

Exhibit 2905

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From Toyoda to Nomura  
27 September 1941  
No. 605

(1) Europe has fallen into utter chaos, and the war has spread to the Atlantic, involving almost all the powers of the world. Fortunately, however, war has not yet reached the Pacific, and the key to war or peace is left in the hands of Japan and the United States. If hostilities should be opened between these two countries and the Pacific thrown into disorder, the civilization of the world would be destroyed and the most disastrous situation imaginable would result.

Recently, various incidents have occurred in rapid succession between Japan and the United States, and the friendly relations between the two countries have tended to be disturbed thereby.

To adjust Japanese-American relations now and to improve the friendship between the two countries will redound, not only to the benefit of Japan and the United States, but also to the cause of world peace. The Japanese Government seeks such adjustment, not only for the sake of the improvement of Japanese-American relations, but also for the purpose of insuring the general peace of the world.

(2) For the past two months, since assuming the present post, I have made strenuous efforts to obtain an amicable settlement of Japanese-American relations, and it is also for the same purpose that Premier Kono himself came forward and determined that he would meet the American President.

(3) Japan being bound by alliance with Germany and Italy, the meeting of the responsible head of this Government with the President of the United States is itself likely to give rise to misunderstanding with respect to Japan's relations with those two countries. Moreover, when seen from the domestic point of view, it is an event unprecedented in our history that the Premier in person should cross the border on a diplomatic mission. This fact alone is sufficient to prove what zeal the Japanese Government entertains for the adjustment of relations between Japan and the United States and for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific, and ultimately for the promotion of the peace of the world.

(4) It is the most deplorable misunderstanding to profess that the present offer of Japan is not because of her desire to maintain peace but because of the fact that she has yielded to the coercion of the United States. Eager as the Japanese people are for peace, they will not bow to the pressure of any other country, nor do they cling to peace at any cost. It is a characteristic trait peculiar to this people to repel, rather than to submit to, external pressure. I repeat this point here in particular consideration of the tone of the American newspapers (although it is true that they have been considerably softened nowadays).

(5) The relations between Japan and the United States are so complicated and varied that they are not capable of being adjusted in a brief space of time, and it may probably be impossible once and for all to solve all the difficult questions attending them with the projected meeting of the responsible heads of both Governments. Nevertheless, this meeting is bound to have a vast political significance. Moreover, those questions which have not been settled by telegraphic communication (assuming

that there still remain such questions) that have been the subjects of our negotiations will be readily solved at the meeting. It is needless to say that the meeting will be an epoch-making turn for the better in Japanese-American relations in this way. I understand that the Government of the United States has no objection in principle to the proposed meeting between the two heads of Government. Should it unfortunately fail to be realized, we would never again be able to find such a favorable opportunity and circumstances for the meeting; moreover, the repercussions of the failure would be most unfortunate.

(6) The stand and the opinion of Japan have been fully communicated to the Government of the United States. A resumé of these, put into the form of the American proposal of 21 June, has also been submitted to you. We believe that the views of this Government have already been fully studied by the Government of the United States.

(7) On our side, the ship to carry the Premier and his suite is prepared, and the membership of the suite, including a full general and a full admiral, has been informally decided. The party is ready to depart at any moment.

(8) Such being the circumstances, the Japanese Government is now anxiously looking forward to receiving a reply from the American Government at the earliest possible date. You are fully aware that, should it be delayed any further, the position of this Government would surely become more delicate, as I explained to you at our last meeting, especially after today's anniversary of the Tripartite Pact. Furthermore, it is also feared that the climatic conditions in the Northern Pacific and the vicinity of the Alaskan coast would grow unfavorable.

(9) Time, as I have repeatedly told you, is a vital factor from the internal as well as the international viewpoint. Decision must be made as quickly as possible. This is why we request the American Government to give the most speedy and sincere consideration. A prompt reply will be appreciated.

As regards the date of the meeting, between the 10th and the 15th of October will suit the Japanese Government.

Finally, by way of conclusion, I should like to point out that negotiations of this kind require sincerity and mutual confidence. I need not dwell on the character, conviction and faith of Premier Kono, nor his political position, all of which are well known to you. If the desired rapprochement be not realized by Premier Kono and the present Cabinet under him, the opportunity for adjustment of Japanese-American relations will be lost for some time to come. Therefore I should like to emphasize again that it is urgently necessary to have the meeting of the two responsible heads at the earliest possible date.