

352.1 SCHOOLS, COURSE OF
INSTRUCTION, MISCELLANEOUS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

RETURN TO INDUSTRY SECTION

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File No. 352.11 SCHOOLS, COURSE OF INSTRUCTION, MISCELLANEOUS

No.	FROM	DATE	TO	SYNOPSIS
1				

CONFIDENTIAL

35 2. 11
Schiffman

2. Korean air lines. 26 May 1947. CG USAMGIK desires to initiate limited internal scheduled commercial air service in Korea over route Seoul-Pusan-Chenju Do-Kwanga-Seoul. Service to be operated by a reliable Korean concern as a private enterprise. Required aircraft to be secured from PLC.

915.1 Joint intelligence study publishing board.
Q3827C Joint army-navy intelligence study of Korea. 3 v. 1945. (JANIS 75)

915.1 Military intelligence service. Survey
R2114C/C of Korea, pt. 1-2. 1943 (S30-784)

951.9 Central intelligence group. SR-2 Korea. 1947
T2320S

327.73 State. Division of historical policy research.
T2306R Foreign policy studies branch. U.S. policy regarding Korea: 1834-1941. 1947 (Research project no. 29)

330.9519 Office of strategic services. Far eastern
R2107C section. Korea economic survey, 1942.

330.9519 Bureau of foreign and domestic commerce.
R2109C Far eastern unit. Preliminary economic survey of Korea. 1943.

A. Collins

Studies undertaken by the National War College.

CONFIDENTIAL

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4. Should the Japs be allowed a modest armed force for their internal security, i.e. should their Constitution be changed to allow.

O95.2 American Political Advisor. Japan.
Z182 Reappraisal of U.S. security interests
No. 3848 and policies in regard to Japan. 1946.

O97.3 Washington document center translation.
Z923 Japanese estimates and comparisons of
No. 7 resources as of the beginning and end of
 the war. 1946.

B336.52 Army service forces. Civil affairs handbook.
R7093 Japan. Section 4. 1944.
M354-4

B940.5314 Holborn, Hajo. American military government,
V3873 its organization and policies. 1947.

H. J. Collins

CONFIDENTIAL

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5. Saudi Arabia request a U.S. Military Mission be sent to their country.

B953 Twitchell, K. S. Saudi Arabia, with an account
O-785 of the development of its natural resources.
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947.

327.53 American legation, Jidda, Feb. 12, 1948. D-37.
AC8263 Discussion with Finance Minister regarding
American assistance to Saudi Arabia.

355.53 American legation, Jidda, December 30, 1947.
AA1335S D-447. British military mission to Saudi
Arabia.

330.953 American legation, Jidda, March 1, 1947. R-27
P-582S Annual economic review, 1946.

915.3 War Department. Intelligence Div., W.D.G.S.
S-653S Saudi Arabia. Chapter 3, Political.
Chapter 6, Armed Forces.

915.3 Great Britain. Joint Intelligence Bureau.
N653S Eastern Arabia. November, 1946.

A. Collins

CONFIDENTIAL

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6. Extension of communication and Army Transport
Command facilities to Eritrea.

- CID 12651 Coordinator of Information. Research and
Analysis Section. R&A 635. Electric
power and wireless installations in Eritrea.
May 15, 1942.
- 330.9635 American Legation, Addis Ababa, June 3, 1947.
R-435C R-21. Economic notes on Eritrea, 1946.
- B963.5 Longrigg, Stephen H. A short history of
J-165 Eritrea. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1945.
- O16.3253 Department of State. Reference Division.
T-1741S Italian colonies, possessions, and areas
under military control in Africa and the
Dodocanese. Bibliography No. 23. July 17, 1947.
- 354.635 Occupied Enemy Territory Administration,
E1878 Eritrea. Half-yearly report by the Military
6-12/42S Administrator on the Occupied Enemy Territory
of Eritrea. Report IV. For period 1 July to
31 December 1942.
- B916.35 British Military Administration, Eritrea.
H3OR Annual Report by the Chief Administrator
on the British Military Administration of
Eritrea for period 1st January to 31st
December, 1945.

A. Z. Collins

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASE OF STUDIES TO THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGETHE PROBLEM

1. To determine a method of procedure for the release of certain studies to the National War College, in possession of the State Department, but originating in some other department or agency.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 31 October 1946 the Commandant of the National War College requested that SWNCC furnish the National War College with certain papers covering subjects which the class was studying. They were not interested in the conclusions reached, but in the problem, facts bearing on the problem, etc., of the pertinent papers. On 16 November 1946 the Committee agreed that the Secretariat, SWNCC, was authorized to release the information requested by the National War College after consultation, where necessary, with Joint Security Control and appropriate representatives of the State Department. It was understood that this did not authorize the release of Top Secret information.

DISCUSSION

3. From time to time the Department of State has been approached directly by a liaison officer from the National War College to screen certain bibliographies and obtain certain of the documents listed therein. In most cases these documents were prepared by agencies such as JANIS, CIG, OSS as well as by the War and Navy Departments. Release of documents of other departments or agencies and even the screening by the Liaison Officer is considered by the Department of State to be a violation of the "Third Agency Rule" agreed to by certain departments and agencies on July 1, 1941 (Appendix "A"). A list of the studies already released to the National War College by the Department of State is appended hereto (Appendix "B").

4. It has been suggested that a solution to this problem would be to have the State, Army, Navy and Air Force Departments waive the "Third Agency Rule" insofar as release of documents to the National War College is concerned. However, the Department of State considers it imperative that this "rule" be faithfully observed, since our good relations with other Government agencies are largely dependent thereon.

5. A possible solution to the problem has been advanced by the Department of State to the effect that the SANACC Secretariat under the authority stated in paragraph 2 above could act as a screening agency on these requests and obtain the necessary clearances from the originating agency prior to their turn-over to the National War College.

CONCLUSIONS

6. It is concluded that:

a. The "Third Agency Rule" should not be waived in cases of this nature.

b. The Department of State should be authorized to allow a designated representative of the Commandant of the National War College to screen the material listed in the bibliographies of the State Department.

c. After this screening, the Department of State should prepare a list of the studies requested by the representative of the NWC, which did not originate in that department, and forward the list to the SANACC Secretariat with a view to obtaining proper clearance from the originating agency prior to release to the National War College.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that:

a. SANACC approve the above conclusions.

b. After approval copies of this paper be furnished to the interested agencies for information, or such other action as is deemed appropriate.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : O - Mr. Gardiner
FROM : CSA - Mr. Fitch *J.F.F.*
SUBJECT: "Third Agency Rule"

DATE: June 3, 1948

Reference is made to your memorandum of March 31, 1948, addressed to Mr. Flaherty, wherein you requested authorization to waive the "Third Agency Rule". After exhaustive research and investigation it has been determined that this rule was devised at a meeting of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, War, Navy, Agriculture, Commerce, Maritime Commission, Office of Emergency Management and Export Control. It is not within the province of this office to waive such a rule. The possible waiving of this rule was explored thoroughly through Department of State liaison channels with Army and Navy, and they emphatically stated they wished the rule strictly adhered to.

As a suggestion in your particular case, since the SANACC Secretariat is authorized to release SANACC papers carrying the classification of up to but not including TOP SECRET to the National War College, you could have the documents presented to that body, which could turn them over to the National War College. This does not violate the spirit or intent of the rule since there would be a representative in SANACC of the agency which originated the desired document.

It is imperative that this "Third Agency Rule" be faithfully observed, since our good relationships with other Government agencies are largely dependent thereupon.

Attached hereto is the final draft of the agreement which was reached on July 7, 1941.

*Withdrawn
by originator
Mrs Blake*

CONFIDENTIAL

CSA:JDD *JDD* :rnc

CONFIDENTIAL*File in National
War College
folder*

COPY

EXTRACT

July 7, 1941

REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS, COMMISSIONS AND OFFICES (HEREINAFTER DESIGNATED "AGENCIES") APPOINTED TO CONSIDER THE DISSEMINATION AND SAFEGUARDING OF INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE FORMULATION OF POLICY IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY.

3. a. (3) Each agency will be the sole judge, and will assume the responsibility for its decisions as to what information received initially by it is to be disseminated to other agencies, to which agencies, and under what classification or other safeguards.

SIGNED:

George Gordon, Representing the State Department

John C. Wiley, Representing the Treasury Department

Sherman Miles, Brig. General, USA., Representing the War Department

Howard D. Bode, Captain, USN, Representing the Navy Department

Arthur M. Becker, Representing the Department of Agriculture

Eugene Burgess, Representing the Department of Commerce

Huntington T. Morse, Representing the Maritime Commission

Shane McCarthy, Representing the Office for Emergency Management

Ralph C. Scott, Major, ORD-Res., USA, Representing the Administrator
for Export Control

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COPY

FINAL DRAFT

July 7, 1941

REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS, COMMISSIONS AND OFFICES (HEREINAFTER DESIGNATED "AGENCIES") APPOINTED TO CONSIDER THE DISSEMINATION AND SAFEGUARDING OF INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE FORMULATION OF POLICY IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY

1. The Problem Presented

a. It is essential that the various policy-making agencies of the Government receive promptly such information as may be required in the execution of their functions.

b. It is also essential that secret and confidential information be safeguarded.

c. The problem therefore entails the adjustment of conflicting interests--the extension of the dissemination of information and the limitation of that dissemination.

2. Discussion of the Problem.

a. No single solution of this problem applicable to all agencies appears to be practicable. The agencies differ materially in organization, in method of handling information and in their liaison with other agencies. The agencies are also rapidly growing in size and complexity. Standardized methods of handling and exchanging information cannot be established by mutual agreement, and indeed it is doubtful if the advantages of such standardization would offset the very considerable risks to the security of information and the reorganization and consequent impairments of efficiency which standardization would entail in the various agencies.

b. Certain steps, however, may be taken, as recommended below, which, it is believed, will materially aid in the solution of the problem. These steps will maintain existing channels of liaison, open others to such use as may be found in practice advantageous, and at the same time require the least dislocation of function in the agencies.

3. Action Recommended.

a. That all of the agencies represented in this report agree on the following:

(1) Existing channels of inter-agency liaison will remain unchanged and will be developed as the situation may require.

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In particular, information of a technical nature and not directly affecting governmental policy will be freely exchanged between agencies by mutual liaison.

(2) Each agency will be responsible for the dissemination and for the safeguarding of information within its own organization.

(3) Each agency will be the sole judge, and will assume the responsibility for its decisions as to what information received initially by it is to be disseminated to other agencies, to which agencies, and under what classification or other safeguards.

(4) In order to establish a common understanding of the relative secrecy of information and the consequent safeguards with which it should be protected, all agencies agree to the following classification, definitions and procedure in handling information which passes from one agency to another:

(a) Secret. All information, the disclosure of which might endanger national security or be of great advantage to an actual or potential enemy. Dissemination to be held to an absolute minimum, and to those persons whose duties require a knowledge of it and who are held responsible for its inviolability.

(b) Confidential. Information, the disclosure of which, although not endangering the national security, might be prejudicial to the interests of the United States or be of advantage to an actual or potential enemy. Confidential information may be given a wider dissemination than Secret, but only to those persons whose duties are concerned with it and who will be responsible for its security.

(c) Restricted. Information for official use only and to be denied to the public. Dissemination may be to persons of undoubted loyalty and discretion who are cooperating in Government work, as well as those in United States service.

b. That the Department of the Treasury, War, Navy, Agriculture and Commerce, and the Administrator of Export Control agree, subject to the above general agreement, to establish or designate, each within his own agency, a single office for the exchange of information of such importance in relation to the present emergency as to bear upon or influence governmental policy.

(1) To this office will be sent all such information which has been initially received by any branch of that agency and which has been passed by competent authority within the agency for transmission to other interested agencies.

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(2) The office will be charged, at its discretion and on its responsibility, with the dissemination of such information, under whatever safeguards it may consider necessary, to corresponding offices of such other agencies as may be concerned with the information in question.

(3) The office will further be charged with receiving information of similar nature from corresponding offices of other agencies, and of making the required dissemination of that information, under proper safeguards, within its own agency.

c. That the Department of State, the Maritime Commission, and the Office for Emergency Management (the latter including and speaking for the Office of Production Management, the Lease-Lend Office, and the National Defense Research Committee) agree, subject to the above general agreement, to designate one or more offices within their respective agencies to which inquiries on matters other than those already covered by existing channels of inter-agency liaison, can be addressed for important information of the nature above set forth on designated subjects, and to which such information may be sent by any other agency. These offices will accept responsibility for the dissemination within their agency of information received by them from other agencies, including adequate steps for the safeguarding of that information during the process of dissemination.

George Gordon
State Dept.

John C. Wiley
Treasury Dept.

Sherman Miles, Brig. Gen.
War Dept.

Howard D. Bode, Capt, USN
Navy Dept.

Arthur M. Becker,
Dept. of Agriculture

Eugene Burgess
Dept. of Commerce

Huntington T. Morse
Maritime Commission

Shane McCarthy
Office for Emergency Management

Ralph C. Scott, Major, Ord-Res
Rep. Administrator for Export Control

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

May 26, 1948

REF - Mr. Ottemiller

Subject: Delivery of Documents to the
National War College

My negotiations on this subject with CSA have wound up in a most horrible mass of spaghetti. After talking with one of the staff of FC he informally suggested that something in line with the attached memorandum ought to take care of this in connection with furnishing Captain Collins with documents originating in the Army, Navy and Air Force. I concur with his ideas.

If you do not think the attached is adequate and would like something else, please do not hesitate to get in touch with me.

John P. Gardiner
J. P. Gardiner

O:JPG:mwc

THE STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 26, 1948

REF - Mr. Ottemiller

Subject: Delivery of Documents to the National War College

Reference is made to your recent delivery of documents to Captain Howard Collins, USN of the staff of the National War College. *Staff*

In connection with any future cases of a similar type involving requests by Captain Collins for documents for use by the ~~staff~~ of the National War College, the Army, Navy and Air Force Members of the SANACC Secretariat confirm that their respective Departments are willing to waive the "third agency rule" in cases where the National War College is concerned, *except matters of classified TOP*

SECRET and information originating in a joint or combined agency. (JCS).

J. P. Gardiner
J. P. Gardiner
SANACC Secretariat

ARMY MEMBER

NAVY MEMBER

AIR FORCE MEMBER

RESTRICTED

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3 MAR 1948

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE
COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

SUBJECT: Allotment of Vacancies at the US Military Academy and
US Naval Academy to the Turkish Armed Forces.

The Army Member, SANACC, desires that the attached memorandum
be referred to appropriate subcommittees of the SANACC for study
and recommendation as to the advisability of securing legislation
to permit admission of Turkish cadets to the US Military Academy
and the US Naval Academy in July 1948.

1 Incl
Sta by Army
Mr, SANACC

William H. Draper, Jr.
Under Secretary of the Army

RESTRICTED

COPY TO ACCOMPANY ORIGINAL

RESTRICTED

ALLOTMENT OF VACANCIES AT US MILITARY ACADEMY
AND US NAVAL ACADEMY TO THE TURKISH
ARMED FORCES

Statement by the Army Member, SANACC

1. The Chief (General McBride), US Army Group, American Mission for Aid to Turkey, has recommended that action be taken to secure two or more vacancies each, for Turkish cadets, in the classes entering the US Military Academy and the US Naval Academy in July 1948.

2. General McBride believes that if the US Mission for Aid to Turkey is authorized to extend an invitation to send students to the US Military Academy and the US Naval Academy that:

a. Such an offer will meet with great approval and appreciation on the part of the Turkish people in general, and the Turkish Armed Forces in particular.

b. It would have the further vital effect of giving flavor ^a ~~and~~ ^{of} permanency to the United States' friendship and interest in Turkey.

c. It would be especially timely in view of the Aid Program.

3. In view of the foregoing, it is desired that appropriate subcommittees of the SANACC undertake study in order to recommend to the SANACC regarding the advisability of securing legislation to permit the admission of Turkish cadets to the US Military Academy and the US Naval Academy in July 1948.

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Service Schools

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80TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 1801

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 12, 1948

Referred to the Committee on Armed Services

AN ACT

To authorize attendance of civilians at schools conducted by the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Joint-Service schools, and for other purposes.

- 1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
- 2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
- 3 That the Secretary of Defense, under such regulations as
- 4 he may prescribe, is authorized to permit civilians, who are
- 5 citizens of the United States, including civilian employees
- 6 of the Federal Government, to attend all schools operated by
- 7 the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, includ-
- 8 ing Joint-Service schools. The Secretary of the Treasury,
- 9 under such regulations as he may prescribe, is authorized
- 10 to permit civilians, who are citizens of the United States,

1 including civilian employees of the Federal Government,
2 to attend all schools operated by the Coast Guard. Civilians
3 authorized to attend such schools shall be entitled to receive
4 traveling expenses and per diem in lieu of subsistence, in-
5 cluding per diem in lieu of subsistence while in attendance
6 at such schools, in accordance with Standardized Govern-
7 ment Travel Regulations, the Subsistence Expense Act of
8 1926, as amended (5 U. S. C. 821-833), and the Act of
9 February 14, 1931, as amended (5 U. S. C. 73a): *Pro-*
10 *vided*, That not to exceed \$50,000 per annum may be
11 expended under the direction of the Secretary of Defense,
12 and not to exceed \$1,000 per annum may be expended
13 under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, for
14 such purposes under the authority of this Act. The schools'
15 equipment, billets, and messing facilities may be used for
16 training of, and providing housing and subsistence for, such
17 civilians while attending such schools. Appropriations avail-
18 able to the National Military Establishment or to the Coast
19 Guard may be used for carrying into effect the purposes
20 of this Act.

Passed the Senate February 9 (legislative day, February
2), 1948.

Attest:

CARL A. LOEFFLER,
Secretary.

80TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 1801

AN ACT

To authorize attendance of civilians at schools conducted by the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Joint-Service schools, and for other purposes.

FEBRUARY 12, 1948

Referred to the Committee on Armed Services

11 February 1947

552.11

Scholar.

Acknowledge to have received this date from the Secretary
of SWNCC:

National War College Committee Report

NLWC, IR-47, C-IV, 1, copy 5
NLWC, IR-47, C-IV, 3, copy 5
NLWC, IR-47, C-IV, 6, copy 5
NLWC, IR-47, C-IV, 2, copy 5
NLWC, IR-47, C-IV, 8, copy 5
NLWC, IR-47, C-IV, 5, copy 5
NLWC, IR-47, C-IV, 4, copy 5
NLWC, IR-47, C-IV, 7, copy 5

John P. Gardiner
J. P. GARDINER

CONFIDENTIAL

NWC
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(1391)

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

30/aem

*311.5
Schools*

6 December 1946.

SUBJECT: Request for Publication.

TO: Chairman, State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee,
Room 278, State Department,
Washington, D. C.

1. It is requested that The National War College be furnished two copies of the following document:

Agreement of Generals Eisenhower, Zukor, Montgomery and de Tassigny for demilitarization and disarmament of Germany.

FOR THE COMMANDANT:

Richard J. Werner
RICHARD J. WERNER,
Colonel, Infantry,
Executive Officer.

N.W.C. advised of whereabouts of this agreement

DEC 9 1946



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CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

TOP SECRET ⁴⁸*Office Memorandum* · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: NOV. 19, 1946

TO : A-H - Mr. Gardner

FROM : MEI - Mr. Dunn

SUBJECT: US Strategic Interest in Iran.

352.11

Misc.

With reference to your memorandum of November 15 concerning the desire of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to transmit to the National War College certain questions propounded by this office, MEI and NEA approve on condition that the questions be rephrased in such manner as not to reveal their source, destination, or immediate purpose. The substance of the questions might be put in such forms as to express the possible interest of the State Department in strategic aspects of US Foreign Policy as regards a sample country of the Middle East. For example, the first question might read: "To what extent is Iran (or Turkey) an area of vital strategic interest to the United States for defensive or counter-offensive purposes, or as a source of supply?"

We appreciate your request for clearance in this case and hope that the questions, rephrased, might be helpful to the National War College.

*WCD**WCD*

MEI:WCDunn:fv

TOP SECRET

November 15, 1946

ME - Mr. Dunn:

JCS - 1714

Sept 27, 46

cc. no. 25

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to pass the attached paper to the National War College and have requested the Department's approval before initiating such action. Your comment is requested.

After indicating your comment, would you be good enough to call me on extension 2685 in order that I may send a messenger for the document.

The Joint Chiefs are extremely anxious to act on this matter and expeditious handling will be greatly appreciated.

John P. Gardiner

SWNOC:JPG:nla

✓
Q1 2498



THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Subs. 7/11
352.11
check
SWN-4887

8 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC ←
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC

The War Department Member, SWNCC, approved SWN-4870 provided paragraph 2 is changed to read as follows:

"2. It is recommended that the Secretariat, SWNCC, be authorized to release the information requested in par 2 of the enclosure to the Liaison Officers listed in par 3, after consultation where necessary, with the Joint Security Control and appropriate representatives of the State Department."

It is requested that you indicate your comment or concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

H. W. Moseley
H. W. MOSELEY,
Secretary

APPROVED: *J. K. Killdridge*

DATE: *Nov 14, 1946*

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COPY

SWN-4870
1 November 1946MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
WAR MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC

1. The enclosure, a memorandum by the Commandant, National War College, is circulated for consideration of the Committee.

2. It is recommended that the Secretary, SWNCC, after consultation with the Subcommittee for Release of State Papers and/or Joint Security Control be authorized to release the information requested in paragraph 2 of the enclosure to the liaison officers listed in paragraph 3.

3. If you concur in the above recommendation, it is requested that you indicate that concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

H. W. MOSELEY
Secretary

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____



THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.


SWN-4887
8 November 1946


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NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC

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It is requested that you indicate your comment or concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.


H. W. MOSELEY,
Secretary

APPROVED: 

DATE: 13 NOV 1946

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SWN-4870
1 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
WAR MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC



1. The enclosure, a memorandum by the Commandant, National War College, is circulated for consideration of the Committee.
2. It is recommended that the Secretary, SWNCC, after consultation with the Subcommittee for Release of State Papers and/or Joint Security Control be authorized to release the information requested in paragraph 2 of the enclosure to the Liaison Officers listed in paragraph 3.
3. If you concur in the above recommendation, it is requested that you indicate that concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

H. W. Moseley
H. W. MOSELEY,
Secretary

APPROVED: *John L. Sullivan*

DATE: 13 NOV 1946

COPY

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
Office of the Commandant
Washington 25, D. C.

31 October 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

In reference to paragraph 6 of the approval of JCS 369/3 contained in memorandum by the Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, dated 28 October 1946, the following request is submitted.

The National War College is urgently in need of certain SWNCC papers covering subjects which the class is studying. Conclusions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have reached on these subjects are of no particular value in this instance, but rather the "Facts Bearing on the Problem" and "Discussion" portions of the papers which represent sound basic background material for the use of the class.

Colonel J. J. Twitty, GE, Captain H. L. Collins, USN, and Colonel W. C. Sweeney, AC, assigned to the faculty of this college have been designated to deal directly with your Secretariat in this regard, subject to your approval. Your favorable consideration of this type of liaison is requested.

/s/ H. W. Hill

H. W. HILL
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commandant

cc: Secretary, JCS.

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SWN-4870
1 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
WAR MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC

1. The enclosure, a memorandum by the Commandant, National War College, is circulated for consideration of the Committee.
2. It is recommended that the Secretary, SWNCC, after consultation with the Subcommittee for Release of State Papers and/or Joint Security Control be authorized to release the information requested in paragraph 2 of the enclosure to the Liaison Officers listed in paragraph 3.
3. If you concur in the above recommendation, it is requested that you indicate that concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

H. W. Moseley
H. W. MOSELEY,
Secretary

APPROVED: *[Signature]*

DATE: 4 Nov, 1946

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

BWH-4870
1 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
WAR MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC

1. The enclosure, a memorandum by the Commandant, National War College, is circulated for consideration of the Committee.

2. It is recommended that the Secretary, SWNCC, after consultation with the Subcommittee for Release of State Papers and/or Joint Security Control be authorized to release the information requested in paragraph 2 of the enclosure to the Liaison Officers listed in paragraph 3.

3. If you concur in the above recommendation, it is requested that you indicate that concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

H. W. MOSELEY,
Secretary

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

COPY TO ACCOMPANY ORIGINAL

| COPY

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
Office of the Commandant
Washington 25, D. C.

31 October 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

In reference to paragraph 6 of the approval of JCS 369/3 contained in memorandum by the Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, dated 28 October 1946, the following request is submitted.

The National War College is urgently in need of certain SWNCC papers covering subjects which the class is studying. Conclusions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have reached on these subjects are of no particular value in this instance, but rather the "Facts Bearing on the Problem" and "Discussion" portions of the papers which represent sound basic background material for the use of the class.

Colonel J. J. Twitty, CE, Captain H. L. Collins, USN, and Colonel W. C. Sweeney, AC, assigned to the faculty of this college have been designated to deal directly with your Secretariat in this regard, subject to your approval. Your favorable consideration of this type of liaison is requested.

/s/ H. W. Hill

H. W. HILL
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commandant

cc: Secretary, JCS.

SWN-4887
8 November 1946

HWK:aj

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWHCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWHCC

The War Department Member, SWHCC, approved SWN-4870
provided paragraph 2 is changed to read as follows:

"2. It is recommended that the Secretariat,
SWHCC, be authorized to release the information
requested in par 2 of the enclosure to the Liaison
Officers listed in par 3, after consultation where
necessary, with the Joint Security Control and
appropriate representatives of the State Department."

It is requested that you indicate your comment or
concerns hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWHCC.

H. R. MOBLEY,
Secretary

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

COPY FOR SWHCC FILE

4887

SWH-4870

VFF:do

1 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
WAR MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC

1. The enclosure, a memorandum by the Commandant, National War College, is circulated for consideration of the Committee.

2. It is recommended that the Secretary, SWNCC, after consultation with the Subcommittee for Release of State Papers and/or Joint Security Control be authorized to release the information requested in paragraph 2 of the enclosure to the Liaison Officers listed in paragraph 3.

3. If you concur in the above recommendation, it is requested that you indicate that concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

H. V. MCSELEY,
Secretary

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

COPY FOR SWNCC FILE

COPY

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
Office of the Commandant
Washington 25, D. C.

31 October 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

In reference to paragraph 6 of the approval of JCS 389/3 contained in memorandum by the Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, dated 28 October 1946, the following request is submitted.

The National War College is urgently in need of certain SWNCC papers covering subjects which the class is studying. Conclusions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have reached on these subjects are of no particular value in this instance, but rather the "Facts Bearing on the Problem" and "Discussion" portions of the papers which represent sound basic background material for the use of the class.

Colonel J. J. Twitty, CE, Captain R. L. Collins, USN, and Colonel W. C. Sweeney, AG, assigned to the faculty of this college have been designated to deal directly with your Secretariat in this regard, subject to your approval. Your favorable consideration of this type of liaison is requested.

/s/ H. W. Hill

H. W. HILL
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commandant

cc: Secretary, JCS.

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SWN-4870
1 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
WAR MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC

1. The enclosure, a memorandum by the Commandant, National War College, is circulated for consideration of the Committee.

2. It is recommended that the Secretary, SWNCC, after consultation with the Subcommittee for Release of State Papers and/or Joint Security Control be authorized to release the information requested in paragraph 2 of the enclosure to the Liaison Officers listed in paragraph 3.

3. If you concur in the above recommendation, it is requested that you indicate that concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

*see copy sent to
Sec'y Nov 5, 1946*

H. W. Moseley
H. W. MOSELEY,
Secretary

APPROVED: *W. B. Madsen Col GSC. For PSW*
As changed (copy to Sec'y) + informally cleared with Sec'y.
DATE: *Nov 6, 1946*

COPY

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Washington, D. C.

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SWN-4870
1 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
WAR MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC

1. The enclosure, a memorandum by the Commandant, National War College, is circulated for consideration of the Committee.

2. It is recommended that the ~~Secretary~~ ^{Secretariat}, SWNCC, be authorized to release the information requested in par 2 of the enclosure to the Liaison Officers listed in par 3, after consultation where necessary, with the Joint Security Control and appropriate representatives of the State Department.

3. If you concur in the above recommendation, it is requested that you indicate that concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

H. W. MOSELEY,
Secretary

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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
31 October 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

In reference to paragraph 6 of the approval of JCS 3693 contained in memorandum by the Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, dated 28 October 1946, the following request is submitted.

The National War College is urgently in need of certain SWNCC papers covering subjects which the class is studying. Conclusions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have reached on these subjects are of no particular value in this instance, but rather the "Facts Bearing on the Problem" and "Discussion" portions of the papers which represent sound basic background material for the use of the class.

Colonel J. J. Twitty, CE, Captain H. L. Collins, USN, and Colonel W. C. Sweeney, AC, assigned to the faculty of this college have been designated to deal directly with your Secretariat in this regard, subject to your approval. Your favorable consideration of this type of liaison is requested.



H. W. HILL
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commandant

cc: Secretary, JCS.

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*(encl. file).
Shore's**Course of
Instruction*1. Disposition of Pacific Islands formerly Occupied by Japan.

What is the present status of Pacific Islands formerly occupied by Japan and now under military occupation by the United States? What should be the position of the United States regarding the future status of--

- (a) Japanese Mandated Islands
- (b) Marcus Island
- (c) The Nansei Shoto
- (d) Manpo Shoto

Should any of these islands be annexed outright to the United States? Should any of these islands be placed under United Nations trusteeships? If so, under strategic trusteeship or ordinary trusteeship? In the case of any islands placed under trusteeship, what provisions should be contained in the trusteeship agreement for safeguarding the security interests of the United States? What action will be required prior to and during the Allied peace conference on Japan to assure that the islands are disposed of as desired by the United States.

2. United States position with respect to the regulation of armaments.

Under Articles 11 and 26 of the United Nations Charter, the subject of the regulation of armaments might arise at any time either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly of U. N. Should the U. S. take the initiative in obtaining through the United Nations a general system for the regulation of armaments? If so, what are the main lines of the system which we should propose? If we should not take the lead, what position should we take if some other government raises the question? What is the relation between the regulation of armaments and --

- (a) The present state of American armaments?
- (b) The continued occupation of enemy territory?
- (c) Solution of the atomic weapons problem?
- (d) Allocation of forces to the Security Council under Article 43 of the Charter?

3. Regional Security Arrangements in Southwest Pacific.

Should the United States join with other nations in establishing a regional security system in the Southwest Pacific? If so, which regions should be included in such a regional system? If the United States does not itself wish to take part in such an arrangement, does it have any objections to other nations effecting such arrangements without the U. S.? What area should be included within a regional security system for the Southwest Pacific and what types of commitments are indicated? How would such a regional system affect the general security system envisaged in the United Nations Charter?

- 2 -

4. Palestine - Implementation of the Anglo-U.S. Committee Report.

Should the United States Government accept the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee with respect to Palestine? Should the U. S. accept a military commitment in Palestine if our approved solution proves unacceptable to either Jews or Arabs? If the Anglo-U.S. Committee report is unacceptable, what alternative solutions to the problem of the persecuted Jews should be considered?

5. U. S. Foreign Trade Policy in Relation to National Security.

Has our experience in the recent war indicated the desirability of any modifications of American foreign trade policy from the point of view of the distribution of strategic materials? Should the U. S. in time of peace export its critical and strategic materials if by doing so it either weakens its own war potential or increases the war potential of another power? Contrariwise, does the military potential of the United States rest primarily upon the advantages of foreign trade during protected periods of peace? If we should adjust foreign trade policies to security considerations and other nations should follow suit, what would the ultimate effect be on United States security. Similarly, should the United States make available through normal trade channels American industrial "know how" and technological advance? If there is a direct conflict between our economic and security interests, which should have priority -- and up to what point?

6. Inter-American Regional Security Arrangements.

What machinery, if any, should be established to implement the Act of Chapultepec with respect to regional security arrangements in the Western Hemisphere? How should such machinery be related to the United Nations, particularly to the Security Council? Should the U. S. attempt to standardize the arms, equipment and training of all Western Hemisphere countries as a part of a regional defense structure?

7. International Control of Atomic Energy.

Are the national security interests of the United States adequately protected in the proposals placed by the United States Representative before the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission? What are the essential differences between the proposals offered by Mr. Baruch and by Ambassador Gromyko? Can these differences be resolved in any plan which might be acceptable to Russia and which might at the same time preserve our security interests? With regard to the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission itself, what should be the definition of "all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction"? Should this include strategic air forces, containing a large fleet of long-distance heavy bombers?

8. Long-range Supervision of Former Enemy Countries.

Should the Allied governments or any other agency undertake long-range supervision of the defeated enemy countries in order to guarantee their demilitarization over a long period of time? In

- 3 -

In particular, are the Secretary of State's proposals for 25 year treaties of guarantee with respect both to Germany and Japan in accordance with the security interests of the United States? Should such treaties be closely related to the United Nations Organization in any way? Would a guarantee by us of German disarmament imply a corresponding guarantee by us of German territorial integrity and internal order? Is it possible to limit a nation's ability to wage war and at the same time permit it to achieve any substantial degree of economic revival? Can the international scene be stabilized to any degree until the defeated enemy countries have undergone a substantial degree of economic revival?

9. Anglo-American Military Cooperation.

To what extent, if at all, should Anglo-American military association in the Combined Chiefs of Staff be carried forward into the period of peace? To what extent is the security of the United States dependent upon the security of the British Commonwealth in the light of—

- (a) Strategically placed British territories?
- (b) The policy of critical and strategic materials?

Should Anglo-American military cooperation remain on a bilateral basis or should it be broadened into a general system through the United Nations? To what extent is United States foreign policy compromised, if at all, by close association with the British Empire? Should the United States and British armed forces agree upon common weapons and equipment, common tactical doctrines, a single military terminology and common staff procedure? If the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not be continued, should we seek a close working agreement with any part of the British Commonwealth, such as Canada? If so, would such an agreement weaken the prestige of the United Kingdom to our own eventual disadvantage?

10. Use of Negro Manpower by the Armed Forces.

Should the Armed Forces limit the enlistment of negroes in time of peace to a one-in-ten ratio reflecting the proportion of negroes in the population or should enlistments be accepted without regard to race on the basis of individual qualifications? Would there be serious objections to an army or navy which is 25% negro? If quotas are to be applied, should quotas be established for other groups in the population; for example, Jews, alien-born, Republicans? Is the Gillem Board Report a satisfactory basis for a long-range policy with respect to negro manpower? Should the armed forces apply segregation either as to negro units or as to negro individuals in the service?

11. Allotment of Forces to the United Nations Security Council.

What general scheme should be used for furnishing forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations? Should the United States offer a specific contingent or should it declare that all of its armed forces are available to the Council upon call? In the light of the existing structure of the Security Council and the voting arrange-

- 4 -

ments thereon, under what conditions are armed forces likely to be employed by the Security Council? In light of the answer to the foregoing question, what size forces will the Security Council probably need? Should the permanent members of the Security Council supply the bulk of the forces and, if so, what contributions should be made by other United Nations members? How should the Military Staff Committee be organized to exercise "strategic direction" over forces operating under the Security Council? Should armed forces earmarked for the Security Council adopt common weapons, equipment, tactical doctrines, staff procedure? Should they engage in combined maneuvers or hold tactical inspections?

12. Public Opinion and National Security.

Can either the foreign policy or the military policy of the United States be successful over any period of time without the general support of the United States public? Should the State, War and Navy Departments accept responsibility for educating the United States public on policy and security matters or is that the responsibility of the President, Congress and private organizations? Should the three departments named above establish specific machinery for keeping in close touch with organized groups throughout the country interested in policy and security matters? Should the State, War and Navy Departments attempt to tie their programs more closely into the educational life of the country, particularly at the college levels? Are there limits beyond which basic security problems cannot be discussed publicly or officially -- for example, our strategic position with respect to Russia?

RESTRICTEDCOPY NO. 68J.C.S. 369/31 October 1946Pages 11 - 17, incl.JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFRELEASE OF C.C.S. AND J.C.S. PAPERS
TO THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
Reference: J.C.S. 369/1Report by the Joint Logistics CommitteeTHE PROBLEM

1. To comment and make recommendation, as a matter of priority, on the request of the Commandant, National War College (Appendix "F") that certain papers of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee be made available to the National War College.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. See Appendix "E".

RECOMMENDATIONS

3. It is recommended that:

a. The policy in Appendix "A" be approved.

b. The Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be instructed to keep the Commandant, National War College, and all other joint and senior command colleges concerned herein, informed as to restrictions on disclosure to other than United States armed forces personnel of the contents of papers of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff made available to them under the approved policy.

c. The memorandum in Appendix "B" be forwarded to the Commandant, National War College.

d. The memorandum in Appendix "C" be forwarded to the addressees indicated.

e. The memorandum in Appendix "D" be forwarded to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

RESTRICTED

APPENDIX "A"

D R A F T

POLICY REGARDING RELEASE OF APPROVED C.C.S. AND J.C.S.
PAPERS TO THE JOINT AND SENIOR COMMAND COLLEGES

Subject to the maintenance of security classifications, and to the understanding that the contents of Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff papers will be disclosed only to members of the United States armed forces (except for those matters which may be disclosed to other personnel, including foreign nationals, under current Joint Chiefs of Staff policy or policies enumerated by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and by the President), the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will release approved C.C.S. and J.C.S. numbered papers requested by the National War College, Armed Forces Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Command and Staff College, Naval War College, and Air University, after concurrence by the British Joint Staff Mission with respect to C.C.S. papers and in accordance with the following:

TOP SECRET papers: Upon concurrence by Joint Security Control.

SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL papers: Upon request, except that papers concerning matters still pending, papers concerning intelligence, papers concerning future plans and operations, papers involving political aspects, and papers involving plans or operations of World War II which were not mounted, will not be released. Any requests for exceptions to this rule will be referred to Joint Security Control.

RESTRICTED and UNCLASSIFIED papers: Upon request, except that papers concerning matters still pending will not be released.

RESTRICTED

APPENDIX "B"

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDANT, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

Reference is made to your memorandum of 3 September 1946 regarding the use by the National War College of certain Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff papers.

Such members of your staff as you may select are authorized to consult with the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has been instructed to release appropriate papers suitable for your purpose in accordance with the enclosed policy*.

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has been requested to authorize selected members of your staff to consult directly with the Committee's secretary with respect to the release to the National War College of appropriate State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee papers and to inform you of the Committee's action.

* Appendix "A"

RESTRICTEDAPPENDIX "C"D R A F TMEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDANTS, ARMED FORCES STAFF
COLLEGE, INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES,
COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
AND AIR UNIVERSITY

The Commandant, National War College, has requested that certain Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff material be made available for use by the National War College. As a result, the enclosed policy* has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the release of Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff papers to the National War College and to other joint and senior command colleges concerned.

Such members of your staff as you may select are authorized to consult with the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has been instructed to release appropriate papers suitable for your purpose in accordance with the approved policy.

* Appendix "A"

RESTRICTEDAPPENDIX "D"D R A F TMEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

In response to the enclosed memorandum* from the Commandant, National War College, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that selected representatives of that College may consult directly with the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has been authorized to release suitable and appropriate Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff papers to the College in accordance with the enclosed policy.**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee similarly authorize selected representatives of the National War College to consult directly with the Secretary of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee concerning the release to that College of appropriate State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee papers and that the Commandant, National War College, be informed direct of the Committee's action on this request.

* Appendix "F"
** Appendix "A"

RESTRICTED

APPENDIX "E"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

1. The mission of the National War College is:
 - a. To prepare selected ground, air, and naval officers for the exercise of command and the performance of joint staff duties in the highest echelons of the armed forces.
 - b. To promote the development of understanding between high echelons of the armed forces and those other agencies of government and industry which are an essential part of a national war effort.
2. It is considered that not only the National War College but other joint and senior command colleges will require certain Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff papers and, therefore, in the consideration of a proper policy regarding the release of such papers, the needs of the Armed Forces Staff College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Command and Staff College, the Naval War College, and the Air University, have been considered.
3. Joint Security Control has been consulted and agrees with the policy contained in Appendix "A" as to papers of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff which may be made available to the joint and senior command colleges, since their missions are somewhat similar to that of the National War College.
4. The policy, as stated in Appendix "A" is somewhat restrictive, and thought was given to broadening the policy, but this was rejected. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are responsible for the security of information in their files, cannot, without endangering the security of the nation, permit access to files containing TOP SECRET and SECRET documents pertaining to the national defense by anyone not directly connected with this responsibility. Rigid adherence to this principle in its application to both military and civilian personnel is essential if leaks of vital military information are to be kept to a minimum.

RESTRICTED

APPENDIX "F"

MEMORANDUM FROM THE COMMANDANT, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

3 September 1946

1. It is anticipated that due to the broad scope of the subject matter, my Serial 1013 of 28 August 1946*, may be under consideration for some time. However, there is a pressing need to provide the Class at the National War College with practical problems, of a relatively low classification, dealing with the formulation of national policy. Unquestionably the best source of such material, for our purposes, is to be found in State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and Joint Chiefs of Staff studies.

2. Accordingly, it is requested that selected members of the staff of the National War College be authorized to consult directly with the secretariats of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in the selection of appropriate papers falling within their respective purviews.

3. The following subjects are typical of the studies which it would be most helpful to obtain at this time:

- U.S. Foreign Trade Policy in relation to National Security.
- Disposition of Pacific Islands formerly occupied by Japan.
- United States Position with respect to the Regulation of Armaments.
- Regional Security in the Southwest Pacific.
- Inter-American Regional Security Arrangements.
- Long Range Supervision of Former Enemy Countries.
- Use of Negro Manpower by the Armed Forces.
- Allotment of Forces to the United Nations Security Council.
- Public Opinion and National Security.

* On file in the Secretariat; under consideration by the Joint Intelligence Committee.