

D. D. 1500-U-1



Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
28 November 1940.

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
 U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Long Beach, California
November 28, 1940.

Dear Betty:

Your last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received.

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a great deal of concern and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and ships, at present, are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance.

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me greater concern, because to provide a reasonable degree of security calls for employment of a great number of Fleet units for security alone, which will consume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed toward training and indoctrination. I feel that the Fleet must operate on either of two assumptions, i.e., (a) that we are at peace and no security measures are required; or (b) that war time measures of security must be carried out. Heretofore, we have carried out limited security measures largely as a basis for training and on the assumption that no foreign power would choose to bring on a war by an attack on the Fleet, but that some misdirected or fanatical nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible attack on Fleet units. Now, however, in the light of your concern over these matters and in view of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose a tentative draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor. It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes, and some degree of extra discomfort, but under the assumption, this will have to be accepted.

In regard to the operations with the Second Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, we had originally planned on a tentative date of January 20. This was based on the readiness of the transports by January 1 and the Department's desire, as I understood it (See Cooke's memorandum to you of October 10) to fit these exercises into the international and diplomatic picture. I do not, of course, know to what extent the picture has been altered or how these exercises now fit in. As you will see later, this makes a great difference in their conception.

According to our information, the last of the "CITY" transports will not be completed, at the yard, until January 23, with a fitting-out period of seven days at a navy yard.

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on top of that. This, with the other four "CITY" class and the EXOCHORDA, will give us six transports by February 1, if the dates now set are met. Allowing for an indoctrination and shakedown period, it does not appear possible to embark the Marines prior to about March 1, with the exercise actually starting in the Hawaiian area around March 10. By that time, the Marines inform me, they will have about 12,000 men, which would, if we took the whole Force, require at least six more transports. This brings up the question of the objectives of the exercise. As I originally understood them, they were to be a full dress rehearsal of an island attack, with the possibility that they might turn into the "real thing." Under this conception, we would, of course, want to carry the entire Force and all their equipment, including organic transportation and ground unit support for their aircraft.

If, however, they are to be largely training exercises, with definitely limited objectives, we can accomplish much needed training for marines, transports and supporting forces by limiting the numbers of men and the quantity of equipment to the facilities provided by the six transports, organizing the units into more or less complete combat teams -- one on each transport. We could, under this assumption, start the exercises much earlier (that is, earlier than waiting for six more transports) and perhaps follow the first ones with a second series applying the lessons learned the first time but utilizing the remaining troops.

Until a decision is reached on the foregoing, I can do little except study the problem and general planning.

Preliminary discussion along this line brings out the following:

- (a) The Marines will have only two squadrons of planes. These can be embarked on carriers, but, depending on the scope of the operations, a separate ship or ships (probably a cargo vessel) may be needed to accommodate the ground troops and equipment.
- (b) If the scope of the exercises includes readiness for further eventualities, at least one and probably two, extra cargo ships will be required to carry organic transportation, 90 days' ammunition, and supplies.
- (c) In any concept, something will have to be done about landing boats. I assume that all transports will carry the boats listed in your conversion letter. These will provide, roughly, about 500 boat spaces per ship, whereas 1100 are required per combat team. The remaining 600 boat spaces per transport must either be provided from the supporting ships (manifestly undesirable) or be carried into the transport area by special cargo vessels or boat carriers. I believe we should convert a special boat carrier for this purpose, similar to ones used at Shanghai by the Japanese.

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- (d) Transport crews should be ample to provide boat crews for boats carried, boat officers, and organized beach parties. A boat carrier, if provided, should carry the necessary boat crews as part of its complement
- (e) Transport equipment should include either special tanks for fresh water capable of being carried ashore in boats or sufficient drums to carry water for troops transported.
- (f) If further eventualities are to be provided for, I would want the AMERICAN SEAMAN (Maritime Commission training ship especially equipped as distilling ship) taken over and made available.
- (g) The Marines' ammunition situation is critical. I feel sure this is known at Marine Corps headquarters, but it cannot be over-emphasized. They also need pack howitzers, to replace their present heavy and unwieldy guns.
- (h). An able, energetic Transport Group Commander must be assigned as soon as possible. This is a man-sized job, requiring ability to work with the Marines. There are many details which can be worked out only by close cooperation. It is my present intention to operate the transports, as soon as each is ready, in the San Diego area, training in loading, embarking, debarking and landing exercises.
- (i) To be ready for real service we will have to have bombardment ammunition, preferably at Oahu, where it can be interchanged with service ammunition if found necessary. The only such ammunition now on the West Coast, to my knowledge, is 14"/50, 6"/53 and 5"/51, which would limit the gunfire support to BB's and CL's (7500), whereas CA's, CL's (10,000) and DD's are indicated for this type work.

I have told the Marines, as a basis for their present planning, that we will take only so much of the Brigade as can be combat loaded on the six transports, and that these should go prepared with what can be carried, ready for any operations that might be possible East of the 160° East Longitude.

We have no reply, as yet, to our letter of October 31, relative to diplomatic arrangements for reconnaissance of CHRISTMAS and MAKIN Islands. Of course, decision as to the suitability of CHRISTMAS must await reconnaissance, and special diplomatic arrangements will have to be made if the landing is to be held there. General Upshur rather favors an exercise on Oahu or similar large island, where opportunity will be afforded for maneuvers after landing. This question, however, cannot be settled now.

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As I see it, the possibilities as to locale include:

Christmas Island -- if found suitable
Palmyra Island -- probably will limit force
that can be employed to less
than that available in six
transports.

One of Hawaiian
Islands

Please let me know as soon as possible your decision as
to the concept and scope of the exercises. I would also appre-
ciate being informed as to the progress made in the conversion
of the transports, the provision of landing boats, boat carriers,
etc.

With best regards,

/s/ J. O. Richardson
Sincerely,

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

辯護側書類 第千五百號ウノ一

千九百四十年（昭和十五年）十一月二十八日附書簡

ジエー・オー・リチャードソン提督ヨリエイチ・アール・スターク提督宛
司令長官級込文書番號

アメリカ合衆國艦隊アメリカ合衆國軍艦旗艦ニユー・メキシコ號

カリフォルニア州ロング・ビーチ

千九百四十年（昭和十五年）十一月二十八日

ペツァイイ君

布哇地域ニ活動中ノ艦隊ノ保護ニ關シ又艦隊附屬海兵隊第二軍ノ同艦隊
中ニオケル第三期作戰ノ展望ニ關シテノ貴翰ニ通落手致シマシタ。

此二ツノ問題ノ第一ニ就キマシテハ小生布哇歸任ノ上ブロツク氏ト審議
致シマシヌ。コノ方面ノ問題ハ大シテ小生ニハ心配ニナリマセン。且ツ私
ノ考ヘマス所デハ簡單ニ處理シ得ル所ト思ハレマス。港灣内ニ防雷網ヲ張
ルコトハ必要デモナク、又實行可能デモナイト小生ハ考ヘマス。同地域ハ

Def, Doc, NO1500u-1

餘リニモ制限セラレテ居リ又目下軍艦ハ港口カラ魚雷發射程内ニハ碇泊シ
 マセン。ソレヨリ心配ナノハ各部隊ノ常規活動中ノ安全防備デアリマス。
 蓋シ相當程度ノ安全防禦ヲ施スニハ管ニ安全防禦ノ目的ダケニデモ大部隊
 ヲ使用スルノ必要ヲ生ジ訓練活動ニ向ケタイ多クノ時間ト勞力トヲコレニ
 消耗スルコトニナリマス。私カ思ヒマスニ艦隊ハ次ノ二ツノ事柄ノ一ツヲ
 前提トシテ行動シナケレバナリマセン。即チ(1)目下ハ平和状態ニ在ツテ何
 等安全防禦手段ヲ講スル必要ナキコト或ハ(2)戰時安全防禦手段ヲ講ジナケ
 レバナラヌコトノイツレカデス。今日マデノ所デハ安全防禦手段ヲ一定ノ
 範圍内デ講ジテ來マシタガコレハ主トシテ訓練ノ基礎トシテ行ハレ又列國
 ニシテ我カ艦隊ヲ襲撃シ自ラ好ンデ戰爭ヲ誘發セントスルモノハナイカ、
 指導ヲ誤マツタ又ハ血迷ツタ國民ノ中ニハ或ヒハ吾カ艦隊ニ個人的ニ無責
 任ナ襲撃ヲ加ヘルモノガナイトモ限ラナイトイフ事ヲ假定シテ講ジ來ツタ
 安全防禦手段デアリマス。所デ私ハ此レ等ノ問題ニ關スル負下ノ懸念ヲ考
 慮シ又小生ニ比シテ貴下ヨリハ多ク情報ニ接セラレ將來ニ於テ發生可能性
 アル事柄ヲ測定スルニ好都合ナル位地ニ立ツテ居ラレル事情ニ鑑ミテ小生

ハ次ノ如キ結論ニ到達シマシタ即チ上記(b)ノ事項ヲ基礎トシテ動作シナケレバナラヌト。小生ノ眞珠港到着次第發表豫定ノ指令草案ヲ同封デオ送り致シマス。コレハ必然的ニ新兵員特ニ艦逐艦ト飛行機ノ搭乗員ニ最モ必要トスル基礎訓練ヲ短縮シナケレバナラヌ結果トナリ又今日以上ノ困難不快ヲ更ニ或ル程度忍バナケレバナラヌ結果トモナルノデアリマスガ、コレハ(b)ヲ前提トスル以上甘受セネバナラヌノデアリマス。

艦隊附屬海兵隊第二軍トノ共同演習ニ關シマシテハ取初ハ一月二十日ヲ試験的ニ演習ノ期日ト定メマシタガコレハ一月一日マデニ完成スル輸送船ノ準備終了ト本省ノ希望トヲ基礎トシテ立テタモノデアリマス。本省ノ希望トイフノハ私ノ了解スルトコロデハコノ演習ヲ本省ノ國際的外交的意圖ニ俟メルモノノ如クデアリマシタガ十月十日附クツク氏ヨリ貫下宛覺書参照一勿論私ハ本省ノ國際的意圖ガドノ程度迄變ツタカ又コノ演習ガ今日ドウシテコノ意圖ニ俟ルモノカ解リマセン。本書面御一讀下サレバオ解リニナルト思ヒマスガ、コノ事ハ右ノ演習ノ解釋ニ大キナ相異ヲ生ズルノデアリマス。

小生ノ受取ツタ報道ニ依レバ「シテイ」型輸送船ノ最終ノ船ガ海軍工廠デ完了スルノハ一月二十三日デ、ソノ上ニ海軍造船所デ機装期間七日ヲ要シマス。決定日ガ守ラレルトセバ二月一日迄ニ他ノ四隻ノ「シテイ」船トエキゾコーダ號ヲ算入シコレデ六隻ノ輸送船ヲ得ルコトニナリマス。訓練及ビ機成ノ期間ニ要スル時日ノ餘裕ヲ見ルト大約三月一日以前ニ海兵隊ヲ乗船セシムルコトハ不可能ト考ヘラレマスノデ布哇地域デノ演習ヲ實際開始スルノハ三月十日頃ニナリマセウ。海兵隊ヨリ小生宛ノ報道ニ依レバ、海兵隊ニハ其レ迄ニ兵員約一万二千名入隊シソノ全軍ヲ参加セシムルモノトセバ、少クトモ更ニ六隻ノ輸送船ヲ要シマス。其所デ問題トナルノハ演習ノ目標デアリマス。最初私ノ了解シタコロデハ、コレハ本格的ノ島嶼襲撃ノ豫行演習デアリ、コノ襲撃演習ハ、何時「本物」ニナルカモ知レナイ可能性ヲ持ツタモノデアリマシタ。コレヲ目標トスルナラバ我々ハ勿論全軍隊トソノ全裝備計畫的輸送設備及ビ空軍附屬ノ地上部隊ヲモ含メテ輸送シタイノデアリマス。

併シ若シコノ演習ガ主トシテ練習的ノモノデソノ目標ガ明確ニ限定サレ

テキルトスレバ兵員及ビ軍裝備品ヲ輸送船六隻ヲ以テ運搬シ得ル程度ノ
 數量ニ制限シ兵員ヲ略々完全セル戰團團體（各輸送船ニ一團體宛分乘）
 ニ編成シ斯クスルコトニ依ツテ海兵隊、輸送船及ビ補助部隊ニソレ等ガ
 大イニ必要トスル所ノ訓練ヲ充分施スコトガ出來ルノデアリマス。コレ
 ヲ前是トシテ行ヘバ演習ヲ更ニ早ク一即チ更ニ六隻ノ運送船ヲ待ツ必要
 ナク一舉行スルコトガ出來ルノデアリマス。且ツ恐ラク、第一回ノ演習
 ニ次グニ第二回ノ演習ヲ以テシコレニ最初ニ得タ經驗ヲ廣用シ殘餘ノ部
 隊ヲ使用スルコトガ出來ルノデアリマス。上記ノ問題ガ決定スル迄ハ私
 トシテハコノ問題ノ一般的立案ヲ研究スル外仕事ガアリマセン。

コノ問題ニ關連スル豫備審議カラ次ノ事項ガ明カニナツテ來マス。

(a) 海兵隊ノ有スル飛行隊ハ僅カニ二箇中隊ニ過ギズ。コノ飛行隊ハ空
 母ニ搭載シ得ベキモ演習範圍ノ如何ニ依ツテ地上部隊及ビ軍裝品ノ運搬
 用トシテ他ニ船舶一隻乃至一隻以上（恐ラク貨物船）ヲ要スベシ。

(b) 若シ演習範圍ガ更ニ起リ得ベキ偶發事件ヘノ準備ヲ言ム場合ニハ計
 畫的輸送設備ト九十日間ノ彈藥ト補給品ヲ運搬スルタメニ少クトモ一
 隻
 恐ラク二隻ノ貨物船ヲ別ニ又必要トスベシ。

(C) 目的の範圍如何ヲ問ハズ、上陸用舟艇ニ關シテ何等カノ措置ヲ講ジナケレバナラヌ。船艦改造ニ關スル貴輪ニ御記載ノ上陸用舟艇ハ、何レノ輸送船モソノ運搬ニ協力シマセウ。コレ等輸送船ハ、大凡、一隻ニツキ五百舟艇分ノスペースヲ有スルモ、一戰團団体上陸ニハ千百隻ヲ要ス。故ニ殘余ノ六百舟艇分ノスペースハ補助船ニ求メルカヘコレハ明カニ望マシカラザル所デアルガ、或ヒハ特別貨物船或ハ舟艇母船ニヨツテ運輸區域内ニ運搬シナケレバナラヌ。コノ目的ノタメニハ何レカノ船舶ヲ特別ノ舟艇母船ニ改造シテ日本軍ガ上海ニ於テ使用セルガ如キモノトスベキデアルト私ハ信ズル。

(D) 輸送船ノ乗組員數ヲ出來ルダケ多クシテ、搭載セル舟艇ニ要スル乗組員掛員、及ビ組織サレタル上陸部隊ニコレヲ當テル。舟艇母船ノ便アラバ、コレニ舟艇ト共ニ所要數ノ舟艇乗組員ヲ搭載ス。

(E) 輸送船ハ舟艇ニヨリ陸上ニ運搬可能ナル淡水用特別水槽カ乃至ハ輸送車除用々水運搬ノタメニ充分ナル數ノドラム罐カ、何レカラ裝備品中ニ含メネバナラヌ。

(F) 以上ノ外、偶然性事項ニ對シテ準備スル所アルトセバ、自分トシテハ、

アメリカン。シーメン號（蒸溜船トシテ特別施設ヲ施セル海軍協會練習船）ヲ接收シ、コレヲ使用シタシ

(G) 海兵隊用彈藥事情ハ重大危機ニアル。海兵隊司令部ハ必ズヤコノ事態ヲ承知シ居ルモノト思フモノノ重大ナルコト極言スルモ猶コレ足ラザルノ有様デアアル。コレ等海兵隊ハ又目下使用中ノ取扱不便ナル重砲ニ代フルニシテ裝包曲射砲ヲ必要トス

(H) 有能ニシテ精力的ナ輸送團司令官ヲ可速的ニ選任スルヲ要ス。コレハ困難ナ任務ヲ海兵隊員ト勞苦ヲ共ニシ得ル力量ヲ要ス。密接ナル協力ニ依ルニアラザレバ完成不能ノ事項多シ。各輸送船準備完了次第サン。デイエゴ一地域ニ於テ輸送船ヲ動かシ、積込乗船下船上陸等ノ訓練練習ヲ行フコト、目下小官ハ企圖シテキル。

(I) 負戦ニ備ヘテ砲撃用彈藥準備ノ要アリ貯蔵ノ場所ハ望ムラクハオアアフ島トス蓋シ同島ハ必要ニ應ジテ上記砲撃用彈藥ヲ實彈藥ニ取替ヘ得ル價ガアル。目下西部海岸ニアルコノ種ノ彈藥ハ小官ノ知ル限りデハ「十四。五〇インチ」一六。五、三インチ」一五。五、一インチ」ノミニシテ、コレハ

掩護射撃ヲ戰艦輕巡洋艦（七千五百噸）ニ限ルコト、ナル。然ルニ此等艦ノ任務トシテ指示サレテキルノハ實ハ重巡、輕巡（一万噸）及ビ驅逐艦テアル。

海兵隊ニ目下ノ計畫立案ノ基礎トシテ、私ハ次ノヤウニ申シテ置キマシタ、即チ海兵隊第二軍戰闘員ノ内輸送船六隻ニ搭乘シ得ルダケノ兵員ヲ乗セ、而シテ此等戰闘員ハ携帶シ得ルダケノ裝備ヲナシテ出發シ、以テ東經五六十度以東ニ起リ得ル如何ナル作戰ニ對シテモ、ソレニ應ジ得ル用意ヲスベキデアルト。

クリスマス島及ビマキン島偵察ノ外交手續ニ關スル十月三十一日附書面ニ對スル回答ハ末ダアリマセン。勿論クリスマス島ノ適不適ニ關スル決定ハ偵察ヲ俟ツテ成サレルノデアリマスガ、若シ同島上陸ガ決行サレルモノトスレバ特ニ外交上ノ手續ヲ踏マネバナリマセン。オアフ島乃至同島ニ匹敵スル位ノ大キナ島ナラバ上陸後引續キ演習ガデキマスノデ、アツツシヤ、大將ハ上記島嶼ニオケル演習ヲ可トシテキマス。併シコノ問題ハ今直グ決定スルコトハ出來マセン。

私ノ考ヘデハ、下記ノ島嶼モ演習ノ場所トシテ可能性ガアルト思ヒマハ
クリスマス島。コレハ適當ト認メラレタ場合。

パルマイラ島 本島ハ、使用兵員數ヲ輸送船六隻ニ搭乗シ得ル數ヨリ遙カ
ニ少クスル必要ガアルマセウ。

布哇群島中ノ一島

演習ノ概念及ビ範圍ニ關スル貴下ノ御決定成ルベク早ク御一報下サイ。
輸送船ノ準備其他ノ進行ノ模様ヲ御報知下サレバ幸甚デス。 敬具

ジエー。オー。リチャードソン署名

ワシントン。海軍省海軍作戦部長

エーチ。アール。スターク大將閣下