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From "Chicken Kiev" to Ukrainian Recognition:
Domestic Politics in U.S. Foreign Policy

by

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ABSTRACT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From "Chicken Kiev" to Ukrainian Recognition:
Domestic Politics in U.S. Foreign Policy

LT Susan D. Fink, USN
June 1993

The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it is meant to give the first analytical account of U.S. recognition of Ukraine, along with its political significance. Second, it is meant to point out that political science theories of the role of ethnicity in foreign policy did not predict what happened in the case of U.S. recognition of Ukrainian independence. This thesis proposes a new theory of ethnic groups in U.S. foreign policy.

Just four months after President Bush announced in Kyiv that the United States would not recognize Ukrainian independence, he reversed his stand. The reason for his reversal was domestic politics.

From Woodrow Wilson, American Presidents pursued a dualistic approach to the "captive nations." Domestically, they reaffirmed the American commitment to liberating nations under Soviet control, but in Moscow they reaffirmed the legitimacy of the Soviet's free hand in those republics. As the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, President Bush sought to hold it together. He continued the trend of his predecessors, but the international context had changed. The dualism alienated the Ukrainian-Americans as well as other East European ethnic groups. These groups, which were securely in the pocket of the Republican Party since the Second World War, mobilized against Bush. Their efforts, including a Congressional resolution urging the President to reverse his position,

a punishing vote against the Republicans in the 1991 Pennsylvania senatorial race and the lobbying of White House officials, put tremendous pressure on the President at the beginning of a crucial election year. The pressure was enough to cause Bush to reverse his stand. The United States recognized Ukraine on December 25, 1991.

The case of Ukrainian independence may indicate a shift in the U.S. domestic political process toward an increasing role for ethnic groups in the post-Cold War environment. While the role of the ethnic lobby has been discounted in the past, they may play an increasing role in the future. This is because, in addition to traditional lobbying techniques, the lobby's most powerful tool was their message. The ethnic lobby understood the geopolitical and strategic importance of an independent Ukraine, as well as the ethnonational powderkeg on which Moscow sat throughout the Cold War. The ethnic community's insight and information exceeded that of high level government officials, the intelligence community and Sovietologists. The collapse of the Soviet Union, demise of the multi-ethnic state and the rise of nations creates an increasing need in American security for the insight which the ethnic community provided in 1991.

The thesis encompasses at least five levels or themes. First: the role of nationalism in world politics, especially in the collapse of the Soviet Union which now increasingly challenges the system of sovereign states. Second: the way in which foreign policy is made in Washington, including the roles of the President, his bureaucracy, Congress and the media. Third: the role of lobbies in the foreign policymaking process. Fourth: electoral politics and its role in decisionmaking. Fifth: East European ethnics,

Ukrainian-Americans in particular, and their role as subjects and objects in the struggle between Democrats and Republicans for the ethnic vote.

Because this is the first account of U.S. recognition of Ukraine, the author relied primarily upon personal interviews. The analytical account of recognition is given in Chapters II and III. Ukrainian-American immigration patterns which gave them the perceived power necessary to sway the President are addressed in Chapter IV. The lobby's Congressional ties were especially helpful in the recognition process. The development of these ties is addressed in the account of the lobby's evolution in Chapter V. The combination of parochial and policy motivations which caused members of Congress to support the recognition legislation will be explored in Chapter VI.

I. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the most important events of the twentieth century. The linchpin of the empire was Ukraine. If that nation of 52 million achieved independence, the Soviet Union would crumble. President Bush, urged on by his friend Mikhail Gorbachev, did all he could to keep Ukraine in the union. On August 1, 1991 he announced in Kyiv¹ that Americans would not support Ukrainian independence, and admonished Ukrainians to sign Gorbachev's Union Treaty. Bush called their democratic aspirations "suicidal nationalism," a phrase provided him by Gorbachev himself, and exhorted them to remember that "freedom is not the same as independence." [Refs. 1,2] Like all postwar presidents, Bush reaffirmed the Soviets' free hand in the non-Russian republics, and supported Gorbachev and his allies in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in their attempt to hold the Soviet Union together. Just four months later, Bush reversed his course. He did so because five decades of dualistic anti-communist rhetoric finally caught up with the White House. They had become so accustomed to their own double talk that, when the Soviet system collapsed out from under them, they could not adjust to the reality of emerging nations. Instead, they clung desperately to the old order. Gorbachev's inability to adapt cost him his union and his presidency. George Bush's inflexibility cost him the East European ethnic vote in a

¹"Kyiv" has been adopted by the Ukrainian Embassy, Washington, D.C. as part of the process of converting Ukrainian names from Russian translations, such as "Kiev," into Ukrainian translations.

crucial election year. In the end, the President was forced to recognize an independent Ukraine, but it occurred in an embarrassing way which left the new state and people with no political debts to the U.S. Government.

A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

What Bush did not take into account in his Kyiv address was that, by 1991, the rules of the policy game had changed, both in the Soviet Union and in American domestic politics. American East European ethnic groups, including the Ukrainian-Americans, had been safely in the GOP's pocket from World War II. In 1991, they became one of the Republican's electoral foes. Exploiting the Democratic need for election-year leverage, they adeptly lobbied members of Congress and the bureaucracy to bring down the Bush stand against Ukraine. A small community with none of the force of the Jewish lobby, the Ukrainians relied upon organization, communication, access to decisionmakers and the power of election-year politics. The lobby's most powerful tool, however, was its message: an independent Ukraine, and not Gorbachev's communism, was vital to American national security. Their success was tremendous. Largely due to their lobbying, the Senate passed a resolution urging Bush to recognize Ukraine, the Secretary of Defense officially parted ways with the State Department-sponsored Bush policy while the Democratic party scored multiple touchdowns with Bush's August speech, dubbed "Chicken Kiev" by the American media (Appendix A). All this was too much for the Bush policy to bear. Fewer than four months after the President set the course of American foreign policy in Kyiv, he reversed it. On November 27th, four days before Ukrainians voted in a referendum on independence, Bush met a group of 15

Ukrainian-Americans in the White House West Wing. To this delegation, which represented an organized community of some 100,000 Americans, the President announced that Ukraine was "entitled to independence."² He granted formal recognition on December 25th.

B. IMPORTANCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

The Ukrainian-American case may shed new light on ethnic politics. This is because most studies have concluded that a lobby's influence is dependent upon such strategies as coalition-building, access to power and grass-roots mobilization. [Ref. 3:p. 116; 4:p. 464] In addition to their *electoral* role in U.S. recognition of Ukraine, the ethnic lobby played an important *informational* role.

U.S. Cold War Soviet policy was made by the President and a few of his closest advisors. [Refs. 5,6,7] George Kennan, the father of American containment strategy, typifies these foreign policy elites.³ That any lobby could influence these wisemen was considered unlikely if not unthinkable. That such a small lobby (740,000 by census statistics, only some 100,000 in an organized community) was able to effect a complete reversal of policy seemed even more ridiculous.

²By 1990 census statistics there are 740,803 Ukrainian-Americans. By indications of membership in Ukrainian-American organizations, 100,000 are members. See Appendix B.

³In Kennan's *Around the Cragged Hill*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), he recommends the U.S. form a non-political foreign policy council of elders. However, a more open politics may be better, especially when the experts are wrong.

However, the ethnics understood what the CIA, State Department and huge community of Soviet experts did not: that the Soviet nationalities question was the greatest ethnonational dilemma of the 20th century, and that Ukraine was the thread which, if tugged by American recognition, would unravel the entire communist empire.⁴ That citizens at the lowest levels of the American socioeconomic ladder understood what powerful officials at the highest levels of government did not is one of the most striking paradoxes of American policy toward Moscow.⁵

Ukraine's geopolitical importance was also shrugged-off by the Bush policy. Ukraine is the one country which prevents the reconstitution of the empire. Belarus, which borders Russia and Poland, has rejoined the Russian military structure. As a sovereign state, Ukraine physically and politically separates Russia from Europe. Between states once dominated by the Red Threat--Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania--now stands a free country: continental Europe's second largest state, its second largest army and the inheritor of the world's third largest nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, half of the population of the Soviet Union lived outside of Russia. About half of those live in Ukraine. U.S. policy which focuses on Russia ignores half of the situation.

⁴For more information on Ukraine see Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) and John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 3rd edition, (Colorado: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990).

⁵Only a marginal group of Soviet specialists held that the multicultural nature of the USSR was important. For arguments that ethnopolitics was the key weakness of the USSR before the collapse, see works of Walker Connor, Robert Conquest, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Roman Szporluk and Hugh Seton-Watson. Since the collapse, numerous works have appeared on this topic.

Perhaps most significant of all, Ukrainian-Americans realized before the Bush White House, that international events had overtaken American foreign policymaking structure and content. The dualistic tactics of Republican policy--domestic talk about liberating the "captive nations" with simultaneous assurances in Moscow of non-interference--could not work after 1989.⁶ The administration could no longer use human rights and democratic self-determination rhetoric by labeling them tools of containment. International events forced Bush to make the choice which no president since Wilson had been forced to make. By backing Gorbachev, Bush chose the world he knew throughout his long postwar career, even though this meant supporting Gorbachev and the USSR against its people. Thus, it was the ethnics--with their insight into the Soviet ethno-national powderkeg--and not professional diplomats nor "Sovietologists," who understood the *realistic* policy. They exposed Bush's clinging to the old world as hopeless and doomed to failure.

The case of Ukrainian independence may indicate a shift in the U.S. domestic political process toward an increasing role for ethnic groups in the post-Cold War environment.⁷ As the raging war in Bosnia demonstrates, the United States must

⁶The contradictory policies of liberation and containment, from the Truman to Bush administrations, are examined in Bennett Kovrig, *Of Walls And Bridges*, (New York: New York University, 1991).

⁷For a look at the reasons why the ethnic lobby was considered ineffective in the past see Bernard Cohen, *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), Irving Louis Horowitz, "Ethnic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy," in *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Abdul Aziz Said, ed., (New York: Praeger, 1977), and Stephen A. Garrett, *From Potsdam to Poland: American Policy Toward Eastern Europe*, (New York: Praeger, 1986).

reconcile foreign policy to the fall of the large, multi-ethnic state and the rise of nations. As the former Yugoslavia also shows, procrastination in facing complex ethnic conflicts abroad can present rapidly deteriorating policy options. It is time for policymakers to throw away outdated Cold War thinking and "Sovietology." As the ethnic lobby argued in 1991, a realistic American foreign policy must be founded upon an understanding of the historical and cultural context, and not be limited to personal contacts with a few diplomats, high officials and academics in government structures as was the case with the White House and Gorbachev's Moscow.

C. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it is meant to give an analytical account of U.S. recognition of Ukraine, along with its political significance. This has not been done before. Second, it is meant to point out that political science theories of the role of ethnicity in foreign policy did not predict what happened in the case of U.S. recognition of Ukrainian independence. This may indicate a new trend in the American political process, including a new theory of ethnic groups in U.S. foreign policy.

The thesis encompasses at least five levels or themes, of which the reader should be aware. First: the role of nationalism in world politics, especially in the collapse of the Soviet Union which now increasingly challenges the system of sovereign states. Second: the way in which foreign policy is made in Washington, including the roles of the President, his bureaucracy, Congress and the media. Third: the role of lobbies in the foreign policymaking process. Fourth: electoral politics and its role in decisionmaking. Fifth: East European ethnics, Ukrainian-Americans in particular, and their role as

subjects and objects in the struggle between Democrats and Republicans for the ethnic vote.

D. METHODOLOGY

Because this is the first account of U.S. recognition of Ukraine, the author relied primarily upon personal interviews. Interviews were conducted in person and by telephone. Some of those interviewed asked not to be identified by name and have been identified instead by their occupation and position (in keeping with their anonymity). A common bank of questions was used for all interviewees whether or not the subject supported or opposed the lobby, in order to determine relative familiarity with the subject. Additional questions were added depending upon degree of familiarity and time available.

Quantitative analysis of ethnic voting behavior and Congressional support for the lobby was found to be lacking, and qualitative analysis by interviewees supplemented the numerical data available. The reasons for the lack of data seem to result from relatively little work which has been done recently on the role of ethnicity in foreign policy.

One important purpose of this thesis is to show that the *perceived* power of the lobby can be much greater than its actual electoral strength. One reason critics argued against the lobby's impact was their small size and minimal electoral significance. But policymakers' perceptions were different. President Bush agreed to meet with Ukrainian-Americans in the White House--apparently to minimize electoral damage done by "Chicken Kiev"--without any substantive data on the broader community's size or voting habits. The Wofford landslide in the Pennsylvania senatorial contest of November 1991

was perceived by Democrats and Republicans as an East European ethnic protest vote which punished Bush's abandonment of Baltic countries and for "Chicken Kiev." [Ref. 8:p. 448] The Ukrainian-Americans were few in number, but they formed part of an Eastern European ethnic group living in key eastern and midwest states (Appendices D, E).

E. ORDER OF THESIS

That such a small ethnic community was able to reverse U.S. foreign policy is remarkable. As mentioned above, the lobby's perceived power was linked to demographics and strategic location. One study concluded that 203 of the 270 electoral votes needed to elect a president are located in the states where East European ethnic groups are ten percent of the vote or greater. [Ref. 9:p. 10] Therefore, the Ukrainian-American immigration patterns and political character will be addressed in Chapter IV.

A group may be perceived as having electoral power, but it must be able to manipulate the strings of Washington to exploit its electoral potential. The Ukrainian-Americans were able to reach key decisionmakers with their message. During the Cold War, and especially during detente, their goal seemed futile. Yet, through three postwar phases, the lobby adapted to international and domestic political climates, and was able to keep Ukrainian independence on the political agenda. The ties made in Congress, especially those made after the lobby's shift to a human rights focus in the 1980's, proved essential in the recognition process. This is the subject of Chapter V.

While many Democrats in Congress were eager to beat George Bush over the head with "Chicken Kiev" because of election-year politics, genuine policy disagreements

motivated others to do the same. Members of Congress who worked on Soviet human rights cases in the 1970's and 1980's were familiar with Moscow's harsh policies toward Ukrainian patriots, and the historical animosity between Russia and Ukraine. Several of the prisoners whom these congressmen worked to free became leaders of the democratic opposition parties. With these personal ties, members of Congress, like the ethnic community which lobbied them, were better informed about the circumstances inside the Soviet Union in 1991 than were the Moscow-based administration sources. Their convictions also served their politics. The Republican weakness offered a possibility of breaking the Republican hold on the white ethnic vote for the crucial election of 1992. Since George Bush was relying heavily on his foreign policy successes for reelection, these members were eager to pull that rug out from under him. The combination of parochial and policy motivations which rallied members of Congress around the banner of Ukrainian independence will be explored in Chapter VI.

II. CAPTIVE NATIONS: THE LIBERATION MYTH

Every election year since the second World War, East European ethnic Americans drew voting booth curtains behind them and renewed their faith in the Republican party. From 1948, the GOP vowed to liberate their captive homelands. In 1991, these ethnics cashed-in their chips of party allegiance only to find that the Republican promise of liberation for their homelands was bankrupt.

A. ETHNOPOLITICS

How could George Bush declare on July 12, 1991:

[U]ntil freedom and independence have been achieved for every captive nation, we shall continue to call on all governments and states to uphold both the letter and the spirit of international human rights agreements. [Ref. 10]

And fewer than two weeks later tell the deputies in Kyiv:

Yet freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred. [Appendix C]

The speeches show how a president can speak about liberation at home and domination abroad. This is nothing new. Woodrow Wilson began the trend with self-determination rhetoric designed to curry the ethnic vote, but leaving out inhabitants of lands in the empires of his allies. Presidents, Democrats as well as Republicans, used two languages: with elites in Moscow they would speak frankly and realistically, assuring them of U.S. non-interference in Eastern Europe. With the masses, presidents

used a different language, filled with symbolism designed to threaten or reassure them in order to get their votes. [Ref. 11]

Henry Kissinger provides another good example of this dual-track, which sometimes perilously verged on contempt for the American electorate. In a recently uncovered Communist Party document, Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin recounted the words of President Nixon's NSC advisor to him on June 12, 1969:

President Nixon takes into account the Soviet Union's special interests in East Europe and does not intend to do anything there that would be assessed in Moscow as a "challenge" to its position in this region. That is Nixon's basic approach to this question and there is no need, affirmed Kissinger, to pay great attention "to separate public critical statements by the president on one East European country or another, since this is only tribute to some layers of the U.S. population which play a role in American elections." [Ref. 12]

B. THE WAY THE REPUBLICANS GOT THE ETHNIC VOTE

Since Woodrow Wilson introduced the idea of national self-determination into U.S. policies in an effort to corner the massive bloc of Central and East European ethnic voters during the First World War, the Republicans and Democrats have engaged in a tug-of-war for the ethnic vote. Wilson raised ethnic hopes for liberation of their homelands with the organization of Oppressed Nationalities of Central Europe, formed in 1918 by George Creel. [Ref. 13:p. 89] Because the nations to enjoy liberation were those under Austria-Hungary and Germany, this turned Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, German and Irish ethnics against the Democrats. Subsequently, the largely blue-collar ethnics were drawn to the Democrat's New Deal under Roosevelt.⁸

⁸Little is known about the number of ethnics under the Democratic and Republican tents in this period, and it bears investigation.

After World War II, however, the Republicans won the ethnic vote. Three things seem to have caused the shift of allegiance. First, postwar immigrants, or Displaced Persons, were highly politicized, nationally-conscious refugees unmoved by Democratic economic policies. Second, the ethnics believed Roosevelt had sold their homelands down the river at Yalta. Third, Eisenhower learned from Wilson's success and used it in his "liberation plank" in the 1952 campaign, his policy of "rollback" (whereby Americans would roll back the Soviets from Eastern Europe) and his sponsoring of the Captive Nations resolution in 1959 (which declared that the independence of those nations was vital to American interests.)⁹

Since Eisenhower's administration, the Republican's staunch anti-communist platform and rhetoric was sufficient to keep the East Europeans in the GOP. There they stayed until history caught up with the Republicans in 1992.

C. ROLLING BACK THE DEMOCRATS

[T]he [Republican] policy of liberation seems to have been devised primarily to roll back the Democrats in the United States, not the Red Army in Eastern Europe. And for this domestic purpose, liberation was a highly effective strategy. [Ref. 14:p. 73]

Liberation theory was politics. For the Republicans this included "roll back" and Captive Nations Week. [Ref. 15]

The Captive Nations Week resolution was signed by President Eisenhower and passed as Public Law 86-90 by Congress in 1959 (Appendices G, H). The resolution and

⁹For a study of the third wave of immigrants see W. Isajiw, Y. Boshyk, R. Senkus, eds., *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons After World War II*. (Edmonton: Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992).

the ethnic lobby's role in framing it and preserving it will be discussed in another chapter. For the present discussion, it should be noted that the resolution declared that liberation of Ukraine was a *vital* national interest:

[I]t is vital to the national security of the United States that the desire for liberty and independence on the part of the peoples of these conquered nations should be steadfastly kept alive; and

Whereas the desire for liberty and independence by the overwhelming majority of the people of these submerged nations constitutes a powerful deterrent to war and one of the best hopes for a just and lasting peace; and

Whereas it is fitting that we clearly manifest to such people through an appropriate and official means the historic fact that the people of the United States share with them their aspirations for the recovery of their freedom and independence. [Ref. 16:p. 100]

Some argue that Republicans adopted the resolution hastily--verbatim from the draft provided by Georgetown professor and leader of the Ukrainian lobby, Lev Dobriansky--in anticipation of ethnic opposition to Eisenhower's meeting with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev three weeks later. [Ref. 15:p. 183] They argue that the Congress which passed it unanimously considered it a "routine response" to constituent wishes, and was ignorant of its content. [Ref. 17:p. 984]

D. MISSED OPPORTUNITY

Ironically, the United States held the key to the Soviet unravelling all along and, because of a fixation on containment, never chose to use it. In 1960, the author of the Captive Nations Week resolution wrote: "Russia understands the significance of the force of nationalism far better than we do." [Ref. 16:p. 11] Khrushchev's vehement protests against the resolution, and Soviet attempts to overshadow its yearly observance, should

have alerted American leaders to the potential power of Captive Nations.¹⁰ Confronting Vice President Nixon in July 1959, Khrushchev shouted, "This resolution stinks!" According to Nixon, "he spelled out what he meant in earthy four letter words." [Ref. 18] In a *Foreign Affairs* article Khrushchev confessed, "I would not be telling the full truth if I did not say that the adoption of this ill-starred resolution was regarded by the Soviet people as an act of provocation." [Ref. 18]

Instead of exploiting the Soviet reaction to Captive Nations, Presidents ritually assured Moscow of its insignificance. The American government's official position was established ten years before Captive Nations became law, in NSC 58/2. The policy study argued that the American goal "must be the elimination of Soviet control" of these nations, but that resorting to war to achieve liberation "should be rejected as a practical alternative." [Ref. 9:p. 181] American inaction in response to the Hungarian uprising of 1956, to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and to martial law in Poland in 1981 reaffirmed the U.S. position.

As American policy shifted to "detente," the gap between foreign and domestic rhetoric widened. The Nixon administration provides a striking example, as Henry Kissinger increasingly began to flirt with Metternichean projects of a stable world which included a Sonnenfeldt Doctrine of a closer, "organic" relationship of the USSR with Eastern Europe.

Gerald Ford realized the need to satisfy ethnic voters too late. In a debate with Jimmy Carter before the 1976 election, he said that the United States recognized Soviet

¹⁰This will be examined further in a chapter on the three phases of the lobby.

domination of Poland. Foreshadowing President Bush's White House meeting with the Ukrainian-Americans, President Ford received Polish-American leaders in an attempt to minimize the political damage. He lost the ethnic vote and the election.

E. THE EVIL EMPIRE

In the aftermath of the 1981 Polish "crackdown, "...whoever occupied the White House would have...[to have] declared that the United States will "never accept" a Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe. [Ref. 19:p. 223]

Of all the postwar presidents, Ronald Reagan wielded Captive Nations most deftly. Reagan elevated the week to unprecedented heights. Crafting human rights and democratic self-determination into his "Evil Empire" strategy, Reagan was the first president to make the annual observance a public event and used it to showcase or announce policy. For example, he used his 1988 address to support anti-communist Afghan freedom fighters. He included a letter received from Soviet dissidents:

"Mr. President," they wrote, "We can hardly envisage the struggle for human rights without a struggle for the national rights of nations. And as today, so in the future, the freedom of nations is one of the main guarantees for human rights." [Ref. 20]

To the ethnic community, it seemed as though an American president finally grasped the potential power of the Captive Nations concept. The same was true in Ukraine. In 1990, when the independence movement began to gain momentum, an American visitor asked Ukrainians, "why now?" The reply, whether from "parliamentarian or peasant," was almost unanimous. The first reason given was Chernobyl, and the need to regain control of Ukraine from Moscow. The second reason was "Ronald Reagan." [Ref. 21]

Hopes soared in the U.S. as well, where Reagan elevated Ukrainian-Americans to prestigious positions. He appointed the author of the Captive Nations resolution, Lev Dobriansky, as Ambassador to Bermuda, and recognized him and other prominent members of the community at the yearly Captive Nations events.

After eight years of tough Reagan anti-communism, the East European ethnic support for the Republican Party was 85 percent. After four years of George Bush, it fell to 55 percent. [Ref. 22]

III. "CHICKEN KIEV"

As Moscow lost Eastern Europe and Ukraine, George Bush and the Republican Party lost their hammerlock on the East European ethnics in America. This is how it happened.

A. BUSH GETS TOUGH ON COMMUNISM

The 45-year Republican grip on the East European ethnic vote was finally broken in 1991. Since the Second World War, the Republican Party relied upon anti-communism to keep it. Finally, "Chicken Kiev" demonstrated to these voters that George Bush was more committed to keeping the old bi-polar world order than he was to anti-communism.

Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott tell the story of a limousine ride which Gorbachev and Bush shared on December 10, 1987. Echoing Kissinger to Dobrynin in 1968, Bush told Gorbachev that no matter how hard a line he had to take against communism to get elected president in 1988, the Soviet president should "ignore them." [Ref. 8:p. 4] The Vice President demonstrated that the private operational language he used with Gorbachev was diametrically different from the image-laden messages he reserved for American voters.

Throughout his presidency, Bush's relationship with Gorbachev grew more important in his decisionmaking. The relationship helped him win Soviet backing in the Gulf War, which proved essential. Without Gorbachev and a strong, stable center in Moscow, Bush believed he could not count on that help in the future. His approach was

consistent. He always backed states rather than peoples, however communist or repressive they might be. For example, he backed the Chinese communist leaders against the Tibetans in 1977 [Ref. 23:pp. 64-65], and then he backed them again against their own people after the Tianenmen Square massacre in 1989. When Gorbachev authorized bloody crackdowns in the Baltics, Bush found it more important to support the Soviet leader than to condemn his policies and jeopardize the relationship. These cases indicate that, even though Bush took a tough domestic stand against communism, his concern for the old system, in which he was comfortable working, prevailed in the end. He consistently favored states over peoples, but this left him dangerously out of touch in a time of rapid historic change, and made him reactionary. He was not a human rights president but neither was he a political realist.

B. "BLOODY SUNDAYS" IN THE BALTICS

Washington has two kinds of Soviet visitors these days--which is only fair since the Bush administration seems to have two Soviet policies. The schizophrenia is a sign of progress.

One sort of visitor is Eduard Shevardnadze, the former foreign minister, who urges solidarity with Mikhail Gorbachev and more credit for the Kremlin. He gets most of the media attention. The other sort is Vytautas Landsbergis, the president of Lithuania, who represents the striving republicans who will inherit the disintegrating Soviet empire. He's mostly ignored. [Ref. 24]

On January 2, 1991, Soviet troops seized buildings in Vilnius. On the 13th, the troops killed 15 Lithuanians there. One week later, Soviet troops killed four Latvians in Riga. Bush's reaction to the "Bloody Sundays" was restrained. Although Vilnius and

Riga were not Hungary in 1956, Prague in 1968 or Poland in 1981, Bush's responses were similar to his predecessors' after those crackdowns.

Bush did not enjoy the political latitude of his predecessors. Whereas Cold War containment policy as outlined in NSC 58/2 rejected liberation because it required force, liberation in 1991 required only diplomatic recognition. In the nascent "post-Cold War," ethnic voters could turn to the Democrats, recently liberated from the fear of being called "soft on communism." Had Bush understood this, his speech in Kyiv might have been very different.

Gorbachev implored Bush not to go to Kyiv in August, 1991, explaining that the trip would give ground to the Ukrainian "nationalists." Bush decided to make the trip, but he showed the speech he was to make there to Gorbachev while in Moscow. [Ref. 8:p. 417] The speech's attacks on "suicidal nationalism," which so infuriated Ukrainians and Americans, were not in the original speech Bush brought from Washington. Rather, they were inserted after consulting with Gorbachev. On Air Force One, during the flight from Moscow to Kiev, the President told reporters that:

...he had discussed the visit with Gorbachev to see if he had any concerns. He said the Soviet president did not and added "There's confidence in Moscow that the Ukraine will come along on the union treaty....No, there is no heartburn at all that I can detect about going here. And I think we'll handle it with proper balance." [Ref. 25:p. A1]

The proper balance included making it clear to the deputies that the United States intended to back Moscow, while not fueling sentiment for independence in Ukraine or alienating voters in the U.S.

The speech in Kyiv had the opposite effect Bush desired. The picture of "suicidal nationalists" which Gorbachev had painted for Bush was not the reality. When Bush walked to the podium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, his audience knew much more about him than he knew about them.

C. "E" MAIL AND PARALLEL DIPLOMACY

Before George Bush stepped off his plane in Kyiv in August 1991, the Ukrainians already knew what he was going to say. The day before the "Chicken Kiev" speech, Ivan Drach, one of the leaders of the democratic party *Rukh*, rebutted the speech, criticizing Bush's Moscow-focus and misunderstanding of the Soviet reality:

President Bush was once the head of the CIA. He must have learned a great deal about the center's ravages of Ukraine, its disregard for human life and spirit...[but] we must be realistic. As President, George Bush seems to have been hypnotized by Gorbachev...I am afraid that Bush has come here as a messenger for the center...the President's spokesman said that the President had never been to Kiev [sic]...and wanted to see some Soviet culture....We are not a sample of soviet culture....Our culture is the culture of Ukraine, the culture of Ukrainians, Russians who live in Ukraine, Jews, Poles. Ukraine will become independent despite the center. Like the United States that cast off the British Empire, Ukraine will cast off Moscow's Soviet Empire. [Ref. 26]

How did Drach know what Bush would say? Very simply: *glasnost* and electronic mail. Even as Bush and Baker negotiated with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, Ukrainian-Americans communicated with their opposition through "E-mail" several times each day.

Frustrated with pursuing traditional channels of lobbying, Ukrainian-Americans developed a parallel diplomacy with *Rukh* members in an effort to level the playing field.¹¹

Thus, the deputies, informed by contacts in Washington, were well aware of circumstances in Washington and Moscow which shaped the speech Bush was about to deliver. Bush, relying upon Gorbachev and Moscow-based State sources to shape his perception, took the podium without understanding the effect his speech would have.

D. "FREEDOM IS NOT THE SAME AS INDEPENDENCE"

Using Gorbachev's message of "suicidal nationalism" in Kyiv demonstrated Bush's reliance upon Gorbachev. This Moscow-focus gave him two misconceptions. First, Bush completely misunderstood Soviet nationalities. Equating the Soviet Union with American federalism, he declared that:

[F]reedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred. [Ref. 27]

Second, Bush believed Gorbachev could do what he said he could do: create a liberal empire. That is, he believed that communism could be gradually reformed, to embrace both democracy in the republics and a strong center which controlled it. Vilnius and Riga demonstrated, however, that with reform come raised popular expectations,

¹¹The lobby was not unique. Using this huge, uncontrolled computer billboard--which was created by the military during the Cold War, Iranians, Iraqi's and Americans communicated with each other during the Gulf War. Not only does this revolutionary technology level the diplomatic playing field, but tips the scales of real time information to the its users. Henceforth, the Nixon-Kissinger-style of foreign policymaking, exclusively "at the highest levels," may be altered if not made impossible.

revolution, and the need for harsh crackdowns to reinstate control. "Bloody Sundays" were not aberrations of *perestroika*, they were part of it. Nor did Gorbachev indicate that he would abandon communism for reform. He told *Time* magazine in June 1990: "I am now, just as I've always been, a convinced Communist." [Ref. 28] He defined democracy as "enthusiastic discipline," and told the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee plenum in the fall of 1990:

...the party has been, and remains, the main organizing and coordinating force capable of leading the people along the path of profound socialist renewal...*Perestroika* will not work without the party and its fundamental influence on all aspects of social life....We say *perestroika* is the renewal of socialism but not its dismantling. We say *perestroika* is revolutionary transformation, the elimination of the deformations of socialism, but not the restoration of capitalism. We say *perestroika* is the revival of creative Marxism, a new awareness of Leninist ideas.... [Ref. 28]

Gorbachev's staunch defense of communism, and the lengths to which he was obviously willing to go to preserve it, should have made it clear that democracy and communism could not coexist in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Baltics made it clear that democracy could not exist in the republics without independence.

Nonetheless, Bush contended in Kyiv that the United States did not have to make a choice between communism and democracy:

Some people have urged the United States to choose between supporting President Gorbachev and supporting independence-minded leaders throughout the U.S.S.R. I consider this a false choice....We will maintain the strongest possible relationship with the Soviet Government of President Gorbachev. But we also appreciate the new realities of life in the U.S.S.R. [Ref. 27]

E. "CHICKEN KIEV" AND THE COUP

The speech, while intended to keep Ukrainians in the union and settle the American domestic debate on recognition had the opposite effect. This is because Bush was playing by the rules his postwar predecessors had made, without realizing that the game had been changed. The reality of the Russo-Ukrainian relationship into which Bush introduced his ideas was completely different from the reality which existed in fact. One observer maintains that the speech actually helped precipitate the August coup:

[H]is words unintentionally stiffened the resolve of many non-Russians to press for independence lest the West continue to back Moscow against their aspirations. And Mr. Bush unwittingly gave the green light to the coup plotters--who moved less than three weeks later--by suggesting that the United States would support virtually any steps to guarantee the territorial integrity and stability of the Soviet Union. [Ref. 29]

Another observer agreed, contending that Bush's harsh words in Kyiv led the coup plotters to believe the President would support anyone in Moscow. They underestimated his attachment to the person of Gorbachev. [Ref. 30] Nonetheless, the day after the coup, in Kennebunkport, the President's reaction to the coup was restrained. He told reporters that he believed Soviet Vice President Yanaev, one of the coup plotters, may be a reformer, too. [Ref. 1]

F. CONGRESS EXPLOITS "CHICKEN KIEV"

In addition to disillusionment in Kyiv and a coup in Moscow, "Chicken Kiev" sparked immediate reaction in Washington. Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) condemned the speech on the Senate floor the next day, saying:

The President's veiled attempts to equate the relationship between the center and republics with American Federalism ignores both the brutal history and the involuntary nature of this union. [Ref. 31]

The speech had exposed the Republican's foreign policy flank just as the official election-year battle was about to begin. It gave Democrats an opportunity they could not pass up. Both houses drafted resolutions urging President Bush to recognize Ukraine and establish diplomatic relations. Ironically, the move was not strictly partisan, since members familiar with the Soviet system (and wanting to see it destroyed) came from both anti-communist (predominantly Republican) and human rights (predominantly Democratic) camps. This aspect will be addressed in more depth in a following chapter on Congressional motivation.

Senators DeConcini and D'Amato (R-NY) sponsored the Senate resolution (Sen.Con.Res.65), while Representatives Ritter (R-PA) and Hertel (D-MI) sponsored the House resolution (H.Con. Res.212). In their "dear colleague" letters, the congressmen called fellow members to arms:

Now is the time to show Congressional support for the efforts of the people of Ukraine in their struggle to take their place among the family of free and democratic nations. [Ref. 32]

First, they addressed human rights and Ukraine's anti-nuclear stance:

Since its declaration [of independence on August 24, 1991], the Ukrainian parliament has released political prisoners and has pledged to abide by the Helsinki Final Act and other agreements of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It has also asserted that it wants to rid itself of all nuclear weapons on Ukraine's soil. [Ref. 32]

Second, the legislators cited Ukraine's history and cultural autonomy from Russia as a reason for their right to sovereignty:

Ukraine, a nation of 52 million people with its own distinct linguistic, cultural and religious traditions, has experienced tremendous hardships and repression during seven decades of Soviet rule. [Ref. 32]

Third, they asserted that it was an American security interest to promote democratic governments, not support communist ones:

By supporting Ukraine's democratically elected government, we can act to encourage the further development of democracy and a free market economy. [Ref. 32]

To garner co-sponsorship for the resolutions, the Ukrainian-American lobby mobilized their community and began their most aggressive lobbying effort ever (Appendix F).

G. THE LOBBY GAINS MOMENTUM

Like the Democrats, Ukrainian-Americans were eager to exploit "Chicken Kiev" to gain diplomatic recognition. Throughout the late 1980's and early 1990's, most of the "dear colleague" letters urging support for Ukrainian issues were generated at the Helsinki Commission, with which the community was working on human rights issues.¹² By the time Ukrainian independence became a possibility, the Ukrainian-American lobby's relationship with these members of Congress was already well-exercised.

For example, in 1990 and 1991, thousands of Ukrainian-Americans wrote, telephoned and visited their representatives seeking the release of Stepan Khmara. Khmara was a Ukrainian deputy imprisoned for defending a woman who protested for

¹²The Helsinki Commission was established by Congress in 1976 as an independent government agency charged with monitoring U.S. compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Its goal was to maintain a linkage between human rights and foreign policy. Technically independent, 18 of its 21 members were U.S. senators and congressmen. The Commission dealt with immigration issues in the 1970's and 1980's, working primarily in Ukraine, the Baltics and other areas with Soviet Jewry.

independence in Kyiv. The lobby's success was unmatched even by the pro-Israel lobby: 165 members of Congress sent letters to President Gorbachev demanding Khmara's release. [Ref. 33] Thus, the larger community was mobilized and ready for action.

In addition to lobbying Congress, ethnics were urged to protest with their votes. An earlier generation had rallied to the Republican Party because the Democrats had sold-out Eastern Europe at Yalta. In 1991, the message was reversed. Republican's were portrayed as selling out the Baltics and Ukraine: it was time to send the White House a signal of protest.

H. THE WOFFORD LANDSLIDE: SENDING BUSH A MESSAGE

There is a shared conviction in Washington that election returns have a proven point. [Ref. 34] In early November 1991, Pennsylvanians, with an Eastern European population of more than 18 percent, took advantage of this. They sent the Republicans the message that Bush's reaction to the "Bloody Sundays," his handling of Baltic recognition, and his speech in Kyiv would not go unpunished.

In a special election for the senate seat which was left by John Heinz--who was killed in an airplane accident--the Democrat and underdog, Harris Wofford, easily defeated Bush's choice, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh.

Even though the ethnic community advertised the Republican defeat as a protest vote, the ethnic division of the Republican National Committee (RNC) conducted no post-election polls. One RNC official explained that the campaign "made no connection between foreign policy decisions and the domestic campaign." [Ref. 35] Complacent after decades of relying on anti-communism for the ethnic vote, the RNC's ethnic

division, once vigorous, had devolved into a handful of "outreach" workers with a minimal budget. This same nationalities division, created in the 1950's, was the reason why the Republicans achieved and maintained their stronghold on the ethnic vote during the Cold War.¹³ After the election, one RNC official interviewed admitted that the ethnic division was not the "best and brightest." The president, on the other hand, did make the connection between Pennsylvania and Kyiv. The Pennsylvania vote alerted him to the prospect of losing the ethnics in 1992. [Ref. 8:p. 448] In addition to the protest vote in Pennsylvania, Bush's Democratic opponents in the 1992 election were making ample use of "Chicken Kiev" (Appendix A).

I. THE BUREAUCRACY JOINS THE FRAY

Speeches are much harder to reverse than presidential memoranda. Hence, one purpose of Bush's August speech was to settle the internal bureaucratic dispute which had erupted over whether or not to recognize Ukraine. The Secretary of State argued for withholding recognition, while the Secretary of Defense advocated immediate recognition. Instead of settling the dispute, the speech turned presidential resolve into indecision and fueled the fire of the bureaucratic debate. Furthermore, the President had to make a decision before December first, the date set for the Ukrainian referendum on independence. Immediately after the failed August coup, the Ukrainian Parliament overwhelmingly voted for independence on August 28th and for a countrywide referendum on December

¹³For a look at the intensity of the Democratic and Republican efforts to court the ethnic vote in the 1950's and 1960's, see Ref. 15.

1st. As preliminary polls showed a strong vote for independence, George Bush was again forced to face the Ukrainian issue.

On October 21st, in an effort to promote the State Department position in Congress, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles--whom Bush later appointed his emissary to Kyiv--testified before the Senate Finance Subcommittee, telling Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ):

In 1917 [the center] collapsed and they had a period of instability and independent republics grew up.... But after several years...the center was re-established...so I do not think we have to necessarily assume that the trend--which is very clear today of authority and power and sovereignty away from the center to the republics--is necessarily the last word. [Ref. 36]

While some went to Congress, other officials went to the press to sway decision-makers. On November 25th, senior aides from State told the *Washington Post* that:

...diplomatic recognition of Ukraine will be withheld, for example, until the republic's elected leaders have taken concrete steps to fulfill arms treaty obligations...these include the 1990 East-West Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty...the 1991 U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty...and international treaties barring development of biological weapons or nuclear arms capabilities. [Ref. 37:p. A16]

More importantly, the aide indicated that the State Department position depended upon Moscow: "'We want to see what [Soviet President] Gorbachev and [Russian President Boris] Yeltsin do,' said one State Department official." [Ref. 37:p. A16] The same day, an official from the Defense Department released Secretary Cheney's position. The official said, "Washington should 'get in on the ground floor' with other nations likely to extend early diplomatic recognition so as 'not to sour our relations with such an important state.'" [Ref. 37:p. A16] The official criticized the State Department's position as finding "the breakup of the Soviet Union a worrisome prospect because of a

'nostalgia' for dealing with a strong, central Soviet government that no longer exists."

[Ref. 37:p. A16]

Meanwhile, a White House official expressed executive fence-sitting:

I cannot imagine we would hold recognition hostage or try to use recognition as pressure on them to do something with respect to the center that they didn't feel in their own judgements appropriate. We will be by and large spectators.

[Ref. 37:p. A16]

It was obvious that "President Bush [had] not tipped his hand about how the dispute should be settled." [Ref. 37:p. A16]

At the same time, American allies in NATO were cautious. Washington was reported to be working with London to urge Canada not to grant early recognition. Canada, however, cited pressure from its large Ukrainian diaspora as the reason why it would have to act. (In fact, Canada was the second country after Poland to officially recognize Ukraine.) Germany recommended a compromise which would fall short of full diplomatic recognition, such as an economic treaty.

Finally, Russia lobbied Washington as well. Russian Foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, met President Bush in late November and urged him not to recognize Ukraine "because that will play into the hand of the [Russian] extremists." [Ref. 38:p. A35]

J. CONGRESS WEIGHS-IN

On November 20th, shortly before the Senate went into recess, Senator DeConcini attached the Senate resolution--which now expressed "the sense of the Congress that the President should recognize the independence of Ukraine" [Ref. 39]--to the Supplemental

Appropriations Bill. As the senator had hoped, the bill passed easily, undeterred by debate. The resolution stated:

It is the sense of the Congress that the President--

(1) should recognize Ukraine's independence and undertake steps toward the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Ukraine should the December 1, 1991 referendum confirm Ukrainian parliament's independence declaration, and

(2) should use United States assistance, trade, and other programs to support the Government of Ukraine and encourage the further development of democracy and a free market in Ukraine. [Ref. 39]

To ensure the resolution had the desired effect on the White House, the senator faxed the results to Roman Popadiuk in the NSC. Members of the lobby sent the approved bill to their own White House contacts, hoping it would become the straw which would break the administration's resistance to recognition. [Ref. 40] It worked. The President finally agreed to meet the Ukrainian-Americans. The meeting was to be held on the 27th of November.

K. MEETING THE LOBBY, REVERSING COURSE

The fallout from "Chicken Kiev" and Baltic recognition was too much for the President to bear. The impact of the Senate resolution, the Wofford election and the August coup were compounded by the fact that November marked the beginning of the election year. Bush finally agreed to meet with the Ukrainian-Americans.

From the ethnic community's perspective, the meeting had many fathers. *Ukraine 2000* started its efforts to secure the meeting in February of 1991, while other groups such as the Ukrainian National Association lobbied as well. The President had rejected

several proposals for the meeting, but the lobby continued the press. Roman Popadiuk submitted a proposal for a meeting through his NSC channels. One of the President's public liaison officers--who had personal contact with *Ukraine 2000*--intercepted the NSC proposal and combined it with previous requests, arranging the a proposal that the President "could not refuse." [Ref. 40] He could not refuse because the political stakes were finally high enough to make him accept: by the time the proposal reached his desk the Senate had passed its "Sense of the Congress," Cheney had become an advocate for the meeting and was bringing Scowcroft over to his side, and Harris Wofford had just crushed Dick Thornburgh in the Pennsylvania election.

On Tuesday the 27th, the Ukrainian-American delegation waited for the President in the Roosevelt Room of the White House's West Wing. Anticipating further stonewalling, they had drawn up their argument, appointed a spokesperson and prepared for the confrontation. Secretary Cheney was not at the meeting. He had met with Bush, Baker and Scowcroft before the meeting, however, to convince the president of the wisdom of early recognition.

Surprising the delegation, Bush responded to their opening remarks by saying that he was looking forward to watching fair and free voting in Ukraine. He said he was anxious to salute the vote of the people of Ukraine and to work with Ukraine on details:

In his description of the "details," the President talked about nuclear weapons, CSCE and the CFE and other treaties. Quickly he added that he had no reason to believe that these things were stumbling blocks to recognition. Indeed, he emphasized that Ukraine had said all of the right things; "all of the right signs" have been coming from Ukraine. He emphasized that he wants to move quickly....He noted that Ukraine is "entitled to independence." [Ref. 41]

After the meeting, members of the delegation immediately sent word to their *Rukh* contacts about the President's softened stand. This news, in addition to the victory of the Senate resolution, was widely advertised and enthusiastically welcomed in Ukraine in the days before the referendum.¹⁴

L. "WELCOMING" THE VOTE, GRANTING RECOGNITION

Whether or not the resolution and White House meeting had any impact on the referendum is difficult to determine. Before the vote, the support for independence was predicted to be 70 percent. The actual results were an overwhelming 90.32 percent. [Ref. 42:p. 1]

Before all the votes were tallied, the administration announced it would not recognize Ukraine immediately, but would "welcome" a vote for independence and send an emissary to Kyiv. [Ref. 43:p. A1] Bush may have believed that this compromise, on the heels of the meeting, was enough to keep the ethnic vote without having to betray Gorbachev. The *Washington Post* made it clear that this tactic would not work. Alongside the administration's announcement, the press highlighted the ethnic community's reaction:

"We're laughing at Bush, that he is taking so long. It's a moral shame. America stands for democracy, and here we are siding with the Soviets," said Natalie Gawdiak, of Silver Spring, who married a Ukrainian American and has embraced the culture. [Ref. 44:p. A14]

¹⁴This was confirmed by several Americans and Ukrainians who were in Kyiv during the referendum.

The administration was forced to compromise again. In what appeared to be the best way to support the failing Gorbachev and accept the inevitability of Ukrainian independence, the President waited until December 25th--the day Gorbachev resigned--to grant formal recognition. Contrary to State Department desires, Ukraine was not required to sign CFE, START and NPT before it was granted U.S. recognition.

When it was all over, the Soviet Union was gone, Gorbachev was out and Ukraine took its place among the states of the world.

IV. THE LOBBY: IMMIGRATION AND ELECTORAL SIGNIFICANCE

A. INTRODUCTION

Unlike the American Jewish lobby, the Ukrainian-American lobby was neither large nor wealthy. How did they get power? To understand why such a small interest group was able to enter the bureaucratic process, it is important to understand: 1) the nature of ethnic politics and the role it plays in an election year; 2) the character of the lobby and the reasons why it remained highly politicized despite patterns of assimilation; and 3) the diplomatic importance of the concept of Ukrainian independence. This chapter will look at the character of the lobby as determined by immigration and ethnic politics.

The success of the Ukrainian-American lobby in 1991 was the result of a decades-long struggle for political influence. Assimilationists in the last two decades pointed to a steady decline in their influence since the 1950's. As 1991 showed, however, this was not the case. A change in the structure of the lobby in the 1970's increased its influence, while making it harder to detect as a lobby. This will be examined in the following chapter. Despite its diffusion in the 1970's, the lobby retained the political characteristics imparted on it by its three waves of immigration. This chapter will focus on those immigrations.

Three waves of immigration gave the lobby its electoral significance, its political focus (on Ukrainian liberation) and a host of internal disputes which hampered both.

Daniel Moynihan argues that "the immigration process is the single most important determinant of American foreign policy." [Ref. 45:pp. 22-23] For the Ukrainian-American lobby, immigration is the primary determinant of its character and political activity. Three things deserve note. First, the third wave, comprising mostly Displaced Persons from the Second World War, was the most politically active immigration. Second, the urban areas in which the last two waves settled gave the immigrants electoral significance. Third, each wave brought with it political, religious and cultural disagreements from the homeland, producing in-fighting among Ukrainian-American organizations which persists.¹⁵ This aspect explains both the large number of the community's organizations and its periods of political ineffectiveness.¹⁶ To achieve the cohesion displayed in the letter writing campaigns and independence demonstrations of the 1980's and early 1990's, the lobby had to overcome this self-imposed obstacle.

B. IMMIGRATION AND POLITICIZATION

The first Ukrainian came to America in 1608. Ivan Bohdan arrived in Jamestown with Captain John Smith, who fought in Eastern Europe against the Turks, and fled from captivity through Ukraine. [Ref. 46:p. 1] The first large immigration of Ukrainians, however, came as part of the great southern and eastern European immigration of

¹⁵In 1990, one Ukrainian visitor to the U.S. remarked, "talking with Ukrainian-Americans is like being in a time capsule. Some things they fight about, we forgot years ago in Ukraine."

¹⁶To have influence, lobbyists must convince members of Congress that they can mobilize voters. Political in-fighting created countervailing factions in the lobby, thus no one group could claim to influence the entire voting community.

1880-1914. [Ref. 47:p. 665] According to U.S. immigration records, there were at least 500,000 first- and second-generation Ukrainians living in the United States by 1914. Most of this early group came from the provinces of Carpatho-Ukraine and Galicia, then part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. [Ref. 48:pp. 39-40]

Because Ukraine was non-existent, and political awareness was low, most of these immigrants did not call themselves "Ukrainians." Some defined themselves as "Rusyns," some "Ruthenians," "Russians," "Poles," or "Austrians," depending upon the area from which they came. Unlike the homelands of immigrants like the Irish, Americans were generally unaware of a separate country of Ukraine. This has forced subsequent generations to explain the political reality, thus reinforcing their ethnic identity. Furthermore, because of the political domination of their homeland--by Turks, Russians, Poles, Nazi's and, finally, by Soviets--liberation became the hallmark of Ukrainian nationalism, and of Ukrainian-American ethnic awareness.

The second wave of immigrants came between 1920 and 1939, bringing 20,000 Ukrainians. It was marked by fractious in-fighting among three groups: the Socialists, the Monarchists, and the Nationalists. [Ref. 49] The last group, rooted in the failed attempt for Ukrainian independence of 1917-1920, prevailed. Growing American anti-socialist sentiment and the large influx of anti-communist Ukrainians after World War II helped them.

The third and final wave brought another 85,000 between 1947 and 1955. From 1955 to its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union restricted immigration to about 5,000. While some estimate the diaspora in the U.S as low as 487,600 [Ref. 49:p. 998], others

maintain that it is as high as 1,500,000 [Ref. 48:p. 45]. The 1980 census found 1.5 million Americans of Ukrainian descent. The commonly used figure today, however, is 740,000. The cause of the disparity in estimates may have something to do with the problems of self-definition and domestic understanding described above.¹⁷

Unlike the first wave which settled primarily in the coal regions of rural Pennsylvania, the second and third waves came to the cities. Six cities became and remain the community's centers of population: New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago. These cities also comprise important swing voting districts, making immigration patterns key to political importance. Ukrainian-Americans generally live in areas of high East European settlement. The East European population exceeds ten percent in 12 states: Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin (see Appendix E).

The third wave differed from previous immigrations socially, economically and politically. Whereas, previous groups were generally illiterate and fleeing poverty, postwar immigrants were urban-dwelling professionals fleeing political persecution.¹⁸ Until they recognized the longevity of the Soviet regime, the postwar immigrants viewed

¹⁷The lack of precise data is important for its comment on the perceived power of the ethnic lobby. When President Bush agreed to meet with Ukrainian-American leaders in November of 1991, he acknowledged their political clout during an election year. Yet he did so without any real data on the broader community's size or voting habits. The lobby's power has less to do with the actual number of voters than with the perception of its impact on swing votes in the urban districts in which the majority of Ukrainian-Americans live.

¹⁸For statistics on the third wave of Ukrainian immigrants, see Ref. 47.

their American home as temporary. Highly politicized, they had an extraordinary tradition of self-organization and added numerous organizations to the two existing umbrella groups:¹⁹

Indeed, few newcomers to the New World were as cohesively and tightly knit as these post-Second World War refugees. Over 40 percent of the youth, 60 percent of the adults, and about 70 percent of the women belonged to one or more organizations. This predilection for organization can be explained, in part, by the fact that a large number of the community activists and leaders from Western Ukraine, and especially Galicia, which had a strong tradition of grass-roots organization, were included in this latest wave of newcomers. [Ref. 50:p. 204]

That this last wave came from the highly nationalistic western region of Galicia was a mixed blessing for the American diaspora. The fervent bonds which preserved a high degree of cultural, linguistic and religious awareness even into the 1990's, also preserved political disputes. One split preserved was between the Bandera and Mel'nyk factions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The Bandera faction prevailed in the American diaspora, but failed to sustain large membership for two reasons. First, their integral nationalism alienated many in the more assimilated generations and indeed among the newer immigrants. Second, their approach raised the question of divided loyalties

¹⁹The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) formed an aid committee (the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC), to lobby for eased immigration. The pro-Communist Ukrainians countered with a campaign to block aid and immigration accurately predicting the influx anti-Communist DP's as a threat to their viability. The American Jewish Committee, on the other hand, supported the Ukrainian-American lobby by sponsoring a campaign to increase public sympathy for refugees. The pro-DP lobby prevailed. By 1948 a bill passed allowing 205,000 DP's (later 395,000) to enter the U.S. [Ref. 50:p. 199].

among politicians they lobbied.²⁰ The latter is a common criticism of American ethnic lobbies. As the American Jewish lobby shows, however, it does not have to be debilitating. The second and third phases of the lobby were successful largely because they avoided purely nationalistic appeals for their homeland. Instead, they phrased their message in terms of American security interests. These groups saw an independent Ukraine as the only way to balance the expansionist Russian threat to European and American security. This idea is central to and provides the continuity for the three phases which will be addressed here.

C. THE THIRD WAVE AND PARTY POLITICS

The postwar immigrants differed from existing American ethnic groups because their political interest was almost exclusively foreign policy.²¹ The Irish and German ethnics failed to prevent U.S. alliance with Britain against Germany in the two World Wars. These groups could be appeased, at least partially, by socio-economic promises. Arriving just as the U.S. was abandoning isolationism and turning outward, the DP's could not be so assuaged. As described above, Eisenhower dislodged the ethnics from the Democratic party in 1952. [Ref. 15:p. 143]

In 1968, this strategy again proved successful. Nixon's ethnic emphasis, coupled with the Republican's sturdy anti-communist plank, kept the ethnics in the GOP during

²⁰For an account of the ideology of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), see Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, (Colorado: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990).

²¹There is a parallel between the third wave of Ukrainians and the later Cuban immigration which also subordinates domestic issues to its foreign policy cause.

the 1970's and 1980's. Even their more assimilated children, who tended toward a human rights focus if they were politically active at all, remained largely loyal to the anti-communist rhetoric. Reagan's "evil empire" approach to Soviet policy, his elevating Captive Nations Week into a White House observance and his appointing members of the Ukrainian-American community to diplomatic and political positions strengthened the bond.²² In 1988 George Bush, enjoying the fruits and the work of his predecessors, received 85 percent of the East European ethnic vote. By 1992, however, the support fell to 55 percent.

The Republican complacency regarding the ethnic vote was not unfounded. The mobilization between 1988-1991 surprised the Ukrainian-Americans themselves. Many of the younger ethnics shared Washington's skepticism of their political significance. They attributed the lobby's mixed success partly to the nationalistic tenor and fractious nature of the postwar organizations:

While they reinvigorated the Ukrainian community and greatly expanded its range of activities, their high degree of politicization, particularly the Melnykiste-Banderite feud, has made the Ukrainian-American community the most politically fragmented in the West. [Ref. 50:p. 251]

Hence, the preference for fraternal and church groups over political organizations was seen as the beginning of the end of the lobby. Assimilation reinforced this prediction. In 1980 only 123,000 of 730,000 Ukrainian-Americans declared Ukrainian

²²In 1982, President Reagan appointed as Ambassador to Bermuda the Captive Nations resolution's author, Professor Lev Dobriansky of Georgetown University. Elevating Captive Nations Week to a White House observance, he made Dobriansky and others part of these observances.

to be their primary language [Ref. 50:p. 255]. Moreover, all indications of membership in organizations, churches and associations were around 100,000.

If assimilation and the decline of political organizations indicated the lobby's failure, what explains their influence upon Congress in 1991?

Even though the Ukrainian-Americans followed the traditional patterns of assimilation (inter-marriage, use of English, etc.) they did not lose the political objective of liberation. In a survey of Ukrainian American youth, 82 percent of the respondents agreed that being Ukrainian "carried with it the obligation to work toward a free and independent Ukraine." [Ref. 47:p. 1008] Even the increasing use of English and decreasing involvement in ethnic groups is deceiving, since large numbers maintained Ukrainian as a second language, and maintained community and cultural awareness through Saturday School and youth groups. Hence, when travel to Ukraine became possible in the late 1980's, a large number of these "assimilated" ethnics used their business and professional connections to launch joint ventures, and form political exchanges and institutions in the U.S. and in Ukraine.²³

D. SUMMARY

As this chapter has attempted to show, a pattern of assimilation did not preclude the lobby's upsurge in the 1980's. This is because of the strong political component (liberation) in Ukrainian cultural awareness, and the persistence of cultural awareness

²³One example is the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, an organization promoting democracy and a market economy in Ukraine. In the U.S., the foundation hosts Ukrainian deputies and delegations. In Kyiv it helps deputies by providing resources for the making of public policy.

despite overt patterns of assimilation. The political nature of the postwar immigration, coupled with its settlement in swing voting districts, reenforced the lobby's political potential.

The children of the third wave of immigration make up a large number of active Ukrainian-American lobbyists. Of those interviewed for this study, the majority were children of third wave immigrants and all had similar political views. Those views were marked by membership in the Republican party, work in the Reagan and Bush administrations and disillusionment with Bush policies which caused all of those interviewed to vote Democrat in 1992, despite Republican party membership. Finally, as the following chapter will address, the Republican's catering to ethnics and monopoly on anti-communism could not overcome Bush's anti-independence stand during the sweeping changes of 1989-1991. This forces a reassessment of the lobby's seeming failure in the Cold War period. As will be argued below, the lobby underwent three phases before liberation. Adapting to the domestic and international political climate, each chose a different structure and strategy. Yet each built upon the initial success of the Captive Nations idea, and the fundamental ideological problem it posed for American policymakers.

V. THREE PHASES OF THE LOBBY

A. INTRODUCTION

Just as the character of the lobby was determined by three waves of immigration, the strategy of the lobby since 1948 was determined by three phases of domestic and international politics: the immediate postwar period, the rise of human rights in diplomacy, and the post-Cold War period. The purpose of this chapter is to complete the picture outlined in the previous chapter by examining successes and failures of the lobby. The story is not one of gradual assimilation and decline, rather of each generation choosing tactics based upon the domestic and international context.

Obviously, the list of characters and accomplishments examined here cannot be comprehensive. The aim is to show the lobby's political evolution through primary examples. Therefore, it will look at three concepts which correspond to three phases of the lobby: Captive Nations (World War II to the present), human rights (1976 to the present) and *Rukh* support organizations (1989 to the present).

In the 1980's, the lobby's human rights focus was new in that it mobilized dormant generations of Ukrainian-Americans. In this way it gained the grass-roots support and alliances needed to motivate Congress to support the recognition legislation. However, human rights and congressional lobbying are not new for Ukrainian-Americans. In fact, for the postwar generation of Ukrainian-Americans, human rights and liberation of their

homeland were coterminous. They were embodied in the Captive Nations Week Resolution which Congress passed as Public Law 86-90 in 1959.

B. PHASE ONE: CAPTIVE NATIONS, FAILURE OR FOUNDATION?

We in America have stood from the day of our birth for the emancipation of people throughout the world who were living unwillingly under governments which were not of their own choice. The thing which we have held more sacred than any other is that all just government rests upon the consent of the governed, that principle has been flouted by the strong, and only the weak have suffered.²⁴

As described above, Captive Nations Week was part of the Republican effort to dislodge the ethnics from the Democratic Party after the Second World War. Authored by a Ukrainian-American, the community embraced the concept as its primary vehicle for keeping liberation of Ukraine on the political agenda. Successive administrations paid little more than lip service to the idea. In fact, some tried to abandon it in practice all together. The Soviet reaction was quite different, however. Understanding how volatile their nationalities problem was, Soviet leaders were threatened by the yearly observance. Unaware, the U.S. never exploited the Soviets' achilles heel.

The small group of university professors who spoke out for the Captive Nations idea argued that:

The nationalism of the non-Russian nations was constantly treated by leading American scholars and journalists as "separatism" or "fascism" and the very existence of some of these nations was negated. [Ref. 16:p. 97]

²⁴Woodrow Wilson in San Diego, September 19, 1919. Cited in Ref. 16:p. 97.

Nonetheless, they found many in Washington who supported their cause. Secretary of State Dean Acheson on June 26, 1951 before the house Foreign Affairs Committee, said:

The ruling power of Moscow has long been an imperial power and now rules a greatly extended empire. This is the challenge our foreign policy is required to meet.

It is clear that this process of encroachment and consolidation by which Russia has grown in the last five hundred years from the Duchy of Moscovy to a vast empire has got to be stopped. [Ref. 16:p. 93]

But neither the Secretary's belated awareness of Russian expansionism, nor the other proponents of national self-determination could compete with the official policy of granting the Soviets a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The concept had to be codified in law if it was to carry any weight at all.

The Captive Nations Week concept was signed into law. Passed by a unanimous vote of Congress on July 17, 1959, the resolution called for a week of commemoration every third week in July, and declared that:

it is vital to the national security of the United States that the desire for liberty and independence on the part of the peoples of these conquered nations should be steadfastly kept alive. [Ref. 16:p. 99]

Even though every president since Eisenhower has observed the occasion, every one has also sought to free himself of its restrictions. In 1977 Jimmy Carter, although he was seen by many as the "human rights president," canceled the proclamation for the sake of detente. After intense criticism, he proclaimed the Week. In 1990, Ukraine declared sovereignty, and President Bush eliminated mention of Ukraine in his Captive Nations address because the Resolution now had become a real possibility. The lobby was able

to "minimize negatives by having other nations taken out of the declaration as [White House] staff would not include Ukraine" [Ref. 51:p. 2]. Thus, the speech did not reflect the hard line against Ukrainian sovereignty which the original speech writers intended.

Why, if the majority of scholars agreed that by the 1970's Captive Nations Week was nothing more than "National Hot Dog Month," was the speech still controversial in 1990? The answer lies in a general American misunderstanding of nationalism, and subsequent underestimation of the resolution's importance in diplomacy. It is not the purpose of this paper to detail the misconceptions of nationalism, but American *mirror imaging* of Soviet nationalities with American ethnic groups is one result. For this reason, many were unaware how sharply the Soviet nerves were struck by the resolution.

One American who protested the resolution was George Kennan, father of Soviet "containment" policy. A Soviet specialist in the U.S. Foreign Service, he accompanied the first U.S ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1933, and assumed that post in 1952. Kennan's view of nationalism was common to most Cold War policymakers. He believed that *patriotism*, or love of state, was admirable, while *nationalism*, love of any unit smaller than the state was "a terrible disease of the human spirit" [Ref. 52:p. 80]. This Manichean view of nationalism not only ignores extensive research on the subject, but has proven inadequate in explaining crises in Bosnia, Sudan, Nagorno-Karabakh as well as disputes in Quebec, Catalonia, indeed the entire world in the 20th century. Yet, the misunderstanding of nationalism helps to explain U.S. condemnation of democratic movements in Ukraine and other non-Russian republics in order to maintain good relations with the communists. Kennan found Captive Nations Week a nuisance if not an obstacle

to this goal and, "in 1961, [he] conditioned his acceptance as Ambassador to Yugoslavia on President Kennedy's promise not to issue the annual proclamation. The President nevertheless did, thanks to Chicago's Mayor Daley's intervention." [Ref. 18]

In Moscow, Khrushchev's protests were more vehement than Kennan's, as described above. In 1982, TASS condemned President Reagan's speech for "rudeness," "cynicism" and "interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union." [Ref. 18:p. 6] That same year Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute on American and Canadian Affairs called the Week a threat to the Soviet Union. [Ref. 18:p. 6] Strangely, this amazing admission went unnoticed by national security staffs and the professional sovietologists. Along with verbal condemnation, the Soviets attempted to overshadow the event in international affairs. They adopted a policy of scheduling events to coincide with the observance, such as the signing of the non-proliferation pact [Ref. 18:p. 6].

Thus, even though many in Congress and in the American public had no idea of the resolution's importance, policymakers in Moscow did. It is not surprising that in April 1993, even after the Soviet collapse, Russian leaders still lobbied Washington to abandon Captive Nations Week. [Ref. 53]

What, then, was the importance of Captive Nations Week for the effort to secure diplomatic recognition of Ukraine? Most Ukrainian-Americans maintain that administrations paid only lip service to the idea, and that it could not overcome centuries of American political focus upon Moscow. At the same time, they recognize that it kept the concept of an independent Ukraine on the American political agenda. While the congressmen may not have appreciated the full weight of the concepts they proclaimed

on the floor, in some administrations the White House and the Kremlin listened with discomfort. The lengths to which Soviets went to overshadow the week--and the vehemence with which the Soviets protested it--indicates that the concept, embodied in law and renewed in yearly symbolism and practice, was more significant than the policymaking elites ever knew.

C. PHASE TWO: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE HELSINKI COMMISSION, ASSIMILATION OR RESURGENCE?

Although the younger ethnics--the first generation born, raised and educated in the United States--believed Captive Nations kept Ukraine on the political map, few felt the Executive paid much more than lip service to it. The same was said of the traditional Ukrainian-American organizations. Even so, there was an increasing public interest in human rights and in political prisoners, many of whom were in the Soviet Union. Seizing the opportunity to diversify their approach, many young members of the community hitched their star to human rights in order to keep the idea of Ukrainian independence alive in Washington. They did so despite criticism of "betrayal" by the more traditional factions, such as the Banderites.

During this same period in the 1970's, many individual Ukrainian-Americans had worked their way up the governmental ladder. In many respects it was these individuals and not the organized groups which became the most effective conduits of information about Ukraine to Congress and the Executive. By the 1980's many had gained appointments in the Republican administrations, while others were members or staff members in Congress or in other government and non-government agencies. Some of

them made careers of "not being a Ukrainian-Americans," while others split their efforts between ethnic and governmental organizations.

Hence, by the 1980's the lobby had taken on an unconventional structure, one comprising formal and informal personal contacts throughout the government, and one not easily discernable.

1. Human Rights: Passing the Baton.

To the morally-based National Captive Nations Council (NCNC), the human rights issue was old hat. The Committee was diligent in explaining to Congress the difference between the Carterite focus on *civil* rights in authoritarian Latin America and the hierarchy of *human* rights: personal, civil and national. [Ref. 18:p. 11] After 1975, however, this fight was taken up by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or Helsinki Commission.

The numerous "dear colleague" letters which alerted Congress to Soviet human rights violations, sprang largely from this office. In addition to these letters, the Commission was involved in the unconventional diplomacy (compared with traditional bilateral negotiations) of the delegation. Unlike the State and Congressional delegations, staff members (including some Ukrainian-Americans) were full members of the groups which negotiated directly with the 52 members of CSCE. While the State Department preferred to keep the delegations' demands abstract, Commission members insisted upon naming names of Soviet political prisoners. The Soviets had to sit and listen. Consequently, there was a noticeable difference between the Madrid conference of 1983 and the Vienna meeting of 1989. As one Helsinki staff member described it, "the

Commission had strengthened the spine of State" and by Vienna, the U.S. had taken the lead in human rights issues.

2. The Helsinki Commission and the Lobby.

Because of the Commission's structure and mission, it became a natural vehicle for Ukrainian-Americans to lobby Congress. Not only formal political and fraternal organizations, but individual members of the community could be heard in this forum. When asked whether the Commission went to the emigration for information or vice versa, one senior staff member replied:

Both. Sometimes there's an issue for which we'll seek them out, but they often come to us, and they come in all kinds. The state groups have many varied organizations, we even have a dentist who gets very involved in these things. [Ref. 54]

Regarding which groups the Commission sought out for information, the staff member answered:

We use only the Ukrainian American Council, since it's the umbrella organization for all the groups. I don't get into the in-fighting among groups. [Ref. 54]

In order to maintain linkage during the 1980's, the lobby kept constant pressure on Congress through the Commission--as well as directly through Congressional offices--to codify Ukrainian interests. They collaborated on several pieces of legislation, including: the 1988 legislation prohibiting any U.S. official from taking part in the Millennial celebrations of Kievan Rus' until liberation of the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Churches; the May 19, 1989 Senate letter to Secretary Gorbachev protesting Soviet harassment of Ukrainians campaigning for human, religious, cultural and national rights; the November 15, 1989 Senate letter asking President Bush

to urge President Gorbachev to legalize the banned Ukrainian churches; the 1990 Joint resolution authorizing a week of commemoration for the victims of the 1932-1933 forced famine in Ukraine; and the 1991 Senate bill requiring all aid to go directly to the republics of the Soviet Union.

Thus, by the late 1980's, the lobby had established a well-exercised network in Washington. It provided the framework for the next phase of the lobby. The extraordinary events in Ukraine precipitated the this final phase: mobilization of the entire community through *Rukh*²⁵ support groups.

D. PHASE THREE: *RUKH* SUPPORT, MOBILIZING THE LARGER COMMUNITY

Rukh support groups marked the third and final phase of the lobby before Ukrainian independence. Founded on the Captive Nations concept, these new groups used the political ties made in the human rights phase and established some new ones. The community formed 23 *Rukh* support organizations, designating the Washington office, *Ukraine 2000*, their umbrella organization and government liaison office. Their efforts built upon the Congressional Commission of the Famine in Ukraine, the Millennial celebrations of Kievan Rus', the famine commemoration legislation and, finally, on *Rukh* support and diplomatic recognition. Two things set this phase apart from the previous two. First, the new groups had daily contact with democrats in Ukraine, using electronic

²⁵*Rukh*, or Movement, was the common name for the Democratic Movement for the Restructuring of Ukraine: a writers union founded in September, 1989.

mail. This allowed them real time intelligence which State and CIA lacked. Second, the once solid bond between the ethnics and the Republican Party was failing.

1. Evolution of *Rukh* Support Groups.

The final phase began in the early nineteen eighties with the Congressional Commission on the Famine in Ukraine. The commission's findings, published June 20, 1990 by the U.S. Government Printing Office, were hailed in Ukraine as "unmatched by any investigation" of the Soviet system in Ukraine. [Ref. 55:p. 3] The newly-revealed information on the Soviets' forced starvation of five million Ukrainians, like the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, was a primary catalyst for the independence movement. The famine legislation met significant resistance in both Houses. Thus the lobby, still in its fledgling stages in its human rights orientation, pursued ad hoc lobbying techniques.

The second important breakthrough for the lobby was the 1988 celebration of the millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus'. Again, the legislation was controversial. Moscow wanted to keep the focus of the event entirely on Russia, not Ukraine. This reinforced the Russian claim that Kievan Rus' is a Russian and not a Ukrainian legacy; hence, that Ukraine has been a territory of Russia since A.D. 988 and has no legitimate claim to independence. As they did for the famine commission, Ukrainian-Americans formed an ad hoc committee from their existing groups. The legislation passed the Senate easily, but several members of the House wanted all references to Ukraine removed and replaced with "USSR." [Ref. 21] Additionally, the members wanted removed all references to the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. The Churches, banned by Stalin, were still harshly repressed by Gorbachev. Ukrainian-American

organizations and the ad hoc committee refused to support the proposed changes. A logjam resulted and was not broken until the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine sent a letter condemning the legislation as a "communist plot." It passed ten days later.

The significance of the commemoration legislation was that it prohibited all American officials from attending any commemorative event until the banned churches were legalized. This affected the upcoming Moscow summit. Reagan's attendance at the events would have lent further legitimacy to Gorbachev's harsh policy toward the churches and the fledgling independence movement in Western Ukraine. Not until sponsors of the initiative informed White House staff was President Reagan aware that he could not attend the millennial celebrations in Moscow to which Gorbachev had invited him.

Both of these cases were important to Ukrainian-Americans because they reestablished a formal lobby in Washington. This lobby was cemented by the third major breakthrough, the formation of *Rukh*. *Rukh's* founding congress took place in September of 1989. The following month, Volodymyr Yavorivsky came to America. He was the first Ukrainian parliamentarian to visit the United States. He was charismatic and inspiring of the younger generation of ethnics. Ukrainian-Americans who did not belong to existing ethnic organizations began to form *Rukh* support organizations. Large groups formed in Chicago and Detroit, smaller organizations formed in California and in states with lower concentrations of Ukrainians. The Washington, D.C. group, the Washington Committee in Support of Ukraine, or *Ukraine 2000*, was designated the government relations organization for the 23 committees which were organized nation-wide. Its

primary tasks were submitting testimony to Congress and making sure that *Rukh* members met with influential members of the White House staff, Congress, Defense, NSC, the press and various Washington think tanks. The second task was made possible because *Ukraine 2000*'s director was a former Reagan administration Assistant Attorney General who retained several close contacts in the upper echelons of the Bush administration.

Ukraine 2000 hosted several *Rukh* members. Many of them had spent several years in Soviet prison camps and were staunchly pro-democratic. Members of Congress eagerly met the men, posing for pictures to send home to constituents. For many who met them, the pro-democratic, ethnically-inclusive demeanor of these men dispelled ideas that Ukraine was anti-semitic and virulently nationalistic. [Ref. 21] It became more and more apparent to these members that the pro-Moscow stand of the Bush Administration could not be reconciled with basic American interests in supporting democracy in other countries. It was also apparent that alienating the future leaders of potentially the second largest country in Europe could have detrimental long term effects on European and American national security. Thus, many members of Congress developed their own stand on post-Cold War Soviet policy. And it was directly opposed to the Bush stand.

The watershed event of this process was Mykhailo Horyn's Washington visit in September, 1990. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze sent communiques to Bush, Baker and Scowcroft, urging them to avoid high-level meetings with Horyn. Nonetheless, Horyn met with more people, at a higher level (including four Cabinet members), than had any Ukrainian or Ukrainian-American. He made "an extraordinary contribution to advancing

the cause of an independent Ukraine." [Ref. 56]²⁶ The most important meeting of his trip was his hour and 20 minute meeting with Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney. The Secretary found Horyn very "believable," even-measured, truly democratic and "unscarred" by his experience in the gulag. After the 1990 meeting, Ukrainian-Americans noticed a change in DoD's position on Ukraine. The Defense Department seemed more attentive to the strategic importance of Ukraine, as well as to matters of financial aid and assistance. Thus, DoD's stand was similar to that of Congress: supporting the pro-democratic movement in Ukraine was the only way to ensure good relations with what could emerge as the second largest state in Europe.

Visitors from Ukraine who arrived without diaspora assistance did not meet with Horyn's success. While protesters in Kyiv demanded his resignation, Ukraine's Foreign Minister, Vitaly Masol, was denied meetings with the President and Secretary of State in 1990. He refused to meet with the Deputy Secretary of State. As a result, he had no meetings with U.S. government officials during his stay.

²⁶Among those with whom Horyn met were: David Atwood, President, National Democratic Institute; Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General; Carl Gershman, Chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy; Senators Richard Lugar, Dennis DeConcini, Bill Bradley; Congressman Frank Wolf; William Kristol, Chief of Staff, Office of the Vice President and Jon Glasman, Assistant to the Vice President and Deputy to the Vice President for National Security Affairs; Jeane Kirkpatrick, Michael Novak and other resident scholars at the American Enterprise Institute; Paula Dobriansky, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs; Curtis Kamman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Office of Eastern European and Yugoslav Affairs; Lane Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO; Bruce Gelb, Director, USIA; Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter; and members of the press, including the *Christian Science Monitor* and *Radio Liberty*.

2. **Stepan Khmara and the Mobilization of the Larger Community.**

Ukraine 2000, while an important part of the lobby, was by no means the only organization active in the third phase. The entire community was mobilized by the events taking place in Ukraine. Ukrainian-Americans who left or never joined an ethnic group were inspired to use their language skills, their business and professional connections--and, most importantly, their votes--to help Ukrainians achieve independence. As the following chapter will argue, mobilization of the voting community is essential to influencing Congress. Also essential is rallying the disparate organizations under one banner. The Stepan Khmara case achieved both ends.

As described above, the Khmara case solidified the lobby-Congress relationship and laid the foundations for the last lobbying effort before the Ukrainian referendum on independence: the concurrent resolutions urging President Bush to recognize Ukraine. These resolutions will be examined in detail in the next chapter. Their effect on the Bush White House, coming as they did in an election year, helped the lobby receive a meeting with the President and ultimately change his position on recognition.

E. SUMMARY

Although all of the lobby's successes and failures could not be examined here, the most important political movements have been highlighted. The Captive Nations idea laid the foundations for the human rights phase of the lobby and for the recognition of Ukraine in 1991. Many inside and outside the lobby have discounted its importance, but the CNW

concept's impact on U.S.-Soviet relations must not be confused with widespread US domestic ignorance of the concept. CNW was important because: 1) U.S. decision-makers understood it (and disagreed with it), even if the majority of Congress didn't; 2) Soviets understood it and abhorred it; 3) Administrations were powerless to completely abandon the observance because it was established in law; and 4) it established a lobby-Congress relationship, giving them a gauge by which to measure Administration's adherence (or lack of it) to the resolution in Soviet foreign policy. The law ensured the administration's making Congress and the lobby permanent considerations (of varying degrees) in Soviet foreign policymaking.

Like the immediate postwar generation, the lobby of the 1970's and 1980's adapted to political realities of the period. The increasing emphasis on ethnicity and human rights in the 1970's contributed the second phase of the lobby. This "shift" to human rights changed the character of the lobby for two reasons: 1) it allowed them to keep liberation on the political agenda while using politically cogent language of human rights; and 2) it made the lobby more difficult to detect as a lobby (because the lines were blurred, the bodies used were not only ethnic groups, but NGO's, positions in government, staff, etc).

Rukh support groups marked the final phase of the lobby. Founded on the CNW concept, they used the political ties made by the human rights phase along with establishing new ones. Their efforts built upon the Congressional Commission of the Famine in Ukraine, the millennial celebrations, the famine commemoration legislation, and finally, *Rukh* support and recognition.

The meeting with the president was the culmination of all of these efforts. First, it showed that the administration recognized the lobby as a consideration in policymaking. Even though their numbers were small, their perceived power in an election year could not be completely dismissed. Second, coming on the heels of Senate Concurrent Resolution 65, it indicated the Congress-lobby solidarity against the Bush stand. Finally, the meeting brought together members of otherwise fractious components of the lobby under one banner: diplomatic recognition.

VI. CONGRESS

Even if a foreign policy issue does not require Congressional support--as for ratifying a treaty or approving an ambassador--the President still recognizes the danger of acting contrary to the will of Congress. He recognizes that an unpopular move "will generate opposition to other policies, perhaps including policies in the domestic sector." [Ref. 57:p. 75] A president's hesitance to defy Congress is reinforced in an election year, especially if the Executive-Legislative relationship is less than cooperative. Such was the case in 1991. That is the reason why the Senate's passing a Sense of the Senate urging President Bush to recognize Ukraine following the December 1, 1991 referendum was so important. That is also the reason why the Ukrainian-American lobby turned their full attention to lobbying for the resolution. This chapter will show the reasons why the lobby was successful.

The 90 percent support for independence in the referendum sounded the death knell for the Soviet Union. The U.S. backing of Ukrainian independence, even before the referendum, sealed the fate of President Gorbachev. However, before November 28, 1991, U.S. policy had been to fully support Gorbachev and the preservation of the Soviet Union. It was not until the manifestation of substantial domestic pressure, displayed by Congress' November 20, 1991 resolution urging the president to recognize Ukraine, that Bush reversed his policy toward the Soviet Union.

Why, after decades of seeming indifference to the Ukrainian-American ethnic lobby, did individual members echo their letters on the Senate and House floors as they backed the resolutions against the President's policy?

The first part of the answer lies in a shift in the ethnic lobby's tactics for achieving "liberation" at the same time the Congress was shifting to a more active role in foreign policy. This gave a human rights foundation to the same coalition that would get the recognition legislation passed. The second half of the answer lies in the benefit each member saw in supporting or not supporting the legislation. While the majority of members preferred to defer to the president, enough members were motivated to support Ukrainian independence, whether for *parochial* reasons, or interest in *policy*, to pass the legislation and affect policy.

This said, the first two sections of this chapter will show the Congress-lobby partnership in human rights formed in the 1980's. The third and fourth sections will address the reasons political scientists predicted that the lobby would fail to sway policy-makers, and the reasons the literature was disproved. The final section will address congressional motivation to support the lobby.

A. CAPTIVE NATIONS AND THE HELSINKI COMMISSION: MERGING INTERESTS

Since the Congress founded the Helsinki Commission in 1976, members had tried to maintain a linkage between human rights and foreign policy. Members of the Agriculture, Trade, Defense, as well as Foreign Affairs or Foreign Relations committees regularly called on members of the Ukrainian National Association, Ukraine 2000 and

other ethnic interest groups to give testimony about what was really happening in the Soviet republic. In addition to giving testimony at hearings, Ukrainian-Americans were full members of the Helsinki Commission. They joined their congressional colleagues on the Commission as they "strengthened the spine of the State Department" at Helsinki meetings.

As the previous chapter described, the one cause which solidified the lobby-Congress partnership was the Stepan Khmara case. One hundred sixty five members of Congress sent letters to President Gorbachev demanding Khmara's release. This "dress rehearsal" put in place the mechanism which would achieve for DeConcini what failed for Senator Jesse Helms who attempted to pass similar legislation concerning Baltic recognition. First, it exercised the internal communications of the lobby. While DeConcini's reputation was essential in motivating *policy*-oriented senators, lobbying was essential in motivating *parochially*-oriented members. The combination will be addressed in the next section. Second, the Khmara case helped interested members and the lobby identify the motivations of each member they would enlist for the recognition legislation. Third, it raised the general awareness in Congress of the duality of American Soviet foreign policy. In addition to these, the success of Senate Concurrent Resolution 65 lay, ironically, in the "Chicken Kiev" speech itself. The speech put Ukrainian independence on the political map, *during and election year*. This aspect, in combination with the overall executive-legislative relationship, would prove essential to swaying members with less than altruistic interest in supporting the legislation.

B. THE REASONS WHY CONGRESS GOT INVOLVED

Political science literature underestimated the success of the ethnic lobby. One reason is the literature's focus on the lobby-executive relationship. Before the post-Vietnam Congress became increasingly involved in foreign policy, this was an appropriate focus. The changing nature of Congress made it more permeable to the ethnic lobby. Post-Vietnam changes included decentralization, the increasing role of staff, skepticism toward the executive, creation of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the rise of Caucuses and increase of travel opportunities for members. This more active Congress coupled with the lobby's shift to a human rights emphasis in the 1980's required a new analysis.

Therefore, what will be analyzed here are two primary reasons critics predicted the failure of Congress and the lobby in Soviet policy. The first has to do with the nature of the lobby itself. Nine reasons will be examined. The second has to do with what motivates members to respond to a lobby once it has overcome those nine reasons for failure.

C. NINE GOOD REASONS WHY THE LOBBY SHOULD HAVE FAILED

There are at least nine reasons most critics give for the past "failure" of the lobby. But, what seemed "failure" (the equating Captive Nations to National Hot Dog Week), really proved to be "foundation." Even if congressmen stuttered through the difficult pronunciations of the various countries year after year, their statements at least kept

Congress aware that there was a separate country of Ukraine.²⁷ [Ref. 58] When the time came in 1991, this awareness would prove essential to American recognition. The following are the nine most common criticisms of the lobby. By examining each one, it is the aim of this chapter to show the changes in the lobby during the 1980's which led to their success.

1. Assimilation.

Ethnics, especially over generations, eventually lose touch with the reality of their homeland. Their attention turns from political to domestic concerns such as business. For this reason, younger generations left or never joined the "nationalistic" political organizations of their parents, and forged business and professional communities. Some dropped out of organized ethnic communities all together.

What critics do not show, however, is that each of these non-political organizations continued to lobby Washington. And, although criticized by the more traditional organizations, young ethnics decided to "hitch their star" to the human rights issue, while maintaining a "liberation" focus.

2. Lack of Cohesion.

Stephen Garrett argues that the failure of the lobby has not been a technical one. He finds that,

...the real story of the ethnic lobby's failure may lie not so much in mistakes made in Washington as in the general environment in which the lobby's activities have proceeded....Simply put, if the circumstances are right in both

²⁷Graham Fuller, of the RAND Corporation, compared this to the "average-person-on-the-street's" awareness of Tibet. Such public awareness may prove useful if an independent Tibet becomes feasible.

areas, even the most clumsy lobbying effort in Washington is bound to have an important effect; if they are not, even the most skilled approaches to government will likely prove unavailing. [Ref. 9:p. 31]

He gives the singular success story as the American Jewish community. Their strength, he finds, is in their cohesion and their support by the general, non-Jewish public. The Eastern European ethnic lobby, he continues, has not been able to demonstrate the same strength in either of the two environmental areas" described. [Ref. 9:p. 31] The unity displayed in the Stepan Khmara case clearly disproves the first point. One Helsinki Commission observer noted that the letter campaign mounted by the Ukrainian-American community brought results that were "unmatched even by the Jewish lobby."

3. Lack of Sympathetic Public Opinion.

The second point regarding the lack of support by non-ethnic Americans has merit. It could be successfully argued that the general public was, and still is, ignorant of the history and aspirations of the non-Russian republics. However, an in-depth understanding of the ethnic platform was not necessary to understand the duality of Bush Soviet policy. The media condemnation of the "Bloody Sundays" in Vilnius and Riga and of Bush's "Chicken Speech" helped to lift this third liability.

4. Negative Connotations of Lobbying.

One scholar discounts the role of interest groups on foreign policy because of the negative image most congressmen and the general public have of lobbying. Ross Perot's campaign and the current debate over lobbying reform reemphasize this criticism. Congressmen resist blatant pressure and the appearance of succumbing to such pressure. Therefore, lobbyists must be careful in their approach. [Ref. 59]

However, the ethnic lobby's shift to a human rights focus in the 1980's seems to have softened their approach, alleviating any negative connotations of dual allegiance. Furthermore, as the next section on lobbying will show, groups which accurately reflect voter attitudes are welcomed more often than eschewed.

5. Limited scope, Inter- and Intra-ethnic Rivalries.

Another boon of joining forces with Congress on human rights was that it broadened the lobby's scope, uniting them with other ethnic and non-ethnic interest groups. This eliminated countervailing lobbies.²⁸ There exists no Russian ethnic lobby in the United States. Rather, the countervailing forces were found in the political establishment and among the academic specialists.

6. Congress' Limited Role in Foreign Policy.

It is important to distinguish congressmen's long- and short-term policy interests. While a later section will give a more comprehensive treatment of Congress' *motivation* to either defer or to take part in policymaking, the human rights issue should be distinguished as a long-term interest for at least some of its proponents. Non-governmental organizations like the Helsinki Commission, and Caucuses like those on Human Rights and the Baltics and Ukraine, provided platforms for sustained interest in foreign policy issues.

²⁸An example of this "uniting" of the ethnic interest is the Jewish lobby's supporting the lobby's push for eased immigration standards of Soviet Jewry.

7. Small Size and Electoral Insignificance.

Furthermore, the lobby overcame its small electoral base. It is estimated that the Ukrainian-Americans number 740,000 and organized members of the community (including members of churches) number 100,000. While their small size would seem to accurately project minimal influence, the intensity of their feelings and their access to decisionmakers may have been underestimated. Despite assimilation of younger generations of Ukrainian-Americans, the political goal of independence remained a part of Ukrainian cultural identity. This sentiment increased after the formation of *Rukh*.

8. Limited Access to Decisionmakers.

Access to decisionmakers had also increased by the 1980's. By then, an ambassador, NSC members, congressmen, an assistant attorney general, and many other members of the government and bureaucracy traced their Ukrainian heritage, or had spouses who did. The power of these personal contacts in "working Washington" was unaddressed in the literature.

9. Congress' Disregard for Constituent Opinion.

It has been argued that representatives do not make "an effective attempt to discover majority opinion in their constituencies," and that, on foreign policy issues, a congressman votes "as he or she feels best or looks to the administration." [Ref. 59:p. 103] This conclusion will be debated in the section concerning congressional *motivation* in foreign policy. It will be argued that the previous literature accurately reflected the *policy* motive of Congress, but ignored the parochial benefits which these groups offered.

Of all the arguments against the lobby's prospect for success, its electoral insignificance and Congress' subsequent disregard for it are the most cogent. The following sections will examine each in turn.

D. SIZE OF THE LOBBY AS A REASON FOR FAILURE

The East European ethnic lobby was projected to fail due to its small size. This argument assumes that *parochial* motivation and number of votes are synonymous. In fact, small groups wield other *parochial* incentives which will be addressed here.

1. Voter Support and a "Passionate" Cause.

Even the most successful lobbies do not win every battle.

As labor, business, and agriculture have found, to establish a credible record it is sufficient to win some of the hard fights....And so it is with the pro-Israel lobby: not powerful enough to dictate American foreign policy in the Middle East [i.e., to avert American condemnation of Israel's 1956 attack on Egypt], but influential enough to become an important factor in the decision-making process. [Ref. 60:p. 61]

Congress cannot and does not respond to every interest group. But it does respond to some of them.

What qualities make a lobby "most likely to succeed?" Lee Hamilton says they have to have good internal communication, know who the decisionmakers are and have access at the right time (when the decision is being made), have good sources of information within the executive and legislative branches and be able to enlist the support of sympathetic groups. [Ref. 60:p. 18]

Measuring the Ukrainian-American community by this standard, it has the proper attributes. Although small, it has very strong internal communication. Its access

to legislative and executive information and understanding of "how Washington works" was also strong by the mid-1980's. Active enlistment of sympathetic groups such as the Lithuanians, Latvians, Croatians, Poles and other groups was *pro forma*, since they found themselves in the same camp protesting the Bush administration's policies. Non-ethnic groups, especially human rights groups were cultivated during the 1980's as well.

The small size of the lobby may not have been a liability either. Vin Weber and Tom Downey offer these attributes for the successful lobby: The most powerful are the most passionate and those which represent actual votes. [Ref. 61] "Passionate voters don't forget to vote against you at election time." The large, PAC-supported lobby is not necessarily the most powerful.²⁹ Each can only give \$5000 per candidate and usually do not. According to these former congressmen, the individual constituent who writes, calls or asks for an appointment has more influence than the PACs. Washington-based lobbies are influential if they accurately reflect voter attitudes at home.

Interviews with congressional staff seem to bear this argument out. One legislative correspondent gave this account:

The heavy volume requires a priority system. We receive 1600 letters per week and answer every one. The handwritten and passionate letters receive priority. The computer-generated letters carry a little less weight. If a

²⁹Professional labor and business lobbyists contacted agreed that the emotional message can overcome even the most amateur, unrefined lobbying technique.

letter is signed with the first name only or with a hand written P.S. it is also given more attention.³⁰

When asked about the number of letters required before an issue was brought to the senator's attention, most staffers agreed with a colleague who said:

We send memos to the senator all day, including the content of letters regardless of the number devoted to one issue. Of course, if we receive a lot on one issue, we bring it to his attention. [Ref. 62]

Regarding the effect of ethnic constituents in particular, he responded:

Very often, letters are solicited in church. This is effective for two reasons. First, the number of people who write, and second, the emotional tone of their letters. We can receive hundreds from one temple or church. For example, we received 250 from Armenian-Americans this week. [Ref. 62]

When asked about the negative connotations of lobbyists, most staff agreed that lobbyists who represent the voters at home are usually looked on favorably by the congressman as providing a service. They feel that they are supposed to be keeping in touch anyway.

Ethnic appeal may have more influence in the House than in the Senate. Because ethnic groups tend to be concentrated in particular districts, they usually represent a larger percentage of a constituency for House members than for Senators. The chances that a countervailing ethnic group may be located in the same state diminishes the ethnic appeal in the Senate. The more frequent election cycle in the House reinforces this consideration.

³⁰This was the favorite technique of one lobbyist interviewed. He believed the staffer would assume he knew and might encounter the congressman in town, and would therefore show the letter in its entirety.

2. Lobby's Reflection of Attitudes at Home.

If a congressman finds that a Washington-based lobby does not accurately represent voter attitudes at home, that lobby will quickly lose credibility. The lobby must mobilize the larger community and sympathetic communities, if possible. However, not all issues from the "homeland" unify an entire ethnic community into an effective lobby. While the overthrow of the democratic regime in Athens did not mobilize the majority of Greek-Americans, Turkish military operations in Cyprus and the subsequent displacement of thousands of Greeks did. [Ref. 60:p. 62] A similar pattern is found in Ukrainian-Americans. While the majority remained dormant during the human rights phase, they were quickly unified against administration policy by the democratic movement in 1989.

3. Access to Facts.

While voter support may overcome the lack of money, the most important source of any lobbyists power is facts.

Forty-three percent of House members have served less than five years. Newspapers cannot give them the substantive detail they need. Congressional staffs are over-worked and underpaid. Lobbyists help fill the information vacuum. [Ref. 63]

The information received from Ukrainian-Americans about the events taking place in the Soviet Union exceeded that from official sources. There are several reasons for this. First, the State Department and CIA were Moscow-based, and maintained only "outposts" in Kyiv, the Baltics and other non-Russian republics. One member of a Washington-based human rights organization stated that Director Gates used the Commission's intelligence instead of his own sources. [Ref. 64] Second, the mainstram academic community was ignorant on Ukrainian issues. They did not know the language,

history or the issues. They had marginalized those in their specialty of sovietology who did. Third, the language skills which the community maintained and the travel opportunities provided by *glasnost* and *perestroika* gave Ukrainian-Americans renewed access to Ukraine. Fourth, because they had worked closely with the Helsinki Union in Ukraine on human rights issues and the millennial celebration, Ukrainian-Americans had strong communication links by the time the independence movement reached its peak.³¹ Fifth, the political prisoners of the 1970's and early 1980's, for whom many congressman had written letters of petition, became the leaders of the independence movement in 1989. When Drach, Horyn, Chornovil and others arrived in Washington to join lobbying effort, congressmen were eager to meet the men behind the names.

Even a well-organized, passionate lobby with access to decisionmakers and all the right facts is only successful if a congressman uses its information in his or her legislative decisionmaking. It is infeasible to question every congressman on the degree to which she does this. It is even less likely that each would admit such parochial motivation. Therefore, the next section will try to establish the likelihood that the ethnic appeal is considered.

E. CONGRESSIONAL MOTIVATION

Even if a lobby convinces a congressmen of the "right thing to do"--either morally or politically--a representative must be motivated to do it. This section examines the

³¹One Washington-based office "E-mailed" *Rukh* thrice daily, sending White house press releases and Congressional proceedings, while receiving updates on democratic and communist movements in Ukraine.

reason why a member of congress might be inclined to support Ukrainian independence, against official U.S. policy.

Since Watergate and Vietnam, the Congress has played a more active role in foreign policy [Refs. 65,66]. In addition to the structural reasons discussed above--decentralization and subsequent increased permeability to public opinion--there is an increasing belief that "members address policy issues because they believe doing so is part of their job." [Ref. 67:p. 10]

Using James Lindsay's three hypotheses of congressional motivation, *deference*, *parochial* and *policy* this section will test those hypotheses on the Congressional and individual levels.

1. Deference.

Congress has a role in shaping foreign policy... the President has to be the architect. [Ref. 68:p. 138]

The executive-legislative relationship is important in understanding the reasons why Congress might be motivated to defer to the administration or respond to ethnic group pressure. If there exist policy differences, significant public opinion or interest group pressure, the relationship may change. [Ref. 69] In 1991 the executive-legislative relationship was generally *confrontational* on a domestic level, and in foreign policy, it was shifting from *cooperation* (i.e. in the Gulf War) and *compromise* to *confrontation*. [Ref. 69]

However, to members of Congress, the issue of Ukrainian independence was unlike the Gulf War and other foreign policy matters due to its roots in human rights. Whereas many argue that the executive takes the lead in foreign policy formulation, while

the Congress is relegated to micromanaging it once formed, Congress has tended to take the lead in human rights issues. This has been true since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, and the forming of the Fascell or Helsinki Commission in 1976. The Jackson-Vanik amendment is an example of Congress initiative in checking State policy.³²

In addition to the already confrontational nature of the independence issue, Congress as a whole, and therefore its members, had much to gain from opposing Bush Soviet policy. First, was Bush's vulnerability to partisan politics in an election year. Second, because of the House Post Office scandal, the Clarence Thomas hearings and other problems, the Congress was the least loved-institution in several 1991 public opinion polls. A wounded Congress needed some public victories. Third, public awareness of Gorbachev's Baltic crackdown made opposition to Bush's Gorbachev-centered policy a potential boon. An example of this is the then-Governor Clinton, advised by Ukrainian-American Democrats, attacking Bush for "Chicken Kiev" in the Northeast and MidWest.³³ Thus, any motivation to defer to the President may have been outweighed by the political gains in opposing him. On a congressional level, then, the *parochial* motive cannot be ruled out.

³²The Jackson-Vanik amendment linked American trade with the Soviets to immigration policies of Soviet Jewry.

³³One Clinton campaign leaflet asked, "Did George Bush want to crush communism-- or just Ukraine?" and listed human rights cases ignored, *Rukh* members not visited on his Kiev trip, and the "Chicken Kiev" speech in particular. See Appendix C.

2. Parochial and Policy Motivation.

Nor can *parochial* motivation be ruled out on the individual level. While "safe" seats may have the luxury of voting their consciences, "marginal" seats, especially in an election year, do not. The parochial model argues that congress avoids the substance of policy, and votes on what electoral benefits it can receive. The policy model argues that congressmen really do care about the issues and want to shape the common good. In the case of supporting Ukrainian independence, both were evident.

a. Policy Model

Men and women want to count for something....The need for meaning prods legislators to be something more than freeloading hypocrites. [Ref. 66:p. 16]

It is not the intent of this paper to argue that representatives did not support freedom in the Baltics and Ukraine because they thought it the "right thing to do." Even so, it is erroneous to assume that all policy motivation stems from a sense of duty, regardless of constituency interest. In fact, it appears that a combination of duty and parochial impetus is the norm. In other words, "pork and policy are not mutually exclusive." [Ref. 67:p. 31]

While all representatives contacted named "doing the right thing" as their primary motivation in sponsoring or co-sponsoring Senate Concurrent Resolution 65, ethnic lobbyists said they tailored their approach to each representative depending upon perceived motivation. Some, the lobbyists said, backed their interests without pressure, while less sympathetic members required more pressure. Compounding the problem is the "chicken and egg" syndrome of representative interests. One foreign policy legislative assistant described his boss' motivation this way:

When he was a freshman, he joined the Caucuses and Committees because of constituency interests. Now that he has learned more about the issues, he'd vote for the legislation even if he weren't lobbied. [Ref. 62]

However, even senior members with genuine policy concerns may also have combined motivations. Every ethnic lobbyist interviewed mentioned Senator DeConcini at the top of the list of their supporters, yet his home state of Arizona comprises only 4.37 percent East European ethnics. On the other hand, Senator D'Amato of New York also made the top of the list, but his state comprises 14.35 percent East European ethnics. Both share experiences on the Helsinki Commission, giving them insight into the democratic struggles and human rights cases of the Soviet Union, and both are senior senators with "safe" seats. Here, it may be impossible to distinguish duty from parochialism, but neither have to be ruled-out.

3. Parochial Model.

Nothing is more important in Capitol Hill politics than the shared conviction that election returns have proven a point. [Ref. 34:p. 37]

As described above, many compared Thornburgh's loss to Wofford (the Republican loss of the 18.31 percent East European ethnic constituency in Pennsylvania) to President Ford's losing the large Polish-American vote in 1976. The spin conveyed to Congress by the ethnic lobby for the Republican defeat was foreign policy protest.

Thus, it could be argued that even a member with no substantive knowledge of the independence issue could be motivated *parochially* by the election results.

The size of the East European ethnic vote exceeds ten percent in only 12 states. So, if the lobby were to rely solely on the voter incentive, it would fail to win the

seats necessary to pass the resolution. They did achieve a winning coalition, however, and the reason is that the issue invited a combination of incentives.

To show this, it is instructive to establish evidence of a relationship between constituency size and attitude and a congressman's voting behavior. If James Lindsay's argument that each incentive--parochialism, ambition or duty--"acknowledges that members of Congress first and foremost want to be reelected" [Ref. 66:p. 7], then, supporting independence must have had some electoral benefit. According to David Mayhew, if the benefit is not in an ethnic constituency, then it may be in *advertising*, *credit claiming* or *position taking* on a salient issue. [Ref. 34:p. 32] When *Rukh* members visited Capitol Hill, some members asked them pointed, probing questions, while others just wanted their pictures taken to send home to their constituencies. One New York magazine carried a cover shot of Senator D'Amato, in fighting stance, with the caption (referring to Gorbachev) "I'll Kick Him in the Baltics!" [Ref. 70] Regardless of constituency's or the representative's level of understanding of the issue, the *advertising*, *credit claiming* and *position taking* benefits were evident.

To reinforce the argument that the lobby's impact was greater than their voting numbers would indicate, a look at the list of resolution sponsors is in order (see Appendix F). Only 15 of the 24 senators from these states supported the

legislation.³⁴ The remaining nine, while lobbied, were not positively influenced by the group. The possible reasons why, while too numerous to mention in detail, may be the perceived lack of parochial benefits or a disagreement of policy.

The House is harder to assess. Fifty-six of the sponsors had an ethnic constituency, while the remaining 26 did not. This ratio is higher than in the Senate, where the split between those with and without constituencies was 14 to 13. As mentioned previously, the reason for the higher ratio may be that ethnic populations are usually concentrated in certain districts.

To summarize, the relationship of constituency-to-vote is closer in the House than in the Senate, where *policy* motivation seems to be greater. "Safe" seats in the Senate tended to vote for or against the measure regardless of constituency size. It appears that the requirement of a large voting population, for either house, was not required. It is apparent that the small size of the Ukrainian-American population did not hurt it on the floor.

Thus, supporting Ukrainian independence against the administration provided congressmen the opportunity to do the right thing and receive electoral benefits as well. A lobby which brought the issue back to the larger public made these policy benefits possible.

³⁴A large constituency is defined here as ten percent or greater. The breakdown of percentage East European Ethnic to number of senators supporting the resolution is: Connecticut, 18.42/2; Delaware, 10.02/0; Illinois, 15.46/1; Massachusetts, 11.63/1; Michigan, 15.27/2; Minnesota, 10.93/0; Nebraska, 12.34/0; New Jersey, 17.7/2; New York, 14.35/2; Ohio, 12.56/2; Pennsylvania, 18.31/2; Wisconsin, 16.43/1.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

That such a small ethnic group could reverse American foreign policy is extraordinary. Their success relied upon two things. First, they possessed superior insight to the experts in the intelligence, foreign policy and academic fields on the Soviet reality. Second, their perceived power was much greater than their actual numbers. This was augmented by their strategic location in important electoral districts and their being lumped together with the Eastern European ethnics. Furthermore, history was on their side: the dualistic policies of American Presidents toward the "captive nations" finally caught up with the Republicans in a crucial election year.

The post-Cold War World in which multi-ethnic states collapse and nations rise is troubling to foreign policymakers. As the Clinton administration seeks to redefine the national interest, the role of the ethnic lobby may increase.

Before he left office, President Bush met with Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister, Boris Tarasyuk. Bush told him that he believed the U.S. needed to cultivate close, bilateral relations with Ukraine. He stated that he would advise the incoming President Clinton of this. [Ref. 71] Unfortunately, the Clinton administration, despite campaign rhetoric, has backslided.

Today, the Ukraine vs. Moscow and Gorbachev dilemma has been replaced by Ukraine vs. Russia. This is manifested in the current U.S. policy of exhorting Kyiv to relinquish its nuclear weapons to its primary security threat--Russia--without making any

security guarantees in return. The policy ignores what may happen when Ukraine is disarmed and taken over by Russia: war and a reconstituted empire.

Ukraine is the only obstacle to a reconstituted empire. A U.S. policy of dealing with Moscow and Kyiv on equal terms is the surest way to serve American security interests in the region, which seem to be a democratic Russia, a democratic Ukraine and peace rather than war and instability in Europe.

APPENDIX A

CLINTON CAMPAIGN LEAFLET

This leaflet was distributed to ethnic voters in the Midwest by the Clinton Campaign. It is representative of the way the Democrats used President Bush's policy toward Ukraine to win the ethnic vote in 1992.

Did George Bush want to crush communism— or just Ukraine?

George Bush is no friend of Ukraine.

He did nothing when the United States shipped a defecting Ukrainian sailor into the hands of the KGB.

He sided with the communists in Moscow
when RUKH marched for freedom in Ukraine.

And one year ago, he went to Kiev and slapped Ukrainian democrats in the face. He called Ukraine's hope for freedom "suicidal nationalism" and told the Ukrainian people to bow to Moscow's will.

Bush's economic policy is costing Americans their jobs.
His foreign policy is drying up investment
and costing Ukraine its future.

**Ukrainian-Americans have had enough
of George Bush's Chicken Kiev.
We need a change.**

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APPENDIX B

1980 AND 1990 CENSUS DATA ON UKRAINIAN-AMERICANS

Appendix A shows 1980 and 1990 census data on Ukrainian-Americans by state. It indicates percent increase or decrease of that population.

UKRAINIAN-AMERICANS

	1980 Census	1990 Census	% Increase (Decrease)
UNITED STATES	730,056	740,803	1.5
Alabama	1,218	1,585	30.1
Alaska	446	962	115.7
Arizona	5,447	8,471	55.5
Arkansas	570	870	52.6
California	49,724	56,211	13.0
Colorado	5,065	6,984	37.9
Connecticut	25,229	23,711	(6.0)
Delaware	4,394	4,950	12.7
District of Columbia	1,108	1,082	(2.3)
Florida	25,227	33,792	34.0
Georgia	2,680	4,967	85.3
Hawaii	926	1,234	33.3
Idaho	641	906	41.3
Illinois	40,987	38,414	(6.3)
Indiana	6,779	6,379	(5.9)
Iowa	1,155	1,356	17.4
Kansas	1,651	2,075	25.9
Kentucky	1,410	1,582	12.2
Louisiana	1,616	1,391	(13.9)
Maine	921	1,328	44.2
Maryland	13,975	15,872	13.6
Massachusetts	17,102	17,500	2.3
Michigan	47,189	43,914	(6.9)
Minnesota	9,522	10,691	12.3
Mississippi	643	480	(25.3)
Missouri	4,649	4,766	2.5
Montana	1,453	1,478	1.7
Nebraska	1,323	1,161	(12.2)
Nevada	1,889	2,434	28.9
New Hampshire	2,078	2,434	17.1
New Jersey	80,751	73,935	(8.4)
New Mexico	1,035	1,512	46.1
New York	127,678	121,113	(5.1)
North Carolina	2,766	4,897	77.0
North Dakota	3,212	3,634	13.1
Ohio	45,820	43,569	(4.9)
Oklahoma	1,497	1,969	31.5
Oregon	4,092	6,220	52.0
Pennsylvania	143,862	129,753	(9.8)
Rhode Island	3,585	3,530	(1.5)
South Carolina	1,560	2,266	45.3
South Dakota	208	391	88.0
Tennessee	1,913	2,063	7.8
Texas	8,636	13,094	51.6
Utah	762	1,062	39.4
Vermont	848	978	15.3
Virginia	8,048	12,321	53.1
Washington	7,885	10,814	37.1
West Virginia	1,970	1,514	(23.1)
Wisconsin	6,585	6,783	3.0
Wyoming	326	405	24.2

COMPILED BY THE WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, INC.

APPENDIX C

PRESIDENT BUSH'S REMARKS TO THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UKRAINE IN KIEV, SOVIET UNION

This speech, dubbed "Chicken Kiev" in the American Press, was delivered on August 1, 1991.

"The city of Kiev is an orchard. Kiev is a poet. Kiev is an epic. Kiev is history. Kiev is art."

Centuries ago, your forebears named this country Ukraine, or "frontier," because your steppes link Europe and Asia. But Ukrainians have become frontiersmen of another sort. Today you explore the frontiers and contours of liberty.

Though my stay here is, as I said, far too short, I have come here to talk with you and to learn. For those who love freedom, every experiment in building an open society offers new lessons and insights. You face an especially daunting task. For years, people in this nation felt powerless, overshadowed by a vast government apparatus, cramped by forces that attempted to control every aspect of their lives.

Today, your people probe the promise of freedom. In cities and Republics, on farms, in businesses, around university campuses, you debate the fundamental questions of liberty, self-rule, and free enterprise. Americans, you see, have a deep commitment to these values. We follow your progress with a sense of fascination, excitement, and hope. This alone is historic. In the past, our nations engaged in duels of eloquent bluff and bravado. Now, the fireworks of superpower confrontation are giving way to the quieter and far more hopeful art of cooperation.

I come here to tell you: We support the struggle in this great country for democracy and economic reform. And I would like to talk to you today about how the United States views this complex and exciting period in your history, how we intend to relate to the Soviet central Government and the Republican governments.

In Moscow, I outlined our approach: We will support those in the center and the Republics who pursue freedom, democracy, and economic liberty. We will determine our support not on the basis of personalities but on the basis of principles. We cannot tell you how to reform your society. We will not try to pick winners and losers in political competitions between Republics or between Republics and the center. That is your business; that's not the business of the United States of America.

Remarks to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of the Ukraine in Kiev, Soviet Union

August 1, 1991

Well, first, thank all of you for that warm welcome. And may I take this opportunity to thank all people of Ukraine that gave us such a warm welcome, such a heartfelt greeting. Every American in that long motorcade—and believe me, it was long—was moved and touched by the warmth of the welcome of Ukraine. We'll never forget it.

Chairman Kravchuk, thank you, sir. And to the Deputies of the Soviet, Supreme Soviet, may I salute you. Members of the clergy that are here, members of the diplomatic corps, representatives of American pharmaceutical and health care corporations who I understand are with us today, and distinguished guests all. Barbara and I are delighted to be here—very, very happy. We have only one regret, and that is that I've got to get home on Thursday night—I can still make it. And the reason is, our Congress goes out tomorrow, finishes their session they're in now, and I felt it was important to be there on that last day of the final session.

This beautiful city brings to mind the words of the poet Alexander Dovzhenko:

Do not doubt our real commitment, however, to reform. But do not think we can presume to solve your problems for you. Theodore Roosevelt, one of our great Presidents, once wrote: To be patronized is as offensive as to be insulted. No one of us cares permanently to have someone else conscientiously striving to do him good; what we want is to work with that someone else for the good of both of us. That's what our former President said. We will work for the good of both of us, which means that we will not meddle in your internal affairs.

Some people have urged the United States to choose between supporting President Gorbachev and supporting independence-minded leaders throughout the U.S.S.R. I consider this a false choice. In fairness, President Gorbachev has achieved astonishing things, and his policies of *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and democratization point toward the goals of freedom, democracy, and economic liberty.

We will maintain the strongest possible relationship with the Soviet Government of President Gorbachev. But we also appreciate the new realities of life in the U.S.S.R. And therefore, as a federation ourselves, we want good relations—improved relations—with the Republics. So, let me build upon my comments in Moscow by describing in more detail what Americans mean when we talk about freedom, democracy, and economic liberty.

No terms have been abused more regularly, nor more cynically than these. Throughout this century despots have masqueraded as democrats, jailers have posed as liberators. We can restore faith in government only by restoring meaning to these concepts.

I don't want to sound like I'm lecturing, but let's begin with the broad term "freedom." When Americans talk of freedom, we refer to people's abilities to live without fear of government intrusion, without fear of harassment by their fellow citizens, without restricting others' freedoms. We do not consider freedom a privilege, to be doled out only to those who hold proper political views or belong to certain groups. We consider it an inalienable individual right, bestowed upon all men and women. Lord Acton once observed: The most certain test by which we judge whether a country is

really free is the amount of freedom enjoyed by minorities.

Freedom requires tolerance embedded in openness, in *glasnost*. Our first amendment protects freedoms of speech, association, and religion—all religions.

Tolerance nourishes hope. A word of *glasnost*: Today, more than the words of Paul the Apostle, 20 years ago, ring out: They count the dead, but look, we are alive. In Russia, in Armenia, and throughout the world, the spirit of liberty thrives.

But freedom cannot survive if despots flourish or permit seemingly innocuous restrictions to multiply until they become shackles. Let us visit the monument at Babi Yar as a reminder, a solemn reminder, that freedom opens when people fail to hold back the terrible tide of intolerance and tyranny.

Yet freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support a far-off tyranny with a local despot. We will not aid those who promote nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.

We will support those who promote democracy. By democracy, we mean a system of government in which power is given openly for the hearts and votes—of the public. We mean a government that derives its just authority from the consent of the governed, that gains its legitimacy by controlling its own power. For years, you had elections, but you did not enjoy them. And now, democracy has begun to take roots in Soviet soil.

The key to its success lies in defining government's proper role. Democracy is not a technical game played by dry statistics. It is the very essence of preserving freedom, so that we can do the important things, the most important things: raise families, express our creativity, build good and fruitful lives.

In modern societies, freedom and democracy rely on economic liberty. Democracy is nothing more than a system of communication. It simply cannot function without individual rights or a pro-

which give people an incentive to go to work, an incentive to produce.

And it certainly cannot function without the rule of law, without fair and enforceable contracts, without laws that protect property rights and punish fraud.

Free economies depend upon the freedom of expression, the ability of people to exchange ideas and test out new theories. The Soviet Union weakened itself for years by restricting the flow of information, by outlawing devices crucial to modern communications, such as computers and copying machines. And when you restricted free movement—even tourist travel—you prevented your own people from making the most of their talent. You cannot innovate if you cannot communicate.

And finally, a free economy demands engagement in the economic mainstream. Adam Smith noted two centuries ago, trade enriches all who engage in it. Isolation and protectionism doom its practitioners to degradation and want.

I note this today because some Soviet cities, regions, and even Republics have engaged in ruinous trade wars. The Republics of this nation have extensive bonds of trade, which no one can repeal with the stroke of a pen or the passage of a law. The vast majority of trade conducted by Soviet companies—imports and exports—involves, as you know better than I, trade between Republics. The nine-plus-one agreement holds forth the hope that Republics will combine greater autonomy with greater voluntary interaction—political, social, cultural, economic—rather than pursuing the hopeless course of isolation.

And so, American investors and businessmen look forward to doing business in the Soviet Union, including the Ukraine. We've signed agreements this week that will encourage further interaction between the U.S. and all levels of the Soviet Union. But ultimately, our trade relations will depend upon our ability to develop a common language, a common language of commerce—currencies that communicate with one another, laws that protect innovators and entrepreneurs, bonds of understanding and trust.

It should be obvious that the ties between our nations grow stronger every single day. I set forth a Presidential initiative that is

providing badly needed medical aid to the Soviet Union. And this aid expresses Americans' solidarity with the Soviet peoples during a time of hardship and suffering. And it has supplied facilities in Kiev that are treating victims of Chernobyl. You should know that America's heart—the hearts of all—went out to the people here at the time of Chernobyl.

We have sent teams to help you improve upon the safety of Ukrainian nuclear plants and coal mines. We've also increased the number of cultural exchanges with the Republics, including more extensive legal, academic, and cultural exchanges between America and Ukraine.

We understand that you cannot reform your system overnight. America's first system of government—the Continental Congress—failed because the States were too suspicious of one another and the central government too weak to protect commerce and individual rights. In 200 years, we have learned that freedom, democracy, and economic liberty are more than terms of inspiration. They're more than words. They are challenges.

Your great poet Shevchenko noted: Only in your own house can you have your truth, your strength, and freedom. No society ever achieves perfect democracy, liberty, or enterprise; if it makes full use of its people's virtues and abilities, it can use these goals as guides to a better life.

And now, as Soviet citizens try to forge a new social compact, you have the obligation to restore power to citizens demoralized by decades of totalitarian rule. You have to give them hope, inspiration, determination—by showing your faith in their abilities. Societies that don't trust themselves or their people cannot provide freedom. They can guarantee only the bleak tyranny of suspicion, avarice, and poverty.

An old Ukrainian proverb says: When you enter a great enterprise, free your soul from weakness. The peoples of the U.S.S.R. have entered a great enterprise, full of courage and vigor. I have come here today to say: We support those who explore the frontiers of freedom. We will join these reformers on the path to what we call—appropriately call a new world order.

Aug. 1 / Administration of George Bush, 199.

You're the leaders. You are the participants in the political process. And I go home to an active political process. So, if you saw me waving like mad from my limousine, it was in the thought that maybe some of those people along the line were people from Philadelphia or Pittsburgh or Detroit where so many Ukrainian-Americans live, where so many Ukrainian-Americans are with me in the remarks I've made here today.

This has been a great experience for Barbara and me to be here. We salute you. We salute the changes that we see. I remember the French expression, *vive la difference*, and I see different churnings around this Chamber, and that is exactly the way it ought to be. One guy wants this and another one that. That's the way the process works when you're open and free—competing with ideas to see who is going to emerge correct and who can do the most for the people in Ukraine.

And so, for us this has been a wonderful trip, albeit far too short. And may I simply say, may God bless the people of Ukraine. Thank you very, very much.

Note: The President spoke at 3:55 p.m. in Session Hall of the Supreme Soviet Building. In his remarks, he referred to Leonid M. Kravchuk, Chairman of the Republic of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet.

APPENDIX D

U.S. EAST EUROPEAN ETHNIC POPULATION

This table gives 1980 and 1990 census data on Eastern European ethnic groups. It indicates percent change in each population.

U.S. EAST EUROPEAN ETHNIC POPULATION

ETHNIC GROUP	1980	1990	CHANGE	PERCENT
Albanian	38,658	47,710	9,052	23.42%
Armenian	212,621	308,096	95,475	44.90%
Belorussian	7,381	n/r	-7,381	n/a
Bulgarian	42,504	29,595	-12,909	-30.37%
Croatian	252,970	544,270	291,300	115.15%
Czech	1,892,456	1,300,192	-592,264	-31.30%
Czechoslovakian	n/r	315,285	315,285	n/a
East European	62,404	n/r	-62,404	n/a
Estonian	25,994	26,762	768	2.95%
German Russian	n/r	10,153	10,153	n/a
Hungarian	1,776,902	1,582,302	-194,600	10.95%
Larvian	92,141	100,331	8,190	8.89%
Lithuanian	742,776	811,865	69,089	9.30%
Macedonian	n/r	20,365	20,365	n/a
Polish	8,228,037	9,366,106	1,138,069	13.8%
Rom	n/r	5,693	5,693	n/a
Romanian	315,258	365,544	50,286	15.95%
Russian	2,781,432	2,952,987	171,555	6.17%
Ruthenian*	8,485	7,602	-883	-10.41%
Serbian	100,941	116,795	15,854	15.71%
Slavic	172,696	76,931	-95,765	-55.45%
Slovak	776,806	1,882,897	1,106,091	142.39%
Slovene	126,463	124,437	-2,026	-1.60%
Soviet Union	n/r	7,729	7,729	n/a
Ukrainian	730,056	740,803	10,747	1.47%
Yugoslavian	360,174	257,994	-102,180	-28.37%
Others	77,762	259,585	181,823	233.82%
TOTAL	18,824,917	21,262,029	2,437,112	12.95%

n/r - Not reported in that census

n/a - Not applicable

* Listed as Carpathian Russians in 1990 census

APPENDIX E

U.S. EAST EUROPEAN ETHNIC POPULATION

This table lists East European ethnic groups by state, indicating population as percentage of the total state population. States in which the East European ethnic group is greater than ten percent are highlighted.

EAST EUROPEAN ETHNIC POPULATION

STATE	ETHNICS	%	STATE	ETHNICS	%
United States	21,262,029	8.55%	Missouri	228,215	4.46%
Alabama	53,940	1.33%	Montana	52,251	6.54%
Alaska	33,344	6.06%	Nebraska	194,773	12.34%
Arizona	160,376	4.37%	Nevada	84,402	7.02%
Arkansas	39,906	1.70%	New Hampshire	87,338	7.87%
California	1,931,758	6.49%	New Jersey	1,368,364	17.70%
Colorado	236,190	7.17%	New Mexico	52,507	3.47%
Connecticut	605,527	18.42%	New York	2,582,440	14.35%
Delaware	66,743	10.02%	North Carolina	140,966	2.13%
D.C.	35,691	5.88%	North Dakota	63,393	9.92%
Florida	1,040,481	8.04%	Ohio	1,362,059	12.56%
Georgia	168,448	2.60%	Oklahoma	76,609	2.44%
Hawaii	30,565	2.76%	Oregon	153,808	5.41%
Idaho	33,884	3.37%	Pennsylvania	2,175,477	18.31%
Illinois	1,767,634	15.46%	Rhode Island	84,944	8.47%
Indiana	367,722	6.63%	South Carolina	68,116	1.95%
Iowa	136,800	4.93%	South Dakota	42,481	6.10%
Kansas	109,420	4.42%	Tennessee	84,092	1.72%
Kentucky	56,729	1.54%	Texas	644,826	3.80%
Louisiana	60,793	1.44%	Utah	42,985	2.49%
Maine	51,999	4.23%	Vermont	35,960	6.39%
Maryland	459,986	9.62%	Virginia	291,931	4.72%
Massachusetts	699,473	11.63%	Washington	275,921	5.67%
Michigan	1,419,636	15.27%	West Virginia	71,947	4.01%
Minnesota	478,348	10.93%	Wisconsin	803,721	16.43%
Mississippi	29,298	1.14%	Wyoming	25,764	5.68%

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APPENDIX F

SPONSORS AND CO-SPONSORS OF HOUSE AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS ON UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

This list shows the Senators and Representatives who sponsored (first two names listed) and co-sponsored Sen.Con.Res. 65 and H.Con.Res. 212. The Senate resolution was passed on November 20, 1991.

S.CON.RES. 65 CO-SPONSORS

DeConcini, Dennis	Arizona	Lieberman, Joe	Connecticut
D'Amato, Alfonse M.	New York	Mack, Connie	Florida
		McCain, John	Arizona
Adams, Brock	Washington	Metzenbaum, Howard M.	Ohio
Bradley, Bill	New Jersey	Mikulski, Barbara A.	Maryland
Dodd, Christopher J.	Connecticut	Moynihan, Daniel P.	New York
Glenn, John	Ohio	Pressler, Larry	South Dakota
Graham, Bob	Florida	Riegle, Donald W.	Michigan
Hatch, Orrin G.	Utah	Seymour, John	California
Helms, Jesse	North Carolina	Shelby, Richard C.	Alabama
Inouye, Daniel K.	Hawaii	Simon, Paul	Illinois
Kasten, Robert W.	Wisconsin	Specter, Arlen	Pennsylvania
Kerry, John F.	Massachusetts	Wallop, Malcolm	Wyoming
Lautenberg, Frank R.	New Jersey	Wofford, Harris L.	Pennsylvania

H.CON.RES. 212 CO-SPONSORS

Ritter, Don	Pennsylvania	Levine, Mel	California
Hertel, Dennis M.	Michigan	Lipinski, William O.	Illinois
		Machtley, Ronald K.	Rhode Island
Annunzio, Frank	Illinois	Marlenee, Ron	Montana
Bonior, David E.	Michigan	Martinez, Matthew G.	California
Broomfield, William S.	Michigan	Mavroules, Nicholas	Massachusetts
Burton, Dan	Indiana	McGrath, Raymond J.	New York
Camp, Dave	Michigan	McHugh, Matthew P.	New York
Campbell, Tom	California	McNulty, Michael R.	New York
Cardin, Benjamin L.	Maryland	Moorhead, Carlos J.	California
Conyers, John	Michigan	Morella, Constance A.	Maryland
Cox, C. Christopher	California	Murphy, Austin J.	Pennsylvania
Coyne, William J.	Pennsylvania	Murtha, John P.	Pennsylvania
Cunningham, Randy	California	Neal, Richard E.	Massachusetts
Dannemeyer, William E.	California	Nowak, Henry J.	New York
DeLauro, Rosa	Connecticut	Oakar, Mary Rose	Ohio
Dingell, John D.	Michigan	Pallone, Frank	New Jersey
Donnelly, Brian	Massachusetts	Paxon, William	New York
Dorman, Robert K.	California	Peterson, Douglas "Pete"	Florida
Dwyer, Bernard J.	New Jersey	Peterson, Collin C.	Minnesota
Eckart, Dennis E.	Ohio	Purcell, Carl D.	Michigan
Fawell, Harris W.	Illinois	Quillen, James H.	Tennessee
Feighan, Edward F.	Ohio	Ramstad, Jim	Minnesota
Ford, William D.	Michigan	Richardson, William	New Mexico
Frank, Barney	Massachusetts	Rinaldo, Matthew J.	New Jersey
Galleghy, Elton	California	Roe, Robert A.	New Jersey
Gallo, Dean A.	New Jersey	Rotrabacher, Dana	California
Gilman, Benjamin A.	New York	Santorum, Richard John	Pennsylvania
Green, William	New York	Schaefer, Dan	Colorado
Guarini, Frank J.	New Jersey	Shays, Christopher	Connecticut
Horton, Frank	New York	Slattery, James	Kansas
Houghton, Amory	New York	Slaughter, Louise M.	New York
Hughes, William J.	New Jersey	Smith, Christopher H.	New Jersey
Hunter, Duncan L.	California	Solomon, Gerald B.	New York
Jacobs, Andrew	Indiana	Traficant, James A.	Ohio
Jefferson, William J.	Louisiana	Walsh, James T.	New York
Kennally, Barbara B.	Connecticut	Weber, Vin	Minnesota
Kildee, Dale E.	Michigan	Wolf, Frank R.	Virginia
Kotter, Joseph	Pennsylvania	Young, C.W. Bill	Florida
Kostmayer, Peter H.	Pennsylvania	Zeliff, Bill	New Hampshire
Kyl, Jon	Arizona		
LaFalce, John J.	New York		
Lantos, Tom	California		
Levin, Sander M.	Michigan		

APPENDIX G

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK RESOLUTION

This resolution, signed into Public Law 86-90 on July 9, 1959, was written by the Honorable Lev E. Dobriansky. It provided the foundation of the Captive Nations concept upon which the Ukrainian-American lobby founded its cause.

Whereas the greatness of the United States is in large part attributable to its having been able, through the democratic process, to achieve a harmonious national unity of its people, even though they stem from the most diverse of racial, religious and ethnic backgrounds; and

Whereas this harmonious unification of the diverse elements of our free society has led the people of the United States to possess a warm understanding and sympathy for the aspirations of people everywhere and to recognize the natural interdependency of the peoples and nations of the world; and

Whereas the enslavement of a substantial part of the world's population by Communist imperialism makes a mockery of the idea of peaceful coexistence between nations and constitutes a detriment to the natural bonds of understanding between the people of the United States and other peoples; and

Whereas since 1918 the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Russian communism have resulted in the creation of a vast empire which poses a dire threat to security of the United States and of all the free peoples of the world; and

Whereas the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led through direct and indirect aggression, to the subjugation of the national independence of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam, and others; and

Whereas those submerged nations look to the United States, as the citadel of human freedom, for leadership in bringing about their liberation and independence and in restoring to them the enjoyment of their Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist, or other religious freedoms, and of their individual liberties; and

Whereas it is vital to the national security of the United States that the desire for liberty and independence on the part of the peoples of these conquered nations should be steadfastly kept alive; and

Whereas the desire for liberty and independence by the overwhelming majority of the people of these submerged nations constitutes a powerful deterrent to war and one of the best hopes for a just and lasting peace; and

Whereas it is fitting that we clearly manifest to such people through an appropriate and official means the historic fact that the people of the United States share with them their aspirations for the recovery of their freedom and independence; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week" and inviting the people of the United States to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities. The President is further authorized and requested to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world.

APPENDIX H
CAPTIVE NATIONS LIST

The list of "captive," or "oppressed," nations dates back to 1920. As the list reveals, additions were made until 1979.

Armenia	1920
Azerbaijan	1920
Byelorussia	1920
Cossackia	1920
Georgia	1920
Idel-Ural	1920
North Caucasia	1920
Ukraine	1920
Far Eastern Republic	1920
Turkestan	1920
Mongolia	1920
Estonia	1920
Latvia	1920
Lithuania	1920
Albania	1920
Bulgaria	1920
Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats Slovenes, etc.)	1946
Poland	1947
Romania	1948
Czecho-Slovakia (Czechs, Slovaks)	1948
North Korea	1948
Hungary	1949
East Germany	1949
Mainland China	1949
Tibet	1951
North Vietnam	1954
Cuba	1960
South Vietnam	1964
Cambodia	1975
Laos	1975
Angola	1975
Mozambique	1975
Ethiopia	1977
Afghanistan	1978
Nicaragua	1979

Source: Lev Dobriansky, "The Captive Nations Week Resolution Then and Now,"
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