

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 in a forlorn hope of making themselves economically
3 self-sufficient."

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, do I understand that you felt
5 that diplomacy had failed and that we were going from a stage
6 of diplomacy to some other instrument to settle the differences?

7 You say:

8 "***I find that diplomacy has been defeated***"

9 Mr. Grew: I said diplomacy has been defeated by trends
10 and forces at that moment. As I recollect it it was after
11 the fall of the Konoye Cabinet with which I had been able to
12 work fairly closely in the hope of being able to build up our
13 relations. When this Cabinet fell and a new Cabinet came in
14 I saw that that work had been pretty well wrecked.

15 Senator Ferguson: What Cabinet came in in December of
16 1940?

17 Mr. Grew: December 1940. I think that was one of
18 Konoye's Cabinets. I will look. I have the complete record
19 here.

20 That is Konoye's. The second Konoye Cabinet came in on
21 July 22, 1940.

22 Senator Ferguson: What is the next step if diplomacy
23 failed? You use this expression:

24 "Only insuperable obstacles will not prevent the Japanese
25 from digging in permanently in China and from pushing the

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southward advance***" and so forth.

What is the next instrument?

Mr. Grew: Senator, I had in mind all that time --

Senator Ferguson: What were you trying to convey to the State Department?

Mr. Grew: I was trying to convey to the State Department that the time had come to take strong measures.

Shefner follows.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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2:35 P:

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Of course, this is to the President.

3 Mr. Grew: Yes.

4 Senator Ferguson: And he is the one in charge of for-
5 eign relations. So you took it right to the top.

6 Mr. Grew: No, I was also reporting to Mr. Hull at that
7 time, of course, along the same lines as indicated by that
8 so-called green light telegram.

9 Senator Ferguson: Well, I do find in the records your
10 reports to Mr. Hull along this same line in December, and let
11 us have that.

12 Mr. Grew: Well, the one in September covers that
13 ground.

14 Senator Ferguson: Oh, the one in September covers that?

15 Mr. Grew: The so-called green light telegram covers that
16 ground completely.

17 Senator Ferguson: I see. So the one in September cov-
18 ered it to the State Department and this one was to the Presi-
19 dent, on the 14th of December?

20 Mr. Grew: That is right; that is correct.

21 Senator Ferguson: Thank you.

22 Mr. Grew: There were probably other telegrams to Mr.
23 Hull along the same lines but I haven't the full records be-
24 fore me so I cannot tell you.

25 My thought was that by taking these measures we would

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1 eventually bring at least the thinking, the sane minded states-
2 men in Japan to the realization that unless they stopped in
3 their tracks they were going to have war with the United
4 States and Great Britain and other countries.
5

6 Now, that is precisely what hap pened. When Prince
7 Konoye came into power for the third time, his third cabinet,
8 with all his black background and record and, certainly, as
9 Mr. Hull pointed out the other day, he had been responsible
10 for one of the worst train of acts of international banditry
11 in world history, he still was an intelligent man and he, in
12 my opinion, as a result of the policy that we followed, the
13 measures we had taken, he saw the handwriting on the wall.
14

15 He knew a good deal more about our country than the hot
16 headed militarists did; he had been to our country, knew
17 something about our productive capacity, knew something
18 about our national spirit. In my opinion he realized that
19 Japan, if she got into war with us and with other countries,
20 other Western powers, would probably in the end be defeated
21 and would emerge as a third or a fifth rate power.

22 In other words, I think at that time some of those more
23 intelligent statesmen in Japan realized that they were on
24 the brink of an abyss and it was my belief at that time that
25 they tried their best to reverse the engine. It was too
late to do it but they tried to do it.

1 Witness Grew:

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2 Therefore, this policy which I had recommended had led
3 up to that position where these intelligent Japanese states-
4 men, quite apart from the hot headed militarists and all the
5 rest of them, realized that they ought to step back and it
6 was my hope that they would step back and, as I said in this
7 telegram, that this would lead to a complete re-molding of
8 our relations with Japan and a re-molding of the entire situ-
9 ation in the Far East. That was always my hope.

10 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now, on the bottom of page 360,
11 in the same letter, you say this:

12 "It is important constantly to bear in mind the
13 fact that if we take measures" - and this is in quota-
14 tions -- "'short of war' with no real intention to carry
15 those measures to their final conclusion if necessary,
16 such lack of intention will be all too obvious to the
17 Japanese, who will proceed undeterred, and even with
18 greater incentive, on their way. Only if they become
19 certain that we mean to fight if called upon to do so
20 will our preliminary measures stand some chance of prov-
21 ing effective and of removing the necessity for war--
22 the old story of Sir Edward Grey in 1914."

23 So you had in mind to convey to the President that it
24 was your opinion and the time had come for the State Depart-
25 ment, - for our foreign relations to be such that we would

1 Witness Grew:

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2 indicate that we were willing to go the whole way and that
3 would be even to the point of war.

4 Mr. Grew: I felt at that time entirely certain about
5 that, Senator, for the very reason that unless we were willing
6 to build up our forces and to build up our armaments to the
7 point where we would be ready for anything, the Japanese would
8 know it in a hurry and we never could get away with any bluff
9 of any kind. I wanted our forces built up as an insurance
10 against war.

11 Senator Ferguson: And you had in mind then that we
12 should build an army and a navy that we could implement every
13 policy that you were telling the President that we should
14 take?

15 Mr. Grew: I felt that that was an essential part of the
16 policy, Senator.

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now, I will ask you whether or
18 not when the President in his letter of January 21, 1941
19 said (Reading):

20 "I find myself in decided agreement with your con-
21 clusion",
22 and then I turn to page 362, you are talking about that we go
23 to the point of even going to war, I will ask you to read
24 what he said to you on page 362, beginning with, "You sug-
25 gest as one of the chief factors."

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2 He is talking now, as I understand it, the President,
3 about war. Will you read that?

4 Mr. Grew: Which paragraph is that on 362?

5 Senator Ferguson: It is the first paragraph.

6 Mr. Grew: "You suggest"?

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

8 Mr. Grew: (Reading)

9 "You suggest as one of the chief factors in the
10 problem of our attitude toward Japan the question whether
11 our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our
12 help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to
13 Britain between victory and defeat. In this connection
14 it seems to me that we must consider whether, if Japan
15 should gain possession of the region of the Netherlands
16 East Indies and the Malay Peninsula, the chances of Eng-
17 land's winning in her struggle with Germany would not be
18 decreased thereby. The British Isles, the British in
19 those isles, have been able to exist and to defend them-
20 selves not only because they have prepared strong local
21 defenses but also because as the heart and the nerve
22 center of the British Empire they have been able to draw
23 upon vast resources for their sustenance and to bring
24 into operation against their enemies economic, military,
25 and naval pressures on a world-wide scale. They live by

1 Witness Grew:

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2 importing goods from all parts of the world and by util-
3 izing large overseas financial resources. They are de-
4 fended not only by measures of defense carried out lo-
5 cally but also by distant and widespread economic,
6 military, and naval activities which both contribute to
7 the maintenance of their supplies, deny certain sources
8 of supply to their enemies, and prevent those enemies
9 from concentrating the full force of their armed power
10 against the heart and the nerve center of the Empire."

11 Senator Ferguson: Now, we could take that as meaning
12 that notwithstanding your warning the President was conveying
13 to you that he felt that it was necessary to go all out on
14 this question; that he understood you, in other words.

15 Mr. Grew: Well, you mean that it would appear from this
16 paragraph that the President accepted that position?

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

18 Mr. Grew: Well, I think, Senator, from the letter as a
19 whole that would be clear.

20 Senator Ferguson: That would follow.

21 Mr. Grew: That would be clear.

22 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, I will ask you in the
23 telegram that you read, the original, the green light tele-
24 gram, whether or not there is not a clause in there about us
25 using the Singapore base? Do you remember that?

1 Witness Grew:

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2 Mr. Grew: Yes. It was, as I remember it, we might
3 have. Let me see how that was stated about that.

4 Senator Ferguson: How did you express that?

5 Mr. Grew: I have it right here. That is the refer-
6 ence, Senator, on page 3, paragraph numbered 4 of my tele-
7 gram 827 September 12, 9 P.M. I had better read the whole
8 paragraph to make the context clear.

9 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

10 Mr. Grew: (Reading)

11 "Now, however, I sense a gradual change in the out-
12 burst of exhilaration which greeted the new Government
13 on its inception. The Japanese Government, the army and
14 navy and the public are beginning to see that Germany may
15 not defeat Great Britain after all, a hypothesis which I
16 have constantly emphasized to my Japanese contacts in the
17 plainest language and now to add to that dawning realiza-
18 tion, they see the United States and Great Britain steady-
19 ly drawing closer together in measures of mutual defense
20 with the American acquisition of naval bases in British
21 possessions in the Atlantic and with our support of the
22 British fleet by the transfer of fifty destroyers. They
23 hear reports of our haste to build a two-ocean navy and
24 of our considering the strengthening of our naval bases
25 in the Pacific and even rumors of our eventual use of

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Singapore."

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Senator Ferguson: Yes.

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Mr. Grew: There was nothing more definite than that.

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Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, had you heard any rumors or information from the State Department -- first, had you any rumors in relation to any agreement we might have, or some rights that we might have to use Singapore as a naval base?

9

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Mr. Grew: So far as I recollect I received nothing of that kind from the State Department, Senator.

11

Senator Ferguson: Had you heard rumors there?

12

13

Mr. Grew: Well, no, sir, I cannot say that I heard rumors.

14

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Senator Ferguson: Did your Naval or Army attache there in Tokyo give you any information on that?

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Mr. Grew: They passed on to me, so far as I know, all the important information that they received. I do not recollect that either of them passed on to me any information to that effect.

20

21

Senator Ferguson: Could you give us any opinion as to where you may have received that information of rumors?

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Mr. Grew: I did not receive that information, Senator. It is clear from the telegram that that was information which the Japanese had heard and were considering. I do not know where they got it from.

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Had they advised you that they had
3 such information?

4 Mr. Grew: Well, of course, going back to this telegram,
5 after all these years I cannot tell you exactly how that came
6 to me. It was very likely in the Japanese press; it may have
7 been passed on to me by individuals. All I can say was, "They
8 hear reports." I cannot be more definite than that. I could
9 not clamp that down.

10 Senator Ferguson: You do not know, though, but what the
11 Army or the Navy attache there may have given you the informa-
12 tion also?

13 Mr. Grew: I could not answer that question, Senator,
14 without looking back in the records.

15 Senator Ferguson: Did the British Ambassador ever give
16 you that information?

17 Mr. Grew: I do not believe so. I have no recollection
18 of it.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever know of any agreement
20 between the United States and Great Britain as to the defense
21 of Singapore?

22 Mr. Grew: I did not.

23 Senator Ferguson: Now we will go to page 556 of Foreign
24 Relations. That is the note of August the 17th, 1941.

25 Mr. Grew: Five hundred and what?

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: 556 of Foreign Relations.

3 Mr. Grew: 556, yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: I am particularly interested in the
5 last paragraph, the one I had you read this morning.

6 Mr. Grew: Yes, we had that this morning.

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now, will you tell me, if you
8 can, when you first considered that message and what did it
9 mean to you?

10 Mr. Grew: Well, I cannot tell you on what date I received
11 the message. I probably received it on the day of its de-
12 livery. You must remember there is a day difference between
13 Tokyo and the United States, so that anything that appeared
14 in the print --

15 Senator Ferguson: It was delivered in Tokyo --

16 Mr. Grew: On August 18th.

17 Senator Ferguson: It was delivered on Sunday and you
18 probably got it Monday?

19 Mr. Grew: I probably would have gotten it Monday.
20 Monday would have been the 19th.

21 Senator Ferguson: What did that message, what did that
22 information mean to you? That was coming from Washington
23 to you.

24 Mr. Grew: Yes. It meant that we were following the
25 policy which I had constantly advocated.

Witness Grew:

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Senator Ferguson: That was the policy that you had advocated?

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Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Did the State Department give you any other information on that instrument?

7

Mr. Grew: Not to my knowledge.

8

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Senator Ferguson: Did your Army or Navy attache give you any information?

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Mr. Grew: Not to my knowledge.

11

Senator Ferguson: Would you consider that an ultimatum?

12

Mr. Grew: By no means.

13

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Senator Ferguson: Well, I want to read to you on page 2 of exhibit 16 this information and ask you whether it was conveyed to you.

15

16

This is a document to the President of the United States dated November the 5th, 1941 and signed by -- this particular one is signed by "W. P. Scobey, Colonel, G.S.C. Secretary," and it is on a message, attached to a message by the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and it is being delivered to the President.

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(Reading)

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"Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China - At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at

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Witness Grew:

1 the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November
2 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situ-
3 ation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was
4 occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General
5 Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against
6 making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting
7 that the United States urge Great Britain to support more
8 fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August
9 17, following the President's return from the meeting at
10 sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ulti-
11 matum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United
12 States to take action in case of further Japanese ag-
13 gression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the
14 opinion that there was no use to issue any additional
15 warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he de-
16 sired to know if the military authorities would be pre-
17 pared to support further warnings by the State Department.
18 A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sun-
19 day, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the
20 British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan
21 should be warned against movement into Siberia."

22 Now, was that ever called to your attention, that the
23 Army and the Navy had considered that instrument of August the
24 17th as an ultimatum?
25

1 Witness Grew:

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2 Mr. Grew: I do not think that that was ever called to my
3 attention, Senator, but I would like to say right here that
4 the application of the term "ultimatum" to that document could
5 not be well taken owing to the fact that the conversations be-
6 tween the United States and Japan continued for a long time
7 thereafter and if you submit an ultimatum to a country, you
8 do not talk any more; it is finished.

9 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, the ultimatum was on this
10 point, as I understood this morning, Mr. Grew.

11 Senator Lucas: Who is that from?

12 Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

13 "At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann
14 gave a statement." * * *

15 "He pointed out that on August 17, following the
16 President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr.
17 Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan
18 that it would be necessary for the United States to take
19 action in case of further Japanese aggression."

20 In other words, if Japan made further aggression af-
21 ter the 17th of August 1941 that we would act and that that
22 was an ultimatum.

23 Mr. Grew: The fact remains, Senator, that the Japanese
24 did take a great deal of action after that date and no such
25 action was taken by us and meanwhile the conversations in

1 Witness Grew:

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2 Washington continued right along.

3 Senator Ferguson: I want to read another statement and
4 ask you whether it was ever conveyed to you, or whether it
5 was your understanding that you had ever conveyed this in-
6 formation to the State Department. On page 4 of the same
7 instrument. (Reading)

8 "Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed
9 out that the fleet strength at the present time is ser-
10 iously handicapped" -- and that is October the 5th, 1941.

11 Now, reading again:

12 "-- by the absence of certain naval units of major
13 category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt
14 that the present moment was not the opportune time to
15 get brash. Explaining further the State Department con-
16 ferences, Captain Schuirmann stated that the State De-
17 partment did not feel that it was necessary for the United
18 States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings
19 should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Horn-
20 beck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State
21 Department was under the impression that Japan could be
22 defeated in military action in a few weeks."

23 Now, did you ever give any information to our State
24 Department that would lead our State Department to the notion
25 that in case we got into war with Japan that they could be

1 Witness Grew:

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2 defeated in a military action in a few weeks?

3 Mr. Grew: I definitely did not, Senator, because I did
4 not --

5 Senator Ferguson: Did you give them the opposite, that
6 it would be a longer war than that?

7 Mr. Grew: I cannot tell you whether I gave any definite
8 estimate at that time or not, - probably not, - but they had
9 plenty of reports from me as to the toughness of the Japanese
10 army and navy. I can bring out passage after passage to
11 indicate that; that they were a fanatical race, they were a
12 do-or-die sort of people, they would probably fight to the
13 last ditch and that they were exceedingly military. I brought
14 that out continually right from the very beginning of my
15 stay in Tokyo, when I wrote that the Japanese army is built
16 for war, prepared for war and anxious to go to war.

17 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did the State Department
18 ever convey to you that that was the attitude of the State
19 Department of the United States?

20 Mr. Grew: I do not remember that they ever did.

21 Senator Ferguson: Well, you would remember such a state-
22 ment, don't you think?

23 Mr. Grew: I think I would.

24 Senator Ferguson: It is so contrary to what your views
25 were that it probably would have impressed you very keenly.

Witness Grew:

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Mr. Grew: I think I would have come back very quickly on a statement of that kind.

Senator Ferguson: Now, I have read you from the exhibit here. Whose views, when they speak about the State Department, whose views would that be? Mr. Hull was the head, was he not?

Mr. Grew: I cannot tell you who expressed those views, Senator, because I was not here. I frankly do not know.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever discuss with Mr. Hull that question, as to whether or not that was his views of October the 5th or near October the 5th, 1941?

Mr. Grew: I do not think that I ever have.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. Grew: I do not believe I ever did.

Senator Ferguson: Did you have any correspondence with Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. Grew: I had a certain amount of correspondence from time to time of an informal nature but I do not recollect --

Senator Ferguson: Official correspondence?

Mr. Grew: I beg pardon?

Senator Ferguson: Official correspondence?

Mr. Grew: No, it was unofficial correspondence; purely personal correspondence, and I do not recollect that that

1 Witness Grew:

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2 am not competent to answer. I was not here at the time.

3 Senator Ferguson: Well, it certainly was not from any-
4 thing that you gave the State Department?

5 Mr. Grew: It was not what?

6 Senator Ferguson: From anything that you ever gave the
7 State Department?

8 Mr. Grew: No, it certainly was not.

9 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, getting back to Captain
10 Schuirmann's idea of the note of August the 17th. That note--
11 have you got it before you there?

12 Mr. Grew: The note itself?

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

14 Mr. Grew: Or Admiral Schuirmann's?

15 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Schuirmann. Have you got
16 that?

17 Mr. Grew: Which page is that on?

18 Senator Ferguson: It is on page 3.

19 Mr. Grew: Can you find that for me, where it is?

20 Mr. Gesell: I think there may have been some confusion
21 about the exhibit.

22 Senator Ferguson: Well, it is marked on the outside,
23 "Exhibit 16".

24 Mr. Gesell: Yes. Only the first two or three pages are
25 a memorandum to the President. The remaining portion is a

1 Witness Grew:

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2 minute of a meeting which amplifies the memorandum to the
3 President.

4 Senator Ferguson: Well, do you understand then that the
5 memorandum attached never went to the President?

6 Mr. Gesell: I have no evidence that it ever did.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, have you any evidence that it
8 did not?

9 Mr. Gesell: I have no evidence either way.

10 Senator Ferguson: The reason is I got that as one
11 exhibit and it is attached and the President has acted on the
12 instrument, as I understand it, when we come --

13 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

14 Senator Ferguson: The next is November the 14th, 1941.

15 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

16 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I will yield.

17 Mr. Murphy: The memorandum is dated, however, under date
18 of November 5, 1941 and the notes of the meeting are dated
19 November 3, 1941.

20 Senator Ferguson: That would be correct.

21 Mr. Murphy: And they are separate papers apparently.

22 Senator Ferguson: Yes, but there isn't any showing here
23 that it all did not go to the President because it is all
24 on the same subject.

25 I ask, Mr. Chairman, that the counsel read the whole

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2 instrument into the record so it will be clear.

3 Mr. Murphy: May I just make this one statement?

4 The Chairman: What is it, Congressman?

5 Mr. Murphy: I just wanted to say that the statement,
6 the memorandum that went to the President would carry the
7 signatures of the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Opera-
8 tions, and on the body of the statement itself there is no-
9 thing incorporated in it, there isn't any reference at all
10 to the minutes of the meeting.

11 Senator Ferguson: Of course, it is difficult, - that is
12 the difficulty we run into when the committee only gets
13 photostatic copies. We cannot tell whether this is a signed
14 one or what.

15 Mr. Murphy: But there is no reference --

16 Senator Ferguson: This is a mimeographed copy rather
17 than a photostatic copy.

18 Mr. Murphy: But there is no incorporation of the minutes
19 in the message by reference, at least.

20 Senator Ferguson: I would like to have read into the
21 record at this place the instrument, Mr. Chairman.

22 The Chairman: Which one is that? The memorandum to the
23 President?

24 Senator Ferguson: No, the whole thing, November the
25 5th, the one from the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval

1 Witness Grew:

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2 Operations. It is addressed to the President. It is an
3 estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation.

4 Mr. Murphy: Thirteen pages.

5 The Chairman: Well, it is a very lengthy document. It
6 is not in the transcript, it has not gone into the hearings
7 as yet?

8 Mr. Murphy: It has been offered.

9 The Chairman: It has been offered as an exhibit but
10 has it been printed in the hearing?

11 Mr. Gesell: No, it has not, Senator. I suggest we
12 could just arrange to have it spread upon the record at this
13 point.

14 The Chairman: Yes.

15 Senator Ferguson: If we could have it spread upon the
16 record at this point.

17 The Chairman: That is agreeable, and it will be put
18 into the record here at this point and made a part of the
19 transcript.

20 (Exhibit No. 16 is in words and figures as follows,
21 to-wit:)

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

rlk 1

SECRET

Serial 0130012

November 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Estimate concerning Far Eastern
Situation.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident". If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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1 and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously cur-
2 tailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central
3 Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will
4 be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere,
5 after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

6 Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated
7 offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed
8 in less than about two months, although initial offensive
9 operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance
10 toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country,
11 with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The
12 maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese,
13 on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of de-
14 feating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone,
15 provided those troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

16 The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the
17 Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or
18 not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive
19 military operations with U.S. forces against Japan, to prevent
20 her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such
21 operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

22 At the present time the United States Fleet in the
23 Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake
24 an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In
25 order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened

rlk 3

1 by withdrawing all* naval vessels from the Atlantic except
 2 those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offen-
 3 sive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant
 4 tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now
 5 considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the

7 * Preceded by handwritten insertion "practically".

9 Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the
 10 United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near
 11 future.

12 The only existing* plans for war against Japan in the Far

14 * Two preceding words struck out, and handwritten
 15 word "current" substituted.

17 East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the
 18 British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the
 19 British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being
 20 reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground
 21 forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking.
 22 By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and
 23 submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a
 24 positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa.
 25 The U.S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached

rlk 4

1 the projected strength by February or March, 1942. The
2 potency of this threat will have then increased to a point
3 where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan
4 in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines.
5 By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements
6 to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength
7 of the entire southern area against possible Japanese opera-
8 tions will then have reached impressive proportions.

9 Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be
10 extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will
11 not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continua-
12 tion of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing
13 amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation
14 and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

15 The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are
16 in accord in the following conclusions:

- 17 (a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed
18 to in the United States-British Staff conversa-
19 tions remain sound. The primary objective of the
20 two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan
21 be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, deci-
22 sion will still have not been reached. In any
23 case, an unlimited offensive war should not be
24 undertaken against Japan, since such a war would
25 greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic

rlk 5

1 against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

2 (b) War between the United States and Japan should
3 be avoided while building up defensive forces
4 in the Far East, until such time as Japan
5 attacks or directly threatens territories whose
6 security to the United States is of very great
7 importance. Military action against Japan should
8 be undertaken only in one or more of the following
9 contingencies:

10 (1) A direct act of war by Japanese
11 armed forces against the territory
12 or mandated territory of the United
13 States, the British Commonwealth, or the
14 Netherlands East Indies;

15 (2) The movement of Japanese forces
16 into Thailand to the west of 100° East
17 or south of 10° North; or into Portuguese
18 Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty
19 Islands.

20 (c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should
21 follow the strategic lines of existing war
22 plans; i.e., military operations should be
23 primarily defensive, with the object of holding
24 territory, and weakening Japan's economic
25 position.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group

rlk 7

1 be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable
2 extent.

3 That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

4 Chief of Staff.

Chief of Naval Operations.

5 -----

6 THE JOINT BOARD

7 WASHINGTON

8 S E C R E T

9 MINUTES OF MEETING, NOVEMBER 3, 1941.

10 At the call of the Senior Member, the weekly meeting
11 scheduled for November 5, 1941, was held today in Room 2003,
12 Munitions Building. The meeting was called to order at 3:40
13 p.m.

14 PRESENT:

15 Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations,

16 Presiding;

17 General G. C. Marshall, U.S.A., Chief of Staff;

18 Rear Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, U.S.N., Assistant

19 Chief of Naval Operations;

20 Major General William Bryden, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of

21 Staff;

22 Major General H. H. Arnold, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of

23 Staff for Air;

24 Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, U.S.N., Chief of the Bureau
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rlk 8

1 of Aeronautics;

2 Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, U.S.A., Acting Assistant

3 Chief of Staff, War Plans Division;

4 Captain O.M. Read, U.S.N., War Plans Division, Office

5 of Naval Operations, in absence of Rear Admiral

6 R. K. Turner; and

7 Colonel W. P. Scobey, U.S.A., Secretary.

8 ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PRESENT:

9 Major General R.C. Moore, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of
10 Staff;

11 Colonel C. W. Bundy, U.S.A., War Plans Division, War
12 Department General Staff;

13 Captain R. E. Schuirmann, U.S.N., Office of Naval
14 Operations;

15 Commander F. P. Sherman, U.S.N., Office of Naval Oper-
16 ations; and

17 Lieutenant Commander A. H. McCollum, U.S.N., Office of
18 Naval Intelligence.

19 The Presiding Officer directed the minutes of the meet-
20 ing of October 22, would stand approved unless there were
21 objections. The minutes were approved.

22 The Secretary then announced the agenda for the meeting
23 as follows:

24 Serial 693 -- Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain.

25 Serial 732 -- Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action

1 of the Army and the Navy." Communications between Ship and
2 Shore.

3 Serial 665-11 -- Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze
4 M43A2 to the Army and the Navy.

5 Serial 725 -- Coordination of Local Defense Measures in
6 Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases
7 are being Established. - Revision requested by the British.

8 Discussion - Action of the United States in the Far
9 East in support of China.

10 Discussion - Alternate Route via Canton Island for
11 movement of airplanes to the Far East.

12 Action taken on the several subjects was as follows:

13 Serial 693 -- Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain.

14 Following a discussion of this subject, during which General
15 Arnold stated that the development of airplane ferrying facilities
16 to the British Isles was provided for in Serials 683-1
17 and 723, the Board approved the Joint Planning Committee report
18 of October 23, 1941, and directed that the subject be
19 stricken from the calendar.

20 Serial 732 -- Revision of Paragraph 109, Joint Action
21 of the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report
22 was approved.

23 Serial 665-11 -- Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze
24 M43A2 to the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee
25 report recommendation of October 30, 1941, was accepted and

rlk 10

1 the Committee of Experts' report was approved.

2 Serial 725 -- Coordination of Local Defense Measures
3 in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States
4 Bases are being established. The Secretary announced that
5 the Joint Planning Committee report before the Board, recommend-
6 ed certain revisions in the United States - United Kingdom
7 initial agreement, which was approved by The Joint Board on
8 September 19, 1941; and that the revisions now requested by
9 the British had been accepted by the United States represen-
10 tatives. Following a properly seconded motion, the Board
11 voted to approve the Joint Planning Committee report of
12 October 29, 1941.

13 Action of the United States in the Far East in Support
14 of China - At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann
15 gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department
16 meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion
17 was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann
18 states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang
19 Kai-Shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to
20 warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan
21 and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to
22 support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that
23 on August 17, following the President's return from the meet-
24 ing at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an
25 ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United

rlk 11

1 States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression.
2 He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there
3 was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we
4 can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military
5 authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by
6 the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State
7 Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was pro-
8 posed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and
9 that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

10 Following Captain Schuirmann's presentation, Admiral
11 Stark read a Navy Department estimate of the recent dispatches
12 received from Chungking. Admiral Ingersoll, gave his personal
13 review of the situation. A summary of this review was that:

14 a. The decision on the Far Eastern situation,
15 made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the
16 Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in
17 a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the
18 U.S.-British Staff Conversations Report ABC-1.

19 b. A major war effort in the Pacific would
20 require an enormous amount of shipping, which would have to
21 come from the Atlantic and other essential areas.

22 c. A U.S. war in the Pacific would materially
23 affect United States aid to England.

24 d. The requirements in tankers alone for support
25 of a Pacific war would create a serious oil shortage in this

rlk 12

1 country, and the United States fleet cannot be supported in the
2 Pacific without auxiliary shipping and adequate supplies.

3 e. The shortest line of communication is flanked
4 by Mandated Islands, and is vulnerable to Japanese attack.
5 Two other routes are available for communications to the Far
6 Eastern Theater: one via Australia; the other via Cape of
7 Good Hope.

8 f. Assuming that the fleet could be moved to the
9 Far East, no repair facilities are available at either Manila,
10 or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless the necess-
11 ary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not
12 present.

13 g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the
14 Fleet due to the lack of adequate antiaircraft protection for
15 the anchorage.

16 This review pointed out that Japan is capable
17 of launching an attack in five directions; viz., against
18 Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against
19 Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of
20 these five operations, United States' action should be:
21 In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or
22 British and Dutch positions the United States should resist
23 the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia,
24 Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not
25 declare war. The study concludes that the United States
should defer offensive action in the Far East until the

rlk 13

1 augmentation of United States military strength in the
2 Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines
3 and army forces, becomes available.

4 Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out
5 that the fleet strength at the present time is seriously handi-
6 capped by the absence of certain naval units of major category
7 which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the pres-
8 ent moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explain-
9 ing further the State Department conferences, Captain Schuir-
10 mann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was
11 necessary for the United States to take immediate action,
12 even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection,
13 he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt
14 that the State Department was under the impression that Japan
15 could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

16 General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the
17 Far East would be Naval and that under this assumption, due
18 consideration should be given to the fact that the Navy was
19 now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information
20 that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the
21 action to be taken under the present situation. The informa-
22 tion which he had received indicated that the Japanese author-
23 ities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by
24 November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the
25 strength of the United States forces in the Far East and

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emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December, the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations.

Admiral Ingersoll gave a summary of naval reinforcements scheduled for the Philippines. A stated number of submarine units en route to the Philippines were now in Guam. Other submarines scheduled for transfer to the Philippines were about to leave Hawaii. With reference to Japanese decision on National policy he felt that United States forces and shipping now being moved to the Philippines might be in danger if a decision adverse to United States interest should be made on November 5th. General Marshall emphasized the point that Japan could hardly take the risk of military operations with a powerful air and submarine force directly on the flank of their supply lines, and that when United States power is sufficiently developed in the Philippines, we would then have something to back up our statements. Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. It appeared that the basis of U.S. policy should be to make

rlk 15

1 certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in
2 saving face. These concessions might be a relaxation on oil
3 restrictions or on similar trade restrictions.

4 Following these discussions the Board adopted the
5 following proposal submitted by Admiral Ingersoll and amended
6 by suggestions made by Admiral Stark and General Marshall:

7 War Plans Division of the War and Navy Depart-
8 ments would prepare a memorandum for the President, as a
9 reply to the State Department's proposed policy in the
10 Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the
11 following lines:

12 Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.

13 Oppose U.S. military action against Japan
14 should she move into Yunnan.

15 Oppose the movement and employment of U.S.
16 military forces in support of Chiang Kai-Shek.

17 Advocate State Department action to put
18 off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.

19 Suggest agreements with Japan to tide
20 the situation over for the next several months.

21 Point out the effect and cost a U.S. -
22 Japanese war in the Far East would have on defense
23 aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided
24 by the U.S.

25 Emphasize the existing limitations on

rlk 16 1

shipping and the inability of the U. S. to engage
in a Far Eastern offensive operation without the
transfer of the major portion of shipping facilities
from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines'
Army Air Forces, General Arnold explained that the military
authorities were building up reserves and were investigating
reports that the Dutch East Indies were capable of supplying
all United States and British requirements.

At this point, General Marshall presented a list of
items of equipment considered necessary by the China Mission
to enable China to maintain her war effort. He pointed out
that the War Department was beset with many trials and
difficulties in the allocation of Lend-Lease items as related
to Great Britain, Russia, Dutch East Indies, China and other
countries. In the case of Russia, a large amount of equipment
allocated to that country would have to go via Archangel,
Vladivostok or Basra. The shortage of shipping, the long
lines of communications, and the difficult transport situation
from the ports of debarkation might cause an inability to make
prompt delivery of all equipment to its final destination.
Under some conditions, this would mean piling up unused equip-
ment at various localities, while at the same time other
localities would suffer from shortage of equipment. The
matter resolves itself into a question as to whom Lend-Lease
material should be released. It was General Marshall's

rlk 17

1 opinion that control of Lend-Lease distribution, and diversions
2 incident thereto, is a strategic decision which should be
3 made by The Joint Board. Since the matter of ocean tonnage
4 is a critical feature in the delivery of Lend-Lease items and
5 is related to the strategic situation, General Marshall felt
6 that Admiral Land of the Maritime Commission should be called
7 in to sit with The Joint Board in deciding matters of this
8 nature. The Board agreed that Admiral Land should be asked
9 to detail a member of his department to work with the Joint
10 Planning Committee on reports involving the disposition of
11 Lend-Lease materials. Navy members agreed to take the necess-
12 ary steps to inform Admiral Land of this request.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

13 Referring to the merchant shipping situation, Admiral
14 Stark felt that merchant tonnage is so short and prospective
15 requirements are so great that an effort should be made to get
16 the 1942 merchant vessel construction program moved up to an
17 A-1-a priority.

18 At the direction of Admiral Stark, Commander Sherman
19 then read a report from War Plans Division, Office of Naval
20 Operations, to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the
21 movement of airplanes to the Middle East for ultimate delivery
22 to Russia. This report recommended that the Normandie be
23 acquired to meet future requirements for transporting aircraft;
24 that three additional sea trains also be acquired and placed
25 in service without conversion; and that delivery of aircraft
to the Middle East be effected by the use of these three sea

rlk 18

1 trains plus the two sea trains U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and U.S.S.
2 Hammondsport, already acquired and converted for Navy use.
3 Copy of this report was furnished to the Deputy Chief of Staff
4 for Air.

5 Alternate Route Via Canton Island for Movement of
6 Airplanes - Following a discussion of this subject the Board
7 instructed that the following directive be given to the Joint
8 Planning Committee:

9 It is directed that the Joint Planning Committee
10 submit a report as to the action to be taken to complete the
11 establishment of an additional landplane route between Hawaii
12 and Australia, less vulnerable to hostile interference than is
13 the existing route via Wake Island, and as to the defenses of
14 additional airdromes and landing fields acquired.

15 W. P. SCOBAY,
16 Colonel, G. S. C.
17 Secretary.

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November 3, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

I. Discussion.

1. A conference was held at the State Department during the morning of November 1, 1941. Present were Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, Mr. Hornbeck, other lesser State Department officials, and Capt. Schuirmann, U.S.N. The subject of discussion was the action which should be taken on the Magruder radiogram of October 28, 1941. Question arose as to the strength of U.S. forces in the Far East as affecting diplomatic pressure on Japan. Measures were discussed, such as sending U.S. Army Air Forces to China, which might lead to immediate involvement in war with Japan. Apparently, the statement of Chiang Kai-Shek, that an immediate Japanese attack on Kunming threatened and that this could be defeated only by the intervention of air forces, was accepted.

2. a. The War Department G-2 estimate (Tab A) does not support Chiang Kai-Shek's conclusions as to immediate initiation of a Japanese move toward Kunming. G-2 believes that: the movement if contemplated will not be initiated in less than two months; the movement will be very difficult over nearly 300 miles of roadless, broken country; the Chinese, in favorable defense terrain, can defeat this offensive by proper concentration and use of ground troops alone.

rbm 2

1 b. G-2 (Col. Bratton) agrees with the Magruder
2 statement that with the fall of Kunming, Chinese resistance to
3 Japan would be very seriously affected.

4 c. The G-2 estimate also covers the broader
5 viewpoint of expected Japanese action.

6 3. An air estimate of the Far Eastern situation (Tab
7 B) brings out the following: the most effective air aid to
8 China can be given by units based in the Philippines; there are,
9 at present many shortages in ammunition and gasoline supply which
10 will militate against a sustained effort; logistical difficulties,
11 aside from general policy, make it undesirable to undertake opera-
12 tions of U.S. Army Air Force units in China.

13 4. The status of the Lend-Lease program for China is
14 shown in Tab C.

15 * * *

16 5. The status of ground troops and defense reserves
17 in the Philippine Department is shown in Tab D. The garrison
18 has not reached the effective strength desired by General
19 MacArthur. Deficiencies are being overcome by the dispatch of
20 personnel and supplies from the United States and by accelerating
21 the training and equipping of the Philippine Army. The present
22 combined air and ground forces will make attack on the islands
23 a hazardous undertaking. The dispatch of any considerable por-
24 tion of the air garrison to China would leave Luzon open to
25 serious risk of capture.

1 6. Informal contact with officers of the local British
2 Staff Mission indicate that the British have incomplete air forces
3 for the defense of Singapore, would refuse to allow units of the
4 Royal Air Force to support Chinese troops in Yunnan, and are of
5 the firm opinion that the British Chiefs of Staff would strongly
6 disapprove any action in China which might bring on war with
7 Japan.

8 7. War Plans Division is strongly of the opinion
9 that:

10 a. The policies derived in the American-British
11 Staff conversations remain sound, viz:

12 (1) The primary objective is the defeat of
13 Germany.

14 (2) The principal objective in the Far East
15 is to keep Japan out of the war.

16 (3) Military counter-action against Japan
17 should be considered only in case of any of the following
18 actions by Japan:

19 (a) A direct act of war by Japanese **armed**
20 forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of
21 any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to
22 define accurately what would constitute "a direct
23 act of war". It is possible for a minor incident to
24 occur which, although technically an act of war, could
25 be resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized

rbm 4

1 that the decision as to whether such an incident is
2 an act of war must lie with the Government concerned.

3 (b) The movement of the Japanese
4 forces into any part of Thailand to the west of 100°
5 East or to the south of 10° North.

6 (c) The movement of a large number of
7 Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships
8 escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position
9 and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine
10 Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra or the
11 East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6°
12 North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from
13 the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or the Equator
14 east of Waigeo.

15 (d) The movement of Japanese forces
16 into Portuguese Timor.

17 (e) The movement of Japanese forces
18 into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands.

19 b. Germany must be defeated. If Japan be de-
20 feated and Germany remain undefeated, decision is not reached.
21 The means to defeat Japan, (Army, Navy, and tonnage,) must be
22 withdrawn in quantity from the effort against Germany. To de-
23 feat Germany will require the utmost total effort.

24 c. It is desirable that large Japanese forces
25 be kept involved in China. However, from the larger viewpoint,

rbm 5

1 prospective Chinese defeat would not warrant involvement of the
2 United States, at this time, in war with Japan.

3 d. Political and economic measures should be
4 used wherever effective to deter Japanese action.

5 e. Most effective aid to China, as well as to
6 the defense of Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, is
7 now being built up by the reinforcement of the Philippines. The
8 safety of Luzon as an air and submarine base should soon be
9 reasonably assured by the arrival of air and ground reinforce-
10 ments. Strong diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted
11 from the military viewpoint at the earliest about the middle of
12 December, 1941, when the Philippine Air Force will have become
13 a positive threat to Japanese operations. It would be advantage-
14 ous, if practicable, to delay severe diplomatic and economic
15 pressure until February or March, 1942, when the Philippine Air
16 Force will have reached its projected strength, and a safe air
17 route, through Samoa, will be in operation.

18 f. Material aid to China should be accelerated
19 consonant with the studied needs of Russia and Great Britain.

20 g. Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China
21 should be continued and accelerated as far as practicable.

22 II. Recommendations.

23 Substitution of the words "War Department" for "War
24 Plans Division" in paragraph 7 above and approval of that
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1 paragraph as a statement of the War Department's position on the
2 Far East situation at this time.

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4
5 L. T. GEROW,
6 Brigadier General,
7 Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

8 6 Incls.*

- 9 #1 - Tab A - G-2 Estimate
- 10 #2 - Tab B - Air Estimate
- 11 #3 - Tab C - Lend-Lease Program for China.
- 12 #4 - Tab D - Ground Troops & Def. Res. Phil. Dept.
- 13 #5 - Tab E - Ground Reinforcements, Phil. Dept.
- 14 #6 - Tab F - Rad. fr. Gen. Magruder (10-28-41).

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* Tab A is included in Exhibit ; other tabs not included.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

rlk 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Nov. 14, 1941

The President's reply was handed to Hu Shih at 6 p.m. by Mr. Hornbeck.

M.M.H.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON

I want to see Hu Shih for five minutes on Wednesday, and give this to me when he comes.

F. D. R.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

November 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Enclosure:
Draft
message.

FE:JWB:HES

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PA/H

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Address Official Communications to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL

November 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

(Signed) HULL

Enclosure:
Draft
message.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

rlk 3

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt:

I have for some days had before me your message of November 2 which was delivered to me through your Ambassador here on November 4; also, your earlier message which was delivered to me through Dr. T. V. Soong on October 30.

We have had for some time very much in mind the situation created by the menace of a Japanese attack against Kunming from Indochina to which you call special attention. When I received the first of your messages under reference, officers of this Government, including high officers of the Department of State, the Army and the Navy, entered immediately into consultations in order to give renewed and urgent consideration to all aspects of the problems underlying that situation. It soon became our conclusion that, while it would be a grave error to underestimate the gravity of that situation, it did not appear that preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunming had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack. Given the difficult character of the terrain and the formidable resistance which your land forces would offer in Yunnan, an invasion of that province from Indochina by land forces calls for substantial preparation and extensive operations. At the same time we fully realize that it is important that your forces be adequately prepared, equipped and disposed in all branches. Under existing circumstances, taking into

rlk 4

1 consideration the world situation in its political, military
2 and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective con-
3 tribution which we can make at this moment is along the line
4 of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials
5 and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer
6 air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are sub-
7 jected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters
8 and in many connections. We are sending materials not only
9 to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet
10 Union and some twenty other countries that are calling
11 urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition,
12 our program for our own defense, especially the needs of
13 our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment
14 in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless,
15 I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increas-
16 ing amounts of material for your use. Meanwhile we are
17 exchanging views with the British Government in regard to
18 the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are
19 presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts
20 in the most practicable ways possible.

21 I believe that you will share my feeling that measures
22 such as the foregoing, together with such as the British
23 doubtless are considering, adopted and implemented simultan-
24 eously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses
25 of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against

rlk 5

1 such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be developing.
2 Indirectly influencing that situation: American military
3 and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which
4 are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet
5 at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese
6 military movement into China from Indochina, are ever present
7 and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the
8 increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their
9 territories to the south.

10 This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out
11 to the Government of Japan various consequences inherent in
12 pursuit of courses of aggression and conquest. We shall
13 continue to impress this point of view upon Japan on every
14 appropriate occasion.

15 In the present state of world affairs, I feel--and
16 I am confident that you will agree with me--that there
17 rests on the United States, in connection with every move
18 which it considers and every decision which it makes,
19 extraordinary obligation to give intensive thought to wide-
20 spread political stresses and strains, to both long-swing
21 and short-swing potentialities, and to the weight of various
22 possible and probable advantages in comparison with the
23 weight of other possible or probable disadvantages. The
24 world conflict is now being waged in many theaters and with
25 a great variety of weapons, both physical and moral.

rlk 6

1 Resistance to the forces of conquest takes many forms.
2 In all probability, the efforts of all of us who are engaged
3 in that resistance, efforts of China and of the United
4 States and of many other countries, will have to be continued
5 and be sustained over a long period of time before our coun-
6 tries, one and all, will again be made secure and our people
7 again be enabled to turn their whole thought and effort to
8 peaceful and constructive pursuits.

9 I assure you that the situation and the problems which
10 are the subject of this correspondence will continue to
11 have my own and my country's constant attention.

12 FE:JWB:HES

13 PA/H:SKH

14 11-10-41

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Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

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Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield for just one observation?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: On page 5 of the minutes, the recommendation of the Board, after hearing these references which the gentleman read, was that they opposed the issuance of an ultimatum.

The Chairman: Well, that will show from the document itself.

Senator Ferguson: That will speak for itself.

The Chairman: Go ahead.

Senator Ferguson: Now, in the President's message, on page 3, the President's message to Generalissimo Chang Kai-Shek, from President Roosevelt, on page 3 of that same document (Reading):

"I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering, adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be developing. Indirectly influencing that situation; American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased,

1 Witness Grew:

 Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do
3 along the flank of any Japanese military movement into
4 China from Indochina, are ever present and significant
5 factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing
6 British and Dutch defensive preparations in their terri-
7 tories to the south."

8 Was that your understanding of the situation, Mr.

9 Grew?

10 Mr. Grew: Well, Senator, as I said, I was not here in
11 this country at that time; I was not in a position to check
12 up on all these steps that were reported as being taken.
13 Frankly, I cannot give you an opinion on that.

14 Senator Ferguson: No, but, Mr. Grew, had you an idea
15 that the fact that our Fleet was on the flank was deterring
16 the Japanese from taking action?

17 Mr. Grew: I said that this morning. I do agree; I do
18 think that, yes.

19 Senator Ferguson: You think that that was true?

20 Mr. Grew: I think that that was true. I think it had a
21 deterrent effect. In other words, I think if --

22 Senator Ferguson: In other words, Mr. Grew, you think--

23 Mr. Grew: I would like to finish, please.

24 Senator Ferguson: I beg your pardon. Go ahead.

25 Mr. Grew: I think it had a deterrent effect. More than

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 that, I think to withdraw the Fleet would have had a disas-
3 trous effect psychologically.

4 Senator Ferguson: Well, Mr. Grew, if it had an effect
5 and there was going to be war between the United States and
6 Japan, how do you account for us allowing that Fleet to be
7 there and being attacked as it was at Pearl Harbor?

8 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that that
9 is a totally unfair question.

10 The Chairman: The witness can take care of himself.

11 Senator Lucas: Mr. Grew can take care of himself, but
12 we have been running along here with one question after an-
13 other that the witness absolutely does not know anything
14 about and I think it is a question that other authorities
15 and other witnesses should answer directly in the time to
16 come. I do not object to it, because the witness is un-
17 doubtedly taking care of himself. It just seems to me like
18 we are wasting a lot of time. Maybe I am wrong.

19 Senator Ferguson: Of course, I am of the opinion that
20 you are wrong.

21 The Chairman: If the witness has any additional opinion
22 as to why the Fleet was there than the reasons that he has
23 already assigned for it being there and the effect of it
24 being there he may state.

25 Senator Ferguson: I understand that the chair rules

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 that the witness cannot answer that question.

3 The Chairman: The chair makes no such ruling. On the
4 contrary, he is suggesting that the witness answer.

5 Senator Ferguson: All right.

6 Mr. Grew: I am simply stating my opinion that I believe
7 that the Fleet at that time was there and I assured that the
8 Fleet would be in perfect condition.

9 Senator Ferguson: You mean by "in perfect condition"
10 that it would be properly protected for all events?

11 Mr. Grew: I assured that the Fleet would fulfill its
12 functions in case of necessity.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you understand, Mr. Grew,
14 that the Fleet was there and it would defend itself, or that
15 the Army base was there to defend the Fleet in Pearl Harbor
16 and to defend Pearl Harbor?

17 Mr. Grew: Senator, I did not go into those very stra-
18 tegic details; naturally, I could not. You asked me merely
19 what my opinion is about keeping the Fleet in Pearl Harbor
20 and I have expressed my opinion that the fact of the Fleet
21 being there, to me that had a deterrent influence on the
22 Japanese and to have withdrawn the Fleet from Pearl Harbor
23 would have had just the reverse. It would have had a very
24 disastrous influence. That was always my opinion and I
25 haven't changed it.

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Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, I read to you last night
3 from the Foreign Relations, I think it was May of 1940, where
4 you expressed to one of the Japanese Ministers that it was
5 not there as a threat to Japan. How do you account for that
6 statement?

7 Mr. Grew: Very definitely it was not there as a threat
8 to Japan because we had no idea of offense. Our whole policy
9 was one of defense and nothing else. That was fundamental
10 in our policy. What reason had we for offense? Our whole
11 policy was based on defense pure and simple.

12 Senator Ferguson: Well, if our whole policy was one of
13 defense -- and was that told to Japan?

14 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. I think that time after time our
15 basic principles were fully explained to Japan, not only by
16 myself in conversations with Japanese officials, not only in
17 written documents to the Japanese Government, but by high
18 officials of the United States Government in public speeches.
19 That was constantly being expressed.

20 Senator Ferguson: Then you would say that the Fleet was
21 there as a defense, and as far as a defense was concerned it
22 was a deterrent to Japan but as an offensive weapon it was
23 not a deterrent to Japan because we had never expressed that
24 it was there for that purpose.

25 Is that a correct understanding, Mr. Grew?

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 Mr. Grew: Well, sir, I merely made the statement that
3 our whole policy was one of defense because we had no reason
4 for offense. We did not want any more territory or anything
5 of that kind. From that point of view, as I say, our whole
6 policy was based on a defensive position.

7 Senator Ferguson: Now, is that your answer to my ques-
8 tion?

9 Mr. Grew: Well, that is my opinion of the situation. Of
10 course, as I say, I am not competent to go into military
11 and naval strategy. There are cases, of course, where de-
12 fensive measures require taking temporary offense. I do not
13 know the strategy, that is not my business.

14 Senator Ferguson: No, I am not trying to get your opin-
15 ion of the Navy strategy. I am trying to get your opinion
16 as expressed to Japan, and the reason I am questioning you
17 in detail, it is only for one purpose, Mr. Grew, and that is
18 to try to find out what Washington knew, what the officials,-
19 I am covering all branches, - what they knew here in Wash-
20 ington in relation to Japan, as far as their military force
21 was concerned, as far as our diplomatic relations were con-
22 cerned, so that the committee may judge what was known by
23 Washington and what was known by you so that you could convey
24 back to Washington your opinion from what they knew here in
25 Washington.

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 Mr. Grew: Senator, as I said in reading that letter this
3 morning, my whole desire is to be helpful as possible to the
4 committee and to give every bit of evidence that I am cap-
5 able of giving.

6 Now, the story from my point of view of Japan has been,
7 I would say, pretty thoroughly spread on the records in the
8 four volumes which I have mentioned. Where I can piece them
9 out I am only too glad to do so and I will do my best, but
10 some of the questions that you are asking me I am not in a
11 position to answer. I could not do it.

12 For instance, I dare say that our military or naval at-
13 taches may have made technical reports to their respective
14 departments which I did not see; I do not know. But I have
15 given you everything that I can give you with regard to my
16 own position and my own observations in Tokyo during that
17 period.

18 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, the only way, of course, I
19 can find out whether you can answer my questions is for me to
20 ask them.

21 Mr. Grew: Right.

22 Senator Ferguson: And I do not wish to convey the idea
23 that you are not trying to answer the questions at all. I
24 merely want to try to get answers, if we can, because you were
25 the one man in Tokyo, in Japan, that could give to the vari-

1 ous agencies in Washington, - the government, in other words,-
2 the information and there is only one way we can find out,
3 as I view it, is from you, what information Washington had
4 on the 7th or the 7th of December, so that the committee may
5 draw some conclusions as to what should or should not have
6 been done, or the facts, rather, would draw the conclusions as
7 to what should or should not be done.

8 Now, going to this instrument of August the 17th, do I
9 understand that you place little significance on that instru-
10 ment of August the 17th, 1941 which Admiral Schuirmann called
11 an ultimatum?

12 Mr. Grew: As I said, Senator, in my opinion it was not
13 in the nature of an ultimatum for the very reason that we
14 did not act on it as an ultimatum. We continued the conver-
15 sations in Washington with a view to trying to reach an agree-
16 ment. You do not deliver an ultimatum to a country and then
17 continue to negotiate after that.

18 Senator Ferguson: Were you here, Mr. Grew, when I asked
19 some questions of Mr. Welles about the parallel action that
20 was to be taken by Great Britain on this instrument?

21 Mr. Grew: Yes, I heard that question.

22 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now I will ask you whether
23 or not you had any opinion then that Japan -- no, that Great
24 Britain took parallel action on this meeting between the
25 President and Mr. Churchill on the Augusta in the Atlantic in

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

2 relation to the message that we gave notice to the Japs on
3 the 17th of August, 1941?

4 Mr. Grew: I knew nothing about that whatever, Senator,
5 and so far as I am aware no step of that kind was taken by me
6 in Tokyo.

7 Senator Ferguson: In other words, the information that
8 came to you, Mr. Grew, was merely this instrument, which does
9 not indicate that parallel action was to be taken, does it?

10 Mr. Grew: Probably so.

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, will you look at it and see
12 whether or not it indicates parallel action?

13 Mr. Grew: Which document do you refer to now?

14 Senator Lucas: Of course, Mr. Chairman, there is no
15 evidence before this committee that there was ever any agree-
16 ment that parallel action should be taken. The Senator from
17 Michigan is assuring in every one of these questions that
18 parallel action was agreed upon.

19 Senator Ferguson: Well, Mr. Chairman, the record will
20 speak for itself as to what Mr. Welles told us.

21 The Chairman: The chair does not know whether it is
22 customary when one government sends a message to another to
23 include in that message things that another government has
24 sent a similar message. Evidently that did not appear in
25 this case.

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I think the record is clear here from what Mr. Welles said.

The Chairman: Well, if it is it will speak for itself.

Mr. Grew: I could speak only from the point of view, frankly, of Tokyo and I recollect neither having been instructed to take, nor having taken such parallel action on this issue.

Now, what happened in Washington I, frankly, do not know. I do not even know whether I was informed at that time. I would have to check the records to find out.

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Well, I will ask you, Mr. Grew,
3 whether you had any knowledge that parallel action was to be
4 taken?

5 Mr. Grew: Not so far as I recollect, Senator. But,
6 after all these years, I find myself in a very difficult posi-
7 tion to give a categorical answer to a question of that kind
8 without looking at the record. Sometimes my memory may be at
9 fault.

10 Senator Ferguson: That would be a rather important matter,
11 would it not?

12 Counsel, would you let me have the 10 Downing Street
13 instrument? I do not recall the exhibit number.

14 Mr. Gesell: Exhibit 22.

15 Senator Ferguson: I want to show it to you, Mr. Grew,
16 and have you interpret it for me.

17 (The document was handed to Mr. Grew.)

18 Mr. Grew: I take it from this document these were to
19 be declarations by these various governments.

20 Senator Ferguson: What is meant by a "draft of parallel
21 communications to the Japanese Government"?

22 Mr. Grew: That would have meant definitely a note to
23 the Japanese Government which might have been presented by
24 the Secretary of State here to the Japanese Ambassador, or
25 might have been presented by me to the Minister of Foreign

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Affairs.

3 Senator Ferguson: Might we have the notes of August 17?

4 Mr. Gesell: They are attached to this exhibit, Senator.

5 The Chairman: Are you prepared to answer the question,
6 Mr. Grew?

7 Mr. Grew: May I ask what exactly was the question again?

8 Senator Ferguson: I was looking through the instrument,
9 if the Chairman please.

10 The Chairman: All right.

11 Senator Ferguson: At the top of the page on Exhibit 22,
12 the seal of the Prime Minister, what would that indicate as to
13 where that instrument was drawn up, the "Seal of Prime Minister,
14 10 Downing Street, Whitehall"? It would be very difficult to
15 tell what was meant by that without seeing the original instru-
16 ment, would it not?

17 Mr. Grew: The only thing that is clear from this is that
18 it was apparently written on the official paper of the British
19 Prime Minister. I do not know that there is any indication
20 further than that.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now does that instrument indicate to
22 you that it was contemplated, if it was to be carried out,
23 that it would be carried out by parallel action of the Government
24 mentioned?

25 Mr. Grew: I do not see any indication here that it would,

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator. There is no indication whatsoever of parallel action
3 here that I can see.

4 Senator Ferguson: What is meant by "draft of parallel
5 communications to the Japanese Government"?

6 Mr. Grew: Well, it would mean presumably that each Govern-
7 ment would send communications along these general lines in
8 its own language.

9 Senator Ferguson: It states: "Declaration by H.M.G.",
10 His Majesty's Government -- "same as above, mutatis mutandis,
11 the last phrase reading: -**** their support of them, H.M.G.
12 would give all possible aid to such power."

13 "Mutatis mutandis" means using the proper language, does
14 it not?

15 The Chairman: There might be some dispute about that.
16 It might mean necessary changes having been made in the instru-
17 ment.

18 Senator Ferguson: What is the witness' opinion on the
19 word?

20 Mr. Grew: Senator, I do not think, frankly, I am com-
21 petent to answer the questions that you are asking about this,
22 because I had nothing whatsoever to do with it.

23 Senator Ferguson: As a diplomat can you answer it?
24 I do not know as I will get a better expert on it.

25 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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The Chairman: Will the Senator yield to the Congressman?

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Senator Ferguson: Does he want to be the better expert?

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Mr. Murphy: Haven't we already heard on the record from

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Mr. Welles, who was at the Atlantic Charter meeting, saying

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that another version was used and not the version that was asked

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the witness? Is not that already in the record?

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Senator Ferguson: I already have had the instrument of
the President read by Mr. Grew. He knows what went on, and I
assume he received it in Tokyo.

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Is that correct?

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Mr. Grew: I assume I did, but as I say, I would have to
consult the record.

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Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

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Senator Ferguson: Not at the present moment.

15

The Chairman: Let us get along.

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Mr. Grew: I think we have gone over all this.

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Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, then, as I understand it,
you did not know of any parallel action to be taken, as far
as the instrument is concerned on page 556 of Foreign Relations?

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Mr. Grew: From my recollection, I doubt it. As I say,
in order to give a categorical reply to that question I would
have to look up the records and see.

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Senator Ferguson: May we have this understanding, that
if you do not return it is because you find nothing in the

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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record on that question, and if you do find something you will bring it back or have it delivered to counsel?

Mr. Grew: That will be understood, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Is that understood?

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, were you familiar with the voluntary Air Corps in China?

Mr. Grew: I know of its existence. You mean the American Corps that went out there?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Grew: Of course I knew of its existence at the time, but I know very little about it.

Senator Ferguson: Was it ever discussed with you in the Japanese Government?

Mr. Grew: The Japanese Government from time to time would make representations to me about our aid to Chaing Kai Shek which, they said, prevented their coming to a peaceful conclusion of the so-called China incident. They never called it war but the China incident. In the course of those representations it is quite possible that they did mention our assistance in connection with the Air Corps, but I cannot recollect any specific statement to that effect.

Senator Ferguson: Were you advised by our Government as to just what that Air Corps was?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Grew: Well, I presumably was.

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Senator Ferguson: You were advised?

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Mr. Grew: I cannot tell you without going into the record.

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Senator Ferguson: Again might I ask you to get the records?

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Mr. Grew: Yes.

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Senator Ferguson: And I assume if you do not come back

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when you have found nothing in the records on that point.

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Mr. Grew: That is correct.

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Senator Ferguson: So that we will understand that.

11

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

12

Senator Ferguson: When did you first get an idea that

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Konoye, the Prime Minister, wanted to meet with the President?

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Mr. Grew: The proposal was, as broached to me in a long

15

talk with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 18, 1941 --

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Senator Ferguson: I did not get the date.

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Mr. Grew: On August 18, 1941.

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Senator Ferguson: You had no information prior to that?

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Mr. Grew: I understand that the matter had been taken

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up by the Japanese Ambassador at Washington. I do not think

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what I was informed prior to that. I think that was the first

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information I had.

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Senator Ferguson: Well, as far as you are concerned, Mr.

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Grew, did you know of any outside intermediaries in the nego-

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tiations between Japan and the United States?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Mr. Grew: Outside intermediaries?

2 Senator Ferguson: Yes. It has been mentioned here that
3 Mr. Walker, the Postmaster General --

4 Mr. Grew: (Interposing) I know nothing about that.

5 Senator Ferguson: You have no knowledge about that what-
6 soever?

7 Mr. Grew: None whatsoever.

8 Senator Ferguson: Your sole point of contact was either
9 the State Department or the President, as you have indicated?

10 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

11 Senator Ferguson: Now will you tell us something about
12 this proposed meeting of Konoye, as to what significance it
13 could have had, as you saw it? I want to know merely as you
14 saw it and conveyed it to our State Department, to find out
15 what knowledge they had.

16 Mr. Grew: Konoye himself arranged a meeting with me on
17 September 6 in order to discuss a meeting with President
18 Roosevelt. As I have said this afternoon, Konoye is saddled
19 with the responsibility for some of the war acts of banditry
20 on the part of Japan which have been recorded in international
21 history, but, as I also said, he, I think, saw the handwriting
22 on the wall and realized that Japan was on the brink of an
23 abyss and wanted, if possible, to reverse the engine. That
24 is only opinion. Anyway, on September 6 he asked me to dinner,
25

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 and he was very much afraid of any possibility of the military
3 extremists learning of that meeting.

4 Senator Ferguson: How did you meet? Under what circum-
5 stances?

6 Mr. Grew: I will tell you, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: All right.

8 Mr. Grew: Ordinarily a Japanese Prime Minister does not
9 consort with diplomats. The contact is always with the Foreign
10 Minister. Most Prime Ministers stay off it completely. But
11 in this case Konoye wanted to talk the thing over directly.
12 So we proceeded to the house of a mutual friend, and automobile
13 tags on diplomatic and official automobiles were changed so
14 nobody could recognize us. We had the dinner. All the
15 servants were sent out and the dinner was served by the
16 daughter of the house. We talked for three hours.

17 During that time Konoye sketched out to me what he had
18 in mind. It is a pretty long story. It is all on record.

19 Senator Ferguson: Will you point out in the Foreign
20 Relations where it is on record?

21 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, I will.

22 Senator Ferguson: So we will have the record clear.

23 Mr. Grew: The report of the dinner is recorded on page
24 604 of Foreign Relations and my analysis of the purpose of the
25 meeting is contained in a long telegram which I sent to the

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Secretary of State on September 29, 1941, on page 645 of Foreign Relations. I would like to read to the committee, if I may, the last paragraph of that message from myself to the Secretary of State:

"In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does so in all deference" -- I might say that all these telegrams were paraphrased by the State Department.

Senator Ferguson: So we might clear the record on that, all these messages in here are either substance or paraphrased?

Mr. Grew: Yes, and in some cases I regret to say I think the paraphrases are very awkward. I think sometimes the language is being obscured rather than clarified.

Senator Ferguson: Do they always convey what you intended to convey? Would a person reading them get an idea as to what you were trying to convey?

Mr. Grew: I think so. I do not think there has been any distortion of the meaning, but I do not think they are as clear an exposition as contained in the original text.

Senator Ferguson: Then it would be more difficult to convey what you intended to say?

Mr. Grew: I think my meaning is clear, in any case. These paraphrases were essential because we had to protect our code. The last paragraph reads:

"In submitting the foregoing discussion, the

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Ambassador does so in all deference to the much
3 broader field of view of President Roosevelt and
4 Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's
5 approach to the matter is limited to the viewpoint of
6 the American Embassy in Japan."

7 I preface everything I said in the position I took on
8 this matter with that premise. In the first place, as I have
9 told you already, I did not have access to any of the tele-
10 graphic intercepts, I did not even know that they existed, and
11 I had no access to any of the secret documents which have ap-
12 peared since, so my analysis of the situation was based entirely
13 on my observation from the standpoint of our Embassy in Tokyo,
14 what I could see at that time.

15 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Grew, you say that the meeting was
16 held as an absolutely secret meeting and you described how you
17 changed the plates on the automobiles. Was it your understand-
18 ing that this was to be a good faith meeting?

19 Mr. Grew: It was my understanding, and also after the
20 meeting had taken place that was my understanding.

21 Senator Ferguson: There was not anything that happened
22 at the meeting that would indicate to you that it was not a
23 good faith meeting, was there?

24 Mr. Grew: No, sir, there was not anything happened at
25 the meeting that would indicate there was any lack of faith.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: And did you, in your opinion, properly report that to the State Department?

Mr. Grew: Well, sir, my report is all contained in that telegram.

Senator Ferguson: A fair appraisal of that telegram would be that you did express that it was a good faith meeting, is that correct?

Mr. Grew: Yes, very definitely, and that was developed still further in my telegram of September 29.

Senator Ferguson: Now did you get any opinions from Konoye, from what he said, that if he could not get such a meeting his Cabinet may fall?

Mr. Grew: Yes, very definitely.

Senator Ferguson: Did you advise the State Department to that effect?

Mr. Grew: That is contained in that telegram of September 29, Senator. I think I better stick to the record here.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, I wish you would.

Mr. Grew: This is a very long telegram.

Senator Ferguson: I want you to boil it down.

Mr. Grew: I think that the story as I saw it is pretty fully brought forward in this telegram, but there is no particular passage that I can pick out.

Senator Ferguson: Can you sum it up?

(16)

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Grew: What is that?

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Senator Ferguson: I want to know now about the Cabinet falling, if that is your opinion from what he said, that his Cabinet would fall if he could not get the meeting.

6

Mr. Grew: I, in my telegram, said this:

7

"The logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States."

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Senator Ferguson: Then you were of the opinion, and conveyed it to the State Department, that if the meeting did not take place that would mean a military dictatorship in Japan?

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Mr. Grew: That was my opinion.

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Senator Ferguson: And did you convey to the United States, or the State Department, what that would mean or could mean?

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Mr. Grew: I do not think anything much could have been added to this statement here, Senator, "formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States."

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Senator Ferguson: When you say "colliding head-on with the United States", is that another way of saying "war"?

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Mr. Grew: I think that would be.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: That is a fair interpretation?

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Mr. Grew: A fair deduction.

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Senator Ferguson: A fair deduction. Then you were of the opinion, and conveyed it to the State Department, that if the meeting did not take place and the Cabinet fell, and you were of the opinion it would fall, it meant war with the United States?

8

Mr. Grew: No, sir, I did not go as far as that. No, indeed.

10

Senator Ferguson: How far did you go?

11

Mr. Grew: I said that risk would be present, but I think the fact that, as far as I was concerned in Tokyo, I was working for peace up to the last minute, and conversations were going on in Washington. I do not think at any time it could be said any particular step or lack of step definitely meant war. No, I would not subscribe to that.

17

Senator Ferguson: How far did you go in that note as a warning to the State Department in Washington?

19

Mr. Grew: That is clear in the telegram.

20

The Chairman: Let me ask the Senator, has that note been made a part of the record?

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Senator Ferguson: I would like now to have the whole note read in.

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The Chairman: It speaks for itself, and should be made

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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part of the record.

Mr. Grew: It speaks for itself.

The Chairman: When it is made a part of the record it speaks for itself, in its own terms.

Mr. Grew: I should think so.

The Chairman: Therefore it will now be made a part of the record, part of the transcript. It is a lengthy document.

Mr. Grew: That is telegram 1529, Tokyo, September 29, 1941, noon. That is on page 645 of Foreign Relations.

(The telegram referred to is as follows:)

(1) In regard to the preliminary conversations taking place at Washington and Tokyo, the Ambassador points out that a review of telegraphic correspondence on this subject since last spring reveals the Japanese Government's efforts, increasing steadily and intensified lately, to arrange a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt without further delay. While admitting his role to be chiefly that of a transmitting agent in these conversations, the Ambassador naturally wishes to aid in any constructive way, particularly by endeavoring to appraise accurately for the President and the Secretary of State the Japanese factors and conditions having direct or indirect bearing on the subject and also by trying to bring the Japanese Government to adopt measures and policies such as the United States Government deems to be

Witness Grew

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2 essential for a mutual understanding or agreement between
3 Japan and the United States. Since the fall of Admiral Yonai's
4 Cabinet in July of 1940, American diplomacy in Japan has been
5 in eclipse temporarily through force of circumstances. How-
6 ever, when the Konoye-Toyoda regime began last July, American
7 diplomacy obtained a very active new lease of life. The
8 Ambassador expresses his earnest hope therefore that so
9 propitious a period be not permitted to slip by without a new
10 foundation having been laid with enough stability to warrant
11 a reasonable amount of confidence that the structure to be
12 erected gradually and progressively thereon can and will endure.

13 (2) The Ambassador recalls his statements in the
14 past that in Japan the pendulum always swings between moderate
15 and extremist policies; that it was not then possible under
16 the existing circumstances for any Japanese leader or group
17 to reverse the program of expansion and expect to survive;
18 that the permanent digging in by Japanese in China and the
19 pushing of the Japanese advance to the south could be pre-
20 vented only by insuperable obstacles. The Ambassador recalls
21 likewise his views that the risks of taking positive measures
22 to maintain United States security in the future were likely
23 to be far smaller than the risks of not taking such measures;
24 that only respect for potential power of the United States
25 has deterred Japan from taking more liberties with American

Witness grew

1 interests; and that Japan's program of forcible expansion could be
2 brought to a halt only by a show of force and by a demon-
3 stration of American willingness to use this force if necessary.
4 The Ambassador recalls also his statement that if Japan's
5 leadership could be discredited eventually by such American
6 action, there might take shape in Japan ultimately a regenera-
7 tion of thought which would allow Japan to resume formal
8 relations with the United States, leading to a readjustment
9 of the entire problem of the Pacific.

10 (3) The Ambassador suggests that the United States
11 has been following very wisely precisely this policy which,
12 furthered by other developments in the world, has helped to
13 discredit Japanese leadership, notably that of former Foreign
14 Minister Matsuoka. The Ambassador cites as world developments
15 arousing a positive reaction from the United States the
16 conclusion by Japan of the Tripartite Alliance and Japan's
17 recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime at Nanking, which
18 preceded Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Germany's
19 action upset the basis for the Tripartite Pact, Japan having
20 jointed the Italo-German Axis in order to obtain security
21 against Russia and thereby to avoid the peril of being caught
22 between the Soviet Union and the United States. At the
23 present time Japan is attempting to correct this miscalculation
24 by getting out of an extremely dangerous position. The
25 Ambassador recalls his reports to the Department to the effect

Witness Grew

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2 that Japanese foreign policies are inevitably changed by
3 the impact of events abroad and that liberal elements in Japan
4 might come to the top in due course as a result of the trend
5 of events. He considers that such a time has arrived. He
6 sees a good chance of Japan's falling into line if a program
7 can be followed of world reconstruction as forecast by the
8 declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
9 American policy - of forbearance, patient argumentation, efforts
10 at persuasion, followed for many years, plus a manifest de-
11 termination of the United States to take positive measures
12 when called for - plus the impact of world developments upon
13 Japan, has rendered Japan's political soil hospitable to the
14 sowing of new seeds which, the Ambassador feels, if planted
15 carefully and nourished, may bring about the anticipated
16 regeneration of Japanese thought and a complete readjustment
17 of relations between Japan and the United States.

18 (4) Certain quarters have advanced the thought - and
19 no doubt it is prominently in the mind of the United States
20 Government - that at this juncture an agreement between Japan
21 and the United States will serve merely as a breathing spell
22 to Japan. During such a breathing spell, Japan, having
23 successfully untangled itself with American aid from the
24 China conflict, will recoup and strengthen its forces in
25 order to resume at the next favorable opportunity its

Witness Grew

1 expansionist program. This thought cannot be gainsaid with
2 certainty. The same school of thought also holds that Japan
3 will be forced to relinquish its expansionist program because
4 of the deterioration of Japanese domestic economy and because
5 of the threat of financial, economic and social collapse due
6 to a progressive intensifying of economic measures by the
7 United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands against
8 Japan. The Ambassador adds that should this thesis be ac-
9 cepted as reasonably sound, the position will confront the
10 United States of choosing one of two methods to approach its
11 objective, namely, either the method of progressive economic
12 strangulation or the method of constructive conciliation,
13 not so-called appeasement. The Ambassador sees the second
14 method as the definite choice of the United States Government
15 following the beginning of the Washington preliminary con-
16 versations and President Roosevelt's acceptance in principle
17 of the Japanese Prime Minister's proposed meeting. Indeed,
18 the Ambassador remarks, the United States has never departed
19 from its readiness to negotiate on any issues with Japan (see
20 the American note dated December 30, 1938), despite the fact
21 that Japan already had embarked at that time on its expansion
22 by force program. He feels that, from the viewpoint of
23 farseeing statesmanship, the wisdom of the American choice
24 seems to be beyond cavil. Should failure greet the con-
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Witness Grew

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

structive, conciliatory method of approach now or later, there will always be available the other method, the application of progressive economic sanctions. In the opinion of the Ambassador, whether the trend of American relations with Japan is for better or for worse, the United States obviously will have to remain for a long time to come in a state of preparedness. The thought that eventual British victory in the world war will solve automatically many problems may, meanwhile, afford whatever degree of encouragement is justified.

(5) The Ambassador, while admitting that risks will inevitably be involved no matter what course is pursued toward Japan, offers his carefully studied belief that there would be substantial hope at the very least of preventing the Far Eastern situation from becoming worse and perhaps of ensuring definitely constructive results, if an agreement along the lines of the preliminary discussions were brought to a head by the proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments. The Ambassador mentions his previous expressions of opinion that the principal point at issue between the United States and Japan is not whether the former must call a halt to the expansionist program of the latter, but when. He raises the questions whether the United States is not now given the opportunity to halt Japan's program without war,

Witness Grew

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2 or an immediate risk of war, and further whether, through
3 failure to use the present opportunity, the United States
4 will not face a greatly increased risk of war. The Ambassador
5 states his firm belief in an affirmative answer to these two
6 questions.

7 (6) Certain quarters hold the view that it is
8 altogether improbable under existing circumstances that
9 counteraction will be deliverately taken by Japan in response
10 to any American action likely to be taken in the Pacific which
11 would bring about war with the United States. The Ambassador
12 states his inability to agree that war may not supervene
13 following actions, whether irrational or deliverate, by elements
14 either in Japan or in the United States tending so to inflame
15 public opinion in the other country concerned as to make war
16 unavoidable. He recalls in this regard the cases of the
17 Maine and the Panay.

18 (7) The Ambassador stresses the importance of
19 understanding Japanese psychology, fundamentally unlike that
20 of any Western nation. Japanese reactions to any particular
21 set of circumstances cannot be measured, nor can Japanese
22 actions be predicted by any Western measuring rod. This
23 fact is hardly surprising in the case of a country so
24 recently feudalistic. The Ambassador conceives his chief
25 duty to be an attempt to interpret accurately Japanese

Witness Grew

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2 psychology, and he states that he has sined to do this in
3 his numerous reports during the last several months and years
4 to the Department. Keeping this thought constantly before
5 him, the Ambassador ventures at the risk of repetition to
6 advance the considerations set forth below.

7 (8) Should the United States expect or await agree-
8 ment by the Japanese Government, in the present preliminary
9 conversations, to clear-cut commitments which will satisfy
10 the United States Government both as to principle and as to
11 concrete detail, almost certainly the conversations will drag
12 along indefinitely and unproductively until the Konoye Cabinet
13 and its supporting elements desiring rapprochement with
14 the United States will come to the conclusion that the
15 outlook for an agreement is hopeless and that the United
16 States Government is only playing for time. If the abnormal
17 sensitiveness of Japan and the abnormal effects of loss of
18 face are considered, in such a situation Japanese reaction
19 may and probably will be serious. This will result in the
20 Konoye Government's being discredited and in a revulsion
21 of anti-American feeling, and this may and probably will
22 lead to unbridled acts. The eventual cost of these will
23 not be reckoned, and their nature is likely to inflame
24 Americans, while reprisal and counter-reprisal measures will
25 bring about a situation in which it will be difficult to

Witness Grew

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2 avoid war. The logical outcome of this will be the downfall
3 of the Konoye Cabinet and the formation of a military dictator-
4 ship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament
5 to avoid colliding head-on with the United States. There is
6 a question that such a situation may prove to be more serious
7 even than the failure to produce an entirely satisfactory
8 agreement through the proposed meeting between President
9 Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, should it take place as planned.
10 Worded otherwise, the question remains whether it will not
11 prove to be a less serious case for the negotiations under-
12 taken in good faith to fail of complete success than for the
13 United States to demonstrate its unwillingness to enter any
14 such negotiations.

15 (9) The Ambassador continues by stating that he
16 has been emphatically told on numerous occasions - and such
17 declarations he considers must be accepted at their face
18 value - that prior to the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting
19 and formal negotiations it is impossible for the Japanese
20 Government to define its future assurances and commitments
21 more specifically than hitherto stated. The Ambassador
22 explains that one reason for this Japanese position, as given
23 him very confidentially, is that former Foreign Minister
24 Matsuoka, after his retirement in July, recounted in complete
25 detail to the German Ambassador in Japan the course of the

Witness Grew

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Washington conversations up to that time. Because many supporters of Matsuoka remain in the Tokyo Foreign Office, the fear has been expressed that these man will not scruple to reveal to both the Germans and the Japanese extremists any information which would render the present Cabinet's position untenable. Although certain basic principles have been accepted provisionally by the Japanese Government, the definitions and formulae of Japan's future objectives and policy, as advanced so far during the preliminary conversations, and the statements supplementary to those definitions, are so abstract or equivocal and are open to such wide interpretation that they rather create confusion than clarify commitments which the Japanese Government is ready to undertake. The Ambassador states that at the same time he has been told the Prince Konoye is in a position in direct negotiations with President Roosevelt to offer him assurance which, because of their far reaching character, will not fail to satisfy the United States. The truth of this statement cannot be determined by the Ambassador, who, however, points out that, in regard specifically to Japan's Axis relations, the Japanese Government, though refusing consistently to give an undertaking that it will overtly renounce its alliance membership, actually has shown a readiness to reduce Japan's alliance adherence to a dead letter by its indication of willingness to enter

Witness Grew

1 formally into negotiations with the United States. The
2 Ambassador therefore does not consider unlikely the possibility
3 of Prince Konoye's being in a position to give President
4 Roosevelt directly a more explicit and satisfactory engagement
5 than has already been vouchsafed in the course of the pre-
6 liminary conversations.
7

(10) In the opinion of the Ambassador, on the basis
8 of the above observations which he has every reason to regard
9 as sound, American objectives will not be reached by insisting
10 or continuing to insist during the preliminary conversations
11 that Japan provide the sort of clearcut, specific commitments
12 which appear in any final, formal convention or treaty.
13 Unless a reasonable amount of confidence is placed by the
14 United States in the professed sincerity of intention, and
15 good faith of Prince Konoye and his supporters to mould
16 Japan's future policy upon the basic principles they are
17 ready to accept and then to adopt measures which gradually
18 but loyally implement those principles, with it understood
19 that the United States will implement its own commitments
20 pari passu with the steps which Japan takes, the Ambassador
21 does not believe that a new orientation can be successfully
22 created in Japan to lead to a general improving of Japanese-
23 American relations and to the hope that ultimate war may be
24 avoided in the Pacific. The sole way to discredit the
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Witness Grew

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Japanese military machine and army is through wholesale military defeat, and the Ambassador sees no present prospect of this. The only alternative (and the only wise one in the view of the Ambassador) is an attempt to produce a regeneration of Japanese thought and outlook through constructive conciliation, along the lines of American efforts at present. The Ambassador inquires whether the better part of wisdom and of statesmanship is not to bring such efforts to a head before the force of their initial impetus is lost, leaving it impossible to overcome an opposition which the Ambassador thinks will mount inevitably and steadily in Japan.

(11) In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does so in all deference to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan.

Grew.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Grew

2 Mr. Gesell: Senator, I just want to call attention
3 again to the fact that these are official Government publica-
4 tions and we have assumed that all of the conversations
5 recorded in these publications are available to the committee
6 and may be drawn upon in making any conclusions or anything of
7 that sort.

8 We simply have not physically offered them as exhibits.

9 The Chairman: If an interpretation is to be made of the
10 document which is part of the record, or which has been filed
11 as an exhibit, it seems to the Chair instead of undertaking
12 to have a verbal interpretation of a record of that sort, it
13 ought to be allowed to speak for itself in its own terms.

14 Mr. Grew: I agree with you. It is all set out here.

15 Mr. Keefe: May I interrupt?

16 The Chairman: Will the Senator yield to the Congressman
17 from Wisconsin?

18 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

19 The Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

20 Mr. Keefe: I would like to inquire whether or not the
21 original document entitled "War and Peace" has been offered
22 as an exhibit and is in evidence, the entire book, or is it
23 considered that the committee is at liberty to consider anything
24 in that book as a matter of reference, it being a so-called
25 public document?

WLC2

1 Witness Grew

2 Mr. Gesell: Congressman Keefe, it is the latter. We have
3 assumed the committee may take judicial notice of these three
4 official publications, Peace and War, and the two volumes
5 containing the actual notes of the conversations in Foreign
6 Relations of the United States - Japan: 1931-1941.

7 Mr. Keefe: Now, Mr. Chairman, in order that there may
8 not be any mistake at any time in the future in connection
9 with these hearings, I think it would be perfectly proper to
10 have the documents referred to offered as exhibits so we may
11 have them.

12 I would like also to have offered as an exhibit the
13 original, what I understand to be the original, short version
14 published by the State Department in 1942, entitled "Peace and
15 War", of which I have a copy, consisting of some 143 pages.

16 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

17 Senator Ferguson: I will yield.

18 The Chairman: Let us clear this matter up.

19 Mr. Murphy: Is not the proper legal procedure, Mr. Chair-
20 man, to incorporate that by reference, and was not that
21 incorporated by reference? Since they are legal documents
22 they are part of the record by reference.

23 The Chairman: In effect, there is not much difference
24 between incorporating by reference and by making them exhibits
25 which are available to the committee. The fact that they are

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Witness Grew

Government publications puts upon them the stamp of authenticity,

I presume. Is there any reason why they cannot be referred to

as exhibits?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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2 Mr. Gesell: Not at all, Mr. Chairman. I think we can
3 refer to Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, 3141, as the
4 next exhibit, Exhibit No. 27; and I might say to Congressman
5 Keefe that it is my understanding that that includes in the
6 front portion the document the Congressman has in his hand,
7 the initial short summary which was originally released.

8 Mr. Keefe: The reason I suggest that this initial short
9 summary be incorporated as an exhibit is because I have found
10 in going through these four volumes after they have been edited
11 and re-edited and changes have been made in the arrangement of
12 the material so that it becomes difficult for me to follow
13 a lot of this material. I find that there is a lot of helpful
14 in this short volume, which can be identified promptly and
15 quickly, and which tells in short form this story.

16 Mr. Gesell: We could make the short form the next exhibit.

17 The Chairman: The Chair suggests that it be made exhibit
18 number "27" because it seems to have been published previously
19 and that the full volume be made Exhibit 28.

20 Mr. Gesell: Very well.

21 As Exhibit 29, the two volumes, Volumes I and II, Foreign
22 Relations of the United States - Japan, 1931-1941, which contains
23 the actual documents of reported conversations held.

24 The Chairman: That will be done.

25 Senator Ferguson: I would like, Mr. Chairman, to now make

WLC2

1 Witness Grew

Questions by Senator Ferguson

2 Mr. Grew's book No. 30.

3 The Chairman: Well, the chairman sees no objection to
4 making it an exhibit. I do not know whether that would increase
5 the circulation or not, but the committee will be glad to have
6 it made an exhibit.

7 (The documents referred to were marked as
8 Exhibits 27, 28, 29 and 30, respectively.)

9 The Chairman: Go ahead.

10 Senator Ferguson: I will ask you, Mr. Grew, when Mr.
11 Dooman came to the United States? When did he come to the
12 United States?

13 Mr. Grew: Mister - who?

14 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Dooman.

15 Mr. Grew: Nomura?

16 Senator Ferguson: Dooman.

17 Mr. Grew: Dooman. Well, he was the counsellor of the
18 Embassy in Tokyo. He came out there -- I don't remember precise-
19 ly what date.

20 Senator Ferguson: My question was: When did he return
21 to the United States before Pearl Harbor?

22 Mr. Grew: I would have to check. Of course, he did not
23 return while I was away, because he had to be Charge d'Affaires.

24 Senator Ferguson: Page 139 of Foreign Relations. Refresh
25 your memory on that.

LC3

1 Witness Grew Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Mr. Murphy: Which volume?

3 Senator Ferguson: I think No. 2.

4 Mr. Grew: 139 of Foreign Relations, Volume II?

5 Senator Ferguson: Page 138.

6 Mr. Grew: "Memorandum by the Counsellor of Embassy in
7 Japan."

8 Senator Ferguson: He had a conversation with Ohashi.

9 Mr. Grew: Yes.

10 Senator Ferguson: Do you remember that conversation?

11 On page 139, I will ask you to read beginning down about
12 15 lines, "It would be absurd to suppose that the American
13 people * * *"

14 Mr. Grew: "It would be absurd to suppose that the
15 American people, while pouring munitions into Britain,
16 would look with complacency upon the cutting of communica-
17 tions between Britain and the British Dominions and Colonies
18 overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were
19 to prejudice the safety of those communications, either
20 by direct action or by placing herself in a position to
21 menace those communications, she would have to expect to
22 come into conflict with the United States. There are many
23 indications of the Japanese moving down slowly toward
24 Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. The United
25 States cannot but be concerned by the various initiatives

LC 4

1 Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 taken by the Japanese in Indo-China and elsewhere for
3 the reason that if Japan were to occupy these strategically
4 important British and Dutch areas, it could easily debouch
5 into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific and create
6 havoc with essential British lines of communication.
7 The United States for its part was well aware that an
8 alternative source of supply for Japanese purchase of
9 petroleum and certain other products of the United States
10 is the Netherlands East Indies, and for that reason it has
11 been reluctant to impose embargoes on the sale to Japan
12 of commodities of which it has a surplus; but the Japanese
13 must clearly understand that the forbearance of the United
14 States in this respect springs from a desire not to impel
15 Japan to create a situation which could lead only to the
16 most serious consequences."

17 Senator Ferguson: That is far enough for my purposes,
18 unless you want to read further.

19 Does that refresh your memory that Dooman had been here
20 and obtained an opinion in the United States?

21 Mr. Grew: I think, as I recollect, that was the opinion
22 he received from moving around the United States, but not
23 necessarily from official sources.

24 Senator Ferguson: Did he convey this idea to you?

25 Mr. Grew: Well, I have no doubt of it. He returned

WLC5

1 Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 from a leave of absence shortly before that, didn't he?

3 I don't know if the record shows. I think he undoubtedly
4 told me of his general impressions.5 Senator Ferguson: Now, I ask you to refer to page 137,
6 "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State,"
7 No. 5397. I ask you to read the second paragraph.8 Mr. Grew: "The presentation by Mr. Dooman of his impres-
9 sions of the position of the United States as gathered during
10 his recent furlough appeared to cause Mr. Ohashi astonishment.
11 Mr. Ohashi is, for a Japanese, extraordinary direct and sparing
12 of words. Upon listening attentively to what Mr. Dooman
13 described as the philosophy of the American position, Mr.
14 Ohashi remained perfectly quiet for an appreciable space of
15 time and then burst forth with the question, 'Do you mean to
16 say that if Japan were to attack Singapore there would be war
17 with the United States?' Mr. Dooman replied, 'The logic of
18 the situation would inevitably raise that question.' Mr. Ohashi
19 then left that subject and adverted to the character of the
20 reports sent to London by the British Ambassador."21 Senator Ferguson: Now, what did Dooman, in your opinion,
22 mean by that phrase?23 Mr. Grew: Well, that referred definitely, when he said,
24 "The logic of the situation would inevitably raise that question"
25 that meant exactly what it says. It would come under considera-

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1 Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 tion. It doesn't mean that it would necessarily bring about
3 war. Inevitably raise that question. Of course, it would be
4 raised.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, your telegram, on page 143,
6 being No. 334, will you read that? It is in relation, I take
7 it, to the same matter. If it isn't I wish you would explain
8 it.

9 Mr. Grew: My short telegram?

10 Senator Ferguson: Yes, the short one.

11 Mr. Grew: "Yesterday, I told Matsuoka that I entirely con-
12 curred in and approved of all that Dooman had said to
13 Ohashi on February 14. As the latter had given only an
14 oral report of the conversation to Matsuoka I read him
15 the whole memorandum of it. I was somewhat surprised
16 when the Minister stated his entire agreement with what
17 Dooman had said. Today I am sending Matsuoka for his
18 personal use a copy of the memorandum."

19 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you ever hear from the State
20 Department on this particular matter after you sent this
21 information to the State Department?

22 Mr. Grew: Not to my recollection.

23 Senator Ferguson: So that they were fully advised as to
24 what you had advised the Japanese?

25 Mr. Grew: I advised the State Department of every step

WLC7

1 Witness Grew Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 taken, Senator.

3 Senator Ferguson: Would you look up and see whether or
4 not you did get an answer?

5 Mr. Grew: I think I can answer that.

6 Senator Ferguson: You say that you did not?

7 Mr. Grew: Definitely that I did not, but I will have it
8 looked up.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now, Mr. Grew, did you send a telegram
10 on November 3, 1941?

11 Mr. Grew: Yes, I did.

12 Senator Ferguson: At that time -- Will you get that
13 telegram?

14 I would like to have that telegram go into the record at
15 this place, Mr. Chairman.

16 Have you it before you?

17 Mr. Grew: I know it pretty well by heart.

18 Mr. Gesell: That is an exhibit, Senator.

19 The Chairman: You want it printed in the hearings?

20 Senator Ferguson: I think it should be, Mr. Chairman.

21 It is an important telegram, is it, Mr. Grew?

22 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, it is a very important telegram.

23 Senator Ferguson: Giving information to the Secretary
24 of State?

25 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. It was addressed "Strictly Confi-

WLC8

1 Witness Grew Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 dential for Secretary and Under Secretary Only."

3 Senator Ferguson: So that it was to go to the Secretary
4 and the Under Secretary?

5 Mr. Grew: Very definitely.

6 Senator Ferguson: Now, I want to discuss that with you.

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7 The Chairman: Are you going to have the Secretary read it?

8 Senator Ferguson: I would like to have it read.

9 The Chairman: Read it into the record.

10 How long is it?

11 Mr. Grew: You wish me to read it?

12 Senator Ferguson: I would like to ask you questions about
13 it.

14 The Chairman: How long is it?

15 Mr. Grew: I think I can get through in about 6 or 7
16 minutes.

17 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

18 The Chairman: Just a minute.

19 Inasmuch as it is an exhibit and has been made in that
20 form a part of the record, do you insist on it being read,
21 Senator?

22 Senator Ferguson: No, except that I wanted to ask him
23 some questions, and I thought we could save time by reading it.

24 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

25 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

WLC9

1 Witness Grew

2 Mr. Murphy: Before we go into the telegram, since the
3 distinguished Senator from Michigan has had parts of the docu-
4 ment on page 138 read, and since there are qualifying parts of
5 it subsequently which are just to the opposite, I think that
6 the whole thing might go in.

7 Senator Ferguson: I would like to have it all go in.

8 The Chairman: Let it all go in, but it will not be read
9 here.

10 (The matter above referred to is as follows---Foreign
11 Relations of the United States - Japan, 1931-1941, Volume II,
12 Page 138:)

13 Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

14 TOKYO February 14, 1941.

15 I called this afternoon by appointment on Mr. Ohashi, the
16 Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. He greeted me quite politely,
17 saying that although we had several mutual friends it was, so
18 far as he knew, the first time we had met. I replied that I
19 had on various occasions taken notice of statements which he
20 had made in various capacities of the past, in Manchuria, and
21 elsewhere, but I had, unfortunately, not been able to profit
22 by opportunities which had presented themselves to make his
23 acquaintance. Mr. Ohashi said he understood that I had just
24 returned from leave in the United States and that he supposed
25 I had received a number of interesting impressions in the