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Statistical Summary

By August 1946 the Japanese Government announced the substantial completion of the initial phase of the purge program. The Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, Prefectural Governors, all officials of the then first three ranks, judges of higher courts, officials of government controlled companies, procurators of certain higher courts, and officials of higher educational institutions directly under the Ministry of Education had all been screened. These totalled 5,520 persons, of which 814 were barred or removed, and 4,706 were passed. This figure was subsequently increased by 4 January 1947 to 8,899 persons screened, of which 7,832 had been passed and 1,067 barred or removed. In addition 183,000 career officers of the army and navy, members of the gendarmerie and former intelligence agents had been categorically barred. The way was now clear for the anticipated extension of the program to local government, to industry and to the field of public information.

## EXTENSION OF PURGE PROGRAM

Preliminary Steps

In August 1946 a statement of SCAP policy was issued requiring the Japanese Government to prepare a comprehensive plan for: (a) the exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies and from appointive posts of all personnel deemed undesirable under the provisions of SCAPIN 550; (b) the application of that directive to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet; (c) the exclusion of all purged personnel from any influential political or economic posts. This statement also provided that the Japanese Government should publish the full text of the plan simultaneously with its submission to SCAP.

The Extension Plan

On 22 October the government submitted to SCAP and simultaneously released to the public a plan which comprehensively implemented the 4 January Directive.

In the ensuing two months the essential features of this plan were incorporated into definitive and appropriate form for issuance as law.

The Extension Ordinances

On 4 January 1947, one year from issuance of the original directive, the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, thus implementing all the features of the approved plan. These ordinances contained provisions which were designed to reach into all fields.

Criteria for Screening

The screenable positions were extended to include all elective and appointive posts in the national and local governments and specified positions in certain companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations. These latter were defined to be positions in: companies in which the government had special interests; organizations subsidized by the government or serving for the public benefit; principle newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theatrical companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication; political parties, their branches and similar organizations; and influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations. The specific offices considered to be policy-making positions and approximately 470 such companies, organizations, etc., were specifically listed.

Criteria for Purging

In a manner similar to that in which definition of screenable positions was enlarged, the purge criteria were also more specifically defined.

No changes were made in the definition of the categories applicable to war criminals (Category A) career military and naval personnel, etc. (Category B), officials of financial and development companies involved in Japanese expansion (Category E) and officials in occupied territories (Category F). With regard to the influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies (Category C) the criteria were specifically defined to include those persons in the local branches thereof who had held positions comparable to those previously defined as applying only to the national level. The criteria applicable to persons influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, (Category D) were further defined in the case of parent organizations and major affiliates to include officials of all local subdivisions thereof, down to and including chiefs of town and village branches.

The category in which the most far-reaching and comprehensive definitions were made was that applying to additional militarists and ultranationalists (Category G).

The provision in this category, implemented by Cabinet announcement of 10 March 1946 described heretofore, which applied to government officials and professional men who had participated in activities such as mentioned in this category was defined more clearly. Those falling under the provisions of the ordinance were government officials who took part in the planning or execution of propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of (1) instigating war; (2) suppressing opponents of jingoism; (3) advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, and militarism or ultranationalism; (4) guiding or controlling thought or speech for the same purpose; (5) political direction or economic exploitation of Japanese occupied territories; (6) furthering

important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members in or outside the Diet who had in writing, speech or action been conspicuously active in instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artists who by their works had advocated aggression or militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar nature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or antimilitaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism were by this provision brought under the terms of the Directive. This added definition made it possible to measure by a clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc. of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as applied to the principal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance certain officials of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations and any other media of mass communication in or outside Japan who held office during the period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 and whose companies engaged in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artists were brought under the Directive. These listed officials were the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

Perhaps the most sweeping extension of the provisions of this broad category, was in the interpretations as they applied to certain top officials of what had previously been referred to as "influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms or producing iron or steel." This category had now been broadened to include all policy-making officials down to but not including ordinary directors, but including all other officials, regardless of title, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above in any company which was conspicuously influential in the manufacture of strategic or critical material of war, conspicuously monopolistic in the production of basic productive materials or business of communications or transportation, or domestic or foreign trade; holding companies or influential companies closely associated thereto; and companies capitalized in excess of one hundred million yen or which had commanded excessive economic power. Two hundred and forty-six such companies were listed in the ordinance.

Injunctions

Contained in Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 are four injunctions designed to prevent the continuity of influence and power by purgees in those positions and organizations in the public service from which they had been removed. Penalty clauses are included which make violators of the above injunctions liable to confinement for not more than three years or to a fine not exceeding 15,000 yen.

Non-Succession Provisions

A feature designed to allow new leadership to come to the front in municipal governments was incorporated in Imperial Ordinances Nos. 3 and 4 of 1947, also issued on 4 January 1947. These ordinances provided that mayors, deputy-mayors, headmen of wards in Tokyo, headmen and deputy-headmen of towns and villages and headmen of federations of neighborhood associations (CHONAI KAI CHO and BURAKU KAI CHO), who had held such positions consecutively from 1 September 1945 until 1 September 1946, even though they did not fall under the provisions of the purge ordinance, were to be barred from filing as candidates for those respective positions for a period of four years. So much of this as it applied to the headmen of federations of neighborhood associations was revoked when, on 3 March 1947, these federations were abolished.

Administration

Because of the increased amount of screening anticipated at all levels, estimated by the government at between 500,000 and 700,000 cases, a reorganization of the screening system was effected by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947.

This ordinance provided for one Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, forty-six Prefectural Committees (including 5 major cities) and 118 Municipal Committees (cities with population of 50,000 or more).

The Central Committee was made responsible to the Prime Minister who makes final decision on all cases screened by that committee. The local committees make recommendations to their respective prefectural governors who give final decision thereon.

The Central Committee's authority was limited to positions in the national government, positions in organizations comparable thereto, and the top elective posts of the prefectures and 5 principal cities. All other posts in local government and those in local branches of screenable organizations were within the screening authority of the local committees.

Publicity

The results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program is accomplished in several ways. The Central Government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, releases to the press and posts semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who have been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances are made available for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned. A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate is

also available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as the screening committee's office. News releases and radio broadcasts explain to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

Schedule of Screening

The order in which various groups would be screened was determined by schedule. Proposed appointees for local committees were screened first. The general elections then impending necessitated screening election officials and candidates next. Screening of economic entities, principal public offices, political parties and public information media organizations followed.

Activities Prior to Elections

Prior to the General Elections in April 1947 all candidates for the more important elective posts were screened and the following report made by the Japanese Government:

| Candidates | Filed | Passed | *Provisionally Passed | Barred |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| House of Representatives | 3,426 | 3,230 | 59 | 137 |
| House of Councillors | 1,406 | 1,365 | 10 | 31 |
| Prefectural Governors | 451 | 428 | 3 | 20 |
| Mayors of 5 Principal Cities | 43 | 42 | - | 1 |

*No final decision could be reached in these cases noted as "provisionally passed" because research in the information media field had not been completed.

During the same period the Local Committees screened an estimated 72,550 candidates for headmen of wards, towns, and villages; 21,126 candidates for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen and accountants of cities, towns and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees.

Activities Subsequent to Elections

Subsequent to the elections and prior to assuming office, successful candidates for the important elective posts, screened by the Central Committee were re-examined. Eleven members-elect to the House of Representatives and four members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed. One of those removed was ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, former Finance Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet.

The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 assemblymen of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees post-screened 158,757 persons who had been elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

Economic Phase

This phase began about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

By the middle of July 1947 approximately 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public

service. There remained the screening of those persons whose questionnaires had not yet been obtained, the seeking out of those whose positions were not listed in the mandatory provisions of the ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised influence and authority commensurate with such listed positions and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees.

Public Information Media Purge

Paragraph 5 of the "remarks" section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcasting corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, espoused totalitarianism or advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, denounced liberals and anti-militarists, or in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of these provisions necessitated extensive research in every field of public information, including not only a study of the media itself but of the organizational structure of public information companies. This program was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15 motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, deemed to have engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the "remarks" outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified officeholders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent persons who had resigned to escape being purged from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or assume positions legally screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which is primarily directed against those potential or "invisible" purgees who engage in political activity, and as such cannot effectively be applied to all "invisible purgees".

On 2 July 1947, the government issued Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 which provides that the Prime Minister can effect the provisional designation of any person concerning whom there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he falls within the purview of the Memorandum. This designation is effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days is provided from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified can, if he so desires, file a letter of exemption with a questionnaire which is examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception is filed within the thirty day period, the designation becomes effective under the provisions of

the basic Ordinance, and is publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

By the end of July 1947 documentary evidence had been submitted listing substantially all officials who held policy positions in the designated economic companies between 7 July 1937 to 2 September 1945. Of these approximately 800 clearly fell under the provisions of the Memorandum, an additional 200 were deceased, the addresses of some 200 were unknown, and more than 500 will be required to submit questionnaires.

Lists of persons coming within the purview of the categories pertaining to war criminals (Category A) and to career military and naval personnel (Category B) are under preparation.

Preparation commenced on 10 July 1947 of a list of persons who held the policy-making positions in the public information media companies and organizations. It is estimated that this list will be completed as soon after 30 July 1947 as all "evidence to the contrary" can be fully considered.

The collection of documentary evidence insofar as it affects the former officers and persons of authority in secret, patriotic, ultranationalistic and militaristic societies is currently in progress.

## APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 setting up a Board of Appeal. Prior to this time any person, who felt that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case could appeal to the Prime Minister. However, relatively few such appeals had been received. But with the greatly enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by July 1947 a total of 99 was listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 36 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 9 recommended for reinstatement, while 54 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. Initially Ordinance No. 65 provided that before an appeal could be submitted an appellant must have vacated his position; however, in July 1947, this provision of the Ordinance was revoked and appeal is now possible immediately upon designation. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a sufficient secretariat but recently a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

## SUMMARY

From its inception the Purge has remained preventative. Although SCAP was authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to suspected war criminals only.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memoranda issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program, subject to the right reserved by SCAP to review any action of the Japanese Government to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

By 4 January 1947 of 8,899 cases acted upon by the Japanese Government 1,770 had been reviewed by SCAP, In 27 instances the actim of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Between 4 January 1947 and 19 July 1947 the Japanese Gove rnment screened 563,099 cases, removing or barring a total of 1,681 individuals. Of the total number screened during this period SCAP reviewed 16,047 cases, representing persons holding important elective and appointive posts in gove rnment, officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese Gove rnment was disapproved.

Further action by SCAP upon post-review of the Japanese Government's action has been to direct the reinstatement of 12 individuals unjustly or mistakenly barred or removed.

Statistics on persons affected by the Purge Program as of mid-July reduce to the following approximate totals:

1. Barred and removed - Initial phase (4 Jan 1946 - 4 Jan 1947)..... 1,067

2. Barred and removed under the Extension (4 Jan 1947 - 15 July 1947)..... 1,681

3. Career officers, gendarmes and intelligence agents barred by original directive..... 183,000

4. Persons who resigned their positions in order to avoid designation..... 20,000

These figures do not, of course, include the tens of thousands of other undesirable leaders who are forever barred from Public Service but who have held no office since the purge became effective and therefore have not yet been designated by name. Nor are nearly 6000 Thought Control and Special Higher Police removed by SCAP's Civil Liberties Directive of October, 1945 included. Because they are barred only from positions in the Justice, Welfare, and Home Ministries and from police work, their status is somewhat different from that of persons purged under SCAPIN 550 who are barred from all Public Service. A similar group, likewise not included in the above, is the approximately 5000 teachers who have been removed from the field of education.

1 August 1947

# THE PURGE

On 4 January 1946 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a sweeping directive requiring a purge of all persons who shared responsibility for Japan's program of aggression.

This directive, issued as SCAPIN 550, was designed to remove undesirable persons from positions of influence and authority in the political, economic and social life of Japan. For the fields of education and police, separate similar programs had been initiated as early as October 1945.

The removal and exclusion program has never been either in concept or administration a punitive measure but was and is a technique designed to eliminate the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons whose past careers showed them to be undesirable leaders for a nation dedicated to democracy and the cause of world peace.

## BASIS FOR THE PURGE

### Potsdam Declaration

The international basis for the entire purge program is found in that part of the Potsdam Declaration which states, "There must be removed for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world".

### Occupation Directives

In accordance with initial U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan SCAP was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that no persons be "allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society". . . . . who have been influential in the activities of Imperial Rule Assistance Organizations, "or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the occupation".

SCAP was further directed to prohibit the retention in, or selection for, positions of important responsibility in industry, finance, commerce, agriculture, or public or private financial institutions, agencies or organizations, of any persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, and of all those who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SCAP was directed to assume that persons who held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in any of the fields enumerated above have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.

## THE 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

SCAPIN 550 which has become famous as the "4 January Directive" is SCAP's implementation of the early instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Purge Categories

This basic directive ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public office and to exclude from government service exponents of militant nationalism and aggression falling within the following defined categories:

Category A. War Criminals

Category B. Career Military and Naval Personnel: Special Police and Officers of the War Ministries.

This category included members of the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, the Supreme Military Council, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Supreme Council for direction of the war; all career commissioned officers and enlisted personnel who served in or with the military or naval police or other special or secret intelligence police organizations; and all persons who served as higher officials in the Ministry of War or Ministry of Navy.

Category C. Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.

Founders, officers, directors and other important officials, large financial contributors to, or editor of any publication or organ of such societies.

Category D. Persons Influential in the Activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

National officers, leading officials in Prefectural or Metropolitan subdivisions, editor of any publication or organ of the above or agencies or affiliates of the above organizations.

Category E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansion.

Persons who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were directors, presidents, vice presidents, advisors, auditors or controlling branch managers in Japanese occupied territory of above institutions.

Category F. Governors of Occupied Territories.

Certain specified higher officials such as governor general, civil administrator, and military administrator in Japan's wartime colonial empire.

Category G. Additional Militarists and Ultranationalists.

These broad provisions bring under the terms of the directive:

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetuated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

## INITIAL ACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING THE PURGE DIRECTIVE

### Ordinances Issued

On 27 February 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 which established the machinery for applying the Directive. These ordinances determined, first, who should be screened, second, who should be classified as undesirable in light of the Directive and third, how the removal of undesirables should be accomplished.

By the terms of these ordinances all incumbent officials of the then first three civil service grades, and those who held positions of comparable authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special control of the government, and all applicants for future elective or appointive posts in the national government were subject to screening to determine their eligibility.

The seven categories of undesirables outlined by the Directive were defined in greater detail by the ordinances as follows:

1. No change was made in the category applying to war criminals (Category A).

2. The one affecting career military and naval personnel (Category B) remained substantially the same.

3. The provisions of Category C were defined as applying to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies.

4. The many agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations (Category D) were enumerated and the influential positions in each duly listed.

5. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion (Category E), as listed in the original directive, was increased.

6. The exact titles and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories (Category E) were defined.

7. The broad provisions of Category G were extensively interpreted by a special cabinet announcement appearing shortly after the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109.

It brought under the purge memorandum all persons who had occupied certain policy-forming positions on the highest government level between the outbreak of "The China Incident" and the Surrender.

It listed other high government positions of somewhat lesser importance and provided for the purge of individuals who had occupied them providing there was conspicious evidence that these individuals have played an important part: (a) in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with puppet nations in preparation for the Greater East Asia War, (b) in the suppression of opponents of militarism, (c) in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries, (d) in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

The interpretation of Category G also brought under the purge: (a) those officials who had over a long period of time engaged in the suppression of civil liberties, (b) other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had participated in activities proscribed under Category G, (c) officials of companies that had produced the weapons and sinews of war, (d) highest officers of patriotic societies not listed under Category C and (e) any person who was recommended as a candidate by the TOJO Government in 1942.

The ordinances provided for a screening committee to examine questionnaires and to decide upon individual eligibility. In the event that the individual was found to fall under the criteria as defined in the ordinance, the Prime Minister was to designate him as an undesirable person, and to order his removal and exclusion from office. The ordinances also provided for the collection of questionnaires and contained a penalty clause designed to insure that such questionnaires would be filled out truthfully and completely.

Initial Operation and Effect Of The Purge

The impact of the Purge Directive was immediate and profound. On 13 January 1946, only 9 days after the Directive was issued, the Cabinet of Baron Kijuro Shidehara underwent extensive re-organization. Three ministers and six cabinet executives and many other high government officials resigned. In view of the imminence of the approaching April elections the government released the criteria as soon as they had been determined in the form of Cabinet announcements, without waiting until the entire bill had been written. Thus, by the end of February when Imperial Ordinance No. 109 was officially promulgated, action had already been taken to bring under the purge (a) persons who had been influential in patriotic and secret societies, (b) influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations, and (c) career naval and military personnel, of whom approximately 183,000 were barred from the Public Service.

On 10 March 1946, the day of the Cabinet announcement interpreting Category G, the Shidehara Cabinet sustained a second wave of resignations; five ministers retired. Many members of the House of Peers followed suit. Within the month 30 new appointees, duly screened under the new ordinances, were appointed to fill the vacancies thus created.

That part of the 10 March interpretation which rendered ineligible for public service all members of the Lower House who had been recommended by the Tojo Government greatly altered the political scene. Leadership of political parties changed, political allegiances shifted and new candidates were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in the April

elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred. Of the 252 barred, 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo in the 1942 elections. Another 268 "recommended candidates" did not file.

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important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members in or outside the Diet who had in writing, speech or action been conspicuously active in instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artists who by their works had advocated aggression or militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar nature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or antimilitaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism were by this provision brought under the terms of the Directive. This added definition made it possible to measure by a clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc. of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as applied to the principal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance certain officials of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations and any other media of mass communication in or outside Japan who held office during the period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 and whose companies engaged in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artists were brought under the Directive. These listed officials were the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

Perhaps the most sweeping extension of the provisions of this broad category, was in the interpretations as they applied to certain top officials of what had previously been referred to as "influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms or producing iron or steel." This category had now been broadened to include all policy-making officials down to but not including ordinary directors, but including all other officials, regardless of title, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above in any company which was conspicuously influential in the manufacture of strategic or critical material of war, conspicuously monopolistic in the production of basic productive materials or business of communications or transportation, or domestic or foreign trade; holding companies or influential companies closely associated thereto; and companies capitalized in excess of one hundred million yen or which had commanded excessive economic power. Two hundred and forty-six such companies were listed in the ordinance.

Injunctions

Contained in Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 are four injunctions designed to prevent the continuity of influence and power by purgees in those positions and organizations in the public service from which they had been removed. Penalty clauses are included which make violators of the above injunctions liable to confinement for not more than three years or to a fine not exceeding 15,000 yen.

Non-Succession Provisions

A feature designed to allow new leadership to come to the front in municipal governments was incorporated in Imperial Ordinances Nos. 3 and 4 of 1947, also issued on 4 January 1947. These ordinances provided that mayors, deputy-mayors, headmen of wards in Tokyo, headmen and deputy-headmen of towns and villages and headmen of federations of neighborhood associations (CHONAI KAI CHO and BURAKU KAI CHO), who had held such positions consecutively from 1 September 1945 until 1 September 1946, even though they did not fall under the provisions of the purge ordinance, were to be barred from filing as candidates for those respective positions for a period of four years. So much of this as it applied to the headmen of federations of neighborhood associations was revoked when, on 3 March 1947, these federations were abolished.

Administration

Because of the increased amount of screening anticipated at all levels, estimated by the government at between 500,000 and 700,000 cases, a reorganization of the screening system was effected by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947.

This ordinance provided for one Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, forty-six Prefectural Committees (including 5 major cities) and 118 Municipal Committees (cities with population of 50,000 or more).

The Central Committee was made responsible to the Prime Minister who makes final decision on all cases screened by that committee. The local committees make recommendations to their respective prefectural governors who give final decision thereon.

The Central Committee's authority was limited to positions in the national government, positions in organizations comparable thereto, and the top elective posts of the prefectures and 5 principal cities. All other posts in local government and those in local branches of screenable organizations were within the screening authority of the local committees.

Publicity

The results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program is accomplished in several ways. The Central Government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, releases to the press and posts semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who have been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances are made available for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned. A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate is

also available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as the screening committee's office. News releases and radio broadcasts explain to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

Schedule of Screening

The order in which various groups would be screened was determined by schedule. Proposed appointees for local committees were screened first. The general elections then impending necessitated screening election officials and candidates next. Screening of economic entities, principal public offices, political parties and public information media organizations followed.

Activities Prior to Elections

Prior to the General Elections in April 1947 all candidates for the more important elective posts were screened and the following report made by the Japanese Government:

| Candidates | Filed | Passed | *Provisionally Passed | Barred |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| House of Representatives | 3,426 | 3,230 | 59 | 137 |
| House of Councillors | 1,406 | 1,365 | 10 | 31 |
| Prefectural Governors | 451 | 428 | 3 | 20 |
| Mayors of 5 Principal Cities | 43 | 42 | - | 1 |

*No final decision could be reached in these cases noted as "provisionally passed" because research in the information media field had not been completed.

During the same period the Local Committees screened an estimated 72,550 candidates for headmen of wards, towns, and villages; 21,126 candidates for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen and accountants of cities, towns and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees.

Activities Subsequent to Elections

Subsequent to the elections and prior to assuming office, successful candidates for the important elective posts, screened by the Central Committee were re-examined. Eleven members-elect to the House of Representatives and four members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed. One of those removed was ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, former Finance Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet.

The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 assemblymen of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees post-screened 158,757 persons who had been elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

Economic Phase

This phase began about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

By the middle of July 1947 approximately 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public

service. There remained the screening of those persons whose questionnaires had not yet been obtained, the seeking out of those whose positions were not listed in the mandatory provisions of the ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised influence and authority commensurate with such listed positions and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees.

Public Information Media Purge

Paragraph 5 of the "remarks" section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcasting corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, espoused totalitarianism or advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, denounced liberals and anti-militarists, or in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of these provisions necessitated extensive research in every field of public information, including not only a study of the media itself but of the organizational structure of public information companies. This program was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15 motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, deemed to have engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the "remarks" outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified office-holders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent persons who had resigned to escape being purged from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or assume positions legally screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which is primarily directed against those potential or "invisible" purgees who engage in political activity, and as such cannot effectively be applied to all "invisible purgees".

On 2 July 1947, the government issued Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 which provides that the Prime Minister can effect the provisional designation of any person concerning whom there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he falls within the purview of the Memorandum. This designation is effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days is provided from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified can, if he so desires, file a letter of exemption with a questionnaire which is examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception is filed within the thirty day period, the designation becomes effective under the provisions of

the basic Ordinance, and is publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

By the end of July 1947 documentary evidence had been submitted listing substantially all officials who held policy positions in the designated economic companies between 7 July 1937 to 2 September 1945. Of these approximately 800 clearly fell under the provisions of the Memorandum, an additional 200 were deceased, the addresses of some 200 were unknown, and more than 500 will be required to submit questionnaires.

Lists of persons coming within the purview of the categories pertaining to war criminals (Category A) and to career military and naval personnel (Category B) are under preparation.

Preparation commenced on 10 July 1947 of a list of persons who held the policy-making positions in the public information media companies and organizations. It is estimated that this list will be completed as soon after 30 July 1947 as all "evidence to the contrary" can be fully considered.

The collection of documentary evidence insofar as it affects the former officers and persons of authority in secret, patriotic, ultranationalistic and militaristic societies is currently in progress.

## APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 setting up a Board of Appeal. Prior to this time any person, who felt that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case could appeal to the Prime Minister. However, relatively few such appeals had been received. But with the greatly enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by July 1947 a total of 99 was listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 36 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 9 recommended for reinstatement, while 54 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. Initially Ordinance No. 65 provided that before an appeal could be submitted an appellant must have vacated his position; however, in July 1947, this provision of the Ordinance was revoked and appeal is now possible immediately upon designation. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a sufficient secretariat but recently a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

## SUMMARY

From its inception the Purge has remained preventative. Although SCAP was authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to suspected war criminals only.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memoranda issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program, subject to the right reserved by SCAP to review any action of the Japanese Government to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

By 4 January 1947 of 8,899 cases acted upon by the Japanese Government 1,770 had been reviewed by SCAP, In 27 instances the actim of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Between 4 January 1947 and 19 July 1947 the Japanese Gove rnment screened 563,099 cases, removing or barring a total of 1,681 individuals. Of the total number screened during this period SCAP reviewed 16,047 cases, representing persons holding important elective and appointive posts in gove rnment, officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese Gove rnment was disapproved.

Further action by SCAP upon post-review of the Japanese Government's action has been to direct the reinstatement of 12 individuals unjustly or mistakenly barred or removed.

Statistics on persons affected by the Purge Program as of mid-July reduce to the following approximate totals:

1. Barred and removed - Initial phase (4 Jan 1946 - 4 Jan 1947)..... 1,067

2. Barred and removed under the Extension (4 Jan 1947 - 15 July 1947)..... 1,681

3. Career officers, gendarmes and intelligence agents barred by original directive..... 183,000

4. Persons who resigned their positions in order to avoid designation..... 20,000

These figures do not, of course, include the tens of thousands of other undesirable leaders who are forever barred from Public Service but who have held no office since the purge became effective and therefore have not yet been designated by name. Nor are nearly 6000 Thought Control and Special Higher Police removed by SCAP's Civil Liberties Directive of October, 1945 included. Because they are barred only from positions in the Justice, Welfare, and Home Ministries and from Police work, their status is somewhat different from that of persons purged under SCAPIN 550 who are barred from all Public Service. A similar group, likewise not included in the above, is the approximately 5000 teachers who have been removed from the field of education.

1 August 1947

# THE PURGE

On 4 January 1946 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a sweeping directive requiring a purge of all persons who shared responsibility for Japan's program of aggression.

This directive, issued as SCAPIN 550, was designed to remove undesirable persons from positions of influence and authority in the political, economic and social life of Japan. For the fields of education and police, separate similar programs had been initiated as early as October 1945.

The removal and exclusion program has never been either in concept or administration a punitive measure but was and is a technique designed to eliminate the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons whose past careers showed them to be undesirable leaders for a nation dedicated to democracy and the cause of world peace.

## BASIS FOR THE PURGE

### Potsdam Declaration

The international basis for the entire purge program is found in that part of the Potsdam Declaration which states, "There must be removed for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world".

### Occupation Directives

In accordance with initial U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan SCAP was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that no persons be "allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society". . . . . who have been influential in the activities of Imperial Rule Assistance Organizations, "or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the occupation".

SCAP was further directed to prohibit the retention in, or selection for, positions of important responsibility in industry, finance, commerce, agriculture, or public or private financial institutions, agencies or organizations, of any persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, and of all those who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SCAP was directed to assume that persons who held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in any of the fields enumerated above have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.

## THE 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

SCAPIN 550 which has become famous as the "4 January Directive" is SCAP's implementation of the early instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Purge Categories

This basic directive ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public office and to exclude from government service exponents of militant nationalism and aggression falling within the following defined categories:

Category A. War Criminals

Category B. Career Military and Naval Personnel: Special Police and Officers of the War Ministries.

This category included members of the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, the Supreme Military Council, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Supreme Council for direction of the war; all career commissioned officers and enlisted personnel who served in or with the military or naval police or other special or secret intelligence police organizations; and all persons who served as higher officials in the Ministry of War or Ministry of Navy.

Category C. Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.

Founders, officers, directors and other important officials, large financial contributors to, or editor of any publication or organ of such societies.

Category D. Persons Influential in the Activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

National officers, leading officials in Prefectural or Metropolitan subdivisions, editor of any publication or organ of the above or agencies or affiliates of the above organizations.

Category E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansion.

Persons who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were directors, presidents, vice presidents, advisors, auditors or controlling branch managers in Japanese occupied territory of above institutions.

Category F. Governors of Occupied Territories.

Certain specified higher officials such as governor general, civil administrator, and military administrator in Japan's wartime colonial empire.

Category G. Additional Militarists and Ultranationalists.

These broad provisions bring under the terms of the directive:.

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetuated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

## INITIAL ACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING THE PURGE DIRECTIVE

### Ordinances Issued

On 27 February 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 which established the machinery for applying the Directive. These ordinances determined, first, who should be screened, second, who should be classified as undesirable in light of the Directive and third, how the removal of undesirables should be accomplished.

By the terms of these ordinances all incumbent officials of the then first three civil service grades, and those who held positions of comparable authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special control of the government, and all applicants for future elective or appointive posts in the national government were subject to screening to determine their eligibility.

The seven categories of undesirables outlined by the Directive were defined in greater detail by the ordinances as follows:

1. No change was made in the category applying to war criminals (Category A).

2. The one affecting career military and naval personnel (Category B) remained substantially the same.

3. The provisions of Category C were defined as applying to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies.

4. The many agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations (Category D) were enumerated and the influential positions in each duly listed.

5. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion (Category E), as listed in the original directive, was increased.

6. The exact titles and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories (Category E) were defined.

7. The broad provisions of Category G were extensively interpreted by a special cabinet announcement appearing shortly after the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109.

It brought under the purge memorandum all persons who had occupied certain policy-forming positions on the highest government level between the outbreak of "The China Incident" and the Surrender.

It listed other high government positions of somewhat lesser importance and provided for the purge of individuals who had occupied them providing there was conspicious evidence that these individuals have played an important part: (a) in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with puppet nations in preparation for the Greater East Asia War, (b) in the suppression of opponents of militarism, (c) in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries, (d) in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

The interpretation of Category G also brought under the purge: (a) those officials who had over a long period of time engaged in the suppression of civil liberties, (b) other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had participated in activities proscribed under Category G, (c) officials of companies that had produced the weapons and sinews of war, (d) highest officers of patriotic societies not listed under Category C and (e) any person who was recommended as a candidate by the TOJO Government in 1942.

The ordinances provided for a screening committee to examine questionnaires and to decide upon individual eligibility. In the event that the individual was found to fall under the criteria as defined in the ordinance, the Prime Minister was to designate him as an undesirable person, and to order his removal and exclusion from office. The ordinances also provided for the collection of questionnaires and contained a penalty clause designed to insure that such questionnaires would be filled out truthfully and completely.

Initial Operation and Effect Of The Purge

The impact of the Purge Directive was immediate and profound. On 13 January 1946, only 9 days after the Directive was issued, the Cabinet of Baron Kijuro Shidehara underwent extensive re-organization. Three ministers and six cabinet executives and many other high government officials resigned. In view of the imminence of the approaching April elections the government released the criteria as soon as they had been determined in the form of Cabinet announcements, without waiting until the entire bill had been written. Thus, by the end of February when Imperial Ordinance No. 109 was officially promulgated, action had already been taken to bring under the purge (a) persons who had been influential in patriotic and secret societies, (b) influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations, and (c) career naval and military personnel, of whom approximately 183,000 were barred from the Public Service.

On 10 March 1946, the day of the Cabinet announcement interpreting Category G, the Shidehara Cabinet sustained a second wave of resignations; five ministers retired. Many members of the House of Peers followed suit. Within the month 30 new appointees, duly screened under the new ordinances, were appointed to fill the vacancies thus created.

That part of the 10 March interpretation which rendered ineligible for public service all members of the Lower House who had been recommended by the Tojo Government greatly altered the political scene. Leadership of political parties changed, political allegiances shifted and new candidates were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in the April

elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred. Of the 252 barred, 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo in the 1942 elections. Another 268 "recommended candidates" did not file.

When the Diet convened on 20 June 1946 all successful candidates to the Lower House were re-screened and their cases reviewed. As a result ten more were removed, nine of these by Japanese Government order and one, Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Liberal Party, by SCAP directive.

On 16 May 1946 the Japanese Government prepared a still more comprehensive and detailed interpretation of those paragraphs of Category G relating to other government officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had engaged in activities proscribed under the Directive. These extended criteria were not publicly announced at the time lest such an announcement interfere with the completion of screening by the scheduled deadline. Nevertheless, this document represented an early extension of the purge program into industry and the field of public information, an extension to be perfected and completed the following year.

Statistical Summary

By August 1946 the Japanese Government announced the substantial completion of the initial phase of the purge program. The Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, Prefectural Governors, all officials of the then first three ranks, judges of higher courts, officials of government controlled companies, procurators of certain higher courts, and officials of higher educational institutions directly under the Ministry of Education had all been screened. These totalled 5,520 persons, of which 814 were barred or removed, and 4,706 were passed. This figure was subsequently increased by 4 January 1947 to 8,899 persons screened, of which 7,832 had been passed and 1,067 barred or removed. In addition 183,000 career officers of the army and navy, members of the gendarmerie and former intelligence agents had been categorically barred. The way was now clear for the anticipated extension of the program to local government, to industry and to the field of public information.

## EXTENSION OF PURGE PROGRAM

Preliminary Steps

In August 1946 a statement of SCAP policy was issued requiring the Japanese Government to prepare a comprehensive plan for: (a) the exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies and from appointive posts of all personnel deemed undesirable under the provisions of SCAPIN 550; (b) the application of that directive to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet; (c) the exclusion of all purged personnel from any influential political or economic posts. This statement also provided that the Japanese Government should publish the full text of the plan simultaneously with its submission to SCAP.

The Extension Plan

On 22 October the government submitted to SCAP and simultaneously released to the public a plan which comprehensively implemented the 4 January Directive.

In the ensuing two months the essential features of this plan were incorporated into definitive and appropriate form for issuance as law.

The Extension Ordinances

On 4 January 1947, one year from issuance of the original directive, the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, thus implementing all the features of the approved plan. These ordinances contained provisions which were designed to reach into all fields.

Criteria for Screening

The screenable positions were extended to include all elective and appointive posts in the national and local governments and specified positions in certain companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations. These latter were defined to be positions in: companies in which the government had special interests; organizations subsidized by the government or serving for the public benefit; principle newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theatrical companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication; political parties, their branches and similar organizations; and influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations. The specific offices considered to be policy-making positions and approximately 470 such companies, organizations, etc., were specifically listed.

Criteria for Purging

In a manner similar to that in which definition of screenable positions was enlarged, the purge criteria were also more specifically defined.

No changes were made in the definition of the categories applicable to war criminals (Category A) career military and naval personnel, etc. (Category B), officials of financial and development companies involved in Japanese expansion (Category E) and officials in occupied territories (Category F). With regard to the influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies (Category C) the criteria were specifically defined to include those persons in the local branches thereof who had held positions comparable to those previously defined as applying only to the national level. The criteria applicable to persons influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, (Category D) were further defined in the case of parent organizations and major affiliates to include officials of all local subdivisions thereof, down to and including chiefs of town and village branches.

The category in which the most far-reaching and comprehensive definitions were made was that applying to additional militarists and ultranationalists (Category G).

The provision in this category, implemented by Cabinet announcement of 10 March 1946 described heretofore, which applied to government officials and professional men who had participated in activities such as mentioned in this category was defined more clearly. Those falling under the provisions of the ordinance were government officials who took part in the planning or execution of propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of (1) instigating war; (2) suppressing opponents of jingoism; (3) advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, and militarism or ultranationalism; (4) guiding or controlling thought or speech for the same purpose; (5) political direction or economic exploitation of Japanese occupied territories; (6) furthering

important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members in or outside the Diet who had in writing, speech or action been conspicuously active in instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artists who by their works had advocated aggression or militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar nature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or antimilitaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism were by this provision brought under the terms of the Directive. This added definition made it possible to measure by a clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc. of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as applied to the principal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance certain officials of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations and any other media of mass communication in or outside Japan who held office during the period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 and whose companies engaged in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artists were brought under the Directive. These listed officials were the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

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Publicity

The results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program is accomplished in several ways. The Central Government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, releases to the press and posts semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who have been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances are made available for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned. A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate is

also available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as the screening committee's office. News releases and radio broadcasts explain to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

Schedule of Screening

The order in which various groups would be screened was determined by schedule. Proposed appointees for local committees were screened first. The general elections then impending necessitated screening election officials and candidates next. Screening of economic entities, principal public offices, political parties and public information media organizations followed.

Activities Prior to Elections

Prior to the General Elections in April 1947 all candidates for the more important elective posts were screened and the following report made by the Japanese Government:

| Candidates | Filed | Passed | *Provisionally Passed | Barred |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| House of Representatives | 3,426 | 3,230 | 59 | 137 |
| House of Councillors | 1,406 | 1,365 | 10 | 31 |
| Prefectural Governors | 451 | 428 | 3 | 20 |
| Mayors of 5 Principal Cities | 43 | 42 | - | 1 |

*No final decision could be reached in these cases noted as "provisionally passed" because research in the information media field had not been completed.

During the same period the Local Committees screened an estimated 72,550 candidates for headmen of wards, towns, and villages; 21,126 candidates for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen and accountants of cities, towns and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees.

Activities Subsequent to Elections

Subsequent to the elections and prior to assuming office, successful candidates for the important elective posts, screened by the Central Committee were re-examined. Eleven members-elect to the House of Representatives and four members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed. One of those removed was ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, former Finance Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet.

The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 assemblymen of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees post-screened 158,757 persons who had been elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

Economic Phase

This phase began about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

By the middle of July 1947 approximately 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public

service. There remained the screening of those persons whose questionnaires had not yet been obtained, the seeking out of those whose positions were not listed in the mandatory provisions of the ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised influence and authority commensurate with such listed positions and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees.

Public Information Media Purge

Paragraph 5 of the "remarks" section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcasting corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, espoused totalitarianism or advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, denounced liberals and anti-militarists, or in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of these provisions necessitated extensive research in every field of public information, including not only a study of the media itself but of the organizational structure of public information companies. This program was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15 motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, deemed to have engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the "remarks" outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified office-holders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent persons who had resigned to escape being purged from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or assume positions legally screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which is primarily directed against those potential or "invisible" purgees who engage in political activity, and as such cannot effectively be applied to all "invisible purgees".

On 2 July 1947, the government issued Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 which provides that the Prime Minister can effect the provisional designation of any person concerning whom there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he falls within the purview of the Memorandum. This designation is effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days is provided from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified can, if he so desires, file a letter of exemption with a questionnaire which is examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception is filed within the thirty day period, the designation becomes effective under the provisions of

the basic Ordinance, and is publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

By the end of July 1947 documentary evidence had been submitted listing substantially all officials who held policy positions in the designated economic companies between 7 July 1937 to 2 September 1945. Of these approximately 800 clearly fell under the provisions of the Memorandum, an additional 200 were deceased, the addresses of some 200 were unknown, and more than 500 will be required to submit questionnaires.

Lists of persons coming within the purview of the categories pertaining to war criminals (Category A) and to career military and naval personnel (Category B) are under preparation.

Preparation commenced on 10 July 1947 of a list of persons who held the policy-making positions in the public information media companies and organizations. It is estimated that this list will be completed as soon after 30 July 1947 as all "evidence to the contrary" can be fully considered.

The collection of documentary evidence insofar as it affects the former officers and persons of authority in secret, patriotic, ultranationalistic and militaristic societies is currently in progress.

## APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 setting up a Board of Appeal. Prior to this time any person, who felt that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case could appeal to the Prime Minister. However, relatively few such appeals had been received. But with the greatly enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by July 1947 a total of 99 was listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 36 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 9 recommended for reinstatement, while 54 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. Initially Ordinance No. 65 provided that before an appeal could be submitted an appellant must have vacated his position; however, in July 1947, this provision of the Ordinance was revoked and appeal is now possible immediately upon designation. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a sufficient secretariat but recently a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

## SUMMARY

From its inception the Purge has remained preventative. Although SCAP was authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to suspected war criminals only.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memoranda issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program, subject to the right reserved by SCAP to review any action of the Japanese Government to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

By 4 January 1947 of 8,899 cases acted upon by the Japanese Government 1,770 had been reviewed by SCAP, In 27 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Between 4 January 1947 and 19 July 1947 the Japanese Gove rnment screened 563,099 cases, removing or barring a total of 1,681 individuals. Of the total number screened during this period SCAP revie ed 16,047 cases, representing persons holding important elective and appointive posts in gove rnment, officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese Gove rnment was disapproved.

Further action by SCAP upon post-review of the Japanese Government's action has been to direct the reinstatement of 12 individuals unjustly or mistakenly barred or removed.

Statistics on persons affected by the Purge Program as of mid-July reduce to the following approximate totals:

1. Barred and removed - Initial phase (4 Jan 1946 - 4 Jan 1947)..... 1,067

2. Barred and removed under the Extension (4 Jan 1947 - 15 July 1947)..... 1,681

3. Career officers, gendarmes and intelligence agents barred by original directive..... 183,000

4. Persons who resigned their positions in order to avoid designation..... 20,000

These figures do not, of course, include the tens of thousands of other undesirable leaders who are forever barred from Public Service but who have held no office since the purge became effective and therefore have not yet been designated by name. Nor are nearly 6000 Thought Control and Special Higher Police removed by SCAP's Civil Liberties Directive of October, 1945 included. Because they are barred only from positions in the Justice, Welfare, and Home Ministries and from police work, their status is somewhat different from that of persons purged under SCAPIN 550 who are barred from all Public Service. A similar group, likewise not included in the above, is the approximately 5000 teachers who have been removed from the field of education.

APPENDIX II

THE PURGE

On 4 January 1946 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a sweeping directive requiring a purge of all persons who shared responsibility for Japan's program of aggression.

This directive, issued as SCAPIN 550, was designed to remove undesirable persons from positions of influence and authority in the political, economic and social life of Japan. For the fields of education and police, separate similar programs had been initiated as early as October 1945.

The removal and exclusion program has never been either in concept or administration a punitive measure but was and is a technique designed to eliminate the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons whose past careers showed them to be undesirable leaders for a nation dedicated to democracy and the cause of world peace.

## BASIS FOR THE PURGE

### Potsdam Declaration

The international basis for the entire purge program is found in that part of the Potsdam Declaration which states, "There must be removed for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

### Occupation Directives

In accordance with initial U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan SCAP was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that no persons be "allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society". . . . . who have been influential in the activities of Imperial Rule Assistance Organizations, "or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the occupation."

SCAP was further directed to prohibit the retention in or selection for, positions of important responsibility in industry, finance, commerce, agriculture, or public or private financial institutions, agencies or organizations, of any persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, and of all those who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SCAP was directed to assume that persons who held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in any of the fields enumerated above have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.

## THE 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

SCAPIN 550 which has become famous as the "4 January Directive" is SCAP's implementation of the early instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### Purge Categories

This basic directive ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public office and to exclude from government service exponents of militant nationalism and aggression falling within the following defined categories:

Category A. War Criminals

Category B. Career Military and Naval Personnel: Special Police and Officers of the War Ministries.

This category included members of the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, the Supreme Military Council, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Supreme Council for direction of the war; all career commissioned officers and enlisted personnel who served in or with the military or naval police or other special or secret intelligence police organizations; and all persons who served as higher officials in the Ministry of War or Ministry of Navy.

Category C. Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.

Founders, officers, directors and other important officials, large financial contributors to, or editor of any publication or organ of such societies.

Category D. Persons Influential in the Activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

National officers, leading officials in Prefectural or Metropolitan subdivisions, editor of any publication or organ of the above or agencies or affiliates of the above organizations.

Category E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansion.

Persons who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were directors, presidents, vice presidents, advisors, auditors or controlling branch managers in Japanese occupied territory of above institutions.

Category F. Governors of Occupied Territories.

Certain specified higher officials such as governor general, civil administrator, and military administrator in Japan's wartime colonial empire.

Category G. Additional Militarists and Ultra-nationalists.

These broad provisions bring under the terms of the directive:

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetuated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

## INITIAL ACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING THE PURGE DIRECTIVE

### Ordinances Issued

On 27 February 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 which established the machinery for applying the Directive. These ordinances determined, first, who should be screened, second, who should be classified as undesirable in light of the Directive and third, how the removal of undesirables should be accomplished.

By the terms of these ordinances all incumbent officials of the then first three civil service grades, and those who held positions of comparable authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special control of the government, and all applicants for future elective or appointive posts in the national government were subject to screening to determine their eligibility.

The seven categories of undesirables outlined by the Directive were defined in greater detail by the ordinances as follows:

1. No change was made in the category applying to war criminals (Category A).

2. The one affecting career military and naval personnel (Category B) remained substantially the same.

3. The provisions of Category C were defined as applying to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies.

4. The many agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations (Category D) were enumerated and the influential positions in each duly listed.

5. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion (Category E,, as listed in the original directive,was increased.

6. The exact titles and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories (Category E) were defined.

7. The broad provisions of Category G were extensively interpreted by a special cabinet announcement appearing shortly after the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109.

It brought under the purge memorandum all persons who had occupied certain policy-forming positions on the highest government level between the outbreak of "The China Incident" and the Surrender.

It listed other high government positions of somewhat lesser importance and provided for the purge of individuals who had occupied them providing there was conspicious evidence that these individuals had played an important part: (a) in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with puppet nations in preparation for the Greater East Asia War, (b) in the suppression of opponents of militarism, (c) in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries, (d) in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

The interpretation of Category G also brought under the purge: (a) those officials who had over a long period of time engaged in the suppression of civil liberties, (b) other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had participated in activities proscribed under Category G, (c) officials of companies that had produced the weapons and sinews of war, (d) highest officers of patriotic societies not listed under Category C and (e) any person who was recommended as a candidate by the TOJO Government in 1942.

The ordinances provided for a screening committee to examine questionnaires and to decide upon individual eligibility. In the event that the individual was found to fall under the criteria as defined in the ordinance, the Prime Minister was to designate him as an undesirable person, and to order his removal and exclusion from office. The ordinances also provided for the collection of questionnaires and contained a penalty clause designed to insure that such questionnaires would be filled out truthfully and completely.

Initial Operation and Effect Of The Purge

The impact of the Purge Directive was immediate and profound. On 13 January 1946, only 9 days after the Directive was issued, the Cabinet of Baron Kinjuro Shidehara underwent extensive re-organization. Three ministers and six cabinet executives and many other high government officials resigned. In view of the imminence of the approaching April elections the government released the criteria as soon as they had been determined in the form of Cabinet announcements, without waiting until the entire bill had been written. Thus, by the end of February when Imperial Ordinance No. 109 was officially promulgated, action had already been taken to bring under the purge (a) persons who had been influential in patriotic and secret societies, (b) influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations, and (c) career naval and military personnel.

On 10 March 1946, the day of the Cabinet announcement interpreting Category G, the Shidehara Cabinet sustained a second wave of resignations; five ministers retired. Many members of the House of Peers followed suit. Within the month 30 new appointees, duly screened under the new ordinances, were appointed to fill the vacancies thus created.

That part of the 10 March interpretation which rendered ineligible for public service all members of the Lower House who had been recommended by the Tojo Government greatly altered the political scene. Leadership of political parties changed, political allegiances shifted and new candidates were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in the April elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred. Of the 252 barred, 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo in the 1942 elections. Another 268 "recommended candidates" did not file.

When the Diet convened on 20 June 1946 all successful candidates to the Lower House were re-screened and their cases reviewed. As a result ten more were removed, nine of these by Japanese Government order and one, Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Liberal Party, by SCAP directive.

On 16 May 1946 the Japanese Government prepared a still more comprehensive and detailed interpretation of those paragraphs of Category G relating to other government officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had engaged in activities proscribed under the Directive. These extended criteria were not publicly announced at the time lest such an announcement interfere with the completion of screening by the scheduled deadline. Nevertheless, this document represented an early extension of the purge program into industry and the field of public information, an extension to be perfected and completed the following year.

Statistical Summary

By August 1946 the Japanese Government announced the substantial completion of the initial phase of the purge program. The Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, Prefectural Governors, all officials of the then first three ranks, judges of higher courts, officials of government controlled companies, procurators of certain higher courts, and officials of higher educational institutions directly under the Ministry of Education had all been screened. These totalled 5,520 persons, of which 814 were barred or removed, and 4,706 were passed.

This figure was subsequently increased by 4 January 1947 to 8,899 persons screened, of which 7,832 had been passed and 1,067 barred or removed. In addition 183,000 career officers of the army and navy, members of the gendarmerie, former intelligence agents, etc., had been categorically barred. The way was now clear for the anticipated extension of the program to local government, to industry and to the field of public information.

## EXTENSION OF PURGE PROGRAM

### Preliminary Steps

In August 1946 a statement of SCAP policy was issued requiring the Japanese Government to prepare a comprehensive plan for: (a) the exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies and from appointive posts of all personnel deemed undesirable under the provisions of SCAPIN 550; (b) the application of that directive to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet; (c) the exclusion of all purged personnel from any influential political or economic posts. This statement also provided that the Japanese Government should publish the full text of the plan simultaneously with its submission to SCAP.

### The Extension Plan

On 22 October the government submitted to SCAP and simultaneously released to the public a plan which comprehensively implemented the 4 January Directive.

In the ensuing two months the essential features of this plan were incorporated into definitive and appropriate form for issuance as law.

### The Extension Ordinances

On 4 January 1947, one year from issuance of the original directive, the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, thus implementing all the features of the approved plan. These ordinances contained provisions which were designed to reach into all fields.

### Criteria for Screening

The screenable positions were extended to include all elective and appointive posts in the national and local governments and specified positions in certain companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations. These latter groups were defined to be positions in: companies in which the government had special interests; organizations subsidized by the government or serving for the public benefit; principle newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theatrical companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication; political parties, their branches and similar organizations; and influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations. The specific offices considered to be policy-making positions and approximately 470 such companies, organizations, etc., were specifically listed.

### Criteria for Purging

In a manner similar to that in which definition of screenable positions was enlarged, the purge criteria were also more specifically defined.

No changes were made in the definition of the categories applicable to war criminals (Category A) career military and naval personnel, etc. (Category B), officials of financial and development companies involved

in Japanese expansion (Category E) and officials in occupied territories (Category F). With regard to the influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies (Category C) the criteria were specifically defined to include those persons in the local branches thereof who had held positions comparable to those previously defined as applying only to the national level. The criteria applicable to persons influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, (Category D) were further defined in the case of parent organizations and major affiliates to include officials of all local subdivisions thereof, down to and including chiefs of town and village branches.

The category in which the most far-reaching and comprehensive definitions were made was that applying to additional militarists and ultranationalists (Category G).

The provision in this category, implemented by Cabinet announcement of 10 March 1946 described heretofore, which applied to government officials and professional men who had participated in activities such as mentioned in this category was defined more clearly. Those falling under the provisions of the ordinance were government officials who took part in the planning or execution of propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of (1) instigating war; (2) suppressing opponents of jingoism; (3) advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, and militarism or ultranationalism; (4) guiding or controlling thought or speech for the same purpose; (5) political direction or economic exploitation of Japanese occupied territories; (6) furthering important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members in or outside the Diet who had in writing, speech or action been conspicuously active in instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Facist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artists who by their works had advocated aggression or militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar nature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or anti-militaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism were by this provision brought under the terms of the Directive. This added definition made it possible to measure by a clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc., of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as applied to the principal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance certain officials of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations and any other media of mass communication in or outside Japan who held office during the period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 and whose companies engaged in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artists were brought under the Directive. These listed officials

were the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

Perhaps the most sweeping extension of the provisions of this broad category, was in the interpretations as they applied to certain top officials of what had previously been referred to as "influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms or producing iron or steel." This category had now been broadened to include all policy-making officials down to but not including ordinary directors, but including all other officials, regardless of title, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above in any company which was conspicuously influential in the manufacture of strategic or critical material of war, conspicuously monopolistic in the production of basic productive materials or business of communications or transportation, or domestic or foreign trade; holding companies or influential companies closely associated thereto; and companies capitalized in excess of one hundred million yen or which had commanded excessive economic power. Two hundred and forty-six such companies were listed in the ordinance.

Injunctions

Contained in Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 are four injunctions designed to prevent the continuity of influence and power by purgees in those positions and organizations in the public service from which they had been removed. Penalty clauses are included which make violators of the above injunctions liable to confinement for not more than three years or to a fine not exceeding 15,000 yen.

Non-Succession Provisions

A feature designed to allow new leadership to come to the front in municipal governments was incorporated in Imperial Ordinances Nos. 3 and 4 of 1947, also issued on 4 January 1947. These ordinances provided that mayors, deputy-mayors, headmen of wards in Tokyo, headmen and deputy-headmen of towns and villages and headmen of the federations of neighborhood associations (CHONAI KAI CHO and BURAKU KAI CHO), who had held such positions consecutively from 1 September 1945 until 1 September 1946, even though they did not fall under the provisions of the purge ordinance, were to be barred from filing as candidates for those respective positions for a period of four years. So much of this as it applied to the headmen of federations of neighborhood associations was revoked when, on 3 March 1947, these federations were abolished.

Administration

Because of the increased amount of screening anticipated at all levels, estimated by the government at between 500,000 and 700,000 cases, a reorganization of the screening system was effected by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947.

This ordinance provided for one Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, forty-six Prefectural Committees (including 5 major cities) and 118 Municipal Committees (cities with population of 50,000 or more).

The Central Committee was made responsible to the Prime Minister who makes final decision on all cases screened by that committee. The local committees make recommendations to their respective prefectural governors who give final decision thereon.

The Central Committee's authority was limited to positions in the national government, positions in organizations comparable thereto, and the top elective posts of the prefectures and 5 principal cities. All other posts in local government and those in local branches of screenable organizations were placed within the screening authority of the local committees.

Publicity

The results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program is accomplished in several ways. The Central Government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, releases to the press and posts semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who have been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances are made available for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned. A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate is also available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as the screening committee's office. News releases and radio broadcasts explain to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

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The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 assemblymen of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees post-screened 158,757 persons who had been elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

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This phase began about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

By the middle of July 1947 approximately 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies and associations had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public service. There remained at that time the screening of those persons whose questionnaires had not yet been obtained, the seeking out of those whose positions were not listed in the mandatory provisions of the ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised influence and authority commensurate with such listed positions and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees.

This remaining task was largely completed by early October 1947, by which time a total of 3,488 such persons had been screened in almost 300 companies and associations, and the total number of persons removed and/or excluded increased to 360.

Public Information Media Purge.

Paragraph 5 of the "remarks" section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcasting corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, espoused totalitarianism or advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, denounced liberals and anti-militarists, or in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of those provisions necessitated extensive research in every field of public information, including not only a study of the media itself but of the organizational structure of public information companies. This program was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15

motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, deemed to have engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the "remarks" outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified officeholders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

Early in October the Japanese Government reported that 134 information media companies had submitted counter-evidence, on which 95 have been acted, resulting in the request to SCAP for approval to remove 12 companies from the black list.

## PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent persons who had resigned to escape being purged from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or assume positions legally screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which is primarily directed against those potential or "invisible" purgees who engaged in political activity, and as such cannot effectively be applied to all "invisible purgees."

On 2 July 1947, the government issued Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 which provides that the Prime Minister can effect the provisional designation of any person concerning whom there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he falls within the purview of the Memorandum. This designation is effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days is provided from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified can, if he so desires, file a letter of exemption with a questionnaire which is examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception is filed within the thirty day period, the designation becomes effective under the provisions of the basic Ordinance, and is publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

By the end of July 1947 documentary evidence had been secured, listing substantially all officials who held policy positions in the designated economic companies between 7 July 1937 to 2 September 1945. By early September 1947 lists had been compiled of the Governors of Occupied Territories (Category F) and of officials who held certain policy making positions in the Japanese Government between 1937 and 1941 (Category G); and by the end of that month the collection of documentary evidence listing the persons falling under the other various categories and provisions of the Purge Ordinances was rapidly approaching completion.

By early October approximately 1,405 persons, on whom documentary evidence was obtained, had been provisionally designated; this will result in the final designation of over 1,000 persons whose period for submitting protest has expired. Of those provisionally designated 130 individuals submitted letters of protest.

## APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 setting up a Board of Appeal. Prior to this time any person, who felt that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case could appeal to the Prime Minister. However, relatively few such appeals had been received. But with the greatly

enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by October 1947 a total of 239 were listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 41 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 16 recommended for reinstatement, while 182 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. Initially Ordinance No. 65 provided that before an appeal could be submitted an appellant must have vacated his position; however, in July 1947, this provision of the Ordinance was revoked and appeal is now possible immediately upon designation. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a sufficient secretariat but in August 1947 a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

SUMMARY

From its inception the Purge has remained preventative. Although SCAP was authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to suspected war criminals only.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memoranda issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program, subject to the right reserved by SCAP to review any action of the Japanese Government to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

By 4 January 1947 of 8,899 cases acted upon by the Japanese Government 1,770 had been reviewed by SCAP. In 27 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Between 4 January 1947 and 4 October 1947 the Japanese Government screened 611,411 cases. Of the total number screened during this period SCAP reviewed 25,600 cases, representing persons holding important elective and appointive posts in government, officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Further action by SCAP upon post-review of the Japanese Government's action has been to direct or approve reinstatement of 21 individuals unjustly or mistakenly barred or removed.

Statistics on persons affected by the Purge Program as of early October 1947 reduce to the following approximate totals:

1. Barred and removed - Initial phase (4 Jan 1946 - 4 Jan 1947). . . . . 1,067

2. Barred and removed under the Extension (4 Jan 1947 - Oct. 1947) . . . . . 1,941

3. Career officers, gendarmes, intelligence agents, etc, barred by original directive . . . . . 183,000

4. Persons who resigned their positions in order to avoid designation . . . . . 20,000

5. Provisionally designated (2 July 47 - 9 Oct 47). . 1,405

These figures do not, of course, include the tens of thousands of

other undesirable leaders who are forever barred from Public Service but who have held no office since the purge became effective and therefore have not yet been designated by name. Nor are nearly 6,000 Thought Control and Special Higher Police removed by SCAP's Civil Liberties Directive of October 1945 included. Because they are barred only from positions in the Justice, Welfare, and Home Ministries and from police work, their status is somewhat different from that of persons purged under SCAPIN 550 who are barred from all Public Service. A similar group, likewise not included in the above, is the approximately 5,000 teachers who have been removed from the field of education.

1 August 1947

# THE PURGE

On 4 January 1946 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a sweeping directive requiring a purge of all persons who shared responsibility for Japan's program of aggression.

This directive, issued as SCAPIN 550, was designed to remove undesirable persons from positions of influence and authority in the political, economic and social life of Japan. For the fields of education and police, separate similar programs had been initiated as early as October 1945.

The removal and exclusion program has never been either in concept or administration a punitive measure but was and is a technique designed to eliminate the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons whose past careers showed them to be undesirable leaders for a nation dedicated to democracy and the cause of world peace.

## BASIS FOR THE PURGE

### Potsdam Declaration

The international basis for the entire purge program is found in that part of the Potsdam Declaration which states, "There must be removed for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world".

### Occupation Directives

In accordance with initial U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan SCAP was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that no persons be "allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society". . . . . who have been influential in the activities of Imperial Rule Assistance Organizations, "or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the occupation".

SCAP was further directed to prohibit the retention in, or selection for, positions of important responsibility in industry, finance, commerce, agriculture, or public or private financial institutions, agencies or organizations, of any persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, and of all those who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SCAP was directed to assume that persons who held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in any of the fields enumerated above have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.

## THE 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

SCAPIN 550 which has become famous as the "4 January Directive" is SCAP's implementation of the early instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Purge Categories

This basic directive ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public office and to exclude from government service exponents of militant nationalism and aggression falling within the following defined categories:

Category A. War Criminals

Category B. Career Military and Naval Personnel: Special Police and Officers of the War Ministries.

This category included members of the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, the Supreme Military Council, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Supreme Council for direction of the war; all career commissioned officers and enlisted personnel who served in or with the military or naval police or other special or secret intelligence police organizations; and all persons who served as higher officials in the Ministry of War or Ministry of Navy.

Category C. Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.

Founders, officers, directors and other important officials, large financial contributors to, or editor of any publication or organ of such societies.

Category D. Persons Influential in the Activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

National officers, leading officials in Prefectural or Metropolitan subdivisions, editor of any publication or organ of the above or agencies or affiliates of the above organizations.

Category E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansion.

Persons who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were directors, presidents, vice presidents, advisors, auditors or controlling branch managers in Japanese occupied territory of above institutions.

Category F. Governors of Occupied Territories.

Certain specified higher officials such as governor general, civil administrator, and military administrator in Japan's wartime colonial empire.

Category G. Additional Militarists and Ultranationalists.

These broad provisions bring under the terms of the directive:

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetuated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

## INITIAL ACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING THE PURGE DIRECTIVE

### Ordinances Issued

On 27 February 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 which established the machinery for applying the Directive. These ordinances determined, first, who should be screened, second, who should be classified as undesirable in light of the Directive and third, how the removal of undesirables should be accomplished.

By the terms of these ordinances all incumbent officials of the then first three civil service grades, and those who held positions of comparable authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special control of the government, and all applicants for future elective or appointive posts in the national government were subject to screening to determine their eligibility.

The seven categories of undesirables outlined by the Directive were defined in greater detail by the ordinances as follows:

1. No change was made in the category applying to war criminals (Category A).

2. The one affecting career military and naval personnel (Category B) remained substantially the same.

3. The provisions of Category C were defined as applying to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies.

4. The many agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations (Category D) were enumerated and the influential positions in each duly listed.

5. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion (Category E), as listed in the original directive, was increased.

6. The exact titles and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories (Category E) were defined.

7. The broad provisions of Category G were extensively interpreted by a special cabinet announcement appearing shortly after the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109.

It brought under the purge memorandum all persons who had occupied certain policy-forming positions on the highest government level between the outbreak of "The China Incident" and the Surrender.

It listed other high government positions of somewhat lesser importance and provided for the purge of individuals who had occupied them providing there was conspicious evidence that these individuals have played an important part: (a) in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with puppet nations in preparation for the Greater East Asia War, (b) in the suppression of opponents of militarism, (c) in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries, (d) in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

The interpretation of Category G also brought under the purge: (a) those officials who had over a long period of time engaged in the suppression of civil liberties, (b) other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had participated in activities proscribed under Category G, (c) officials of companies that had produced the weapons and sinews of war, (d) highest officers of patriotic societies not listed under Category C and (e) any person who was recommended as a candidate by the TOJO Government in 1942.

The ordinances provided for a screening committee to examine questionnaires and to decide upon individual eligibility. In the event that the individual was found to fall under the criteria as defined in the ordinance, the Prime Minister was to designate him as an undesirable person, and to order his removal and exclusion from office. The ordinances also provided for the collection of questionnaires and contained a penalty clause designed to insure that such questionnaires would be filled out truthfully and completely.

Initial Operation and Effect Of The Purge

The impact of the Purge Directive was immediate and profound. On 13 January 1946, only 9 days after the Directive was issued, the Cabinet of Baron Kijuro Shidehara underwent extensive re-organization. Three ministers and six cabinet executives and many other high government officials resigned. In view of the imminence of the approaching April elections the government released the criteria as soon as they had been determined in the form of Cabinet announcements, without waiting until the entire bill had been written. Thus, by the end of February when Imperial Ordinance No. 109 was officially promulgated, action had already been taken to bring under the purge (a) persons who had been influential in patriotic and secret societies, (b) influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations, and (c) career naval and military personnel, of whom approximately 183,000 were barred from the Public Service.

On 10 March 1946, the day of the Cabinet announcement interpreting Category G, the Shidehara Cabinet sustained a second wave of resignations; five ministers retired. Many members of the House of Peers followed suit. Within the month 30 new appointees, duly screened under the new ordinances, were appointed to fill the vacancies thus created.

That part of the 10 March interpretation which rendered ineligible for public service all members of the Lower House who had been recommended by the Tojo Government greatly altered the political scene. Leadership of political parties changed, political allegiances shifted and new candidates were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in the April

elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred. Of the 252 barred, 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo in the 1942 elections. Another 268 "recommended candidates" did not file.

When the Diet convened on 20 June 1946 all successful candidates to the Lower House were re-screened and their cases reviewed. As a result ten more were removed, nine of these by Japanese Government order and one, Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Liberal Party, by SCAP directive.

On 16 May 1946 the Japanese Government prepared a still more comprehensive and detailed interpretation of those paragraphs of Category G relating to other government officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had engaged in activities proscribed under the Directive. These extended criteria were not publicly announced at the time lest such an announcement interfere with the completion of screening by the scheduled deadline. Nevertheless, this document represented an early extension of the purge program into industry and the field of public information, an extension to be perfected and completed the following year.

Statistical Summary

By August 1946 the Japanese Government announced the substantial completion of the initial phase of the purge program. The Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, Prefectural Governors, all officials of the then first three ranks, judges of higher courts, officials of government controlled companies, procurators of certain higher courts, and officials of higher educational institutions directly under the Ministry of Education had all been screened. These totalled 5,520 persons, of which 814 were barred or removed, and 4,706 were passed. This figure was subsequently increased by 4 January 1947 to 8,899 persons screened, of which 7,832 had been passed and 1,067 barred or removed. In addition 183,000 career officers of the army and navy, members of the gendarmerie and former intelligence agents had been categorically barred. The way was now clear for the anticipated extension of the program to local government, to industry and to the field of public information.

## EXTENSION OF PURGE PROGRAM

Preliminary Steps

In August 1946 a statement of SCAP policy was issued requiring the Japanese Government to prepare a comprehensive plan for: (a) the exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies and from appointive posts of all personnel deemed undesirable under the provisions of SCAPIN 550; (b) the application of that directive to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet; (c) the exclusion of all purged personnel from any influential political or economic posts. This statement also provided that the Japanese Government should publish the full text of the plan simultaneously with its submission to SCAP.

The Extension Plan

On 22 October the government submitted to SCAP and simultaneously released to the public a plan which comprehensively implemented the 4 January Directive.

In the ensuing two months the essential features of this plan were incorporated into definitive and appropriate form for issuance as law.

The Extension Ordinances

On 4 January 1947, one year from issuance of the original directive, the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, thus implementing all the features of the approved plan. These ordinances contained provisions which were designed to reach into all fields.

Criteria for Screening

The screenable positions were extended to include all elective and appointive posts in the national and local governments and specified positions in certain companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations. These latter were defined to be positions in: companies in which the government had special interests; organizations subsidized by the government or serving for the public benefit; principle newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theatrical companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication; political parties, their branches and similar organizations; and influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations. The specific offices considered to be policy-making positions and approximately 470 such companies, organizations, etc., were specifically listed.

Criteria for Purging

In a manner similar to that in which definition of screenable positions was enlarged, the purge criteria were also more specifically defined.

No changes were made in the definition of the categories applicable to war criminals (Category A) career military and naval personnel, etc. (Category B), officials of financial and development companies involved in Japanese expansion (Category E) and officials in occupied territories (Category F). With regard to the influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies (Category C) the criteria were specifically defined to include those persons in the local branches thereof who had held positions comparable to those previously defined as applying only to the national level. The criteria applicable to persons influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, (Category D) were further defined in the case of parent organizations and major affiliates to include officials of all local subdivisions thereof, down to and including chiefs of town and village branches.

The category in which the most far-reaching and comprehensive definitions were made was that applying to additional militarists and ultranationalists (Category G).

The provision in this category, implemented by Cabinet announcement of 10 March 1946 described heretofore, which applied to government officials and professional men who had participated in activities such as mentioned in this category was defined more clearly. Those falling under the provisions of the ordinance were government officials who took part in the planning or execution of propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of (1) instigating war; (2) suppressing opponents of jingoism; (3) advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, and militarism or ultranationalism; (4) guiding or controlling thought or speech for the same purpose; (5) political direction or economic exploitation of Japanese occupied territories; (6) furthering

important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members in or outside the Diet who had in writing, speech or action been conspicuously active in instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artists who by their works had advocated aggression or militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar nature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or antimilitaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism were by this provision brought under the terms of the Directive. This added definition made it possible to measure by a clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc. of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as applied to the principal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance certain officials of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations and any other media of mass communication in or outside Japan who held office during the period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 and whose companies engaged in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artists were brought under the Directive. These listed officials were the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

Perhaps the most sweeping extension of the provisions of this broad category, was in the interpretations as they applied to certain top officials of what had previously been referred to as "influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms or producing iron or steel." This category had now been broadened to include all policy-making officials down to but not including ordinary directors, but including all other officials, regardless of title, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above in any company which was conspicuously influential in the manufacture of strategic or critical material of war, conspicuously monopolistic in the production of basic productive materials or business of communications or transportation, or domestic or foreign trade; holding companies or influential companies closely associated thereto; and companies capitalized in excess of one hundred million yen or which had commanded excessive economic power. Two hundred and forty-six such companies were listed in the ordinance.

Injunctions

Contained in Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 are four injunctions designed to prevent the continuity of influence and power by purgees in those positions and organizations in the public service from which they had been removed. Penalty clauses are included which make violators of the above injunctions liable to confinement for not more than three years or to a fine not exceeding 15,000 yen.

Non-Succession Provisions

A feature designed to allow new leadership to come to the front in municipal governments was incorporated in Imperial Ordinances Nos. 3 and 4 of 1947, also issued on 4 January 1947. These ordinances provided that mayors, deputy-mayors, headmen of wards in Tokyo, headmen and deputy-headmen of towns and villages and headmen of federations of neighborhood associations (CHONAI KAI CHO and BURAKU KAI CHO), who had held such positions consecutively from 1 September 1945 until 1 September 1946, even though they did not fall under the provisions of the purge ordinance, were to be barred from filing as candidates for those respective positions for a period of four years. So much of this as it applied to the headmen of federations of neighborhood associations was revoked when, on 3 March 1947, these federations were abolished.

Administration

Because of the increased amount of screening anticipated at all levels, estimated by the government at between 500,000 and 700,000 cases, a reorganization of the screening system was effected by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947.

This ordinance provided for one Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, forty-six Prefectural Committees (including 5 major cities) and 118 Municipal Committees (cities with population of 50,000 or more).

The Central Committee was made responsible to the Prime Minister who makes final decision on all cases screened by that committee. The local committees make recommendations to their respective prefectural governors who give final decision thereon.

The Central Committee's authority was limited to positions in the national government, positions in organizations comparable thereto, and the top elective posts of the prefectures and 5 principal cities. All other posts in local government and those in local branches of screenable organizations were within the screening authority of the local committees.

Publicity

The results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program is accomplished in several ways. The Central Government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, releases to the press and posts semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who have been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances are made available for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned. A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate is

also available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as the screening committee's office. News releases and radio broadcasts explain to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

Schedule of Screening

The order in which various groups would be screened was determined by schedule. Proposed appointees for local committees were screened first. The general elections then impending necessitated screening election officials and candidates next. Screening of economic entities, principal public offices, political parties and public information media organizations followed.

Activities Prior to Elections

Prior to the General Elections in April 1947 all candidates for the more important elective posts were screened and the following report made by the Japanese Government:

| Candidates | Filed | Passed | *Provisionally Passed | Barred |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| House of Representatives | 3,426 | 3,230 | 59 | 137 |
| House of Councillors | 1,406 | 1,365 | 10 | 31 |
| Prefectural Governors | 451 | 428 | 3 | 20 |
| Mayors of 5 Principal Cities | 43 | 42 | - | 1 |

*No final decision could be reached in these cases noted as "provisionally passed" because research in the information media field had not been completed.

During the same period the Local Committees screened an estimated 72,550 candidates for headmen of wards, towns, and villages; 21,126 candidates for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen and accountants of cities, towns and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees.

Activities Subsequent to Elections

Subsequent to the elections and prior to assuming office, successful candidates for the important elective posts, screened by the Central Committee were re-examined. Eleven members-elect to the House of Representatives and four members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed. One of those removed was ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, former Finance Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet.

The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 assemblymen of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees post-screened 158,757 persons who had been elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

Economic Phase

This phase began about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

By the middle of July 1947 approximately 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public

service. There remained the screening of those persons whose questionnaires had not yet been obtained, the seeking out of those whose positions were not listed in the mandatory provisions of the ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised influence and authority commensurate with such listed positions and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees.

Public Information Media Purge

Paragraph 5 of the "remarks" section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcasting corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, espoused totalitarianism or advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, denounced liberals and anti-militarists, or in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of these provisions necessitated extensive research in every field of public information, including not only a study of the media itself but of the organizational structure of public information companies. This program was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15 motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, deemed to have engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the "remarks" outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified office-holders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent persons who had resigned to escape being purged from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or assume positions legally screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which is primarily directed against those potential or "invisible" purgees who engage in political activity, and as such cannot effectively be applied to all "invisible purgees".

On 2 July 1947, the government issued Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 which provides that the Prime Minister can effect the provisional designation of any person concerning whom there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he falls within the purview of the Memorandum. This designation is effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days is provided from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified can, if he so desires, file a letter of exemption with a questionnaire which is examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception is filed within the thirty day period, the designation becomes effective under the provisions of

the basic Ordinance, and is publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

By the end of July 1947 documentary evidence had been submitted listing substantially all officials who held policy positions in the designated economic companies between 7 July 1937 to 2 September 1945. Of these approximately 800 clearly fell under the provisions of the Memorandum, an additional 200 were deceased, the addresses of some 200 were unknown, and more than 500 will be required to submit questionnaires.

Lists of persons coming within the purview of the categories pertaining to war criminals (Category A) and to career military and naval personnel (Category B) are under preparation.

Preparation commenced on 10 July 1947 of a list of persons who held the policy-making positions in the public information media companies and organizations. It is estimated that this list will be completed as soon after 30 July 1947 as all "evidence to the contrary" can be fully considered.

The collection of documentary evidence insofar as it affects the former officers and persons of authority in secret, patriotic, ultranationalistic and militaristic societies is currently in progress.

## APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 setting up a Board of Appeal. Prior to this time any person, who felt that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case could appeal to the Prime Minister. However, relatively few such appeals had been received. But with the greatly enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by July 1947 a total of 99 was listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 36 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 9 recommended for reinstatement, while 54 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. Initially Ordinance No. 65 provided that before an appeal could be submitted an appellant must have vacated his position; however, in July 1947, this provision of the Ordinance was revoked and appeal is now possible immediately upon designation. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a sufficient secretariat but recently a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

## SUMMARY

From its inception the Purge has remained preventative. Although SCAP was authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to suspected war criminals only.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memoranda issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program, subject to the right reserved by SCAP to review any action of the Japanese Government to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

By 4 January 1947 of 8,899 cases acted upon by the Japanese Government 1,770 had been reviewed by SCAP, In 27 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Between 4 January 1947 and 19 July 1947 the Japanese Gove rnment screened 563,099 cases, removing or barring a total of 1,681 individuals. Of the total number screened during this period SCAP reviewed 16,047 cases, representing persons holding important elective and appointive posts in gove rnment, officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese Gove rnment was disapproved.

Further action by SCAP upon post-review of the Japanese Government's action has been to direct the reinstatement of 12 individuals unjustly or mistakenly barred or removed.

Statistics on persons affected by the Purge Program as of mid-July reduce to the following approximate totals:

1. Barred and removed - Initial phase (4 Jan 1946 - 4 Jan 1947)..... 1,067

2. Barred and removed under the Extension (4 Jan 1947 - 15 July 1947)..... 1,681

3. Career officers, gendarmes and intelligence agents barred by original directive..... 183,000

4. Persons who resigned their positions in order to avoid designation..... 20,000

These figures do not, of course, include the tens of thousands of other undesirable leaders who are forever barred from Public Service but who have held no office since the purge became effective and therefore have not yet been designated by name. Nor are nearly 6000 Thought Control and Special Higher Police removed by SCAP's Civil Liberties Directive of October, 1945 included. Because they are barred only from positions in the Justice, Welfare, and Home Ministries and from police work, their status is somewhat different from that of persons purged under SCAPIN 550 who are barred from all Public Service. A similar group, likewise not included in the above, is the approximately 5000 teachers who have been removed from the field of education.

7375

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500
4 January 1946

AG 091 (4 Jan 46) GS
(SCAPIN-548)

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT : Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations, Societies and Other Organizations.

1. You will prohibit the formation of any political party, association, society or other organization and any activity on the part of any of them or of any individual or group whose purpose, or the effect of whose activity, is the following:

a. Resistance or opposition to the Occupation Forces or to orders issued by the Japanese Government in response to directives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or;

b. Support or justification of aggressive Japanese Military action abroad, or;

c. Arrogation by Japan of leadership of other Asiatic, Indonesian or Malayan peoples, or;

d. Exclusion of foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce or the exercise of their professions, or;

e. Opposition to a free cultural or intellectual exchange between Japan and foreign countries, or;

f. Affording military or quasi-military training, or providing benefits, greater than similar civilian benefits, or special representation for persons formerly members of the Army or Navy, or perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit in Japan, or;

g. Alteration of policy by assassination or other terroristic programs, or encouragement or justification of a tradition favoring such methods.

2. A list of organizations, some or all of whose purposes are prescribed under the provisions of paragraph 1 above, is given in Appendix A to this Memorandum. This list will not be regarded as inclusive. The organizations listed in that appendix and other organizations, whose purposes or activities are those above mentioned or similar to them, will be immediately dissolved, together with any organizations which they control or with which they are affiliated.

3. a. You will take such action immediately as may be required to prevent all transactions involving property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by any organization dissolved or to be dissolved in accord with this Memorandum or of the type enumerated in paragraph 1 hereof. All such property, including all books, files and records of such organizations, will be seized and held in your custody. You will obtain complete records of all such property and will keep them available for inspection as public records. Officials receiving such records will be held personally responsible for their safe keeping and use in accord with this Memorandum. Any such property which is capable of use for the production of food, shelter or other necessities of life will be exploited as promptly as possible for those purposes.

b. You will promptly obtain and submit to this Headquarters the name and address and the position held by each person who has, at any time since 7 July 1937, served as an officer of any organization dissolved in accord with this Memorandum. Such information will also be kept available as a public record. Complete membership lists will also be furnished.

4. You will enact appropriate laws or ordinances to carry out the terms of this Memorandum and to prevent further activities contrary to its terms.

5. Until further order of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, any organization shall be deemed, regardless of its declared purposes, to further purposes or activities contrary to the terms of this memorandum if:

a. Any of its principal officers were (i) members of organizations abolished in accord with this order, or (ii) former commissioned officers of the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy or the Special Volunteer Reserve, who have been on active duty since 1 January 1930 or (iii) any person who has served in or with the military police (Kempei-Tai) or Naval Police, the TOKUMU KIKAN, KAIGUN TOKUMU BU, or other special or secret intelligence or military or naval police organizations.

b. Its membership includes more than twenty-five percent of persons who were formerly members of an organization or organizations abolished or prohibited in pursuance of this Memorandum.

6. You will forbid the formation or activity of any party, society, organization, association or group whose purpose or activity consists of:

a. Proposing or supporting candidates for public office.

b. Influencing the policy of Government, or

c. The discussion of the relations between Japan and foreign powers,

unless it shall first have filed a declaration of (a) its name, (b) its purposes, (c) the address of its principal offices, (d) the names and addresses of its officers together with a statement as to their military or police service and the names of any associations, societies or parties of which they are or have been members, (e) the names and addresses of substantial financial supporters and the amounts of their respective contributions, (f) a roster of the names and addresses of its membership in the office of the mayor of the town or city in which it has or intends to have its principal office. Such declarations will be kept up to date as changes in purposes and membership occur. Declarations with regard to changes of membership and substantial contributions will be made as required by the Supreme Commander; reports of changes in officers or purposes will be made immediately. You will direct that the mayor of any town or city receiving such a declaration or any change forward two copies to an appropriate office of the Imperial Japanese Government in Tokyo. Both the original and one of the copies of such declarations will be kept available for public inspection at all times during ordinary business hours. No fees will be charged in connection with any of the foregoing and the procedure fixed for filing such declarations shall be such as to make compliance with these directions as simple and easy as possible.

The provisions of this paragraph which require the filing of a roster of the names and addresses of members will not apply to groups or other organizations of workers or employees who meet for the purpose of the discussion of questions relating to wages, hours and working conditions or the choice of persons to represent them in negotiation with their employers in connection with such questions.

7. The purpose of the provisions of paragraph 6 of this Memorandum is to secure public knowledge of the character of political organizations in Japan and to prevent the formation of secret, militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic societies and organizations. It shall not be interpreted nor shall it be applied in a manner which interferes with freedom of assemble, speech or religion except with respect to the purposes and activities specifically mentioned herein.

8. You will present your programme for the execution of the directions of this Memorandum, together with any laws, ordinances or orders to be issued in accord with it, for the approval of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Any laws or ordinances which you will enact in compliance with this Memorandum will provide that upon such approval they will be effective from the date of this Memorandum, regardless of the date of their enactment.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN
/t/ H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

# A P P E N D I X  A

List of Organizations to be Abolished referred to in Paragraph 2 of the Memorandum to the Imperial Japanese Government AG 091 (4 Jan 46) GS.

Note: This list does not include all of the organizations which are to be dissolved in accord with the directions of the above Memorandum.

1. DAI NIPPON ISSHIN-KAI (Great Japan Renovation Society)
2. DAI NIPPON KOA RENMEI (Great Japan Rising Asia Alliance) and all its affiliated organizations
3. DAI NIPPON SEISANTO (Great Japan Production Party)
4. DAI NIPPON SEKISEI-KAI (Greater Japan True-hearted Society)
5. DAI TOA KYOKAI (Greater East Asia Association)
6. DAITO JUKU (Eastern Academy)
7. GENRON HOKOKU KAI (literary Patriotic Society)
8. GENYOSHA (Dark Ocian Society)
9. JIKYOKU KAIGI KAI (Current Affairs Discussion Society)
10. KAKUREI-SO (The House of the Cry of the Crane)
11. KENKOKU-KAI (national Foundation Society)
12. KINKEI GAKUIN (Golden Pheasant Institute)
13. KOKURYUKAI (Black Dragon Society)
14. KOKUSAI HANKYO RENMEI (Anti-Communist League)
15. KOKUSAI SEIKEI GAKKAI (International Political Economic Society)
16. KOKUSUI TAISHUTO (Ultranationalist Party)
17. KOKUTAI YOGO RENGO KAI (National State Protection League)
18. MEIRIN-KAI (Higher Ethics Society)
19. MIZUHO CLUB (Mizuho - archaic poetic term for Japan, literally "Fresh Rice Plant")
20. SONJO DOSHIKAI (Loyalist Comrades Society)
21. TAIKA KAI (Great Change Society)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500
4 January 1946

AG 091.1 (4 Jan 46)GS
(SCAPIN - 550)

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office.

1. The Potsdam Declaration states: "There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security, and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world".

2. In order to carry out this provision of the Potsdam Declaration, the Imperial Japanese Government is hereby ordered to remove from public office and exclude from government service all persons who have been:

a. Active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression.

b. Influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates; or

c. Influential in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society or the Political Association of Great Japan,
as those terms are defined in Appendix A to this directive.

3. The term "public office" as used in this directive shall mean and include.

a. Any position in the government service which is customarily filled by one with the civil service rank of Chokunin or above (or equivalent rank under any reorganization of the civil service system); or

b. Any other position in the government service not customarily filled by a member of the civil service which is equivalent or superior to the civil service rank of Chokunin (in the case of government corporations the term will include at least: Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, Vice-President, Director, Advisor and Auditor).

4. The term "government service", as used in this directive, shall mean and include all positions in the central Japanese and Prefectural Governments and all of their agencies and local branches, bureaus ( including Regional Administrative Bureaus) and offices and all positions in corporations, associations and other organizations in which said Governments or any of their agencies have a financial interest representing actual or working control.

5. The term " remove for public office" as used in this directive shall mean to discharge the person from public office which he holds and to terminate his influence and participation therein, directly and indirectly. Persons removed from public office will not be entitled to any public or private pensions or other emoluments or benefits without the consent of this Headquarters. An official removed under this procedure will be dismissed summarily and will not be entitled to the hearing or other procedures precedent to removal to which he may have been entitled under Japanese Law.

6. The term "exclude from government service" as used in this directive shall mean to bar the person in question from any position in the government service. Thus, persons removed from public office will be disqualified for holding any other positions in the government service. Also persons who may not be holding public offices from which they must be removed, may nevertheless be disqualified from taking a position in the government service. This disqualification from holding public office shall be continued until the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration quoted in paragraph 1 have been fulfilled in Japan.

7. The mere removal of officials from public office and the exclusion from government service of those persons described herein will not be sufficient to establish the new order of peace, security and justice envisaged by the Potsdam Declaration. If Japan is to achieve a peacefully inclined and responsible government, the greatest care must be taken to appoint new officials who will foster the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people and who will respect fundamental human rights and freedom of speech, religion and thought. If existing civil service qualification regulations provide obstacles to the appointment of such officials or unduly narrow the field from which appointments may be made, such regulations shall be amended or superseded.

8. The removals ordered by this directive shall be effected as expeditiously as possible, priority being given to the more important positions. Removal may be postponed in the case of individuals who are absolutely required to insure demobilization of the Japanese armed forces in the outlying theaters or to carry out the provisions of this directive. When their assistance is no longer absolutely required they will be dismissed. The names of such individuals, their positions, the reason for their disqualification, and the reasons for their temporary retention will promptly be reported to theis Headquarters. The time of their final dismissal will also promptly be reported.

9. Appendix "A" contains a list of the categories of persons who must be removed from public office and excluded from government service by the Imperial Japanese Government in order to carry out the provisions of paragraph 2 of this directive. Persons included in the categories listed in Apprndix "A" shall be removed from public office as provided in paragraphs 8 and 10 and shall thereafter be excluded from government service. However, if the Imperial Japanese Government represents that in order to carry on indispensable peaceful executive activities of such government, the temporary reinstatement of an individual so removed is essential and that it is impossible to obtain a suitable replacement, an application so stating, signed by a responsible official of the Imperial Japanese Government, may be filed with this Headquarters. Such application shall contain a statement of the name, rank, position, duties, and responsibilities of the individual involved; shall state fully the reasons why such temporary reinstatement is regarded as essential, the requested period of temporary reinstatement and the efforts made to obtain a suitable replacement. Such application shall be accompanied by a copy of the questionnaire described in paragraph 10, below. No such temporary reinstatement will be effected by the Imperial Japanese Government until this Headquarters has registered its approval in writing.

10. In order to insure that the government service is cleansed of undesirable personnel the following action will be taken:

a. The Imperial Japanese Government will instruct each of its Ministries or other appropriate agencies to remove from the positions described in paragraph 3 which are within its competence, any persons whom the records show or who are known to have been within the categories listed in Appendix "A". A Questionnaire (see below) will be obtained from each such individual before he is notified of his dismissal.

b. In addition, the Imperial Japanese Government will instruct each of its Ministries or other appropriate agencies to prepare and distribute to all incumbents of positions described in paragraph 3 and to future applicants for government positions which are within its competence, the Questionnaire contained in Appendix "B". Such Questionnaires will be reviewed and on the basis of them and any other knowledge in possession of the Government, individuals will be removed from office or denied employment in accordance with the provisions of this directive.

11. Each Ministry or other appropriate agency will prepare a Plan for handling the Questionnaires which will provide for:

a. Distribution.

b. Collection.

c. Review.

d. Action on basis of information in Questionnaire.

e. Classification and filing -- this system should permit reference to the Questionnaire in terms of agency, rank of officials, and action taken (e.g. removal or retention.)

12. Each plan will provide for screening of positions occupied by higher rank officials first. A duplicate set of completed Questionnaires will be provided at the Headquarters of each Ministry or other agency where it will be available for inspection or removal by this Headquarters.

13. In addition to the Questionnaries each Ministry or other agency will maintain at its headquarters an alphabetical file of Questionnaire Record Cards substantially in the form indicated in Apprendix "C" available for inspection or removal by this Headquarters. The cards will be filled out in English (also in Japanese if desired). Identical numbers, with an identifying symbol for each Ministry or other agency, will be assigned to each Questionnaire and the Record Card relating thereto.

14. In order that the forthcoming elections may provide a full opportunity for democratic elements in Japan to obtain memberships in the Imperial Diet denied them during the years of Japan's militaristic nationalism and aggression and in order to eliminate from the new Diet the influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, any person who comes within the categories described in Appendix "A" shall be disqualified as a candidate for any elective position in the Imperial Diet. Any such person shall be disqualified from standing at any time as a candidate for Prefectural Governor or Mayor of a city (Shi). Also, all such persons shall be removed from and henceforth excluded from appointment to the House of Peers. The Imperial Japanese Government shall adopt measures to enforce this disqualification of candidates for elective office, including the issuance of necessary regulations, the publication of disqualification categories prepared in conformity herewith and the certification by each candidate that he is not thereby disqualified from standing for election. A comprehensive report of the measures proposed to be adopted will be furnished to this Headquarters.

15. The Imperial Japanese Government will make the following reports to this Headquarters (in English; in triplicate):

a. Reports required by paragraphs 8 and 14 hereof;

b. An initial report of the Plan of each Ministry or other agency called for by paragraph 11. This Headquarters may direct revision of any of these Plans if they are not considered adequate.

c. A weekly report, divided into sections for the fields of

competence of each Ministry or other agency, showing:

(1) Total number of positions whose incumbents are to be investigated.

(2) Number and type of positions investigated previously and during the current week.

(3) Number of persons removed or denied employment during the current week.

(4) Names, ranks, positions, and Questionnaire numbers of persons removed or denied employment during the current week.

16. This Headquarters will provide for inspections and investigations necessary to check compliance with this directive, and the Imperial Japanese Government will render any assistance required for the making of such inspections and investigations. Action taken by the Japanese Government with respect to removal or denial of employment and with respect to disqualification of candidates for elective office will be reviewed and may be reversed by this Headquarters.

17. Wilful falsification of or failure to make full and complete disclosures in any Questionnaire, report or Application provided for in this directive will be punishable by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers as a violation of the Surrender Terms. In addition, the Imperial Japanese Government will make any provisions necessary to provide adequate punishment in Japanese courts and under Japanese law for such wilful falsification or non-disclosure and willundertake such prosecutions as may be required.

18. In addition to the general provisions of this directive covering all public offices, this Headquarters has made and may make more restrictive requirements respecting employment of certain classes of individuals at all levels in special fields.

19. All officials and subordinates of the Imperial Japanese Government affected by the terms of this order will be held personally responsible and strictly accountable for compliance with and adherence to the spirit and letter of this directive.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN
H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst Adjutant General.

Inclosures:

Appendix A - Removal and Exclusion Categories.
Appendix B - Questionnaire.
Appendix C - Questionnaire Record Card.

## APPENDIX "A"

## REMOVAL AND EXCLUSION CATEGORIES

A. War Criminals.

Persons arrested as suspected war criminals unless released or acquitted.

B. Career military and naval personnel: special police and officials of the war ministries.

Any person who has at any time held any of the following positions:

1. Member of:

Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals
Supreme Military Council
Imperial General Headquarters
Army and Navy General Staffs
Supreme Council for Direction of the War

2. Commissioned officer in the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy or in the Special Volunteer Reserve.

3. Commissioned or non-commissioned officer, enlisted man or civilian employee who served in or with the Military Police (Kempei-Tai) or Naval police, the TOKOMU KIKAN, KAIGUN TOKUMU BU, or other special or secret intelligence or military or naval police organizations.

4. Ministry of War (unless appointed since 2 September 1945)

Minister
Permanent Vice-Minister
Parliamentary Vice-Minister
Parliamentary Councillor
Chief Secretary

All civilian officials of the civil service rank of Chokunin, or above, or who occupy positions normally held by persons of such rank.

5. Ministry of the Navy (unless appointed since 2 September 1945)

Minister
Permanent Vice-Minister
Parliamentary Vice-Minister
Parliamentary Councillor
Chief Secretary

All civilian officials of the civil service rank of Chokunin, or above, or who occupy positions normally held by persons of such rank.

C. Influential Members of Ultr-nationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.

Any person who has at any time:

1. Been a founder, officer, or director of; or
2. Occupied any post of authority in; or
3. Been an editor of any publication or organ of; or
4. Made substantial voluntary contributions (a sum or property the value of which is large in itself or large in proportion to the means of the individual in question) to any of the organizations or their branches, subsidiaries, agencies, or affiliates (other than the organizations referred to in paragraph D below) described in the Memorandum to the Japanese Government on "Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations and Societies" AG 091 (4 Jan 46) GS.

D. Persons Influential in the Activities of IRRA, IRAPS, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

Any person who has at any time:

1. Been a founder or national officer, a national director, national committee chairman, or a leading official of a prefectural or metropolitan subdivision of; or

2. Been an editor of any publication or organ of:

   a. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai) and any of its affiliates.

   b. The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (Taisei Seijikai) and any of its affiliates or agencies.

   c. The Political Association of Great Japan and any of its affiliates or agencies.

E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansions:

Any person who has at any time between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945, occupied any of the positions listed below;

Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, Vice-President, Director, Adviser or Auditor of any of the following or, in territory occupied by the Japanese armed forces since 7 July 1937, manager of a branch of:

South Manchurian Railway Company
Manchuria Development Company
North China Development Company
Central China Development Company

Southern Development Company
Taiwan Development Company
Manchuria Heavy Industry Development Company
Nanyo Development Company
Oriental Development Company
Wartime Finance Bank
United Funds Bank
Southern Development Bank
Overseas Funds Bank
Chosen Colonization Bank
Deutsche Bank Fuer Ostasien
Bank of Chosen
Bank of Taiwan
Bank of Manchukuo
Manchurian Development Bank
Korean Trust Company

Any other bank, development company or instituion whose foremost purpose has been the financing of colonization and development activities in colonial and Japanese-occupied territory, or the financing of war production by the mobilization or control of the financial resources of colonial or Japanese-occupied territories.

F. Governors of Occupied Territories.

Japanese officials who have held the positions listed below:

1. Korea:

Governor General
Chief Civilian Administrator
Members of Privy Council

2. Formosa:

Governor General
Chief Civilian Administrator

3. Kwantung:

Governor General
Chief Administrator
Director of the Bureau of Pacification

4. South Seas:

Governor General
Director of South Seas Administration Office

5. Netherlands East Indies:

Chief Military Administrator
Chief Civil Adminstrator

6. Malaya:

Chief Military Administrator
Chief Civil Administrator
Mayor of Singapore

7. French Indo-China:

Governor General
Inspector General of Police
Director of Bureau of General Affairs
Financial Charge d'Affaires

8. Burma:

Advisers to the Burmese Administration
Chief to the Political Affairs Department of the Japanese Military Administration
Chief of the Internal Affairs Department of the Central Administration

9. China:

Advisers to the Nanking Puppet Government
Ambassador

10. Manchukuo:

Director of General Affairs Board
Vice-Director of General Affairs Board
Officers of the Central organization of the Concordia Society

11. Others:

Responsible Japanese Officials controlling collaborationist native governments in the Mongolian Federated Autonomous Government, the Philippine Puppet Republic, the Provisional Government of Free India, and Thailand.

G. Additional Militarists and Ultra-Nationalsits.

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetrated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

QUESTIONNAIRE

Questionnaire number _____
(to be assigned by Ministry or other Appropriate agency)

(Instructions: This Questionnaire shall be filled out in both Japanese and English. The English version will prevail if discrepancies exist between it and the Japanese version. Answers must be typewritten or printed clearly in block letters. Every question must be answered precisely and conscientiously and no space is to be left blank. If the question is to be answered by either "yes" or "no", print the word "yes" or "no" in the appropriate space. If the question is inapplicable, so indicate by some appropriate word of phrase such as "none" or "not applicable". Add supplementary sheets if there is not enough space in the Questionnaire. Omissions or false or incomplete statements are criminal offenses and will result in prosecution and punishment.)

A. PERSONAL

1. List position which you hold or for which you are under consideration, with Civil Service Grade: _____

2. Name: _____
(Surname) (First & Middle Name)

3. Other names which you have used or by which you have been known: _____

4. Date of Birth: _____ 5. Place of birth: _____

6. Height: _____ 7. Weight: _____ 8. Scars, marks, or deformities: _____

9. Present address: _____
(in full)

10. Permanent Residence: _____
(in full)

11. Identity card type & number: _____

12. List any instances when you have been arrested, together with the reasons therefor, and any crimes of which you have been convicted: _____

13. Give any Civil Service rank and grade now held: _____

B. CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EMPLOYMENT AND MILITARY SERVICE

14. In the space below, give a chronological history of your employment, including all of the positions which you have held, since 1 January 1931. In reporting either governmental or military positions, be sure to give all of the ranks which you may, at any time, have held: _____

APPENDIX "B"

## C. MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS

15. In the space below, report whether or not you are or were a member or a founder or organizaer or an officer of a national office or of a prefectural or metropolitan sub-division of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, or the Political Association of Great Japan. Report also whether or not you acted as edititor for any publication of any of these associations or organized any branches or special activities for any of them:.

a.

b.

c.

d.

16. In the space below, report any other party, association, society, fraternity, club, union, institution, whether social, political, military, patrictic professional, cultural, honorary, athletic or otherwise, of which you are or were a member. Make this report whether or not this society was secret. State whether or not you were a founder or organizer or leader, or occupied any post of authority in any such organization and whether you have been an editor of any of its publications:

17. Has any member of you family held office, rank, or post of authority, or been otherwise influential, in any of the organizations listed above? If so give his name and address, his relationship to you and a description of the position which he held and of the organization:

18. With the exception of regular membership dues, list and give details of any contributions of money or property which you have made, directly or indirectly, to any of the organizations listed above, including any contributions made by any natural or juridical person or legal entity on your behalf or through your solicitation or influence:

19. Have you ever been the recipient of any titles, ranks, medals, testimonials, or other honors from any of the above organizations? If so, state the nature of the honor, the date conferred, and the reason:

## D. RECORD OF OTHER SERVICE

20. With exception of those you have specifically mentioned in Sections B and C above, list:

(a) Any part time, unpaid or honorary position of authority or trust you have held since 1 January 1931 as a representative of the Army or Navy or of any National Ministry or other Central Government agency or as a representative of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, the Political Association of Great Japan, or their agencies, affiliates, or successor organizations.

(b) Any service of any kind you have rendered, since 1 January 1931, in any military, police, law-enforcement, peace protection, or intelligence organization or in any organization concerned with Protection and Surveillance and control of thought, speech, religion, or assembly.

| From: | To: | Name and Type of Organization | Highest office or Rank you held or Type of your service | Date of Apmt to highest office or rank | Duties |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |

## E. WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

21. List on a separate sheet the titles and publishers of all publications from 1 January 1931 to the present which were written in whole or in part or compiled or edited by you, and all public addresses made by you, giving subject, date and approximate circulation and in the case of speeches, the number in audience. If such publications or speeches were sponsored by any organization give its name. If no speeches or publications write "None" in this space: _____

## F. CORPORATE POSITIONS

22. With the exception of those you have specifically mentioned above, list any corporate directorships or executive positions held by you since 1 January 1931 and where you served whether in Japan proper or outside of Japan.

| Corporation | Position Held | Dates |
|---|---|---|
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

G. REMARKS

23. _____

_____

_____

_____

The statements on this Questionnaire are true and I understand that any omissions or false or incomplete statements are criminal offenses and will subject me to prosecution and punishment.

Signed _____ Date _____
(Signature of individual to whom the Questionnaire relates)

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE SUPERIOR

(Instructions: This certification shall be signed by the service superior (or other responsible official) of the incumbent of public office, or, in the case of applicants for public office, by the official responsible for employing the applicant).

I certify that the above is the true name and signature of the individual concerned and that, with the exceptions noted below, the answers made on this Questionnaire are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and the information available to me.

Exceptions (if no exceptions, write "none")

_____

_____

_____

_____

Signed _____ Official Position _____ Date _____

QUESTIONNAIRE RECORD CARD

Questionnaire No. _____

NAME: _____ Japanese Governmental
(Surname) (First & Middle Name)

ADDRESS: _____ Agency _____

Position which applicant holds or for which he is under consideration (with Civil Service Grade):

_____

Summary of pertinent portions of Individual's Record: _____

_____

_____

ACTION TAKEN (Check one): DATE: _____

( ) Removed from position: _____
(describe position)

( ) Application for employment as _____ denied.
(describe position)

( ) Retained in position: _____
(describe position)

( ) Application for employment as: _____ approved.

OTHER ACTION:

(Here record any applications to Hq, SCAP, for approval of appointment or reinstatement, the action taken by Hq, SCAP, on such application, the action taken by the Japanese Government accordingly and the date of such action. Also record any other action concerning the individual, such as reversal of initial retention of the individual upon direction of SCAP, conviction of the individual for falsifications or omissions in the Questionnaire, subsequent employment of the individual, etc.)

_____

_____

_____

APPENDIX "C"

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500
3 May 1946

AG 014.1 (3 May 46)GS
(SCAPIN 919)

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Removal and Exclusion from Public Office of Diet Member.

1. Under the memorandum of 4 January 1946, "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office", (SCAPIN 550) the Japanese Government was directed to disqualify any candidate for the Diet who had deceived and misled the people of Japan within the spirit and letter of that directive.

2. After the election on 10 April 1946, the Central Liaison Office was informed that the eligibility of one Ichiro Hatoyama, (member-elect of the House of Representatives from the First Electoral District, Tokyo) to hold any public office being open to doubt in the light of evidence published subsequent to his screening by the Japanese Government, it was expected that his eligibility would be re-examined by the Government forthwith.

3. The Japanese Government having failed to act on its own responsibility, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has determined the facts relative to Hatoyama's eligibility and finds that he is an undesirable person within the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Category "G", Appendix "A", SCAPIN 550 in that:

a. As Chief Secretary of the Tanaka Cabinet from 1927 to 1929, he necessarily shares responsibility for the formulation and promulgation without Diet approval of amendments to the so-called Peace Preservation Law which made that law the government's chief legal instrument for the suppression of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, and made possible the denunciation, terrorization, seizure, and imprisonment of tens of thousands of adherents to minority doctrines advocating political, economic, and social reform, thereby preventing the development of effective opposition to the Japanese militaristic regime.

b. As Minister of Education from December 1931 to March 1934, he was responsible for stifling freedom of speech in the schools by means of mass dismissals and arrests of teachers suspected of "leftist" leanings of "dangerous thoughts". The dismissal in May 1933 of Professor Takigawa from the faculty of Kyoto University on Hatoyama's personal order is a flagrant illustration of his contempt for the liberal tradition of academic freedom and gave momentum to the spiritual mobilization of Japan which, under the aegis of the military and economic cliques, led the nation eventually into war.

c. Not only did Hatoyama participate in thus weaving the pattern of ruthless suppression of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of thought, but he also participated in the forced dissolution of farmer-labor bodies. In addition, his indorsement of totalitarianism, specifically in its application to the regimentation and control of labor, is a matter of record. His recommendation that "it would be well" to transplant Hitlerite anti-labor devices to Japan reveals his innate antipathy to the democratic principle of the right of labor freely to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of its own choice. It is a familiar technique of the totalitarian dictatorship, wherever situated, whatever be its formal name, and however be it disguised, first to weaken and then to suppress the freedom of individuals to organize for mutual benefit. Whatever lip service Hatoyama may have rendered to the cause of parliamentarianism, his sponsorship of the doctrine of regimentation of labor identifies him as a tool of the ultra-nationalistic interests which engineered the reorganization of Japan on a totalitarian economic basis as a prerequisite to its wars of aggression.

d. By words and deeds he has consistently supported Japan's acts of aggression. In July 1937 he traveled to America and Western Europe as personal emissary of the then Prime Minister Konoye to justify Japan's expansionist program. While abroad he negotiated economic arrangements for supporting the war against China and the subsequent exploitation of that country after subjugation. With duplicity, Hatoyama told the British Prime Minister in 1937 that "China cannot survive unless controlled by Japan", and that the primary motive behind Japan's intervention in China involved the "happiness of the Chinese people."

Memo for I.J.G., file AG 014.1 (3 May 46)GS (SCAPIN 919), subj: "Removal and Exclusion from Public Office of Diet Member."

e. Hatoyama has posed as an anti-militarist. But in a formal address mailed to his constituents during the 1942 election in which he set forth his political credo, Hatoyama upheld the doctrine of territorial expansion by means of war, referred to the attack on Pearl Harbor as "fortunately . . . a great victory", stated as a fact that the true cause of the Manchuria and China "incidents" was the anti-Japanese sentiment (in China) instigated by England and America, ridiculed those who in 1928 and 1929 had criticized the Tanaka Cabinet, boasted that that cabinet had "liquidated the (previous) weak-kneed diplomacy toward England and America", and gloated that "today the world policy drafted by the Tanaka Cabinet is steadily being realized." This identification of himself with the notorious Tanaka policy of world conquest, whether genuine or merely opportunistic, in and of itself brands Hatoyama as one of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into militaristic misadventure.

4. Accordingly, in view of these and other considerations not herein recited, the Imperial Japanese Government is directed to bar Ichiro Hatoyama from membership in the Diet and to exclude him from government service pursuant to SCAPIN 550.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

B. M. FITCH,
Brigadier General, AGD,
Adjutant General.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
and
FAR EAST COMMAND

AG 091.1(11 Jan 47) CIS

APO 500
11 January 1947

STAFF MEMORANDUM )
:
NO.....13 ) (SCAP)

REMOVAL AND EXCLUSION OF UNDESIRABLE JAPANESE PERSONNEL FROM GOVERNMENTAL AND INFLUENTIAL PRIVATE POSITIONS

1. a. Rescission. The following Staff Memorandums, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, are rescinded.

(1) Staff Memorandum 2, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 21 January 1946.

(2) Staff Memorandum 6, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 5 February 1946.

b. References.

(1) Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government, file AG 091.1 (4 Jan. 46) GS, 4 Jan. 1946 (SCAPIN 548), subject: "Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations, Societies and Other Organizations."

(2) Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government, file AG 091.1 (4 Jan 46) GS, 4 Jan. 1946 (SCAPIN 550), subject: "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office."

2. General Application. The directives (SCAPIN 548 and SCAPIN 550) place the initial responsibility for making decisions on subject removals on the ~~Imperial~~ Japanese Government and to provide the machinery whereby General Headquarters may review those decisions. All Japanese making inquiries or requests for opinions will be referred to the ~~Imperial~~ Japanese Government.

#6

3. Staff Responsibility of the Government Section.
a. The Government Section is charged with staff responsibility under the reference directives for all matters relating to the removal and exclusion of Japanese personnel from national and local elective and appointive posts and influential political and economic positions.

b. It will advise the Japanese Government relative the administration of SCAPIN 548 and SCAPIN 550 and the ordinances and plans submitted by the Imperial Japanese Government implementing the same.

c. All interpretations, opinions, instructions and questionnaires with attached record cards relating to the application of the reference directives, will be given to or received from the Imperial Japanese Government by the Government Section. It will furnish copies of such questionnaires and attached record cards to the Civil Intelligence Section for its files.

d. In carrying out the above responsibilities the Government Section will secure the advice and recommendations of such interested staff sections as possess expert knowledge in their special fields, concerning all matters relating to the scope of screening and the timing of removal and exclusion of personnel as it affects current and prospective programs.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

PAUL J. MUELLER,
Major General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

(signed) John B. Cooley

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General.

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

Jack P. Napier
Major, CAC

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 091.112 ( 13Feb47 ) GS

APO 500
13Feb47

SUBJECT: Administration of the Purge

TO : Commanding General, Eighth Army, APO 343

1. Reference SCAPIN 550, 4 January 1946, subject, "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office", (Inclosure No. 1); Imperial Ordinances Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 1947, and Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, (Inclosure No. 2).

2. Imperial Ordinances Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 were issued by the Imperial Japanese Government to further implement SCAPIN 550 and extend its application to local government organs and other influential political and economic posts. These Ordinances define in detail the categories of personnel to be screened and the criteria by which certain personnel shall be designated as falling under the memorandum and thereby subject to removal or barring from specified positions and exclusion from the public service. They also establish the administrative machinery and procedures required for the conduct of the screening program by the Japanese Government.

3. In order to insure compliance by the Japanese Government with the provisions of SCAPIN 550, as implemented by the Ordinances referred to above, it is necessary that SCAP supervise and review the administration and action of the Japanese Government.

4. Effective review and supervision by SCAP can only be accomplished with the assistance of the occupation forces in the field.

5. The basic principles to be observed by Eighth Army representatives in rendering such assistance with particular reference to the administration of the purge program by the Japanese Government were discussed during the conference held by the Government Section with Military Government representatives 6 through 10 January.

6. The principal points of the information discussed with Military Government officers at that time are summarized below:

#21

a. Purpose

(1) The purpose of the purge program can best be expressed by reference to the major objectives of the Occupation as outlined in the Potsdam Declaration and specified in subsequent basic policy directives which may be summarized briefly as (1) the physical, economic and political disarmament of Japan with respect to its capacity to develop and operate a war machine capable of threatening the life and liberty of its neighbors; (2) the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people; (3) the establishment of a peacefully inclined and responsible government in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

(2) The purge as an instrument for effectuating Occupation objectives is clearly indicated in the language of the Potsdam Declaration to the effect that "there must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest"; and is specifically required by the terms of subsequent basic policy directives to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the effect that under no circumstances will persons be allowed to hold public office, or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies, their agencies or affiliates, who have been influential in the activities of other specified organizations, or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the military occupation.

(3) The purge policies and procedures, therefore, are techniques designed to eliminate or prevent the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons who are designated as undesirable personnel under the provisions of SCAPIN 550 and the implementing ordinances of the Japanese Government.

b. Interpretation

(1) The Japanese Government will be solely and completely responsible for the administration of the Purge Program under the provisions of SCAPIN 550, 4 January 1946, as implemented by the

ordinances referred to above.

(2) All Japanese submitting petitions or making inquiries or requests for opinions will be referred to the Imperial Japanese Government.

(3) Military Government officers will not interpret the basic directive or the ordinances referred to above, nor will they take direct corrective action unless specifically instructed to do so.

(4) General and detailed information concerning the interpretation of important provisions of the basic directive and the implementing Japanese ordinances will be transmitted to Eighth Army authorities and Military Government officers from time to time through Command channel communications, special reports and Political Affairs Bulletins to be distributed through the Civil Information and Education Section, SCAP. Furthermore, information of interest to Military Government personnel will be released through the media of radio programs concerning which you will receive prior notice.

c. Method of Implementation

(1) In order to administer the Purge Program, the Japanese Government has established a Public Qualifications Committee System composed of a central committee, forty-six prefectural committees and one hundred twenty-eight municipal committees. The central committee is responsible to the Prime Minister and the prefectural and municipal committees are responsible to the respective governors.

(2) The scope of screening, that is the categories of persons who are subject to screening, is outlined in Appendix 2 of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947. The committees having jurisdiction for such screening and the executives having authority to take final action in these cases, are enumerated in Appendix 5 of the above Ordinance.

(3) The criteria under which persons will be screened for the public service are enumerated in Appendix 1 of the above Ordinance and the appended interpretation of Category G.

(4) The following points are of particular importance:

(a) The Prime Minister and the prefectural governors are required to publish the results of all action taken by them as the result of screening by the

committees under their jurisdiction and are required to make the questionnaires of all such persons screened immediately available for public inspection.

(b) The Prime Minister may post-review cases screened by the prefectural municipal committee only after the final and complete action has been taken by the prefectural governor and the results and questionnaires made available for public inspection.

(c) The screening program will be conducted by the Japanese Government in accordance with the following schedule:

SCREENING SCHEDULE

| Date | | Approximate No. |
|---|---|---|
| 1 February | Members of Screening Committees | 2,900 |
| 15 " | Holders of Principal Public Office at the Prefectural Level | 8,000 |
| 20 " | Holders of Principal Public Office at the Municipal Level and Election Administration Committee Members | 5,200 |
| 25 " | Candidates for Governor and Mayor of five principal cities and Members of the House of Councillors | 3,500 |
| 28 " | Candidates for Prefectural Assemblymen | 21,000 |
| | Candidates for Mayor and Headmen of Town and Village, Superintendents of the poll station and Superintendents of the vote | 22,500 |
| 20 March to 25 April | Holders of Principal Public Office in organizations under para. 10, 11 and 12, Appendix II of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1, 1947 | 6,000 |
| 25 March to 15 April | Candidates for Assemblymen of City, Town and Village | 15,000 |
| 16 April to 20 April | Holders of Principal Public Office in organizations under para. 7,8,9 and 13, Appendix II of Cabinet & Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1, 1947 | 10,000 |
| | | 80,700 |

(d) Questionnaires will not be translated from Japanese into English until they are submitted to the Supreme Commander.

(e) All echelons of the Japanese Government concerned with the administration of the purge will be held strictly responsible for the maintenance of accurate and adequate records in such form that they may be immediately submitted to the Supreme Commander upon request.

4. Responsibilities of the Occupation Forces

(1) Except as specifically directed, Military Government officers will institute no positive corrective action relative to the administration of the purge. It is, however, extremely important that they report allegations received or knowledge acquired concerning the following matters:

(a) Failure of responsible officials to remove persons designated as falling under the Ordinances within the time limit required.

(b) Failure of responsible officials to designate as purgees, persons who fall under the Ordinances.

(c) Violation by purgees of the injunction forbidding the continuity of their influence or power through any person in the public service or any organization listed in Appendix 2 of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947.

(d) Violation by any persons in the public service of the injunction prohibiting their seeking or accepting advice or guidance from Purgees.

(e) Violation by purgees of the injunction prohibiting their occupying a position in a newspaper, magazine or other publishing company, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations, or companies controlling any other media of mass communication.

(f) Violation by purgees of the injunction prohibiting their entry into the premises of the place of business of the government entity or company or other organization from which they have been removed or specifically barred.

(g) Failure by members of the screening committees to properly discharge their responsibilities.

(h) Failure by responsible officials to exhibit questionnaires of persons screened for public inspection in accordance with procedures outlined in annexed Table 10 of the "Notification to Screening Committees".

(i) Failure by responsible officials to exhibit for public inspection copies of Imperial Ordinances 1, 2 and 3 and Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 and the detailed interpretation of Category G, appended thereto.

(j) Failure by responsible officials to post the bulletins indicating the screening action taken by the prefectural governor or the Prime Minister during the preceding two weeks, as provided for in the procedures outlined in annexed Table No. 10 of the "Notification to Screening Committees". In this connection the following points should be specifically noted and deviations reported upon:
1. Place of posting
2. Date and duration of posting
3. Preservation and availability of old questionnaires
4. Delivery of bulletins to newspapers

(k) Failure by prefectural governors to prosecute persons who have made false entries in, or omitted information from their questionnaires on relevant and material matters.

7. The inherent value and ultimate success of the Purge Program can only be realized with the general awakening of the people to their responsibilities and constitutional prerogatives in the selection of democratic and well qualified representatives. In order to stimulate public reaction along constructive lines, a publicity program is being developed by the Government Section and the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP. Military Government officers will receive specific instructions concerning this program. It is imperative that no action be taken in this matter until those instructions are received through channels. It should be noted, however, that the Political Affairs Bulletin, prepared jointly by the Government Section and the Civil Information and Education Section, SCAP, is prepared for direct consumption by the Japanese reader and may be used as a basis for discussions and translated in whole or in part without restriction.

Military Government officers should, however, be on the alert for distortion or inaccurate translations or interpretations.

5. The following points are reiterated for emphasis:

a. Military Government officers will not interpret the purge directives or ordinances except as formally and specifically instructed to do so. All requests for opinions, interpretations or instructions from Japanese sources should be directed to the Japanese Government.

b. The activities of Military Government personnel should not in any way interfere with or inhibit the procedures or actions of the committees or officials associated therewith; for example, Military Government personnel shall not investigate alleged discrepancies in the information contained in questionnaires, nor shall they sit in committee meetings or hearings conducted by central, prefectural or municipal screening committees, or investigate, unless specifically instructed to do so, the administrative functioning of such committees. This latter instruction is not to be construed as prohibiting Military Government officers from visiting the offices of the screening committees, consulting with the chairmen thereof and observing compliance with the publicity procedures.

9. In addition to material contained in the regular monthly report of Non Military Activities concerning the progress of the Purge, it is directed that military government teams report immediately to SCAP by the most direct means available all alleged or suspected evasions or violations of Purge ordinances and procedures.

10. The documents listed as inclosures, copies of which, with the exception of SCAPIN 550, were distributed to the Military Government officers during the conference referred to in paragraph 5 above are to be considered a part of these instructions. In order to avoid confusion, however, Military Government officers should be instructed immediately that they are to disregard two additional documents which they received at the conference referred to above, namely, Imperial Ordinance No. 4 of 1947 concerning headmen of chonaikai, burakukai and federations thereof, inasmuch as the Japanese Government has taken action to abolish these organizations and positions; and the "Guide for Military Government Officers", inasmuch as the information contained therein has been revised and incorporated in paragraph 6 d above under the heading "Responsibilities of the Occupation Forces."

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

4 Incls:

Incl 1 - SCAPIN 550
" 2 - Imperial Ordinances Nos. 1,2,3 of 1947;
Cabinet & Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947
" 3 - Notification to Screening Committees
" 4 - Tentative List of Screening Committees.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY
United States Army
Office of the Commanding General
APO 343

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE)
)
NUMBER - 25)

7 March 1947

ADMINISTRATION OF THE PURGE OF JAPANESE OFFICIALS

1. References:

a. SCAPIN 550, 4 January 1946, subject: Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office.

b. Imperial Ordinances Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 1947, and Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947.

c. Notification to Screening Committees.

d. Tentative List of Screening Committees.

(Copies of references b, c and d were furnished to military government and tactical force representatives at the conference held by the Government Section, SCAP, 6-10 January 1947.)

2. The Ordinances mentioned in paragraph 1b were issued by the Imperial Japanese Government to further implement SCAPIN 550 and extend its application to local government positions and other influential political and economic posts. They define in detail the categories of persons to be screened and criteria by which certain personnel shall be purged. They also establish the administrative machinery for the conduct of the screening program by the Japanese Government.

3. SCAP will supervise and review the administration of the purge by the Japanese Government with the assistance of military government units in the field.

4. The basic principles to be observed in executing surveillance over the administration of the purge program by the Japanese Government were discussed during the conference held by the Government Section at SCAP with military government and tactical force representatives 6-10 January 1947. The principal points discussed are summarized as follows:

a. Purpose:

(1) The purpose of the purge program can best be expressed

by reference to the major objectives of the Occupation as outlined in the Potsdam Declaration and specified in subsequent basic policy directives which may be summarized briefly as (1) the physical, economic and political disarmament of Japan with respect to its capacity to develop and operate a war machine capable of threatening the life and liberty of its neighbors; (2) the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people; (3) the establishment of a peacefully inclined and responsible government in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

(2) The purge as an instrument for effectuating Occupation objectives is clearly indicated in the language of the Potsdam Declaration to the effect that "there must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest;" and is specifically required by the terms of subsequent basic policy directives to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the effect that under no circumstances will persons be allowed to hold public office, or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression; who have been influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies, their agencies or affiliates; who have been influential in the activities of other specified organizations; or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the military occupation.

(3) The purge policies and procedures, therefore, are techniques designed to eliminate or prevent the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons who are designated as undesirable personnel under the provisions of SCAPIN 550 and the implementing ordinances of the Japanese Government.

b. Interpretation:

(1) The Japanese Government will be solely and completely responsible for the administration of the Purge Program under the provisions of SCAPIN 550, 4 January 1946, as implemented by the ordinances referred to in paragraph 1b above.

(2) All Japanese submitting petitions or making inquiries or requests for opinions will be referred to the Imperial Japanese Government.

(3) Military government officers will not interpret the basic directive or the ordinances referred to above, nor will they take direct corrective action unless specifically instructed to do so.

(4) General and detailed information concerning the interpretation of important provisions of the basic directive and the implementing Japanese ordinances will be transmitted to military government officers from time to time through command channel communications, special reports, and Political Affairs Bulletins to be distributed through the Civil Information and Education Section, SCAP. Furthermore, information of interest to military government personnel will be released through the media of radio programs concerning which you will receive prior notice.

c. Method of Implementation:

(1) In order to administer the Purge Program, the Japanese Government has established a Public Qualifications Committee System composed of a central committee, forty-six prefectural committees and one hundred twenty-eight municipal committees. The central committee is responsible to the Prime Minister and the prefectural and municipal committees are responsible to the respective governors.

(2) The scope of screening, that is, the categories of persons who are subject to screening, is outlined in Appendix 2 of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947. The committees having jurisdiction for such screening, and the executives having authority to take final action in these cases, are enumerated in Appendix 3 of the above Ordinance.

(3) The criteria under which persons will be screened for the public service are enumerated in Appendix 1 of the above Ordinance and the appended interpretation of Category G.

(4) The following points are of particular importance:

(a) The Prime Minister and the prefectural governors are required to publish the results of all action taken by them as the results of screening by the committees under their jurisdiction and are required to make the questionnaires of all such persons screened immediately available for public inspection.

(b) The Prime Minister may post-review cases screened by the prefectural municipal committee only after the final and complete action has been taken by the prefectural governor and the results and questionnaires have been made available for public inspection.

(c) The screening program will be conducted by the Japanese Government in accordance with the following schedule:

SCREENING SCHEDULE

| Date | | Approximate No. |
|---|---|---|
| 1 February | Members of Screening Committees | 2,500 |
| 15 February | Holders of Principal Public Office at the Prefectural Level | 5,000 |
| 20 February | Holders of Principal Public Office at the Municipal Level and Election Administration Committee Members | 5,200 |
| 25 February | Candidates for Governor and Mayor of five principal cities and members of the House of Councillors | 3,500 |
| 28 February | Candidates for Prefectural Assemblymen | 21,000 |
| | Candidates for Mayor and Headmen of Town and Village, Superintendents of the poll station and Superintendents of the vote | 12,500 |
| 20 March to 15 April | Holders of Principal Public Office in organizations under par 10, 11, 12, Appendix II of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1, 1947 | 6,000 |

| Date | SCREENING SCHEDULE | Approximate No. |
|---|---|---|
| 25 March to 15 April | Candidates for Assemblymen of City Town and Village | 15,000 |
| 16 April to 30 April | Holders of Principal Public Office in organizations under par 7, 8, 9 and 13, Appendix II of Cabinet & Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1, 1947 | 10,000 |
| | | 80,700 |

(d) Questionnaires will not be translated from Japanese into English until they are submitted to the Supreme Commander.

(e) All echelons of the Japanese Government concerned with the administration of the purge will be held strictly responsible for the maintenance of accurate and adequate records in such form that they may be immediately submitted to the Supreme Commander upon request.

5. Responsibilities of Military Government Units:

a. Except as specifically directed, military government officers will institute no positive corrective action relative to the administration of the purge. It is, however, extremely important that they report allegations received or knowledge acquired concerning the following matters:

(1) Failure of responsible officials to remove persons designated as falling under the Ordinances within the time limit required.

(2) Failure of responsible officials to designate as purgees, persons who fall under the Ordinances.

(3) Violation by purgees of the injunction forbidding the continuity of their influence or power through any person in the public service or any organization listed in Appendix 2 of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947.

(4) Violation by any persons in the public service of the injunction prohibiting their seeking or accepting advice or guidance from purgees.

(5) Violation by purgees of the injunction prohibiting their occupying a position in a newspaper, magazine or other publishing company, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations, or companies controlling any other media of mass communication.

(6) Violation by purgees of the injunction prohibiting their entry into the premises of the place of business of the government entity or company or other organization from which they have been removed or specifically barred.

(7) Failure by members of the screening committees to properly discharge their responsibilities.

(8) Failure by responsible officials to exhibit questionnaires of persons screened for public inspection in accordance with procedures outlined in annexed Table 10 of the "Notification to Screening Committees."

(9) Failure by responsible officials to exhibit for public inspection copies of Imperial Ordinances 1, 2 and 3 and Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 and the detailed interpretation of Category G, appended thereto.

(10) Failure by responsible officials to post the bulletins indicating the screening action taken by the prefectural governor or the Prime Minister during the preceding two weeks, as provided for in the procedures outlined in annexed Table No. 10 of the "Notification to Screening Committees." In this connection, the following points should be specifically noted and deviations reported upon:

(a) Place of posting
(b) Date and duration of posting
(c) Preservation and availability of old questionnaires
(d) Delivery of bulletins to newspapers

(11) Failure by prefectural governors to prosecute persons who have made false entries in, or omitted information from their questionnaires on relevant and material matters.

b. Military government officers will not interpret the purge directives or ordinances except as formally and specifically instructed to do so by this headquarters. All requests for opinions, interpretations or instructions from Japanese sources will be directed to the Japanese Government.

c. The activities of military government personnel should not in any way interfere with or inhibit the procedures or actions of the committees or officials associated therewith; for example, military government personnel shall not investigate alleged discrepancies in the information contained in questionnaires, nor shall they sit in committee meetings or hearings conducted by central, prefectural or municipal screening committees, or investigate, unless specifically instructed to do so, the administrative functioning of such committees. This latter instruction is not to be construed as prohibiting military government officers from visiting the offices of the screening committees, consulting with the chairmen thereof and observing compliance with the publicity procedures.

d. In addition to material contained in the regular "Monthly Report of Non-Military Activities," concerning the progress of the purge, it is directed that military government teams report immediately to SCAP by the most direct means available all alleged or suspected evasions or violations of purge ordinances and procedures. Information copies of such reports will be forwarded to this headquarters.

e. The documents listed in paragraph 1 as references, copies of which, with the exception of SCAPIN 550, were distributed to the military government officers during the conference mentioned in paragraph 1 above, are to be considered a part of these instructions.

f. Military government officers will disregard two additional documents which they received at the conference mentioned above, namely, Imperial Ordinance No. 4 of 1947 concerning headmen of chonaikai, burakukai and federations thereof, inasmuch as the Japanese government has taken action to abolish these organizations and positions; and the "Guide for Military Government Officers" inasmuch as the information contained therein has been revised and incorporated in these instructions.

6. In order to stimulate public reaction along constructive lines, a publicity program is being developed by the Government Section and the

Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP. Military government officers will receive specific instructions concerning this program. It is imperative that no action be taken in this matter until those instructions are received. It should be noted, however, that the Political Affairs Bulletin is prepared by SCAP for direct consumption by the Japanese reader, and may be used as a basis for discussions and translated in whole or in part without restriction.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL EICHELBERGER:

CLOVIS E. BYERS
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

Schanze

SCHANZE
G-1

DISTRIBUTION: "B", "C" and "Z" plus

| | |
|---|---|
| SCAP | 3 |
| Mil Govt Sec, Hq 8th Army | 25 |
| Each Mil Govt Team | 3 |

HEADQUARTERS EIGHT ARMY
United States Army
Office of the Commanding General
APO 343

operational directive)

Number 25/1 for 1947 )

8 December 1947

ADMINISTRATION OF THE PURGE OF JAPANESE OFFICIALS

1. Operational Directive 25, this headquarters, 7 March 1947, subject as above, is amended as follows:

a. Paragraph 1 to add:

"e. SCAPIN 548, 4 January 1946, subject: "Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations, Societies and other Organizations.

f. Paragraph II, Appendix I, Purge Ordinances. compiled by Government Section, SCAP, 1947, and distributed to all Military government teams.

g. Imperial Ordinance 101, promulgated 23 February 1946, as amended, 12 June 1946."

b. Paragraphs 5a, b, c, and d by entending surveillance to include matters relating to SCAPIN 548, reference 1e.

2. SCAPIN 548 directs the Japanese Government to prohibit the formation of certain types of political parties, associations or other organizations and activities and lists 27 such organizations. Paragraph III, Appendix I, Purge Ordinances, reference 1f lists 127 such organizations, including the 27 listed in SCAPIN 548. This list is not to be regarded as all inclusive.

3. It is desired that military government teams report immediately to Government Section, SCAP, by the most direct means available, all alleged or suspected evasions or violations of SCAPIN 548, and the purge directives. Information copies of such reports will be forwarded to this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL RYDER:

CLOVIS E. BYERS
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Schanze
/T/ Schange

DISTRIBUTION:
"B" plus "C" plus "Z"
Each MG Team (3)
SCAP (10)

C O P Y

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

APO 500
27 February 1948

AG 091 (27 Feb 48)GS

SUBJECT: Purge Statistics, Including Forecasts

TO: The Adjutant General, Dept. of the Army
Washington 25, D.C.
(Attn: Civil Affairs Division)

1. Reference: Ltr. Dept of Army, Wash., D.C. AGAO-S 014 Japan, (26 Jan 48) CSCAD: subject, "Purge Statistics, Including Forecasts," dated 2 Feb 1948.

2. Inclosed herewith are available purge statistics and forecasts as requested in Series I.

3. Since the information requested in Series II has never been required, purge statistics have never been compiled in accordance with subdivisions comparable to A,B,C and D of that Series. Generally, however, it may be said that every person found subject to the purge directive by virtue of the position held actively supported the policies leading to war and aggression and none were able to present satisfactory proof to the contrary, although all had full opportunity to do so.

4. Throughout the administration of the purge operation, it has been the concept here that the persons to be removed and excluded from important positions in government and business should be the policy-makers rather than the technicians. Accordingly, the detailed criteria included in the Japanese Government's implementing ordinances and the actual operation of the purge were such that none other than persons who had made or influenced policy in government or in business in the direction of war would be affected thereby. To this end, if any individual occupying a position classified under the criteria as policy-making was able to show that he was not in fact a policy-maker or that he opposed the policies leading to war and aggression, he was exempt from the provisions of the purge. Full opportunity to secure such exemption was afforded both in the initial screening and the appeal. In addition, with due regard to the critical economic condition of Japan, temporary exemptions or extensions were granted to individuals where a showing was made that the continued services of such individuals were essential to the efficient operation of enterprises important to national economic recovery.

5. At various stages of this operation the fear has been expressed in certain quarters that the removal of important individuals from the

economy would adversely affect the operating efficiency of business concerns, retard economic recovery, and increase the burden on the taxpayers of the United States. Statistics of production and trade during the last six months have failed to bear out this fear. In fact, evidence has come to the attention of this Headquarters that the removal of old leaders has, by permitting younger and more vigorous executives to assume more important positions, created a healthier and sounder base for the future Japanese economy.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

1 Incl:
Purge Statistics and
Estimates, in quadruplicate.

A. J. REHE
Major AGD
Asst. Adj. Gen.

BASIC: Ltr. Dept. of Army, Wash., D.C. AGAO-S 014 Japan, (26 Jan 48) OSCAD; subject, "Purge Statistics, Including Forecasts", dated 2 February 48.

## PURGE STATISTICS AND ESTIMATES
(As of 14 February 1948)

SERIES I

| a. Numbers of Persons removed and excluded (barred) from principal categories of public office listed in Imperial Ord. of 27 February 1946: | REMOVED | BARRED |
|---|---|---|
| (1) Government officials and candidates for position in Government. | 706 | 216 |
| (2) Officials of corporations, associations and other organizations under special control of the government. | 139 | 0 |
| | 845 | 216 |

| b. Numbers of persons removed and excluded from public office under each of the 12 categories of public office listed in Appendix II of Imperial Ord. No. 1 of 1947: | | REMOVED | BARRED |
|---|---|---|---|
| Par. 1. | National Government entity. | 2,550 | 0 |
| 2. | National Diet | 20 | 204 |
| 3. | Commissioners or committees (of prefectural level or above) etc. | 339 | 1 |
| 4. | To, Do, Fu or Ken (metropolis, territory or prefecture) | | |
| 5. | City, town or village or "Town and Village Association. | 779 | 997 |
| 6. | Special companies, banks, etc. in which the Government is the largest stockholder. | 33 | 0 |
| 7. | Companies and organizations to be designated under Temporary Supply and Adjustment Law | 5 | 0 |
| 8. | Organizations established under special legislation, subsidized organizations, other organizations serving for the public benefit. | 1,320 | 118 |

BASIC: Ltr. Dept. of Army, Wash., D.C. AGAO-S 014 Japan,(26 Jan 48).
CSCAD: subject: "Purge Statistics, Including Forecasts", dated 2 February 48.

Purge Statistics and Estimates - Contd.

| | | REMOVED | BARRED |
|---|---|---|---|
| Par. 9. | Information media organizations. | 151 | 2 |
| 10. | Political parties and members in Diet and branches and organizations affected by Imperial Ord. 101 of 1946. | 12 | 1 |
| 11. | Influential companies, financial institutions, and other economic organizations. | 246 | 4 |
| 12. | Influential companies, financial institutions, and other economic organizations not listed in Par. 11. | 16 | 1 |
| | | 5,471 | 1,328 |

c. Numbers of persons removed and excluded from public office under each of the 7 categories and principal sub-categories listed in Appendix I of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance of Feb. 27, 1946 and Appendix I of Imperial Ord. No. 1 of 1947:

(1) Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance of 27 Feb. 1946. (Including Cabinet Announcements of 10 Mar. 46 and 16 April 46).

| | | REMOVED | BARRED |
|---|---|---|---|
| Category A | | 29 | 7 |
| B | | 231 | 58 |
| | Career army officers - 165 | | |
| | Career navy officers - 116 | | |
| | Chokunin rank officials in War or Navy Ministries. - 8 | | |
| C | | 4 | 9 |
| D | | 106 | 26 |
| E | | 49 | 12 |
| F | | 9 | 2 |
| G | | 273 | 100 |
| | Economic - 41 | | |
| | Public Information Media. - 15 | | |
| | Special Higher Police, etc. - 331 | | |
| Compound | | 44 | 11 |
| | | 845 | 216 |

BASIC: Ltr. Dept of Army, Wash., D.C. AGAO-S C14 Japan, (26 Jan 48) CSCAD; subject: "Purge Statistics, Including Forecasts", dated 2 February 48.

Purge Statistics and Estimates - Contd.

| | | REMOVED | BARRED |
|---|---|---|---|
| (2) Appendix I, Imperial Ord. No. 1 of 1947 (including Amendments). | | | |
| Category | A | 8 | 2 |
| | B | 2,652 | 663 |
| | Approx: Career army officers. - 1,835 | | |
| | Career navy officers, (includes Demobilization Bureaus, etc.). - 980 | | |
| | C | 131 | 32 |
| | D | 1,026 | 257 |
| | E | 38 | 9 |
| | F | 2 | 0 |
| | G | 1,511 | 340 |
| Compound | | 103 | 25 |
| | | 5,471 | 1,328 |

d. Estimates of numbers of persons who have resigned from each category of public office to avoid possible removal:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Par. 1. | National Government entity. | 1,300 |
| 2. | National Diet | 470 |
| 3. | Commissioners or committees (of prefectural level or above) etc. | 0 |
| 4. | To, Do, Fu or Ken (metropolis, territory or prefecture) | ) |
| 5. | City, town or village or "Town and Village Association". | ) 5,000 |
| 6. | Special companies, banks, etc. in which the Government is the largest stockholder. | 0 |
| 7. | Companies and organizations to be designated under Temporary Supply and Adjustment Law. | 0 |
| 8. | Organizations established under special legislation, subsidized organizations, other organizations serving for the public benefit. | 2,000 |
| 9. | Information media organizations. | 250 |