picture shows it as the torpedoes hit it.

⁽o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition

Altitudes

Speeds

Approach Tactics

Use of Cover, Deception

Angles of Attack and

Distance of Opening Fire Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack Distance of Opening Fire Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses

Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
""", Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
""", Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting

Recognition, Aircraft

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.) On 6 April 1945 information was received that Jap fleet units might come out the following morning and all carriers were instructed to be prepared to launch strikes against such units by 1000 the following morning. At about 0830 on 7 April search planes sighted an enemy force consisting of a bettleship, two cruisers and eight destroyers about 40 miles off the southwestern tip of Kyushu on a southwesterly course. At 1025 this strike was launched by the U.S.S. SAN JACINTO to intercept this enemy force and cooperate with strikes launched by other carriers in destroying it. The eight VT-45 planes, loaded with torpedoes with 12 foot settings, were piloted by Lieutenants Piegari, Van Hoven and Bertoglio, Lieutenants (j.g.) Robinson, Laughlin and Mason, and Ensigns Lennox and Nickell. They proceeded to the expected position of the force and first sew it through breaks in the clouds at a distance at latitude 31-00N, Longitude 128-55E. It consisted of a Yamato class BB, a heavy cruiser and nine destroyers, two of which were very large, and it was proceeding on a course of approximately 225° at a speed of about 15 knots. Directly over this enemy force the clouds were 10/10 at 2000 feet, but there were areas of scattered clouds to the southeast side of the force from which the strike planes were coming. At a distance of at least 10 miles from the force the Yamato class battleship opened up on the approaching planes with its main betteries. This fire was at most only fairly accurate. No plane was hit but the force of the explosions nearby jounced several of the planes severely, more severly than any nearby anti-aircraft burst had over done. These shells were apparently of a phosphorus variety because large streamers of white smoke were thrown out like tentacles in every direction as the shells burst. Glistening particles drifted down from these white streamers like mow falling with the rays of the sun on it. None of these planes flew directly into this white matter so it is not known what effect it might have. It is thought that these large rifles were fired in part for the psychological effect. Pilots reported that they could see the huge flash of flame as the rifles fired and then would have several seconds of apprehension as to where the shell would explode before the actual explosion took place. Window was dropped as soon as this firing began and pilets reported that the shells were more accurate at hitting in the area filled with window then in the eree the planes were in. This effectiveness of window was even more marked against the regular heavy anti-aircraft when it opened fire. Shell bursts followed along behind and slightly below the formation and appeared to occur on several occasions directly in the middle of recently dropped bundles of window. The Jap force also put up a concentrated barrage type fire at the place in the sky where the 10/10 cover ceased and breaks in the clouds existed. There were no reports of colored shell bursts in this anti-aircraft fire but all reports indicate that when this Jap force was first approached it was putting up a very concentrated and impressive amount of anti-aircraft fire. A target coordinator had been designated prior to take-off to control the efforts of all participating air groups. After about ten minutes in the area the Air Group 45 planes were ordered by the Target Coordinator to attack the cruiser or large destroyer standing off about 5 miles to the port side of the formation. This ship looked very large for a destroyer and it was only after the attached photographs were exemined that it was ascertained to be a large destroyer of the Takanemi class. The torpedo planes immediately began to deploy for

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA (Cont'd.)

an attack on this ship and the seven accompanying fighter planes went in to drop their 1000# G.P. bombs. The 1000# G.P. bombs were all dropped in close proximity to the destroyer but none hit it. Two of the misses were close beside the starboard beam and it is believed that they sprung the sides of the vessel in some fashion as a large oil slick was spreading out from the starboard side when the torpedo planes went in to attack. The destroyer put up a strong anti-aircraft defense, principally 40 mm and lighter. All runs were made from the starboard side of the target from positions ranging from 30° off the bow to 1000 off the bow. There was no distinguishable time interval between the verious planes' attacks. The destroyer was only slightly under way when these attacks were launched at a speed of 4 or 5 knots and it turned to the starboard in an apparent attempt to comb the torpedoes. However it did not have sufficient speed to do this and only succeeded in avoiding two torpedoes by her turn. Of the other six torpedoes one did not make any observable run as it tumbled end over end out of the bomb bay. The other five were dropped normally from 1200 to 1800 yards from the destroyer and ran straight and true. Two wakes ran directly up to the destroyer and two high order explosions resulted, one near the brid ge and one slightly abaft amidships. The destroyer reared up in the water lifting its bow high in the air. Its stern went under and appeared to break off. There are some reports that two more torpedo wakes were seen to cross the position where the ship had been a moment before. After the explosions of the two torpedoes and the initial rearing up the destroyer slowly slid back down under the water. Before the bow disappeared, however, there was a tremendous explosion from below the water which pushed the vessel bow first back up well above the surface of the water. Then it appeared to disintegrate and in a matter of seconds it had disappeared completely and finally. Only the oil slick, a number of survivors and a miscellaneous mass of wreckage remained on the surface.

A careful analysis of the attack indicates that the two hits were scored by torpedoes dropped by Lieutenant Piegari and Lieutenant (j.g.) Mason. Several of the others were deprived of hits only by a narrow margin.

Lieutenant Piegari dropped his torpedo at a range of 1500 yards at an altitude of 500 feet and a speed of 240 knots and Lieutenant (j.g.) Mason dropped at a range of 1400 yards at an altitude of 300 feet and a speed of 240 knots. Both torpedoes made a normal entry and ran straight and true. The other five torpedoes which made normal entries were dropped from ranges of between 1200 and 1800 yards, at altitudes of from 250 feet to 800 feet and at speeds of from 210 knots to 240 knots. As has been stated, the eighth torpedo fell end over end into the water.

The three photographs attached to this report show the destroyer before it was torpedoed from a profile and a plan view and as it exploded as a result of the two torpedo hits. The first and third photographs were taken with a K-20 camera from the radioman's compartment of one of the torpedo planes. The second photograph was taken by Lieutenant (j.g.) David H. Willis, the Photographic

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
MII. TACTICAL AND OFERATIONAL DATA (Cont'd.)

Officer of VF-45. Lieutement (j.g.) Willis has invariably brought back excellent terget and demage assessment photographs and his work has embellished a long series of VT-45 action reports.

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

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REPORT No.

XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.

Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar Homing Devices Visual Signals Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF Signals Battle Lights Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles of Fire Needing Further Protection Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes
Life Belts, Life Rafts
Safety Belts
Emergency Kits
Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment Personnel Facilities

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

more the second that is all the second


J. G. PIRGARI. Lieut. USER

RANK AND DUTY

12 April 1945.
DATE

SIGNATURE





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