

DD# 2631

Rush
HAROT

証 明 書

自分、林馨は外務省文書課長の職に居る者なる処外務省の保管に係る公文書中に日華関係につき一九三五年二月二十日汪兆銘行
 政院長の行いたる演説（弁護側文書第二二六八号参照）右汪氏の演説
 演説に關し一九三五年三月二日蔣介石氏より汪兆銘氏に対し發せ
 られたる電報（弁護側文書第二二六九号参照）及び日華間大使交
 換問題に關し一九三五年五月十七日國民政府外交部の發したる声
 明（弁護側文書第二二七〇号参照）の内容を示す公文書の存在せ
 ざる事を証明す

昭和二十二年九月二十三日

於東京外務省

林
 馨

外 務 省

1968

右署名捺印は自分の面前においてなされたり

同日於同所

立会人

浦部勝馬



外務省

Certificate

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of the chief of the Archives Section in the Foreign Office, hereby certify that among the official documents which are in the custody of the Foreign Office, there is not the document which shows the contents of the statement (cf. Defense Document No. 2270) made by the Diplomatic Department of the Nationalist Government on May 17, 1935 in connection with the exchange of ambassadors between Japan and China.

Sept. 23, 1947

At the Foreign Office, Tokyo

HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

He affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

At the same date

At the same place

Witness URABE, Katsumasa (seal)

stability of the Pacific areas, Hull declared that he wished to know the reasons why the Japanese Government proposed to limit the matter exclusively to the Southwestern Pacific instead of, as the United States wished, extending it to the entire Pacific areas, in spite of the fact that the present conversation between the Secretary of State and myself was concerned with the peace of the whole Pacific area. He repeated, in this connection, what he had often stated to me with respect to the peace policy of Japan and the Tripartite Pact, and requested reassurance of the peaceful promise which the Japanese Government had made on 28 August. I replied that, though I believed there was no change in the spirit of the statement of the Japanese Government in the light of the fact that it was incorporated into our present proposal, I would confirm it for the sake of assurance. I emphasized, further, the earnest efforts of the Japanese Government for the conclusion of the agreement and for the peace of the Pacific, and pointed out the fact that the preamble of the Japanese proposal clearly manifests the Japanese intention to establish and maintain peace in the whole area of the Pacific although it is confined in its text to the Southwestern Pacific. Hull answered, however, that the preamble does not constitute a part of the text, and it is the text which has the restrictive power, and he repeated his doubts as to the peaceful intentions of Japan. Pointing out the contradiction that Japan maintains the military alliance with Germany while wishing to conclude a peace agreement with the United States, Hull stated that, though he himself understands the explanation of the Japanese Government, the general public of the United States and the whole world, judging simply from the stipulations of the alliance pact, would laugh at the Government of the United States for concluding a peace agreement with Japan in spite of such contradiction, and that it would be difficult to make a convincing explanation thereof. He said, again, that there will be no need for Japan to "hold on" to the Tripartite Pact if the agreement be concluded between Japan and the United States, and that it is a self-contradiction that Japan is inviting Britain and the Netherlands, who are now fighting with Germany, to participate in the peace agreement between Japan and the United States, while maintaining the military alliance with Germany, the enemy of Britain and the Netherlands. I replied that, as to Japan's relations with the Tripartite Pact, they have already been explained in our proposal, and that, as I have emphasized on the occasion of our previous conversation by the example of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a pact of alliance is not inconsistent with an agreement of peace. I stated, further, that the original objective of the Pact consists in peace, and that the German Government understands that it is not incompatible with peace between Japan and the United States. Hull stated, in response to this, that, if Japan adheres to the military alliance with Germany even after the conclusion of the Japanese-American agreement, the Government of the United States will find it very difficult to explain the situation to other countries, and that, after all, the United States does not wish to fall into such relations as exist between Japan and the Soviet Union, who are concentrating vast forces on their border in spite of the neutrality pact concluded between them. He repeated that he hoped the Tripartite Pact would "disappear" (he used also an expression "become a dead letter") upon the conclusion of a peaceful agreement between Japan and the United States. Wakasugi inquired, thereupon, if Hull meant to say that the conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the United States was impossible so long as Japan did not secede from the Tripartite Pact. Hull only repeated, however, that he hoped the pact of alliance would be rendered a dead letter as soon as an agreement was reached between Japan and the United States, because the agreement of peace contradicts the military alliance, and avoided giving a definite answer. Wakasugi further asked if this