

the aims of
 had understood, the Tripartite
 Treaty ~~was~~ ^{were} to "intimidate"
 America ~~so that she would be unable~~
~~impossible for her~~ to support
 Britain and ~~also~~ ^{also} ~~maintain~~
~~it~~ forcing her to retreat to
 her shores so as to ~~prevent her~~
~~impossible for her to~~ ~~exercise~~ exercising
 the right of self-defence till
 she had lost ~~the command of~~
~~the sea~~ naval supremacy in the Atlantic

Then he said that America
 naturally desired peace but that
 there would be a greater possibility
 of ensuring peace if she
 demonstrated power; and that
 the axis-powers would ~~not~~ ^{rapidly}
~~rapid advance~~ ^{push forward} according to
 their ~~pre-arranged~~ policies, if
 America ~~made a concession too~~ ^{should concede}
 much or betrayed her weakness.

(39)

Now relating mainly to the ~~state~~
~~of~~ situation in Tokyo, he
continued that there were signs
of Japan's "temperature" rising
or falling according to the
progress of the ^{Soviet} German-Russian
War and ^{that} the whole ~~of~~ ^{situation}
~~affairs~~ was "very delicate and
very changeable". (The New York
Times, 28th.)

~~The~~ Secretary of ~~the~~ State, Hull
once said ^{to me} ^{since} that the Americans
and the Japanese ~~are~~ ^{were} both
"proud peoples"; ~~so~~ they would
not be moved by "bluff".

3. Assistant Vice Secretary of the
State ^{Breckenridge} Long is said to have
stated ^{to a certain Japanese visitor} that it would be impossible
to ~~settle down~~ ^{arrive at a} the Japanese-
American understandings by

the 15th of October ~~the~~ ^{this} ~~Japanese~~ ~~visitor~~ had stressed the advantages of quick ~~consumption~~ ^{consumption} of the Japanese-American understandings, referring to ~~the~~ ^{press dispatches from} ~~the~~ ^{Washington} ~~papers~~ in Tokyo.

4. Recently I have had a talk with Lord Halifax twice and tried to feel out the British attitude toward the Japanese-American understandings.

Britain seemed to follow the wake of America after all, as would be seen in Churchill's speech.

^{Lord Halifax} ~~He~~ hoped that Japan would ~~be patient~~ ^{be patient} after mature consideration because ^{both} Britain ^{and the U.S.A.} did not want ~~the Pacific question~~ ^{any complications} complicated in the Pacific.

41

and America would be of the
same opinion on that point and
he ~~was not~~ avoided ^{going deep into} ~~by~~ ~~reference~~ to
the "embargo" ^{"now being enforced by"} Britain and U.S.A.
America.

(Despatched, 29th.)

~~General~~
Ambassador Nomura's Diary

(From Nov. 1, 1941

to Nov. 30, 1941.)

Tr. by Kotaro KUROSAWA.

42

Tuesday, Nov. 4,
~~Thursday, Oct. 30,~~ 1941

W.B. [unclear] 30, 1941

No. 1034

(Despatched, Nov. 4)

General ~~State~~ Situation
in the U. S. A.

Observing the recent ~~state~~ of
situation in this country, I
find that there are no signs
of ~~propaganda~~ ^{indignation} in ^{the} people's
sentiment toward Germany
in spite of the frequent damages
~~to~~ ^{to} ~~American~~ ^{American} destroyers and merchantmen,
and ^{that} the people here think that
America will never break off
~~her~~ relations with Germany,
nor will she declare war. ^{They} ~~and~~
^{think that} ~~that~~ ^{that} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~case,~~ ^{case,} Germany
knows too well the disadvantages
of waging war against
America, ~~to~~ ~~declare~~ ~~war.~~

This country has ^{yet} made no preparations for participating ⁱⁿ the European War. For the present, ~~they~~ ^{this country} are ~~only~~ helping the countries ~~of the axis~~ ^{aiding with this country to the extent of} supplying goods, ^{defending and patrolling the seas} and giving technical support. ~~and~~ ~~keeping~~ ~~great~~ ~~industries~~ ~~in~~ ~~operation~~.

As the country proper is not in imminent danger, the people in general are easy-going and they are more interested in ~~the~~ questions of livelihood, such as the ~~raising~~ ^{rising} ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~prices~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~country~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~increase~~ ~~of~~ ~~taxes~~, and inflation, than in war. The government authorities ~~too~~ ^{to be} seem, trying to make a cat's paw of other countries ^{as much as possible} and, ~~are~~ ~~going~~ to appear on ~~if~~ ~~unavoidable~~,

the final scene to win ~~the~~ victory, if it cannot be helped and consequently they assume the attitude ~~of not~~ not minding the continuation of war for five or ten years. Though they are supporting the Soviet Union at present, it is only to make a cat's paw of her, and not ^{because they are} ~~because~~ friendly to the communist Russia.

The severance of economic relations with Japan is supported by the whole nation. As for the imminent danger of war, they seem to be of the opinion that they need not be worried much, since the forces on the Pacific ^{will} ~~may~~ be able to secure national defence and in the south-western Pacific Britain, America and New Zealand have gradually repleted their forces. They

(45)

are not afraid ^{at all} of Japan's strong attitude ^{toward America} and are hinting that the ~~ambassadors of the~~ A-B-C-D powers' conference ^{has arrived at an agreement} regarding the distribution of materials and goods needed for war. ~~They show an attitude of proceeding along the~~ ^{They are going to make} ~~that~~ ^{pre-arranged} policies to the end.

The Army and Naval authorities, however, are not so consistently optimistic: 1) some admit that the British "morale" is not as ^{high} as is reported by the newspapers and that there is a possibility of a ~~the~~ British-German peace, if the Soviet Union should drop out of the ranks; 2) they think that the Mediterranean Sea will ^{before} ~~soon~~ ^{long} ~~be~~ ^{before long} ~~obliged to~~ face danger and therefore, some make

(46)

the observation that Churchill, ~~though~~
in view of the American tendency to direct its
~~attention to the Pacific~~ ^{has been} ~~directly to the~~
~~President~~ ^{President} ~~to direct his attention to the~~
~~Pacific at first~~, and ~~has~~ succeeded in
making the latter
assume a cautious attitude in
concerning the Pacific; and 3) ^{I should}
~~judge~~ ^{judge} ~~that the~~ ^{American} authorities are
well aware of the fact that the
Pacific War will be ^{very} burdensome
and difficult, ^{and} ~~once~~ ^{commentaries and newspaper reports indicate} ~~the war~~ ^{that}
breaks out, they will concentrate
their power and watch for the
chance of a decisive battle, ^{on the}
basis of thorough examination of the whole
war situation. ~~of war~~, are seen in
the newspapers here.

I hereby submit the above
report for your information.

(Repatched, Nov. 4th, 4 p.m.)

Thursday, Nov. 6, 1941
called in / Post-Master General / Walker in the
afternoon

47

Called on Secretary Hull at 9 a.m.
Attended Reception in commemoration of Soviet Union's Revolution at 5 p.m.
Friday, Nov. 7, 1941
(Wakasugi accompanied me)

Friday, Nov. 7, 1941

No. 1055

Despatched 2:00 p.m. Nov. 7 (Friday):
Re: Interview with Hull on 7th.

At 9 a.m. on the 7th, I met Hull (Valentine sat in company with him) accompanied by Wakasugi, and told him that it was our desire to settle the Japanese-American relations as soon as possible. After explaining to the President and the Secretary of State Japan's intentions and standpoint in accordance with the instructions of the Japanese Government, ~~the President and the Secretary of State~~

Hull replied that there were in the world at present ~~no~~ ^{two} ~~opposing~~ ^{opposing} ~~forces~~ ^{forces} of the world which should ~~fight~~ ^{fight} ~~each other~~ ^{each other} but since neither side could win over the other swiftly, ~~there~~ ^{there} would be a danger of ~~the world~~ ^{the world} ~~falling~~ ^{falling} ~~into~~ ^{into} a chaotic state of "anarchy".

(48)

and that, ~~as a result of the present~~
~~the present situation~~, if Japan
and America should adopt ~~such~~
peaceful policies ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ the
Pacific at ~~such~~ a time, this chaotic
condition could be prevented.

I explained ^{to him} as follows on the basis of
~~your instructions~~
your instructions:

1) Of the three pending problems,
two are likely to be solved somehow
or other; ~~In respect to~~ ^{In respect to} the stationing and
withdrawing of our troops, we are
ready to make ^{the maximum} ~~as great a~~ concession
^{permissible under} ~~as~~ the state of our home affairs.
with ~~at~~.

2) We earnestly desire that America
would cooperate with us in settling
our relations with her, ^{by taking a} ~~from the~~
~~the long range~~ ~~view~~ ^{view} of the present situation
~~standpoint~~ ^{based on} the ~~main~~
from the standpoint of
~~the~~ ^{the} friendship between
Japan and America.

3) Our Government instructed me to settle the question as soon as possible, after fully explaining Japan's resolution and standpoint to the President and the Secretary of the State.

4) We ardently desire the ~~rapid~~ speedy ^{consummation} ~~realization~~ of our negotiations, because Japan's state of affairs has ~~become~~ ^{become so} "impatient" after six months' negotiations that ~~the situation is serious~~ ^{the situation is serious} ~~and the Japanese government is~~ ~~in a very serious position~~

5) In view of the seriousness of the current situation, a parity will be started ~~in Tokyo~~ ~~also~~ ~~parallelly~~ ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~negotiations~~ ~~that~~ ~~are~~ ~~being~~ ~~conducted~~ ~~here~~.

Thus explaining, I ~~submitted~~ ^{submitted} the proposals instructed by you, saying that we proposed the above in the most friendly and conciliatory spirit, and asked him

(50)

to agree to them ~~based~~ from a long range
~~standpoint based on the~~
~~main issue~~ view of the situation.

After reading them carefully, Hull,
and, nodding assent to the
principle of non-discriminatory
treatment, ~~stated that this~~
~~that it~~ would be advantageous
to Japan, too; Regarding the stationing
and withdrawing of our troops, he
simply inquired ^{about} ~~the~~ the proportion
of ^{the troops to be} stationed to those ^{to be} withdrawn. To
that, I explained that the greater
part would be withdrawn, stationing
only a portion. I also gave
explanation ~~of~~ the right of self-
defence, (based on your instructions)
~~and~~ to that he replied that he
would answer afterwards after
studying the subject, so I ~~decided~~
~~to ask~~ ~~the answer~~ ~~at my~~
to give detailed explanation ~~at the~~
and obtain a reply in my

(57)

~~Kind of map~~

next interview with the President,
~~who would give more detailed~~
~~explanation to that.~~

Further, Hull ~~mentioned~~ ^{revealed to me that,}
as he had told me before, ^{it was}
necessary to holding a conference
among such countries concerned
as Britain, China and the Nether-
lands ^{and other countries concerned in regard to the} ~~to~~ maintain ^{the} peace ~~in~~
the Pacific, ^{and that the United States was}
consulting with China in respect to the Chinese question.

~~and that~~; Then he asked me ^{as his own idea} what
would be Japan's opinion if the
supreme authorities of China
~~declare to the Japanese Government and people, China's~~
~~should~~ ~~express~~ ~~their~~ ~~desire~~ ~~to~~ ~~restore~~
sincere friendship and trust in Japan and
~~express~~ the desire to restore friendly relations between
Japan and China. ~~to~~ ~~revive~~

their sincere friendship with
and their confidence in the Japanese
Government and people. For this,

Wakasugi asked, ^{Hull} in return whether
~~this question was~~ ^{he had} made that question after
having made arrangements with
he had ascertained China's intention.

(52)

Chang, to which Hull said that it had ^{was} ~~been~~ entirely his own personal idea, ~~and~~ ^{and} that it would ^{set} give a very good example and influence to the world. ^{However, ~~that~~ it seems to me ~~from my observation~~} that he probably ^{put this question after he had obtained} ~~asked~~ China's opinion beforehand.

Hull wished me to refer the aforesaid idea of his to the Japanese Government for its opinion, so I simply ~~replied~~ ^{told} him that I would take it into my consideration.

(7th, 2 p.m., #1055.)

Thursday, Nov. 6, 1941

Called on Post-Master General Walker in the afternoon.

(53)

Sunday, Nov. 9, 1941

At night I called on Walker. Ordering the room cleared, he ^{told me} ~~began~~ ^{substantially as follows} ~~with~~ an extremely earnest attitude:

"I ~~confess~~ ^{tell} this only to you, swearing to God. Both our 'boss' and the Secretary of ~~the~~ State have ^{received} ~~got~~ an authentic report that Japan has decided ^a ~~the~~ policy of ^{taking action} ~~activity~~.

So the interview with the President tomorrow, the tenth, will be, in a word, a ~~general~~ ^{perfunctory} one and ^{almost} ~~you will~~ ~~not be able to expect too much~~ ^{no hope is placed on} ~~of~~ "Kurusui's coming to Washington"

Then I told him that he was wrong and explained that, ^{although} Japan was ~~only~~ becoming impatient on account of the economic oppression

(54)

against
~~discussed~~ her and was longing for
the ~~swift~~ ^{prompt} settlement ~~and~~ ^{she would}
sincerely ~~in her wish~~ ^{in her wish} to reach an understanding
~~of the Japanese~~ ^{with} American
~~understanding would not be~~
 ~~doubted.~~

His talk, in brief, seemed to
disclose the ~~secret~~ ^{substance} of the Cabinet
conference yesterday, the 8th, and
~~finally~~ ^{finally} confirmed that they
had got an authentic report
about the situation in Tokyo, though
he was sure that I was enjoying
the unshakable confidence of
both the President and Hull.
He informed me that, although the President
and Hull ~~had~~ ^{placed} unshakable confidence
in me, they possessed authentic
report on the situation in Tokyo.

(55)

Monday, Nov. 10, 1941.

[No. 1066]

Despatched, 10th.

1. We had Moore contact with ~~Moore~~ ~~who contacted~~ ~~Thomas~~ ~~(a~~ ~~senator~~ ~~foreign~~ ~~relations~~ ~~committee~~ ~~member~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~committee~~ ~~on~~ ~~foreign~~ ~~relations~~ ~~who~~ ~~is~~ ~~intimate~~ ~~with~~ ~~Hull~~).
The gist of his report ~~amounts to~~ ^{is as} the following:

America is not ~~going to~~ "bluffing" but will fight ~~with~~ Japan, if Japan dares ^{undertake} further invasion. The Americans are ~~mentally~~ ^{spiritually} prepared for the worst and the Navy is "ready for action."

(Sunday)

2. Yesterday night, a Cabinet Secretary, ~~minutes~~, ordering the room cleared, told me in earnest

(56)

with an introductory remark that ~~he~~
~~would~~ ^{he was} disclosing the matter only to me,
swearing to God, ^{in view of my intimacy} ~~considering that~~
~~intimate~~ with him, that the
U. S. Government had obtained an
authentic information that Japan would
start ~~activity~~ ^{hostile activity} very soon and hence
~~had addressed~~ ^{considered that} that neither my visit to
the President on Monday nor Truman's
coming to America would ~~have~~
any important ~~effect~~ ^{effect} on the
~~general situation~~ ^{general situation}. Therefore, I explained
to the minutest detail that, ^{although} the
Japanese people had become
especially "impatient" since the
"freezing" and had been longing
for the ^{swiftly consummation} ~~realization~~ of an
Japanese-American understand-
ing, ~~namely~~ that neither the Government
nor the people wanted ^{at} the Japanese-
American War but ~~firmly~~ ^{desire} desired

(57)

friendly

relations to the last. Upon ^{To this} that,
he ~~stated~~ ^{replied} that their "boss" (the
President) believed the aforesaid
information and so did the
Secretary of ~~the~~ State.

As for the comments seen in the
~~newspapers and magazines~~
~~journalists or papers~~ here, excepting
the Daily News and the ^{Hearst} papers, ~~that have~~
~~the trends of the Hearst~~, ^a the Japanese-
American War seems to be far
more popular ~~with~~ than ~~the~~
a German-American War and there
are some among ~~the~~ Englishmen
who even try to avail themselves
of this popularity; As to ~~the~~ military
and naval cooperation ^{between} of Britain
and the U.S.A., ~~the preliminary~~
understanding is reported to have
been ~~settled~~ ^{reached} and some ^{urge} ~~advocate~~ ^{that}
~~it is necessary~~ ^{of despatching} a part of the
British fleet to ~~advance~~ to

Singapore. We cannot be sure that the ~~many~~ President will not be influenced by ~~domestic political considerations~~ ^{domestic political considerations} to move toward this ~~direction~~ ^{direction}.
 Anyhow, the above-mentioned Cabinet Secretary stated that the U.S.A. would never ~~take the initiative~~ ^{take the initiative} of starting action, but once Japan starts action ~~she~~ ^{she} would surely do the same to keep her honor ~~by force of past circumstances~~ ^{by force of past circumstances}.
~~Japan started her activity~~ ^{by force of past circumstances}.

3. Contrary, In my interview with the President today, the 10th, I will do my utmost ^{to carry out the} ~~purpose of~~ ^{purpose of} your instructions.

(59)

Nov. 10, 1941

Interview with the President

(The Secretary of the State, being ~~also present~~ ^{present also})
~~in company with him~~ and Wabouge

I had an hour's talk with the President from ^{11:30} 7 a.m. I read our so-called "final proposal" based on from my prepared ~~arranged~~ "statement".

~~and that~~ The President gave his answer ^{to this} ~~which may~~ be summarized as follows:

(a) The whole world ^{because of} was in danger ^{of} ~~of~~ ^{disturbances caused} ~~by~~ ^{the} "forces of aggression".
He earnestly desired that the world would return to the regular course of peace. From the spirit of "fair play", he ^{would} ~~would~~ determine ^{to} do his best for contributing to the establishment of peace and stability all over the Pacific. To this

(60)

end, we should give ~~practical~~ ^{practical} efficacious
~~satisfactory~~ results to the welfare
of humanity. He wished the preliminary
~~parley~~ ^{parley} ~~preparatory conference~~ would
produce ~~such good~~ ^{such good} results ~~which~~ ^{as to}
~~might be used as the~~ ^{form} the
basis for our negotiations. ~~and promised to~~
~~assure that~~ ~~he~~ would endeavor to expedite
~~action~~ ^{parley} this negotiation.

He hoped Japan would take
"peaceful courses" and ~~clarify~~ ^{make clear}
that she would never resort to opposite
measures ~~apparently~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~past~~ ~~and~~
This, he believed, was the way to ^{achieve} our
mutual desired end.

(b) The United States desired to prevent
the war from extending farther and to
establish everlasting peace.

(c) He hoped the principle of

(61)

throughout the world,
non-discrimination would be carried
out, which, ~~was~~ ^{to some extent} just the contrary
of what Germany had generally
been adopting ~~abroad~~
~~world~~. ↓ in Europe

In view of ~~the~~ ^{the} failure of the
~~present~~ ^{American} high-handed policy ^{in the past,} he
adopted ~~as a principle~~ ^{a good} 'neighborly
~~policy~~ ^{friendship} which brought about
friendly relations between the U.S. and the
other countries of America. To this he
was unfavourable. He stressed the
need of ~~a new~~ ^{new} ~~policy~~ ^{policies} to cope with new situations.
When the President advocated
the necessity of some ~~new~~ measure
that will meet the present
situation. (d) When I pointed out
that the economic oppression
had made the Japanese people
'impatient', he ^{annotated the} ~~statement that~~
might sometimes ^{be} ~~used~~ ^{as} a
term "modus vivendi" by saying that
sometimes a "modus vivendi" was

(62)

~~necessary~~ ^(in order) ~~to live~~ ^{to live, interpreting}
~~the terms~~, but I could not
understand clearly what he
really meant.

At our parting, I said that even
though I knew there was a limit
to what an ambassador ~~was~~
~~allowed to do~~, I could not help
feeling keenly my responsibility to
toward the present and coming
generations of ^{the} Japanese ^{people} and that
it was not my wish to be the last
ambassador. To this, the President
listened ^{intently} ~~and earnestly~~ and so did
Hull.

(63)

Wednesday, Nov. 12, 1941.

Interview with Hull on ^{the} 12th.

I had a talk for an hour and a half with Secretary of State Hull, ~~(Hull)~~ (Wakasugi accompanied ~~me~~ ^{me}; Valentine sat with Hull). Hull inquired of me whether the new Cabinet also would ~~reaffirm~~ ^{confirm} the note dated August 28th (taking out the note) and ^{he} also handed ^{to} me a note, ~~which~~ explaining their "suggestions" concerning ~~the~~ peace between Japan and China, which he had referred to ^{me} in our last interview.

As to our proposals ~~on~~ ^{on} the three questions, ^{he replied that the United States too,} recognizing the ^{acute} ~~imminent~~ state of the ^{present} situation, was ~~making~~ ^{making} hastily ~~with~~ ^{with} their investigations. ~~But they~~ ^{But they} deliberating on them, but that it

was difficult to settle overnight questions that had ~~remained~~ been pending for ~~ten~~ ^{ten} years. ~~cannot~~ ~~be settled overnight~~. According to him, we ~~shall~~ ^{shall} have ~~an~~ ^{an} answer the day after tomorrow.

a) Asking him ~~of~~ ^{connection} the ~~relations~~ between the aforesaid "suggestion" and ~~the consummation~~ ^{the consummation} of the Japanese-American negotiations, I inquired whether ~~it could be construed that~~ ^{it could be construed that} ~~China held the key~~ ^{China held the key} to the solution of ~~the~~ Japanese-American relations, if it was his ~~own~~ ^{own} opinion that ~~the~~ ^{Japanese-American} negotiations would not ~~be consummated~~ ^{be consummated} in case ~~no~~ ^{no} mutual agreement ~~had~~ ^{had} been ~~reached~~ ^{reached} between Japan and China. ~~is not reached.~~

(65)

Hull, ^{however,} referred only to the application
extension of the general
principle to China and so
on, but ~~failed to give a clear~~
answer to the above inquiry.

Further, he told me that the U. S. A.
had already ~~advised~~ ^{apprised in a general way}
~~standing of~~ Britain and the
Netherlands, ^{on this matter} and that he
believed they were ready to
sign simultaneously with the
U. S. A. as soon as the basis
of negotiations ~~had been~~ ^{are} agreed
upon ~~accomplished~~. To this Valentine
added that, ^{as had been stated in the proposal of}
~~the~~ Japan ^{could not} participate ^{in the} "banjo" ^{in the} affairs of
~~other countries~~ other countries
with the ^{conditions} ~~proposed~~
contrary to ^{the principles} ~~that they had~~ the United States
~~been~~ advocated, ~~and~~
~~was~~ ~~clarified~~ in ~~their~~
~~positions~~ made on June 21st.

b) Referring to the stationing of ~~troops~~ ^{troops}, I clarified that the period of stationing troops was not indefinite. Then he hinted that ~~it was difficult to admit~~ ^{it was difficult to admit} the indefinite stationing of troops under the policy of no interference ~~in other countries' internal affairs.~~ ^{in other countries' internal affairs.}

c) Referring to the Tripartite Alliance, he said that he found it very difficult to fully explain it to ~~the politicians and~~ ^{politicians and} others, because some said it was peaceful, ~~while~~ ^{and} others maintained that Japan had an indivisible relation with Germany. As to Hitler, he declared that since Hitler ~~judged that~~ ^{judged that} he would not remain long in power, ~~so~~ he thought it necessary to devise a post-war program; and it was ~~his idea that~~

(67)

He expressed the opinion that, if ~~Japan~~ Japan would cooperate with the United States as ~~one of the~~ "leaders" in a ~~peaceful~~ ^{peaceful} program, it would be unnecessary for Japan to remain ~~in the~~ ^{in the} Tripartite Alliance ~~in case of an~~ ^{in case of an} agreement for ~~restoring the~~ general peace in the Pacific that ~~was~~ ^{reached}. Thereupon ~~On this~~ I strongly ~~explained~~ ^{explained} to him the compatibility of the Tripartite Alliance and ~~that~~ ^a peaceful plan, citing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as an example.

(d) I added that Japan naturally did not desire to resort to force and that she ~~could do so without~~ ^{would have} ~~no need of~~ ^{no need of} force ~~so long as she~~ ^{so long as she} could obtain oil and other raw materials from the U. S. A. and the Dutch Indies.

68

Saturday, Nov. 15, 1941.

Accompanied by Wakasugi I)

Called on Secretary Hull accompanied by Wakasugi at 9:00 a.m. (Valentine was in company with Hull.)

Ambassador Kurusu arrived here at 1:30 p.m.

Interview with Hull on ^{the} 15th.

1) The propositions (including a proposal for making a joint ^{Japanese-American} statement) ~~and for~~ ~~proposing a joint statement regarding~~ ~~the~~ non-discrimination of trade and commerce were made.

2) When I insisted that these conversations had reached the

stage of a "negotiations", he declared that it would be very improper for us to announce that Japan and the U. S. A. had initiated negotiations ~~only~~ ^{between} themselves ^{only} before ~~the United States~~ ^{the United States} had negotiated with Britain and the Netherlands, because (as Japan ^{too} had hoped) it was necessary to negotiate with them too, ^{in order to} ~~come to a desired~~ settle this issue.

conclusion of this. He was very much dissatisfied, saying that the Japanese demand was "preemptory".

3) ~~Regarding~~ ^{Hull said that he understood} ~~disposition~~ ^{that, in view of the fact that Japan} As to the Tripartite Alliance, ~~was attempting to arrive at a~~ ^{peaceful agreement with} between Japan and the U. S. A. on the one hand and ~~strengthening~~ ^{strengthening} the military alliance with Germany on the other, ~~he found it~~ ^{he found it} ~~impossible to justify it~~

(70)

This contradiction to rather difficult to explain, the American public and the world, though he ~~was~~ ^{himself understood my explanations,} ~~an advocate of~~ ^{explains} ~~himself~~; Such being the case, he wanted to confirm the intentions of the new Cabinet toward peaceful policies: namely, he would like to have the new Cabinet confirm the Japanese Government's statement which was presented ~~last time and for the American proposals~~ ^{the Japanese Government's intention in regard to} ~~of June 21~~ ^{of June 21} ~~for the~~ ^{political stability throughout} the whole Pacific (though Japan wished to limit it to the south-western Pacific). He further stated that ~~and~~ the U. S. A. ~~is going to give her~~ ^{would} reply on the other two problems after ~~receiving~~ ^{receiving} ~~its~~ ^{its} answers to today's proposals.

~~Mr. Hull further~~ ^{Hull further} said that, although a neutrality ~~treaty~~ ^{treaty} had been concluded between Japan and the Soviet Union, the United States did not desire to see large ~~frontiers~~ ^{frontiers} ~~in spite of the existence of~~ ^{in spite of the existence of} frontier,

(71)

the treaty of neutrality between Japan
and the Soviet Union and she ^{that}
also wished that the ^{Treaty} Tripartite Alliance ^{is}
~~would~~ ^{will} prove to be a scrap of paper
when ^{an} ~~the~~ Japanese-American
understanding ~~has been settled~~ ^{is reached}.

To this, I strongly elucidated the
compatibility of the Tripartite
Alliance and ~~the~~ Japanese-American
peace, giving ^{him} various explanations.

Upon my telling him at parting
that Tokyo would be disappointed
^{over} ~~of~~ our conversation today, he replied
in such a manner as to give the impression that there
~~was~~ ^{was} ~~the~~ ^{the} possibility of further
negotiations was still room for negotiation.

72

Monday, Nov. 17, 1941.

Called on Secretary ^{of State} Hull at 10:30 a.m.

Accompanied by Kurusu,

Hull said that the ~~blunders~~ of ~~far~~ ~~lighted~~ statesmen after World War I caused the present situation of the world. ~~to be made, therefore,~~ ~~of taking some~~ measures should be taken ~~for~~ ~~to~~ preventing such a situation from re-emerging, and so forth.

Kurusu said that ~~the responsibility~~ ~~resting upon~~ both Japan and the United States was great, and that ~~responsibility for~~ before everything there were things that needed ~~swift~~ ~~rapid~~ disposition between Japan and America, and so on.

(73)

Interview with ^{the} President.

I called on the President at the White House at 11 a.m.

The President said in substance as follows:

(1) "There is no last word between friends."

(2) Many of the ^{non-aggression pacts} ~~Treaties of inevitability~~ are now "out of date", but the establishment of "general understanding" will save the situation.

(3) In regard to the Chinese ^{question} ~~problem~~ he had heard of the difficulty of ~~the~~ withdrawing ~~of~~ troops, but the U.S.A. has no intention ~~to~~ ^{to} "intervene" or "mediate" into the ^{Sino-Japanese} ~~question~~ ~~question~~. She ^{is} ~~is~~ simply trying to be an "introducer", though he ~~doesn't~~ ^{doesn't} know ~~whether~~ ^{whether} this term

(74)

call, ~~is~~ used in)

fits diplomatic phraseology.

(4) Kurosu explained that if a ~~deep~~ ^{great} understanding regarding the Pacific should be ~~brought about~~ ^{arrived at}, it would "outshine" the Tripartite Alliance, ~~which~~ ^{and} ~~would~~ ^{automatically} dispel all ~~suspensions~~ ^{suspensions} ~~as to~~ ^{as to} the application of the alliance.

Hull ~~stressed~~ ^{stressed} the necessity of self-defence against the danger of Germany coming on as far as South America ^{after} ~~with~~ conquering Britain and gaining possession ~~of the British fleet.~~ ^{of the British fleet.} ~~after~~ ^{after} ~~invasion~~ ^{invasion} of Britain, etc.

5. The President said that he would see us again if we ~~desired~~ ^{so desired} necessary to meet ~~him~~ ^{him} again after a talk with ^{the} Secretary of ~~the~~ State. ~~Hull~~ Hull.

(75)

Secretary Hull handed us
a note ^{on} regarding the two problems of
~~the~~ confirmation ^{of} ~~the~~ Konoje Cabinet's
statement and ~~the~~ ^{expanding} ~~development~~
~~of~~ the south-western Pacific question
into the whole Pacific question.

(26)

1656

Tuesday, Nov. 18, 1941.

Called on Secretary ^{of State} Hull at 10 a.m. and had a talk (for three hours) with him. Called on Walker (at 9 p.m.)

Interview with Hull.

Hull expatiated on the incompatibility between the American peaceful policy and Hitler's "conquest" policy and on the difficulty of ~~the~~ readjusting ~~of~~ Japanese-American diplomatic relations so long as Japan was tied up with Hitler by the Tripartite Alliance. He further commented on the impossibility of facing from the American people's minds the idea that Germany ~~had been~~ ^{would} carrying out a "conquest" policy in Europe and ^{that} Japan, too, ~~had~~ ^{would} ~~been~~ ^{do the same} following the policy in East Asia, and he feared that there might be some Americans who would even argue that the U. S. ~~had been~~ brought

(57)

was supporting
over to be involved in Hitler's empire
through Japan, ^{Hull insisted that} even if an agreement is
reached between Japan and
America, such an

Hull insisted that the establishment
of the Japanese-American agreement
would be of no use, if ~~it is destroyed~~ the relations between
the two countries were similar to those
~~to be destroyed~~ ^{now existing} ~~as the present relations~~
between Japan and the Soviet Union.

^{Against} ~~the~~ Kurusu's explanation that the aim of
the Tripartite Alliance ~~is~~ ^{is} not to expand force of
arms, ~~but~~ Hull insisted on the necessity
of carrying it into effect actually.

Seeing that the situation ~~threatened~~
had come to an impasse, I ^{explained in detail} ~~produced~~
the crisis in south-western Pacific and proposed
a tentative plan to return to the
status ^{existing} before "freezing", ^{after} ~~making~~
^{making various representations,} ~~the danger of making~~
~~the south-western Pacific, which~~
he promised to take ^{the proposal} into consideration
after various consultations.

78

At 5 p.m. called on Secretary of State Hull at his private residence. ~~Engaged~~ Engaged from chats only.

Wednesday, Nov. 19, 1941.

No. 1136 Representation of Opinion.

(Despatched 19th 10.20 a.m.) ~~No. 1136.~~

At ~~the~~^a time when ~~the~~ Japanese-American relations have become acute ~~imminent~~ and we are at the cross-roads, ~~it is~~ beyond my imagination ^{to judge} how ~~much~~^{worried} you ~~ministers~~^{are} who occupy seats in the Cabinet and ~~are~~^{bear the} greatly responsibility ~~for~~ saving our country and people, ~~and yourselves.~~

Now, the courses ^{which} our Empire should take on this occasion ~~with~~^{are} as follows:

1. To maintain ~~the~~ status quo;
2. To break ~~in~~ the deadlock ~~by~~ military ~~farther~~ advance;
3. To establish ^a state of mutual inviolability by ~~taking~~ some means

~~message~~ or other.

~~The~~ ^{1st Course} ~~no. 1~~ will cause both sides to strengthen preparedness and despatch additional fleets, which will bring ~~forth~~ ^{about a situation full of dynamite} ~~and finally lead~~ ^{and finally give an impetus} to an armed clash, though there may be some difference of time ^{when compared} ~~with~~ ^{1st Course} ~~no. 2~~, ~~and~~ ^{1st Course} ~~no. 3~~ is a ~~to~~ make-shift to settle the situation for the present by a modus vivendi ^{and} ~~to make every effort to achieve~~ ^{our objectives during the} ~~interval of peace~~ ^{interval of peace}

In fact, yesterday's telegram no. 1134 ~~of~~ ~~was~~ ^{intended to give this opinion} ~~of no. 3.~~ I know quite well that our Government will be discontented with that idea, but I do not think it opportune to wage a great protracted war when the country is in an exhausted condition after the Manchurian Incident

(80)

and the ~~subsequent~~ ^{succeeding} four years ^{of the} China Affairs.
In my opinion, a temporary truce ~~at present~~ based on
"a give-and-take" principle at present will
be a stepping stone to ~~the~~ ^{for} future great
achievements. I look at the situation in
that light.

I hereby express ^{the foregoing} my view as a supplementary
additional explanation to my ~~of yesterday~~ ^{of yesterday} telegram. ^{Kindly} ~~to the~~ ^{you} will communicate
this ~~with~~ ^{to} the Premier.

(81)

Thursday, Nov. 20, 1941.

At noon,

I called on Secretary of State Hull at the Department of State and had a talk with him for an hour and half.

Telegram No. 1147

telegram,

Interview with Hull, no. 1147.

To Kurusu's explanation ~~of~~ ^{on} the various ~~suspensions~~ items of our proposal "B", Hull asked no important questions ^{on items} other than the particular item ~~promising that~~ promising that ~~no~~ ^{no} measures or ~~acts~~ ^{acts} shall be taken ~~which~~ ^{as will} obstruct the efforts ^{toward a} general peace ^{between} Japan and China. He showed great disapproval ^{of this item} and repeated his ~~past~~ ^{past} contentions against ~~the~~ ^{the} Tripartite Alliance. Hull explained that

(82)

It would be difficult for the U. S. A. to ^{discontinue her} ~~discontinue her~~ support of Chiang Kai-shek ~~team~~ ^{as long as} there was an ineffaceable doubt in the ^{American} people's minds; ~~that in~~ ^{that in} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~United States~~ ^{the United States} ~~was~~ ^{was} supporting Britain on ^{the} one hand and Chiang Kai-shek on the other, ~~and hence~~ ^{and hence} so long as ~~the~~ ^{the} Japanese policy ~~did~~ ^{did} not ~~definitely~~ ^{definitely} become ~~peaceful~~ ^{peaceful} policy, the support of ~~Chiang Kai-shek~~ ^{Chiang Kai-shek} would be tantamount to the support of Britain; ~~and that~~ ^{and that} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~rights and interests of~~ ^{rights and interests of} ~~American~~ ^{American} had been infringed upon before the situation had come to ~~what it was at present.~~ ^{what it was at present.}

Thereupon Curran asked him if it was not quite ^{proper} ~~proper~~ for the U. S. A. to suspend ~~her~~ ^{her} support of Chiang since the President had declared ~~himself~~ ^{he would act as} an "introducer". To this Hall explained that ~~the President's~~ ^{the President's} ~~statement was~~ ^{statement was} ~~done~~ ^{done} ~~had said so~~ ^{had said so} ~~on~~ ^{on} the assumption that the Japanese policy

83

should be peaceful, ~~and in fact~~

Then I explained to him that, since ~~the situation had become acute~~

~~no great progress had been made in regard to two or three points in our~~

proposal "A" ~~and since in the meantime~~ the situation ~~had become acute~~, today's proposal

aimed ~~at bringing about a speedy~~ compromise in ~~the~~

~~order to alleviate the tense~~ ^{situation between}

and America, ~~and~~, especially in

~~the~~ the south-western Pacific, and ^{to} restore a

friendly atmosphere even a little, ~~and thereafter~~ expedite the negotiations.

Hull replied ^{in a sad tone} that he understood

what I had said, but that there was

the aforesaid difficulty ~~and~~ adding

that he and I ~~both~~ ^{both} ~~assumed~~

a great responsibility toward the ~~Japanese and American~~ ^{Japanese people,}

respectively, and also to

84

~~as well as the whole humanity, in~~
~~dissonant notes.~~ However, he promised
to study ~~the proposal.~~ ~~with full~~
sympathetically

(85)

Saturday, Nov. 22, 1941.

Accompanied by Kurusu, ~~called~~

~~at 8:30 p.m.~~ called on the Secretary of State and had a three hours' talk ~~accompanied by Kurusu~~ (Valentine sat with Hull).

Conversation with Secretary ^{of State} Hull.

To sum up the talk we had on the night of the 22nd, ^{Hull stated that} the U.S.A. ^{would} ~~is going to~~ gradually restore ~~the~~ Japanese-American trade and commerce ~~to its original state~~, if Japan would adopt a peaceful policy.

Regarding the cooperation among the countries concerned, Hull said ^{he had} ~~was~~ fully ^{discussed it} ~~discussed it~~ ~~with the~~ ^{of these countries, and that} ~~representatives~~ ~~and that~~ they ~~would~~ ^{would} hold a second talk by Monday, after ^{consulting} ~~making~~ previous ~~arrangements~~ with their respective

home governments. ~~Hull said~~ ^{Hull said} his opinion ~~that this was~~ ^{this was} the best he could do, as there was ~~no~~ a limit to his ~~personal~~ ^{personal} ability, Hull added, ~~though~~ ^{while} recognizing the reason for ~~the~~ ^{the} pressing demand from ~~the~~ ^{the} Japanese, he seemed to believe that there ~~is~~ ^{is} no reason why Japan ~~should not~~ ^{could not} wait for a few days more.

I hear that Hsu Shih, who had been ill in bed, also came in haste on the 22nd to participate in the latter ~~part~~ ^{stage} of the conference on the 22nd.

The Secretary of State has no intention of acting as a go-between ~~between~~ ^{for} Japan and China at present and he maintains that the ~~discontinuation~~ ^{discontinuation} of the support of Chiang is very difficult. ~~However, he betrays~~ ^{However, he betrays} the attitude ~~that the present extent of~~ ^{that the present extent of} the support ~~is~~ ^{is} does not seem so great and, there ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~nothing~~ ^{nothing} about ~~him~~ ^{him} which betrays the possibility of development of the above problems!

(87)

depending upon the progress of)

as soon as the peaceful policy.

For the present, America appears to be trying

to put off the ~~the~~ ^{China} problem, but

~~proposes to~~ according to

information from ~~another~~ ^{other} sources, she

seems to ~~take~~ take the view that the period

necessary for stationing Japanese troops is, even

under "indefinite period of stationing troops", limited to

~~four or five years~~ ^{with have}

four or five years ^{as} the first period and

then set ~~at~~ another date depending upon the subsequent

developments, there ^{will} be no special objection against it,

but if it is for an indefinite period of time, it will

~~be~~ run counter to the principles

of non-annexation and of respecting

sovereignty. (Hull said over again

that he was very sorry that ~~Japan~~

~~had begun to station her troops~~

~~in French Indo-China in July~~

while the preliminary negotiations

~~was in process and it~~

had to be suspended in July because

Japan, ^{had} advanced her troops to French Indo-

(88)

China while the conversations were ^{still} in progress.

~~He responded that~~ he indirectly warned us not to duplicate such a thing again.

~~That the transfer of troops~~ Hull pointed out that the transfer from the southern part of French

Indo-China to the northern part would

be of no avail in alleviating the ~~unimproved~~ situation in the south-western Pacific,

because the countries concerned would still

be held in check and ~~we~~ find it necessary to "freeze" their

forces, ~~as at present~~ just as they are at present.

there making the situation not much different

from what it was at present.

Looking at it from a

~~strategic~~ strategic point of view, it was

a great concession and would greatly

contribute to the peace of that ~~area~~ ^{area}.

In which the Secretary assumed ^{an attitude of not} ~~to be~~

being able to understand strategic affairs,

saying that the nature of the ~~conference~~ ^{conversations} was kept

to himself only ~~by him~~ ^{following} no participation

by others (but he admitted that he had

(89)

~~spoken~~ ~~demanded~~ it to a few influential Senators).

article by article

Showing him the preamble of our proposal "B" I ~~asked him whether~~ ^{tried to} ~~ask him whether~~ ^{ask him} if he ~~accepted or rejected it.~~ ~~disapproved each one of the~~ ~~should accept or decline a separate~~ ~~article.~~ ^{He seemed to understand} Apparently viewing

the proposal "B" as ^a "demand" toward the U. S.A.; he stated in a ^{very} displeased

injured tone that ^{he saw} ~~there was no~~ reason why we should demand,

~~the same~~ and that he was ~~much~~ "discouraged" ^{by the fact} that we ~~should~~ forcibly

demanded his acceptance or ~~rejection~~ ^{rejection}

^{in spite of the fact that he had done} ~~after all~~ his utmost efforts so far.

past. We parleyed with ~~him~~ ^{him}

a presence of mind and ^{remained un-} ~~undisturbed~~ ^{not}

~~to be~~ excited, and so did he.

The Secretary hoped that Japan would keep in step with the American peaceful policies,

as ^{the United States} ~~we~~ was negotiating ^{with Japan} on the assumption

that we were taking the ^{golden} ~~good~~ means to

peace.

(Despatched, 23rd, 1 p.m., no. 1161)

90

Tuesday, Nov. 25, 1941.

In the afternoon, I called on Walker
and learnt the difficulty of ~~the~~ accepting
of our proposition "B".

(91)

Wed., Nov. 26, 1941.

At 5 p.m. I called on the Secretary of State (accompanied by Kurusu) and had an hour's talk with him, who handed to me three documents.

most important

Interview with Secretary of State Hull.

The Secretary of State said to the following effect:

1) He is very sorry to say that he cannot agree to ~~our~~ ^{our} proposals "B" (excepting nos. 6 and 7, ^{which was} submitted to ~~us~~ ^{him} on the 20th, though ~~he~~ ^{he} has studied it for five days (he ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~discussed it~~ ^{discussed it} ~~talked over it~~ ^{talked over it} with the countries concerned, too).

2) This proposal is ^{which is} one made up of ~~the American proposal~~ ^{the American proposal} combining ours of June 21 ^{and the Japanese} proposal of September 25. ^(which is) We are obliged to make ~~propose~~ ^{propose} this ~~proposal~~ ^{proposal} in view of the demand of

American ~~and~~ public opinion ~~which~~ ^{demands} ~~insists~~ ^{that} ~~insists~~ ^{should not be left} China to her fate and also in view of the unpeaceful discussions carried on by ^{Japanese high} ~~some~~ ^{important} officials, in Japan.

3) The U.S.A. is not demanding the immediate application of ~~the~~ ^{the} principle of ~~non~~ ^{non} discrimination in China. ~~It is~~ ^{It is} ~~not~~ ^{not} a general principle.

4) ~~In~~ ^{To} Japan's opposition to the revival of the nine power ~~machinery~~ ^{machinery}, the Secretary of State made no reputation. ~~It~~ ^{It}

* ~~Bracketed by~~ ^{to avoid the confusion of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~U.S.A.~~ ^{U.S.A.}
5) ~~By~~ ^{By} the withdrawal of troops stipulated in no. 3, the U.S.A. ~~does~~ ^{does} not mean to ask you the immediate withdrawal of troops, ~~by~~ ^{he} ~~the~~ ^{said} ~~idea~~ ^{idea} no. 3. ~~To~~ ^{To} our ~~contention~~ ^{contention} that we cannot leave the Nanking Regime ^{to its fate,} ~~Hull~~ ^{Hull} said that the Nanking Regime had no power to rule over China. ~~Then~~ ^{Then} I

(The same applies to the following papers.)

(93)

said that I never dreamt the President had meant such a thing when he had told us that he would be an "introducer" and so forth, but Hull gave me no particular answer to this. 3

Kurusu ~~said~~ told ~~him~~ Hull that, since
6) ~~This~~ ^{if} this proposition included ~~the~~ ^{items} absolutely unacceptable to Japan, ~~because they~~ ^{were tantamount to} ~~things which were no better than~~ pressing Japan to make as much concession as possible ^{in respect to} ~~regarding~~ the ^{tripartite} Triple Alliance on the one hand and urging her to beg China's forgiveness on the other, we ~~it is absolutely impossible for us to~~ accept it, ~~may say,~~ ^{really we} are wondering whether or not we should ^{transmit it as it was} ~~convey this~~ to our home government. He added ~~country, but said~~ ^{Japan said} ~~that we would~~ ^{decide it} after talking it over ^{between us two,} ~~with our ambassador~~ ^{he said} ~~thereon,~~ said Kurusu. 7

I ~~asked~~ ^{asked} whether)
7) ~~I wonder if the U.S. admits of~~ ^{considered}

(24)

there ~~is~~ ^{was} no room for consideration other than the
consideration of ~~one~~ ^{no} other proposition
proposal. Pointing out ~~that~~ that
then ~~that~~ ^{had told me} that the
President ~~had~~ ^{are} some time ago
that there ~~would~~ ^{are} be no last words
between friends, so I ~~requested~~ ^{requested} Hull
to ~~arrange~~ ^{arrange} for an interview with
the President, ~~saying that this was one plan,~~
~~to say of after all other~~
~~propositions, I said as for the latter,~~
he accepted. }
he agreed to do so. }

Nov. 26, No. 1180

(Despatched, 26th.)

My Opinion (The gist only.)

I believe it advisable
~~to send~~ ^{to His Majesty the Emperor} at this juncture to ~~make~~ ^{have}
the President wire ~~to His Majesty the Emperor~~ ^{his desire}
^{for Japanese-American} cooperation with the object of maintaining
the peace ⁱⁿ the Pacific, ^{and in reply to it, have}
His Majesty send ^a ^{to the President,} ~~an~~ ^{Imperial telegram} ~~and~~ ^{thereby}
putting a new face to the present
clearing the present atmosphere and

Netherlands Indies

providing sufficient time for ^{Japan to} ~~proposing~~ the establishment of a neutral zone, comprising the ~~French Indo-China and Thailand~~, taking into ^{Britain} consideration ^{the U. S. A.} the possibility of protecting occupation of the Netherlands Indies by Britain and ~~the U. S. A.~~ ^{on our side,} ~~the maintenance of a zone~~ the establishment of a neutral zone in which French Indo-China, the Netherlands Indies and Thailand ~~is included~~ are included.

^{According to} ~~From~~ my observation, the rupture of the negotiations will not necessarily bring about ~~the~~ ^{since} Japanese-American war, but ^{the} advance of ~~the~~ British and American troops ^{into} the Netherlands Indies ^{is} ~~being~~ expected, ^{after} ~~there will~~ eventually occur ~~the~~ ^{and} a clash between Japan and Britain and the U. S. ~~As~~ ^{the} result of an attack ^{by our side} ~~it will be obliged to retreat~~ and ~~and~~ Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Germany would respond ^{demand for the fulfillment} ~~to the~~ ~~treaty~~ of treaty obligations. ~~the~~ ^{also} ~~the~~ ^{Consequently} ~~The~~ China Affair, will be protracted.

(26)

Thursday, Nov. 27, 1941.

At 2:30 p.m. called at the White House (accompanied by Kurusu) and had an hour's talk with the President.

Interview with the President (27th)

The President said to the following effect:

(1) In World War I, Japan and the U.S. took sides with the Allies. Germany then could not ~~lay hold of~~ ^{grasp} the other nations' minds.

(2) It is ~~with~~ ^{at} pleasure ~~that I have~~ ^{to learn} that there are ^{in Japan} many lovers of peace ^{in Japan} who ^{are} exerting themselves to their utmost ^{for} ~~the~~ ^{peace}. A great majority of the Americans are doing the same. ~~He~~ ^{He} still places ~~expecting much of them~~ ^{great hopes in them}.

(3) ~~On~~ ^{On} my saying that the new ^{proposal} ~~proposition~~

(26)

Thursday, Nov. 27, 1941.

At 2:30 p.m. called at the White House (accompanied by Kurusu) and had an hour's talk with the President.

Interview with the President (27th)

The President said to the following effect:

(1) In World War I, Japan and the U.S. took sides with the Allies. Germany then could not ~~lay hold of~~ ^{grasp} the other nations' minds.

(2) It is ~~with~~ ^{at} pleasure ~~that I have~~ ^{to} learn that there are ^{in Japan} many lovers of peace ^{in Japan} who ^{are} exerting themselves to their utmost ^{for} ~~the~~ ^{peace}. A great majority of the Americans are doing the same. ~~He~~ ^{He} still places ~~expecting much of them~~ ^{great hopes in them}.

(3) ~~On~~ ^{On} my saying that the new ^{proposal} ~~proposition~~

~~was~~ disappointed ^{he said that he was} Japan ~~I am~~
 also disappointed that things ~~should~~
 have come to ~~this~~ ^{such a pass}. Japan poured
 over ~~us~~ ^{the U.S.A.} her first cold water when
 she advanced into French Indo-
 China and now ^{there is the danger of a} ~~we are fearing that~~
~~we shall~~ ^{have} a second cold water poured
~~over~~ (He means our advance into
 Thailand.)

(4) The fact that we have had no peaceful
 words ~~from~~ ^{were uttered by} the leaders of Japan ~~while~~ ^{during}
~~my~~ ~~own~~ ~~own~~ negotiations with
 Secretary of State Hull, had made
 the negotiations very difficult, he
 said.

5) ~~He~~ ^{In his opinion} ~~thinks~~ a temporary solution
 would be after all of no effect, if
 we could not ^{agree on} ~~reach an~~ ~~agreement~~ with our
 fundamental principles.

(6) To my question concerning China, ^{he stated that} ~~he said~~ I ^{had} ~~was~~ not going to give up ^{his} ~~my~~ idea of introducing the two countries, but that it was necessary for both Japan and China to hope for it simultaneously. From ^{his} ~~my~~ experience in ~~the~~ domestic administration, he thought there ^{was} ~~may~~ be naturally ^{some} ways for it.

When I expressed the hope that, (7) Though I had not ^{received from Tokyo} ~~get~~ any instruction, ~~responsibility to my duty as a representative~~ ~~representative~~ some measure for ^{would be found through} breaking the deadlock, ~~submitting~~ into the staidmanship of the President, to whom I held in great esteem ~~through~~ through thirty years' friendship, ^{he stated to} ~~over expressed~~ my ~~hopes~~ that he wanted to see ^{me} ~~you~~ again next Wednesday when he comes back to Washington. He should be very glad if ^{the developments to} the situation which would contribute to ~~or break~~ ~~the~~ finding a way out of the

deadlock develops would occur in the meantime.

To the above explanations of the President, Secretary of State Hull added, ^{the following} as the reasons ^{why he} ~~they~~ thought a modus vivendi ~~could~~ ^{would} be unsuccessful.

Japan is despatching additional troops to French Indo-China, ^{check} ~~conserve~~ holding in check ^{the troops of other} ~~the troops of other~~ countries, and furthermore, she is flinging up the Tripartite Alliance and the Anti-Communist Treaty on ^{the} one hand and ~~is~~ demanding oil ^{from the United States oil} ~~sub~~ ~~marine~~ ~~resources~~ on the other.

To ~~this~~ ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~the~~ ~~case~~ ~~with~~ ~~the~~ American public opinion ^{is not agree} ~~is not agree~~. And then he pointed out the ^{following} ~~best~~ contradiction:

When we are endeavoring ^{to arrive} ~~at~~ ~~the~~ peaceful settlement, the ^{high} ~~important~~ officials in Tokyo are, on the contrary, advocating the establishment of a new order. ^{is}

(100)

Friday, Nov. 28, 1941.

Gist of Telegram no. 1209
despatched on ^{Nov} 28th

Regarding the attitudes of Britain, Australia, ^{the} Netherlands and China as well as the U.S.A. there may be various ^{arguments} ~~discussions~~, but in view of the circumstances of affairs that the President's ~~statement~~ ^{in his "oral"} statement on the 17th of August that the United States would take appropriate action in such an event ^{and of the press comments, we} ~~have made an observation~~ ^{if it is my observation} that even if Britain and the U.S.A. ^{do not oppose us} ~~take any~~ ^{in Thailand, there} ~~take any~~ ^{by} military action ~~the~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} no small possibility that the United States ~~will~~ ^{will} ~~gather~~ ^{gather} together the countries concerned, ^{and} ~~will~~ take the step of ^{reinforcing} ~~forming~~ ^{strengthening} their joint defence in the ~~area of the~~ ^{area of the} south-western Pacific area.

101

Sunday, Nov. 30, 1941.

Tokyo is naturally dissatisfied with the ~~proposal~~ ^{proposal made by} the Secretary of State last Wednesday (met the President on Thursday) is quite natural, there ^{has been} as yet no ^{detailed} instructions. ^{As an interim measure} requests ^{made} and promised to see the Secretary ^{of State} tomorrow, Monday, as an interim table. The U.S.A. has not yet declared that ~~rupture~~ ^{breakdown} of the negotiations have been ~~broken off~~ ^{broken off}, and the President started for Warm Spring last Friday announcing that it all ~~will~~ depends on what attitude ^{Japan} will assume.

^{This} ~~the~~ morning, the ~~Minister~~ ^{Minister} of Australian called on me ^{and} ~~stated~~ ^{stated} that it was necessary for Japan to stop her ^{military movements in order} ~~movements~~ to save the situation.

It is reported that the ~~President~~ ^{President} The newspapers ^{utilized and} played up the report that

(102)

the Premier declared in) yesterday night
~~made~~ a speech ~~to the effect~~ that
Britain and America should be
~~we should~~ "purged" Britain and
~~America~~ with a "vengeance" and
all the papers are utilizing
this for publicity while The President
is reported to ~~start~~ ^{leave} from Warm
Spring tomorrow Monday (making his
return to Washington ~~was scheduled for Wednesday~~)
~~departure earlier~~ in order to cope
with ~~meet~~ the situation ^{of} the Far East.

H 2
letter

1696

Ambassador
~~Admiral~~ Nomura's Diary

(From Dec. 1, 1941
to Dec. 31, 1941)

Tr. by Kotaro KUROSAWA.

(103)

Monday, Dec. 1, 1941.

Called on Secretary Hull at 10:15 a. m.

Interview with the Secretary of State.

Calling on Hull, I communicated to him ~~with~~ ^{the} Government's instructions. The Secretary, referring to the trend of ~~the~~ ^{our} Government's ^{attitude and public} ~~opinion~~ ^{opinion} ~~said that~~ and the reinforcement of Japanese troops in French Indo-China ^{and the} ~~the~~ residents return to Washington ^{was} ~~was~~ ^{partly due to these factors} ~~had been caused by that.~~ For this I ~~made~~ ^{offered} ~~various~~ ^{various} explanations and refutations to remove ~~the~~ ^{this} misunderstandings ^{whereupon Hull} ~~expressed the~~ ^{wishes} that Japan ^{too,} ~~would~~ ^{state that she desired} ~~to establish~~ the peace in the Pacific ^{through the consummation} ~~of the~~ ^{present} negotiations and also ~~support~~ ^{support} the efforts of the Secretary of State and myself.

Regarding the re-enforcement of the troops in French Indo-China,

he said that the U.S.A. ^{was in possession} had got
 of various ^{intelligence reports} ~~information~~, and that the
 destinations of the ^{re-inforcements} ~~additional troops~~ were
~~being~~ unknown, ^{since} not only Thailand
 but all other ^{regions} ~~districts~~ in the south-
 western Pacific were feeling
 the danger, ^(and that) ~~that~~ being the case,
 the U.S.A. ^{would naturally} ~~also~~ be forced to ~~take~~ take
 counter-action, ~~if~~ ^{the} ~~delayed~~ ~~planning~~
~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~U.S.A.~~ ~~and~~ ~~Japanese~~ ~~public~~ ~~opinion~~ ~~and~~
~~the~~ ~~fact~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~U.S.A.~~ ~~and~~ ~~Japanese~~ ~~public~~ ~~opinion~~ ~~and~~
 actions being such as described above, ~~to~~ ~~find~~ ~~that~~
~~there~~ ~~was~~ ~~no~~ ~~way~~ ~~of~~ ~~finding~~ ~~a~~ ~~way~~ ~~out~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~situation~~, ~~while~~
~~he~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~President~~ ~~fully~~ ~~agreed~~ ~~that~~ ~~a~~
~~the~~ Japanese-American War would
~~not~~ be, ^{not} a constructive, ~~one~~ but
 a destructive, ^{they were placed in a} ~~one~~ ~~in~~ ~~a~~
 difficult position, ^{he explained}. ~~He~~ ~~further~~ ~~referred~~
 referred to the circumstances ~~that~~
~~they~~ ~~had~~ ~~been~~ ^{which} ~~obliged~~ ^{him} ~~to~~ ~~propose~~
 last Wednesday's proposition in
~~consideration~~ ^{view} of the ~~Japanese~~ ~~in~~
~~state~~ ~~of~~ ~~affairs~~ ^{Japan} ~~and~~ ~~public~~
~~opinions~~. ^{American} And finally he

105

in view of the present situation,
expressed their wish that Japan
would take some measure for
~~exchange of discussions for the~~
~~purpose of having regard to the present~~
~~situation. Improving public ^{opinion from} ~~the~~
~~point of all~~
improving public opinion, ~~for~~ etc.
(first of all.)~~

(106)

Tuesday, Dec. 2, 1941.

At 10:15 a.m. called on ~~the~~ Acting Secretary of State Welles (~~at~~ his request).

Interview with Welles.

The Acting Secretary of State made several inquiries ^{through documents} regarding our advance into French Indo-China ~~through documents~~ saying that the inquiries were made under order from ~~the President~~ the President.

I promised ~~him~~ to transmit ^{to} ~~them~~ ^{to} Tokyo.

I explained that

~~the~~ economic oppression ~~was~~ more poignant than force of arms and the Japanese people were not driven to an impasse of being obliged to ~~choose~~ choose between submission and beat through. I said that ~~the~~ ~~proposal~~ ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~in~~ ~~line~~ ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~policy~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~United~~ ~~States~~ ~~Government~~. Tokyo ~~was~~ now

giving the recent American proposals,

(careful consideration), but ^{that} I thought

that ~~this~~ ^{proposal} ~~was~~ a great backward step as compared

with ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~proposal~~ ~~of~~ ~~June~~ ~~21~~ (Sept.

25). ~~I~~ ~~explained~~ ~~to~~ ~~him~~ ~~that~~ ~~in~~ ~~view~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~fact~~ ~~that~~ ~~you~~

I asked him if it was not true that,

(107)

~~the proposals for the proposed~~
propositions included the question of
the withdrawal of troops from French ~~Indo-China~~
Indo-China, ~~the problems proposed by the~~
American side) would also be settled as a matter of course ~~when~~
~~settled as soon as~~ the fundamental
principles are settled.

The Acting Secretary of State ~~learned~~ ^{said}
to pay much attention to my remarks
and ~~that~~ said that the proposals
of November 26 had been made ~~to~~ ^{under the}
^{first of all} necessity of clarifying the American standpoint. ~~first~~
on a basis demanded. ~~both~~

Anyhow ~~was stated~~ ^{I observed} that Hull
and Welles ~~were~~ ^{desired a} ~~in favor of~~
peaceful solution. ~~the problem~~

Opinion

On the 1st of December (yesterday), I
proposed ~~to~~ ^{a conference} ~~the interview~~
of the ~~most~~ ^{most trustworthy} ~~representatives~~
of the leaders of ~~the~~ ^{the two} countries (the ~~USA~~).

(108)

American)

side by Wallace and Hopkins; our
side by Prince Konoé or Viscount
Ishii ^{to be held} in Honolulu. To which they
replied on the 3rd that it ~~was~~ was
~~deemed~~ improper for Japan to
propose ^{this} at this juncture.

The Secretary of State Hull made at
^{a press conference}
an important statement regarding
the adjustment of ~~the~~ Japanese -
American relations. ^{at this press conference,}
~~as you will~~ see ~~in~~ the accompanying clipping
~~of~~ the New York Times ^(for particulars)

109

Wednesday, Dec. 3, 1941.

Opinion

To the ^{Navy} Minister ~~of the Navy~~ and the Chief of the Naval General Staff;

It is true ~~they are assuming~~ ^{the other side is taking} a firm attitude, but they ~~want~~ ^{desire} peace (on the other hand); ~~they~~ ^{and} wish to resume the negotiations ^{on receipt of a favorable ("iro arui")} Japanese reply, which ~~is not a little~~.

Such being the situation, I ~~earnestly~~ ^{earnestly} ~~wish to receive~~ ^{wish to receive} ~~early~~ ^{early} ~~replies~~ ^{replies} to the American proposition of the 26th and to the inquiries made of the 2nd of December as will save the ~~pressing~~ ^{critical} situation.

Thursday, Dec. 4, 1941.

In the documents handed ^{to} us on the 2nd by the Acting Secretary of State ~~to make~~ inquiring ^{about} ~~for~~ the re-inforcement of the Japanese troops in French Indo-China, ~~that referred to~~ ^{reference was made,} the danger ~~toward~~ ^{to} the Philippine Islands, the Netherlands Indies, Burma and Malaya. The President gave detailed explanations ~~for~~ the above to the reporters. (See the annexed clipping from the New York Times).

~~Received~~ ^{the following} telegram from Sugi ^{on Dec. 4:}

~~reads:~~

"I can ^{clearly} picture your ^{strenuous} ~~vigilant~~ efforts ~~without~~ ^{any} ~~regard~~ ^{request} ~~to~~ ^{withdraw} my ~~best~~ ^{request} ~~on~~ you. Your family at home are all well."

Masa ^{to} SUGI.

(111)

Friday, Dec. 5, 1941.

At 11 a.m. ^{Dec. 5} I called on Secretary of State, ^{Hull} and ~~expressing~~ ^{submitted a written reply,} I explained to him the re-enforcement of our troops in French Indo-China, showing him ~~a written paper~~ ^{as a written paper}. Then I told him that ~~for fear of~~ ^{lest} such misunderstandings as the inquiries made by the President should arise I ~~had~~ ^{best} believed it ~~wisest~~ ^{wisest} to try to break the deadlock by ^{adopting} my proposal of November 20. ~~As to the repeated references to the sending of Japanese troops to French Indo-China, I said this was a matter of "power politics."~~ ^{As to the repeated references to the sending of Japanese troops to French Indo-China, I said this was a matter of "power politics."} Pointing out that even in America it is held ~~that the best way of defence is in attack, which idea is cherished especially by army and naval circles,~~ ^{that the best way of defence is in attack, which idea is cherished especially by army and naval circles,} I told him that ~~our army and navy also could not remain indifferent to the reinforcement of the troops and fleets of the "A.B.C.D." powers.~~ ^{our army and navy also could not remain indifferent to the reinforcement of the troops and fleets of the "A.B.C.D." powers.} Then ~~saying that~~ ^{saying that} he had been severely ~~disappointed~~ ^{disappointed} at the report of

criticized for having permitted the export of

~~oil~~ ^{oil} to Japan from the time the ~~we started our~~ ^{were started down} negotiations, to the end of July, when Japan made advances into French Indo-China, ~~shall~~ stated that ~~the situation had become so serious that~~ ~~it was very~~ difficult to ~~renew~~ ^{renew} the supply of ~~oil~~ ^{oil} to Japan ~~under~~ under the present circumstances.

Thereupon, I insisted on the necessity of ~~a~~ ^{breaking up the} deadlock by ~~holding up~~ ^{holding up} my proposition of November 20. ^{As the} ~~the~~ aforesaid problem would ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~automatically~~ ^{automatically} ~~in itself~~ ^{solved} when a ~~consensus~~ ^{consensus} ~~the~~ ^{the} general understandings ~~concerning~~ ^{for} the improvement of ~~the~~ ^{the} Japanese-American relations is ~~had been~~ ^{had been} brought about ~~reached~~.

Our written ~~statement~~ ^{reply} was made public afterward by the White House.

(113)

Sunday, Dec. 7, 1941.

The day on which ~~the~~ diplomatic relations between Japan and America were severed.

At 2 p.m. called on the Secretary of State and handed ^{to} him our reply (though it was instructed to be handed ~~in~~ at 1 p.m., we could not make preparations in time).

^{After reading it}
The Secretary ~~read~~ ^{read} through it once, ^{the Secretary of State} and said that he had

~~also~~ told ~~me~~ only the truth during the past nine months, but that he had never seen ^{in public} a document ~~was~~ more crowded with "distortions" than ^{this one}. (See the accompanying clipping.)

The report of our surprise

114

attack ^{against} Hawaii reached my ears when I returned home from the State Department; this might have reached Hull's ears ~~while~~ ~~we were talking~~ our conversation.

Started a confined life from today, the police surveillance of the F.B.I. being very strict.

F.B.I. began strict surveillance from today and we began a life of confinement.

(115)

Friday, Dec. 8, 1941.

○ The President read his message to the Congress. ^{Congress passed the declaration of} ~~the proclamation~~ of war ^{against Japan.} ~~passed the Congress.~~ excepting Miss Rankin. (The President signed ^{it} at 4:10 p. m.) Britain declared war ^{against} ~~against~~ Japan a little before America did.

○ The Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo made public the ^{existence} ~~establishment~~ of a state of war at 6:00 ^{a. m.} on the 8th (Tokyo time; i. e. 4 p. m., Sunday, by Washington time).

○ Churchill ~~made it known~~ in his speech in ~~to~~ ^{the} Parliament, ^{stated} that "some of the finest ships" were reaching their destination at "the very convenient moment."

(116)

Sat., Dec. 13, 1941.

Swiss
~~Swedish~~ Minister Charles Bruggman
called on me. Making ^{an} introductory
remarks that he came ^{to me} in ~~an official~~ ^{a private}
capacity, the Minister told me that
he had received a report informing
that Switzerland was to represent the
American rights and interests
in Japan and the Japanese
rights and interests in the
Philippine Islands and the Samoan
Islands. ~~He was~~ ^{afraid} ~~to~~
~~express his~~ ~~disapproval~~
~~of the~~ ~~Japanese~~ ~~officials~~ ~~in~~ ~~Japan~~,
that, if I should commit suicide in
indignation ^{over} ~~at~~ the treatment
accorded ~~to~~ ~~me~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~American~~ ~~officials~~, it would
immediately affect greatly the ~~American~~ ~~officials~~ ~~in~~ ~~Japan~~.
Toward evening Spanish
Ambassador Don Juan

(117)

Francisco de Cardenas called on me ~~and presented his~~ ^{and told me} ~~congratulations saying~~ that he had immediately come to me to inform that according to a telegram he had received ~~from the Japanese~~ ^{at} 4 p.m., Spain was to represent ~~the~~ Japanese rights and interests in America. (Councillor and ^{consequently} Minister Molina was with him.)

According to ~~today's~~ ^{this} morning's papers, the Pravda is reported to have predicted that Japan would be defeated, as she had to face the allied forces of Britain, America and China, but ~~that~~ if she did not refer ~~to~~ to the attitude of the Soviet Union, ~~and~~ The Russian authorities are ^{reported} also said to have ~~keeping~~ ^{kept} their ^a silent attitude.

(118)

Sunday, Dec. 14, 1941.

○ According to ~~today's~~ ^{this} morning's papers, ~~L. Litvinov~~ ^{L. Litvinov} held a press interview yesterday (Saturday) ~~and issued a~~ ^{and issued a} statement concerning the policies of the Soviet Union. Having ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~interviewed~~ ^{interviewed} ~~with the reporter~~ ^{with the reporter} ~~yesterday~~ ^{yesterday}, ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ response to the reporters' questions he is said to have stated that, ^{though} Japan was the common enemy of the Soviet Union, Britain and America, ~~but~~ ~~that~~ the Soviet Union would concentrate her energies on the annihilation of Hitler ~~and~~ ^{and} could not relax her efforts in the least for the consummation of this object.

○ Judging from the reports in the various ~~papers~~ ^{papers}, it appears that, though serious ~~damage~~ ^{damage} was

(119)

suffered in the Japanese attack against Hawaii,
the great ~~affair~~ in Hawaii was, the
public ~~market~~ ^{has} ~~has~~ calmed down
a little ~~owing to the measures taken by~~
~~the authorities to quiet down the "panic" by~~
~~causing the panic to subside, holding~~
back the disclosure of the actual
state of things ~~and~~ the official announce-
ment of the number of the killed.

They seem to have awakened
from their dream of underestimating
~~the~~ Japan's real power, ~~especially~~
^{in regard} to the real power of our Navy,
particularly its air wing,
~~especially its air force, we~~
come across ~~the~~ comments which
say that "it was grossly underestimated"
or ~~that our~~ ^{that our} bombings have "fiendish
accuracy."

(120)

Monday, Dec. 15, 1941.

Had a visit from the Spanish
Ambassador and the Councilor

In the afternoon, called on the
Spanish Ambassador and the
Swiss Minister to return ~~the~~
courtesies (accompanied by F. B. I.).

(121)

Tues., Dec. 16, 1941.

Today is my birthday, and I am now fully ~~in my~~ sixty-four ~~th~~ years old

○ This ~~morning's~~ morning's papers ^{carried} ~~concerning~~ the President's report ^{to Congress yesterday,} ~~concerning~~ the Japanese-American relations which was submitted to the Congress by the President yesterday and are ^{that} they hinted at bringing forth serious ~~problems~~ ~~in~~ His Majesty the Emperor's ^{implication} ~~in~~ ^{treacherous} ~~act.~~ ^{structure.} ~~act.~~ ^{structure.} would become a serious problem in Japan's national ~~policy.~~ ^{structure.}

○ They are endeavoring to calm down the public opinion ^{by} publishing yesterday's statement of Secretary of Navy ~~Knox~~ ^{Knox} ~~that~~ The paragraph which disclosed that the ~~responsible~~ ^{responsible} ~~officers~~ ^{officers} were ~~not~~ "not on the alert against a surprise

"attack" is arresting public
 attention. ^{It appears that} ~~and~~ The Navy and the
 Army ~~will~~ ^{will} start investigation
 first of all. And it seems that
~~there still is prevailing dissatisfaction still~~
 prevails in congressional quarters
~~Chairman Connally of the Committee on Foreign Relations,~~
 Chairman Connally, for instance, is reported
 to have said, "I am pained and
 grieved at its seeming failure of
 its high duty."

(123)

Wednesday, Dec. 17, 1941.

0 According to a London despatch in this ~~today's~~ morning's papers, Britain and Australia ~~are beginning to~~ ^{are beginning to} feel uneasy about the ability of the Commander of the Far Eastern ^{forces} in view of the situation in the Far East, especially of the sinking of the two battleships, the loss of the Kota Bharu airdrome, the destruction of ~~the~~ oil-fields in Sarawak and the ~~pressing~~ ^{imminent} threat ~~against~~ ^{to} Singapore, ~~criticisms are~~ ^{criticisms are} levelled against ~~and~~ ^{are} Duff Cooper's ~~incompetency~~ ^{incompetency} as First Lord of the Admiralty, Brook-Popham's failure to provide sufficient number of ~~fighters~~ ^{fighters} ~~for land and sea operations~~ ^{for land and sea operations}, and Tom Phillip's lack of ~~experience~~ ^{experience} in sea-service for many years.

Under date of ~~Dec~~ Pearl Harbor
 Dated ~~on~~ the 16th, the Investigation
 Commission ~~was established~~
 Battle (was) officially ~~announced~~ created. It
 consists of five members:— Admiral
 Standley, Maj.-General Reeves, General McCoy
 Brigadier General McNarney, and ~~Justice~~
 Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court, who is
 Chairman of the Commission.

○ According to the New York Times
 of the 17th, Secretary of State Hull
 is reported to have sent ^{on November 27th} a warning
 to every department (including the
 Army and the Navy Departments, of
 course) of the U. S. Government
 just after ^{handing over} his "final proposals" to
 Japan. (The ~~account of the same~~
 dated 18th confirms the above.)
 (The same paper carried on the 18th an
 article confirming this.)

(125)

Thurs. Dec. 18, 1941.

~~under date of Dec 17th~~

~~under date of Dec 17th~~

○ Nimitz was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific; Emmons, of air force origin, was appointed Supreme Commander of the Army in Hawaii; and Brig-General Tinker, Commander of the Air Force.

○ Though it is generally ^{argued} ~~discussed~~ that Hawaii and Singapore should be defended "at all costs" as two important bases, and the Philippin Islands are of the second rate, ~~among~~ ^{well-informed persons} the difficulty of ~~the~~ defending of Singapore is acknowledged by ^{well-informed circles.} Mr Baldwin ~~in the staff~~ of the New York Times ^{wrote} stated in his paper on the

(126)

17th that the situation of the Pacific was "bleak", and the ability of the U.S. to participate in the west Pacific had been decreased and the opportunity for activities there had been much delayed. Citing the Japanese surprise attack on ~~the~~ Hawaii, the sinking of the two British battleships, and the Soviet Union's unwillingness to allow ~~the U.S.~~ ^{the} use of her territory in the Far East to the United States, he declared that the United States' ability to participate in ~~the~~ western Pacific had been reduced and the chance of launching operations greatly delayed.

(127)

Friday, Dec. 19, 1941.

The competency and boldness of our naval officers and sailors as demonstrated in ~~the~~ ^{on} the surprise attack ~~against~~ Hawaii and the sinking of two British battleships ~~which~~ ^{we} have ~~between~~ the competency and boldness of our naval officers and sailors startled the world. The Washington Post of the 16th had the following account: ~~visit that~~ When an A.P. reporter ~~had a talk~~ ^{interviewed} with a British officer who ~~had~~ ^{was a veteran of} many a battle, the officer ~~was said to have~~ stated that the Japanese never feared death, and that ~~they could not~~ ^{bullets failed to} prevent the Japanese from advancing ~~by bullets~~ and that because of this Japan had achieved such a triumphant

(128)

success, which could not ~~have~~ be expected ~~with~~ ^{from} the German or Italian forces.

○ ~~Knot~~, referring to Japan in his address at the commencement exercises of the Naval Academy on the 19th, ^{knob} ^{to the following effect} said with reference to Japan:

At present Japan has the "largest naval force" in the west Pacific and ^{the paucity of} her officers and sailors ~~bravery~~ is characteristic of the "bravery of fanaticism." The commanders are skilled in their leadership and defy everything ^{in the battle field} in order to ^{achieve victory.} ~~the U.S.~~ However, ^{the United States will surely} ~~is going to win~~ win the final victory. . . .

129

Under date of Dec. 20th
~~Dated on the 20~~, King was
appointed Commander-in-Chief
of the Combined ~~Squadrons~~ ^{Fleets} and Ingersoll,
Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic
Fleet. King is highly spoken of
as the man ^{most} ~~best~~ fitted for the post.

(130)

Saturday Dec. 20, 1941.

Through the defeat in Hawaii the
~~The~~ Americans ~~universally~~ have
come to acknowledge their past
mistake in underestimating Japan's
real power. ~~by their defeat in~~
~~Hawaii~~ ^{and} those ^{commentators} critics or
editorial writers who swaggered
that Japan could be "pushed
over" in a short time, have
changed their ~~sharp~~ tone ^{and now}
~~congratulating~~ ~~the~~ ~~Japanese~~
~~on their~~ ~~display~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~
Near East ^{via Rangoon} ~~the~~ ~~important~~
~~position~~ ~~of~~ ~~Singapore~~ ~~and~~ ~~admitting~~
admit the impossibility of saving
the ~~critical~~ ^{critical} situation of the
Philippine Islands and
Singapore by despatching fleets.
↑ Our overwhelming victory at
the outset of the war really
they ^{simply} ~~now~~ urge the despatching of planes from
the Near East via Rangoon for the defense of ~~the~~
the important base of Singapore.

(131)

gave a great shock to the people
~~in general~~
^{at large}

New York Mr. Baldwin ~~on the staff of~~ the
York Times pointed out ^{the following}
^{defects} following defects (in ^{the} Sunday (21th)
edition):

1. The Army and the Navy,
especially the Navy, had ~~been~~
looking down ^{on} Japan and had
~~been~~ indulged in their
self-confidence to such an
extent that they might be
called easy-going.

2. Lack of "unity of command"
in Hawaii ^{among}
~~between~~ the Commander-in-Chief
of the Fleet, the Commander of
the Harbor, and the Army
Commander.

3. Too many warships were
^{assembled}
gathered in Pearl Harbor.

(132)

4. ~~They had laid~~ ^{had been laid} No torpedo nets at the entrance of the harbor.
5. Oil storage tanks, ~~etc~~ ^{etc} ~~repositories for all~~ were not placed under ~~the~~ ground.
6. ~~The planes of the Army and the~~ ^{planes were assembled in} small areas. Naval ~~aircraft~~ ^{aircraft} on ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~places~~.

133

Monday, Dec. 22, 1941

British Prime Minister Churchill arrived at Washington and entered the White House ^{on Dec. 22.} Lord Beaverbrook, Pound, Chief of the Naval General Staff, Dill, Chief of ^{the Army} General Staff, and Portal, Chief of the Air Force General Staff, ^{comprised} ~~were among~~ the important persons of his suite.

The President ^{had interviews with} ~~interviewed~~ Litvinov, Hu Shih and Lauden, ^{that order} ~~in turn~~; ~~with~~ an ~~interview~~ before Churchill's arrival.

The White House statements are ^{given} ~~seen~~ in the accompanying clipping.

134

Tues, Dec. 23, 1941.

○ The President signed the "draft bill" on the 23rd. Those ~~who are~~ between twenty-two and forty-four years ~~of age~~ ^{of age} will be subject to military service ~~in the army~~, the number of which will ~~amount~~ ^{total} to 7,000,000.

○ The Senate carried the bill for increasing the ^{naval} personnel of the Navy from 300,000 to 500,000 and the number of ~~the sailors~~ ^{marines} from 60,000 to 104,000.

○ The President and Prime Minister Churchill had an interview with the reporters. Churchill's consummate tact ^{in meeting reporters} testifies vividly ^{to} his fame as ~~one of~~ ^a veteran ^{parliamentary} statesmen in the Parliament.