

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- - Against - -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN

DEPOSITION

Deponent:

TANAKA, Takeo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

I, TANAKA, Takeo was born on January 19 of the 24th year of Meiji (1891) in Hyogo Prefecture, and live at present at No. 2956 Kichijoji, Musashino-machi, Kitatama-gun, Tokyo Metropolis. In the 45th year of Meiji (1912), I was graduated from the Meiji University, and after passing the civil service examination, entered the government service.

I was appointed the Secretary of the Government-General of Korea in the 8th year of Taisho (1919), was appointed the Director of the Police Affairs Bureau of the same Government-General in the 11th year of Showa (1936), and , after retiring from the service in September of the same year, returned to Japan and was out of service. Then I was appointed the Vice-Minister for Overseas Affairs in April of the 14th year of Showa (1939), and resigned the post in October of the 15th year of Showa (1940). I was appointed the Civil Governor of the Government-General of Korea in May of the 17th year of Showa (1942), and as soon as I resigned in July of the 19th year of Showa (1944)

and returned home, I was appointed the Secretary-General to the Cabinet. Later I resigned the post of the Secretary-General on February 1st of the 20th year of Showa (1945), and was nominated to the House of Peers. I resigned from the House of Peers in February of the 21st year of Showa (1946).

It was since about August of the 7th year of Showa (1932) that I became acquainted with General KOISO, but my political connection with him began in April of the 14th year of Showa (1939), when the General was appointed the Minister for Overseas Affairs in the HIRANUMA Cabinet, and I served as the Vice-Minister under him. Since then I have been acquainted with him until this day. Therefore, I will refer to the following points concerning the General.

1. The General's view on the so-called southward expansion question.

When the General was the Minister for Overseas Affairs, namely, between the 14th and 15th years of Showa (1939-1940), the so-called Southward expansion question, that is, economic expansion in the southern area was sought, became a subject of much discussion in the country. Just at that time, the HIRANUMA Cabinet was in power, and the question how to determine the attitude toward the Japanese-German-Italy Tri-Partite Alliance as well as that of southward expansion, were befalling the Government as the matters of national importance. In addition, the Government's attitude toward these questions was so serious a matter as would decide the course of our country that every foreign nation was, with keen eyesight, watching the movements of our state. So I would like to elucidate the General's attitude toward these two questions. The Cabinet of the time made it a rule to hold the Five Ministers' Conference, to wit, another meeting by the Premier and Ministers of War, Navy, Foreign Affairs and Finance besides the Cabinet Meeting and to talk over very

important matters.

The Tri-Partite Alliance question was of course discussed and studied in this Conference. The Minister of Overseas Affairs however, was not a member of the Conference and was nothing but an outsider holding a sinecure. So he was never consulted about any matter as a member of the Cabinet. But the General held, as his private opinion, that, in view of the complicated international situation, our foreign policy was not so simple as to be necessary pro-Italo-German, if not pro-Anglo-American; or to be essentially pro-Anglo-American, if not pro-Italo-German. That is to say, it could not be that our foreign policy should be either the Right or the Left.

Therefore proper steps should be taken lest we should remorse in future for our erroneously directing the course of the state by taking rash actions now. KOISO expressed himself to the effect that it was advisable at this moment to give up concluding the Alliance in order to avoid producing such unfavorable results as to be vainly made use of by Germany. On one occasion KOISO stated this view opposing the foreign alliance privately to the Premier and the Foreign Minister. As regards the Southward economic expansion question, he was of opinion that the aimless advocacy of the southward economic expansion was liable to make the foreign nations mistake our intention for that of expanding to the southern area with territorial ambitions, and if so, it would be greatly different from our true intention; that accordingly, the necessity of our economic expansion must be explained with such an attitude of mind as convincing everyone of the necessity for reasonable economic expansion of our nation; and that, for that purpose, the dogged advocacy of the southward economic expansion would not do; but, so long as the expansion was a reasonable and economic one for the sake of our nation's self-support,

expansion either to the south or to the north will do and it was not always necessary to emphasize a one-sided view. The General, also held the view on population problems that it would be difficult to encourage a large population of Japanese to emigrate to the southern areas, as, in the light of the actual results in the past, the southern climate did not seem to suit the Japanese.

2. His state of mind and determination when he accepted the Imperial command to form a Cabinet.

It was on July 18 of the 19th year of Showa (1944) that General KOISO was summoned by the Throne to be ordered to form a new cabinet. The General, at that time at his post as the Governor-General of Korea, was informed of nothing about the war situation except from official announcements by the Army and Government. Various informations, however, made us feel that the fact was that the war situation was more unfavorable for Japan than was announced and that the naval power had sustained heavy losses. For at this juncture, the fall of SAIPAN was officially announced. Therefore, not only were we deeply impressed that the war situation was really unfavorable but also felt that most of the gloomy news which had come to our ears in the past should have been true. On the other hand, the general public, who had up to that time half believed and half doubted various rumours about the unfavorable war situation of our country, began about this time to be pessimistic about the prospects of war rather than deeply suspicious about it. Such a state of things was not merely in Korea but also even at home. It was only natural that it should have been the case in Korea. Under these circumstances, General KOISO accepted the Imperial command to form a new Cabinet. When at first he received a telephone call from the Grand Chamberlain about the Imperial summons, the General said that, if the Emperor would by any chance order him to form a new Cabinet, he

had to give serious consideration to what sort of resolution he ought to make in forming a Cabinet. Therefore, after most careful consideration, he determined to form a new Cabinet, according to the principles as outlined below, to wit:

"A. At present the war situation is very unfavorable for us. We are now defeated and in retreat, and now that even SAIPAN fell already into the enemy's hand, the prospects of war are really serious. Although we have of course an eager desire to survive by exhausting every means, it will be most difficult to do so, because of the present circumstances of being overwhelmed by the enemy in the armed conflicts and because of successive lowering of production in the industrial warfare.

A far-sighted national policy seriously required us not only to hold in check in anyway the enemy's rushing force at this moment but also to take a cool view of how to bring the war to a conclusion. The question rather lies here. For that purpose, it is a matter of the greatest urgency to win the hearts of our people which are recently apt to be alienated from the Government and the conditions of the armed conflict and of the economic warfare, the people only become depressed in spirit and it is feared that, whatever attempt the Government may make, it could have no influence nor authority over the people. Such being the case, he felt confident of the absolute necessity of bracing up our people in order to increase the productive power by anyhow smashing the enemy's scheme for invasion and of gaining some time there to take steps to negotiate peace on full scale through the third powers including the Soviet Union as well as to proceed with a prompt peace move toward China."

"B. In order to accomplish the above purpose, he stated that the Prime Minister assuming the stewardship of state affairs must effect a strong adjustment and combination of both the politi-

cal and military tactics from the standpoint of the whole of the state affairs, otherwise perfect administration of the state affairs could not be realized in bringing to a conclusion this great war. Accordingly, the head of the Cabinet at this moment ought to be placed in a position enabling him to perform such function. He came up to Tokyo with these thoughts we had discussed in mind and with the serious determination given above. After having an audience with His Majesty, he was ordered to form a new Cabinet together with Admiral YONAI, so he acted up to his original principle. He intended to assign the portfolio of Navy to Admiral YONAI, and hoped to secure a Minister of War who would help carry out their program to establish peace.

In addition, he expressed his resolution that he wished to decide whether or no he would comply with the Imperial command to form a new Cabinet, on condition that the ordinance concerned should be revised at that moment so as to qualify the premier in attending the meetings of the imperial headquarters or else that a strong and simple organ of directing the war affairs should be established with a few persons as its members. He received a promise that a definite answer might be given. To this, the Army, after Three Chief's conference, replied that the war should be carried on, that Field-Marshal SUGIYAMA would be recommended for the portfolio of the Army and that, as to the creation of the war direction council, they would meet the General's desire. On the part of the Navy, a reply was made to the effect that the post of the Navy Minister should be assigned to YONAI and that they had no objection to creating the said council. Then KOISO, after consulting with Admiral YONAI, decided to approve of them and completed the formation of the Cabinet.

3. The organization of the Supreme War Direction Council and the actual condition of its operation.

The members of this council were the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of the Naval General Staff, the Minister of War, the Minister of Navy, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Secretaries being the Secretary-General to the Cabinet, the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau and the Director of the Naval Affairs Bureau. It was decided that besides them, both the Vice-Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Army and Navy might attend the Council on proper occasions and that the members of the Cabinet concerned were to attend it according to the contents of the subjects. It was also decided that, when the war situation was reported, every member of the Cabinet, the Director of the Legislation Bureau and the Director of the Planning Bureau were also to attend. The main matters to be discussed in the Council related to the harmonization and adjustment between The Supreme Command and state affairs. In this Council there were no chairmen or such like, but the Premier was to be charged with the expediting the proceeding.

The main points of the Council was the harmonization and adjustment between the supreme command and state affairs as given above.

As for the secrets of operations and tactics concerning the war, the Premier was not able to touch them but was a total outsider. As, nevertheless, Premier KOISO happened to be a General, he sometimes questioned and expressed his views about the matters relating to the details of operations. Generally speaking, however, an attitude not desiring to have the Premier meddle with the tactical affairs was found among the officers of the Army and Navy including the members of the Council. They challenged him when he wished to touch their secrets. The movements and the degree of damages of the Combined Fleet, for instance, were in no case informed of. Concerning the operations of the front lines of the army and navy, he only heard of the

general war situation, when it was reported, in company to the Cabinet colleagues.

In short, the Premier had a great expectation at the outset for the Council, and yet the actual circumstances were, as mentioned above, against his expectation. Such being the case, since it was impossible to materialize the primary principle decided at the time of forming the Cabinet, KOISO finally asked the Throne to issue an Imperial order authorizing the Premier to attend the conferences of the Imperial Headquarters.

However, as for his attending the Imperial Headquarters, the authority of the Premier was confined to being informed of the condition of operations and tactics and he was not vested with the authority to set forth his view and to have a share in the discussions in the conference on operations and tactics. Therefore, KOISO was not placed in the position at which he could have his views from a standpoint of the general state affairs reflect on the direction of the front line. Now the Premier discussed the idea that after all that it would be impossible to carry forward his ideas for ending the war, unless he would return to actual service and hold the additional portfolio of war minister, to perfect the adjustment of the supreme command to the state affairs. He took steps to get this power but in spite of his effort to get back on the active list of the army so he could hold the concurrent portfolio of war minister, he could not obtain approval necessary from the Three Chiefs of the Army. By the way, I would like to add here a special remark. It is that Premier KOISO took pains, in the Supreme War Direction Council, for making the moves toward the Soviet Union and China relative to concluding the War.

4. The general's view and attitude in regard to the disposition of the China Affair.

The General's view on the China Affair was as follows:

"Originally speaking, Japan ought not rashly meddle in China. It is inevitable that once Japan is involved in China she will be drifted into a fix as if stepping into a swamp. Accordingly, we ought, for Japan's sake, to be most cautious against wasting our national power, being plunged in such a sad plight. Unfortunately, however, that Japan and China became at war with each other is really so deplorable a matter that we must lose no time in recovering peace and restoring the relation of true cooperation to both States.

This view which he had held consistently could not manifest itself in concrete actions till the General assumed the premiership. On his being appointed Premier later, he firmly urged this view onward. Namely, he, while in office as the Premier, left nothing undone to try to succeed in a peace move toward the Chungking Government. Also in the Supreme War Direction Council, he repeated deliberation on this matter, taking pains over materializing his original intention, but he failed in the end due to various circumstances that will be explained. For instance I think that MIU Pin Issue, one of the movements of the KOISO Cabinet to restore peace, serves the purpose of proving how the General was intent on the realization of peace with China, apart from the questions whether or not he dealt with the Issue adroitly and what its outcome was.

I would like here to explain the MIU Pin Issue. The said man named MIU Pin was of Central China and once served as the Vice-President of the HSIN-MIN-HUI (New Nation Association) of North China. He was later appointed the President of the Legislative Yuan (Bureau) of the Nanking Government and then relegated to the Vice-President of the Examination Yuan (Bureau). As he was once the instructor at the HUANGPU Military Academy, he had a considerable acquaintance with those army men around CHIANG Kai-shek and seemed to have been intimate with, for

instance, YO Ying-chin. He visited this country in the 14th year of Showa (1939) when he was the Vice-President of the HSI-MIN-HUI. On that occasion, General KOISO met him by my introduction. MIU unbosomed himself, explaining the reason for the real necessity of cooperation between Japan and China, so there was much sympathy between them. Ever since they had no particular connection with each other. After the General assumed the premiership, however, he was urged by Minister of State OGATA to send for MIU Pin to hear his opinion about the peace question between the two countries. On the part of Premier KOISO, it happened that, as the diplomatic operations toward CHUNGKING came to all but a deadlock, he, as the Premier, was very worried at heart about it and was desirous of breaking it by some means. Therefore he thought that, although it was uncertain how much influence MIU Pin should have upon the Chungking Government, it should be fortunate if he would be of any use to settling the peace question between Japan and China and that, if a step was taken further and a direct connection could be established with Chungking, it should be still more favorable. With such an idea, he took Minister OGATA's advice and tried to first bring him to Japan to hear his opinion well and then to decide our attitude and policy concerning whether or no they should make use of him. However, as a result of this plan having met with the opposition from both the Army and diplomatic circles, everything came to a deadlock and ended in failure except the success in bringing MIU Pin to Japan. In consequence, the said MIU returned to Nanking in vain.

KOISO also took great pains in order to bring about peace at large through the medium of the Soviet Union. Not only did he make moves in various ways at home but also the negotiations were entered into with the Soviet Union, but unfortunately they ended in failure.

It was as mentioned above that he as well gave his constant energies to realizing the peace between Japan and China. As to these diplomatic moves, sometimes his opinion on procedure did not agree with the Foreign Minister and other to bring about peace. So far as I know, that he dared to try to realize what he believed good for all the adverse circumstances was because he was confident that it would serve the state to materialize his primary intention which he had cherished at the outset of forming the Cabinet.

5. On his speech in the 85th Session of the Diet.

When the Cabinet was formed in these circumstances as given above, the 85th Session was at hand. So Premier KOISO delivered a speech on the government policy at the beginning of the Session to make his opinion clear. The contents of his speech was nothing but a concrete expression of his determination with regard to forming the Cabinet. Namely, in this speech, he required the hundred million people to brace themselves up in unison for the task ahead and he declared the Indonesians' independence to be justifiable, because every race is entitled to independence and to be able to maintain a proper position among other nations and for that reason he also proclaimed that the Korean and Formosan people should quickly be vested with suffrage.

6. As for the treatment of war prisoners, the Supreme Command and the Ministers of War and Navy took charge of these matters and the Prime Minister either had the authority over it nor assumed the responsibility for it. Accordingly, the Cabinet at no time dealt with affairs relating to the treatment of war prisoners. Besides, according to my memory, no one ever gave any reports about prisoners of war matters at the Cabinet-council, not to speak of the Foreign Minister as well as of the Ministers of War and Navy. The Premier, therefore, was com-

pletely ignorant of the condition of how~~ever~~ prisoners were treated.

7. The personality of General KOISO.

General KOISO was a man of common sense so unusual with any army man that he always held propriety and excluded extravagance in his conduct. He was very faithful to his duties and a so-called diligent man. He, however, kept from meddling in business beyond his own territory, namely business of other persons' field. As a result, both while he was in office as the Governor-General of Korea, he maintained a quite harmonious relation with other departments, so that we, as his staff, found it easy and congenial to do our work.

The General had no racial prejudice or such like but detested the discrimination between races and eagerly advocated that any race ought to be equally treated by all means. As its concrete instance, the most striking one was that Koreans were invested with suffrage.

As regards this question, he asserted himself since the time while in office as the Governor-General, but it made little progress due to the opposition from many quarters. After, however, he assumed the premiership later on, he made his way by rejecting these dissents and finally realized it.

Besides he succeeded in requiring the central Government to raise the allowance for the Korean governmental and public officials to the standard equivalent to the Japanese and to employ Koreans extensively in the government service at home.

Koreans had theretofore been subjected to discrimination, on account of their being Koreans, in regard to the social treatment including their emigration to Japan, of which they had much complained. Therefore, he had worked to equalize the treatment of the Japanese and Koreans, abolishing all discriminations.

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I have had this statement read and explained to me in both English and Japanese and have read the Japanese translation thereof and state that this affidavit is true and correct.

/S/
TANAKA, Takeo

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned by the above named TANAKA, Takeo, in Tokyo, Japan, this 25th day of August, 1947.

/S/
TAKAGI, Kazuya