




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第五卷合訂本

VOLUME FIVE



中國文化服務社印行

Published by

CHINA CULTURE SERVICE

Shanghai



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中華民國三十六年九月滬一版

英漢對照 當代文獻 第五卷 合訂本

每冊定價國幣十元

主編人 施 瑞 展

發行人 劉 百 閱

發行所 中國文化出版社
 上海福州路六七九號
 電話九一七〇五
 電報掛號五一二三

印刷所 中國文化服務社印刷廠

合訂本

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第五卷合訂本目錄

	Page
1. 邱吉爾在珍珠港事變後關於大戰局勢之祕密講演	1
2. 貝爾納斯在安全理事會開幕時致歡迎詞	39
3. 郭代表泰祺向國人播講「我對安全理事會之觀感」	43
4. 貝爾納斯向美國人民報告外長會議經過之播詞	48
5. 美代理國務卿艾契生關於美國對華政策之聲明	63
6. 聯合國原子能委員會美代表巴洛茨講演國際管制原子能	66
7. 美原子能試驗估計委員會關於比基尼原子彈試驗之正式報告書	84
8. 杜魯門致菲律賓人民之咨文	90
9. 菲律賓總統羅哈斯關於美菲合作之聲明	92
10. 貝爾納斯向美國人民報告最近巴黎外長會議經過之播詞	95
11. 莫洛托夫對巴黎和會之檢討	111
12. 王外長世杰向國人報告巴黎和會經過之播詞	119
13. 莫洛托夫關於蘇聯對經濟政治重建德國然後訂約之聲明	122
14. 貝爾納斯講演美國對德政策	131
15. 貝爾納斯重申同盟國聯合對德之演詞	148
16. 邱吉爾呼籲法德攜手維持歐洲和平	160
17. 赫爾呼籲世界團結之演詞	167
18. 麥克阿瑟關於管制日本之報告書	172
19. 美國務院發表盟國管制日本政策	177
20. 麥克阿瑟關於日皇在國內地位之聲明	189
21. 華萊士致函杜魯門主張改變美外交軍事政策並公佈原子能情報	191
22. 華萊士講演美國應有現實性和平政策	212
23. 杜魯門關於華萊士演說之聲明書	224
24. 斯達林對倫敦星期泰晤士報記者而書面問題之答覆	226
25. 貝爾納斯向國人廣播報告巴黎和會經過謂美蘇關係緊張	230
26. 斯達林答覆合衆社長提出之詢問書否認「蘇美關係緊張」	244
27. 邱吉爾答覆斯達林之書面聲明	250
28. 斯達林答羅故總統子愛里奧羅斯福問	253

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CHURCHILL'S SECRET SPEECH ON WAR PROSPECT AFTER THE PEARL HARBOUR

*Made to the House of Commons in secret session on April 23, 1942
following Pearl Harbour, released "Life" for publication,
January 28, 1946*

邱吉爾在珍珠港事變後關於大戰 局勢之秘密講演

一九四二年四月二十三日在下院秘密會議講演，一九四六年一月二十八日由美「生活」雜誌發表

Since Japan became our enemy and the United States our ally after December 7, the weight of the war upon us has become far more severe and we have sustained a painful series of misfortunes in the Far East.

Apart from the stubborn and brave defense of the Bataan Peninsula by the United States, the brunt of the Japanese attacks has fallen almost entirely upon us and the Dutch. The United States fleet has not yet regained the command of the Pacific which was lost after Pearl Harbor; and while we are at war with Germany and Italy we do not possess the naval resources necessary to maintain the command of the Indian Ocean against any heavy detachment from the main Japanese fleet.

Before the Japanese entered the war, we were already fully extended in the North

自從十二月七日日本成爲我國的敵人美國成爲我們的盟友以來，戰爭所加於我們的重負遠勝過去，我們在遠東遭遇了一連串悲痛災難。

除美軍在巴丹半島英勇頑強的抵抗以外，日軍進攻的銳鋒，幾乎集中於我們及荷蘭。美國艦隊自經珍珠港一役的損失後，尙未恢復太平洋的制海權；而我們在和德義作戰的期間，我們的海軍，實在沒有餘力再來維持印度洋的制海權，與日本主力艦隊作任何大規模的接觸。

日本參戰以前，我們的海陸空軍已遍佈北海，大西洋及地中海的戰

Sea, Atlantic and Mediterranean theaters by sea, land and air. We have drawn all possible forces to meet our new, fresh and most formidable antagonist. But in spite of all we could do and the risks we ran and are running, we have been and are at present outnumbered by the sea, land and air forces of Japan throughout the Far Eastern theater. This fact must be faced by all who wish to understand what has happened and what is going to happen.

From the beginning of our struggle with Hitler, I have always hoped for the entry of the United States; and although the ideal was to have America in while Japan remained out, I did not think that injuries that Japan would certainly inflict upon us in our ill-guarded and even denuded Eastern theater would be too heavy a price to pay for having the immense resources and power of the United States bound indissolubly to our side and to our cause. That is still my feeling. But I frankly admit that the violence, fury, skill and might of Japan has far exceeded anything that we had been led to expect. The Japanese military performances in China had not seemed remarkable. The Chinese had always been a weak nation, divided and traditionally unwarlike. We knew that they were very ill-armed and ill-supplied, especially with every weapon that *matters*¹ in modern war. And yet for four and a half years the Japanese, using as many as a million men at a time, had failed to quell or conquer them. This seemed to give a line as to form. The event was different.

Neither of course were we prepared for

場。我們曾經抽調所有可能調動的兵力，以應付新加入的極可怕的敵人。我們已經盡力之所能，並且冒極大的危險。在遠東戰區，過去和現在我們都是和數量上佔優勢的日本海陸空軍作戰。凡欲瞭解我們已經遭遇的及行將來臨之局勢的人們，都須正視這事實。

自我們和希特勒開始戰鬥時起，我一直希望美國的參加；雖然按照理想是美國加入而日本置身局外，但是我以為日本一定會加於我們東方脆弱防線上以損害，對於獲致美國龐大資源及力量並不是過大的代價。我現在仍舊這樣想。但是坦白承認，日本的暴戾、技巧及力量，遠超過我們的意料所及。日本在中國的軍事行爲，似乎並不驚人。中國過去是弱國，散漫分裂，而傳統的不喜戰爭。我們知道，他們武裝陋劣，供應貧乏，尤其是在現代戰爭所需的武器上是如此。然而，在四年半中，日軍雖一度調動了百萬大軍，仍然不能壓服或征服他們。這似乎給我們一個大致的輪廓。誰知事實却大謬不然。

我們自然對於珍珠港慘劇以後，

the temporary eclipse and paralysis of the United States sea power in the Pacific which followed from the disaster at Pearl Harbor. The combination of these two factors has been very adverse to us.

Our military position at the outbreak of the Japanese war was as follows: I had obtained from President Roosevelt in *October last*² shipping sufficient to carry two divisions additional to our ordinary heavy convoys from this country to the Middle East. The first of these divisions, the 18th, was rounding the Cape in the early days of December. It was destined for the Levant-Caspian front, which it then seemed so necessary to reinforce, and the 17th Indian division was already preparing to move from India to this same theater where the dangers of 1942 seemed mainly to lie. Both these divisions were immediately diverted to the Malay Peninsula.

In the few days before I left for the United States [Dec. 12, 1941—ED.] we set in motion to India or Malaya other very considerable *forces*³ which we had on the water, including 6 anti-aircraft and anti-tank units and 250 aircraft. All these forces were sorely needed either in Libya where General Auchinleck's offensive was at its height, or on the threatened Levant-Caspian front. The fact that they, and many other forces that have followed them, were turned to meet the new antagonist in no way lessens the need for them in the Middle East. This may become painfully apparent should the magnificent Russian defense of the approaches to the Caucasus be beaten down, or General Rommel be able to assume

美國太平洋海軍的暫時失勢及麻痺毫無準備。這兩個因素的結合，對於我們是非常不利的。

對日戰爭爆發時，我們的軍事地位如下：去年十月間，我從羅斯福總統獲得足夠將兩師兵力自此運往中東的船舶，將之加入我方龐大的原有的護航隊。最初運出的一師就是第十八師，它在十二月初正在繞好望角而駛行。它是派往萊文—裏海前線，該方面當時似亟需增援，而第十七印度師也已準備從印境開向同一戰場。因為一九四二年危機似乎大半伏於該區。但這兩師馬上被調往馬來半島。

當我離英赴美國的前幾天（原編者按：即一九四一年十二月十二日），我們在海上派遣相當的兵力前往印度及馬來，這包括六個防空隊及防坦克車隊以及二百五十架飛機。這些兵力，正是歐慶萊將軍的攻勢已達高潮的里比亞，或正受嚴重威脅的萊文—裏海前線所急切需要的。他們以及其後加派的許多軍隊，都不得不前去抵禦新的敵軍，絲毫沒有減少中東方面對於他們的需要。這種情形，如果蘇聯攔阻德軍侵入高加索的雄壯防線趨於崩潰，或是隆美爾將軍能用優勢的德軍進攻埃及，那就更為明顯

the offensive against Egypt in superior strength.

The House must face the position squarely. Not only have we failed to stem the advance of the new enemy, but we have had to weaken seriously the hopeful operations we were carrying on against the old.

In all, in the first two months of the Japanese war, up to the time of the fall of Singapore, we had landed in the Malay Peninsula, or moved from India into Burma, 70,000 troops, 300 guns, a certain number of tanks, and 350 aircraft—all of which, I repeat, were taken away from actual fighting operations elsewhere. At the same time we began to move the Australian army away from the Levant-Caspian front to sustain the Dutch in the East Indies or, as has since turned out, for a large number of them, to defend the homeland of Australia. The valiant and hitherto successful resistance of Russia has alone rendered these highly dangerous diversions possible without disastrous consequences so far.

In spite of the results up to date, I remain convinced that the broad strategic dispositions which we made of our forces prior to the Japanese attack, and the redistributions made after that attack, were the best in our power. Sometimes, though not always, people are wise after the event, but it is also possible to be wise before the event and yet not have the power to stop it happening. In war misfortunes may come from faults or errors in the High Command. They may also come from the enemy being far too strong, or fighting far too well. It is easy when the tide is adverse

的了。

國會必須正確應付這種形勢。我們不但沒有阻止新敵軍的前進，並且我們不得不大大減弱我們正在對舊有敵人進行的有望的作戰。

在和日本作戰的最初二個月，直到新加坡陷落時止，我們在馬來半島全部卸下，或從印度調往緬甸的軍隊約七萬名，大炮三百門，坦克若干輛，飛機三百五十架——這些，我要在這裏重複一遍，都是從其他正在劇戰之處抽調而來。同時，我們將萊文一裏海前線的澳軍調到東印度去協助荷軍，結果其中一大部份開拔到澳洲去防衛他們的桑梓了。而這種調動所以不致產生悲慘的後果，則完全得力於蘇聯軍隊英武而成功的抵抗。

姑置迄今所有的結果不論，我仍舊確信：這是我軍在日本進攻前的廣大戰略的分佈以及進攻後的重加調整，我們能力所及的最好方法了。有時，雖然不是常常如此，人們是事後學乖的，不過也可以在事前就很乖巧，然而却沒有力量去阻止它的發生。戰時，由於高級司令部的過失或錯誤，可以產生種種不幸。然而，不幸的來臨，也可以說是由於敵軍實在太強，或打得太好。在局勢不利的

to contend that alterations in the structure of the war direction would have made or will *make amends for* the vast and gaping lack of men and resources or power of transportation. It is easy, but it may not be true.

During these anxious times a series of unexampled losses fell upon the Royal Navy. On September 27 the *Nelson* [a 33,950 battleship—ED.] had had her bows blown in by a torpedo and was put out of action for six months. On November 13 the *Ark Royal* [a 22,000-ton aircraft carrier—ED.] was sunk in the Mediterranean by a single torpedo—a feature most disquieting to our naval constructors. On November 25 the *Barham* [a 31,100-ton battleship—ED.] foundered off Libya from a *volley of* torpedoes, with a loss of 800 men. Here again chance played a hard part.

The *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* arrived at Singapore on December 2. [The 35,000-ton *Prince of Wales* was one of Britain's newest battleships, the *Repulse* a 32,000-ton battle cruiser.—ED] This seemed to be a timely moment. It was hoped that their presence there might be a deterrent upon the war party in Japan, and it was intended that they should vanish as soon as possible into the blue. I have already explained to the House how they became involved in a local operation against Japanese transports in the Gulf of Siam which led to their destruction. On the night of December 9, in view of the news we had received about the heavy losses of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, I proposed to the Chiefs of the Staff that the *Prince of*

時候，主張戰事指揮機構的人事之更動，或者能夠對人力資源及運輸力的缺乏加以補償，是頗容易的一件事。不過，這雖然容易，但事實却未必如此。

在這一段焦急的時期內，皇家海軍遭到一連串空前損失。九月二十七日「納爾遜號」（編者按：此係三三、九五〇噸的戰艦）的艦首，為魚雷擊中，以致有六個月不能行動。十一月十三日，「皇家方舟號」（按此係二二、〇〇〇噸的航空母艦）又為一顆魚雷擊中沉於地中海——這事最使我們海軍製造家感到不安。到了十一月廿五日，「巴漢號」（編者按：此係三一、一〇〇噸的戰艦）又在里比亞海面遭受一排魚雷齊攻而浸水沉沒並且喪失了八百名人員。在這裏，機遇又對我們非常不利。

「威爾斯親王」號及「擊退」號，是在十二月二日駛抵新加坡的。（編者按：三萬五千噸的「威爾斯親王」號是英國最新式戰艦之一，「擊退」號則是三萬二千噸的戰鬥巡洋艦）。那時正是劍拔弩張的時候，所以希望他們的存在可以威嚇日本主戰派，而且我們預定要使她們迅速消失於茫茫的蒼海之中。關於他們如何捲入對暹羅灣方面的日軍運輸艦的局部戰鬥，以致慘遭毀滅的情形，我在國會中已予以解釋。在十二月九日晚上鑒於我們獲悉珍珠港美國艦隊損失慘重的消息，我曾經向參謀總部建議

Wales and *Repulse* should join the undamaged portion of the American fleet in order to sustain the position in the Pacific. The matter was to be further considered next day, but in the morning arrived the news of the loss of both these great ships. We had now no modern or modernized capital ships in the Indian Ocean. The remnants of the American battle fleet from Pearl Harbor were withdrawn a further 2,000 miles or more to the Californian bases. Since then from San Francisco to Aden or Capetown, distances of about 14,000 miles, there has been no surface fleet capable of fighting a general action with the navy of Japan.

A further sinister stroke was to come. On the early morning of December 19 half a dozen Italians in unusual diving suits were captured floundering about in the harbor of Alexandria. Extreme precautions have been taken for some time past against the varieties of human torpedo or one-man submarine entering our harbors. Not only are nets and other obstructions used but underwater charges are exploded at frequent irregular intervals in the fairway. None the less these men had penetrated the harbor. Four hours later explosions occurred in the bottoms of the *Valiant* and *Queen Elizabeth* [the *Valiant* was a 30,600-ton battleship; the *Queen Elizabeth* (not the liner) was a sister ship—ED.], produced by limpet bombs fixed with extraordinary courage and ingenuity, the effect of which was to blow large holes in the bottoms of both ships and to flood several compartments, thus putting them both out of action

「威爾斯親王」號及「擊退」號應即參加未受損害的美國殘餘艦隊藉以維持太平洋上的陣地。此項建議，當時預備到第二天再予考慮，誰知翌晨就傳來這兩艘巨艦已經葬身海底的噩耗了。於是，我們在印度洋上已無新式或現代化的主力艦。而美國殘餘的戰鬥艦隊也從珍珠港澈退到相距二千哩以上的加里福尼亞的根據地去了。自此以後，由舊金山直到亞丁或開普敦距離約一萬四千哩的海上，已沒有能夠和日本海軍作一次大戰的海面艦隊了。

另一惡劣的打擊不意又接踵而來。十二月十九日清晨，有六個義大利人穿着異常的潛水衣，在亞力山大港中奮力掙扎中被捕。在過去相當期間，對於進入我國海港的各種人體魚雷或獨人潛艇，曾採取極端戒備。我們不但用網及其他障礙物，同時又不時在通道爆炸水下炸彈。雖然如此這些人員仍得進入港內。四小時後，「英勇號」及「愛麗莎白皇后號」的船底發生爆炸（編者按：「英勇號」是三萬六百噸的戰艦；「愛麗莎白皇后號」（並非郵船）是一姊妹艦），這是由異常的勇氣和技巧裝上雀貝炸彈發生的，它的效果是在二艘艦隻的船底炸成大洞，使幾個船室浸入海水，這使兩艦數月失去戰鬥力。其中

for many months. One ship will soon be ready again, the other is still in the floating dock at Alexandria, a constant target for enemy air attack.

Thus we had no longer any battle squadron in the Mediterranean. *Barham* had gone, and now *Valiant* and *Queen Elizabeth* were completely out of action. Both these ships floated on an even keel, they looked all right from the air. The enemy was for some time unaware of the success of his attack, and it is only now that I feel it possible to make this disclosure to the House even in the strictness of a Secret Session. The Italian fleet still contains four or five battleships several times repaired of the new *Littorio* or of the modernized class. According to prewar notions and indeed all paper calculations there was no reason why a large German and Italian army should not have been ferried across to invade not merely Libya or Palestine or Syria, but Egypt itself. The sea defense of the Nile Valley had to be confided to our submarine and destroyer flotillas with a few cruisers and of course to shore-based air forces. For this reason it was necessary to transfer a part of our shore-based torpedo-carrying aircraft from the south and east coasts of England, where they were soon to be needed, to the North African shore. This movement was justifiable because of the absence of any preparation for immediate invasion apparent on the enemy's side of the Channel and because of his evident preoccupation with Russia. We may say these arrangements for the defense of Egypt have so far been successful. The

一艘不久即可修竣，另一艘仍在亞力山大港的浮船塢中，成為敵機襲擊的經常目標。

因此我們在地中海已不再有戰鬥艦隊。「巴亨號」已被擊沉，而現在「英勇號」和「愛麗莎白皇后號」也完全失去戰鬥力。這二艘艦是浮在水平的龍骨之上，從空中看來形似完整。所以敵方暫時並未查覺襲擊的成功，而我到現在才覺得可以把它向下院宣佈，不過這也是在祕密會議的嚴密的席上。義大利艦隊仍舊包括幾經修理的新里托里奧或現代級的四五艘戰艦。照戰前的觀念以及一切紙上的估計，大隊德義軍具有充分理由可以橫渡而侵入里比亞、派勒斯坦、敘里亞，或甚至埃及本身。尼羅河流域的海防，必須付託我軍的潛艇及驅逐艦隊（包括少數驅逐艦），以及岸上基地的空軍。因為這原故，我們必須從英國東南海岸調遣一部分該處不久即將需要的在岸上基地的攜帶魚雷之飛機至東非海岸。這移動是具有正當理由的，因為在英倫海峽對面的敵軍現在尚無即行進攻的準備，同時它顯然為俄國分散心力。我們可以說直到今日為止對埃及防禦之這些佈置是成功的。維安海軍上將因他的煙幕受到有

very opportune and brilliant action by Admiral Vian when, favored by a happy slant of wind for his smoke screen, he made the Italian battleship turn tail in broad daylight by a mere attack of light cruisers and destroyers has been rightly applauded. It has, it will now be seen, a significance of a special character. [With his light force, Vian, on March 22, 1942 beat off a big Italian flotilla including a Littorio class battleship and heavy cruisers, thus saving a convoy he was escorting to Malta.—ED.] We were of course left very bare in home waters. However I have no doubt other resources will be at hand before the main German armies can again be transported to the west and the invasion danger again become imminent.

These events and their sequence which I have mentioned to the House in Secret Session have a bearing upon the escape of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* from their uncomfortable station at Brest. I have been impressed by the shock which the passage of these two ships through the Channel gave to the loyal masses of the British nation. Personally, with my special knowledge, I thought it a very annoying incident but not comparable at all to the other happenings I have just described. Our torpedo-carrying aircraft were depleted by the needs of Egypt. As to the Navy, we do not for obvious reasons keep capital ships in the narrow seas. Attention has, however, also been drawn to the fact that there were only six destroyers capable of attacking the German battle cruisers. Where, it is asked, were all the rest of our

利的風勢，僅藉輕巡洋艦及驅逐艦的攻擊，即使義大利戰艦遁逃，他這及時而光輝的行動曾受極正當的讚許。現在我們可以看出，這是有着特殊的重大意義。（編者按：維安上將率其小隊海軍於一九四二年三月二十二日擊退義大利大艦隊，包括里特里奧級戰艦及重驅逐艦，因而使其護送至馬爾太的護航隊免於難）。當然我們在本國海面已幾無艦隻殘留。但是我相信，在德軍主力再能移至西線，英國被侵入的危機再度趨於迫切之前，必定另有兵力可供驅使。

在下院的祕密會議中我所提及的這些事件及其發生程序，與「沙恩霍斯特號」及「納森諾號」從其在普萊斯特不安定的停泊處遁逃是有連帶關係的。這二艘艦隻的通過英倫海峽對於英國效忠的民衆所引起的震驚頗使我感動。根據特殊的情報，我個人認為這是極惱人的事件，可是和我上述的其他事件是不能比較的。我軍魚雷飛機因埃及的需要而全部調開。至於海軍，我們因明顯的理由在狹海中並不駐主力艦。並且我們又注意到，我軍僅有六艘驅逐艦可能攻擊德軍戰鬥巡洋艦。有人問我國其他的艦隊在那

flotillas? The answer is that they were and are out on the approaches from the Atlantic conveying the food and munitions from the U. S. without which we cannot live. However, there is a good plan which, should invasion again become imminent, will very rapidly multiply the flotillas in the narrow waters. The photographic reconnaissance of the enemy harbors, basins and river mouths, made daily when the weather permits, should keep us well advised of any gathering of barges similar to that which took place in the summer and autumn of 1940. Moreover, in 1940 an invading force of perhaps 150,000 picked men might have created mortal havoc in our midst. But now our home army and Home Guard have grown and improved to such an extent that it would not be much use an invader coming with less than 600,000 or 700,000 men and six or seven armored divisions with many thousands of vehicles. The enormous shipping movements and air activities which would be the indispensable prelude to this would certainly be detected. We therefore feel entitled to use the flotillas to the utmost on feeding the island and escorting the outward-bound troop and Russian convoys, and we also felt entitled to send to the African shore a considerable proportion of our coastal torpedo-carrying aircraft after the disappearance of our battle fleet in the Mediterranean. We hold ourselves answerable in the gravest manner to watch and handle judiciously this invasion danger, and I do not think you will ever have to run again the frightful hazards through which we passed in 1940.

裏呢？回答是，它們過去以及現在一直出駛於大西洋入口，從美國護送我們生存所必須的食物及軍火。然而，現有一種極佳計畫，如侵入再度趨於迫切，狹隘之海面上，艦隊將迅速增加。於氣候允許時，每日在敵方海港、小灣及河口所作攝影之偵察，可使我們經常獲得正確情報，是否有與一九四〇年夏季及秋季同樣之艦隻之屬集。況且在一九四〇年約十五萬精銳的侵入軍或許在我國引起致命的毀滅。但是現在我國內軍及國防團已經相當成長與改良，如侵入者僅帶七十萬或八十萬的軍隊，及擁有數千車輛的六七師裝甲部隊是無濟於事的。此舉的不可省免之前奏的大量船隻移動及飛機活動，必定將為我們所偵察出來。因此我們可以盡量利用艦隊為國內搬運食糧，並護送外遣軍隊及俄國護航隊。並且在地中海的英國戰鬥艦隊消失之後，我們又可以把大隊海防魚雷飛機遣至非洲海岸。我們以最嚴肅的態度負責監視並審慎地處理這侵入的危險，並且我覺得你們決不會再度遭遇一九四〇年所經歷的可怕之危險。

I will digress for a moment from my general theme to comment further upon the passage of the *Scrarnhorst* and *Gneisenau* up the Channel and through the Straits of Dover. Most people thought this very astonishing and very alarming. They could have broken south and perhaps got into the Mediterranean. They could have gone out into the Atlantic as commerce raiders. They could have gone north, and tried to reach their own home waters by the Norwegian fiords. But the one way which seemed impossible to the general public was that they could come up the Channel and through the Straits of Dover. I will therefore read an extract from the Admiralty appreciation which was written on the 2nd February, 10 days before the cruisers broke out:

"At first sight this passage up the Channel appears hazardous for the Germans. It is probable, however, that, as their heavy ships are not fully efficient, they would prefer such passage, relying for their security on their destroyers and aircraft, which are efficient, and knowing fully well that we have no heavy ships with which to oppose them in the Channel. We might well, therefore, find the 2 battle cruisers and the 8-inch cruiser with 5 large and 5 small destroyers, also, say, 20 fighters constantly overhead (with reinforcements within call), proceeding up Channel.

"Taking all factors into consideration, it appears that the German ships can pass east up the Channel with much less risk than they will incur if they attempt an ocean passage to Norway, and as it is considered the Germans will evade danger

我要暫時離開一般的論題，來批評「沙霍斯特號」和「納森諾號」的駛上英倫海峽並通過多維海峽的事。多數人都認為這是可怕而可驚的。它們可以突破南方，或許駛入地中海。它們可以駛出大西洋，成為商船襲擊艦。它們也可以向北駛，經挪威的峽江，設法達到其本國海面。而一般大眾所認為不可能的一條路，就是它們能夠駛上英倫海峽，並通過多維海峽。因此我將閱讀海軍部之觀測的一節，這是在二月二日，德艦突破的十天前所寫的：

「初看起來，駛上英倫海峽對於德方是頗為危險的。然而，這是很可能的，因為他們的巡洋艦能率不足，他們寧取這條路線，而將它們的安全付託給能率頗高的驅逐艦與飛機，並且充分知悉，我們並無重軍艦在海峽中與之對抗。因此我們或許將發現二艘戰鬥巡洋艦和八英吋的巡洋艦，帶着五六五小的驅逐艦，並且約有二十架戰鬥機經常在頭上飛行（增援隊即在附近），而向海峽上駛。

「計及一切的因素，德艦東上海峽所遭遇的危險似乎較它們企圖由海面駛至挪威為小，並且一般認為德方在充份準備之前必將避免危險，通過海峽似乎是它

until they are fully worked up, the Channel passage appears to be their most probable direction if and when they leave Brest.”

I have read this document to the House because I am anxious that members should realize that our affairs are not conducted entirely by simpletons and dunderheads as the comic papers try to depict, and in particular that the Admiralty, which I regard as an incomparable machine for British protection in spite of all the misfortunes and accidents that have happened, deserves a very broad measure of confidence and gratitude. Considering their knowledge and foresight and the intense indefatigable care which has brought us thus far safely on this hard voyage, I think they deserve to be regarded with respect. Any feather-head can have confidence in times of victory, but the test is to have faith when things are going wrong for the time being, and when things happen which cannot be explained in public.

I now return to my narrative and general argument. The House will see that in November and December of last year in a few weeks we lost or had put out of action for a long time seven great ships, or more than one third of our battleships and battle cruisers, and that this happened at a time when we were fully extended and had to meet the attack of a new, fresh and tremendous enemy and while our great ally was temporarily entirely crippled at sea. It is upon this background and with this accompaniment that I will make a very few observations about the tragedy and disaster of Singapore.

們假定離開普萊斯特時最可能的方向。」

我將這文件向下院閱讀，因為我急於使議員們知道，我們的國事並不是如漫畫報所描繪，全部由呆子及憨大所主持，其中特別是海軍部，雖然過去曾發生許多不幸及意外事件，我認爲它是保護英國無與倫比的機構，它是值得寄與大量的信任與感激。想到使我們安然達到這艱鉅之航海目下之地步的它的知識、遠見和不屈不撓的審慎，我想它是值得尊視的。在勝利時任何傻瓜都能懷取自信，但是最困難的是，在暫時形勢逆轉，以及在不能將事件向大眾宣佈的時候，懷取自信。

現在我回到我的陳述和一般辯論的本題。下院可以知道，去年十一月到十二月在幾個星期內，我們喪失的或長期失去戰鬥力的巨艦，計達七艘之多，此數已佔我們全部戰艦及驅逐艦的三分之一以上。這事的發生，又正在我們已經展開全部兵力，並須應付兇猛的新敵人的攻擊，同時我們偉大盟國的海上勢力暫時陷入完全麻痺的狀態。讓我在這背景及附帶的情形之下，對新加坡的悲劇，作一番說明。

On December 7, 1941; there were in Singapore and the Malay Peninsula about 60,000 British, Australian and Indian troops, and immediately after the declaration we set in motion to Malaya, as I have described, between 40,000 and 50,000 others,⁶ including a high proportion of technical arms. After a long rear-guard action down the Malay Peninsula, there were according to the War Office figures, about 100,000 men gathered in the island of Singapore by the morning of February 3. On the night of February 8 about 5,000 Japanese made a lodgment on the north-western corner of the island and were gradually reinforced by landings from other points until perhaps 30,000 men had been landed. After five or six days of confused but not very severe fighting the army and fortress surrendered. The Japanese have not stated the number of prisoners they have taken, but it does not seem that there was very much bloodshed. This episode and all that led up to it seems to be out of harmony with anything that we have experienced or performed in the present war. Many explanatory factors are mentioned: the absence of the air force owing to the enemy's domination of our airfields; the dispiriting effects of the long retreat upon the troops engaged in it; the enervating effects of the climate upon all Europeans; the fact that some of the reinforcements had been a long time on board ship; and above all the embarrassment to the defense, caused by it being intermingled with a city containing at that time upward of 1,000,000 human beings of

在一九四一年十二月七日，駐紮新加坡與馬來半島的英軍、澳軍及印度兵，總計約六萬人，宣戰以後，如上所述，我們立刻向馬來調遣四五萬之間的增援兵力，包括一大部分機械化部隊在內。經過長時間的沿馬來半島而下的後衛戰，根據陸軍部的數字，在二月三日晨騰集新加坡島上的兵力，計約十萬人。二月八日夜，約有五千日兵佔領了星洲西北角，並逐漸在其他地點上登陸增援，最後登陸的日軍人數，約達三萬名。經過五六天混亂而不劇烈的戰鬥後，守軍及各要塞竟屈服了，日方沒有說明他們俘獲多少人，但所流的血似乎並不多。這段悲劇的插話及所以致此的一切，和我們在這次戰爭中所經驗或從事的任何事，似乎毫不相合。辯解的理由有許多，例如：由於敵軍控制我方飛機場，致空軍不能助戰；參加作戰的軍隊因長期的退却作戰，兵心渙散不振；氣候使歐洲士兵之衰弱的影響；若干增援部隊因久處船上之故，到達目的地時都疲憊不堪；而最使防禦上發生困難的，就是其間夾雜着一個當時擁有一百多萬人口的城市，並且種

many races and conditions. In all these circumstances I do not at all wonder that requests should be made for an inquiry by a Royal Commission, not only into what took place upon the spot in the agony of Singapore but into all the arrangements which had been made beforehand. I am convinced however this would not be good for our country, and that it would hamper the prosecution of the war. Australian accounts reflect upon the Indian troops. Other credible witnesses disparage the Australians. The lack of any effective counter-attack by the 18th Division, which arrived in such high spirits and good order and never seem to have had their chance, is criticized. The generalship is criticized. There is an endless field for recrimination. Most of those concerned are prisoners. General Wavell, who was in charge of the whole ABDA area [American-British-Dutch-Australian joint operations zone—ED.] from January 15 onward, is far too busy grappling with new perils. We too have enough trouble on our hands to cope with the present and the future, and I could not in any circumstances consent to adding such a burden, for a heavy burden it would be, to those which we have to bear. I must ask the House to support the Government in this decision, which is not taken in any ignoble desire to shield individuals or safeguard the administration but solely in the interests of the state and for the successful prosecution of the war.

The premature fall of Singapore led to failures of the resistance in Java and Sumatra. But this might have happened in

族分歧，情況各異。在所有這一些情況之下我一點不疑慮應該由皇家委員會作一次調查，不但要澈查新加坡悲劇當時發生的各種事情，並且要調查事前的種種措施。不過，我深信此舉無益國家，並且或許將妨礙戰爭的推行。澳軍的報告對印軍加以責難，其他可靠的見證則指斥澳軍。抵達時軍心振作，秩序良好的第十八師，似乎完全沒有一顯身手的機會，它的未作任何有效的反攻，大受批評。統帥也受到批評。有無限的方面可以互相譴責。而牽涉到的人，現已大多成為俘虜了。從一月十五日起，負責指揮美英荷澳聯合戰區（編者按：指 America-British-Dutch-Australian 之 ABDA）的威斐爾將軍，正忙於應付新的危機。我們對於應付眼前與未來已足夠忙碌，因此我無論如何不能同意再在我們所負擔上加上新的負擔。我請求國會在這一決定上支持政府。這決定，並不是妄想偏袒個人或行政機關，而完全是爲了國家的利益，以及爲戰爭之成功的推進。

新加坡過早的陷落，使爪哇和蘇門塔臘的抵抗，也歸於失敗。不過

any case in view of the decisive Japanese superiority in numbers and organization.

General Wavell has been receiving in India all the aircraft we can transport and service, to the temporary detriment of General Auchinleck's operations in Libya. The United States is sending powerful air reinforcements, both to India and China. All this takes time, and the number of airfields at our disposal in Burma and the protection which it was possible to afford to them have not been sufficient to enable the British air force to maintain itself, and successive reinforcements have been wiped out, many of them on the ground as they arrived. General Wavell has also to consider the defense of northeastern India, which may at any time be gravely menaced. He is not therefore at present in a position to denude himself to any large extent, and he must not fritter away his resources. The difficulty is to get established on a sufficiently large scale and to maintain supplies and services in the teeth of Japanese superiority. Without this it is like throwing good money after bad, or throwing snowballs into a furnace to keep down the temperature. Efforts are being made to re-equip the American Volunteer Group working with the Chinese under the American general, General Stilwell, who has in every way shows himself a fine soldier and a good comrade, and who has established the closest relations with General Alexander.

At the present time there is very little air support for our troops or for the Chinese, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has complained to me that he was

於日軍在數量上及組織上所佔決定的優勢，此事無論如何，總要發生的。

威斐爾將軍在印度獲得我們所能運輸及動用的全部飛機，這使里比亞方面歐慶萊克將軍的作戰暫時受到妨礙。美國也已把有力的空軍增援印度與中國。這些都需要時間，而緬境我方所有的飛機場之數，及其所施的防禦，均不足以使英國空軍維護其本身，而陸續增援的飛機也被殲滅，有許多竟於飛抵地面時便遭炸毀。威斐爾將軍又須考慮印度東北邊之防衛，該處隨時有受到重大威脅的可能。所以他一時不能出全力作大規模的攻勢，並且他不得浪費物資。困難的是：如何在優勢日軍的槍口下建立相當大規模陣地，並維持供應及後繼部隊。這如果不能辦到，好比不幸之後又浪費有用的金錢，也好像把雪球丟入爐中以求降低溫度。現已努力重行裝備，在史蒂威將軍統率下與中國合作的美國義勇軍。那位美國將軍在各方面都顯出他是良好的軍人和良好的戰友；他和亞力山大將軍已樹立最密切的關係。

目前，我們的軍隊，都很少空軍的協助。蔣介石將軍曾經向我抱怨，說是他曾獲得空軍協助的約言，可是

promised air support which is not forthcoming when he ordered his divisions to march south into Burma. Mandalay and other towns have been the subjects of very severe air raids with great slaughter, and a huge flight of refugees is moving northward toward China, or westward in the hopes of reaching India over extremely primitive and half-constructed roads. Typhus and cholera have made their appearance behind our harassed front. Treachery and infiltration are rife. A tragic fate impends upon the mass of refugees collected to the north of Mandalay. In the midst of these scenes of indescribable misery and ruin, the Governor-General [the Right Honorable Sir Reginald Hugh Dorman-Smith—ED.], whom we knew so well in this House as Minister of Agriculture a couple of years ago, and his devoted wife have been a fountain of courage and inspiration.

The advance of the enemy has been greatly slowed down by the exertions of General Alexander and his American colleague and by the very brave fighting of the British, Indian and Chinese troops still on the front. Our imperial forces are however reduced to very small proportions. There is no means of bringing reinforcements to them by sea, for the Japanese hold complete command of the Bay of Bengal and only trickles of men and supplies can come cover the mountain roads and tracks from Assam. General Wavell has the duty of distributing his resources to the best advantage, and we are sending him everything we can, having regard to our other responsibilities which

當他派遣大軍南進緬甸時，却並未得到空軍的協助。曼德萊與其他城市，已成為大空襲的目標，死傷慘重，難民成羣向北逃入中國，或向西循尚未完工的原始道路以便逃到印度。在我們時受敵軍蹂躪的前線後方，出現了傷寒與霍亂。叛亂與搶劫更是盛行各地。廣集於曼德萊之北的難民之羣即將遭遇悲慘的命運。在這不可言喻的悲慘及酷劫的場所，二年前在這下院擔任農相為我們熟知的現任總督（編者按：指杜曼施密斯勳爵）及其忠實的夫人實引起無限的勇氣和鼓舞。

由於亞力山大將軍及其美國戰友的努力，以及仍在 frontline 奮勇作戰的中、英、印軍的抵抗，敵人的前進已大為減緩。然而帝國的兵力已減到極小之數。我們沒有方法從海上增援，因為日軍完全控制孟加拉灣，只有極少的人員和給養，能從阿薩密循山徑小道抵達緬甸前線。威斐爾將軍負責分配其人力物力，獲得最大的效用，我們則盡力將兵力和物資運往，同時

are neither few nor easy.

I cannot encourage the House to expect good news from the Burma theater. The best that can be hoped for is that the retreat will be as slow as possible and give time for other factors to make their weight tell.

At this point we may consider what Japanese strategy is likely to be. So far as we know the Japanese have 72 field divisions with some additional brigades and a mass of trained soldiers which is certainly not less than 2,000,000 additional behind them. Of these 72 divisions 27 are in the so-called ABDA area including Burma, 15 are in China, 20 are opposite Russia in Manchuria and only 10 are left in Japan. The Japanese army in the ABDA area threatens simultaneously Australia, India and, through Burma, China. They have conquered the whole of Malaya, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. They have destroyed or captured the following divisions of the Allies or their equivalent: British and Indian, 6; Dutch, 3; United States, 2; Filipinos, 3 or 4. Total 14 or 15. They may have lost 100,000 killed and wounded but none of their divisional formations has been destroyed and I make no doubt they can easily replace all casualties.

They cost about a quarter to feed and carry of what British and still more American troops require. They certainly show no inferiority when they get to the spot. The Japanese army, navy and air force, working in close harmonious combination, being absolutely fresh after their many years of preparation and inculcation of war as the highest art and duty, having brought

又得兼顧其他許多並不容易的責任。

我不能鼓勵下院對緬甸戰區盼望獲得好消息。所可希冀的，至多是盡可能延緩退却，使其他因素在時間上有發生作用的餘裕罷了。

在這裏，我們可以考慮日軍戰略將大致如何。據我們所悉，日本擁有七十二個野戰師團，外加若干獨立旅團，以及大量曾受訓練的士兵其人數一定不下二百萬。在這七十二個師團中，廿七個師團配置於包括緬甸在內的所謂美英荷澳戰區，十五個師團在中國，二十個師團在滿洲防範蘇聯，只有十個師團留在日本。美英荷澳戰區的日軍，同時威脅澳洲，印度，以及由緬甸威脅中國西南。他們已攻下整個馬來、菲島與荷屬東印度。他們已擊潰或俘獲下列聯合國之軍隊：英印軍六師；荷軍三師；美軍二師；菲軍三或四師。總計十四，五師。日軍或已傷亡達十萬人，但其師團之組織，並未破壞，我毫不懷疑，他們能夠很容易補充此項死傷。

他們僅需英軍及更多的美軍所需的食糧及運輸之費用的四分之一。當他們抵達當地時，他們當然毫無遜色。日本陸海空軍作着極密切的合作，經過數年戰爭作為最高藝術及義務的準備和教導，他們是初上戰場，

their plans up to date by fullest information and closest study of the German victories in Europe, and having added their own jungle-craft thereto, have established themselves in little more than four months in the whole of these wide regions, which they call their Asiatic Co-Prosperity sphere, from Luzon to Rangoon, and from the northern approaches of Australia to the southern approaches of China. In this vast area they have forces largely superior to any that we can bring to bear for a long time. They are no doubt sprawled and spread widely, but they are consolidating their positions to the full extent of their saved-up resources.

Which way will they go? Where will they strike next? Australia naturally fears immediate invasion, and the United States, which has accepted responsibility for everything east of a line drawn west of Australia, has sent and is sending continuous strong reinforcements. We have transported back to Australia a large part of the Australian Imperial Forces from the Middle East. We do not see here that the Japanese would get great advantage by invading Australia in force. By so doing they would commit themselves to a very formidable campaign at a great distance from home with American sea power, as it regains its strength, operative on their communications. No doubt the Japanese will do their utmost to threaten and alarm Australia and to establish lodgments and bases on the northern part of Australia in order to procure the the greatest locking-up of Allied forces in that continent. We have done and will continue to do everything in our power to

並且藉德軍在歐洲之勝利的充分之知識及密切的研究，刷新他們的計畫，再加上他們自己的叢林戰術，他們已在四個月多一點的時間在這他們叫做東亞共榮圈的廣袤地區確立其地盤，那是從呂宋到仰光，從澳洲的北境到中國的南境。在這廣大的區域，他們的兵力遠較我們長期間能與之對抗的兵力為大。他們當然是四散展開，但是他們是在充分利用其蓄藏的資源鞏固其障地。

他們今後將取什麼方向呢？他們今後將向何處進攻？澳洲自然懼其立即侵入。美國負責將有力的援軍，不斷送往起自澳洲西面的防線。我們曾將大部分澳軍從中東調回澳洲。我們看不出日本派遣大軍侵入澳洲能得到多大利益。他們這樣地將使自己在遠離日本之處，從事威勢凌人的戰役，而有行將恢復力量的美國海上勢力破壞其運輸線。無疑的日本將竭力恐嚇澳洲，而在澳洲北部覓取立足點及根據地，以期封鎖聯合國大軍於澳洲大陸上。我們已經並且仍要

sustain our kith and kin. I have also procured from President, Roosevelt a substantial reinforcement of United States troops for New Zealand, whose attitude and morale have been admirable. But neither Great Britain nor the United States must be drawn into immobilizing in Australasia undue numbers of the limited forces which they can transport across the sea within any given period.

Alternatively the Japanese may invade India. There is no doubt of their ability, if they chose to concentrate their efforts, to invade and overrun a large part of India, to take Calcutta and Madras, and certainly to make very cruel air raids upon defenseless Indian cities.

The Japanese have not told us what they intend to do, so I can only make a guess, which I do under all reserves, knowing well the fallibility of human foresight in the fog of war. It would seem, however, looking at it from their point of view, that their best plan would be to push right ahead northward from Burma into China and try to finish up Chinese resistance and the great Chinese leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. We have not noticed any Japanese movement lately which is inconsistent with this idea, but there are several which support it. Certainly by driving China out of the war and possibly installing another puppet government in China, which would be their ally, Japan would seem to be greatly furthering her own interests. China is the only place where Japan can obtain a major decision in her favor in 1942. Moreover, let me point out, this process, if suc-

盡力援助我們的屬地領土。我已從羅斯福總統獲得強力的美軍增援新西蘭，他們的態度與士氣是極可贊譽的。但英美兩國，均不可將任何指定期間內將所能渡海的數量有限之軍隊使它過多地在澳亞洲陷於無法運動的狀態。

此外，日軍也可能侵入印度。他們的能力是無可懷疑的，如果他們集中全力，他們可以侵入，並蹂躪印度大部分，攻下加爾各答和麻打拉斯，而且一定會對印度不設防的城市作殘酷的空襲。

日本沒有告訴我們，他們的目的所在，所以我只能臆測，但是我對所說的必須作一切的保留，因為在戰爭的迷霧中，人類的預測極難準確。不過根據他們的觀點，他們最好的計劃是一直向北，由緬甸攻入中國，以期解決中國的抵抗及其偉大的領袖蔣介石元帥。日軍最近的行動未見有與此說有何矛盾，而且更有幾點正在加強此說。當然，迫使中國退出戰爭，並可能在中國樹立另一傀儡政府，這對日本將是非常有利的。中國是日本在一九四二年內，能對其有利決定的唯一地方。還有，讓我指出，此事如

cessful, would be to Japan one of contraction and not of further perhaps excessive expansion. It would be entirely in harmony with a Japanese attack on Russia for which many preparations have been made. It would certainly release a good many Japanese divisions for further enterprises in a subsequent year. Of course this appreciation may be wrong, but it is what seems most in the interests of the enemy and therefore most to be feared.

Before I leave the Far Eastern theater with its dark panorama of ruin, actual and prospective, I will deal with the naval situation and the air situation as it affects naval operations in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal.

The surprise of Pearl Harbor threw the American Pacific Fleet, on which so much depended, out of action for the time being; and though the losses have been largely *made good*,⁸ the American fleet has remained separated from the enemy by the vast distances of the Pacific, and has been mainly concerned with maintaining communications with Australia, along which considerable forces are passing. The Japanese navy lies in the center of the scene, and like the Japanese army it can strike in either direction. Our Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean cannot tell with any certainty what size or strength of Japanese vessels will emerge from the Malay Archipelago, through the Straits of Malacca or the Straits of Sunda. We cannot tell how far the Japanese preoccupations about the American Navy will force them to retain the bulk of their naval power in their home

果成功，對於日本將是一種收縮，而非再事擴張。這和日軍的積極準備進攻蘇聯也是完全相配的。這可以使日軍在來年抽調許多師團從事其他企圖。當然，這種臆測或許是錯誤的，不過此對敵人似乎最為有利，所以也最為可慮。

在我結束籠罩着實際的及預測的毀滅之黑影的遠東戰場之前，我要把影響印度洋及孟加拉灣之海上及空中的形勢加以一述。

珍珠港奇襲使我們所倚重的美國太平洋艦隊暫時不能舉動；雖然損失已大體得了補償，但美國艦隊仍和敵軍隔着廣大的太平洋，而以維持運輸大量軍械兵力的美澳給養線為其主要工作。日本海軍正處於舞台中央，與其陸軍一樣，它可向任何方向進攻。印度洋上我們的東方艦隊，不能確定地說：由麻六甲海峽或巽達海峽出現於馬來羣島的日本艦船，究竟有多大的數目或力量。我們不知道，日本為警戒美國海軍，將留多少艦隊的主力於其本國近海或東太平洋。我們不知

waters or in the eastern Pacific. We do not know whether the Japanese wish to fight a battle with any American naval forces which may be operating in the islands between the American continent and Australia. Obviously, if the main part of the Japanese navy comes west into the Indian Ocean, we, with our other tasks on hand, would not be able to fight a fleet action.

On the other hand, when and in proportion as they get tied to the American sphere by the reviving strength of the American Navy, our control of the Indian Ocean will improve, provided of course we are not brought to action and defeated in the meantime. The fact, however, that the Japanese have at present a move either way and can undoubtedly move our way in largely superior strength, confronts the Admiralty and the commander in chief of our Eastern Fleet with most vexatious and difficult problems, not capable perhaps for some months of a satisfactory solution.

After virtual annihilation of British, Dutch and United States light forces in Javanese waters and the loss of Singapore, Java and Sumatra, we naturally considered Ceylon as a key point we have to hold. This cannot be done without adequate shore-based aircraft and ample anti-aircraft artillery. Our resources were limited and there are, as I have said, many claimant calls upon them. However, casting aside a great many other needs, we did manage to give a considerable measure of protection to Colombo and Trincomalee, and also to place in Ceylon military forces sufficient to require a substantial invading army to overcome them.

道，日本是否願意在美澳間的島嶼羣中，和美國任何艦隊作戰。顯然的，如果日本海軍的主力西駛入印度洋，我們既須作另外的工作，自然不能從事艦隊戰。

另一方面，當他們隨美國海軍逐漸恢復力量而相對地被牽制於太平洋時，我們對於印度洋的控制亦將改進；這自然是假定我們在這期間不會被迫交戰而被擊敗。不過，事實上日軍目前可向任何一方推進，而且無疑的，能用優勢的兵力進犯我方，使海軍部及東方艦隊司令遭遇最麻煩最困難的問題，這或許不是幾個月就能得到滿意的解決。

自從英荷美輕裝艦隊在爪哇海面慘遭覆沒，新加坡、爪哇、蘇門答臘相繼陷落以後，我們天然認錫蘭是我們必須防衛的要點。若無適當的海岸飛行隊及龐大的防空炮隊，這是無法辦到的。我已經說過，我們的資源是有限的，而且還有許多迫切的需要。不過，我們終於不顧其他種種急需，在哥倫坡及特林科瑪里完成相當規模的防禦工程，並於錫蘭境內配備須有大批侵入軍始能壓倒的大軍。

All through March we were most anxious about Ceylon because of our weak condition there. But by the end of March we began to feel a little more comfortable; and this feeling persists so far.

In the last days of March, Admiral Somerville, who commands our Eastern Fleet, and who, as I said, is fresh from two years' almost continuous fighting in the Mediterranean and has conducted at least 20 extremely tricky and hazardous operations there—who is perhaps more familiar than any other man except Admiral Cunningham with the conditions of modern air attack on ships of war, who has run many convoys into Malta, raided Genoa, and taken part in all kinds of actions—formed the impression from what scraps of information he could pick up, that a Japanese incursion into the Bay of Bengal was probable. It was also thought that there might well be a certain number of aircraft carriers supported by three Kongo battle cruisers. These are old battle cruisers modernized like every other large ship in the Japanese navy (we of course only modernized a few of ours) and they carry 14-inch guns.

I am not of course going to tell what our naval strength was, is or will be in these waters, but I will go as far as to say that we should have been happy to fight an action with a force of this kind. Accordingly, Admiral Somerville took station southeast of Ceylon where he would be most likely to encounter the enemy, and our Catalina aircraft, which were on the spot, made far-ranging reconnaissances.

There was no sign of the enemy and

整個三月份中我們最焦慮的是錫蘭島，因為我們在那邊的防禦頗為脆弱。但到三月末，我們開始稍感安心；而這種感覺一直維持到現在。

三月下旬指揮東方艦隊的索末維爾上將——他剛剛結束在地中海上所作戰兩年多的戰鬥，他至少曾指揮二十次極詭奇危險的戰役；除出克寧漢上將以外，也許沒有第二個人比他更熟悉現代空軍對海上戰艦攻擊的情況，他曾經數次護送船隊到馬爾太去，並曾襲擊熱那亞，參加各式各樣的軍事行動；這位將軍，從他所得各種片段的情報，預料日軍可能進犯孟加拉灣，並料到或許是由三艘加古級巡洋戰艦掩護的若干航空母艦。加古級是曾經加以現代改裝的老式戰鬥巡洋艦，正和日本海軍其他每只巨艦一樣我們當然只有幾艘艦艇曾經現代的改裝。這和加古級巡洋戰艦備有十四吋的大炮。

我自然不預備陳述，我國海軍在這些海面，過去現在或將來的力量如何，不過，我要聲明我們將欣然與這樣一支艦隊交戰。因此，索末維爾上將佈陣於錫蘭東南，在那邊他實有與敵軍遭遇的最大可能，而該方面的我軍加太林拿飛機，則作長距離的偵察飛行。

可是却不見敵蹤，而艦隊則須

it became necessary for the fleet to go back to refuel. The admiral came to the conclusion that the intelligence which had led him to expect the Japanese naval advance into the Indian Ocean was faulty. The whole work of the Navy has to be carried on. One of his two 8-inch gun cruisers, the *Cornwall*, was needed for an Australian troop convoy, and the other had to undergo certain necessary repairs. He sent both to Colombo. The *Hermes*, one of our oldest aircraft carriers, also had a mission to perform, and had to pick up various essentials at Trincomalee. No sooner had the admiral dispersed his concentration than what he had formerly expected came to pass. A report was received of a large Japanese fleet steering northwestward toward Ceylon. The reconnaissance Catalina aircraft was shot down before it could describe exactly the composition of the enemy fleet. Immediately Admiral Somerville, who had by now completed refueling, issued orders to concentrate his ships. He expected to meet the three Kongos and perhaps two aircraft carriers together with ancillaries and though he saw that he could not intercept them before they attacked Colombo, he hoped to bring them to action should they tarry or should any of them be crippled by the counter-attack of our shorebased bombers. He therefore fixed a rendezvous for his forces, told the *Dorsetshire* and *Cornwall* to get out of Colombo harbor and join him at this sea point, and he told *Hermes* at Trincomalee to go to sea and keep out of the way. The Admiralty did not interfere at all in these dispositions. When they put

駛回加煤了。索末維爾上將於是斷定：使他等待日本海軍進入印度洋的諜報，也許是不確實的。海軍所負的全部任務必須進行。在他指揮下的兩艘八吋砲巡洋艦之一的「康華爾」號須去護送澳軍運輸船隊，另一艘須經某項必需的修理。他把這二艘都派到哥倫坡去。我們最老的一艘航空母艦「黑梅斯」號，也須執行一項任務，並須在特林科瑪里裝載各項應用物品。可是當索末維爾上將一經鬆弛其集中的力量，他先前預期的事竟發生了。據報一支龐大的日本艦隊正自西北向錫蘭挺進。加太林拿偵察機在它能夠詳細報告敵艦隊陣形之前，不幸已被擊墜。索末爾上將此時剛將各艦燃料裝足，立即下令集中其艦隊。他預期遭遇加古級三日艦，同時或許還有兩艘航空母艦及補助艦，他知道在它們進攻哥倫坡以前無法加以攔截，但他希望在我方陸上根據地出動的轟炸機，對之反攻後，它們在海上流連或受到損傷時，和它們交戰。所以他定好一個集合地點，命令「道塞特夏」號及「康華爾」號駛出哥倫坡港，而在預定地點和他會合，並令正在特林科里的「黑梅斯」號駛往外海，遠離敵軍航線。海軍部對於此種

one of their best admirals in charge of a fleet and a theater, they do not stand over him with a stick joggling his elbow. It is only very rarely when they possess exceptional knowledge that they override the judgment of the man on the spot. If the Admiralty does too much of that they simply destroy the whole initiative and responsibility of the Admirals at sea. Such a bad habit, only acquired through wireless telegraphy, would be entirely contrary to the traditions of the Royal Navy. But of course if the House thinks fit, it may blame me for whatever went wrong.

At daylight on April 5 the Japanese air force attacked Colombo. All was in readiness for them. The harbor was largely cleared of ships; the *Cornwall* and *Dorsetshire* were, as Admiral Somerville thought, safe at sea; the anti-air-raid precautions worked well; our fighters were in the air; and the enemy was beaten off with the loss of probably two-thirds of the aircraft they used in the attack. The counter-attack by our Blenheims upon the enemy's aircraft carriers returned without finding them, but later in the day a Japanese reconnaissance plane sighted the *Cornwall* and *Dorsetshire* on their way to join Admiral Somerville's fleet. Both these ships were sunk in about a quarter of an hour by attacks of from 40 to 60 fighter aircraft carrying one single large bomb each. Three quarters of the ships' crews were however saved.

Here is another example of the formidable quality of the Japanese seaborne air force. Our cruisers have on many occasions in the Mediterranean been exposed to pro-

措置毫不干涉，他們派出一個最好的海軍將領，負責一個艦隊及一個戰區後，就決定不加以掣肘。惟有極稀少的場合，當海軍部獲得特殊的情報時才拋棄在派出地點之將領的判斷。如果海軍部作此太多則惟有毀滅在海上大將所作之機動力及責任。此一壞習慣，乃從無線電報獲來，完全與海軍之傳統相違反。但當然如果議院認為適當，它可為任何錯誤的事情批評我。

四月五日黎明，日本機羣來襲哥倫坡。一切均準備完竣，港中船舶大部駛出；索末維爾上將以為「康華爾」號及「道塞特夏」號這時已安處海上；防空工作進行順利；我軍戰鬥機已飛升空中；敵機損失了來襲機數的約三分之二，終被擊退，出發前往襲擊敵軍航空母艦的我方勃倫赫姆機羣，結果因未找到敵蹤，而空手回來。可是，當天下午，日本偵察機却發現「康華爾」號與「道基特」號前往加入索末維爾上將的艦隊。經過一刻鐘的猛攻，這兩艘巨艦就葬送在各攜帶一顆巨彈的四十至六十架日本戰鬥機手中。但艦上的人員，約有四分之三被救起。

這是日本海軍飛機隊可怕之性質的另一例。我軍巡洋艦在地中海曾數度遭受德義機之長時間攻擊，雖然常

longed attacks by German and Italian aircraft, and though often damaged have rarely been sunk, and in two cases only have they been sunk without all their anti-aircraft ammunition having been used up. The fact that the Japanese, in spite of their heavy losses in the morning, could provide so large a force to attack the cruisers made it clear that they were employing a greater number of aircraft carriers than had been expected. In fact there were found to be no fewer than five. In these circumstances it would have been wrong to force a fleet action, and Admiral Somerville, with the full approval of the Admiralty, withdrew into the wastes of the Indian Ocean.

The way was now open for any Japanese sea-borne invasion of Ceylon. However this did not take place. Instead the Japanese raided Trincomalee, where they were again severely rebuffed. They caught the *Hermes*, which had been ordered to clear out of the harbor, and inflicted very heavy losses, nearly 100,000 tons, upon our shipping in the Bay of Bengal.

It seems now that the enemy has retired to replenish his aircraft carriers after their heavy losses, and that his incursion into the Bay of Bengal was a foray and demonstration with an intention to bring off a Pearl Harbor surprise at Colombo.

I am not able to tell the House what we are doing in this lull. I can speak of the past, but not even in Secret Session of the present and future, but it ought not to be assumed that we are doing nothing. On the contrary, we have every hope that

受損傷，但從未被擊沉，只有二次其高射砲彈並未用竭前被擊沉。日機雖在清晨曾蒙受重大損失，下午仍能以大隊空軍攻擊我方巡洋艦，足見他們所用的航空母艦，隻數遠較預料為多。在這種情況下，是不該展開艦隊作戰的。於是索末維爾上將在海軍部的充分容許下，退到印度洋浩瀚的海中。

現在錫蘭已門戶洞開，日軍儘可由海上侵入。不過這事並未發生。他們反去空襲特林瑪里，結果又被猛力擊退。他們截擊奉命駛離港口的「黑梅斯」號，猛炸孟加拉灣中我方船舶，使之蒙受約數達十萬噸的重大損失。

此時敵軍似須補充曾受重大損失的航空母艦，而他們的侵入孟加拉灣是一種聲東擊西的戰略，目的是希冀在哥倫坡重演一次珍珠港奇襲。

我不能把我們在這休止中所幹的工作報告國會。我只能敘述過去，但即使在秘密會議中，我也不能敘述目前與未來，不過，請勿以為我們是無所事事。相反的，我們對於在印度洋方面，不久將較過去更形懷着無限的

we shall presently be stronger in the Indian Ocean than hitherto.

The unpleasant fact remains that for the present the enemy has effective command of the Bay of Bengal. Ceylon is the objective which would be most valuable to him, and it is there that we are most prepared.

I now leave the lesser war—for such I must regard this fearful struggle against the Japanese—and come to the major war against Germany and Italy.

I will begin with the gravest matter, namely, the enormous losses and destruction of shipping by German U-boats off the east coast of the United States. In a period of less than 60 days, more tonnage was sunk in this one stretch than we had lost all over the world during the last five months of the Battle of the Atlantic before America entered the war. Most of all has this loss been heavy in tankers; indeed the loss has been so severe that we have for some time past been withdrawing our own ships from the route. Our oil reserves are happily large, though the utmost economy must be practiced. We have done our best to aid the Americans in establishing a convoy system, and this will soon be brought into being. At their request, to assist the Americans we have sent over a number of our officers most experienced in anti-U-boat warfare, and upward of 30 corvettes and anti-submarine craft from our own hard-pressed store. The figures for the last two months on the American coast, plus those in the Indian and Pacific Oceans from the Japanese attacks, constitute totals of month-

希望。

敵軍目前暫時有效地控制孟加拉的不愉快之事實依然存在。錫蘭對於他們，是個最有價值的目標，而對於該地，我們也最加緊防備。

現在我要放下次要的戰爭——我必須認為對日本之可怖的戰爭是如此——再談到對德義的主要戰爭。

我將以最嚴重的問題開始，那就是在美國東海岸的海面船隻受德國潛艇的大量損失及損壞。在不到六十日的期間，這一帶所損失的噸數，遠較美國參戰之前大西洋之戰的最後五個月中我們在全世界所損失的為多。其中損失最慘重的要推油槽船；事實上這損失實在過大，我們在過去相當時期把本國船隻從這航線撤回。幸而我們的石油蓄藏量尚多，雖然我們必須實施極端的經濟。我們已竭力幫助美國建立護航制，這將不久完成。循美國的要求，為協助美國人計，我們已派遣大批對反潛艇戰有充分經驗的軍官，而三十艘以上的海防艦及反潛艇艦也已從我們枯竭的船源中抽出。過去二個月中在美國海岸的損失數字，加上受日軍攻擊在印度洋及太平洋的

ly losses which are most alarming and formidable and comparable to the worst I have witnessed either in the last war or in this. On the other side, it must be remembered that the United States brought into the pool of Allied shipping upward of 9,000,000 gross tons, so that the tonnage at the disposal of the Allies today is substantially greater than at this time last year, though at the same time the calls on our fleets are also increased. Moreover, I feel confident that the counter-measures which are being taken will be successful as they have been in the Battle of the Atlantic, and that the sinkings will presently be reduced to manageable proportions. I must however repeat that tonnage sinkings and the multiplication of U-boats constitute my greatest anxiety. It is only by the expansion of tonnage over losses, which will occur when the shipbuilding power of the United States makes itself felt, that easement will be given on the oceans which separate the United States from the rest of the world, and the strength of the great republic be enabled to come increasingly into action.

It is only by shipping that the United States or indeed ourselves can intervene, either in the Eastern or the Western theater.

People speak airily of moving armies hither and thither. They do not know how harsh is the tonnage stringency, especially for ships of a suitable speed to carry troops, and how rigorous are the limitations which time and numbers impose upon our actions. Nevertheless since the new war started we have actually moved from this country or

損失數字，全部形成的損失，是極可怕而驚人，可與上次戰爭及這次戰爭我所看到最惡劣的情形媲美。在他方面，我們不可忘記，美國將盟國船隻總噸數提高到九百萬噸以上，因此今日盟國可驅使的噸數比去年今日大形增加，雖然同時我國艦隊的需求也已增加。並且我相信，現在所取的對抗方策將如大西洋之戰中同樣成功，而船隻之擊沉不久將減低到無足輕重之數量。然而，我必須反復申言，船隻之擊沉及德國潛艇之增加，實為我最大憂慮。只有在美國的造船力擴張之後，使抵消損失的船隻噸數予以增加，方能將美國與世界各地隔開的海洋獲得安泰，而偉大合衆國之力量方能大量付諸戰鬥。

惟有藉船隻，美國及我們自身才可以參加東方或西方戰場。

人們隨便地談着把軍隊移東移西。他們不知道噸數的限制是多麼苛刻，尤其是具有適當速度的運兵船隻，而對於我們的戰鬥所加的時間與數量的限制又是多麼嚴厲。雖然如此，自從新的戰爭開始以來，我們確

from the Middle East across the sea against Japan more than 300,000 men, and we have over 100,000 on salt water at the present time. All these great convoys have hitherto been carried through the perils of mines and U-boat attacks without any appreciable loss of any kind since the beginning of the war. I regard this as a prodigy of skill and organization on the part of all those responsible for it.

I now come to the Middle East.

Our strongest and best-equipped army overseas stands in close contact with the enemy in Cyrenaica. Twice have we hunted the enemy out of the Bengasi triangle and twice have we been chased back ourselves. The very severe battle which General Auchinleck fought last year just missed being a decisive victory. By what narrow margins, chances and accidents was the balance tipped against us no one can compute.

When I last spoke on this subject I said: "If not a victory it was a highly profitable transaction." That is true.

But the fact that we do not possess Bengasi has a serious bearing upon the defense of Malta, because we cannot give continuous daylight air protection to our convoys to Malta from Egypt. For now nearly two years Malta has stood against the enemy. What a thorn it has been in their side! What a toll it has taken of their convoys! Can we wonder that a most strenuous effort has been made by Germany and Italy to rid themselves of this fierce aggressive foe! For the last six weeks over 450 German first-line strength in aircraft and perhaps 200 Italian have been venting

已自本國或自中東自海上移動三十萬以上的軍隊以對抗日本，並且現在我們在海上的尚有十萬以上。自從戰爭開始以來，這些龐大的護航隊在水雷及潛艇襲擊的危險中運輸，並未遭遇任何重大的損失。我認爲這是負責担任此項工作之人員的技巧與組織的天才。

我現在要談到中東方面。

我們在海外最堅強與裝備最佳的軍隊在西里納加和敵軍對峙着。我們曾二度將敵軍從本加西三角地帶驅出，而二次我們被敵軍驅回。歐慶萊將軍去年所作的劇戰，差一點獲得決定的勝利。沒有人能夠預計，命運及意外形勢對我轉向不利的幅度是多麼狹小。

我上次談到這問題時我說：「即使這不是勝利，也至少是極獲利的交易。」那是一點不錯的。

然而，我們因並未佔有本加西，對於馬爾太的防禦有着嚴重的影響，因為我們因而不能對從埃及來到馬爾太的護航隊予以不斷的日間之空中保護。到現在馬爾太已有二年抵抗敵軍的攻擊。這對於敵方是多大的眼中釘呀！這使他們的護航隊受到多大的犧牲！所以德義爲除去這可怕的侵略之敵人不惜用最大的努力是不足爲怪的！在過去六個星期中，有四百五十架德軍第一線飛機及約二百架義機對

their fury on Malta. An unending intermittent bombardment has fallen upon the harbor and city and sometimes as many as 300 aircraft have attacked in a single day. The terrific ordeal has been borne with exemplary fortitude by the garrison and people. Very heavy losses have been inflicted upon the enemy's air strength. Malta is the first instance of an air force being maintained at odds often of ten to one from so few airfields all under constant bombardment. We replenish Malta with aircraft by all means in our power. The President has helped us with one of his best aircraft carriers, which has just completed a successful operation. [USS *Wasp* carried airplane reinforcements to Malta in March 1942.—ED.] We are stronger now than we have been, but the struggle is very hard and the question of supply and replenishment dangerous, difficult and costly. The supply of food and ammunition is our constant care and our increasing anxiety.

If you add the air forces facing us in the Mediterranean to those which face us across the Channel and the North Sea, or are detained in Germany to meet our bomber offensive, we account for two-thirds of the German fighter strength and more than one-third of their bomber strength. We are also detaining in the Mediterranean area more than 1,000 Italian first-line aircraft. Evidently this is a solid help to Russia. Both across the Channel and in the Malta fighting we have this year inflicted considerably heavier losses of aircraft than we have ourselves sustained. It is our interest to engage the enemy's air power at as many

馬爾太大肆攻擊。斷續的轟炸不斷地施於海港及城市，有時一日中攻擊機達三百架之多。防軍及人民對這可怖的浩劫所示的剛毅是足資示範的。敵方空軍已蒙受極大損失。馬爾太是由少數空軍（有時成十對一之比）及少數機場（這又全處於轟炸之下）護衛的第一個實例。我們盡力之所能補充馬爾太的空軍。美國總統已助我一艘最佳的航空母艦，它剛完成勝利的戰役。（編者按：美艦「黃蜂號」於一九四二年三月將增援飛機運至馬爾太）。我們現在較過去堅強，但戰鬥仍頗困苦，供應及補充問題仍頗危險、困難而昂貴。食糧及軍火之供應是我們經常的注意及不斷的憂慮。

假使把地中海上對抗我們的空軍加上海峽及北海上空對抗我們的空軍，或留在德國以防禦我機之轟炸的空軍，這共計德軍戰鬥機數的三分之二及轟炸機數的三分之一以上。同時我們在地中海區域所截留第一線義機達一千架以上。這顯然是對蘇聯極大的幫助。在海峽上空及在馬爾太之戰中，我們今年所加於敵方的損失遠較我們自身所受者為大。我們所關心的是，在儘多的地點和敵機交戰，以便

points as possible to make him bleed and burn and waste on the widest fronts and at the utmost intensity, and it pays us to lose machine for machine. We have done much better than that. Therefore every day that the air battle for Malta continues, *grievous as it is* to the island, its defenders and its gallant inhabitants, it plays its part in our general war effort and in helping our Russian allies. It may be that presently the German air force attacking Malta will have to move eastward to sustain the impending offensive against southern Russia. If so we shall have topped the ridge. Meanwhile the struggle at Malta is very hard. It is too early to say how it will end. But all the time we watch with admiration and with gratitude this protracted, undaunted, heroic conflict.

No one will accuse me of glozing over with a smooth and thin veneer the ugly realities of our situation. On the contrary, I thought the House would wish to have its darkest features underlined. But I would not have dared to do this if my confidence in our power to come through safe and victorious was in any way diminished, and I will now proceed to that part of my argument which will give reasons for this. If we are anxious about the sea, our enemies must be more anxious about the air. The gigantic American shipbuilding program, with our own comparatively modest contribution of 1,200,000 tons a year, will in 1943 give a very large favorable balance over sinkings, calculated even at a rate of half a million tons a month. We shall be very tight this year, but we ought to be a good

使其空軍在極廣泛的戰線以最猛烈的程度消耗其軍力，並且一機對一機對我們也是值得的。而我們的成績遠勝於此。因此，在馬爾太的空戰繼續的期間，對於該島及防軍與英勇之居民雖是一種痛苦，但對於我們全部的戰爭及幫助盟邦蘇聯上却佔着重要的地位。也許不久進攻馬爾太的德空軍將移向東方以支持即將發動的對蘇聯南部的攻勢。假使如此，我們將越過一重關口。目下馬爾太之戰頗為激烈。預測它的結束為時尚早。但我們始終懷着欽佩和感激觀看這長期不屈不撓英勇的抗戰。

誰也不會因為我把局勢醜陋的現象加以少許虛飾而說明對我指責。反之，我想下院一定希望我把最黑暗的一面加以強調。如果我對於我們安然獲勝的力量之信賴有些許消損，我決不敢這麼做，而現在我將轉向我的辯論之另一部，這將對此提出充分理由。假使我們憂慮海上，敵軍將更形憂慮空中。美國龐大的造船計劃，加上我們每年造一百二十萬噸的比較微力的貢獻，到一九四三年將使我們對擊沉處於極有利的地位，即使擊沉之噸數每月達五十萬噸。我們本年非常

deal better off next year. On the other hand the Axis air power, upon which the enemy has so largely relied and by which so many of his triumphs have been gained, is certainly falling behind in the race. The recent estimates of American aircraft production, which seemed so extravagant, have so far been not only made good but exceeded. It is calculated that by July 1942 the American, British and Russian production of aircraft will be nearly three times that of Germany, Italy and Japan. Now of course it takes some months for an impulsion of this character to be felt upon the fighting fronts. Transportation rears her ugly head. But it is only a matter of six or nine months before a marked preponderance of air power should manifest itself upon our side. At present there are more pilots than aircraft, but we have in no way slackened off our training of pilots. On the contrary we are stimulating it because quite soon, in fact during this autumn, we hope, the flood of aircraft will overtake and bear forward on its crest the very great numbers of pilots who are being trained.

In particular, the air position of Japan deserves scrutiny. According to our information, the Japanese losses and wastage greatly exceed and perhaps are nearly double their output, and the Japanese are separated by vast distances from and assistance by their confederates. One cannot tell where the various fronts of the Japanese war will be stabilized. But that we and the United States will presently be very much stronger in the air on all those fronts *may be soberly but confidently expected.*¹⁰ As

困苦，但到明年將處境較佳。他方面，敵方極端依賴而多數勝利藉之而獲得的空軍，在競賽上確已大形落後。似乎非常誇張的美國飛機產量的最近之估計，到現在為止不但證明為事實並且遠超過之。預料至一九四二年七月，美、英、蘇的飛機產量將三倍於德義日。當然，使這種性質的衝擊在戰線發生效力需要數月。運輸呈現捉襟見肘之象。但是空軍在我方表示明顯的優勢，不過是六或九個月的事。現在我們所有的駕駛員多於飛機之數，但是我們一點沒有鬆弛駕駛員的訓練。反之，我們正在推進之中，因為不久（實際上到今年秋季），我們希望大量飛機將追趕上來，把現在正在訓練的多數的駕駛員載在其上。

日本的空軍力，尤其值得細加考察。據我們所獲的情報，日機的損失與消耗，或許已兩倍其生產量。沒有人能指出對日戰爭的各前線中何處將可穩定。不過我們可以堅信地盼望，我們和美國在各前線的空軍不久將更形強化。這將使整個亞洲戰區的戰局

this process goes on it will make a great deal of difference to the war in the whole Asiatic theater. What has been lost wholesale may be regained bit by bit, and after that perhaps more quickly. Our hope is that it will not be long before we have a fleet in the Indian Ocean, well supported by seaborne and shore-based aircraft, which will be sufficiently powerful to challenge any major detachment of the Japanese navy. At the same time the United States fleet in the Pacific will gain very large accessions of strength and, apart from the hazards of war, which we must never forget, will become even before the end of this year markedly superior to the whole Japanese navy. The islands and bases which the Japanese have lightly acquired will become very heavy hostages to fortune. All this is carefully weighed and calculated out and various important enterprises are afoot. The aircraft carriers which are being built or rapidly adapted are numbered not by dozens but by scores, and it may well be that even before the end of this summer Japanese cities will begin to feel the weight of an air attack, of which they on Sunday morning [day of Doolittle's raid—ED.] received only a foretaste—and squealed well. On no account let any word be spoken in disparagement of the war effort and war impulse of the United States. Our lives depend upon the growing application of its power.

《 Thus we may look to a fairly rapid acquisition of general air superiority, to a solid re-establishment of sea power both in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and, though

爲之改觀。那些整批損失的可以零星收回，而於空軍強化後或將更形迅速。我們的希望是：不久我們將在印度洋有一艦隊，在海軍航空隊及根據地機羣的掩護下，具有足夠的威力和日本海軍展開大規模的戰鬥。同時，太平洋美國艦隊也將大形增強，姑置戰爭中的意外於不論——這點我們要常常記住——在本年年底以前或能超過日本的整個海軍力。日本過去輕易擷得的島嶼和根據地，將成爲隨時有失去之虞的東西。這一切，均經慎重的斟酌與估計，而各種重要的工作都已開始。正在建造或改裝的航空母艦，其數以數十計，或許在今年夏末秋初以前，日本各城市即將遭受我方空襲的威脅，他們在星期日早晨所受的不過是先嘗一點滋味罷了（編者按：此指杜立德的空襲而言），但已經在大聲叫喊了。我們對於美國的戰爭之努力及戰爭之推進，絕不可有侮蔑之言。我們的生命全賴其力量不斷增加的施用。

這樣，我們可以盼望取得一般空軍的優勢，在印度太平洋重建鞏固的海上勢力，並且不願海上運輸的損

this has to be toiled for, to the expansion in spite of losses of our transportation by sea.

But it is in Europe that the immediate main clash impends. Everything goes to show that perhaps even before the end of May, Hitler will hurl a renewed offensive upon Russia, and there are no indications which contradict the general impression that his main thrust will be toward the Caspian and the Caucasus. We do not know what reserves the Russians have gathered. Everybody has always underrated the Russians. They keep their own secrets alike from foe and friend. The renewed German onslaught will start this year perhaps somewhat earlier and certainly a good deal farther east than last year. But this time there will be no surprise on the Russian side. Terrible injuries have been inflicted during the winter by the Russian armies, not only upon the German military power but biting and searing deep into the whole life of the Nazi regime. With all its power and organization, it is a haggard Germany that Hitler leads into this new, ferocious and sanguinary campaign against Russia. Behind lies a Europe writhing with hatred and thirsting for revolt.

What can we do to help Russia? There is nothing that we would not do. If the sacrifice of thousands of British lives would turn the scale, our fellow countrymen would not flinch. But at this present time there are two important contributions we can make. The first is the supply of munitions to the utmost extent which our shipping can carry. We have hitherto not failed in any

失，努力將之擴張，雖然這需要極大的努力。

但是即將發生大戰的却是歐洲。一切表示或許在五月底之前，希特勒將對蘇聯發動新攻勢，而他的主要目標恰如一般的印象，將是裏海及高加索。我們不知道蘇聯有多少後備軍。誰都老是把蘇聯估計過低。他們對敵方及友方同樣保守秘密。德軍的新攻勢今年將稍早發動，並且必然將比去年更向東部深入。但是這次對蘇聯將不是突如其來。在冬季蘇軍已使德方蒙受極大的創傷，這非但影響其作戰力。並且已深入納粹政權的全部生命。儘其所有的力量和組織，希特勒所領導從事對蘇這次新的兇猛而流血的戰役的，是一個憔悴的德國。而在它後面是在憎恨中掙扎，急欲叛變的歐洲。

我們怎樣能幫助蘇聯呢？我們願意犧牲一切。倘使犧牲數千英人的生命即可使形勢改觀，英國人決不會畏縮的。但是目下我們可以作二項重大的貢獻。其一是儘我們船隻的能力供應軍火。直到現在我們對斯達林所作

way in the immense undertakings which we made to Stalin. It is not however only a question of giving up what we need for ourselves but of carrying it there safely and punctually. Our northern convoys are a task of enormous difficulty and hazard. For the next few weeks the ice drifts lower and lower, and the channel between the ice floes and the North Cape becomes narrower. We convey not only our own contribution but that of the United States, which to a large extent is taken from what the United States would otherwise have given us. Our ships and their escorts, the heaviest we have ever used, are pressed by the ice ever nearer to the shores of Norway, and large numbers of German U-boats and powerful air forces can strike continually at the merchant ships and their guardians.

There is a further serious complication—the *Tirpitz*, the *Scheer* and the *Hipper* lie in Trandhjem fiord. Every British-American convoy to Russia is liable to attack by swift, heavy, modern German surface ships. Battleship escort has to be provided on every occasion. The enemy has great opportunities, by threatening attack upon the convoys and laying traps of U-boats, of inflicting vital losses upon our fleet. Serious risks are run by our great ships—so few, so precious—only one where in the last war there was a squadron of eight every time they go north on this perilous duty; at any time the Admiralty or even the Minister of Defence may have to account to you for some loss which would take five years to replace. I cannot speak of our naval dispositions further than to say that the

的這龐大的工作，從未有所間斷。然而，這不但是放棄我們自己需要的東西之問題，而是把它安然而準時地送到的問題。我們北方的護航隊負着極端困難而危險的工作。在今後的數星期中，冰塊將越益向下游飄流，而浮冰塊及北海角間的海峽將更形狹窄。我們不但護送本國製造的軍火，同時又護送美國的軍火，這本來是送給我們的。我們的船隻及其護航隊（這是我們自來所用佔最多的），因冰塊的壓迫更形趨近挪威海岸，而大量的德國潛艇和有利的空軍可以不斷地襲擊商船及其護航隊。

更有一個嚴重的問題——德艦「蒂比茲號」，「許爾號」及「希潑號」泊在脫倫典峽江。每一英美赴蘇護航隊都極易受德國的輕快的重級現代海面艦的攻擊。因此每次必須受戰艦的護航。敵方有着極好的機會，對護航隊施以攻擊的威脅，以潛艇佈置陷阱，使我軍艦隊蒙受重大損失。我軍的大船——如此稀少而如此寶貴——均冒重大的危險，每次駛向北方從事這危險的任務時，只有一艘，而在上次大戰時却有八艘的艦隊成行；在任何時海軍部或國防部長對你們報告某項損失時，那大概需要五年才能補充。關於我方海軍的分佈我只能對你們說，美國在這方面是和我們在同一陣線。這是在可怕的暴風和不斷的

United States is with us on this. It is a grim and bitter effort amid fearful gales and ceaseless perils, but if it be in human power we will carry our tanks, our aircraft and all the other essential supplies to our heroic ally in his sublime struggle.

There is another immediate way in which we can help. While the German armies will be bleeding copiously upon a 2,000-mile front in the east we shall be on their backs in the German homeland. The British bombing offensive upon Germany has begun. Half a dozen German cities have already received the full measure that they meted out to Coventry. Another 30 or more are on the list. We have improved methods of finding the targets and built-up areas by night. The wastage of bombs has been reduced, perhaps by half. Daylight thrusts, far into the heart of Germany, striking with deadly precision at the most sensitive industrial spots—such as the immortal feat of arms on Friday last [the bomber raid on Augsburg, Bavaria, longest daylight raid up to that time—ED.] will be launched upon the enemy. Presently, indeed quite soon, heavy United States formations will be established here in England and will work at our side. This summer and autumn—aye, and winter too—Germany will experience scientific and accurate bombing of a weight and upon a scale and frequency which none of the nations they have maltreated has ever endured. We must not let false guides divert our minds from these major and terrible strokes of war, or tempt us to fritter away the solid mass of our endeavor. I heard a pretended

危險中冷酷而艱辛的努力，但只要有人力可及的範圍，我們將運輸我們的油槽船、飛機以及一切其他主要的供應品，給作着崇高之戰鬥的我們英勇的盟邦。

我們還有一種直截的援助的方法。當德軍在東線二千哩長的戰線大量流血時，我們正在他們之背部的德國本土。英國對德國的轟炸攻勢已經開始。有六個德國城市已經充分遭受他們對考文特萊所加的浩劫。另有三十個以上的城市尚在名單之中。我們已改良在夜間尋覓目標和偽裝區域的方法，炸彈的浪費已經減少一半。白晝的突襲，深入德國的心臟，以極度準確的瞄準打擊最敏感的工業地點——例如上星期五的那永垂不朽的偉績（編者按：轟炸機的襲擊巴拉維亞的奧斯堡，這是截至當時最持久的日間轟炸），這種突襲即將對敵方發動。不久，實在是在極近的將來，美國重轟炸編隊飛機將駐搭於英國，從我方作戰。本年夏季、秋季——是的，還有冬季——德國將遭受科學化而準確的轟炸，其程度、規模及頻仍絕非德國所虐待任何國家所遭受者。我們不可讓騙人的嚮導把我們的思想移開這些主要而可怕的戰爭之動向，或是誘導我們浪費我們充實的努力。我在前幾天晚上在德國無線電上聽到

British voice on the German radio the other night which said:

"We should know better than anyone that the 'bombardment' of towns can't bring the end of the war nearer. London withstood about as heavy a bombardment as could be launched—something compared with which the raid on Tokyo can't have been more than a pinprick. The proper use of aircraft is to support land forces in the actual battle zone, and as the RAF isn't large enough to fulfill all its tasks, it should be reserved for this purpose only. A day-light raid on Augsburg, for instance, may be spectacular, but its practical value is negligible. They say we had 600 planes up yesterday. It's a pity they weren't up over Burma, defending our stricken forces there."

Plausible—but is it disinterested?

All this leads me to the final point I have to make. When I went to the United States in December last I proposed to the President the preparation of a combined British and American invasion of German-occupied Europe for the liberation of its enslaved peoples and for the ultimate destruction of Hitlerism.

The war cannot be ended by driving Japan back to her own bounds and defeating her overseas forces. The war can only be ended through the defeat in Europe of the German armies, or through internal convulsions in Germany produced by the unfavorable course of the war, economic privations and the Allied bombing offensive. As the strength of the United States, Great Britain and Russia develops and begins to be realized by the Germans, an internal collapse is always possible, but

冒充英國人的聲音說：

「我們應該比任何人聰明些，這城市的「轟炸」並不能使戰爭更接近結束。倫敦曾忍受空前猛烈的轟炸——東京的轟炸和它比較起來只是像針戳吧了。飛機的正常用途是在實際的戰區支持陸上部隊，並且皇家空軍之規模不足以履行其任務，它應予以保存，僅供此項用途。例如，對奧斯堡的白晝轟炸，也許可視為奇觀，但其實際價值是等於零。有人說，到昨天止我們有六百架飛機。可惜它們不是在緬甸的上空，保衛我們在那裏受苦的軍隊。」

頗有道理——但這是否公正呢？

這一切都是用以達到我的結論。

我於去年十二月到美國去，我對美國總統提議，組織英美聯軍，侵入德國佔領的歐洲，以便解放被壓迫的人民，終究毀滅希特勒主義。

將日本驅回本國，擊敗其海外軍隊，並不能結束戰爭。只有將歐洲德軍擊敗，或是由不利的戰局、經濟貧困，及盟軍的轟炸攻勢引起德國國內的動亂，戰爭才能結束。隨着美英蘇的力量之增長，而這開始為德人所感覺，國內的崩潰總歸是可能的，但是

we must not count upon this. Our plans must proceed upon the assumption that the resistance of the German army and air force will continue at its present level and that their U-boat warfare will be conducted by increasingly numerous flotillas.

We have therefore to prepare for the liberation of the captive countries of western and southern Europe by the landing at suitable points, successively or simultaneously, of British and American armies strong enough to enable the conquered populations to revolt. By themselves they will never be able to revolt owing to the ruthless countermeasures that will be employed: but if adequate and suitably equipped forces were landed in several of the following countries, namely, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the French Channel coasts and the French Atlantic coasts, as well as Italy and possibly the Balkans, the German garrisons would prove insufficient to cope both with the strength of the liberating forces and the fury of the revolting peoples. It is impossible for the Germans, while we retain the sea power necessary to choose the place or places of attack, to have sufficient troops in each of these countries for effective resistance. In particular, they cannot move their armor about laterally from north to south or west to east: either they must divide it between the various conquered countries—in which case it will become hopelessly dispersed—or they must hold it back in a central position in Germany, in which case it will not arrive until large and important lodgments have been

我們不能認爲這是可靠的。我們必須假定德國陸軍及空軍目下之規模的抵抗將仍舊繼續，而其潛艇戰術將以更多的艇隊發動，以推進我們的計畫。

因此，我們必須準備在歐洲西部及南部適當的地點登陸，而英美軍必須充分強大，足以使被征服的人民羣起叛變，以便解放歐洲淪陷各國。他們獨力決不能叛變，因爲敵方將使用殘忍的報復手段；但是如果相當之數的適當配備的軍隊在以下數國登陸，即：挪威、丹麥、荷蘭、比利時、法國海峽海岸及法國大西洋海岸，以及義大利，或許巴爾幹等，德國駐軍將不足以同時應付解放軍之軍力及叛變之人民的憤怒。當我們握有可以選擇進攻地點的海上勢力，德國無法在以上各國保持充分的兵力，作有力的抵抗。特別是，他們不能把軍隊從北至南，或從西到東作橫的移動：結果他們必須把兵力分散於各佔領地——如此它將毫無希望地分散——或是把軍隊退到在德國的中央陣地——如此於我們在海外作大規模及重要的占領

made by us from overseas.

We had expected to find United States attention concentrated upon the war with Japan, and we prepared ourselves to argue that the defeat of Japan would not spell the defeat of Hitler, but that the defeat of Hitler left the finishing-off of Japan merely a matter of time and trouble. We were relieved to find that these simple but classical conceptions of war, although vehemently opposed by the powerful isolationist faction, were earnestly and spontaneously shared by the Government and dominant forces in the United States. The visit of General Marshall and Mr. Hopkins was to concert with us the largest and the swiftest measures of this offensive character. It will no doubt become common knowledge that the liberation of the Continent by equal numbers of British and American troops is the main war plan of our two nations. The timing, the scale, the method, the direction of this supreme undertaking must remain unknown and unknowable till the hour strikes and the blows fall. More than that I cannot say—except that in the early hours of this morning I received a message from the President of which, since we are in Secret Session, I will read the material part:

“I am delighted with the agreement which was reached between you and your military advisers and Marshall and Hopkins. They have reported to me of the unanimity of opinion relative to the proposal which they carried with them and I appreciate ever so much your personal message confirming this.

後，他們方能趕到。

我們預料美國將其注意力集中於對日戰爭，而我們亦已預備辯論：日本的敗北並非就是希特勒之敗北的預兆，但於打敗希特勒以後，結果日本不過是時間及手續的問題罷了。使我們釋然於懷，是這種單純而古典的戰爭觀念，雖經有力孤立派的猛烈反對，却為美國政府及統治階級所熱烈贊同。馬歇爾將軍與霍浦金氏的訪問，就為和我們商議雙方協力發動這攻勢的最大規模而最迅速的步驟。由英美相等的兵力解放歐洲乃是兩國主要的作戰計劃；這無疑已成為一般的常識了。至於時間、規模、方法及此龐大工作的指揮，必須保守秘密，一直等到時機成熟開始發動之時。除此之外，我不便多講，不過今天清晨我接到羅斯福總統的通知，我們既是在舉行秘密會議，我將宣讀其中主要的一部。

「對於閣下及各軍事顧問與馬歇爾、霍浦金間已獲致協議，甚為欣慰。馬霍二人曾向我報告，他們所攜之建議，已荷一致贊同；而對於閣下證實此事的手札，使我欣喜萬分。

"I believe that this move will be very disheartening to Hitler and may well be the wedge by which his downfall will be accomplished. I am very heartened at the prospect and you can be sure that our army will approach the matter with great enthusiasm and vigor.

"While our mutual difficulties are many I am frank to say that I feel better about the war than at any time in the past two years."

Testing, trying, adverse, painful times lie ahead of us. We must all strive to do our duty to the utmost of our strength. As the war rises remorselessly to its climax, the House of Commons, which is the foundation of the British life struggle—this House of Commons which has especial responsibilities—will have the opportunity once again of proving to the world that the firmness of spirit, sense of proportion, steadfastness of purpose which have gained it renown in former days, will now once again carry great peoples and a greater cause to a victorious deliverance.

「我相信此舉將使希特勒大為沮喪，而且極可能是完成打倒希特勒之大業的楔子。我對前途非常樂觀，而且我們的軍隊必將以莫大的熱誠與勇氣從事此項工作。

「我們彼此雖有許多困難，但我可以坦白地說，目前我覺得比過去兩年任何時期為樂觀。」

試煉、嘗試、不幸、痛苦尚在我們前面。我們必須一致用最大的力量去履行我們的責任。際此戰爭冷酷無情達到頂點時，為英國生死之戰之基礎的衆議院，這負有特別責任的衆議院，將再有機會向世界顯示它的精神之果毅，識見之穩健，目標之確定——這曾使它過去享受盛名——並且將再度使偉大的民族和更偉大的目的，獲得勝利的結束。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "matters" (= is material, important), 『有重要性』。 It matters much to a character where a man is born, 人之誕生地對品格極重要。
2. "October last", 即 last October, 習慣常將 last 置後。
3. "forces" 為動詞 "set" 之受詞。
4. "make amends for", 『補償』。 I have to make you amends (單數複數同) for the loss, 余應補償汝之損失。
5. "a volley of", 『齊發』, 『一陣』。 "A volley of oaths", 『同聲宣誓』。 "A volley of applause", 『一齊喝采』。
6. "other" 為 "set" 之受詞。
7. "upward (of)", 『以上』。 The price is two thousand dollars or upward, 價格在兩千元以上。 Upward of two hundred men were present at the meeting, 到會人數在二百以上。
8. "to make good losses", 『補償損失』。 If you suffer loss, I will make it good to you, 如汝蒙受損失, 余決將為汝賠償。
9. "Grievous as it is", "as" 表示退步語氣, 即 "Although it is grievous". "As" 此種用法限定將 "as" 句之補充字置於句首。
10. "may be expected" 之主詞為 noun-clause, "that we and the United States will presently be very much stronger in the air on all these fronts".

BYRNES'S MESSAGE OF GREETING AT THE OPENING MEETING OF THE UNO SECURITY COUNCIL

Delivered on March 26, 1946

貝爾納斯在安全理事會開幕時致歡迎詞

一九四六年三月二十六日發表

This is a moment of great importance in the history of the world. With this meeting the Security Council begins, as required by the Charter, to function continuously. For this purpose the members of Council are obligated to be represented at all times at the seat¹ of the organization. This is essential because it is the function of the Council to guard *at all times*² the peace of the world.

The President of the United States has requested me to read to you the following message :

"On behalf of³ the people of the United States I welcome the members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations and their staffs to our country.

"We are greatly honored that the United Nations has chosen a site in our country for its home. We will do our best to make you *feel at home*⁴.

"But there can be no home anywhere for the United Nations unless the United Nations remain united and continue to work together, as they have fought together for peace and for freedom.

此際誠世界史上極關重要之瞬間。安全理事會召開此次會議後，即將依照聯合國憲章之規定，經常執行其任務矣。職是之故，凡為該會理事國，理應派遣代表，隨時留駐該一機構之所在地。此點十分重要，蓋理事會之任務即在隨時保衛世界和平也。

美國大總統囑托本人對諸君宣讀下列歡迎詞：

「余代表美國人民，對安全理事會各理事國代表，聯合國機構秘書長及其同僚等蒞臨敝國，謹致歡迎之意。

「聯合國機構選擇敝國以為會址，吾人深以為榮。吾人應盡力使君等安適。

「但聯合國苟不能保持戰時為爭取和平與自由而共同作戰之精神，繼續團結與合作，則無論何處，皆無聯合國機構置身之安適所在。

"The people of the United States not only wish you success, but they pledge to you their wholehearted cooperation to give to the United Nations the strength and the will to maintain peace and freedom in this *interdependent*⁵ world".

I am sure that the Governor of the State of New York and the Mayor of this city will join with President Truman and me in welcoming you to our country and to your temporary headquarters in the City of New York.

It is less than 160 years ago that our 13 sovereign states entered into a union for their common defense and to promote the general welfare and to secure the blessings of liberty for themselves and their posterity. That was then an untried experiment and many doubted whether such a union of free states could long endure. It is fitting to recall that the Union also chose as its temporary abode the City of New York.

Although it was later to go through *dark days of trial*³, that Union did survive. It grew and has played its part in preserving the blessings of liberty for all mankind. Let us hope that the new and broader union of states, which has also chosen New York City as its temporary abode, will likewise grow in strength and survive every crisis.

It is, I am sure, the firm resolve of the American people to uphold the Charter. I am sure this is the equally firm resolve of all the peoples of the United Nations who have joined together to preserve the peace under law.

The Charter does not sanctify privilege. It does not attempt to outlaw change in an

「美國人民願特願諸君美滿成功，抑且願對諸君保證吾人宜能精誠合作，以加強聯合國機構之力量與意志，俾在此互相依存之世界中得能維持和平與自由。」

余深信紐約州長與紐約市長亦如杜魯門總統與余同為熱忱歡迎君等蒞臨敝國之紐約小住也。

距今不及一百六十年前，美國十三州亦在紐約聯合作共同防衛，推進普遍福利，並為自身及後代謀得自由之幸福。當時此為創舉，故有若干人士對此等自由邦之聯合能否垂久，甚至懷疑。今日聯合國安全組織復擇紐約為臨時會址，余於追憶之餘，深覺擇地之宜也。

美十三州聯邦莫立後，雖經挫折，然在今日猶屹然不動，並已滋長進而為人類自由幸福盡保獲之責。我人深盼目前選定紐約為臨時會址之新而更廣泛之聯合國必亦能渡過難關，而生長也。

本人確信維護憲章，乃美國人民之堅定決心，至於團結一致從事保衛和平與法律之聯合國人民，想亦必具有同樣之決心。

憲章並未使古代特權成為神聖不可侵犯。同時在瞬息萬變之世界中，

ever-changing world. It does, however, obligate all the states, large and small alike, to *refrain from*⁷ the use of force or threat of force except in the defense of law.

Nations, like individuals, should do their best to settle their disputes without resort to litigation. But no nation has the right to take the law into its own hands. If disputes cannot be settled by friendly negotiations, they must be brought before the Security Council. That is why the Security Council must at all times be prepared to function continuously. If the United Nations is to *endure*,⁸ there must be no excuse, or need for any nation to take the law into its own hands.

Upon the Security Council rests the gravest responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. It must *of necessity*⁹ deal with the problems about which nations in the past have been prepared to fight.

On all the members of the United Nations rests the duty to cooperate with the Council to enable it to meet its responsibility. They must be willing freely and frankly to discuss their grievances before the Council.

Questions affecting peace of the world must not be questions of honor which cannot be discussed. Questions of honor between individuals are no longer left to the expedient of the duel. Thus questions of honor between nations should no longer be left to the expedient of the battleground.

We must *live by*¹⁰ the Charter. That is the road to peace. And the road to peace is the road the peoples of the world want to travel. We are here to carry out their mandate. We must not let them down.

該憲章亦並未使任何變動成爲不合法。憲章已規定大小國家避免訴諸武力或以武力威脅，但爲保衛公法者則除外。

在解決糾紛時，各國應一如個人應竭力避免訴諸戰爭。但任何國家均無權爲所欲爲。若糾紛不能用友好之談判獲得解決，應提交安全理事會。此亦即安全理事會必須繼續活動之原因。吾人苟欲聯合國持久，則任何國家均不應利用何種藉口或需要而爲所欲爲。

維護和平與安全之最嚴重責任已降於安全理事會之身。該會必需處理若干問題，而該項問題，乃以前各國所以準備作戰之因素。

與安全理事會合作使其完成任務，乃聯合國各會員之職責。各國必須以自由及坦白之方式在安全理事會中討論其申訴。

凡有關世界和平之問題均不應成爲一種不能討論之榮譽問題。個人間之榮譽問題，既已不再用決鬥方式解決，因此國與國之間之榮譽問題，亦不應在戰場上謀諸解決。

吾人必須遵守憲章。此爲到達和平之途徑。而和平之途徑亦即全世界人士所願意遵循者。吾人在此集議，其目的在完成對國民之職責。吾人必不能使彼等失望。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "seat", 『所在地』。 Which is best suited for being the seat of the central government, Nanking, Peiping, or Wuchang, 南京，北平，武昌三地孰為最適宜之中央政府所在地？
2. "at all times", 『隨時』。 Take care of your health at all times, 隨時注意汝之健康。
3. "on behalf of", 『代表』，『代』。 The president thanked the speaker on our behalf, 校長代表吾等向講演人致謝。
4. "feel at home", 『安適』。 I do not feel at home in the midst of hustling and bustling of a large city, 余對大城市之匆忙繁囂生活極不安適。
5. "interdependent", 『互相倚賴』。 The interdependence of nations for the supply of raw material, food, and finished products requires the organization of a world government, 世界各國相互倚賴原料，食物與工業成品之供給要求世界政府之組織。
6. 指美國南北之內戰。
7. "refrain from", 『抑制』，『避免』。 I cannot refrain from weeping when I recall my past life, 余回憶過去痛哭不能自制。
8. "be" + infinitive 表示發言者之意志，決定，推定，委派之意。 He is not to do that = He shall not do that, 不准彼為之。
9. "of necessity", 『必需』。 Since the price of rice is so high many people are of necessity compelled to eat other cereals, 米價昂貴甚多之人不得不吃雜糧。
10. "live by", 『遵守』，『恪遵』。 He always lives by his words, 彼能守約。

DR. QUO TAI-CHI'S BROADCAST SPEECH ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNO SECURITY COUNCIL

Broadcast to China from New York on May 1, 1946

郭代表泰祺向國人播講「我對安全 理事會之觀感」

一九四六年五月一日由紐約廣播

It gives me great pleasure to discuss with my fellow countrymen in China the proceedings of the United Nations Security Council. During the past months, it was China who assumed presidency of the Council. During our term of presidency, the Security Council held ten meetings. *With the exception of*¹ some discussion about rules of procedure, the major part of the agenda was occupied with the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran and the question of severing diplomatic relations with the Franco regime.

While occupying the chair, it was naturally not convenient for me to make a broadcast to my fellow countrymen at home. But *now that*² my term of chairmanship has expired, I am more than happy to have this opportunity to describe to you my personal impressions of the Security Council and to express to you my hopes for the Security Council. As the time placed at *my disposal*³ today is limited and as newspapers at *home*⁴ may have already published accounts of the proceedings of each meeting of the Security

余得與國內同胞，暢談聯合國安全理事會工作經過，至感欣慰。過去數月中，安理會主席一職，係由中國擔任。在吾國任主席期間，安理會前後曾舉行十次會議。除偶或討論程序規則外，議程主要為討論蘇聯軍自伊朗撤退，及與弗朗哥政權斷絕外交關係二問題。

當余任主席之時，向吾國內同胞廣播，實有未便。今余主席任期已告屆滿，余獲此機會向君等報告余個人對安全理事會之希望，實快慰無似。因時間關係，且安理會每次會議經過，國內報紙諒已有刊載，故余不擬反覆重述。余將限於發表個人對於安

Council, I shall not attempt to go over the same ground again. Therefore, I shall limit myself to my personal reactions and my views on the outlook of the Security Council. You all know that the problems presented before the Security Council could not readily be solved. It was because invariably they were submitted to the Security Council after the two parties involved had failed to effect a direct settlement and, at the same time they were of such nature as may threaten international peace and security. In other words, then, the principal function of the Security Council is to prevent any international situation of international dispute from endangering the peace and security which we all want to maintain.

Of course, mankind's hope for peace, and the desire to seek safety and avoid danger, did not begin only after the end of the war. However, it was not until after this last war that the nations of the world realized that a prerequisite to world peace henceforth is to recognize the indivisibility of peace and security. It was realized that any peace that is divisible is a false peace and cannot last. Such a lesson was learned through bitter human experience. *Small wonder* then that all nations, whether big or small, now rely upon collective peace to safeguard their own security. It was through such a realization and such a belief that the Security Council has been established.

We delegates on the Security Council naturally represent eleven member countries, but at the same time we have an even larger responsibility. That is, we are entrusted by all the United Nations to maintain world

理會之觀感而已。諸君均知在安理會提出之若干問題，無法立予解決。其原因乃此等問題，係於有關雙方無法覓求直接解決辦法以後，始提交安理會，同時此等問題之性質，均足危及國際之和平與安全。換言之，安理會之主要工作，厥為預防任何國際局勢或糾紛威脅吾人均欲維護之和平與安全。

人類憧憬和平，渴求安全，及防避危險自非於戰事告終後始告開始。然待至最近戰事結束，世上各國始恍然世界和平之先決條件，為認識和平與安全之不可分性。世人茲已覺悟，任何可以劃分之和平，係一似是而非之和平，且不能垂諸久遠。人類經歷痛苦之經驗始獲此教訓，難怪今日不論大小國家，莫不仰賴集體和平以保障彼等之安全。安理會則係依此種覺悟與信仰而建立。

余等忝任安理會代表，固係代表十一會員國，然同時吾人尚負有一更大責任。吾人係受所有聯合國家之託

collective security. In this sense, member countries of the Security Council not only represent their respective governments; at the same time they are the trustees of the United Nations. Under such circumstances it is unavoidable that the interests and demands of member nations, when necessary, be exhumed and judged according to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

But the United Nations Charter is only an outline of principles. Often it cannot be directly and concretely applied to the problems before the Security Council. Besides, like a legal code, the interpretations of the provisions of the Charter are varied. This is an inescapable difficulty. When I was president of the Council, I was frequently confronted with this difficulty. There is another difficulty which the president of the Council, especially I, myself, quite constantly encountered. It is the absence, up to now, of a complete set of rules of procedure. Since the meetings of the preparatory commission in London, until now, a committee of experts has been unceasingly at work, revising and establishing rules of procedure. We hope that this committee can finish its work *before long*. Then the Security Council may have a more complete set of rules of procedure to guide its deliberations. For a chairman there is nothing that makes him feel more handicapped than to have to improvise rules of procedure to guide the discussion of the problem as it arises.

What I have just said was not intended to disappoint you, but to make you sympathize with the difficulties confronting the Security Council at this stage. As for myself, I

，維繫世界集體安全。準此而言，安理會會員國不僅代表其本國政府，同時亦為聯合國之代理人。在此情形下，各會員國之權益與要求，於必要時應依照聯合國憲章之原則予以披露並加以判斷。

惟聯合國憲章僅為原則綱要，往往對安理會所檢討之問題，不能直接或切實應用。抑有進者，憲章有如法律條文，解釋因人而異。此固為一不可避免之困難。當余任理事會主席時，則時感此種困難。凡任理事會主席者，尤以余個人為甚，往往復遭遇另一困難。此即迄此尚乏完整之程序規則是也。自籌備委員會在倫敦召開會議以迄今日，專家委員會則孜孜不倦訂定及修正程序規則。吾人深盼此一委員會之工作不久可告完成。其時安理會進行討論，將有一比較完密之議事規則可資遵循。凡任主席者最感苦痛之事，莫過於當討論某項問題時，不得不臨時擬定程序規則。

上述諸端，並非余有意令君等失望，實欲君等對安理會此時所遇困難寄予同情。以個人而言，余對安理會

entertain the highest hopes toward the future of the Security Council.

The problem before us now is to strengthen the power and enhance the prestige of the Security Council. This is because what we need is not a congress for debate, and especially not a forum for propaganda, but a machinery that possesses the necessary prestige and strength to safeguard world peace and security.

You all know that under the Security Council is a Big Five military staff committee. This committee is meeting concurrently in New York. Our delegate is General Shang Chen, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the National Government. The Chinese delegation includes our Land Army Commander, Lieutenant General Sun Li-jen, Air Major General Mao Pang-tsoo, and more than 20 experts from the Chinese army, navy and air force. Meetings of the military staff committee are not open to the public and are devoted to practical military problems.

China is one of five permanent members of the Security Council. Our conception of permanent membership in the Security Council is that it does not constitute a special privilege, but involves a special responsibility. The present-day world peace and security depends first of all upon Big Five cooperation; otherwise there can be no peace and security. If the five permanent members cannot unite together, the Security Council will have lost its function. Consequently, we who are permanent members are more than *conscious of* our responsibility in maintaining world peace and security.

Finally, I would like to say a few words

之未來，實懷有最高之希望。

吾人目前之難題，乃如何加強安理會之權力及提高其威信。蓋吾人所需者，非一辯論責難之議會，尤非一宣傳之講壇，而為一擁有保障世界和平與安全所需之威信與權力之機構。

諸君均熟知在安理會之下，有一五強軍事參謀委員會。此一委員會同時亦在紐約召開會議，我國代表係國民政府參軍長商震將軍。中國代表團包括吾國之陸軍指揮官孫立人中將，空軍少將毛邦初，暨我國海陸空部隊專家不下廿名。軍事參謀委員會歷次會議向不予公開，且純係討論具體軍事問題。

中國為安理會五永久會員之一。

吾人對安理會永久會籍之印象，乃此種永久會籍非一特權，而係一特殊責任。今日世界之和平與安全，端賴五大強國之攜手合作，否則必無和平與安全可言。倘五強不能團結一致，安理會勢將失去效能。

最後，余欲略敘數語，說明中國

on China's attitude and policy toward the Security Council. China is one of the founding members of the Charter. We Chinese believe that the principles contained in the Charter coincide with the principles upon which our republic is founded. Consequently, our participation in any discussion at the Council is guided by the spirit of the Charter. China had waged a war of resistance for 13 years. Our desire for peace exceeded that of any other country. At the same time, our national defense is weak. Although we have the world's longest frontier and coastline, we do not have adequate naval, land and air defenses. Security then is our foremost requirement. As we believe that our desire for national security coincides with the desire of the rest of the world for international security, we repose the sincerest hope in the Security Council. Simultaneously, we are determined to lend our utmost cooperation in fostering the growth of the authority and prestige of the Security Council.

對安理會之態度與政策。吾等中國人民，深信憲章所含原則，與我民國建國原則，不謀而合。職是之故，吾人參加理事會任何討論之時，悉係以憲章之精神為依歸。中國曾抗戰十三年，吾人企求和平之念，較任何他國為殷。同時我國國防實力未臻充實。雖吾人國境與海岸線之漫長，在世界首屈一指，然吾人缺乏充分之海陸空防禦力量。安全實為吾人當務之急。正因吾人對國家安全之願望，與全球其他國家對國際安全之願望，互相吻合，故吾人對安理會乃寄予最熱烈之希望。同時吾人決竭力合作，促安理會之權利與威信與日俱增。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "with the exception of," 「除……外」。 All agreed to go with the exception of two, 除兩人外，全體同意前去。
2. "now that" (=since), 「既然」，「既」。 Now that you have finished your work, you may take rest, 汝工作既已完畢，可從事休息。
3. "at one's disposal", 「任……利用」，「由……處分」。 I have plenty of time at my disposal, 余有充分時間任余利用。
4. "at home", 「國內」(指中國)。
5. "as" 為關係代名詞 = "which" (或 who), 前面須有 "as", "such", "the same".
6. "small wonder that.... = It is small wonder that...". 同樣: "No wonder that..." = "It is no wonder that...". 在此等構造之 "that" - clause 內常用 "should", 如: "Small wonder that he should fail", "No wonder that he should have failed".
7. "before long", 「不久」。 He will come back before long, 彼不久即回。
8. "conscious of", 「感」(內心感知, aware of, 由外觀察)。 I am conscious of my inability to deal with the situation, 余知余無應付此局面之能力。

BYRNES' BROADCAST SPEECH ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF PARIS FOREIGN MINISTERS COUNCIL MEETING

Broadcast on May 20, 1946

貝爾納斯向美國人民報告外長會議經過之播詞

一九四六年五月二十日播講

I wish to talk with you about the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris. On that mission, I was accompanied by Senator Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Vandenberg, a Republican member of that committee. I cannot adequately express my appreciation.

Senator Connally was exceedingly helpful. Senator Vandenberg, by his wholehearted cooperation, let the world know that regardless of how much he and his party may disagree with the Administration about domestic issues, in our relations with foreign governments we have but one policy, the policy of the United States.

Building the foundations of a people's peace in a war-shattered world is a long, hard process. A people's peace cannot be won by flashing diplomatic triumphs. It requires patience and firmness, tolerance and understanding. We must not try to impose our will on others, but we must make sure that others do not get the impression they can impose their will on us.

關於巴黎外長會議，余願與諸君一談。余在此使命中，得有參院外交委員會主席參議員康納利與共和黨參議員范登堡作陪，銘感之意，殊非言語所能表達。

參議員康納利對余極有幫助。參議員范登堡，以其謁誠之合作，告示世人曰：對於國內問題，不論黨及其政黨與政府意見如何不合，但在吾人對外國政府之關係中，吾人僅有一個政策，此即美國政策是也。

在此慘遭戰爭破壞之世界中，建立人民和平之基礎，乃一久長而艱苦之工作。人民之和平，非閃電式之外交勝利所得獲致，必須具有忍耐與堅決，寬容與諒解。吾人決不可以吾人之意旨，強迫施諸他人，但吾人必須確定他人亦不可以為能以其意旨加諸吾人。

The progress made towards peace at the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was disappointingly small in the light of the expectations we had when it was agreed at Moscow last December that the Council should resume the work which had been interrupted by our inability to agree at London last September. But the progress towards peace at Paris was infinitely greater than I expected when I suggested that the Council should meet in Paris preparatory to the prompt calling of a peace conference.

The Ministers *did*¹ come to Paris seriously intending to *pave the way for*² a peace conference. We differed considerably on a number of fundamental points. But we did come to know what these fundamental points were and the varying weight the different Ministers attached to these points. We found that there were three basic issues outstanding on the Italian treaty, reparations, the colonies and the Italian Yugoslav boundary, particularly as it concerns the Italian city of Trieste. In summarising the significance of these basic issues, I shall deliberately seek to avoid intensifying the conflict in viewpoints.

Our position on reparations is simple. To enable the Italian nation to live we have already advanced directly or indirectly US \$900,000,000. We should prefer, in the interest of peace, to forget about reparations. But we are willing to agree to limited reparations, provided these do not deprive Italy of the resources necessary to enable her to subsist without external assistance. If Italy requires help from others she will look to us. And we made it clear that we are not going to advance millions of dollars to enable Italy to

去年九月間，吾人在倫敦舉行會議，因意見不能一致而無結果，旋於十二月間在莫斯科會議中同意繼續努力。而此次巴黎外長會議對和平所作之進步，亦甚為微小。以視當時之期望，不免令人失望。但當余提議外長在巴黎重行會議以便迅速召集和會時，其在和平方面所獲之進展極為廣大。

各外長之駕臨巴黎也，確有為召開和會開一途徑之意。吾人對於若干基本點，意見頗不一致，但吾人已確知此種基本點為何事，以及各外長對於此等基本點見解之不同。就義大利條約而言，我人發見有三個特殊之基本問題，即賠款，殖民地，及義大利與南斯拉夫之邊界是也。（尤其關於義大利之的里埃斯特城）。在概論此等基本問題之重要性中，余將有意設法避免加強意見之衝突。

吾人對於賠款問題所取之立場甚為簡單，為使義大利民族能生存起見，吾人已直接或間接墊付九億美元。吾人為和平之利益計，對於賠款問題，寧願置之度外。但吾人願同意有限之賠款，使義大利不致失去其生存所必需之資源，而不必依賴外來之協助。義大利若需要他人之援助，則可寄望於吾人。但吾人聲明：吾人不擬墊

produce goods to be paid as reparations to any of our allies.

The Soviet Government has insisted on reparations for itself of US \$100,000,000. We have pointed out certain sources from which reparations can be taken which would not seriously affect the Italian economy and which would yield substantially the amount which the Soviets claim. But the Soviet Government is unwilling to count what she will obtain from some of these sources as reparations. For example, she insists that some of the naval ships surrendered by Italy to the navies of the United States and Britain be³ shared with her. She declares the ships are war booty. But war booty belongs to the nation capturing it. The Soviet Union has never shared with the Allied nations any war booty captured by her. We are willing to give to her *in lieu of*⁴ reparations some of the naval ships surrendered to us. She demands the ships but refuses to consider them as a substitute for reparations. She insists upon being paid out of current production. We would have to finance the production, and therefore I refused to agree to the proposal.

The differences regarding the colonies have been narrowed but not resolved. The Soviet Government receded from its claim for a trusteeship of Tripolitania, first in favor of a joint Soviet-Italian trusteeship and later in favor of an Italian trusteeship, as originally proposed by the French.

Our position has always been that the colonies should be placed under United Nations trusteeship, having as its objective the welfare of the inhabitants and their independence at the earliest practicable date. The Trustee-

付數百萬美元，使義大利能生產貨物，以資償付我盟國中任何一國之賠款。

蘇政府堅持必須取得賠款一億美元。吾人已指出若干來源，可獲取賠款而不致使義大利之經濟受到嚴重之影響，且能得到蘇聯所要求之數目。但蘇政府不願將其由此等來源中之一部份所取得者認作賠款。例如蘇聯堅持義大利交予英美海軍之艦船，必須與蘇聯均分。蘇聯宣稱，此等艦船為戰利品。但戰利品屬於奪獲之國家，蘇聯所獲之任何戰利品，從未與各盟國均分。吾人願意將吾人所接受之一部份艦船給予蘇聯以代賠款。蘇聯要求此等艦船，但不承認此等艦船為賠款之代替品。蘇聯堅持要求在現有之生產中，獲取賠款。但此種生產，須由吾人供給資金，因此余對此種建議不予同意。

關於殖民地之爭執，範圍已見縮小，但仍未解決。蘇政府對於要求代管特立波里太尼亞一事，已表示讓步，初則主張由蘇義聯合代管，繼則贊成法國所提原來建議，即由義大利代管。

吾人始終認為此等殖民地應置於聯合國托治之下，而以居民之福利，及儘早促使彼等獲得「獨立」，為托治目標。托治理事會應選任對該會直

ship Council should appoint a neutral administrator responsible to it, thus avoiding all possible rivalry between the powers. Libya and Eritrea should be granted independence in ten years.

It is *open to question* whether Italy is in an economic *position* to assume the responsibility of trusteeship, and whether the return of the colonies to Italy as trustee takes sufficiently into account the wishes of the inhabitants.

For these reasons, it was with considerable reluctance that I indicated my willingness to yield to the French suggestion of an Italian trusteeship if that would bring about an agreement in the Council, and if it were agreed that a definite date would be fixed for the independence of Libya and Eritrea. But the French Government was unwilling to agree to a fixed date for independence. The British felt that because of their promises during the war they could not agree to an Italian trusteeship for the territory occupied by the Senoussi tribes. For security reasons, they also proposed a British trusteeship for Cyrenaica.

When no agreement was reached, I again urged the original American proposal for a United Nations trusteeship.

It was my impression that agreement on reparations and the colonies as well as on a host of other questions would not be long delayed if only a solution of the Trieste problem could be found.

The Soviet representative finally indicated that there would be no serious question on the cession of the Dodecanese Islands to Greece, but he refused to approve it until

接負責之中立國行政長官一人，藉以防止各國之一切可能競爭。里比亞及厄里特里亞一地，應於十年內賦予獨立地位。

以義大利今日之經濟狀況而言，該國是否可負托治責任不無疑問，且如令該殖民地重歸義大利托治，此舉是否充份顧及居民之志願，亦屬可疑。

職是之故，余實出於不得已，始表示願意接受法國所提委託義大利管治之提案，俾會議可獲協調，唯會議應確定里比亞及厄里特里亞獨立日期。法國政府不願同意確定獨立日期。英人感覺因彼等於戰時曾提出諾言，故不能贊同以聖虜西族人民卜居之地，委託義方管治。彼等為安全計，且提議委託英人管治息里內島卡。

當各方意見歧異之時，余遂重提美國原建議案，擬將該項土地置於聯合國托治之下。

余個人之印象，乃認為如的里雅斯特之問題能告解決，則關於賠償與殖民地，暨其他若干問題，當不難取得協議。

蘇方代表最後表示，以多得卡尼斯羣島劃歸希臘版圖一事，當無若何嚴重之爭執。惟在處理其他領土

the other territorial dispositions could be agreed upon.

Experts appointed to investigate the Italian-Yugoslav frontier did not differ as to the facts. But the Soviet representative differs from the other members of the Council as to the conclusions to be drawn from the facts. It is his position that Venezia Giulia must be treated as an inseparable whole, and that so treated the claim of Yugoslavia to the area is superior to that of Italy. The other representatives believe that wise statesmanship as well as the explicit decision taken by the Council at London requires a boundary line which will in the main be an ethnic line leaving a minimum of people under alien rule.

It was wrong to give Italy the whole of Venezia Giulia after World War I. It would be equally wrong to give Yugoslavia the whole of Venezia Giulia now. It would transfer from Italy to Yugoslavia approximately 500,000 Italians.

The British and French experts proposed ethnic lines more favorable to Yugoslavia than our own.

In an effort to reach agreement, we stated that we were willing to accept the British or French line, or any other ethnic line that could be justified upon the basis of the London decision. The American delegation suggested a plebiscite for the area between the line proposed by the United States and the line proposed by the Soviet Union. But the Soviet delegation would not consider a plebiscite except for the whole Venezia Giulia area.

All of us are agreed that Yugoslavia and

問題未獲得協議之前，渠拒絕贊同此議。

被推調查義南兩國邊境之專家，對於各項事實尚無異議。惟蘇聯代表自此等事實所獲結論，與會中其他代表意見相左。彼主張應視威尼西亞幾利亞為一不可剖分之整體，以是南斯拉夫對該地區之要求，較諸意大利略勝一籌。其他代表相信，倫敦外長會議之賢明政治手法及明確之決定，規定大體依照種族界線從事劃定國境，俾將置於異族統治下之人數，減至最低限度。

世界第一次大戰以後，以威尼西亞幾利亞全境劃歸義大利，固屬錯誤，今若以該地全部劃歸南斯拉夫，亦犯同樣錯誤。蓋此舉將分約有五十萬之義大利人民，脫離義大利而改隸南國也。

英法專家所建議之民族界線，較吾人之專家所建議者，對南國較為有利。

吾人為力求獲致協議起見，聲稱願意接受英方或法方所定界線，或任何足能符合倫敦決議之其他種族界線。美國代表團提議在美國所提界線與蘇聯所提界線中區域，舉行人民投票。但蘇方代表除在全部威尼西亞幾利亞區域舉行投票外，不願考慮任何人民投票計劃。

余等一致承認，南斯拉夫及利用

the countries of central Europe which have for years used the port of Trieste shall have free access to³ Trieste at which there shall be a free port under international control. But we will continue to appeal to the Soviet Government and the Yugoslav Government not to press for a boundary line which will needlessly violate ethnic principles and will breed trouble in the future.

Agreement on the Balkan treaties is blocked principally by the inability of the Council to agree upon the economic clauses. Agreement on these provisions may have been delayed as part of a bargaining process, although so far the Soviet Government has stood out against the inclusion in the treaties of any provision which would promise freedom of commerce on the Danube, the gateway to central Europe.

If the Soviet Government is opposed, as the United States Government is opposed, to the formation of exclusive political and economic blocs, they will not persist in their refusal to permit the countries of central and eastern Europe to open their gates to the commerce of all nations.

It is regrettable that our outstanding differences on the treaties could not have been adjusted at our recent meeting in Paris. A short recess to allow a calm re-examination of our respective positions should expedite agreement when we reconvene. But when a world short of³ goods and short of food is crying for the return of conditions of peace, we cannot indefinitely delay the making of peace and the withdrawal of troops from occupied areas.

The four Allied Governments cannot

的里雅斯特港有年之中歐國家，應獲通往的里雅特港之自由，是故該地應設一國際管理之自由港。然吾人將繼續籲請蘇聯與南斯拉夫政府，勿堅持一不必要破壞種族原則，及足貽後患之國境界線。

巴爾幹條約未能取得協議之故，主要乃因外長會議對經濟條款，態度不能一致。此項條約遲遲未能獲致協議，或因有人擬利用之以為討價還價之一部對象。雖蘇聯政府已公開反對，在條約中附入任何保證號稱中歐門戶之多瑙河貿易自由條款。

倘蘇聯政府一如美國政府，反對成立壟斷性之政治與經濟集團，彼等決不致堅持拒絕准許中歐及東歐國家開放門戶，與以便利與所有國家通商。

吾人對此項條約之爭執，竟無法在最近之巴黎會議予以解決，實屬遺憾。在短促之休會期中，吾人可以冷靜之頭腦，重新檢討吾人之個別立場，此當可助吾人於會議重開時獲得協議。然當茲世界需要貨品與糧食孔殷，人民馨香禱祝恢復和平狀態之時，吾人不能無期遷延締立和平，及自淪陷區撤退軍隊。

此四盟國政府不能徒以彼等對和

Indefinitely delay the making of peace with countries which they have long ceased to fight, simply because they cannot agree among themselves on peace terms.

The Council of Foreign Ministers was formed to facilitate, and not obstruct, the making of peace.

It was for that reason the American delegation proposed that the Council at its next meeting on June 15 should conclude, as far as possible its work on the proposed drafts, but that the date for the peace conference should be definitely fixed for July 1 or July 15, and invitations should be issued at once. It was our view that the Council had taken sufficient time to try to narrow their differences, and at this stage with the principal issues defined, we should not deny to our other war partners their right to participate.

The making of peace is not the exclusive prerogative of any four governments. The Soviet delegation insisted that invitation for the conference could not be sent until we had reconvened and agreed on all fundamental questions. Unanimous agreement was necessary and we were forced, therefore, to recess without agreement for the actual calling of the peace conference.

While the American delegation will, when the Council reconvenes, make every effort to reach agreement on fundamental question, it will renew its demand for the calling of a peace conference on July 1 or July 15.

If we cannot have a peace conference until the four nations agree on every subject deemed fundamental by any one of them, that will give to one member of the Council the

平條件不能協調之故，致無期延擱與彼等停止作戰已久之國家締立和平。

外長會議成立之目的，為便利而非阻礙和平之奠立。

職是之故，美國代表團提議，下屆外長會議於六月十五日舉行時，應在可能範圍之內，完成起草條約工作。且和會舉行日期應確定為七月一日或七月十五日，請帖並須立即發出。吾人所持見解，乃外長會議既已有充分時間以求減少彼等間之爭議，且當此各項主要問題已告澄清階段，吾人不應剝奪其他戰友參加之權利。

締成和平之工作，並非任何四國政府之特權，蘇方代表堅持非待至吾人重開會議，及對各項主要問題獲得協議，不應邀請各國參加會議。全體一致之協議既屬必要，吾人不得已未經商得同意召開和平會議，即宣告休會。

雖外長會議重開之時，美國代表將竭力對各主要問題謀致協議，唯將重新提出於七月一日或七月十五日召集和會之要求。

倘吾人非待至四國對其中任何一國認為主要之每一問題取得協議方能召集和會，則外長會議任何一國，將

power to stop all efforts toward peace.

It would be better for the Council to submit to the peace conference a single draft of each treaty and to set forth in this draft both the matters on which agreement had been reached and those on which agreement had not been reached. This would permit free discussion in the peace conference by all the nations that did the fighting, and world opinion will then point the way to a final settlement.

If the peace conference is not called this summer, the United States will feel obliged to request the General Assembly of the United Nations, under article 14 of the Charter, to make recommendations with respect to the peace settlements. But I confidently expect a peace conference to be called this summer.

The situation which we will face in the coming months will be a test not only of others but of ourselves. There are now, and there will be in the future, many occasions which might impel us to say, as we did after the last war, that, much as¹⁰ we would like to cooperate in the restoration of Europe, cooperation as a practical matter is impossible without the sacrifice of our principles, and that we must be content to cultivate and defend our own hemisphere. But we must not forget that if we fail to cooperate in a peace which is indivisible, we may again find that we will have to cooperate in a war which is world-wide. Whether we like it or not we live in one world. I am unwilling to admit that we cannot cooperate without the sacrifice of our principles. If we are going to play our part we must take the offensive for peace

有阻遏一切促使和平努力之權力。

外長會議最佳者，莫如向和會提出每一條約之草案，並於草案之內，詳敘某某問題已獲協議，某某問題未獲協議，此種辦法可令所有參戰國家，在和會中自由討論，其時世界輿論將指出最後解決之途徑。

若和平會議不能在今夏召集，則美國認為應即請求聯合國大會按照憲章第十四條就和平解決事提出建議，但余深信和會當可於今夏舉行。

在未來數月中我人將面臨之局勢，不特係對他人且亦係對我人本身之一種試驗，目前以及未來均可能發生許多際遇，迫使我人遵循上次大戰時之所為而聲明曰：「合作既係一種非犧牲原則即屬不可能之現實問題，我人願就復興歐洲事予以合作，且將以保衛及培植我人本身之天地為滿足。但我人苟不能在不可分割之和平中合作，則或將再度需要在遍及全球之戰爭中合作，此為我人所不能遺忘者。不論我人愛好世界與否，我人乃生存於同一宇宙中之人物。所謂非犧牲我人之原則即不能合作一語，余不願承認之。我人若欲盡本身之職責，必須為和平發動攻勢，一若我人在戰爭中

as we took the offensive for war.

But the victories of peace, like those of war, require the sacrifice not of principle but for principle. They require faith in ourselves and in our ideals. They require initiative, resourcefulness, and unrelenting effort. There is no iron curtain that the aggregate sentiments of mankind cannot penetrate. The American delegation at Paris did not hesitate to start the offensive for peace.

Security is the concern of every nation. But the effort of one nation to increase its security may threaten the security of other nations and cause them, in turn, to try to increase their own security. The quest for security may lead to less, rather than more, security in the world.

It is in truth extremely difficult to know to what extent the action of any nation may be ascribed to its quest for security or to its desire to expand. But some so-called security moves on the diplomatic checker-board have not contributed to a general sense of security.

Many of these moves are said to originate in the fear of the revival of German military might. On our way to Potsdam last summer, President Truman and I discussed this situation and agreed that it should be American policy to disarm Germany and keep her disarmed and to do what we can to prevent a struggle between the powers for the control of Germany which might give Germany the chance to divide and conquer. These principles were stated in the Potsdam agreement. But President Truman and I thought at that time that the policy of disarming Germany and keeping Germany disarmed for a definite

採取攻勢然。

但和平之勝利，一如戰爭之勝利，需要者並非主義之犧牲，而實為主義而犧牲。和平之勝利需要吾人對本身之信心及對吾人理想之信心，需要主動，足智多謀，與始終不懈之努力。至誠可以開金石。巴黎會議中之美代表團並不猶豫，發動和平之攻勢。

安全一事為每一國家所關心之問題，但一國對於增進其安全之努力，或足以威脅其他國家之安全而使彼等亦從事於增進其本身之安全。如此對安全之追求，並不能增加世界之安全，而或許反而減少世界之安全。

實則任何國家之行動，何者為追求安全，何者為企圖擴張勢力，極難辨別。但在外交棋盤上，若干所謂安全行動，對於安全之一般意義，並未有所貢獻。

此等行動中有不少據稱係由於恐懼德國軍事武力之死灰復燃。去年夏季在我等去波茨坦之途中，杜魯門總統曾與余討論此種情形，一致認為美國之政策，應為解除德國之武裝，並竭力避免列強在管制德國上發生衝突，以免予德國以各個擊破之機會。此等原則已註明在波茨坦協定中。但杜魯門總統與余當時均以為解除德國武裝並使德國在規定時期內不得擁有武裝之政策，應成為主要盟國間嚴肅條

period of years should become a part of a solemn treaty between the principal Allied powers. Our policy should be to prevent war and not to wait until aggression gets out of hand. It was not a new thought. It had been foreshadowed in the Moscow declaration of 1943. Others had discussed it, but no one more forcefully than Senator Vandenberg in a speech in the Senate in January 1945.

At the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, when the Soviet Foreign Secretary seemed greatly concerned about the Soviet security requirements in the Balkan, I suggested a 25-year four-power treaty to keep Germany disarmed as a means of preventing any real threat to Soviet security. I explained that we contemplated a similar joint guaranty of the disarmament of Japan. I again proposed such a treaty in a talk with Generalissimo Stalin on December 24 while I was in Moscow. The Generalissimo said that if the United States made such a proposal he would wholeheartedly support it. Later, I also spoke to Mr. Bevin who advised me that he personally was most sympathetic to the suggestion. In February, I sent a working draft of the proposed treaty for German disarmament to the Soviet, British and French Governments and the proposed treaty for Japanese disarmament to the Soviet, British and Chinese Governments. I invited their suggestions as to the draft. I was informed by Mr. Bevin and Mr. Bidault that they favored the proposal in principle but would have a few suggestions to make. I did not hear from Mr. Molotov. Just before the Paris meeting, I advised the Ministers that I would like to discuss the proposal at Paris.

約之一部份。吾人之政策應為預防戰爭，而勿等待至侵略發動以後。此非新思想，在一九四三年之莫斯科宣言中，已有此暗示，其他人等亦有討論及之，但無人較之參議員范登堡於一九四五年一月間在參院演辭中所講者更為有力。

在倫敦外長會議中，當蘇外長對於巴爾幹之安全需要，似乎極為關心之時，余即提議締訂解除德國武裝二十五年之四強條約，作為防止真正對蘇聯安全有任何威脅之工具。余說明吾人對於解除日本之武裝，擬成立類似之共同保證。十一月二十四日，當余在莫斯科之時，余與斯達林元帥談話中，再度提議此種條約。史氏稱：美國若果提出此一建議，渠將全力予以擁護。其後余又向貝文談起此事，貝氏稱：渠本人對此建議極表同情。本年二月間余即以關於解除德國武裝所建議之條約草本送達蘇，英，法三國政府，同時並以關於解除日本武裝所建議之條約送達蘇，英，中三國政府。余請各該國政府對於余之條約草本加以建議。貝文與畢多爾特對余稱，彼等對於余之建議，在原則上皆表示贊成，但將貢獻若干建議。余未自莫洛托夫處獲得其意見。在巴黎會議未開會前，余告各外長謂，余甚願在

The Soviet Minister agreed to discuss it informally, but stated without specification that there were serious objections to the draft. At Paris, the Soviet representative stated that he first wanted to know if Germany was being disarmed as contemplated by the Potsdam agreement, and he feared the treaty might delay immediate disarmament. I pointed out that our proposal could not fairly be so construed, that it did not lessen the obligation to disarm Germany now, but provided machinery to keep Germany disarmed.

To remove any question as to our purpose, I asked General Clay to request the Allied Control Council to appoint representatives with power to go into every zone and make a report as to the disarmament of Germany.

Later, the Soviet representative stated that when Generalissimo Stalin agreed with me to support the treaty I did not have a draft of it. He said that as it could not become effective until after a German treaty was signed, consideration of it could be delayed.

It is our sincere hope that after the Soviet Union studies our proposal and comes to appreciate our earnest desire to see Germany disarmed and kept disarmed, the Soviet Union will support it wholeheartedly.

While making of the German peace settlement may take some time, we took the initiative at Paris to propose the immediate appointment of special deputies to prepare a peace settlement which could be considered at a general Allied conference, the date of which should be fixed by the Council at its

巴黎討論此項建議。蘇方外長同意非正式予以討論，據稱，渠激烈反對是項草案，但未言明理由。在巴黎時，蘇代表聲明渠首先願明瞭德國是否已依照波茨坦協定實行解除武裝，並表示渠甚恐該項條約將阻延德國武裝之立即解除。余當即指出，我人之建議若作如此解釋，殊不公允。該項條約並未減少解除德國武裝之義務，且已備有工具，維持德國武裝現狀。

為消除對我人目的之疑問起見，余曾請克萊將軍轉懇盟方管理委員派有權代表前赴每一區域，就德國解除武裝問題，提出報告。

蘇聯代表旋復稱：當斯達林委員長同意支持該條約時，余尙未有該約之草案。渠稱：該約在德國協定簽訂前既不能生效，當可展延予以考慮。

吾人竭誠希望蘇聯詳細研究吾人之建議，並對於吾人亟欲使德國解除武裝一節開始瞭解之後，蘇聯將竭力擁護吾人所提之建議。

作成德國和平協定一事，或需費若干時間，在此時期內，吾人在巴黎提議立即委任特別代表預備和平協定，以便提交盟國大會考慮。大會會議

next session. While there is no German government yet which could accept the settlement, agreement among the Allies on the nature of the settlement is necessary to enable the Allies to know the goal towards which the Allied occupation and administration should be directed and the kind of German government which should be created to accept the settlement.

I also asked that the special deputies on Germany be instructed to report on several pressing problems, including boundary and economic questions. We cannot, for example, continue to carry out the reparation program if Germany is not to be administered as an economic unit, as agreed upon at Potsdam. Whatever boundaries are agreed upon for Germany, she must be able to subsist without external assistance. We cannot subsidize Germany to enable her to pay reparations to other nations.

I regret that the Soviet representative was not prepared to act upon my proposal for the appointment of special deputies without further study. I shall renew my proposal when the Council reconvenes.

Important as the German questions are and eager as we are to press for their speedy solution, we must not and cannot delay the peace settlements with other countries. At Potsdam, it was agreed that the start should be made with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland. While Germany must remain under occupation for some time, we cannot fail to do our part to rid the rest of Europe of the burden of the forces of occupation. There can be no recovery in Europe until we do.

日期應由外長會議在下次集會時決定之，目下雖尚無德國政府能接受此和平協定，但盟國對於協定之性質，必須意見一致，務使各盟國明瞭盟國佔領與管理德國之目標，以及應創立何種德國政府，以接受和平協定。

余並請求訓令各特別代表，就德國若干迫切問題，包括邊界及經濟問題，提出報告。例如吾人如果管理德國不以經濟單位相待，一如在波茨坦會議中所同意者，則吾人仍將無法執行賠款計劃。不論其邊界如何，德國必須能不賴外來之幫助而生存。吾人不能資助德國使其能對其他各國償付賠款。

余對於蘇代表並不準備依照余之建議立即委任特別代表一事，引為遺憾。外長會議重開時余將重提余之建議。

德國問題雖屬重要，而吾人切望迅速予以解決，但對於其他各國之和平協定，吾人亦不能任其延擱。在波茨坦會議中，一般同意應開始與義大利，保加利亞，匈牙利，羅馬尼亞及芬蘭等國作成和平協定。德國雖仍需處於佔領之下，但吾人必須設法解除歐洲其餘部份對佔領軍之負擔，否則歐洲無復元之望。

It is particularly important that we press forward vigorously with the Austrian treaty. The Moscow declaration on Austria contemplated that Austria should be regarded more as a liberated than as a satellite country. It was agreed at Potsdam that no reparations would be taken from her. She was one of the first countries in central Europe to have free elections following the liberation. The continuance of foreign troops in Austria is an undue burden on her economy. In February, we asked that the Austrian treaty be prepared along with other treaties for satellite states. At Paris, I insisted upon its preparation, but the Soviet representative declined to discuss the Austrian treaty or say when he would consider it. The making of peace with Austria is essential to the restoration of anything like conditions of peace in Europe. As long as there is no peace with Austria and foreign troops remain on her soil, military communication lines will continue to be maintained in Rumania and Hungary and possibly Italy. If peace could be made with Austria concurrently with the treaties now under consideration, there would be no necessity or excuse for a single soldier on foreign soil in Europe, with the exception of Germany and a line of communication through Poland. The European states would have a chance to live and breathe.

It is American policy to press unremittingly for the conclusion of peace settlements to make possible the withdrawal of troops from countries where they do not belong and where they impose unjustified economic and social difficulties upon the people. And even without waiting for the conclusion of peace

吾人對於奧國之條件，尤須着力進行。莫斯科關於奧國之宣言，含有奧國應視為解放國更甚於衛星國之意。在波茨坦會議中，同意不向奧國索取賠款。奧國為解放後中歐第一個舉行自由選舉之國家。外國軍隊之繼續留駐在奧國，對於奧國之經濟，實為過份之負擔。在二月間，我等提議奧國條約及其他衛星國之條約同時準備。在巴黎會議中，余堅持準備此一條約，但蘇代表不願討論奧國條約，亦不說明何時將加以考慮。欲使歐洲恢復形似和平時之情形，非對奧國作成和平條約不可。對奧國一日無和平及其領土上駐有外國軍隊一日，則軍事交通線將繼續維持在羅馬尼亞，匈牙利，及義大利。反之，如果對奧和平條約一旦簽立，則外國軍隊，除德國及橫貫波蘭之一條交通線外，即無留駐一兵一卒之必要或藉口。屆時歐洲各國將有生活與呼吸之機會。

成立和約為美國之一貫政策，蓋和約訂立後，各國即可撤退其國外駐軍，德義等佔領區人民亦得排脫對彼等所加予之不允當之經濟社會等約束也。甚至在和約未訂立之前，美方之

treaties, it is American policy to press for the reduction of occupation troops in all countries.

Our policy of continuing to press for the return of conditions of peace, without regard to the making of formal peace treaties, finally yielded some constructive results in the case of Italy. For months we have been urging the revision of the Italian armistice so as to restore virtually complete sovereignty to Italy, except in the colonies and in the controversial Venezia Giulia area. At Paris, this revision was agreed to. While the absence of a peace treaty still handicaps Italy in her effort to rebuild her broken economic and political life, the revised armistice gives the Italian Government the largest possible freedom that can be given to it without a formal peace treaty.

Our problems are serious, but I am not discouraged. Our offensive to secure peace has only begun. We are determined to work for political and economic peace in Europe, in the Near East and in the rest of the world. We shall work for it in the peace conferences and in the councils of the United Nations. The objective of our offensive is not territory or reparations for the United States. The objective is peace.....Not a peace founded upon vengeance or greed, but a just peace, the only peace that can endure.

政策即促使各國儘量減少其佔領軍人數。

吾人在和約正式訂立前，繼續力行促使和平局面恢復之政策，對義大利問題已獲相當創造性之結果。數月來各方曾敦促吾人修訂義大利休戰協定，務使義大利人民完全恢復主權（維尼西亞基里亞等殖民地等特殊地區不在此例）。在巴黎，各國對此項修訂問題已獲得協議。在和約迄未訂立，義大利未能以主力重建其支離破碎之經濟政治生活聲中，經已修改之停戰協定，將予義大利政府以最大限度之便利。

吾人之問題固極嚴重，惟余並不因是而失望。吾人爭取和平之工作，僅僅宣告展開，吾人決為爭取歐洲近東及其他地區之政治及經濟和平而奮鬥。吾人將在和會及聯合國各理事會中展開此項工作。吾人之工作目標並非為美國爭取土地或賠償，吾人之目標即係和平。和平絕難建立於報復或貪婪之基礎上，惟有基於正義及公理上之和平始能恆久存在。

ANNOTATIONS

1. "did" 強調 "come".
2. "pave the way for", 「開一途徑」, 「開……先河」, 「準備」。The Revolution of 1911 paved the way for democratizing China, 辛亥革命為中國民主化開一途徑。
3. "be" 為 subjunctive mood 表示建議語氣。
4. "in lieu of" = "in place of", 「代替」。In some cities house rent is paid in rice or gold in lieu of money, 若干城市房租以米或金償付以代理款。
5. "open to question", 「發生疑問」。Whether he will come or not is open to question,

彼來與否實屬疑問。 6. "in a position", 『力能』。 I am not in a position to help you, 余目下無力助汝。 7. "a host of", 『甚多』。 His proposal was endorsed by a host of people, 多人贊同其建議。 8. "access to", 『進入』。 The theatre was so crowded last night that we could not get access to it, 昨夜戲院觀客擁擠致余等無從進入。 9. "short of", 『缺』, 『短少』。 He would not read a book short of truth, 彼雅不欲讀無事實根據之書。 10. "as" 表示退步語氣 = Though 即 Though we would like very much, . . . 11. "as" 同 10,

U. S. ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN
ACHESON'S STATEMENT ON THE U. S.
POLICY ON CHINA

Made at a press conference on June 28, 1946

美代理國務卿艾契生關於美對華政策之聲明

一九四六年六月二十八日在記者招待會中發表

Recent press reports from China indicate a misunderstanding or misconstruction by various Chinese elements of our objectives and policies in affording assistance to China.

The various moves taken by this government to aid China are but steps in the complete implementation of a long-agreed programme for helping the Chinese nation as a whole to rid itself of the effects of a long and devastating war against Japan. They cannot rightfully be interpreted as current support of any factional military group in China.

They will not fully materialize for many months. Their purpose is to cement rather than to destroy unity, to encourage the Chinese to find a solution of their internal problems by the democratic process of peaceful agreement rather than by resort to military force.

In the foregoing connection, it is pertinent to quote from the President's public statement on policy towards China of December 15, 1945. He said:

"As China moves toward peace and unity the United States would be prepared to

最近中國方面新聞報導，足證中國各種人士對於吾人援華目標及政策，發生誤會與曲解。

美國政府以各種行動，援助中國，不過為完全實踐久已商定之計劃，以謀協助整個中國，解除對日長期破壞戰之影響，故不能解釋為對於任何黨派軍事團體之支援。

此項計劃非經過數月不克實現。其目標則在鞏固而非破壞中國之團結，鼓勵中國以和平協議之民主方式，解決國內問題而不訴諸武力。

關於此層，引用杜魯門總統一九四五年十二月十二日之對華政策宣言，最為適當。故總統之言曰：

「中國正向和平與統一邁進，美國將準備用每種合理的方式，

assist the national government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial economy, and establish a military organization capable of discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order."

There is now in Congress a bill authorizing advice and assistance to the Chinese government in the creation of a modern, moderately sized Chinese army.

One of the principal objectives of this legislation is to provide practical assistance to the Chinese in implementing the agreement reached in Chungking on February 25 this year for the reorganization and unification of the armed forces of China. This agreement provides for a single, non-political, national army made up of troops drawn from the presently existing Communist and Central government armies.

In testifying before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House in regard to this legislation, the Acting Secretary of State indicated that there was a direct relation between the successful implementation of the plan for the reduction and unification of Chinese military forces and steps that might be taken under that authority provided in the bill before Congress to give military aid and assistance to the Chinese army.

Many of the contemplated measures for aid to China involve a consuming procedure of negotiation, agreements, legislative action, and lastly, decisions by the President in the light of the situation existing at the time implementation is to be undertaken.

以援助中國之復興，改良農業及工業經濟，樹立軍事機構，俾中國克盡其維持和平與秩序之國際責任。」

美國國會現正討論一項法案，授權援助中國政府，建立現代化及員額適當之軍隊。

此項法案主要目標之一，乃在切實援助中國實行今年二月二十五日在重慶簽訂之中國整軍方案。此項方案規定改編國共兩軍，使成爲整個無政治作用之國軍。

本人在衆院外交委員會討論此項法案時，曾出席聲明充分實施此項整軍方案，與國會給予中國軍事援助及其他援助之前依本法案規定之權力採取各項步驟，直接有關。

援助中國所擬種種辦法，包括談判，協議，立法及總統在實施時參照實際情形之裁決權等等。

These various steps may consume more than a year in case of the legislation now in the Congress for military advice and assistance to China and, if interrupted in any particular stage, could not be readily resumed without running the risk of encountering considerable difficulty.

Publicity has recently been given to a pipeline lend-lease agreement with China for approximately US\$58,000,000. This agreement merely formalized an understanding reached shortly after V-J Day that China would purchase those lend-lease supplies which were being processed or were en route to China.

Measures to provide economic aid to China in the form of supplies and credits are an impartial American effort to contribute toward a solution of the acute economic crisis in China and to forestall a financial and economic breakdown.

Too much stress cannot be laid on the hope of this government that our economic assistance be carried out in China through a medium of a government fully and fairly representative of all important Chinese political elements, including the Chinese Communists.

This government has felt that some measures of economic assistance could not be held in abeyance pending agreement among the Chinese political parties to come together in a unified government.

Failure to afford such minimum economic assistance would needlessly invite danger of an economic collapse which would bring great tragedy to the common people of China.

以國會現所討論之軍事援華法案而論，凡此各項步驟，即需費時一年以上，如在某一特別時期中斷，則非遭遇重大困難，決難予以恢復。

美國最近已與中國成立五千八百萬元油管租借協定。此項協定乃在勝利以後不久商定，並成立諒解，中國將購買加工製造或在運華途中之軍備租借法項下之供應品。

其他以接濟及借款方式對華作經濟援助之種種措置，乃美國解除中國深刻之經濟危機及阻止金融經濟崩潰作公正不偏之贊助。

若謂美國政府應以其經濟援助，經由充分並公正代表中國各重要政黨包括共產黨在內之政府，以達於中國，此實美國政府之希望。

惟美國政府感覺若干經濟援助不能擱置，以待中國各政黨之成立協議，組成統一政府。

此際若不出以最低限度之經濟援助，必致引起經濟崩潰之危機，使中國人民遭受重大之悲劇。

U. S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED
NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
BERNARD M. BARUCH'S ADDRESS ON WORLD
CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

*Delivered on June 14, 1946, at the first meeting of the Commission
in New York City*

聯合國原子能委員會美代表巴洛茨講演
國際管制原子能

一九四六年六月十四日在該會開幕時發表

My fellow members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and my fellow citizens of the world:

We are here to make a choice between the *quick and the dead*.¹

That is our business.

Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, *seized upon*² with faith, can *work*³ our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of fear. Let us not deceive ourselves: We must *elect*⁴ world peace or world destruction.

Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its potentialities that our minds *cover from*⁵ the terror it creates. Yet terror is not enough to inhibit the use of the atomic bomb. The terror created by weapons has never stopped man from employing them. For each new weapon a defense has been produced, in time. But now we face a condition in which adequate defense does not exist.

Science, which gave us this dread power, shows that it can be made a giant help to

聯合國原子能委員會諸位委員同

人，全世界同胞：

我們來到這裏是要對人類的生機與死亡兩途，選擇一途。

這就是我們的工作。

在這原子的新時代凶兆的陰影後面，有一個希望，這個希望，要是抱有信念地把握住，可造成人類的拯救。如果我們失敗，那末，我們就判定世界每一個人成為恐懼的奴隸了。我們對世界和平和世界毀滅兩途必須要選定其一，關於這一點我們不能自誤了。

科學從自然手中奪來一個祕密，這祕密的潛力之大足以使我們對牠所引起的恐怖膽戰心驚但是恐怖的心理的力量不足以禁止人類使用原子彈的。由於武器所造成的恐怖自來絕沒有阻止人類使用武器。對每一種新的武器，向是跟着就產生一種防禦。但是目下我們面臨着一種情形我們還沒有對牠的防禦方法。

給予我們這種可怕的力量的是科學，牠顯示這種力量可能用以大大造

humanity, but science does not shows us how to prevent its baleful use. So we have been appointed to obviate that peril by finding a meeting of the minds and the hearts of our peoples. Only in the will of mankind lies the answer.

It is to express this will and make it effective that we have been assembled. We must provide the mechanism to assure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war. *To that end,*⁶ we must provide immediate, swift and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by the nations. Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a feverish interlude between wars. And, too, the United Nations can prescribe individual responsibility and punishment on the principles applied at Nuremberg by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, France and the United States—a formula certain to benefit the world's future.

In this crisis, we represent not only our governments but, in a larger way, we represent the peoples of the world. We must remember that the peoples do not belong to the governments but that the governments belong to the peoples. We must answer their demands; we must answer the world's longing for peace and security.

In that desire, the United States shares ardently and hopefully. The search of science for the absolute weapon has reached fruition in this country. But she stands ready to proscribe and destroy this instrument—to life its use from death to life—if the world will join in a pact *to that end.*¹¹

禍人類，但科學並沒有顯示我們怎樣防止牠的毀滅性的用途。因此，我們受委派來此從我們人民內心的共同點上以求消除這種危險。這個答案祇是在人類的意志裏面纔可得到的。

我們在此地開會的目的正是要把這個意志表達出來並且要使牠生效。我們必須設立一個機構，保證原子能僅為和平目的而使用，制止牠用於戰爭。為此，我們對違犯各國所訂立協定的人們，必須規定迅速實施懲處辦法。假使我們認為和平不是兩回戰爭中間一幕熱烈的插戲的話，懲罰實是必要的。同時聯合國可援用蘇英法美在紐倫堡所實施的原則，規定個別責任和懲處，這是對世界的未來確為有益的一個方式。

我們在目下的危機中不但代表我們的政府，而且在廣義上也代表全世界的人民。我們必須記着：人民並不屬於政府，相反的，政府是屬於人民的。我們必須滿足人民的要求，我們必須滿足全世界對和平同安全的渴望。

美國抱着熱烈地希望與各國同有這種願望。美國對這種絕對武器的科學研究已經完成，但是美國準備禁止並毀滅這種工具，使牠用作死亡的用途改作生活的用途，不過只要全世界加入簽訂一個同此目的協定就是。

In our success lies the promise of a new life, freed from the heart-stopping fears that now beset the world. The beginning of victory for the great ideals for which millions have bled and died lies in building a workable world plan. Now we approach fulfillment of the aspirations of mankind. At the end of the road lies the fairer, better, surer life we crave and mean to have.

Only by a lasting peace are liberties and democracies strengthened and deepened. War is their enemy. And it will not do to believe that any of us can escape war's devastation. Victor, vanquished and neutrals alike are affected physically, economically and morally.

Against the degradation of war we can erect a safeguard. That is the guerdon for which we reach. Within the scope of the formula we outline here, there will be found, to those who seek it, the essential elements of our purpose. Others will see only emptiness. Each of us carries his own mirror in which is reflected hope or determined desperation—courage or cowardice.

There is a famine throughout the world today. It starves men's bodies. But there is a greater famine—the hunger of men's spirit. That starvation can be cured by the conquest of fear, and the substitution of hope, from which springs faith—faith in each other; faith that we want to work together toward salvation; and determination that those who threaten the peace and safety shall be punished.

The peoples of these democracies gathered here have a particular concern with our answer, for their peoples hate war.

我們的成功纔有新生活的希望，這種新生活將會免除目下普遍全世界令人心寒的恐懼。千百萬人們為崇高理想流血捐軀所換得的勝利的開始就在建立一個實用的世界計劃。目下我們到了要把人類希望實現的時候。我們所渴望，所企望的更光明，更好，更確切的生活就在我們長途的終點。

祇有永久和平纔使自由和民主根深蒂固。戰爭是牠們的敵人，而我們相信我們任何一人可以避免戰爭的摧殘是不行的。勝利者，被征服者和中立者在物質，經濟和道德三方面都是一樣同敗俱傷了。

我們對戰爭的惡化力量可能建立一種防禦。這就是我們有意求得保障的人們所求的報酬；在我們所扼述的方式的裏面可發覺我們的工作目的要點。其他的人們所見的祇是空洞之詞而已。每個人的鏡子和別人的不同，有的裏面反映着希望，或是堅定的絕望，有的反映着勇敢，或是懦怯。

目下全世界有普遍的飢荒。這個飢荒是把人們的身體餓壞。但是還有更大的飢荒，那就是精神的飢餓。這種飢餓惟有用克服恐懼，而以希望替代的辦法纔可以得以療治的。希望是彼此信賴的泉源，就是我們要合作拯救世界的信心，也就是我們要懲罰威脅和平者的決心。

此次到會各民主國代表的答案對他們所代表的人民有重大關係，因為他們都是恨惡戰爭。我們如果失敗不

They will have a heavy exaction to make of those who fail to provide an escape. They are not afraid of an internationalism that protects; they are unwilling to be *fobbed off with*⁸ mouthings about narrow sovereignty, which is today's phrase for yesterday's isolation.

The basis of a sound foreign policy, in this new age, for all the nations here gathered, is that: Anything that happens, *no matter where or how*,⁹ which menaces the peace of the world, or the economic stability, concerns each and all of us.

That roughly, may be said to be the central theme of the United Nations. It is with that thought we begin consideration of the most important subject that can engage mankind—life itself.

Let there be no quibbling about the duty and the responsibility of this group and of the governments we represent, I was moved, *in the afternoon of my life*,¹⁰ to add my effort to gain the world's quest, by the broad mandate under which we were created. The resolution of the General Assembly, passed January 24, 1946, in London reads:

"Section V. Terms of Reference of the Commission. "The Commission shall proceed with utmost dispatch and inquire into all phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible. In particular the Commission shall make specific proposals:

"a. For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;

"b. For control of atomic energy

能有逃避戰爭的辦法，他們必對我們要嚴厲譴責的。他們並不怕有一個確能盡保衛之責的國際組織，而決不願受那狹義主權論調的欺騙，這種語句是過去孤立主義的新名詞。

這次到會各國，在這新時代中所應遵行的健全外交政策是這樣的：凡是世界和平和經濟穩定發生威脅的任何事情，不論發生何地，或起因如何，和我們全體均有關係。

這個大致可以說是聯合國的中心任務。我們就是懷着這個思想着手考慮聯擊着人類最重要的事體——人生本身。

關於本會以及我們所代表的政府的職責不能有模稜兩可的情形。我個人在晚年對全世界人民所探討之和平從事協力覓致的時候，大為設立本會的遠大之委托所感動。一九四六年一月二十四日，大會在倫敦所通過的議決案有云：

【第五節：“原子能管制”委員會提供參攷條件：「本委員會須儘速調查本問題之各方面並對此須隨時儘力提出建議。本委員會尤須提有關下列之詳細提案：

【（甲）求各國間以和平為目的之科學情報交換上得以推廣；

【（乙）管制原子能務使其為和

to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes;

“c. For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

“d. For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

“The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages. The successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.”

Our mandate rests, in text and in spirit, upon the outcome of the conference in Moscow of Messrs. Molotov of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bevin of the United Kingdom, and Byrnes of the United States of America. The three Foreign Ministers, on December 27, 1945, proposed the establishment of this body.

Their action was animated by a preceding conference in Washington, on November 15, 1945, when the President of the United States, associated with Mr. Attlee, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Mr. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, stated that international control of the whole field of atomic energy was immediately essential. They proposed the formation of this body. In examining that source, the agreed declaration, it will be found that the fathers of the concept recognized the final means of world salvation—the abolition of war. Solemnly they

平目的之應用得有必需限度之保障；

【（丙）消除各國間原子武器及其他有大規模毀滅性主要武器之軍備；

【（丁）藉調查及其他辦法保護守約國家對因危犯及逃避所發生之危險得有效之保證。

【本委員會之工作得分各個階段實施，因此每一階段工作之順利完成可在下一階段開始前使全世界對原子能管制必需之信任得以進展。】

我們的委托，在文字和精神兩方面，都是根據蘇聯莫洛托夫，英國貝文和美國貝爾納斯三位先生所舉行莫斯科會議結果的。本會是根據一九四五年十二月二十七日那次會議的建議而設立的。

他們這種措置是由於同年十一月十五日前一次的華盛頓會議促成的。那個時候美國總統會同英首相艾德禮加拿大首相金氏聲明整個原子能方面有國際迅速管制的必要。於是他們建議了組織本會。把那次協議的聲明的原文檢討一下，就可以發覺國際管制原子能這個觀念的創始者對消滅戰爭為拯救世界的最終極的手段一點，是認清了的。他們詞嚴義正的這樣地寫

wrote:

"We are aware that the only complete protection for the civilized world from the destructive use of scientific knowledge lies in the prevention of war. No system of safeguards that can be devised will of itself provide an effective guarantee against production of atomic weapons by a nation bent on aggression. Nor can we ignore the possibility of the development of other weapons, or of new methods of warfare, which may constitute as great a threat to civilization as the military use of atomic energy."

Through the historical approach I have outlined, we find ourselves here to test if man can produce, through his will and faith, the miracle of peace, just as he has, through science and skill, the miracle of the atom.

The United States proposes the creation of an international atomic development authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and including:

1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.
2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.
3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.
4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character intended to put the authority *in the forefront* of atomic knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to detect, misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the authority must itself be the

着：

「吾人深知欲使文明世界不至受科學知識毀滅性應用之危險，其唯一完全保障端在制止戰爭。吾人欲設計一種保證制度使牠本身對某一蓄意侵略國家製造原子武器可提供有效保障，實為不可能。吾人亦不忽視可能有他種新武器戰爭方法發明，一如原子能用於戰爭，將對人類文明作巨大之威脅。」

從我所概述的歷史過程看起來，我們在此地開會的目的就是要試驗人類是否能像用科學和技術創造原子奇蹟一樣地用意志和信心來創造和平的奇蹟。

美國提議產生一國際管理原子能發明之機構專理原子能的發明和應用的一切方面，自原料起并包括：

- 一，管理或保有對世界安全具有潛在危險性的一切原子能活動。
- 二，有權統制，檢查和許可一切其他的原子活動。
- 三，負責鼓勵原子能的有益的應用。
- 四，負責積極研究和發明，目的在使管理機構獲得最新的原子知識，因此可以使牠明瞭，並進而偵察原子能的不正當應用。為求管理機構生效起見，管理機構本身對原子能知識和發明方面必須站在全世界領導者地位

world's leader in the field of atomic knowledge and development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge.

I offer this as a basis for beginning our discussion.

But, I think, the peoples we serve would not believe—and without faith nothing counts¹²—that a treaty, merely outlawing possession or use of the atomic bomb constitutes effective fulfillment of the instructions this Commission. Previous failures have been recorded in trying the method of simple renunciation, unsupported by effective government of security and armament limitation. No one would have faith in that approach alone.

Now, if ever,¹³ is the time to act for the common good, public opinions supports a world movement toward security. If I read the signs aright, the peoples want a program not composed merely of pious thoughts but of enforceable sanctions—an international law with teeth in it.

We of this nation, desirous of helping to bring peace to the world and realizing the heavy obligations upon us, arising from our possession of the means of producing the bomb and from the fact that it is part of our armament, are prepared to make our full contribution toward effective control of atomic energy.

When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and consign punishments set up for violations

，那末，因據有知識上的領導所賦予的偉大力量就可補充管理機構的法律地位之不足。

我個人就貢獻這個建議當作我們開始討論的基礎。

但是我以為我們所代表的人民們一定不會相信——那末，沒有信念，任何東西都沒有價值——紙條約祇是禁止原子彈的擁有或使用會使本會執行牠的命令而生效的。在過去缺乏安全和軍備限制有效保證的支持，簡單的廢止辦法都是累次失敗，這有案可查的。沒有人對這個辦法相信是唯一解決的途徑。

現在是為公共利益採取行動的時機，再則再沒有了。目下輿論正支持着一個全世界要求安全的運動。假使我的觀察不錯的話，全世界人民所要求的不是僅由虔誠思想所形成的計劃，而是一個由實施有效的制裁——一個有全力的國際公法所形成的計劃。

我們美國人有意協助使世界得有和平，並且由於據有製造原子彈的方法和擁有原子彈作一部分軍備的事實，認清我們重大責任，準備對原子彈的有效控制作充份的努力。

等到各方面同意建立一個統制原子能的適當制度，包括廢止以原子彈為武器，並且把這樣的制度付諸實施，同時更規定違反管理條例者應受懲

of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose that:

1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop.
2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty, and
3. The authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy.

Let me repeat, so as to avoid misunderstanding: My country is ready to make its full contribution toward the end we seek, subject of course, to our constitutional processes, and to an adequate system of control becoming fully effective, as we finally work it out.

Now, as to violations: In the agreement, penalties of as serious a nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as possible, should be fixed for:

1. Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb;
2. Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb;
3. Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the authority;
4. Wilful interference with the activities of the authority;
5. Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the absence of, a license granted by the international control body.

處判以國際罪行，我們就提議：

- (一)原子彈的製造應予停止。
- (二)業已製成的原子彈一應按照條約規定處置。
- (三)管理機構應保有製造原子能技術的全部情報。

讓我重述一遍以免誤解：美國已準備在遵從美國憲法上應有的程序並在我們最後擬就的適當管理制度完全生效條件下，充分努力以求達到我們所尋求的目標。

那末，關於破壞規定一點，協定裏面關於下列情事應該規定各國所能希望到的嚴肅性懲罰條款，並且要儘量的迅速確切實施：

- (一)非法據有或使用原子彈。
- (二)非法據有或使用製造原子彈合用的原子材料。
- (三)強佔管理機構所有或其所特許之任何工廠或其他財產。
- (四)故意干涉管理機構的措置。
- (五)造成或實行一切違反國際管制機構所特許或缺乏特許帶有危險性的計劃。

It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to *lend*¹⁴ myself, were I not to say to you and to our peoples, that the matter of punishment lies at the very heart heart of our present security system. It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes straight to the veto power contained in the Charter of the United Nations so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The Charter permits penalization only by concurrence of each of the five Great Powers—Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, China, France and the United States.

I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes.

The bomb does not *wait upon*¹⁵ debate. To delay may be to die. The time between violation and preventive action or punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as to the course to be followed.

As matters now stand, several years may be necessary for another country to produce a bomb, *de novo*.¹⁶ However, *once*¹⁷ the basic information is generally known, and the authority has established producing plants for peaceful purposes in the several countries, an illegal seizure of such a plant might permit a malevolent nation to produce a bomb in twelve months, and if preceded by secret preparation and necessary facilities perhaps even in a much shorter time. The time required—the advance warning

我所說的關於懲罰一層正是我們目下安全制度的中心，假使不把這一點向各位和全世界人民說明，就等於欺騙，這是我個人不願意插手的。我們不妨在此時此地公認，就原子能方面而言，懲罰的問題與聯合國憲章裏面的否決權直接有關。憲章規定僅在蘇英中法美五大強國一致同意條件下，纔許可實行懲罰。

我要明白的告知各位，我在這裏所涉到的否決權，祇限於牠對這一個特別問題的影響。對於那些違反不為破壞目的而發明或使用原子能鄭重協議的人們，不應利用否決來複護他們。

原子彈並不是候辯論有結果纔產生的。延遲也許就等於死亡。破壞的事實和防止行動或懲罰間隔的時間太短促，不許可從事延長研究什麼是應該遵行的途徑。

以目前情勢而論，別的一個國家從頭來製造一個原子彈也許需要好幾年。但是基本情報一經公佈，管理機構一經設置在各國產生為和平目的的工廠之後，非法強佔這樣的一個工廠可使一個蓄意不良的國家在一年之內造成原子彈的，假使牠已經預先有了秘密準備和必要的便利，製造所需要的時間甚至還要更短。對於原子彈可能的用途所預先發出的警告所需要的時間，祇能做一個廣泛的估計，而遲

given of the possible use of a bomb—can only be generally estimated but obviously will depend upon many factors, including the success with which the authority has been able to introduce elements of safety in the design of its plants and the degree to which illegal and secret preparation for the military use of atomic energy will have been eliminated. Presumably no nation would think of starting a war with only one bomb.

This shows how imperative speed is in detecting and penalizing violations.

The process of prevention and penalization—a problem of profound statecraft—is, as I read it, implicit in the Moscow statement, signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States and the United Kingdom a few months ago.

But before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons, it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have a guarantee of safety, not only against the offenders in the atomic area, but against the illegal users of other weapons—bacteriological, biological, gas—perhaps—*not not?*¹⁸—against war itself.

In the elimination of war lies our solution, for only then will nations cease to compete with one another in the production and use of dread “secret” weapons which are evaluated solely by their capacity to kill. This devilish program takes us back not merely to the Dark Ages, but *from cosmos to chaos*.¹⁹ If we succeed in finding a suitable way to control atomic weapons, it is reasonable to hope that we may also preclude the use of other weapons adaptable to mass destruction. When a man

明顯地要根據許多的因數，裏面包括管理機構對工廠設計方面能不能採用安全因素而有成功，以及非法和祕密準備以原子能用作武器的消滅到什麼限度。沒有那個國家祇想用一顆原子彈就發動戰爭，這我們可以推測到的。

我所說的就可指明偵察和懲罰破壞規定的迅速行動是怎樣迫切需要。

這深奧政治技術的防止和懲罰程序問題，據我看來，是默認在幾個月前蘇美英所簽訂的莫斯科聲明裏面的。

但是在任何一個國家準備放棄一個操必勝之算的武器以前，僅有空言是不足作保證的。這個國家必需要求安全保障，這不僅是對原子範圍裏面的侵犯者而有保障，而並且對非法使用其他如微菌，生物，毒氣種種武器要有保障，即根本對戰爭也未始不可有所保障。

戰爭的消弭纔使我們得有解決，因為祇有在戰爭消弭之後，各國彼此纔停止競爭製造並使用那些純粹以殺人力量強大得有價值的產生恐怖「祕密」武器。這種兇惡的殺人計劃目的不僅是要把人類退化到黑暗時代，並且要把世界從有秩序弄到混亂為止。假使我們研究管制原子武器的適當方法而有成就，我有理由希望也可以排除適合造成大規模毀滅的他其武器的使用。一個人開始學着讀“a”字的時

learns to say "a" he can, if he chooses, learn the rest of the alphabet, too.

Let this be anchored in our minds:

Peace is never long preserved by weight of metal or by an armament race. Peace can be made tranquil and secure only by understanding and agreement fortified by sanctions.: We must embrace international co-operation or international disintegration.

Science has taught us how to put the atom to work. But to make it work for good instead of for evil lies in the domain dealing with the principles of human duty. We are now facing a problem more of ethics than of physics.

The solution will require apparent sacrifice in pride and in position, but better pain as the price of peace than death as the price of war.

I now submit the following measures as representing the fundamental features of a plan which would give effect to certain of the conclusions which I have epitomized:

1. *General*—the Authority should set up a thorough plan for control of the field of atomic energy, through various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research and management by competent personnel: After this is provided for, there should be as little interference as may be with the economic plans and the present private, corporate and state relationships in the several countries involved.

2. *Raw materials* — the Authority should have as one of its earliest purposes to obtain and maintain complete and accurate information on world supplies of uranium and thorium and to bring them

候，假使他高興的話，也可以會讀其他的字母的。

我們的心裏要牢記着這一點：

軍艦發射砲量和軍備競賽決不能使和平保持長久的，祇有用制裁所支持的諒解和協議纔可以使和平得以安全。我們對國際合作和國際分裂兩途祇能選擇其一。

科學已經指示我們怎樣應用原子。但是應用原子使牠對人類有益而不為害這點是有關人類責任基本原則的範圍。所以我們所面臨的問題涉及倫理方面的比涉及物理方面的成分多。

解決之道需要對我們自己的傲慢和地位有所犧牲，但是寧可忍受痛苦作和平的代價而不自取死亡作戰爭的代價。

現在我提出下列辦法用作代表——整個計劃的各項基本要點，這個計劃可以使我剛纔所概述的結論的一部發生效力：

(一)廣泛方面——管理機構應備有合格的人事機構，採用各種形式的公有，統制，特許，產造，調查，研究與管理去訂立一個管制原子能方面的澈底計劃。有了這樣的規定後，對於有關各國的經濟計劃和現有的私人，法人和政府各種關係應儘量的減少干涉。

(二)原料——管理機構首要目的應在獲取並保有世界鈾，鈷供應的完全的，正確的情報，並且應統制鈾和

under its dominion. The precise pattern of control for various types of deposits of such materials will have to depend upon the geological, mining, refining, and economic facts involved in different situations.

The Authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it will have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium and thorium. Only after all current information on world sources of uranium and thorium is known to us all can equitable plans be made for their protection, refining and distribution.

3. *Primary production plants* — the Authority should exercise complete managerial control of the production of fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and must own and control the product of these plants.

4. *Atomic explosives*—the Authority should be given sole and exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives. Research activities in the field of atomic explosives are essential in order that the Authority may keep in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy and fulfill the objective of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by maintaining its position as the best informed agency will the Authority be able to determine the line between intrinsically dangerous and nondangerous activities.

5. *Strategic distribution of activities and materials*—the activities entrusted exclusively to the Authority because they are intrinsically dangerous to security should be distributed throughout the world. Similarly, stock piles of raw materials and fissionable materials should not be centralized.

鈷。這些原料各個種類的鑛床的確定統制方式須要根據不同情勢下有關的地質，冶礦，提煉和經濟事實。

管制機構應該不斷地進行實地查勘，這樣對全世界鈷，鈷地質獲得最完全的知識。祇有在我們大家知道了關於全世界鈷，鈷來源目下所有一切的情報之後，對鈷，鈷的保獲，提煉和分配纔能擬具一個公平的計劃。

(三)最早製造原子工廠——管理機構對最早製造原子工廠產造成危險數量的分裂性原料應施行澈底的管理，並應該把這些工廠的原子出產沒收和統制。

(四)原子炸彈——管理機構應該有唯一專有權利進行原子炸彈方面的研究。原子炸彈方面的研究是必要的，目的在使管理機構以獲得關於原子能方面的最新知識，並且使牠達到防止非法製造原子彈的目標。祇有藉保持它消息靈通的地位，管理機構纔能決定本質上含有危險性，和本質上不含危險性的差別。

(五)原子活動和原料的戰略分配——因為本質對安全含有危險而完全交管理機構負責的種種原子活動應該分佈全世界。同時對於儲存材料和分裂性材料不應集中一地。

6. *Nondangerous activities*—a function of the Authority should be promotion of the peacetime benefits of atomic energy.

Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of research reactions, the production of radioactive tracers by means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of such tracers, and to some extent the production of power should be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from the Authority. Denatured materials, whose use we know also requires suitable safeguards, should be furnished for such purposes by the Authority under lease or other arrangement. Denaturing seems to have been overestimated by the public as a safety measure.

7. *Definition of dangerous and non-dangerous activities*—although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn between dangerous and nondangerous activities, it is not *hard and fast*.²⁰ Provision should, therefore, be made to assure constant re-examination of the questions, and to permit revision of the dividing line as changing conditions and new discoveries may require.

8. *Operations of dangerous activities*—any plant dealing with uranium or thorium after it once reaches the potential of dangerous use must be not only subject to the most rigorous and competent inspection by the Authority, but its actual operation shall be under the management, supervision and control of the Authority.

9. *Inspection*—by assigning intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to the Authority, the difficulties of inspection are reduced. If the Authority is the only agency

(六)對安全無危險性的活動——促進原子能有利的平時用途應該是管理機構工作的一部份。

原子的研究(炸彈除外),反應的應用研究,用無危險反應器製造輻射作用的探準器,這種探準器的應用,以及某種限度的原子力量製造,在獲得管理機構合理特許辦法之下應該對世界各國和公民公開。變性原料的使用,我們知道也需要適當的防範。牠們為上述目的使用,管制機構應該以租借或其他辦法予以供應。人們在過去把變化作用看作安全辦法似乎是太過分。

(七)危險和無危險活動的定義——危險和無危險兩種活動中間,雖然可以劃一條合理的分線,但是這條線卻不嚴確。因此我們要規定對有關問題須作不斷之檢討,並且要適應不斷變化的條件和新發現的要求,使分線得以修正。

(八)危險活動的經營——關涉產造鈾和鈾的工廠,在一經達到危險的使用可能限度時,不但須受管理機構極嚴格有效檢查,而這個工廠的經營應受管理機構的管理,監督和統制。

(九)檢查——把本質對安全含有危險性的活動完全交由管理機構管理,檢查上的困難就可減少。假使管理

which may lawfully conduct dangerous activities, then visible operation by others than the Authority will constitute an unambiguous danger signal. Inspection will also occur in connection with the licensing functions of the Authority.

10. *Freedom of access*—adequate ingress and egress for all qualified representatives of the Authority must be assured. Many of the inspection activities of the Authority should grow out of, and be incidental to, its other functions. Important measures of inspection will be associated with the tight control of raw materials, for this is a keystone of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting, survey and research in relation to raw materials will be designed not only to serve the affirmative development functions of the Authority, but also to assure that no surreptitious operations are conducted in the raw materials field by nations or their citizens.

11. *Personnel*—the personnel of the Authority should be recruited on a basis of proven competence but also so far as possible on an international basis.

12. *Progress by stages*—a primary step in the creation of the system of control is the setting forth, in comprehensive terms of the functions, responsibilities, powers and limitations of the Authority. Once a charter for the Authority has been adopted, the Authority and the system of control for which it will be responsible will require time to become fully organized and effective. The plan of control will, therefore, have to come into effect in successive

機構是唯一合法經營對安全危險活動的機關，那末，除管理機構外，其他方面有公然經營的事，明顯地就成為危險信號。關於管理機構的特許權力，也要舉行檢查。

(十)出入的自由——管理機構所有的專門代表出入的確切辦法應得有保證。管制機構的多種檢查活動應該由牠其他的職權裏面產生出來，並且要根據其他職權臨時發動。重要的檢查辦法要和嚴密統制原料取得聯絡，因為這就是整個計劃的基石。關於原料的探礦，調查和研究種種不斷活動的目的不僅在推進管理機構積極發明的職權，而並且要保證各國或各國公民對原料方面不得私行產造。

(十一)人事——管理機構的人事應該根據能力證明而徵用，同時應該儘量根據國際性的原則。

(十二)分段進行——創立統制制度的初步是用顯明的文字把管理機構的職權，責任，實力和限制說明。管理機構的憲章一經施行，管理機構和牠所負責的管制制度還需要時間纔使牠的組織完全而且生效。因此，管制的計劃不得已要在往後各階段纔發生

stages. These should be specifically fixed in the Charter or means should be otherwise as set forth in the Charter for transitions from one stage to another, as contemplated in the resolution of the United Nations Assembly which created this Commission.

13. *Disclosures*—in the deliberations of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States is prepared to make available the information essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals which it advocates. Further disclosures must be dependent, in the interests of all, upon the effective ratification of the treaty. When the Authority is actually created the United States will join the other nations in making available the further information essential to that organization for the performance of its functions. As the successive stages of international control are reached, the United States will be prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control of activities in this field to the Authority.

14. *International control*—there will be questions about the extent of control to be allowed to national bodies, when the Authority is established. Purely national authorities for control and development of atomic energy should to the extent necessary for the effective operation of the Authority be subordinate to it. This is neither an indorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of national authorities. The Commission should evolve a clear demarcation of the scope of duties and responsibilities of such national authorities.

效力。這幾點應該在憲章裏面詳細規定，並且除憲章裏面所載明各階段的過渡辦法外，應該遵照聯合國大會產生本委員會之意旨規定其他辦法。

(十三) 情報的發表——美國準備為聯合國原子能委員會的討論，供應情報，這是對美國建議的合理了解所必要的。為全體的利害着想，還有其他的要發表，不過這要候協定得了有效的批准纔決定。國際管理機構實際產生的時候，美國就會聯合其他的國家供應管理機構行使職權上必要的情報。美國準備在國際管制進入往後各階段的時候，按照每一階段的需要程度，把美國對原子方面的管制向管理機構交代。

(十四) 國際管制——候管理機構成立後，關於許可國家機關管制的限度，會有問題發生的。純粹的國家管制和發明原子能的機構應該在國際機構有效推動所必需限度的管制下，隸屬於國際管制機構。這對國家管制的產生並不表明贊成或反對的意味。本委員會對這種國家管制的職責範圍應該劃出一個適合環境的明白分線。

And now I end. I have submitted an outline for present discussion. Our consideration will be broadened by the criticism of the United States proposals and by the plans of the other nations, which, it is to be hoped, will be submitted at their earliest convenience. I and my associate of the United States delegation will make available to each member of this body books and pamphlets, including the Acheson-Lilienthal report, recently made by the United States Department of State, and the McMahon Committee Monograph No. 1 entitled "Essential Information on Atomic Energy" relating to the McMahon Bill recently passed by the United States Senate, which may prove of value in assessing the situation.

All of us are consecrated to making an end of gloom and hopelessness. It will not be an easy job. The way is long and thorny, but supremely worth traveling. All of us want to stand erect, with our faces to the sun, instead of being forced to furrow into the earth, like rats.

The pattern of salvation must be worked out by all for all.

The light at the end of the tunnel is dim, but our path seems to grow brighter as we actually begin our journey. We cannot yet light the way to the end. However, we hope the suggestions of my Government will be illuminating.

Let us keep in mind the exhortation of Abraham Lincoln, whose words, uttered at a moment of shattering national peril, form a complete text for our deliberation. I quote, paraphrasing slightly:

"We cannot escape history. We of this

我的建議已經講完了。爲便利目前討論我把這個綱要提交本會。我們還可以拿我們對美國提案的批評和我們所期待其他各國從速提交本會的計劃補充我們的研究。我和美國代表團的同僚對本會的每位委員可供應有關的書籍和小冊子，其中包括美國國務院最近所編的艾契生和李廉托爾報告書，同關於美國參議院最近通過的麥克馬洪提案的麥克馬洪審查委員會專書第一冊，「原子能重要情報」，這對目下情形的推斷是很有價值的。

我們大家到這裏開會的專責是要掃除一切悲觀和絕望。這是一件很不容易的工作。我們的路程雖是很長又是遍滿了荆棘，但是牠是極有旅行價值的一個路程。我們大家決心面對着太陽挺起胸膛前進，而不像老鼠那樣被迫投身泥土裏面去。

我們大家必需要爲全世界人類解決拯救的方式：

我們的地道前面洞口的光線雖是暗淡，而在我們真正開始前進的時候，我們的前途就會逐漸光明。我們還不能使我們的路程光明到終點。然而我們希望美國政府的建議可以發出光輝的。

我建議我們要把林肯在美國危難的時候所發表鼓勵的言論記在心頭作我們討論的整個的藍本。我把他的話略改一下引證幾句作個結束：

「我們想逃避歷史是不可能的。」

meeting will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we are passing will light us down in honor or dishonor to the latest generation.

"We say we are for peace. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save peace. The world knows that we do. We, even we here, hold the power and have the responsibility.

"We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just—a way which, is followed, the world will forever applaud."

我們所參加的這個會，決會傳到後代，這不是我們自己所能控制的。個人的重要不重要一點不能使我們任何一個人可以放手的。目下我們所經過的大難，牠的火光會把我們的名字不是帶着榮譽的就是帶着恥辱的襯出來傳到子孫後代。

〔我們宣告我們擁護和平。全世界的人不會忘記我們這個宣告。我們知道怎樣保全和平。全世界的人明瞭我們知道這一點。我們就是在此時此地把握着這個力量，荷負着這個責任。〕

〔我們如果不能把這個世界的最後，最好的希望不能堂皇地把握住，卻會無恥的喪失掉。我們的途徑是平易的，和平的，寬大的，公正的，這個途徑如果為我們採取，全世界會永遠讚揚的。〕

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "the quick and the dead", 『生機與死亡』, 『生與死』, ("the quick"="living", "having life" 古代英語常用)。
2. "seize upon", 『奪得』, 『乘時而取』。 We must seize upon the present opportunity to democratize and industrialize our country, 吾人必須乘取目下機會使我國民主化及工業化。
3. "work" (動詞)="bring about", 『產生』, 『造成』。 Such a plan will work about a great change, 此一計劃將造成重大變更。
4. "elect" (非作『選舉』解)="choose" 『選』, 『擇』。 No one elects(=chooses, courts) ruin, 人無自取滅亡者。
5. "cower from", 『畏縮』, 『惶恐』。 The world cowers from the destructive potentialities of the atomic bomb, 全世界之人對原子彈之毀滅可能性能皆為膽裂。
6. "to that end", 『為達此(上述之)目的』(即"to assure that atomic energy is used for useful purposes and preclude its use in war") China must be industrialized; to that end, we should promote scientific education, 中國有工業化之必要, 為達此目的吾人應推進科學教育。
7. "to that end" 指 "to proscribe and destroy this instrument"。
8. "fob off (a person with something)", 『欺騙』, 『朦蔽』。 He fobbed off the public with a false presentation of facts, 彼將事實是非顛倒以朦蔽大眾。
9. "no matter where or how"="no matter where or how it may happen (或it happens)" 之省略。
10. "in the afternoon of life", 『晚年』("in the morning of life", 『幼時』)。 Work hard or you'll regret in the afternoon of your life, 少小不努力, 老大徒傷悲。
11. "in the fore-front of (a battle)", 由戰陣之最前線轉為) 『最先』, 『最新』。 The betterment of the life of farmers should stand in the fore-front of the national rehabilitation program, 改進農民生活為計劃全國善後當務之急。
12. "count", 『有價值』。 Such men do not count for any thing, 此種人無甚可重。
13. "now, if ever"="now, or never"。
14. "lend oneself to", 『有關係』, 『插手』。 He never lent himself to falsehood, 彼決不關涉虛偽之事。
15. "wait

upon" 『待』，『候』。Such an important problem requires immediate solution, for it cannot wait upon our deliberation, 此一重要問題須立即解決，不能待吾人詳加討論。 16. "de novo" (拉丁語) = "afresh", "anew", 『重新』『再作』。 17. "once" = "when (式if) once", 『一旦』，『一經』。(When) Once you have formed a bad habit, you will find it hard to shake it off, 惡習一經染成，汝將不易脫去之。 18. "why not!" 插入句。 19. "from cosmos to chaos", 『由秩序而入混亂狀態』，『成為天翻地覆』。 It is strange to note that a single person or a single misconception should turn the whole world from cosmos to chaos, 某一人或一種錯誤觀念可將世界由秩序引入混亂一事，誠為奇異。 20. "hard and fast", 『固定』，『顯明不變』。 No hard and fast line can be drawn between the two, 此二者之間無固定之界線。

THE PRELIMINARY OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE ATOMIC BOMB TEST HELD AT BIKINI ATOLL ON JULY 1, 1946

*Made by the U.S. Evaluation Board¹ for the Atomic Tests to the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff in Washington*

比基尼原子彈試驗正式報告書

美國原子彈試驗估計委員會向聯合參謀部提出

The members of the Board inspected the target ships the day before the test, witnessed the explosion from an airplane 20 miles distant, and then approached to within nine miles of the atoll for a brief view. On the following day, as soon as safety clearance had been received, the members flew to Bikini and began their examination of ship damage. Many photographs have been studied, and military and scientific specialists interviewed, in an attempt to obtain an over-all understanding of test results prior to the compilation of all the data.

From its previous study of the plans for the test, and from its observations in the Bikini area, the Board considers that the test was well conceived and executed by the services in close co-operation with a large civilian staff. It is satisfied that the conditions of the test were well chosen and that highest skill and ingenuity have been used to obtain a maximum amount of data in an unbiased and scientific manner. It believes that the commander, staff and personnel of Task Force One deserve high commendation

委員等曾經於試驗之先一日檢查靶子艦，次日曾乘飛機至距離爆炸地二十哩從事觀察，其後又到達珊瑚島九哩以內作簡短之考察。委員等日於接獲安全障礙掃除報告後，比即飛達比基尼開始檢查靶子艦損壞情況。委員等復研究各種照片，並與軍事及科學專家晤談冀求於獲得試驗結果澈底瞭解後，從事編輯一切資料。

本委員會根據對試驗計劃之預先研究及其在比基尼之實地觀察，認為此次試驗設計週到並在海空軍及文官官佐密切合作下圓滿執行。本委員會對此次試驗條件選擇之完善，及抱嚴正科學態度覓致極大量資料所用之高度技術與智慧，均為滿意。本委員會相信此次試驗司令官及第一特種聯部隊官佐人員工作之優良，合作精神

for their excellent performance and their notable co-operative spirit.

Effective precautions appeared to have been taken to safeguard personnel against radio activity and associated dangers.

The Board's present information is that the bomb exploded with an intensity which approached the best of the three previous atomic bombs, over a point, 1,500 to 2,000 feet westerly of the assigned target, and at approximately the planned altitude.

The target array in no sense represented an actual naval disposition but was designed to obtain the maximum data from a single explosion. The most important effects produced by the bomb are the following:

(a) A destroyer and two transports sank promptly and another destroyer capsized. It later sank, and the Japanese cruiser *Sakawa* sank the following day. The superstructure of the submarine *Skate* was so badly damaged as to make it unsafe to submerge the vessel. The light carrier *Independence* was badly wrecked by the explosion, gutted by fire, and further damaged by internal explosions of low order, including those of torpedoes. All the above vessels were within one half mile of the explosion point.

(b) Numerous fires were started on other ships, including one on a ship two miles distant, which was apparently due to some unusual circumstance, since the other fires were much closer. Here it should be remembered that the target ship decks carried a great variety of test material not ordinarily exposed on the decks of naval

之表現應受崇高贊譽。

對所有人員避免輻射能及其他有關危險之有效預防，證明事先確有佈置。

本委員會所得情報為：此次爆炸之原子彈在預定靶子以西一千五百至二千呎之一點，並在原有設計之高度下，達到以前原子三枚之最高強度。

此次靶子之裝備絲毫無實際海軍配備，其計劃僅在覓致一次爆炸所有之極大量資料而已。此次原子彈所發生之重要影響如下：

(甲)驅逐艦一艘，運輸艦兩艘立即沉沒。驅逐艦另一艘傾覆後亦沉沒，日本巡洋艦佐賀號於次日沉沒。潛水艇斯凱特號船面裝備損壞太重以至不能使其沉於水面下。輕航空母艦獨立號因爆炸受創極重，着火損壞，更因內部低度軍火及魚雷爆炸損壞。以上船隻均在爆炸點半哩範圍以內。

(乙)其他艦隻，均已起火，包括距離兩哩一艘在內，此當為某特殊情形所致，與離爆炸處較近其他起火船隻自為不同。且靶子艦艙面有各種試驗器材通常不置放軍艦艙面者，此一事實應在此處提明。

vessels.

(c) The only major combatant ships within one half mile of the explosion point were the battleships *Nevada* and *Arkansas* and the heavy cruiser *Pensacola*. The blast struck these from the after quarter. Apparently little damage was done to their hulls or their main turrets but their superstructures were badly wrecked. These ships were unquestionably put out of action and would, along with many others within three fourths of a mile, have required extensive repairs at a principal naval base.

(d) Other ships in the target array suffered damage in varying degrees, depending on position and type of ship, but there was relatively little damage at distances greater than three fourths of a mile.

(e) The primary material effects noted were due to blast, buckling of decks and bulkheads, and destruction or deformation of lightly constructed exposed objects, including stacks, masts, and antennae. Secondary effects were due to fire, and it is noteworthy that Army Quartermaster stores and miscellaneous equipment placed on the decks for the test proved more vulnerable than normal naval deck gear. It should be pointed out that since the targets carried no personnel the fires were uncontrolled and undoubtedly there was more damage than there would have been under battle conditions. Singularly, although considerable amounts of explosive ordnance were exposed on decks and in gun turrets, there is no indication on ships which remain afloat that any of this material was exploded by direct action of the atomic bomb. Fire-fighting ships entered

(丙)在爆炸點半哩範圍以內之主要作戰艦隻僅為主力艦尼伐達號及阿剛薩斯號，輕巡洋艦本薩科拉號。原子彈火力襲擊在數艦之後輪，故其艦殼及船面主要車塔顯無絲毫損壞，但其船面裝備破裂甚重。此數艦艘已完全失去效用，殆無問題，並與在一哩四分之三以內之其他艦艘需在海軍主要基地從事大規模修理始可。

(丁)靶子範圍以內之其他艦隻所受損壞之程度各有不同，此須視艦隻之位置與形式而定，但在距離大於一哩之四分之三以外所受損壞比較微小。

(戊)顯明之主要物質影響係原子彈爆炸力所致。如船上甲板隔板之彎曲及烟囪船桅天線等甲板外部不甚堅固裝置之毀壞或歪曲是。次要之影響係由火力所致，此次由放置甲板面上為試驗用之軍需用品及其他雜項配備示明較正常海軍機械易受損壞，此點堪以注意。此處須指明一點，即此次各靶子艦既未載人，火力未加控制，故所遭受之損壞較在作戰情勢假定下為重，毫無疑問。所引為奇異者，即甲板及砲塔面上所放置有爆炸性軍工器材雖有相當數量，而水面所浮之未

the target area as soon as they could obtain radiological security permission and subdued a number of fires. The speed and efficiency with which these ships acted preserved for later examination a great deal of evidence of bomb action which might otherwise have been lost.

(f) Examination of the flash burn effects produced by the initial radiation from the explosion indicates that casualties would have been high among exposed personnel. However, it is the opinion of the Board that persons sheltered within the hull of a ship or even on deck in the shadow of radiation from the bomb would not have been immediately incapacitated by burns alone, whatever might have been the subsequent radiological effects.

(g) Within the area of extensive blast damage to ship superstructures there is evidence that personnel within the ships would have been exposed to a lethal dosage of radiological effects.

Personnel casualties due to blast would no doubt have been high for those in exposed positions on vessels within one half mile of the target center. Beyond this, any discussion of the blast effect upon personnel will have to await the detailed reports of the medical specialists.

In general, no significant unexpected phenomena occurred, although the test was designed to cope with considerable variation from predictions. There was no large water wave formed. The radioactive residue dissipated in the manner expected. No damage occurred on Bikini Island, about three miles from the explosion center.

沉沒艦隻概不示明任何器材係原子彈直接爆炸毀滅者。救火船隻在獲得輻射能安全許可後，即駛入靶子地區，撲滅多處火勢。

(己)由檢查爆炸最初發射所產生之閃光燃燒影響示明艦面如有人員，死傷勢必巨大。觀察團認為人在艦殼內得有掩蔽，或在甲板而上得以遮蔽不受原子彈影響，不論原子彈所爆發後之輻射效力為如何，不至立即僅因受輻射灼傷而失去能力。

(庚)如船面載有人員，可證明在爆炸可能損壞艦隻表面裝配之廣大範圍內，彼等皆冒受輻射影響相當分量足以致命。

在靶子中心半哩以內之艦隻上無掩蔽之人員因原子彈爆炸所致之死傷數字必甚大，毫無疑問。關於此範圍以外，原子彈爆炸對人員之影響如何，須俟醫學專家詳細報告到達後始能從事研究。

廣泛言之，此次試驗設計雖為針對預測以外相當差異結果而作，但並無超過預期之顯著現象發生。原子彈爆炸並未激成巨大水浪。輻射能餘力在預期情形下消散。比基尼距離爆炸中心約三哩，並未有損害發生。

From what it has seen and from what it has ascertained from data now available, the Board is able to make certain general observations:

(a) The atomic bomb dropped at Bikini damaged more ships than have ever before been damaged by a single explosion.

(b) The test has provided adequate data of a sort necessary for the redesign of naval vessels to minimize damage to superstructures and deck personnel from this type of bomb. Because of the nature of the first test (air burst) little information has been obtained on hull effects. Damage to ships' hulls will be studied specifically in the second test when a bomb will be exploded under water.

(c) A vast amount of data which will prove invaluable throughout scientific and engineering fields has been made available by this test. Once more the importance of large-scale research has been dramatically demonstrated. There can be no question that the effort and expense involved in this test has been amply justified both by the information secured and by greatly narrowing the range of speculation and argument. Moreover, it is clear to the Board that only by further large-scale research and development can the United States retain its present position of scientific leadership. This must be done in the interests of national safety.

The Board desires to say that it has had the fullest co-operation of the task force commander, and that every opportunity has been afforded it in carrying out its mission. The members of the Board have had access

本委員會由目擊一切並由所獲得之資料推斷，可作廣泛之觀測要點如下：

(甲)在比基尼所投下之原子彈，損壞艦隻較以前所投原子彈一枚所發生之損壞為大。

(乙)此次試驗曾供備適當之資料，為海軍艦隻重新設計以求減少此種形式原子彈對甲板面上裝備及人員損傷所必需者。關於第一次試驗上空墜落爆炸對艦殼之影響，因試驗本身性質關係無從獲得情報。關於艦殼損壞一點，將在第二次深水爆炸時將作特別研究。

(丙)此次試驗獲有對全面科學及工程學方面有價值之大量資料。此次試驗再次指明大規模之研究實屬重要。此次試驗所耗費之努力與金錢於吾人所獲得之情報並於縮小對原子能之推測與爭論兩點，可謂獲有重大酬報則毫無疑問。更有進者，本委員會對美國僅有持更進步之大規模研究與發明始可保持其當前科學領導地位有明顯之認識。為國家安全起見，此種研究與發明為勢所必行之事。

本委員會有一事欲聲明者，即海軍特種混合部隊司令官曾予本委員會充分之合作及執行任務上一切之機會。委員等對截至本階段止所有搜集之

to all data thus far accumulated and have had every facility for personally inspecting the results of the test.

資料均得參考上便利並對此次試驗結果，亦獲有實地調查之一切便利。

NOTE

美原子彈，試驗委員會由麻省工大校長 Dr. Karl T. Compton (主任委員)，Bradley Dewey (副主任委員)，Thomas F. Farrell, Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell(空軍), Lieut. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton (空軍)，Rear Adm. W. R. Purnell (海軍)，Rear Adm. R. A. Oftie (海軍) 七人組織而成。

TRUMAN'S MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Delivered on June 30, 1946

杜魯門致菲律賓人民之咨文

一九四六年六月三十日發出

To the people of the Philippines:

I am, indeed, happy to be able to join with you in the formal inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines.

This is a proud day for our two countries. For the Philippines it marks the end of a centuries-old struggle for freedom. For the United States it marks the end of a period of almost 50 years of cooperation with the Philippines looking toward independence.

Now the new republic faces the problems of independent nationhood. Those problems will be difficult and trying. The road to independence has not been an easy one. The road of independence will likewise not be an easy one.

The mettle of a people, the mettle of a nation, are tried before the world.

But the United States has faith in the ability and in the determination of the Philippine people to solve the problems confronting their country.

The men who defied Magellan, who fought for a republic in 1898, and who more recently on Bataan, Corregidor, and at a hundred other unsung battlegrounds in the Philippines flung back the Japanese challenge, will not lack the courage which is necessary

菲律賓人民公鑒：

本人能與諸君參加菲律賓共和國

正式宣佈獨立典禮深感欣慰。

今日乃菲美兩國光榮之一日。以

菲律賓言，此蓋表示近五十年來協助

貴國實現獨立之完成。

現今新共和國面對獨立國所具有之種種問題。此類問題極為繁雜。達到獨立之路並非康莊大道。獨立前途亦將荆棘叢生。

民族之勇氣及國家之勇氣正待世界考驗。

惟美國對於菲律賓人民解決面臨

困難之能力與決心，頗具信念。

過去舉凡反抗馬吉倫，一八九八年為建立共和國而戰鬥，晚近於巴丹可累幾多，以及菲律賓島上無數無名之戰場擊退日軍挑戰之人民，在和平時期決不缺乏推進國家行政所必需之

to make government work in peace as well as in war. The will to succeed, I am sure, will continue to govern the actions of the Philippine people.

The United States, moreover, will continue to assist the Philippines in every way possible. A formal compact is being dissolved. The compact of faith and understanding between the two peoples can never be dissolved. We recognize the fact and propose to do all within our power to make Philippine independence effective and meaningful.

Our two countries will be closely bound together for many years to come. We of the United States feel that we are merely entering into a new partnership with the Philippines—a partnership of two free and sovereign nations working in harmony and understanding. The United States and its partner of the Pacific, the Philippine Republic, have already charted a pattern of relationships for all the world to study. Together in the future, our two countries must prove the soundness and the wisdom of the great experiment in Pacific democracy.

May God protect and preserve the Republic of the Philippines.

勇氣有如戰爭時期然。余確信爭取成功之心將繼續支配菲律賓人民之行動。

再者美國將繼續盡力於各方面協助菲律賓。形式之結合固已解體，而菲美兩國人民信仰與諒解之結合，則決無解體之一日。吾人深知此事實，自當竭力促使菲律賓獨立發生實效而有意義。

菲美兩國於未來多年中將緊密團結。吾輩美人認為吾人與菲律賓成立一種新結合——一種同心協力互相諒解之兩大獨立國家之結合。美國及其太平洋上友人菲律賓共和國且已確立友好關係之榜樣，可供世界之學習。以將來言，菲美兩國共同對於太平洋民主政治之偉大實施，必以事實說明其健全與智惠。

願上帝保衛菲律賓共和國而使之永存。

PRESIDENT OF THE PHILLIPINES MANUEL A ROXAS'S STATEMENT PROMISING TO MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES WITH THE U. S.

Written for the Associated Press, July 1, 1946

菲律賓總統羅哈斯關於菲美合作之聲明

一九四六年七月一日交聯合社發表

As President of my republic, I have committed myself to a policy of frank, open and whole-hearted cooperation with the United States in its foreign policy, particularly in the Far East, and toward the United Nations.

I regard the United States as the leading nation in this part of the world. I have great faith and confidence in the fine purposes and the altruism of the United States and I am certain its foreign policy will always be inspired by these great ideals.

The United States is not looking for advantage anywhere in the Far East. I am firm in my purpose not merely to cooperate with America's policy in the Philippines, but also do everything in the power of the Philippine government in enabling the United States to safeguard all military, naval and air bases it may desire permanently to establish here.

As President of the Philippines, I will so arrange the defense of these islands that it may be intimately coordinated with the plans of the United States for the maintenance of defensive bases in the Philippines. We will

予茲以菲律賓總統身份聲明，對美國之外交政策，尤其對遠東及聯合國國家所行政策，深願開誠佈公與之合作。

予承認美國在遠東居領導地位。予對美國高尚之目標及其利人精神，發生極大之信任。予敢斷言，美國之對外政策將常以此種高尚理想為其出發點。

美國固不欲在遠東任何一地獲取利益。予不僅堅欲對美國在菲所行政策表示合作，且更欲盡菲政府之所能，使美國欲在此間建立之陸海空軍永久基地，獲得保障。

此外，予亦將確定防衛菲律賓辦法，俾使與美國保衛菲律賓基地之計劃，發生緊密聯繫。吾人並將以全力

maintain as large an army as our resources permit and it will cooperate very closely with the armed forces of the United States based in the Philippines.

Also I am committed with reservations in favor of stimulating the influx of American capital into the Philippines. After the destruction we have suffered, due to war, it can be truthfully said that the Philippines constitute an almost complete economic vacuum. We do not have enough of our own capital to develop the country and, therefore, unless American capital comes to our aid we will have to depend on other foreign capital.

I wish to safeguard against this in order to avoid any future political complications which might prove most dangerous to the independence of the Philippines.

Most people of the Philippines, without exception, profess the most profound affection and gratitude to the people of the United States. It is not merely because of what America had taught us before the war in showing us the ways of democracy and thus inspiring us with an even greater love for freedom and equality. It is also because of America's liberation of our country from the hands of a cruel and inhuman enemy.

We have drunk very deeply from the fountain source of America's great history and traditions.

After we receive our independence, we will continue to seek and to maintain as close relationship with the United States as possible. Perhaps not always will we be able to maintain a close political relationship, but an intimate cooperation with American institutions will remain and endure.

組織菲律賓陸軍，使其與此間美國駐軍通力合作。

予更將鼓勵美國資金流入菲律賓。菲島飽受戰禍，經濟上實已成真空狀態。吾人無充分資金以供復興之用，以故美國如不來投資，勢將另外仰給其他國家。

為避免將來引起政治糾紛而陷菲律賓於極度危險境地，予願對此先事聲明。

大多數菲人對美國人民幾均表示異常親切與感激，無一例外。其原因固不僅以美國曾於戰前領導吾人踏上真正民主之途，使吾人更加崇愛自由與平等。美國使吾人於慘無人道之敵人手中，獲得解放，要亦為其原因之一。

美國有偉大之歷史與傳統，吾人受其薰陶始已甚深。

菲人獨立後，將繼續盡力與美國保持友好關係。吾人容或不能與美國維持親密之政治關係，惟美國各種制度，各種團體之友善關係，必將保持不衰。

We will always continue teaching the English language in our public schools. We will attentively watch America's leadership in world affairs.

I truly hope there will be no more war. However, should future events prove otherwise and the United States once again takes up arms in defense of liberty and human rights, I am sure the people of the Philippines will consider it not merely an honor but also their duty to fight alongside the Americans.

吾人之初高等學校均將繼續教授英語。吾人對美國在世界所居之領導地位將予密切注意。

予至誠希望此後永無戰爭。但如不幸，事與願違，美國再度所保護自由與人權而使用武力，則予深信菲律賓人民將與美國駢肩作戰，美菲共同作戰，不僅為一種光榮，且亦為應盡之責任。

BYRNES'S BROADCAST SPEECH ON "THE ROAD TO PEACE"

A radio report to the American people on the progress of the Big Four Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris and on plans for the 21-nation Peace Conference in Paris on July 29, made on July 15, 1946.

貝爾納斯向國人報告最近巴黎外長 會議經過之播詞

一九四六年七月十五日播送

After every great war, the victors find the making of peace difficult and disappointing. It took the 13 American states more than five years after winning their independence to agree upon¹ a constitution which promised anything like a durable peace among themselves.

The building of world peace, bridging over² differences in ideas, values, codes of conduct and deeply cherished aspirations, requires even greater tolerance, patience and understanding. It requires the will and ability to seek the best, to accept the best obtainable, and then to make the best obtainable work. As war breeds war, so peace can be made to breed peace. That is why President Truman and I were determined at Potsdam last summer, two months after V-E Day,³ to set up the Council of Foreign Ministers.

We were eager to have the Council start the making of⁴ peace and to make⁵ peace as quickly as possible whenever possible.⁶ It was obvious then that the making of peace with Germany would take time. There was

每次大戰之後，勝利國均感締造和平工作之困難及令人失望。即就獨立戰爭後之美國而言，其時亦有十三州在內政問題相持之下，歷時五年始制定保證國內恆久和平之憲法。

世界和平之締造，作不同觀念等之彌補，在在均須更大之容忍與諒解，覓取最完善之決策，接受之，然後予以實施。締造世界和平必須具有此種意旨與能力。一如戰爭之助長戰禍，吾人亦能以和平加強和平。因此去年夏間歐洲勝利兩閱月後，杜魯門總統與余在波茨坦決定設立外長理事會。

余等急欲展開締造和平之工作，並儘速獲致各地之和平。就當時之情勢觀之，與德國締結和約顯需相當時日。德國既無與聞其事之政府，吾人

no German government to deal with, and no agreement as to how soon we should permit a German government to function.

It was equally obvious that a start could be made toward making peace with Italy and the states which were satellites of the Axis. They had governments. So we started there.

The world knows how great the struggle has been during the last ten months to harmonize the views of the great powers so as to⁷ make possible⁸ the presentation of tentative drafts of treaties to a peace conference. That struggle has now been brought to a successful conclusion, and the peace conference has been called to meet in Paris on July 29.

In addition to the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, China and the United States, the states which are represented on the Council of Foreign Ministers, the 16 other states which took an active part in the fighting⁹ against the European Axis will be represented at the conference.

While the Council of Foreign Ministers has made some suggestions as to the organization and procedure of the conference, the conference will be free to determine its own organization and procedure. It was proposed that the meetings of subcommittees should be secret. But on our objection, this provision was eliminated. I gave notice that so far as¹⁰ the United States is concerned, it will use its influence to open to the press the meetings of the conference and of its committees.

The conference will make only recommendations. But the members of the Council are committed, in drafting the final

亦無規定日期允許德國政府成立之協定。

吾人應與義大利及其他軸心附庸國訂立和約亦為極其顯明之事。因義大利等國仍有政府，故吾人即在此方面展開工作。

過去十月來，吾人消弭各強異見，草擬和約及準備召開和會工作之繁重，已為世界人士所深知。此項工作現已獲得圓滿之結果，和會亦經決定於七月廿九日在巴黎召開。

除業已派代表出席外長會議之國家蘇、英、法、中、美外、並有其他會積極參與歐洲反軸心戰之十六國家亦將推派代表出席。

外長理事會對和會之組織及議程雖有所建議，惟和會仍可自行決定其組織及會議程序。過去曾有小組委員會會議應保守秘密之建議，惟經吾人反對後，此項建議已作罷論。余曾表示，就美國而論，認為吾人應將和會及其委員會之會議內容儘量公開。

和會之任務僅在提出各項建議；外長理事會各會員則負責擬定和約之

texts of the treaties, to consider the recommendations of the conference and not to reject any of them arbitrarily.

It is my hope that the Council of Foreign Ministers will consider the recommendations and agree upon the final text so that the treaties may be signed by the delegates before the conference adjourns.

The drafts of treaties agreed upon are not the best which human wit could devise, but they are the best which human wit could get the four principal Allies to agree upon. They present as satisfactory an approach to the return of peace as we could hope for in this imperfect and war-weary world.

The attitude of the United States in these matters represented not only the judgment of the President and the Secretary of State, but also the judgment of Senator Connally and Senator Vandenberg, whose long experience in our foreign relations and intimate knowledge of the specific issues made their counsel invaluable.

The greatest struggle was over the Italian treaty, and the greatest issue involved in that treaty was the fate of Trieste and adjacent territory along the western shore of the Istrian peninsula. The American delegation, supported by the French and British, urged that Trieste adjacent territory, which are predominantly Italian, should remain with Italy, and the predominantly Slavic hinterland should go to Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union argued strongly that Trieste and adjacent territory should not be cut off from its immediate hinterland. While it admitted that a few cities and towns along the coast were predominantly Italian,

最後草案並考慮和會之建議，不得武斷拒絕其中任何一項。

余希望外長理事會考慮和會建議並贊同和約最後草案後，和約即由代表在和會休會前簽訂。

經由各國贊同之和約草案，並非人類智慧之最佳結晶，惟確係人類智慧所能促使四強一致同意之最佳成果。和約草案，將顯示各國在戰雲密佈之世界中，對恢復世界和平，已迫進一步。

美國對此事之態度不僅代表總統及國務卿之意見，且代表參議員康納利及范登堡之意見，康納利及范登堡參議員均富於外交經驗，且對訂立和約締造和平之工作均有深切之認識。

最大之爭執，在於義大利條約，而該條約所牽涉之最大問題，厥為特里雅斯特港以及沿伊斯特里亞半島西岸領土之命運。美代表在英法代表支持之下，力主特港及其附近領土仍留與義大利，而屬於斯拉夫之內地，則歸於南斯拉夫。蘇聯竭力爭辯謂，特里雅斯特與附近領土，不應與其直接之內地切斷。蘇聯雖承認沿海岸數處城市與市鎮確屬於義大利，但力主伊斯特里亞半島應視作整個的領土，而

it urged that the Istrian peninsula should be regarded as a whole and that so regarded it was predominantly Yugoslav. This view was also urged by Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union further urged that greater consideration should be given to the Yugoslav claims than to the Italian claims because, while Italy as one of the Axis partners was responsible for bringing on the war against the Allies and for the loss of thousands of Allied lives, Yugoslavia had fought on the Allied side throughout the war and suffered from the attacks of Italy.

Since neither the Soviets nor ourselves were prepared to yield, we then proposed that the issue be left to the peace conference, but the Soviets would not agree. This left us in a more serious *dilemma*¹¹ than most people realize.

We could make a separate peace with Italy, leaving her Trieste, but the Soviet and Yugoslav Governments, and possibly others, would not accept that treaty. If we made a separate peace, the Soviet and Yugoslav Governments would undoubtedly demand that Italy *make*¹² a separate peace with them, ceding Trieste to Yugoslavia. If Italy refused, it is not difficult to foresee the difficulties which would arise. Even if no one of us presented a treaty to Italy, a disarmed Italy could hold Trieste against the army of Yugoslavia *only*¹³ so long as our troops held it for her.

In an effort to break this deadlock, the French informally suggested that Trieste and adjacent territory be separated from Italy but not ceded to Yugoslavia, and that its security and integrity be internationally

既作為整個的領土論，則其主權自當屬諸南斯拉夫。捷克亦支持此種見解。蘇聯更主張對於南斯拉夫之要求，較之對於義大利之要求，應予以更大之考慮，因義大利前為軸心夥伴之一，對於向盟國作戰及盟國數千萬人生命之喪失，應負責任。反之，南斯拉夫則始終與盟國并肩作戰而遭受義大利之襲擊。

蘇聯與吾人彼此既均不準備讓步，於是吾人提議將此問題提交和平會議，但蘇聯對此點亦不同意。因此吾人遂處於進退兩難之地位，較之大多數人所能想像者更為嚴重。

吾人固不妨與義大利單獨訂立條約而置特里雅斯特於不顧，但蘇聯與南斯拉夫政府以及其他若干政府不願接受此種條約。吾人苟單獨訂立條約，則蘇聯與南斯拉夫政府勢必要求義大利亦與彼等單獨訂立條約而以特里雅斯特割與南斯拉夫。義大利若果拒絕，則不難預料種種困難將由此而起。即使無人向義大利提出條約，而已被解除武裝之義大利亦僅能在我軍代為保守特里雅斯特之時期內，抵禦南斯拉夫之軍隊。

為努力打破此種僵局起見，法國非正式提議，特港及其附近領土與義大利分離，但並不割讓與南斯拉夫，而由國際保證安全與完整。初時無人

guaranteed. At first, no one liked this proposal. But the more it was studied, the¹⁴ more it seemed to offer a reasonable basis for agreement. It was recalled that before Italy entered World War I, she had proposed that the Trieste area should become an autonomous state. Our delegation insisted that the area should be protected by the United Nations and not by the Governments of Italy and Yugoslavia as the Soviets suggested, and not by the four principal Allied Powers as suggested by the French. Our proposals were accepted. The proposal, as finally agreed upon, leaves Gorizia and Montfalcone with Italy in the north and includes within the free territory of Trieste the rest of the area west of the agreed ethnic line. It is true that the free territory of Trieste is predominantly Italian in the city and predominantly Slav outside of the city. But neither the Italians nor the Slavs in this territory are placed under foreign rule. They are given home rule; the people will elect their own assembly, and the assembly will select the officials to administer the laws. They will be subject to supervision by the United Nations Security Council and by an impartial governor appointed by the Security Council.

The prosperity and the welfare of Trieste are linked not only with Italy but with Yugoslavia and the countries of central Europe. It is the natural outlet of central Europe to the Mediterranean. The only railroads entering Trieste come through Yugoslavia and are controlled by Yugoslavia.¹⁵ Representatives of that Government asserted that if Trieste were given to Italy,

贊成此種建議，但經細加研究後，此一建議似甚合理，足為彼此同意之基礎。按義大利在參加第一次世界大戰之前，曾建議特里雅斯特區應成為一自治邦。我代表團堅持該區應由聯合國保護而不應依照蘇聯之建議，改由義大利與南斯拉夫政府保護者，同時亦不應依照法國之建議由盟國四強保護。此一建議，經最後同意，以北部之高里齊亞與蒙特法爾康歸於義大利，並將雙方同意之種族線以西其餘區域，包括在特里雅斯特自由領土內。誠然，特里雅斯特自由領土城內之主權屬於義大利，城外之主權屬於斯拉夫，但該領土內之義大利人與斯拉夫人均非置於外國之統治下。彼等得有國內之統治，人民將選擇其自己之議會，而由議會中選出官吏以執行法律。彼等將受聯合國安全理事會及安理會所委派之公平監理人之監督。

特港之繁榮與福利，不但與義大利有關，而且與南斯拉夫及中歐各國均有關係，特港為中歐通往地中海之天然出口處，通入特港之唯一鐵道，係經過南斯拉夫而由南斯拉夫管理。南國政府代表力言，特港若果交與義

they would divert traffic to Fiume or some other port in Yugoslavia.

Because of the bad feeling between the two peoples in that area, the control by the United Nations may be best means of preventing armed conflict and relieving tension. If the area were joined either with Italy or Yugoslavia, its political and economic relations with the other would suffer. Its industries might be unable to attract the necessary capital, and labor might have difficulty finding employment. If friendly relations are maintained between the free territory of Trieste and her neighbors, this little territory may enjoy greater prosperity and be a source of greater prosperity to its neighbors than would be the case if it were joined either with Italy or Yugoslavia.

I am convinced that the agreed solution to the problem of Trieste is fair and workable if the peoples most concerned work together to make it so. Unless they work together, there can be no solution.

No final decision was reached on the disposition of the Italian colonies. It will be recalled that originally the Soviets had requested the trusteeship of Tripolitania. They stated they wanted a base in the Mediterranean for their merchant ships. The French favored Italy as trustee for all the colonies, and at the April session the Soviets expressed their willingness to accept the French proposal. Except for certain reservations in respect of Cyrenaica, the British were willing to accept our proposal to have all the colonies placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations. In view of the difficulty the Foreign Ministers were

大利。則彼等勢將移轉其交通至費亞姆或其他南斯拉夫之口岸。

由於該區兩國民族感情之惡劣，故聯合國之管制，可謂避免武裝衝突與緩和緊張局勢之最好辦法。若以該區無論加入義大利或南斯拉夫，則其對另一國之政治與經濟關係，必將蒙受損失。其工業或將不能吸收必要之資本，而勞工或將難以獲得工作。如能使特里雅斯特自由領土與各隣國保持友好之關係，則此一小小領土或可享受更大之繁榮，而成爲各隣國更大繁榮之泉源，較之無論加入義大利或南斯拉夫，更爲有利。

余深信有關人士如能竭誠合作，特里雅斯特問題之解決方案既極公平，且有實現之希望。除非彼等合作一致，問題即無解決之一日。

對於處置義大利殖民地之問題，各方迄未獲致最後決策。吾人應記得蘇聯原有委任托治特里波立坦尼亞之要求，蘇聯謂渠希望能於地中海區獲得一商船基地。法國贊成各殖民地交由義國委任托治之議，蘇聯亦於四月間表示願接受法國之建議。英國對於吾人將義大利殖民地交由聯合國委任托治之建議，除有關西蘭尼卡之問題尙待考慮外，亦表贊同。鑒於外長會議當時所感之困難及殖民地問題有妨

having in reaching agreement and the danger of the colonial question becoming a *pawn*¹⁵ in the settlement of other issues, I suggested that we defer a final decision. It was finally agreed that the ultimate disposition of the colonies should be made by the four principal Allied Powers *in the light of*¹⁶ the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and world peace and security, *taking into account*¹⁷ the views of other interested governments.

If the four principal Allied Powers do not agree upon the disposition to be made of the colonies within a year after the coming into force of the treaty they have bound themselves to make such disposition of them as may be recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The four powers have further agreed to send commissions to the colonies to ascertain the wishes of the local population. *Pending*¹⁸ the final disposition of the colonies, they will remain under the existing British military administrations.

The thing I like about the agreement on the colonies is that the ultimate decision does not require unanimity. Failing agreement among the four powers, the decision rests with the United Nations.

The Soviets finally withdrew their objection to the cession of the Dodecanese islands.

It was, however, extremely difficult for us to reach agreement on reparations. The Soviets insisted that they were entitled to at least US\$100,000,000 reparations for the devastation of their territory by the Italian armies. Moreover, under the armistice

礙其他問題解決之危險，余曾建議暫緩討論此一問題。卒經決定最後處置殖民地之事，應由四強根據各殖民地人民之願望及其福利，世界和平安全並顧全有關他國之意見而決定之。

四強如果不能於和約生效後之一年內獲致處置殖民地之協議，自應依據聯合國大會所提處置殖民地問題之意見，加以處理。四強並同意派遣使團至各殖民地，調查當地人民之願望。在此一問題未解決前，義大利殖民地當仍由現有之英軍當局管轄。

余對於此事甚感滿意，因殖民地問題之最後決定，並無須四強意見一致之必要也，縱令四強未能獲致協議，尚有聯合國可出而決定之。

蘇聯終於收回其反對佔領多特坎斯羣島之議。

惟賠償問題則尤為困難，蘇聯堅持至少應得義國賠款一億美元。此外，按照盟國與匈牙利，羅馬尼亞及芬蘭簽訂之休戰協定，上述各國應各付

agreements with Hungary, Rumania and Finland, reparations payment of US\$300,000,000 from each had been imposed. The Soviets found it difficult to *reconcile themselves to*¹⁹ a more lenient reparations policy in the case of Italy.

We, on the other hand, were more deeply conscious of the help that Italy gave us in the last months of the war, and opposed putting on her a reparation's burden which would delay her economic recovery. We had previously agreed that reparations could be taken in war plants not needed for Italian peacetime economy and could be paid out of Italian assets in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. But the Soviets insisted that part of the reparations should come from current or future production of Italian factories and shipyards. We reluctantly agreed that the Soviets could receive reparations up to US\$100,000,000. But we required them to agree that in so far as reparations were taken from Italian production, the deliveries must be arranged so as to avoid interference with economic reconstruction.

We further required the Soviets to agree that such deliveries should not commence for two years. In order to avoid our having to finance Italy's purchase of raw materials to furnish manufactured products to the Soviets, we also required agreement that the imported materials needed by Italy to make these deliveries should be supplied by the Soviets.

There remain some questions in the Italian treaty and the other treaties on which we were unable to reach final agreement. As the Soviet delegation took the position

賠款三億美元與蘇聯。職是之故，蘇聯對義之賠償政策，亦難寬大為懷。

另一方面，吾人則深感戰事結束前數月內，義國曾予吾人以種種協助，故不欲其負擔賠償重荷，阻緩其經濟復員。吾人前曾同意，義大利得以其國境內之戰時工廠及該國在匈牙利，羅馬尼亞與保加利亞境內之義僑資產劃充賠償。惟蘇聯則堅持義大利之賠償應以目下或未來義國工廠造船廠之生產品支付。吾人雖無可奈何而同意蘇聯應得賠償一億美元。惟吾人曾提出要求，認為即使義大利係以其生產償付賠款蘇聯應設法輸送此項生產品，免使義國經濟復員遭受障礙。

同時吾人並要求蘇聯應寬限義方於二年後開始支付此項賠償，為避免義國因製造蘇聯所得賠償品而向吾人借款購買原料計，吾人並要求蘇聯以必需之製造原料供給義國。

義大利及他國和約仍有若干問題未能獲致最後協議。蘇聯代表團堅持主張非俟四強對各項基本問題之觀點

that they would not agree to the calling of the peace conference until the four governments had harmonized their views on fundamental questions, we assume that the Soviets do not regard these issues as fundamental and will accept the decisions of the peace conference.

I admit that prior to our meeting in April I had little hope we would ever reach agreement. After our April meeting, I had lost hope. Now the prospect for peace treaties with five countries is bright. Ninety days after ratification of those treaties the occupation armies must be withdrawn, except where they protect a line of communications. Then the people of the occupied states can live and breathe as free people. We are on the road back to peace.

I have no desire to conceal from the American people the great struggle and tremendous difficulties the four governments had in harmonizing their views to the extent they did on these treaties. *In the long run*²⁰ we shall have a much better chance to work out our problems if we and our allies recognize the basic differences in our ideas, standards and methods, instead of trying to make ourselves *believe*²¹ that they do not exist or that they are less important than they really are.

While the Council made real progress toward peace with Italy and the *ex-satellite*²² states, it made no progress at all on the German and Austrian questions. Perhaps the time taken in the discussion was not wholly lost because our experience suggests that understandings, particularly with our Soviet friends, cannot be reached until we

已獲協議，蘇聯決不同意召開和會，吾人即認為蘇聯並不以此一問題為基本問題，並將接受召開和會之決策。

余承認在四月間舉行會議之前，余對於會議之獲得協議，甚少希望；在四月會議以後，余所抱之希望更少。目下對五國訂立和平條約之前途已見光明，此等條約批准後之九十天，佔領軍必須撤退，惟保護交通線者不在此例。屆時佔領國之人民能呼吸自由空氣而獲得自由人民之生活。吾人現正在回至和平之途上。

余不欲向美國人民諱言四國政府對於在此等條約上調和意見所遭遇之爭執與困難。吾人及吾人之盟國若果承認吾人觀念，標準與方法之基本不同點，則吾人終必有較佳之機會，從事解決吾人之問題。

此次會議對於義大利及其附庸國之和平問題，雖有真正之進步，但對於德奧兩國問題則毫無進步。或許討論所費之時間，並非徒然，因吾人之經驗證明吾人與蘇聯友人之諒解，不能一蹴而就，吾人必須經過一番唇

have gone through rounds of verbal combat, in which old complaints are repeated, past positions reaffirmed, differences accentuated and crises averted. I am ready to believe it is difficult for them to understand us, just as it is difficult for us to understand them. But I sometimes think our Soviet friends fear we would think them weak and soft if they agreed without a struggle on anything we wanted, even though they wanted it, too. Constant struggle, however, is not always helpful in a world longing for peace.

The Soviets started the German discussion with a prepared statement on the draft treaty we had proposed to guarantee the continued demilitarization and disarmament of Germany for at least a quarter of a century. The Soviet statement reveals how hard pressed the Soviets were to raise objection to a treaty which gives them the assurance that Germany would never again become a threat to their security or to the security of Europe.

I do not believe that the Soviets realize the doubts and suspicions which they have raised in the minds of those in other countries who want to be their friends by the aloofness, coolness and hostility with which they have received America's offer to guarantee jointly the continued disarmament of Germany. *Had America been*²³ a party to such a guarantee after World War I, World War II would never have occurred, and the Soviet Union would never have been attacked and devastated.

Is German militarism going to be used as a pawn in a struggle between the East and the West, and is German militarism

舌劍，重彈舊調，重申立場，爭持異意，與挽救危機。余固深信蘇聯之不易諒解吾人，亦猶吾人之不易諒解蘇聯。但有時余以爲吾人之蘇聯友人深恐彼等對於吾人所需要之一切，若不爭辯而即表示同意，則吾人將視彼等爲軟弱，故不得不故意作梗，然而不斷之爭執，對於一希望永久和平之世界，非盡有利。

蘇聯以事前擬就之聲明，開始討論德國問題，吾人所建議之條約草本，原爲保證繼續解除德國之武裝至少二十五年，而蘇聯之聲明對於保證德國不再威脅蘇聯與歐洲安全之條約，竟堅持反對。

余不信蘇聯能明瞭其冷淡與仇視態度在友好國家思想中所引起之懷疑。美國所建議共同保證繼續解除德國之武裝一舉，原爲對蘇聯安全着想之善意的建議。在第一世界大戰後，美國若爲此種保證之當事人，則第二次世界大戰決不致發生，而蘇聯不致遭受攻擊與蹂躪。

德國之黷武主義豈能作東西兩方爭鬥之小卒，德國之黷武主義豈能再

again to be given the chance to divide and conquer?

To that question there must be an unequivocal answer, for equivocation will increase unbearably the tensions and strains which men of goodwill everywhere are striving to relieve.

The Soviets stated that our proposed treaty was inadequate, that it did not assure the *denazification*²⁴ and democratization of Germany, that it did not assure them reparations. But these are political matters which are already dealt with in the Potsdam agreement. Our military agreement of June 5, 1946 provided for the prompt disarmament of armed forces and the demilitarization of war plants. By our 25-year treaty we propose that when Germany is once disarmed, we shall see that she stays disarmed. We cannot understand the Soviet opposition, especially as Generalissimo Stalin on last December 24 agreed with me in principle on this subject.

The Soviet representative stated that he had reports that in the British zone the disarming of military forces *was not being carried out*.²⁵ The British representative stated that he had reports that in the Soviet zone German war plants were being operated. We asked that the Central Commission *investigate*²⁶ the accuracy of both reports. The British and the French agreed. But the Soviet Government would not agree to the investigation unless we limited it to the disarmament of armed forces.

I certainly made clear in our earlier meeting in Paris that the proposed guaranty of German demilitarization was only a part

使其獲得各個擊破之機會。

此一問題之答案，必須不能模稜兩可，因模稜兩可對各地善意之人所奮力解除之緊張局勢，更為增加而不可耐。

蘇聯方面稱，吾人所建議之條約不適當，不能保證德國納粹主義之消滅與民主主義之抬頭，不能對蘇聯保證賠償。但此等皆屬政治問題，早已在波茨坦協定中論及之。吾人一九四六年六月五日之軍事協定，規定立即解除德軍之武裝並消滅其戰爭工廠之軍事能力。吾人所建議之二十五年條約，意在德國一經解除武裝，吾人將注意其不再披上武裝。吾人不明蘇聯反對之理由安在，尤其史太林元帥對於此事已於去年十二月廿四日在原則上表示同意。

蘇聯代表謂渠已接獲報告，英軍佔領區內之解除軍備工作並未實施。英國代表則謂據報告蘇軍佔領區內之德國工廠現仍開工。吾人要求管制委員會調查雙方報告之真像，並加以證實。英法兩國代表贊同此項辦法，惟蘇方則不同意調查之議，除非此次調查工作僅限於解除軍備方面。

余確曾在巴黎會議初期中指出，德國解除軍備，僅係解決德國問題之

of the German settlement. I proposed then, and I proposed again at our recent meeting, that deputies *be appointed*²⁷ to start work on the whole settlement which the Allies expect the Germans to accept. The British and French accepted the proposal. The Soviets rejected it.

The Soviets suggested that we have a special session of the Council on the German problem. I agreed and insisted on setting a date. But from my experience with the Italian and Balkan settlements I fear that until the Soviets are willing to have responsible deputies who are *in close touch with*²⁸ the Foreign Ministers, sit together continuously over a period of time and find out just what is the area of our agreement and our disagreement, the exchange of views between the Ministers on the complicated problems of the German settlement will not be sufficient.

It is no secret that the four-power control of Germany on a zonal basis is not working well from the point of view of the army of the four powers. Under the Potsdam agreement, Germany was to be administered as an economic unit and central administrative departments were to be established for this purpose. But, in fact, Germany is being administered in four closed compartments with the movement of people, trade and ideas between the zones more narrowly restricted than between most independent countries. In consequence, none of the zones is self-supporting. Our zone costs our taxpayers US\$200,000,000 a year. And despite the heavy financial burden being borne by ourselves and the other occupying

一部分工作。當時余即建議，在最近之會議中余再度建議各國指派代表，推展解決全部有關德國問題之工作。英法兩國贊同此項建議，蘇聯則反對之。

蘇聯建議各國應召開一商討德國問題之特別會議，余對之表示同意，並堅持確定一召開會議之日期。惟就余對義大利及巴爾幹問題之經驗判斷，深恐蘇聯若不願派遣代表與各外長保持密切關係，並致力研討同意與不同意各點，則各外長交換錯綜複雜德國問題之意見，尙嫌不夠。

吾人已無須諱言，如就四強之軍事觀點言，四強劃區管制德國實非盡善盡美之辦法。按照波茨坦宣言，在經濟方面，德國應為一整體，吾人應設立一中央管理部門以達成此項目標。惟事實上，德國已被分化為四個區域，各區人民間之動向，貿易及思想已受嚴密限制，其情形已有甚於各獨立國之間。結果，各區均難自足自給。吾人用於美國佔領區者每年達二億美元，吾人及其他佔領國家雖肩起重大之金融負荷，德國仍遭受通貨膨脹

powers, the country is threatened with inflation and economic paralysis.

This condition must not continue. At Paris, we proposed that the Central Commission be instructed to establish the central administrative agencies necessary to administer Germany as an economic unit, and to arrange for the exchange of products between the zones and for a balanced program of imports and exports. The French Government, which had previously opposed the establishment of central administrative agencies, indicated their willingness to accept our proposal when we suggested that the seat *be excluded*²⁹ from the jurisdiction of these agencies. The British agreed. But the Soviets said that they could not agree to the exclusion of the Saar without further study, and therefore no immediate progress was possible.

I made clear that we were unwilling to share responsibility for the economic paralysis and suffering we felt certain would follow a continuance of present conditions in Germany. I then announced that as a last resort we were prepared to administer our zone in conjunction with any one or more of the other zones as an economic unit. I had indicated that recently we had secured cooperation with the Soviet zone in one matter and with the British on another. I explained that our offer was made not in an effort to divide Germany but to bring it together. I stated that whatever arrangements were made with one government would be open on equal terms to the governments of the other zones at any time they were prepared to participate. The

及經濟麻痺之威脅。

此種情形不應繼續。在巴黎會議中，吾人建議訓令管制委員會設立中央行政機關，以便管理德國，作為一個經濟之單位，並籌備各區產品之交換及進出口之平衡計劃。以前原反對設立中央行政機關之法國政府，表示願接受吾人之建議，英國亦表示同意。但蘇聯則稱不能同意將薩爾區擯除在外，因此無法進行。

余曾聲明吾人對於德國之經濟麻痺及長此以往不可避免之痛苦情形不願分負責任。於是余遂宣布最後辦法，吾人準備將吾人之佔領區與其他任何地區聯合為一個經濟單位予以管理。余曾說明最近吾人對若干問題曾獲得英蘇佔領區之合作，余說明吾人之建議，並非欲分裂德國，而在使其合而為一。余稱，對一國政府所作之任何協議，其他政府準備參加時，亦得在同等條件下加入在內。英國稱，彼等將考慮吾人之建議，並表示希望能

British stated that they would consider our proposal and indicated that they hoped to agree. Neither the Soviets nor the French expressed any view.

Our military representative in Germany will this week be instructed to cooperate with anyone or all of the three governments in essential administrative matters like finance, transportation, communication, trade and industry.

Finally we came to a discussion of the Austrian problem. On June 1, I had circulated a proposed draft treaty recognizing the independence of Austria and providing for the withdrawal of the occupying troops. The British also had submitted a draft for consideration. I asked that the deputies be directed³⁰ to prepare the treaty. The Soviets submitted a counter-proposal calling first for further action to ensure the denazification of Austria and the removal of a large number of displaced persons from Austria whom they regard as unfriendly to them.

The British and French were willing to join us in submitting to the deputies the consideration of the treaty and in requesting the Control Council to investigate and report on the progress of denazification and on the problems of the displaced persons. But the Soviets were unwilling to agree to the deputies' taking up the Austrian treaty until more tangible action was taken on those other two problems.

We recognize the seriousness of those problems and have been grappling with them. The problem of displaced persons is particularly difficult to solve. Where they are willing, we help them to return to their

予以同意。但蘇聯與法國則均不表示意見。

我國駐德軍事代表將於本星期內接獲訓令，對於各種重要行政事務如財政，運輸，交通，貿易及實業等，將與三國政府中任何一國政府或全體合作。

最後，吾人論及奧國問題。六月一日，余發出草約一則，承認奧國之獨立，並規定佔領軍之撤退，英方將草案提出付諸討論，余則請求任命各外長代表草就條約，蘇方提出反建議，包括兩點：(一)採取進一步行動，保證奧國納粹主義之全完消除；(二)撤退奧境內大批無家可歸之流民，據稱彼等對蘇極不友好。

英法兩國均願意與吾人採取一致行動將條約提交各外長代表考慮，並申請管理會就消除納粹主義及難民兩問題進行調查，並報告其進展之情形。但蘇聯代表在此兩問題，未採取更實際行動前，對各代表所起草之對奧和約，不願同意。

吾人承認此項問題之嚴重性，盡力設法解決之。難民問題，尤為難以解決，在難民同意下，吾人助其返國，但許多人拒絕返至其本國，因深恐

homes. But many refuse to return to their own countries because they fear death or imprisonment for their political views.

Our tradition of protecting political refugees is too precious for us to consent to the mass expulsion of those people from our zone. The United Nations has³¹ a committee studying the problem and we shall continue to do our part to try to find a solution, but it cannot be a cruel solution that will reflect discredit upon the American people.

It would be a tragedy to hold up the peace treaty with Austria because she is obliged to afford temporary refuge to those people until homes can be found for them in other countries.

We shall press on *in session*³² and out of session to restore conditions of peace to this war-sick world, to bring soldiers back to their homes and to their families, to beat our swords into ploughshares. The war has left wounds, but we must work to heal those wounds.

We do not believe in a peace based on a desire for vengeance. We believe in justice, charity and mercy. If we act with charity and mercy, those we fear as enemies may become our friends. We must trust to the healing processes of peace and pray that God in His mercy will give peace to the world.

政見之不同將致其於死命或陷其於獄中也。

吾人保護政治犯之傳統，極可珍貴，不能同意將此輩人民集體自我方區域中逐出，聯合國已有特種委員會，研究此項問題，吾人將繼續努力覓得解決。但此種解決，不應成爲一種殘忍的解決，致使美國人民不再爲人信任。

展緩與奧地利簽訂和約將引致悲慘之結果，因奧國在流亡政治人士之未能在他國獲得歸宿前，奧國實爲彼等之臨時居留地。

吾人應於會議中堅守吾人之立場，務使戰爭病痛之世界恢復和平，並令海外士兵返回其祖國及其家庭，化干戈爲玉帛。戰爭已使世界遍體鱗傷，吾人亟應治療此項創傷。

吾人並不信任基於復仇願望之和平，吾人信仰正義。寬大與慈愛。吾人以寬大與慈愛待人，吾人之敵亦將成爲吾人之友。吾人應遵循和平進程，並禱告上帝一本其慈悲之懷以和平賜與世界。

ANNOTATIONS

1. "agree upon (on) anything" 『協定』，『決定』。We all agree on (用 upon 較少) these terms. 吾人對此等條件均獲協議。〔Passive: The terms are agreed "upon" (多用 upon)。〕(又: We agree "on" a subject—"with" a person—"about" a matter—"to" a proposal.)
2. "bridge over" 『彌補』，『勉過』。No means has been found to bridge over the present crisis, 目下尚無法勉渡危機。
3. "V-E Day" = "Victory over Europe Day", 『對歐戰勝日』。
4. "the making of" = verbal noun 指事。
5. "to make" = infinitive 指動作，即進行方法。"making"

與 “to make 同爲 “start” 之受詞，意義各別。 6. “as quickly as possible” (as quickly as we could) 與 “wher ver possible” (wherever it was possible) 兩省略式 adverb clauses 皆爲形容 “to make.” 前者指時間之比較，後者指範圍。 7. “so as to” 強調目的用之。 He studies hard so as to build up a strong foundation, 彼用功讀書之目的在建立堅固根基。但 “so”(爲 adverb) 可置於 “hard” 之前，語氣變爲強調結果。 He studies so hard as to build up a strong foundation, 彼用功讀書其結果得建立一堅固根基。 8. “possible” 爲 “presentation”(“make” 之 object,) 之 object complement。 9. “fighting” 雖前有 “the” 而後無 “of” 並非 verbal noun 用法上錯誤，此字已成純粹名詞直等於其他名詞，如 “war.” 10. “so far as” 爲 conjunction 指範圍。 So far as I am concerned (=as regards me 或 as for me) this is O. K., 就余言之 (在余個人)，認爲此事甚當。 11. “in a dilemma”, 『左右爲難』。 Turkey did not want to join the war and was not in a dilemma, 土耳其不願加入戰爭，故不感有進退爲難之苦。 12. “make” 爲 subjunctive verb, 凡表示命令，建議，堅持，爭執時用之不論其主動詞爲何，其時式爲現在或未來(should make)。 13. “only” 係 adverb 形容 conjunction phrase “so long as”, 他如 “only when——”, “only if——” 等。 14. “the” 爲 relative adverb 當連接用與其後之第二 “the” (demonstrative adverb) 關連。 The sooner (“you will do it” 省略) the better (“it will be” 省略) = “In what degree sooner you do it; in that degree it will be better”, 第一 “the”-clause 爲輔句，第二 “the”-clause 爲主句。 15. “pawn”, 下棋之『小卒』，在某種局面下，『小卒』亦有舉足重輕之時，故借喻(simile) 爲『小障礙』。 16. “in the light of”, 『看法』，『見地』。 Viewed in the light of history World Wars I and II are but one, 由歷史觀點言之兩次大戰皆爲一事。 17. “to take into account” (或 “to take account of”——“反面” to leave out of account) 『計及』。 Taking this fact into account, you know why I did it, 君如計及此一事實必知余何故爲之。 18. “pending”, 『俟…決定』，『在進行中』。 The matter will be discussed pending his return, 此事俟彼歸來後再決定討論。 19. “to reconcile oneself to”, 『安於』。 Brain workers have to reconcile themselves to lot, 用腦筋之人不得不安命受之。 20. “in the long run”, 『久而久之』，『終極』，『到底』。 The value of land will rise in the long run, 地價終久必高。 21. “believe” 爲 infinitive 在 “make” (see, hear, let, watch, feel) 字後不用 “to”。 22. “satellite” 『衛星』轉爲『附庸』。 He sat in the centre; all around his satellites, 彼中坐，四側其部屬坐。 23. “Had been” 爲 subjunctive verb, conjunction “if” 省略 (即 “If America had been——”)。 24. 此係新字由 “de” (拉丁 prefix, 意『除去』) + “Nazi” (『納粹主義』) + “fication” (『舉動』) = 『消滅納粹主義』 (名詞)。 25. “was being carried out” 過去進行被動式。 26. 見 12. 27. 見 12 此爲被動式。 28. “in touch with”, 『接近』，『聯絡』，『通消息』 (“out of touch”, 『不通』，『脫離』)。 Please keep in touch with him, 請與彼取得聯絡。 29. 全 27. 30. 同 27. 31. “The United Nations” 雖係複數但爲一整個機構，動詞用單數 “has”, 他如 “The United States”. 32 in session, 『開會(期間)』 (“out of session,” 『閉會』，『休會』)。 The parliament is in session, 議會正在開會。

MOLOTOV'S REVIEW OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Excerpts from an address to the Peace Conference on October 14, 1946

莫洛托夫對巴黎和會之檢討

一九四六年十月十四日發表

In examining the peace treaty with Finland, the Conference is completing its work, and we now can see what are the first results, the general results, obtained in the course of this Conference. The Conference, meeting in Paris, constitutes the first attempt to institute broad collaboration among all the states and to establish a firm peace after the war which has just taken place.

We see united here the representatives of small countries beside the representatives of big ones, with a view to establishing the peace treaty drafts with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. These treaties must constitute the foundation of a firm peace in Europe.

But, to answer our expectations, these treaties must correspond to the profound aspirations of the peoples and be the effective rampart against aggression. Consequently, they must allow democracy's principles to prevail and establish the responsibility of the aggressor and punish him, and that without a spirit of vengeance toward the vanquished party. They also must guarantee the security of the peoples and forge their union against

和會對檢討對芬和約一事將告完成，吾人目下對此次和會期間所獲得之直接廣汎成果，可得而知之。在巴黎舉行之和會乃戰爭甫畢之後企圖建立世界各國間普遍合作，並穩定和平之創舉。

吾人今日在此，除各大國代表外，且與各小國代表團結一堂，目的在擬定對意、羅、布、匈、芬各國和約草案。吾人必須使此類和約成爲歐洲穩固和平之基礎。

惟此類和約必須符和各國人民之厚望，並須成爲防範侵略之堡壘，然後方可達成吾人之期望。爲此之故，和約必須使民主原則得以宣揚，並確定侵略者之責任而加以懲處，但吾人對戰敗者不應抱報仇精神。和約必須保障各國人民之安全，加緊團結以防禦新侵略之再起。

any new aggression.

This Conference was preceded by important preliminary work accomplished by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Big Four. That Council examined the principal questions. It took decisions notably as regards the frontiers of the enemy countries. It studied the question of reparations, although it did not deal with it in its entirety. It likewise set restrictions of a military nature which will be imposed on Germany's satellite countries.

On a great number of points, agreement could be realized among the Big Four. On the other hand, certain others could not be settled. Economic questions in particular did not see a complete agreement of the Big Four realized. Other questions of lesser importance likewise were not handled.

The Paris Conference was then assembled to give its opinion on the clauses contained in the peace treaty, clauses on which the four had reached agreement, as well as clauses on which it did not yet exist.

Now what are the first lessons to be drawn from the sessions which have been held?

One notes that the questions on which the Big Four already had reached agreement also received the agreement of the 21. Changes have indeed been made here and there, but they do not modify the substance of the prepared texts except as regards Trieste.

In the case of Trieste, we have indeed seen the Conference take a step backward compared with what had been proposed. A decision of an anti-democratic character was taken which does not conform with what we

和會開會前，有四大國外長會議所達成之重要預備工作。外長會議對主要問題曾作檢討。外長會議關於前敵國疆界所作決定尤為顯著。外長會議對賠償問題雖未作整個處理，然確曾加以研究。外長會議同時對德國衛星國會規定多種軍事性質之限制。

四大國對甚多要點，可能達成協議。其他數點適為相反，不能有所決定。四大國所不能達成完全協議者特在經濟問題。其他重要性較次之問題亦未加以處理。

和會代表在彼時開會之目的為對和約中四強業已達成，或未達成協議之各條款表示意見。

然吾人於累次會議中所獲得之初步教訓為何者，此不得不加以檢討。

任何人於檢討時即可注意此一點，即，凡四大國業已達成協議之各問題，亦皆獲得二十一國之協議。條約中變更之處雖多，除特港問題外，原擬條約原文之實質並未變更。

關於特港問題，和會所予決議實較原有建議為退步。此一決議為反民主性質，此與四強外長會所建議之原

find in the text proposed by the Council of the Big Four.

Who is responsible for this disagreement, for this lack of solidarity? This responsibility *weighs heavily on* three countries, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, which have violated the engagement made.

If we now examine the contents of the clauses on which the Big Four had come to agreement, on which agreement then could be reached by the 21, we note that these results, which we all know, were in general satisfactory.

We know that the decisions taken in this regard *do*² answer to the aims sought by the democratic powers. *None the less*³ there is a lesson which emerges from it. It is that, when the countries which have borne the greatest part of the burden that fell on the shoulders of the United Nations during their fight against the common enemy, when the Big Four have come to agreement, it seems that the essence of this agreement *does*⁴ correspond to the wishes of the entire democratic world.

But sometimes this agreement could not be obtained among the Big Four, notably as regards the questions of reparations, of property abroad belonging to ex-enemy countries or their nationals, of the disposal of certain assets, or again the question of *the*⁵ Danube.

The result of the examination of this question that took place in the commissions is now before us. Well, it is not as satisfactory as those obtained in the solution of those questions belonging to the first category.

If the four-power Council had been able to furnish a supplementary effort to reach

文不符。

然則和會不能達成協議，缺乏團結，究由何人負責？美、英、法三國背棄原議，對此應負重大責任。

四強業已達成之協意，二十一國亦可贊同，吾人設對此加以檢討，皆知其結果在大體上可令人滿意。

吾人皆知關於此點所有決議確可符合民主列強所追求之目的。然其中產生一教訓。此即在四強對共同敵人作戰期間負荷，加於聯合國責任之最大部分，雖則達成協議，然此種協意之素質卻不能與全體民主國家之願望相合。

而四強之間有時不能達成協議，此尤以賠償、前敵國國家或人民國外財產、若干利益之處分以及多腦河諸問題為然。

委員會對上述後一問題從事檢付之結果，已送交吾人之前。然此不若第一類問題解決之能如吾人意。

如四強外長會議當時能略加努力

agreement, if certain members of the Council had not judged that an effort of this kind was useless, it seems that we could have reached this preliminary agreement, and that the results on these questions in the work of the Conference would have been as satisfactory as the results obtained on the questions on which the Big Four had reached agreement

That is why the *balance sheet* the complete result of this Conference, cannot be considered satisfactory. In fact, it is not satisfactory on numerous questions which were the object of insufficient preparation and concerning which certain countries, members of the four-power Council and having a practically assured majority in the Conference, did not wish to continue the examination. These countries are the keystones of a group that succeeded in imposing its will on the Conference by the game of majority votes.

The first cause of this unsatisfactory work that comes from examining the results of the Conference comes from the fact that, throughout the entire duration of this Conference one group of countries showed the desire of dominating, of dictating to other countries what they considered essential.

In drawing up their recommendations, the commissions applied the rules of procedure to determine whether solutions were to be presented as recommendations to the Conference. To obtain this qualification of "recommendation," every proposal had to be adopted by a commission by a two-thirds majority.

Take, for example, the Danubian question, and we find no recommendation. The nonriparian countries of the Danube were

以求達成協議，即會議中若於代表不認爲此種努力毫無裨益，則吾人似可達成初步協議，和會對此問題進行工作所得之結果，或可與四強業已達成協議其他問題所獲之結果同樣圓滿。

吾人於以上所述，可以明瞭吾人對和會之最後估計，即完全結果，不能令人滿意之處何在。就事實言，關於甚多之問題，事先既無充分準備，而和會中擁有事實上大多票數之四強外長會議若干國家代表復不願繼續對此等問題加以檢討。此等國家操縱大多數投票把戲結成集團，目的在以彼等之意旨強迫和會接受。

吾人於檢查和會成果即知其工作不能令人滿意之第一原因由於開會期間，某數國家之集團意圖壓迫並指定其他國家奉行彼等所認爲重要之事。

委員會於草擬提案時，竟應用程序規程決定此等提案之決議應否以提案方式提交大會。每一建議爲取得此項「提案」資格應先交由某一委員會經三分之二多數投票通過始可。

舉例言之，關於多腦河問題，吾人則未聞有提案。不毗連多腦河國家

unable to obtain a two-thirds majority to impose their point of view against the desires of the riparian countries.

The question was simply transmitted to the plenary conference, and these decisions relative to navigation on the Danube were taken by a majority of 15 to 6. However, in this majority of 15 votes were countries like Norway, India and Ethiopia, etc., whose votes played a decisive role in the vote.

It seems, however, that these countries should have been able to bring to the examination of a question of this order, to a question like the Danube, a spirit of perfect impartiality. They would only have been able to judge if they had had the possibility of voting without being the object of pressure from another country.

Why, for example, did India make a decision on the Danubian question? What are the Hindu interests that demanded the convocation of a Danubian conference? The Indian delegation voted as indicated by the United Kingdom. Its decision was taken without any impartiality.

The clearest result of this manner of action is that we have arrived at the end of the Conference without having decided a question as grave as that of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier. To tell all, this vote, this decision concerning the Greco-Bulgarian frontier, only serves those who are fomenting new aggressions, and not those who want to serve the cause of peace.

Our Bulgarian friends can be calm. This evil vote will not be ratified by the four-power Council. What was not judged good before the opening of the Conference will not

不能獲得三分之二票數以彼等之意見強加毗連該河之各國接受。

此一問題祇轉交大會，而有關多腦河航行之各種決議以十五票對六票多數通過。然代表此多數十五票國家為挪威、印度及阿比西尼亞等，而其所投之票卻佔決定性。

此類國家事前應能發揮完全公正精神從事檢討多腦河一類之問題。如彼等能自動投票而不受他國壓力，則彼或能對此事自加判斷。

舉例言之，印度對多腦河何以有所決議？印度有何有關權益而要求召集關於多腦河之會議？印度代表團之投票實係受英國指使。是以其所作決議毫無公正可言。

此種措施方式，其最明顯結果為使吾人在大會結末之際，對一嚴重有如希、布邊界問題竟未加以決定。揭穿言之，關於希、布邊界之投票、決議僅為人利用作醞釀新侵略之用，不能為服務和平正義之用。

布國友人可少安毋躁。此種毒害之投票決不為外長會議批准。凡和會開會前所被公斷為不當之事，開會後亦必被公斷為不當，且不為輿論所接

be judged good afterward, nor will it be accepted by public opinion. That is why we can say to our Bulgarian friends: Be calm. The frontier will remain as it is.

When the chief United States delegate, for example, voted "no," it was the signal for a cascade of other "noes"—12 to 13—which assured a majority. We have been able to state that a group here was able to impose its decisions, whether just or not, simply because these decisions pleased this dominating group.

As for the Trieste question, these three powers did not maintain the point of view that they had adopted in the Council of four. They did, in fact, judge the moment favorable to withdraw their decision, although it conformed with the purest democratic spirit, and by doing that the three powers that I have named have broken their most formal engagement.

Senator Vandenberg tried to prove that the reparations imposed on Finland were too heavy for the country's economy... it is not without uneasiness, without distrust, that we see this "flirt" with a small country, and that *under the cover of* good intentions.

We have seen that the United Kingdom proposed not seizing Finland's assets abroad. However, when discussing the same clauses in the peace treaties with Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, there was no question of a similar proposal...

On the contrary, the United Kingdom made of that an exceptional case in favor of Finland. But this playfulness hides a scheming. The United Kingdom is trying to change the current of present friendships in Finland,

受。此所以吾人能告布國友人，請其少安毋躁之理由。布國邊界將照目下原樣不動。

舉例言之，美首席代表投反對票時，即為連續而來有如瀑布之其他國家相續投約十二三反對票之信號，可保證大多數通過。吾人已經說明某一集團可以其決議，不論公正與否，強加他人接受，因此類決議契合此一有威勢集團心意之故。

關於特港問題，蘇聯以外之三強未堅持彼等在外長會議所採取之立場。以事實言，彼等此舉雖符合最純粹民主精神，然實在乘有利機會收回原有決議，彼等於余所指出之動作上以破壞彼等原來應有之法律拘束。

參議員范登堡企圖證明勒令芬蘭所負之賠償，遠非該國經濟力量所能荷担...吾人目擊彼向小國藉出自好意以送「秋波」，心中實為尷尬並難以信任其真意。

吾人皆見英有不強取芬之國外資產之建議。然在討論對匈、羅、布各條約之同樣條款時，則未見有同樣建議之徵詢。

英對芬反特別加惠。但此種戲謔之中卻藏有陰謀。蓋英正圖改善目下

and I have already warned the Finnish Government of the danger inherent in measures of this order

Turning to another question, I notice that an attack is being mounted now against the right of veto, an attack that is to be unleashed during the work of the General Assembly.

Day before yesterday, there were preliminary declarations coming from Australia and Cuba. Yesterday, it was *no less than*⁸ the President of the General Assembly, M. Spaak, who also made a statement directed against the right of veto.

But, in reality, it is not the right of veto which is involved but to know whether we want to set up a collaboration among all in the heart of an existing organization in which we are all represented, a frank collaboration between big and small countries.

Unfortunately, we see the President of the General Assembly himself—he who should *have* the Charter of the United Nations *at his finger-tips*⁹—criticizing the United Nations Charter, where it is written that the concurring votes of the Big Five are necessary on all questions relative to peace and security

Someone is trying to *blow on the coals*¹⁰ By lending himself to this game, M. Spaak is not serving the cause of international collaboration. He is serving other ends which should be foreign to the United Nations.

But the war has ended, and we are now witnessing a series of regrettable temptations. Whatever these temptations may be, no matter where they come from, they are directed toward the use of the work of the United Nations or the results of this Peace Conference

對芬之友誼，而余已警告芬政府此種措施內含之危險。

余再舉一問題，即余發覺目下正進行對否決權加以攻擊，擬於大會進行時發出。

前日奧、古已發出預先聲明。昨日竟有大會主席，斯巴克先生，繼起對否決權直接加以抨擊。

實際言之，目下所牽涉之問題非在否決權，而在說明吾人於出席現有國際組織之中樞機構是否有決心謀得大小國家間之合作。

不幸對聯合國憲章應有深刻認識之大會主席亦批評該憲章，其中固明白規定凡遇有關和平、安全各問題必需有五大國全體投票始可。

此中必有人企圖從事煽惑舉動。斯巴克先生協助此種把戲實不能謂為對國際合作有良好服務。彼於此實為服務聯合國以外之其他目標。

第二次世界大戰雖已結束，而吾人刻下又目睹一連串令人惋惜之引誘。不論此類引誘為何，不論其由何地而發，此類引誘皆為趨向以聯合國措施

to serve the exclusive interests of a group of countries. And against these temptations the Soviet Union will always protest everywhere.

On the other hand, wherever is shown a sincere desire of collaboration between small and large countries on the basis of a frank and absolute friendship, of respect or the interests of all and of equality in the democratic sense of the word, there will be found full support from the Soviet Union.

That is the policy we follow. That is the only policy we judge to be good.

和會成果爲集團中等等國家獨享權益而利用。蘇聯代表團不論在何處，遇有此類引誘，決將抗議之。

反之，蘇聯如在任何一處表示大小國家基於坦白、絕對友誼、尊重全體權益及真民主意義之平等而誠意合作，蘇聯必以全力持之。

以上爲蘇聯所遵守之政策。以上爲蘇聯所評斷認爲係至善之政策。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "to weigh heavily on", 『使負重責』。 The expenses for keeping troops weigh heavily on the people, 軍費使人民負擔甚重。
2. "do" 爲加重動詞 "answer" 之語氣，『確實』。
3. "None the less", 『雖然』，表示對上句意義進一步說法。 He is old but works hard nonetheless, 彼年老然工作仍勤。
4. "does" 全 2。
5. 河名之前用 "the"。
6. "balance sheet" 商業會計名詞，『損益對照表』，即平常所謂『總算帳』。
7. "under the cover of", 『由』，『藉』。 He went under the cover of an escort of bodyguards, 彼由衛兵護衛以去。
8. "no less than", 『不亞』，『竟』。 I never expected such a good remark from a man who is no less than my opponent, 余未料想竟有與余意見反對之人予余以好評。
9. "have... at finger-tips", 『熟悉』，『通曉』。 He has all the important historical dates at his finger-tips, 彼對重要歷史大事日期皆爲爛熟。
10. "to blow on the coals", 『煽惑』，『煽動』。 He tries to blow on the coals because he is dissatisfied with the new governor, 彼因對新任長官不滿意故企圖煽惑他人。

DR. WANG SHIH-CHIEH'S BROADCAST SPEECH TO THE PEOPLE AT HOME ON THE NATURE OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Broadcast from Paris, August 9, 1946

王外長世杰向國人廣播巴黎和會之性質

一九四六年八月九日由巴黎播送

Today I am addressing you all from the Paris radio station of "The Voice of America." As you all know I came to Paris to represent our government in the Peace Conference.

I should like now to say a few simple words to you about it:

1. The nature of this peace conference.
2. Our attitude towards this conference.
3. Political and economic situation in France.

Let me take up the first subject, namely, the nature of this Peace Conference. This conference has been called to discuss problems relating to the peace treaties with the five enemy countries in Europe, namely, Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. This conference will neither discuss the peace settlement with Japan nor the peace treaty with Germany. The Allied nations have not yet decided when the peace conference on Japan or Germany be convened. Although this conference does not cover problems concerning Germany or Japan, its organization and procedure may constitute a precedent for the coming conferences about peace with Germany and Japan. Whatever provisions of peace treaties on territorial, military or

今天我是從巴黎「美國呼聲」電台向各位說話。各位都知道，我是代表我們中國來巴黎和會開會的。

關於和會我現在要對各位作簡單的報告：

一、巴黎和會的性質。二、中國對和會的態度。三、法國的政治經濟情況。

讓我先講第一個題目，就是巴黎和會的性質。巴黎和會是為着討論對五個過去的敵國，意大利，羅馬尼亞，布加利亞，匈牙利，芬蘭和約有關的問題召集的。巴黎和會既不討論對日和平問題，也不討論對德和約，因為盟國還沒有決定召開對德日的和會。這個和會雖然沒有包括德日問題，但是它的組織和程序可以作德日和會的藍本。這個和會所製定的和約裏面，領土，軍事和經濟方面的條款

economic affairs which this conference will make will certainly have an important bearing on the contents of the treaties with Germany and Japan. We must not therefore minimize the importance of this confab.

Furthermore this conference will be a test of whether or not the big powers among the United Nations can cooperate with one another. If the conference could successfully conclude its work it will dissipate the atmosphere of mutual suspicions and fears which exists among them. Otherwise, the United Nations will be finding it impossible to reconcile themselves when they come to discuss the peace settlements with Germany and Japan.

In the second place, I wish to say a few words about China's attitude towards this peace conference. Confucius said: "One should reciprocate kindness for kindness and righteousness for hatred." This has been the traditional spirit of our Chinese scholars for thousands of years and it is our guiding principle at this conference today.

There may be conflicts of interests and views among our Allies. But they should never forget that they have been friends in times of difficulties and need; and they have rendered each other good help. Accordingly, the United Nations should maintain in common this spirit of reciprocating kindness with kindness in dealings with one another, but not to return hatred for kindness. Towards our enemy of course we must not be indulgent. But it will be equally wrong if the United Nations should adopt a policy of "hatred for hatred." They should be righteous. We must understand that the defeated nations

，對於德日和約的內容必然有重大關係。我們不能輕視這個會議的重要性。

進一步說，巴黎和會是測驗聯合國裏面的各大國能不能合作的試金石。如果它能夠圓滿的完成任務，就能消除各國間互相猜疑畏懼的氣氛。否則聯合國在討論德日和約時將更無協調的可能。

第二點，關於中國對巴黎和會的態度我要簡略的說一說。孔子說過「以直報怨以德報德」。這是幾千年以來中國學者的傳統精神，也就是我們今天在和會裏面的指針。

盟國間在利益和觀念方面可能發生衝突，但是他們決不該忘了在困難的時候，大家是朋友，彼此幫過忙。因此聯合國都應該保持以德報德的精神。對於敵人，我們固然不能縱容。但是如果採取以怨報怨的精神，也是同樣的不對。我們應該要公正。我們應該知道戰敗國共有二萬萬的人民。

have more than 200,000,000 populations. It should be obvious to all that no fundamental solution is possible if a policy of revenge is pursued by the Allies. We believe that so far military provisions of the peace treaties are concerned, the Allied countries should be strict; the political and economic clauses must not be too harsh. The Allied Nations must give a good chance for democratic and peace-loving forces in defeated countries to survive and consolidate.

Lastly, I will add a few words about the situation in France, as I see it. There are two things which specially have impressed me. The first thing is that France, having gone through a long period of occupation by the enemy, has suffered tremendous losses, especially in manpower. This makes economic rehabilitation and reconstruction most difficult.

Another matter which strongly struck me is that during the period of resistance, the French Communist party and other parties had maintained underground, military or guerrilla forces; but now there is only one single national army. No political party in France maintains today any independent armed forces; nor is there in France's national army any unit which may be said to have connection with any political party.

大家都明瞭如果盟國抱着復仇的政策，根本的解決是不可能的。我們相信關於和約裏面的軍事條款應該嚴格，但是政治和經濟條款就不應該太苛刻。我們應該給戰敗國裏面的民主和愛好和平的力量有生存鞏固的機會。

最後，我要把我親眼看見的法國情況簡單地附帶報告一下。有兩點使我有印像。第一，法國經敵人長期佔領之後，遭受巨大的損失，尤其是在人力方面的損失。這使法國經濟的善後救濟和重建感到極大困難。

有一件事很使我發生感想，就是在法國的抗戰期間，共產黨和其他各黨都保持地下游擊隊，但是現在祇有一個統一的國家軍隊。法國沒有一個政黨今天還保持着獨立的軍隊，在法國的軍隊裏面現在沒有一個部隊能說是與任何一黨有關係。

MOLOTOV'S STATEMENT RE RUSSIAN VIEW- POINT ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF GERMANY BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY

Made to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris on July 10, 1946

莫洛托夫關於蘇聯對經濟政治 重建德國然後訂約之聲明

一九四六年七月十日在巴黎外長會議發表

The time has come when we should discuss the fate of Germany and a peace treaty with that country.

The Soviet Government has always held that the spirit of revenge is a poor counsellor in such affairs. It will be just as incorrect to *identify* Hitler Germany with¹ the German people, though the German people cannot *divest* themselves of² the responsibility for Germany's aggression and for its gravest consequences.

The Soviet people went through unparalleled sufferings of occupation as a result of the invasion of the Soviet Union by the German armies. Our losses are great and inestimable. Other peoples of Europe, and not of Europe alone, will long feel the heavy losses and hardship caused by the war that was imposed by Germany.

It is, therefore, natural that the problem of Germany's fate agitates at present not only the minds of the German people but

我們應該討論德國命運及與牠訂立和約的時間已經到了。

蘇聯政府一向認為關於這類的事，復仇的精神是一個惡劣的主見。這正和把德國人民看作等於希特勒德意志一樣的不正確，固然德意志人民不能卸脫他們對德國侵略及侵略的嚴重後果所應負的責任。

德軍侵入蘇聯的結果使蘇聯人民遭受了無與倫比的災難。我們的損失重大，無法計算。歐洲，和歐洲以外的其他民族將長久的感覺德國強加於他們的戰爭所造成的慘重損失和痛苦。

因此，德國命運的問題現在自然會不獨激動德國人民的心，而且會自

naturally also those of other peoples who are trying to safeguard themselves for the future and to prevent a new aggression by Germany.

And one should *bear in mind*³ the fact that, *thanks to*⁴ the industrial might she has achieved, Germany is an important *link*⁵ of the whole system of the world economy. Neither can one forget the fact that more than *once*⁶ this industrial might has formed the base of the armament of aggressive Germany.

Such are the premises from which conclusions are to be drawn.

I proceed from the fact that *in the light of*⁷ the interests of world economy and tranquillity in Europe, it would be incorrect to adopt a *course*⁸ of Germany's annihilation as a state or that of its agrarianization, including the annihilation of its own main industrial centers.

Such a course would result in undermining the economy of Europe, in the dislocation of world economy and in a *chronic*⁹ political crisis in Germany that would *spell*¹⁰ a threat to peace and tranquillity.

I think that even if we adopted such a course, the *course*¹¹ of history would subsequently impel us to renounce this course as an abortive and groundless one.

I think, therefore, that our purpose is not to destroy Germany but to transform Germany into a democratic and peace-loving state that, *next to*¹² its agriculture, will have its own industry and foreign trade but that will be *deprived of*¹³ economic and military potentialities to rise again as an aggressive force.

然的激動那些別的國家人民的心，他們正在設法保障他們的將來，和避免再被德國的侵略。

並且我們應當牢記，德國由於它在工業方面所得的成就，它在世界經濟上是重要的一環的事實。我們也不應忘記不止一次此工業成就曾構成德國侵略的軍備的基礎的事實。

這些就是獲得結論需要根據的前提。

從世界經濟利益及歐洲安靜上着眼，採取消滅德國政策或瓜分土地，一包括消滅它本身之主要工業中心一的政策實為錯誤，這一個事實是我今天所有陳述的出發點。

這個政策將造成歐洲經濟的削弱，世界經濟的脫節和德國的慢性的政治危機，會使和平及安定感受威脅。

我以為設使我們採取這一個政策，歷史的過程往後會強迫我們放棄這一個無效和無理由的政策。

因此，我以為我們的目的不是毀滅德國而是將德國改變成爲一個民主的和愛好和平的國家，除農業外，將保有它自己的工業和對外貿易，但要剷除足以使它再興起成爲侵略勢力的軍事及經濟壓力。

While still engaged in the war the Allies declared that they had no intention of destroying the German people. Even at the time when the overweening Hitler openly proclaimed that he wanted to destroy Russia, J. V. Stalin, the head of the Soviet Government, *holding these boastful stupidities up to ridicule*,¹⁴ said:

"It is *no more* possible to destroy Germany *than*¹⁵ to destroy Russia. But the Hitler State can and must be destroyed."

Germany has long held an important position in the world economy. *While continuing as a single state*¹⁶ Germany will remain an important factor of world trade, which also corresponds to the interests of other peoples.

On the other hand, the policy of Germany's annihilation as a state or that of her agrarianization and annihilation of her principal industrial centers will result in making Germany a center where dangerous sentiments of revenge will be nourished and will play into the hands of German reactionaries and will deprive Europe of tranquillity and a stable peace.

One should look not backward but ahead and should be concerned about what is to be done *in order that Germany may become*¹⁷ a democratic and peaceloving state that will have a developed agriculture, industry and foreign trade but that will be deprived of an opportunity to resuscitate as an aggressive force. Victory over Germany delivers into our hands powerful means to achieve this purpose. It is our duty to utilize these means *to the full*.¹⁸

It has of late¹⁹ become fashionable to

當戰爭尚在進行的時候，聯合國曾宣稱它們無意消滅德國人民。甚至當傲慢的希特勒公開聲言他要毀滅蘇聯的時候，蘇聯政府的元首史達林揭發這種誇大愚妄的言論譏笑着說：

「消滅德國和消滅蘇聯是同樣的不可能。但消滅希特勒政權不但可能而且是必須的。」

很久以來德國在世界經濟上佔着重要的地位。當繼續為單獨的國家時，德國將在世界貿易中依然為與其他國家有利的一個重要份子。

另一方面，將德國滅亡或瓜分及消滅其主要工業中心的政策，結果將使德國成為危險的復仇情緒長育的中心而將為德國反動者所操縱利用並將奪去歐洲安定及永久和平。

我們的眼光不應向後而應向前看，而且應當關懷要採取怎樣的步驟才能使德國成為一民主及愛好和平的國家，因而能夠發展其農業，工業及對外貿易，但同時又能剷除其復活為一侵略勢力的機會。德國的勝利賦予我們完成此目標的有力手段。我們的責任是去盡量應用此手段。

最近盛行關於將德國肢解為幾個

talk about dismemberment of Germany into several "autonomous" states, about federalization of Germany and about separation of the Ruhr from Germany. All such proposals originate in the same policy of destruction and agrarianization of Germany. For it is easy to understand that without the Ruhr Germany cannot exist as an independent and viable state. But I have already said that if the interests of peace and tranquillity are dear to us the destruction of Germany should not be our objective.

Naturally, if as a result of a plebiscite throughout Germany the German people express their wish to transform Germany into a federal state, or if as a result of a plebiscite in various former German states a desire will be manifested to break away from Germany, *it goes without saying*²⁰ that there cannot be any objection on our part.

There have been not a few instances in which Allied authorities in the western zones of occupation of Germany have encouraged the idea of a federal structure for Germany. But the attitude of Allied authorities is one thing, *whereas*²¹ a real desire of the German people, or at least a desire of the population of some part of German territory, is another thing.

We, the Soviet people, hold that it is incorrect to *impose upon*²² the German people a solution of this question. Such an imposition would not in any case produce any good if only for the reason that it would be precarious.

☛ If on the one hand we should not *stand in the way*²³ of the rightful aspirations of the German people after the revival of their

「自治」國家；組織德意志聯邦；將魯爾從德國脫離的說法。這一切意見同樣係從滅亡及瓜分德國的政策脫胎而來。因為我們不難了解，如果沒有魯爾，德國不能存在為一獨立的及能生活的國家。但我曾經說過假使我們把和平及安定的幸福看作珍貴的話，那麼滅亡德國不應當是我們的目標。

自然，如果全德國舉行普遍投票的結果是德國人民表示他們願望將德國改為聯邦，或如果在以前德國的各省舉行普遍投票的結果表示願望脫離德國時，那無庸贅述我們（蘇聯）方面不能有任何異議。

德國西部佔領區盟方當局，曾有不少的事實，鼓勵德國成為聯邦組織的思想。但盟國當局的態度是一事，而德國人民的真正願望，或至少德國領土某一部居民的願望，又是一事。

我們，蘇聯人民，認為強迫德國人民對此問題謀一解決方法為不當。這種強迫方式在任何方面皆不能產生任何良好結果，除非是為着產生捉摸不定的結果的理由。

即使在一方面我們在德國人民恢復國家採取民主之後，不應阻礙德國

state on democratic lines, then on the other hand it is our duty to prevent the rise of Germany as an aggressor force. It would be a crime to forget about this sacred duty of ours to the peoples of the world.

If the world is to be safeguarded against an eventual aggression on the part of Germany, the latter should be completely disarmed both militarily and economically and the Ruhr should be placed under an inter-Allied control of four countries with the object of preventing a revival of war industries in Germany.

The program for the complete military and economic disarmament of Germany is not something new. The decisions of the Berlin Conference deal with this in detail. And it is natural that the Ruhr, as the main phase of Germany's war industries, *should be kept*²⁴ under the vigilant control of the principal Allied powers. The purpose of complete military and economic disarmament of Germany must also be furthered by a plan for reparations.

The fact that until now no plan for reparations has been drawn up, in spite of the repeated demands of the (Soviet) Government that the corresponding decision of the Berlin Conference *be carried out*,²⁵ and the fact that the Ruhr has not been placed under an inter-Allied control, on which the Soviet Government insisted a year ago, is a dangerous thing as far as the maintenance of the future peace and security of the nations is concerned.

*We are of the view that*²⁶ it is impossible to *put off*²⁷ the accomplishment of these tasks without running the risk of frustrat-

人民正當的期望，那麼在另一方面我們責任是要去防止德國重起為侵略勢力。忘記我們對世界人民所負的這個神聖任務會成為罪行。

如果世界需要保證安全不再受德國可能的侵略，德者應當在軍事上及經濟上澈底解除武裝，同時為着防止德國戰爭工業的復興起見，魯爾應當由四盟國共管。

澈底解除德國軍事上及經濟上武裝的計劃並不是新的計劃。柏林會議的議決案對此要作詳細的討論。同時因為魯爾是德國戰爭工業的主要地區，自然應當受主要聯合國的防範管理。為達到澈底解除德國軍事經濟武裝的目的，應當有一賠償計劃以促進之。

不顧（蘇聯）政府對柏林會議有關議案應付實施的連續要求，直到現在還沒有訂立一個賠償計劃的事實，以及魯爾尚未由盟國共同管理的另一事實——蘇聯政府一年前曾經堅持此主張——都對各國未來和平及安全的保持有危險的。

我們的意見以為除非冒險阻礙完全解除德國軍事及經濟武裝決議案的實

ing the decision to carry out the complete military and economic disarmament of Germany.

Such is the view of the Soviet Government regarding the war industry and war potential of Germany. These considerations cannot hamper the development of peaceful industries in Germany.

In order that the development of German peaceful industries may be of benefit to other peoples who need German coal, metal and manufactured products, Germany should be granted the right of exports and imports, and if this right of foreign trade is to be effectuated we should not put obstacles to the increase in output of steel, coal and manufactured products of a peaceful nature in Germany; naturally, within certain bonds and *provided that*²⁸ an inter-Allied control shall inevitably be established over German industries and over the Ruhr industries in particular.

As we know, the Control Council in Germany recently fixed the level that would be reached by German industries in the near future. Germany has not yet *by far*²⁹ reached this level. Nevertheless, it should already now be admitted that the peaceful industries of Germany must receive an opportunity to develop on a wider scale, provided only that this industrial development should really be used to satisfy the peaceful needs of the German people and the requirements of trade with other countries.

All this *calls for*³⁰ the establishment of proper inter-Allied control over German industries and over the Ruhr industries in particular. Responsibility for the latter

施，我們對這些任務的完成，不能拖延了。

這就是蘇聯政府關於德國戰爭工業及戰爭潛力的意見。這些考慮並不影響德國的和平工業。

為謀德國和平工業的發展能對需要德國煤，五金及工業品的其他國家有益起見，德國應獲得輸出與輸入的權利，同時如果欲使此權利真正奏效，我們對德國和平性質的鋼，煤及工業成品生產力的增加不應加以阻礙；當然，在相當的約束範圍內，同時在德國工業，特別是魯爾工業，必須不可避免的由盟國共同管制的條件下才可獲得這個權利。

我們知道，德國管制委員會最近規定德國工業在最近將來可以達到的水準。德國現在遠遠沒有達到這個水準。然而，現在我們已經應當承認德國的和平工業應有機會作大規模的發展，唯一條件是這個工業發展應當真正用來滿足德國人民和平需要及和其他國家交易的需要。

這一切需要建立一個適宜的盟國共同對德國工業，特別是魯爾區的工業的管制。管制後者的責任不應只由

cannot rest only upon one of the Allied countries. Adoption of a corresponding program for the development of German peaceful industries that will provide for the development of the foreign trade of Germany as well as for the establishment of inter-Allied control over the whole of German industry satisfies the need for implementation of the decisions of the Berlin Conference that provide for the treatment of Germany as an economic whole.

It remains for me to dwell on the question of the peace treaty with Germany.

Of course we stand in principle for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, but before concluding this treaty there should be set up a single German government sufficiently democratic in order to be able to extirpate all remnants of fascism in Germany and sufficiently responsible in order to be able to fulfill all its obligations toward the Allies, including and more particularly those in respect to reparation deliveries to the Allies. It goes without saying that we raise no objection to the setting up of a German central administration as a transitional step toward the establishment of a future German government.

From what I have said, it follows that before talking about a peace treaty with Germany, it is necessary to solve the question of setting up an all-German government. However, to this day no German central administration of any kind whatsoever has been created, though the Soviet Government raised this question at the Berlin Conference a year ago. But while at that time this question was put off, it is

某一盟國負擔。採取一個能發展德國對外貿易同時又能建立盟國對德國全部工業管制的發展德國和平工業一個相符的計劃可滿足柏林會議規定德國為整個經濟單位的決議案的需要。

我現在還要討論的是對德國的和平條約。

當然我們在原則上贊成和德國訂立和約，但在訂立這和約以前應當成立一單獨的充份民主的德國政府能夠剷除德國法西斯主義所有的殘餘及充份負責能夠履行對盟國的義務，包括特別是關於交付盟國賠償的義務。不用贅言我們並不反對成立一德國中央行政組織作為建立未來德國政府的過渡步驟。

根據我所說的，自然是在談到和德國的和約以前，需要先解決成立一個完全德國政府的問題。雖則蘇聯政府一年前在柏林會議已經提出這問題，但是直到今日還沒有產生任何形式的德國中央行政組織。然而在那個時候這個問題曾擱置，所以現在它是

becoming now particularly urgent as the first step toward the establishment of a future German government.

But even when a German government has been set up it will take a number of years to check up on what this new German government represents and whether it is trustworthy.

A future German government must be such a democratic government as will be able to extirpate the remnants of fascism in Germany and will at the same time be able to fulfill Germany's obligations towards the Allies, and amongst other things and above all it will be bound to carry out reparation deliveries to Allies. Only when we become satisfied that the new German government is able to cope with these tasks and is really honestly fulfilling them in practice, only then will it be possible to speak seriously of concluding a peace treaty with Germany.

Unless this condition is fulfilled, Germany cannot claim a peace treaty and the Allied powers will not be able to say that they have fulfilled their duties toward the nations who are demanding that a durable peace and security be assured.

Such is the view of the Soviet Union on the fundamental problems of Germany and on the question of a peace treaty with Germany.

建立未來德國政府特別急要的第一步

但甚至在一個德國政府成立以後，我們還須不少的年月去審核這德國新政府代表什麼及是否可靠。

將來的民主德國政府必須有力剷除德國法西斯主義的殘餘，同時除其他義務外，尤須能夠履行對盟國的賠償。祇有在我們滿意於德國新政府能應付這些工作的時候，和它在實行上真正忠實的履行這些義務的時候，祇有在那個時候才能認真的談到和德國訂立和約。

除非這個條件已經履行，德國不能要求訂立和約，同盟國不能說他們已經履行對要求永久和平及安全的國家所負的義務。

這就是蘇維埃聯邦對德國基本問題及對和德國訂立和約問題的觀點。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "identify with", 『視為同一』。It is wrong to identify democracy with mob rule, 將民主與暴徒政治同為一事係為錯誤。
2. "divest oneself of", 『卸脫』。No one should divest oneself of the right to take active part in politics, 人不應卸除其積極參加政治之應有權利。
3. "bear in mind", 『記在心中』, 『勿忘懷』 you must bear in mind that there was a time when China was self-sufficient, 汝須牢記一事，即在過去中國曾為一自給自足之國家。
4. "thanks to" = "as a result of", "owing to", 『由於』。Thanks to the abundant crop this fall,

there is no fear of famine, 由於今秋豐收, 目下已無飢荒之憂矣。 5. "link" (由鏈環中之一環轉爲)『連繫物(人)』。 He is a link between the people and the government. 彼爲人民與政府之連繫人。 6. "once"="when once" 或 "if once" 『一旦』, 『一經』。 Once (when once) you try, you will like it, 汝一經嘗試, 即愛爲之。 7. "in the light of", 『看法』, 『見地』, 『立場』。 Viewed in the light of military use of atomic energy, it is an additional means of man slaughter, 由軍用原子能見地觀之, 原子能實爲人類屠殺新加之一工具。 8. "course", 『方針』, 『政策』。 Democratization is the only course for China, 中國唯一之途徑爲民主化。 9. "chronic", 『慢性』, 『長延』。 This is a chronic disease, 此爲慢性病。 10. "spell", 『意指』, 『表示』。 Failure spells ruin, 失敗蓋表滅亡。 11. "course", 『進程』, 『過程』。 He expressed great confidence in you in the course of our conversation 彼與余談次對汝表示信任。 12. "next to", 『次於』, 『亞於』。 Nanking is next to Peiping in size, 以大小論南京亞於北平。 13. "deprive of", 『剝除』, 『剝奪』。 He is deprived of the privilege, 彼對此權利已爲剝奪。 14. "holdup to ridicule", 『揭舉.....而嘲笑之』。 Chwangtze wrote very witty allegories to hold man's follies up to ridicule, 莊周作極妙隱喻揭舉人類愚妄而譏諷之。 15. "no more...than"="as...as". He has no more right to do this than you have (=He has as little right to do this as you have), 彼之無權爲此一如汝然。 16. "While continuing as a single state" 爲 "While it continues as a single state", "it" 指 "Germany", 凡 "if", "when", "while" 等子句之主詞與主句主詞相同始可省略。否則錯誤, 如 "While sleeping, he knocked", 此處 "sleeping" 爲指發言人="While I was sleeping" 非 "he", 此等子句不能省略。 17. "in order that Germany may become", 凡用連接字 "that" 或 "in order that" 爲表示目的, 子句中須用 may (過去用 might) 助動字 (爲subunctive)。 18. "to the full", 『盡量』, 『充分』。 He enjoyed himself to the full, 彼充分自樂。 19. "of late"="lately". Of late he has not been heard of, 最近不知其消息。 20. "It goes without saying that...", 『不言而喻』, 『不待言』, 『毋庸贅言』。 It goes without saying that international control of atomic energy is impossible, if nations are secretly preparing to fight another war, 如各國秘密準備再作戰爭, 國際管制原子能之不可能, 此毋待言。 21. "whereas"="While", 『然而』(又用作 "seeing that", 『因』解)。 The father sticks to the old notions; whereas(while), the young people to the new, 父執陳見, 而子女則趨新。 22. "impose upon", 『強加』。 Do not impose any more tax upon the people, 勿再強加人民新稅。 23. "stand in the way", 『阻礙』。 Nothing stands in the way of China's democratization at all, 中國民主化毫無障礙。 24. 凡在 "natural", "good", "right" (應當之事) 及 "strange", "no wonder" (反常之事) 其子句皆應用 "should" (本文第一面倒數第二行之 "agitates" 應爲 "should agitate")。 25. 表示命令, 要求用 subjunctive verb, 此處 "be carried out" 爲 subjunctive present passive. 26. "we are of the view that"="we are of the opinion that", 『吾之見解爲.....』, 『吾人視爲.....』。 We are of the view that freedom of expression is a pre-requisite to democracy, 吾人視言論自由爲民主之先具條件。 27. "put off", 『延擱』。 Do not put off till to-morrow what can be done today, 今日能爲之事勿委之明日。 28. "provided (that)"="on condition that"="if", 強調條件意味。 I shall lend you the money provided that you must return it to me when I want it, 余可借款於汝惟以余需要時汝須歸還爲條件。 29. "by far"="much", 『遠』。 30. "call for", 『要求』, 『需要』。 Such a task calls for courage, 此一任務需要勇氣爲之。

BYRNES'S ADDRESS ON U.S. POLICY ON GERMANY

Made at Stuttgart to American Troops of U.S. Occupied

Zone in Germany, September 6, 1946

貝爾納斯講演美國對德政策

一九四六年九月六日在德國美佔領區之斯多加特城對美佔領軍發表

I have come to Germany to learn *at first hand* the problems involved in the reconstruction of Germany and to discuss with our representatives the views of the United States Government as to some of the problems confronting us.

We in the United States have given considerable time and attention to these problems, because upon their proper solution will depend not only the future well-being of Germany but the future well-being of Europe.

We have learned, whether we like it or not, that we live in one world from which we cannot isolate ourselves. We have learned that peace and well-being are indivisible and that our peace and well-being cannot be purchased at the price of the peace or well-being of any other country.

I hope that the German people will never again make the mistake of believing that because the American people are peace-loving, they will sit back hoping for peace if any nation uses force or the threat of force to acquire dominion over other people and other governments.

余此次來德國，意在直接研究關係重建德國之種種問題，並與我方代表討論美政府對於當前若干問題之意見。

吾人在美國對此等問題，曾費相當之時間予以注意，蓋因不僅德國未來之幸福，且歐洲之未來幸福皆有賴此等問題之適當解決。

吾人業已知悉，吾人係生存於一整個世界，欲離此孤立勢不可能，此一事實不受吾人愛惡所支配。吾人業已知悉和平與幸福為不能分割者，而且吾人亦不能以任何他國之和平與幸福為代價以換取吾人之和平與幸福。

余希望德國人民勿再陷入錯誤，以為美國人民因愛好和平之故，可於任何國家使用武力或武力威嚇以求統制他國人民與政府時，仍能坐而期待和平之來臨。

In 1917 the United States was forced into the First World War. After that war we refused to join the League of Nations. We thought we could stay out of Europe's wars and we lost interest in the affairs of Europe. That did not keep us from being forced into the Second World War.

We will not again make that mistake. We intend to continue our interest in the affairs of Europe and of the world. We have helped to organize the United Nations. We believe it will stop aggressor nations from starting wars. Because we believe it, we intend to support the United Nations organization with all the power and resources we possess.

The American people want peace. They have long since ceased to talk of a hard or a soft peace for Germany. This never has been the real issue. What we want is a lasting peace. We will oppose harsh and vengeful measures which obstruct an effective peace. We will oppose soft measures which invite the breaking of the peace.

In agreeing at *Potsdam*² that Germany should be disarmed and demilitarized and in proposing that the four major powers should by treaty jointly undertake to see that Germany is kept disarmed and demilitarized for a generation, the United States was not *unmindful of*³ the responsibility resting upon it and its major allies to maintain and enforce peace under law.

Freedom from militarism will give the German people the opportunity, if they will *but*⁴ seize it, to apply their great energies and abilities to the works of peace. It will give them the opportunity to show themselves

美國於一九一七年被迫而參加第一次世界大戰。是次大戰之後，吾人拒絕參加國聯。吾人認爲吾人對歐洲戰爭可置身事外，對歐洲事務不生興趣。然此並不能使吾人避免捲入第二次世界大戰。

吾人決不一誤而再誤。吾人對歐洲及世界事務準備廣續予以關懷。吾人業已協力組織聯合國，信其必能制止侵略國家發動戰爭。正因吾人有此信念，吾人準備以吾人所有之全力對聯合國組織予以支持。

美國人民需要和平。彼等久已未談及對德須有強硬或寬大之和平。此實非吾人所爭之要點。吾人所爭取者厥爲永久之和平。吾人反對阻礙有效和平之苛刻與報復措施。吾人同時反對引致和平破裂之寬大措施。

美國於波茨坦贊同德國應解除軍備，並建議四強應按照協定共同監視德國於三十年內解除軍備之際，對其本身及主要盟國所負依法保持並加強和平之責，並非未加注意。

由黷武主義之解放使德國人民得有機會，如彼等能善用之，可使彼等運用其偉大力量從事和平工作。此種解放可使德國人民獲有機會表示彼不

worthy of the respect and friendship of peace-loving nations, and in time to take an honorable place among the members of the United Nations.

It is not in the interest of the German people or in the interest of world peace that Germany should become a pawn or a partner in a military struggle for power between the East and the West.

Twice in our generation German militarism and Nazism have devastated the lands of Germany's neighbors. It is fair and just that Germany should do her part to repair that devastation. Most of the victims of Nazi aggression before the war were less well off than Germany. They should not be expected by Germany to bear, unaided, the major costs of Nazi aggression.

The United States, therefore, is prepared to carry out fully the principles outlined in the Potsdam Agreement on demilitarization and reparations. However, there should be changes in the levels of industry agreed by the Allied Control Commission if Germany is not to be administered as an economic unit as the Potsdam Agreement contemplates and requires.

The basis of the Potsdam Agreement was that, as part of a combined program of demilitarization and reparations, Germany's war potential should be reduced by elimination and removal of her war industries and the reduction and removal of heavy industrial plants. It was contemplated this should be done to the point that Germany would be left with levels of industry capable of maintaining in Germany average European living standards without assistance from other countries.

負全世界愛好和平國家之尊敬與友誼，且於時機成熟時，可在聯合國中獲得榮譽地位。

德國若形成東西兩方因爭取權力所引起軍事鬥爭中之工具或同夥，非為德國人民之福，亦非世界和平之福。

三十年以來，德國黷武主義與納粹主義已兩度蹂躪德隣國土。德國對他國所受蹂躪應盡責補償，實為公平，公正之事。受納粹侵略犧牲之國家中，大半在戰前皆不及德國之繁榮。德國不能期望彼等獨自擔負納粹侵略之重大損失。

美國因此有意將波茨坦協定中之解除軍備及賠償原則完全實施。惟德國不依照波茨坦協議原旨及規定視為整個經濟單位而治理，則盟國管制委員會所同意之德國工業水準，即應加以修改。

德國之戰時工業及重工業工廠應拆運以削減其作戰潛力，此為波茨坦協定所規定為解除德國軍備及賠償聯合方案之一部分。當時盟國之原意為實行此一方案使其達到一定限度，即德國保有無須仰賴他國而能維持歐洲生活程度所必需之工業水準。

The plants so to be removed were to be delivered as reparations to the Allies. The plants to be removed from the Soviet zone would go to the Soviet Union and Poland and the plants to be removed from the Western zones would go in part to the Soviet Union but in the main to the Western Allies. *Provision was also made for* the distribution of Germany's foreign assets among the Allies.

After considerable discussion the Allies agreed upon levels to which the principal German industries should be reduced to carry out the Potsdam Agreement. These levels were agreed upon on the assumption that the indigenous resources of Germany were to be *available for* distribution on an equitable basis for all Germans in Germany and that products not necessary for use in Germany would be available for export in order to pay for necessary imports.

In fixing the levels of industry, no allowance was made for reparations from current production. Reparations from current production would be wholly incompatible with the levels of industry now established under the Potsdam Agreement.

Obviously, higher levels of industry would have had to be fixed if reparations from current production were contemplated. The levels of industry fixed are only sufficient to enable the German people to become self-supporting and to maintain living standards approximating the average European living conditions.

That principle involves serious hardships for the German people, but it only requires them to share the hardships which Nazi aggression imposed on the average European.

根據此一方案所拆運之工廠應交與盟國以充賠償。蘇聯佔領區應拆運之工廠將歸蘇聯及波蘭，西部佔領區應拆運之工廠，一部分歸蘇聯，而大都分則歸西歐盟國。此外對盟國分有德國國外資產亦有規定。

經縝密討論後，盟國對實行波茨坦協定，削減德國主要工業之水準，業已獲得同意。盟國所同意之此項水準係以一種假定為根據，即德國所亟需之資源應公平分配德國境內之德國人民，德國不需用之生產品則將輸出以抵償德國必需之輸入。

確定德國工業水準之時，盟國並無以目下之生產品充作賠償之規定。以目下之生產品充作賠償，將與波茨坦協定所規定之現有工業水準抵觸。

如欲以德國現有生產充作賠償，則顯然必提高德國工業水準。業已規定之工業水準，僅足使德國人民自給以維持近於歐洲一般生活狀況之生活程度。

此一原則使德國人民陷入嚴重之艱苦，但其所要求於德國人民者，僅需彼等分擔納粹侵略所加於一般歐洲人民之艱苦而已。

The German people were not denied,⁹ however, the possibility of improving their lot by hard work over the years. Industrial growth and progress were not denied them. Being obliged to start again like the people of other devastated countries, with a peacetime economy not able to provide them more than the average European standard, the German people were not to be denied the right to use such savings, as they might be able to accumulate by hard work and frugal living, to build up their industries for peaceful purposes.

That was the principle of reparations we agreed to at Potsdam. And the United States will not agree to the taking from Germany of greater reparations than was provided by the Potsdam Agreement.

The carrying out of¹⁰ the Potsdam Agreement has, however, been obstructed by the failure of the Allied Control Council to take the necessary steps to enable the German economy to function as an economic unit. Essential central German administrative departments have not been established, although they are expressly required by the Potsdam Agreement.

The equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports has not been arranged, although that too is expressly required by the Potsdam Agreement.

The working out of¹¹ a balanced economy throughout Germany to provide the necessary means to pay for approved imports has not been accomplished, although that too is ex-

然德國人民並非不得享有以數年辛苦取得命運改善之可能。彼等亦非不得有工業之發展與進步。德國人民之平時經濟既不能使彼等得有較一般歐洲標準更高之生活，而又不得不重建一切一如其他被蹂躪國家之人民然，彼等不應被拒絕不得享有利用其由辛勞工作，節儉生活所贏得之積蓄以建設其和平目標之工業。

此即吾人在波茨坦所同意之賠償原則。而美國決不同意向德國取得較波茨坦所規定者更大之賠償。

但盟國管制委員會不能採取必要步驟使德國經濟不能以整個經濟單位而發生作用，致波茨坦協定之執行遭受阻礙。必要之德國中央行政各部門，雖在波茨坦協定明白規定，但迄今仍未成立。

各佔領區間主要商品之公平分配，藉以產生德國全國平衡之經濟，同時減少輸入之需要，雖亦在波茨坦協定內有明文規定，但亦未辦理。

為實現德國全國平衡經濟抵償許可輸入品之必要款項之籌劃，雖亦在波茨坦協定明文規定，但亦未有完

pressly required by the Potsdam Agreement.

The United States is firmly of the belief that Germany should be administered as an economic unit and that zonal barriers should be completely obliterated so far as the economic life and activity in Germany are concerned.

The conditions which now exist in Germany make it impossible for industrial production to reach the levels which the occupying powers agreed were essential for a minimum German peacetime economy. Obviously, if the agreed levels of industry are to be reached, we cannot continue to restrict the free exchange of commodities, persons and ideas throughout Germany. The barriers between the four zones of Germany are far more difficult to surmount than those between normal independent states.

The time has come when the zonal boundaries should be regarded as defining only the areas to be occupied for security purposes by the armed forces of the occupying powers and not as self-contained economic or political units.

That was the course of development envisaged^{1,2} by the Potsdam Agreement and that is the course of development which the American Government intends to follow to the full limit of its authority. It has formally announced that it is its intention to unify the economy of its own zone with any or all of the other zones willing to participate in the unification.

So far only the British Government has agreed to let its zone participate. We deeply appreciate their co-operation. Of course, this policy of unification is not intended to

成。

美國堅信：就德國經濟生活與活動而論，德國應以整個經濟單位而以治理，其佔領區之疆界應完全消除。

目下德國情形，使工業生產不能達到各佔領國所同意之德國平時經濟最低限度所必需之水準。顯然吾人欲使德國工業水準能以達到，自不能繼續限制德國全國各地商品，人事與觀念之自由交換。德國境內四周佔領區之疆界，較之正常獨立國間之疆界所產生之困難更不易克服。

目下時機已至，佔領區之疆界應視為僅合劃分列強佔領部隊為安全目標所佔領地區之用，而不應為自內生成之各個經濟或政治單位。

此為波茨坦協定所預測之發展途徑，亦即美國政府願以全力所遵行之發展途徑。美國政府曾正式宣佈願意將美國佔領區與其他有意統一之任何佔領區或其全體實行統一。

迄今為止，僅有英政府同意在其佔領區加入。吾人對其合作深表同情。此統一政策並無排除其他政府不願

exclude the governments not now willing to join. The unification *will be open to*³ them at any time they wish to join.

We favor the economic unification of Germany. If complete unification cannot be secured, we shall do everything in our power to secure the maximum possible unification.

*Important as economic unification is*¹⁴ for the recovery of Germany and of Europe, the German people must recognize that the basic cause of their suffering and distress is the war which the Nazi dictatorship brought upon the world.

But just because suffering and distress in Germany are inevitable, the American Government is unwilling to accept responsibility for the needless aggravation of economic distress that is caused by the failure of the Allied Control Council to agree to give the German people a chance to solve some of their most urgent economic problems.

So far as many vital questions are concerned, the Control Council is neither governing Germany nor allowing Germany to govern itself.

A common financial policy is essential for the successful rehabilitation of Germany. Runaway inflation accompanied by economic paralysis is almost certain to develop unless there is a common financial policy directed to the control of inflation. A program of drastic fiscal reform, to reduce currency and monetary claims, to revise the debt structure and to place Germany on a sound financial basis, is urgently required.

The United States has worked hard to develop such a program but fully co-ordinated measures must be accepted and applied

加入者之意。彼等如有意加入統一，隨時均可。

吾人贊同德國經濟統一。吾人如不能獲得完全統一，則將以全力覓致可能最大限度之統一。

經濟統一對德國及歐洲之復興固為重要，德國人民應認清其困苦之主因厥為納粹獨裁者演成遍及全世界之戰爭所致。

惟正因德國困苦不可避免之故，美國政府不願因盟國管制委員會不能同意使德國人民得有機會解決其若干最緊急之經濟問題，而得無故增加德國人民經濟痛苦之責。

就各種重大問題而言，管制委員會既非事實上治理德國，而亦不任德國治理其自身。

共同金融政策為使德國復興得有成果之所必要。若無以控制通貨膨脹為目的之共同金融政策，則惡性通貨膨脹及經濟痺麻決有發生可能。因此德國亟需一巨大金融改良計劃，以減少貨幣及金融之抵償，改造內外債機構而使德國金融基礎得以穩定。

美國業已致力以求此一計劃之建立，惟吾人如欲遏止惡性通貨膨脹，則須採取與此計劃配合之措施，使其

uniformly to all zones if ruinous inflation is to be prevented. A central agency of finance is obviously necessary to carry out any such program effectively.

It is also essential that transportation, communications and postal services should be organized throughout Germany without regard to zonal barriers. The nationwide organization of these public services was contemplated by the Potsdam Agreement. Twelve months have passed and nothing has been done.

Germany needs all the food she can produce. Before the war she could not produce enough food for her population. The area of Germany has been reduced. The population of Silesia, for instance, has been forced back into a restricted Germany. Armies of occupation and displaced persons increase demands, while lack of farm machinery and fertilizer reduce supplies. To secure the greatest possible production of food and the most effective use and distribution of the food that can be produced, a central administrative department for agriculture should be set up and allowed to function without delay.

Similarly, there is urgent need for the setting up of a central German administrative agency for industry and foreign trade. While Germany must be prepared to share her coal and steel with the liberated countries of Europe dependent upon those supplies, Germany must be enabled to use her skills and her energies to increase her industrial production and to organize the most effective use of her raw materials.

Germany must be given a chance to

能在所有佔領地區同等實施。中央金融機關之設立，顯為有效實施此一計劃之所必需。

抑有進者，德國應建立不受區域限制之運輸，交通及郵政服務亦極需要。波茨坦協定中曾擬設立此項全國性公共服務之事。時間已過一年，惟盟國於此無成就。

德國需要其全部國產糧食。在戰前，德國之糧食即不能自足自給。且今日德國之領土又經縮小。例言之，西里西亞居民即被迫返回面積有限之德國。在農具及肥料缺乏削減糧產聲中，佔領軍人及失業人士却增加糧食之需求。為儘可能增產糧食及統籌糧食分配事宜，中央農業管理部門應即設立使其迅速推行工作。

此外，德國亟需設立一工業及對外貿易管理處。德國既應以其煤斤及鋼鐵供應各毗隣國家，則德國須能善用其技能以增加工業生產量並充分運用其原料。

為使德國自足自給，德國應有輸

export goods in order to import enough to make her economy self-sustaining. Germany is a part of Europe and recovery in Europe, and particularly in the adjoining states, will be slow indeed if Germany, with her great resources of iron and coal, is turned into a poorhouse.

When the ruthless Nazi dictatorship was forced to surrender unconditionally, there was no German Government with which the Allies could deal. The Allies had temporarily to take over the responsibilities of the shattered German state, which the Nazi dictatorship had cut off from any genuine *accountability*¹⁵ to the German people. The Allies could not leave the leaders or minions of Nazism in key positions ready to reassert their evil influence at the first opportunity. *They had to go.*¹⁶

But it never was the intention of the American Government to deny to the German people the right to manage their own internal affairs as soon as they were able to do so in a democratic way with genuine respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Potsdam Agreement, concluded only a few months after the surrender, bound the occupying powers to restore local self-government and to introduce elective and representative principles into the regional, provincial and state administration as rapidly as was consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation.

The principal purposes of the military occupation were and are to demilitarize and denazify Germany but not to raise artificial barriers to the efforts of the German people to resume their peacetime economic life.

出其物資之機會，以交換輸入品。德國係歐洲之一部分，如以本有龐大資源及鋼鐵煤斤之德國變為救濟之所，則歐洲之復興將因而阻緩，尤以其毗鄰各國為然。

當殘暴之納粹獨裁政權被迫無條件投降後，盟國即無可與發生關係之德國政府。盟國遂暫時負起治理支離破碎德國之職責，蓋因納粹政權對德國人民之任何實際上責任，業已斷絕。盟國不能一任納粹領袖留在重要職位上，以防止彼等候機重新發展其惡勢力。彼輩勢必脫離政治。

但美政府在德國人民能以民主之方法處理其本國內務，而真正尊重人權與基本自由之時從未拒絕彼等有此權利。

德國投降以後不過數月所訂立之波茨坦協定，約束佔領列強恢復德國地方政府，並在軍事安全與軍事佔領目的不抵觸之下，儘速於分區及地方與中央行政方面，建立選舉及代議原則。

軍事佔領之主要目的在過去及現在皆為解除德國之武裝與肅清德國之納粹份子，而非對德國人民恢復其平時經濟生活之努力加以人為之障礙。

The Nazi war criminals were to be punished for the suffering they brought to the world. The policy of reparations and industrial disarmament prescribed in the Potsdam Agreement was to be carried out. But the purposes of the occupation did not contemplate a prolonged alien dictatorship of Germany's peacetime economy or a prolonged alien dictatorship of Germany's internal political life. The Potsdam Agreement expressly bound the occupying powers to start building a political democracy from the ground up.

The Potsdam Agreement did not provide that there should never be a central German government. It merely provided that for the time being there should be no central German government. Certainly this only meant that no central German government should be established until some sort of democracy was rooted in the soil of Germany and some sense of local responsibility developed.

The Potsdam Agreement wisely provided that the administration of affairs of Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. This was not intended to prevent progress towards a central government with the powers necessary to deal with matters which should be dealt with on a nationwide basis. But it was intended to prevent the establishment of a strong central government dominating the German people instead of being responsive to their democratic will.

It is the view of the American Government that the German people, throughout Germany, under proper safeguards, should

因納粹戰犯造成遍及世界之痛苦彼等自應受有懲罰。波茨坦協定中所規定之賠償政策與解除工業武裝，自應實行。但佔領之目的並非欲延長外人對德國平時經濟之獨裁，亦非欲延長外人對德國國內政治生活之獨裁。波茨坦協定明白約束佔領列強開始從頭建立一政治民主國家。

波茨坦協定並未規定不應有一德國中央政府。該協定僅規定暫時不應有德國中央政府。此意當然為建立德國中央政府之前，須在德國領土上深植某種民主主義及發展某種地方責任之意識。

波茨坦協關於此點之規甚為明智，即管理德國之事務應以分化中央集權政治機構，發展地方責任為目的。此意並非對建立一具有必要權力，能應付須統籌全國應付一切事務之中央政府，加以阻礙。但意在阻止建立一不從民意而有心統制德國人民之強有力中央政府。

美政府之意見認為德國全國人民在適當之保障下，現在應有處理其自

now be given the primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs.

More than a year has passed since hostilities ceased. The millions of German people should not be forced to live in doubt as to their fate. It is the view of the American Government that the Allies without delay should make clear to the German people the essential terms of the peace settlement which they expect the German people to accept and observe. It is our view that the German people should now be permitted and helped to make the necessary preparations for the setting up of a democratic German government which can accept and observe those terms.

From now on, the thoughtful people of the world will judge Allied action in Germany not by Allied promises but by Allied performances. The American Government has supported and will continue to support necessary measures to *denazify*¹⁷ and demilitarize Germany. But it does not believe that large armies of alien soldiers or alien bureaucrats, however well motivated and disciplined, are in the long run the most reliable guardians of another country's democracy.

All that the Allied governments can and should do is to lay down the rules under which German democracy can govern itself. Allied occupation forces should be limited to a number sufficient to see that those rules are obeyed.

But the question for us will be: What force is needed to make certain that Germany does not rearm as it did after the First World War? Our proposal for a treaty with the major powers to enforce for 25 or even 40

身事務之主要責任。

自戰爭停止以來已逾一年，數百萬德國人民不應被迫生活於不問捉摸之命運中。美政府之意見，認為盟國應立即向德國人民說明和平解決之主要條件。此等條件，預料當為德國人民所接受而遵守者。吾人之意見以為目下應准許並協助德國人民從事必需之準備，以便建立一個民主的德國政府，能接受並遵守此等條件。

今後，世界有思想之人民將不以盟國之諾言，而以盟國之實踐判斷盟國在德國之行動。美政府已支持，並將繼續支持一切必要之措施，以肅清德國之納粹份子並解除德國之武裝。但美政府相信大批外軍或外國官僚，不論其動機與紀律如何良好，終非另一民主國家最可靠之保護人。

各盟國政府所應做而能做者為立下規程，務使民主之德國在此項規程下實行自治。盟國佔領軍之人數應以能使人服從此等規程為限。

但吾人之問題將為需要何種力以確保德國之不再從事武裝，一如其在第一次世界大戰後所為者。吾人曾建議與主要列強締立一條約，然後在

years the demilitarization plan finally agreed upon in the peace settlement would have made possible a smaller army of occupation. For enforcement, we could rely more upon a force of trained inspectors and less upon the infantry.

For instance, if an automobile factory, in violation of the treaty, converted its machinery to the production of weapons of war, inspectors would report it to the Allied Control Council. They would call upon the German Government to stop the production and punish the offender. If the German Government failed to comply, then the Allied nations would take steps to enforce compliance by the German Government. Our proposal for a treaty was not agreed to.

Security forces will probably have to remain in Germany for a long period. I want no misunderstanding. We will not shirk our duty. We are not withdrawing. As long as an occupation force is required in Germany the Army of the United States will be a part of that occupation force.

The United States favors the early establishment of a provisional German government for Germany. Progress has been made in the American zone in developing local and state self-government in Germany, and the American Government believes that similar progress is possible in all zones.

It is the view of the American Government that the provisional government should not be hand-picked by other governments but should be a German national council composed of the democratically responsible Minister, Presidents or other chief officials of the several states or provinces which have been

和會召開時追加同意實行解除德國武備之計劃二十五年或甚至四十年，如此則佔領軍隊可以減少。吾人在實行時可依靠有訓練之檢查隊而不必完全依靠步兵。

例如：若果有一汽車工廠違反條約而將其機器改製戰具，則檢查隊即可向盟國管理委員會報告。彼等將着令德國政府停此製造，並懲罰違規之人。德政府若不依從，則盟國將採取步驟，強迫德政府服從，但美國關於此種條約之建議未得人同意。

安全部隊大概須留駐德國時期頗長。余不欲被人誤會。吾人不願規避責任。吾人並不撤退駐軍。德國境內一日需要佔領軍，則美國陸軍將一日為佔領軍之一部份。

美國贊成從早建立德國之臨時政府，美軍佔領區內對於德國地方自治與國家自治之發展，已有不少進步，美政府相信其他各國軍隊佔領區內亦未始不能有類似之進行。

美政府之意見認為臨時政府不應由其他政府越俎代庖，而應為一德國之國民議會，由民主派之負責閣員總統或由四佔領區每地所設立省區其他

established in each of the four zones.

Subject to the reserved authority of the Allied Control Council, the German national council should be responsible for the proper functioning of the central administrative agencies which should have adequate power to ensure the administration of Germany as an economic unit as was contemplated by the Potsdam Agreement.

The German national council should also be charged with the preparation of a draft of a federal constitution for the United States of Germany which among other things should ensure the democratic character of the new Germany and the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all its inhabitants.

After approval in principle by the Allied Control Council, the proposed constitution should be submitted to an elected convention for final drafting and then submitted to the German people for ratification.

While we shall insist that Germany observe the principles of peace, good neighborliness and humanity, we do not want Germany to become the satellite of any power or powers or to live under a dictatorship, foreign or domestic. The American people hope to see a peaceful and democratic Germany become and remain free and independent.

The time has also come to define the boundaries of the new Germany.

Austria has already been recognized as a free and independent country. Her temporary and forced union with Germany was not a happy event for either country and the United States is convinced that it is in the interest of both countries and the peace of

高級官員組合而成。

德國國民議會在盟國管制委員會保留權管理之下，對於中央行政機構之適當工作，應負責任，而此等行政機構應有充分權限保證德國之行政符合波茨坦協定。

德國國民議會，並須負責籌備德國聯邦憲法之起草，保證新德國之民主性質，其居民之人權與基本自由。

擬議中之憲法原則上經盟國管制委會通過後，當即發與遴選成立之大會修正，其後始交與德國人民完成最後之立憲手續。

吾人認為德國將秉承和平，睦鄰及人道等原則，故吾人不欲德國成為任何一國或多國之附庸，或處於國內外獨裁政體之統治下。美國人民希望德國將成為民主和平，民主獨立而且自由之國家。

劃定新德國疆界之時機，亦已成熟。

奧地利已被認為一個自由獨立國家。奧國與德國之短暫合併均非德奧兩國之快事，美國深信為願全兩國之

Europe that they should pursue their separate ways.

At Potsdam specific areas which were a part of Germany were provisionally assigned to the Soviet Union and to Poland, subject to the final decisions of the Peace Conference. At that time these areas were being held by the Soviet and Polish armies. We were told that Germans in large numbers were fleeing from these areas and that it would in fact, because of the feelings aroused by the war, be difficult to reorganize the economic life of these areas if they were not administered as integral parts, in the one case, of the Soviet Union and, in the other, of Poland.

The heads of government agreed to support at the peace settlement the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the city of Königsberg and the area adjacent to it. Unless the Soviet Government changes its views on the subject, we will certainly stand by our agreement.

With regard to Silesia and other Eastern German areas, the assignment to Poland by Russia for administrative purposes had taken place before the Potsdam meeting. The heads of government agreed that, *pending*¹⁸ the final determination of Poland's Western frontier, Silesia and other Eastern German areas should be under the administration of the Polish state and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. However, as the protocol of the Potsdam Conference makes clear, the heads of government did not agree to support at the peace settlement the cession of this particular area

利益及歐洲和平，德奧兩國應再度分手。

在波茨坦，某些指定與蘇聯及波蘭之德國領土仍有待和會最後決定。其時，此項地區係在蘇軍及波軍佔領之下。其時蘇聯及波蘭先後謂此項地區因德籍居民已大部離去，又因戰爭所激成情緒之不同關係，若不以完整之部分視之，則此項地區之經濟生活即難恢復。

美政府首領亦同意於和會召開時支持蘇聯要求康尼斯及隣近地區最後割讓與蘇聯之建議。除非蘇聯對此事之意見變更，吾人仍將繼續支持此項協議。

關於西里西亞及其他德國東部地區，波茨坦會議時蘇聯即因行政上之關係即指定與波蘭。各巨頭同意在波蘭西部疆界未劃定前，西里西亞及其他德國東部地區應在波蘭行政經營之下，以是，此項地區不應視之為蘇聯德國佔領區之一部分。雖然，一如波茨坦會議中之明文規定，各巨頭不同意於和平會議召開時支持分割此項特別地區之議。

The Soviets and the Poles suffered greatly at the hands of Hitler's invading armies. As a result of an agreement at Yalta,¹⁰ Poland ceded to the Soviet Union territory east of the Curzon Line. Because of this, Poland asked for a revision of her Northern and Western frontiers. The United States will support a revision of these frontiers in Poland's favor. However, the extent of the area to be ceded to Poland must be determined when the final settlement is agreed upon.

The United States does not feel that it can deny to France, which has been invaded three times by Germany in 70 years, its claim to the Saar territory whose economy has long been closely linked with France. Of course, if the Saar territory is integrated with France, she should readjust her reparation claims against Germany.

Except as here indicated, the United States will not support any encroachment on territory which is indisputably German or any division of Germany which is not genuinely desired by the people concerned. So far as the United States is aware, the people of the Ruhr and the Rhineland desire to remain united with the rest of Germany. And the United States will not oppose their desire.

While the people of the Ruhr were the last to succumb to Nazism, without the resources of the Ruhr, Nazism could never have threatened the world. Never again must those resources be used for destructive purposes. They must be used to rebuild a free and peaceful Germany and a free peaceful Europe.

The United States will favor such controls over the whole of Germany, including

蘇聯及波蘭人民遭受希特勒侵略

所予之慘重損失。雅爾達協定規定波蘭應將卡遜線以東之土地割讓與蘇聯。爲此，波蘭要求重行劃定其東部及西部疆界。惟割讓波蘭之領土之面積仍有待和會最後決定。

對於法國要求薩爾區之事，美國認爲盟國應予接受，蓋七十年內德國曾三次侵犯法國，且該區之經濟與法國有密切之聯帶關係也。如薩爾區歸併與法國，法國將檢討其賠償要求，此爲當然之事。

除此以外，美國決不支持對德國固有土地之侵略行爲，或不顧德國人民意志而劃分德國土地之議。美國認爲魯爾及萊茵區人民仍願與其他德國領土結合。故美國決不反對彼等之願望。

在魯爾區人民屈服於納粹淫威之下時，納粹若無魯爾之資源，納粹亦難威脅世界。是以魯爾之資源今後不應再度流爲破壞性之用。此項資源應用以重建一自由而且和平之德國及自由而且和平之歐洲。

凡安全目的所需要之控制整個德國(包括魯爾與萊茵區)計劃，美國均

the Ruhr and Rhineland, as may be necessary for security purposes. It will help to enforce those controls. But it will not favor any controls that would subject the Ruhr and Rhineland to political domination or manipulation of outside powers.

The German people are now feeling the devastating effects of the war which Hitler and his minions brought upon the world. Other people felt those devastating effects long before they were brought home to the German people.

The German people must realize that it was Hitler and his minions who tortured and exterminated innocent men, women and children and sought with German arms to dominate and degrade the world. It was the massed, angered forces of humanity which had to fight their way into Germany to give the world the hope of freedom and peace.

The American people who fought for freedom have no desire to enslave the German people. The freedom Americans believe in and fought for is a freedom which must be shared with all willing to respect the freedom of others.

The United States has returned to Germany practically all prisoners of war that were in the United States. We are taking prompt steps to return German prisoners of war *in our custody*²⁰ in other parts of the world.

The United States cannot relieve Germany from the hardships inflicted upon her by the war her leaders started. But the United States has no desire to increase those hardships or to deny the German people an opportunity to work their way out of those

表贊成。美國將協助實施此項控制。

但對於外強統治魯爾與萊茵之計劃，美國則不予贊成。

對於戰爭之破壞影響，德國人民現已能覺得，而此種戰爭，乃希特勒及其匪徒所加諸世界者。事實上在德人未覺得前，其他各國人民早即感覺是項影響矣。

慘殺無辜男女婦孺，及企圖以德方軍火統治世界，並使世界退化者，即希特勒本人，德人對此應有所明瞭。攻入德國以便將自由與和平還諸世界者，乃人類激怒之力量。

為自由而奮鬥之美國人民固不欲奴役德國人民。自由之美國人所信取與鬪爭者厥惟自由一事，此項自由應分惠與願意尊重他人自由之人。

美國業已將在美國境內之戰俘幾全部送返德國。吾人正迅速採取步驟將世界他地由美國看守之德國戰俘送回德國。

美國不能解除德國之苦難，此項苦難係彼等領袖發動戰爭所帶來者。惟在德國人民尊重人類自由並走向和平之途時，美國並不欲增加彼等之

hardships so long as they respect human freedom and cling to the paths of peace.

The American people want to return the government of Germany to the German people. The American people want to help the German people to win their way back to an honorable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world.

困難，並拒絕彼等解除此項困難之機會。

美國人民願將德國政府交還與德國人民，美國人民願協助德國人民恢復國際地位，而成爲世界上自由與愛好和平國家之一。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "At first hand", 『直接』, 『親自』。 I have had the news at firsthand, 余直接獲悉此消息。
2. 波茨坦會議公報見「當代文獻」第三卷合訂本, 第302面至第331面。
3. "(un) mindful of", 『(不)注意』, 『(不)關念』。 He is not unmindful of his duty, 彼非不注意其職責。
4. "but" = "only".
5. "worthy of", 『值得』, 『堪受』。 His conduct is worthy of praise, 彼之行爲堪受讚賞。
6. "It" 爲強調 "not in the interest of the German people or in the interest of world peace" 之用。 如: He works for the welfare of the common man 爲自然次序, 陳述清楚。 It is for the common man that he works, 此句爲強調 "for the common man" 而用 "It", 並變更構造。
7. "Provision was made for.....", 『……有(明文)規定』。 In the contract, provision was made for compensation, 合同對賠償一點有所規定。
8. "available for", 『用作』。 There is no fund available for appropriation, 無定款可撥用。
9. "were denied" = "were not given", 『不得有』, 『被拒絕』。 He is denied admittance, 不准彼入內。
10. "The carrying out of", "carrying out" 爲 verbal noun.
11. "The working out of", "working out" 同 10. 亦爲 verbal noun.
12. "envisaged", 『所預料』。 The future of the United Nations Organization cannot yet be envisaged, 聯合國之成就, 目下尚不能預測。
13. "to be open to", 『得參加』, 『得加入』。 The oratorical contest is open to all students, 全體學生皆得加入演說競賽。
14. "Important as economic unification is", 此處 "as" 爲退步 (concession) 用法 = "Although economic unification is important". "As" 之此種用法, 須將補充字等置於句首, 如: Diligent as he is, Diligent student as he is, Diligently as he studies. "As" 之此種用法又等於 "however", = However diligent he may be.
15. "accountability", 『應負責任』。 The manager of a factory has accountability to the workmen for their safety, 工廠經理對工人安全有應負之責任。
16. "had to go" = "must leave the government", 『必須離開政府』。
17. "denazify", 『肅清納粹份子(或勢力)』。
18. "pending", 『俟……決定後』。 The contract will be signed pending his instruction, 俟接獲彼命令後, 合同即將簽訂。
19. 見「當代文獻」第三卷合訂本第98至第107面美英蘇三國克里米亞會議聲明書及三國對歐洲解放國家聲明書。
20. "in one's custody", 『由某看管』。 The prisoners are in the custody of the gendarmes, 該罪犯等現由憲兵看管。

BYRNES'S ADDRESS ON ALLIANCE AGAINST GERMANY

Made to the American Club in Paris

on October 3, 1946

貝爾納斯重申盟國聯合對德之演詞

一九四六年十月三日在巴黎美國

俱樂部發表

I am not in Paris today by accident. While in Moscow last December, when the question of the place of the peace conference arose, I at once thought of Paris and France.

I telephoned to Mr. Bidault, suggesting that if the French Government would invite the conference to meet in Paris, I felt confident the invitation would be accepted. The invitation was extended and unanimously accepted.

Mr. Bidault and his associates and the people of Paris have left undone nothing that would contribute to our work and our comfort. The longer we stay—and we have been in no hurry to leave—the more the French people have made us feel at home. They not only want to be hospitable, but they have the know-how.

Because of the many duties *devolving on* Mr. Bidault, I am amazed at his ability to find time to show such interest in the work of the conference. He is a man of great intelligence, charm and industry. And this intelligence, charm and industry he always uses to promote the welfare of the country

今天我在巴黎並不是偶然的。去年十二月我在莫斯科當和平會議地點問題發生的時候，我立即想到巴黎和法國。

我曾打電話給皮杜爾先生提議如果法國政府邀請會議在巴黎召開，我確信此一邀請將被接受。結果發出請柬為全體所接受。

皮杜爾先生及其僚屬暨巴黎人民曾厥盡所能協助吾人之工作及給予吾人舒適。吾人逗留愈久——吾人亦不急於離開——法國人民愈使吾人感覺安適。他們不但欲殷勤招待，而且他們有招待的技巧。

皮杜爾先生因為負責政務很紛忙，我對他能有時間去對會議工作表現這樣的關懷感到驚異。他是一個天資很高，可愛的及勤勉的人。而他不斷用這天資，可愛及勤勉去增進他所圓

he serves and loves so well.

In this company I will not speak of the long and firm friendship which has existed between the people of France and the people of the United States—a friendship which existed before we attained our independence. That friendship runs so deep that we do not have to talk about it. Differ as we may from time to time, our two peoples always have stood and always will stand together in time of crisis. Liberty, equality, fraternity—the rights of man—are our common heritage.

Twice in my generation the soldiers of France and the soldiers of America have fought side by side in defense of their common heritage of freedom. America is proud of her contribution to our common victory in 1945. America is proud of her contribution to our common victory in 1918. But America is not so proud of the course she followed after the victory of 1918.

In 1918 I was a follower of Woodrow Wilson. I gloried in his idealism and in the magnificent effort he made to build the peace upon the Covenant of the League of Nations.

But the American people expected too much from Woodrow Wilson and supported him too little. While he was in Paris working for peace, political opponents at home bitterly criticized his course and questioned his motives. They exaggerated and exploited the shortcomings of the Treaty of Versailles and they belittled and besmirched what Woodrow Wilson had accomplished.

America failed to join the League of Nations. America refused to guarantee the defence of the French frontier. America allowed other countries to believe that she

滿服務及熱烈愛護的國家的福利。

在本席上，我不講及那法國人民及美國人民彼此間所有的悠久及穩定的友誼——一個在美國未獲得獨立以前的友誼。這個友誼是那麼深切以至我們無需乎講到它。雖然吾人不時不免發生歧見，我兩國人民在緊急時候會共同站在一起而且將來亦將站在一起。自由，平等，博愛——人權主義——是我們共同的遺產。

在余之一代內法國的士兵和美國的士兵已有兩度共同併肩為保衛他們共同的自由的遺產而作戰。美國對於它對一九四五年吾人的共同勝利的貢獻，頗足自豪。美國對於它對一九一八年我們共同勝利的貢獻，頗足自豪。但美國對一九一八年勝利後它所採取的政策則不是同樣地自豪。

在一九一八年我是威爾遜總統的隨從。我誇讚他的理想和他由國聯盟約建立和平所作之絕大努力。

但當時美國人民對威爾遜總統的希望太大而對他所予的支持却太少。當他在巴黎為和平而工作的時候，他的國內政敵猛烈地批評他的政策並質問他的動機。他們誇大及揭發凡爾賽條約的缺點，同時輕視並損害威爾遜總統所有的成就。

美國未克參加國際聯盟。美國當時拒絕保證防衛法國的邊界。美國故使他國認為美國不關懷並不願對

had no interest and would not seriously concern herself in what was happening in Europe, in Africa or Asia.

But wars started, first in Asia, then in Africa and then in Europe. Then came Pearl Harbor. America learned too late that this is one world and that she could not isolate herself from that world.

America is determined this time not to retreat into a policy of isolation. We are determined this time to cooperate in maintaining the peace.

President Roosevelt this time sought to avoid the political opposition which had defeated the peace after the first World War. Then President Wilson neglected to invite the leaders of the political party in opposition to his Administration to participate with him in making the peace. President Roosevelt, on the other hand, asked the Congressional leaders to participate in the peace studies being made by the Department of State shortly after our entry into the war.

At Yalta², immediately after the heads of Government had agreed to call the San Francisco Conference to draw up the Charter for the United Nations, President Roosevelt advised Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius and me that he would appoint on the delegation to the San Francisco Conference Republicans as well as Democrats and would name Senator Vandenberg as the ranking Republican member of the delegation.

Even before our entry into the war President Roosevelt repudiated the idea that the United States was not interested in what takes place in Europe. Knowing from the start that the war was a war of aggression,

歐洲，非洲及亞洲所發生的事件發生關係。

但戰爭接踵爆發，首先在亞洲，繼而在非洲，在歐洲。旋又有珍珠港事件。美國當時才知道此一世界是一個整體，而它並不能脫離此一世界而孤立，惟為時已太晚。

美國此次遂決定不再退而採取孤立政策。吾人此次遂決定合作維持和平。

羅斯福總統此次設法避免第一次大戰後擊敗和平之政治對敵。彼時，威爾遜總統疏忽邀請反對其政府之政黨領袖與其在締造和平中分工合作。羅斯福總統在另一方面要求國會領袖參與研討國務院在吾人參戰後所作之和平研究。

在雅爾達，緊隨政府首腦同意召集舊金山會議以釐訂聯合國憲章後，羅斯福總統通知國務卿史特汀紐斯及余謂彼將同時任命共和黨員和民主黨員參加舊金山會議之代表團，並將任命上議院議員范登堡為代表團中之共和黨高級團員。

早在吾人參戰之前，羅斯福總統已拋棄美國與在歐洲發生之事情無關之觀念。從開端起，彼已知此戰爭係

he never asked the American people to be neutral in spirit.

Before we entered the war he inspired the declaration of principles known as the *Atlantic Charter*³, which was proclaimed by him and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on Aug. 14, 1941.

It was President Roosevelt who at Yalta presented the declaration on liberated Europe which Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill accepted and which imposed a responsibility upon the three Governments to continue their interest in the Balkan States and uphold the basic freedoms embodied in that declaration.

The policies inaugurated by President Roosevelt have been consistently followed by his successor, President Truman. He has consistently urged the carrying out in the liberated and ex-enemy states of Europe of the policies agreed to by the heads of Governments at Yalta *at the instance of*⁴ President Roosevelt.

President Truman continued the practice of seeking the cooperation of the leaders of both major political parties in the making of peace. It was with the approval of President Truman that I invited Senator Vandenberg as well as Senator Connally to assist me in the drafting of the peace treaties. And President Truman reinforced this bipartisan policy by appointing Senator Austin our representative on the Security Council of the United Nations.

The President has recently made known to the world in the most convincing manner possible that the foreign policy which was started by President Roosevelt and which

侵略戰爭，彼從未要求美國人民在精神上保守中立。

在吾人參戰之前，彼倡導大西洋憲章之主義之宣言，於一九四一年八月十四日由彼與英國首相共同公佈。

在雅爾達會議時，羅斯福總統復提出有關歐洲解放區之宣言，而為斯達林元帥及邱吉爾首相所接受，責成三國政府繼續關注巴爾幹各國及維護此一宣言內所列舉之基本自由。

羅斯福總統所倡導之政策始終為其繼承人杜魯門總統所秉承。彼一再籲請在歐洲被解放前之敵國內，實施在雅爾達會議羅斯福總統所提議而為各國政府首領所同意之決策。

杜魯門總統繼續設法爭取兩大政黨領袖之合作，以締造和平。余得杜魯門總統批准乃邀請上議院議員范登堡及康納利協助余起草和約。杜魯門總統並委任參議員奧斯汀為我國出席聯合國安全理事會代表，藉以加強此兩黨外交政策。

杜魯門總統最近向世界確切聲明：
：羅斯福總統所發端而為杜魯門總統

has been consistently followed by President Truman will continue to be the policy of the American Government.

Because that policy is supported by Republicans as well as Democrats, it gives assurance to the world that it is our American policy and will be adhered to regardless of which political party is in power.

Because today we have such a policy I was able to say recently, with the approval of the President—and I am happy to be able to reaffirm here in France—that so long as there is an occupation army in Germany, the armed forces of the United States will be in the Army of Occupation.

I would not want you to believe that our course in this regard is entirely unselfish. It is true that the United States wants no territory and seeks no discriminatory favors. The United States is interested in one thing, above all else, a just and lasting peace.

The people of the United States did their best to stay out of two European wars on the theory that they should *mind their own business*⁵ and that they had no business in Europe. It did not work.

The people of the United States have discovered that, when a *European*⁶ war starts, our own peace and security inevitably become involved before the finish. They have concluded that if they must *help finish*⁷ every European war, it would be better for them to do their part to prevent the starting of a European war.

Twice in our generation doubt as to American foreign policy has led other nations to miscalculate the consequences of their actions. Twice in our generation that doubt

所始終遵循之外交政策，將繼續作為美政府之政策。

因此項政策為我民主黨與共和黨所共同支持，故可向世界保證：不論任何一黨當權，美國此項政策將永遠不變。

因吾人今日有此一政策，故余在最近得總統之允許發言，而余能在法國此地重申此事甚感愉快，即，德國一日有佔領軍在其境內，則美國之武裝部隊將參加佔領軍。

余不欲各位相信吾人關於此方面之政策為完全不自私。美國確無領土野心及不欲覓取特權。但美國却關注一超過一切之物——公平而永久之和平。

美國人民曾竭力設法避免捲入歐洲兩次戰爭之漩渦，力謀保持各人自掃門前雪之原則，而不預問歐洲之事。但結果行不通。

美國人民發現，當一歐戰發動之時，吾人之和平與安全必牽涉在內。彼等之結論認為：彼等如果必須出力協助結束歐洲每次之戰爭，則最好莫如遏止歐戰之發生。

在吾人之一代內曾有二次因其他各國對於美國外交政策之發生疑慮，以至引起錯估其行動之後果。在吾人

as to American foreign policy has not brought peace, but war.

That must not happen again.

France, which has been invaded three times in the last seventyfive years by Germany, naturally does not want to be in doubt as to American foreign policy toward Germany.

To dispel any doubt *on that score*⁸ the United States has proposed that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and the United States shall enter into a solemn treaty not only to disarm and demilitarize Germany, but to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized for forty years. And the treaty can be extended if the interest of international peace and security require.

On June 5, 1945, Generals Eisenhower, Zhukov, Montgomery and de Tassigny entered into an agreement providing in detail for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany.

The treaty I proposed on behalf of the United States contains all the provisions of that agreement. It provides that all German armed forces, all para-military forces and all the auxiliary organizations shall be kept demobilized. It provides further that the German General Staff and the staffs of any para-military organizations shall be prohibited and no German military or para-military organizations in any form or disguise shall be permitted in Germany. It provides for the complete and continued demilitarization of her war plants and for a continuing system of quadripartite inspection and control to make certain that Germany does not rearm or rebuild her armament plants or reconvert her civilian industries for war.

So long as such a treaty is in force, the

之一代內，曾有二次，此種懷疑未帶來和平卻帶來戰爭。

此類情事不應再有發生。

法國，在過去七十五年來曾被德國侵略三次，自不願對美國對德外交政策有所懷疑。

為祛除此種疑慮起見，美國曾建議：蘇英法美四國必須締結一嚴正之條約，不但解除德國之武裝，而且在四十年內不復擁有武裝。而且此一條約能依國際和平與安全之需要而予以延長。

一九四五年六月廿四日艾森豪威爾與朱可夫，蒙哥姆利，戴西尼四將軍簽訂一協定，詳細規定解除德國武裝辦法。

美國方面所建議之條約包括該協定之一切條項。該條約規定德國一切武裝部隊，一切軍佐屬部隊及一切輔屬機構均須保持復員之狀態。並規定禁止德國設立參謀總部及其他軍佐屬機構參謀部，不准在德國有任何形式或偽裝之軍事或軍佐屬機構存在。又規定將其兵工廠完全拆卸並繼續非軍事化，由四國相繼實行監督，務使德國不再擁有武裝或重建其兵工廠或將其民用工業再改造為戰爭工業。

此一條約一日有效，魯爾區即永

Ruhr could never become the arsenal of Germany or the arsenal of Europe. That is a primary objective of the proposed treaty.

The United States is firmly opposed to the revival of Germany's military power. It is firmly opposed to a struggle for the control of Germany which would again give Germany the power to divide and conquer. It does not want to see Germany become a *pawn*⁹ or a partner in a struggle for power between the East and the West.

The United States does not oppose, but strongly urges, the setting up of effective inspection and control machinery to see that Germany does not rearm, does not rebuild her armament industries or convert her civilian industries for war.

We propose that the Allied occupation of Germany should not terminate until a German government does accept the required disarmament and demilitarization clauses. Even then the proposed treaty envisages the need for limited but adequate Allied armed forces, not for occupation purposes, but to insure compliance with the treaty.

To keep watch over war potential in this industrial age, engineers are more important than infantry. Engineers can detect at an early stage any effort upon the part of a manufacturer of motor cars to convert his machinery to manufacture of tanks or other weapons of war. Engineers can probe the mysteries of a chemical plant; infantry soldiers cannot.

If violations are discovered, they must be immediately reported to the Commission of Control. If the Commission of Control finds that the violations are not immediately

不能成爲德國或歐洲之兵工廠。此爲余所建議之條約之重要目的。

美國堅決反對德國軍事力量之復興，堅決反對爭管德國，使德國再有各個擊破之力量。美國不願見德國成爲東西兩方爭霸之小卒或伙伴。

美國並不反對而只有力促建立有效之監督管制機構，務使德國不再重披武裝，不再重建其軍備工業或將其民用工業改爲戰爭之用。

吾人建議盟國對德國之佔領必須延續直至德國有一政府確能接受規定解除武裝與廢棄軍備之條款爲止。甚至彼時，所建議之條約指出需要保持一有限而適量之盟國軍隊，非爲佔領目的而爲保證此和約之遵守。

在此工業時代監視戰爭潛力之工作中工程師實較步兵爲重要。工程師可在初步階段查出一汽車製造商企圖將其工廠改造坦克車及其他戰爭武器之任何努力。工程師可澈查一化學工廠之祕密而步兵則不能。

如果有人發覺德國有違犯條約情事，應立即報告管制委員會。如果管制委員會發見違約之處未立即遵照工

corrected by orders of the engineer inspectors, the commission should at once demand that the German government close¹⁰ the plants and punish the violators of the treaty.

If the government does not comply, the Allied representatives in twenty-four hours should order the necessary forces to enforce compliance.

If the Allied representatives deem it necessary, they should be in a position to call for bombers from France, Britain, the United States or the Soviet Union. These planes could fly to Germany to enforce immediate compliance.

After the last war, the great French war leader, Clemenceau, hoped to secure a guaranty that the Allies would come to the aid of France if Germany violated her frontiers. But President Wilson failed in his effort to get the American people to join in such a guaranty. This time the American people propose not to wait until France is again invaded. They offer now to join with France, Britain and the Soviet Union to see to it that Germany does not and cannot invade France.

Mr. Bidault, on behalf of France, and Mr. Bevin, on behalf of Britain, have accepted in principle the treaty we have proposed. I hope very much that the Soviet Union, which thus far has regarded the treaty as unacceptable, will on further examination and study find it possible to join with us to prevent Germany again from becoming a menace to the peace of Europe.

The military representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and the United States easily reached an agreement

程師監督之命令改正，管委會應立即要求德國政府關閉該工廠及懲戒違犯條約者。

如果德政府不遵守時，盟國代表在二十四小時內應命令必需之軍隊強制執行。

如果盟國代表認為需要，彼等可以從法英蘇美召喚轟炸機。此等飛機可飛至德國強制立即遵守。

在上次大戰後，偉大之法國戰爭領袖克里孟梭曾希望獲得一保證：如果德國侵略其邊界時，盟國應援助法國。威爾遜總統在使美國人民參加此一保證之努力不幸失敗。此次美國人民建議勿等待至法國再被侵略。彼等提出現在即與法、英、蘇聯合密切注意使德國不至，而且不能侵略法國。

皮杜爾，代表法國，貝文，代表英國原則上已接受吾人所提出之條約。余熱切希望蘇聯雖截至現階段為止，認為不能接受此條約，在作更進一步之研討以後，可認為能與吾人聯合以防阻德國再成為對歐洲和平之一威脅。

蘇、英、法、美之軍事代表容易地獲得一協議，規定解除德國人民之

providing for the disarming of the German people and the demilitarization of German plants, to continue until the peace settlement. The United States proposes to continue this disarming and demilitarization for forty years after the peace settlement.

If the Allied nations will enter into the treaty which the United States proposes to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized for at least a generation, the people of France and the people of Europe need not fear the efforts of the German people to rebuild their devastated country and rebuild a peaceful Germany.

We do want to give encouragement to the peaceful, democratic forces of Germany. We cannot do this unless we do give them a chance to govern themselves democratically.

For our own security as well as for the welfare of the German people, we do not want to see an over-centralized government in Germany which can dominate the German people instead of being responsible to their democratic will.

In the American zone we have placed great emphasis upon the development of a sense of local responsibility and have taken the lead in creating *Länder*, or States, so that the people will look to the States and not to a central government on all matters that do not basically require national action.

We want to see the Federal Government of Germany created by the States and not the States created by the Central Government. If we so proceed, we do not think we will find that the responsible representatives of the States will want to give excessive powers to the Federal Government.

武裝及將德國工廠非軍事化，此一協議將繼續至簽訂和約為止。美國建議在簽訂和約後將此解除武裝及非軍事化繼續四十年。

假如盟國接受美國之建議訂立解除德國軍備至少一代之協定，法國人民及歐洲人民對德國人民致力重建其支離破碎之國家並重建一和平之德國即無須戒懼。

吾人願激勵德國之和平民主力量。除非吾人以民主自治之機會給予彼等，吾人即無從激發德國之和平民主力量。

為吾人之本身安全及德國人民之福利起見，吾人不願德國建立一過度集權之政府，以至能夠支配德國人民而非對彼等之民主意志負責。

在美軍佔領區，吾人已加強地方責任之意識，並倡導設立省份，由此人民對一切基本不須國家行動之事情可向各省而非向中央政府求解決。

吾人願見德國之聯邦政府將由各省組設，而非中央政府組設各省政府。如果吾人如此進行，吾人不認為各省之負責代表將有意以過大之權力予聯邦政府。

We want a peaceful, democratic and disarmed Germany which will respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all her inhabitants and which will not threaten the security of her neighbors.

We want such a Germany, not because we want to appease Germany, but because we believe that such a Germany is necessary to the peace and security of France, our oldest ally, and is necessary to the peace and security of a free and prosperous Europe.

After every great war which has been won by the combined efforts of many nations there has been conflict among the Allies in the making of peace. It would be folly to deny the seriousness of the Allies after this war.

To ignore that conflict or minimize its seriousness will not resolve the conflict or help us along the road to peace. To exaggerate that conflict and its seriousness, on the other hand, only makes more difficult the resolution of the conflict.

I concur most heartily in the view recently expressed by Generalissimo Stalin that there is no immediate danger of war. I hope that his statement will put an end to the unwarranted charges that any nation or group of nations is seeking to encircle the Soviet Union, or that the responsible leaders of the Soviet Union so believe.

I hope also that his statement will put an end to the unwarranted charges that the United States is seeking to use its possession of the atomic bomb as a threat of force against the Soviet Union or that the responsible leaders of the Soviet Union so believe.

I do not believe that any responsible

吾人需要一和平，民主與解除武裝之德國，尊重人權及其居民之基本自由同時並不威脅其鄰國之安全。

吾人需要一如此之德國並非因為吾人欲與德國妥協而係因為吾人相信如此之德國誠為吾人最老之盟友法國之和平及安全所必需者，亦為自由繁榮之歐洲之和平及安全所必需者。

在每次經過數國共同努力而獲勝之大戰後，盟國間之締造和平意見常有衝突。否認此次大戰後盟國意見衝突之嚴重性實為愚蠢。

忽視此項衝突或減少其嚴重性固不能解決此項衝突，或協助吾人走向和平。反之，舖張此項衝突及其嚴重性僅將加多解決此項衝突之困難而已。

余對斯達林元帥最近所表示之意見竭誠同意，即目前並無戰爭之危險。余希望斯氏之聲明足以打破外傳某一國家或國家集團包圍蘇聯之謠言或蘇聯負責領袖有此信念之說。

余並希望此宣言足以打破外傳美國在企圖利用擁有原子彈作為對蘇聯一種武力威脅或蘇聯負責領袖有此信念之說。

余不信任任何政府之任何負責官員

official of any Government wants war. The world has had enough of war. The difficulty is that while no nation wants war, nations may pursue policies or courses of action which lead to war. Nations may seek political and economic advantages which they cannot obtain without war.

That is why, if we wish to avoid war, we must decrie not only war but the things which lead to war. It is easy to get every one to agree that war is evil. It is not so easy to get agreement as to the things which lead to war.

Just because war is not now imminent, we must take the greatest care not to plant the seeds of a future war. We must seek less to defend our actions in the eyes of those who already agree with us, and more to defend our actions in the eyes of those who do not agree with us. But our defense must be the defense of justice and freedom, the defense of the political and economic rights, not of a few privileged men or nations, but all men and all nations.

It is particularly appropriate that here in the birthplace of the doctrine of the rights of man I should reaffirm the conviction of the Government and the people of the United States that it is the right of every people to organize their own destiny through the freest possible expression of their collective will.

The people of the United States believe in freedom for all men and all nations, freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom of assembly, freedom to progress. The people of the United States have no desire to impose their will upon any other people or to obstruct their efforts to improve their

需要戰爭。世人已飽受戰爭之苦。困難之點端在任何一國雖不願再有戰爭，但若干國家或有採取足以引起戰爭之政策或行動。若干國家或有追求政治上與經濟上之利益，而此種利益係非從事戰爭而不能獲得者。

因此，吾人如欲避免戰爭，則吾人不但必須斥責戰爭，而且亦須斥責足以引起戰爭之事。吾人容易使每一個人同意戰爭為有害的。但吾人不易於足以引起戰爭之事方面獲得協議。

吾人正因目下戰爭尚非迫在眉睫，故尤須注意，切勿種下未來戰爭之種子。吾人在經已與吾人協議者之前應減少辯護吾人行動之企圖，而在與吾人不同意見者之前應增加辯護吾人行動之企圖。但吾人必須保衛正義與自由，保衛人類與全體國家，而非少數特權人士或少數國家之政治與經濟利益。

在此人權主義誕生地，余感更適當以重申美國政府與人民之信念：每一人民均有權利經由其集體意志之自由表現，以組織其本身之命運。

美國人民相信各國人民均有一切自由，言論自由，信仰宗教自由，集會自由及進步自由。美國人民不願以其意志強迫任何其他人民接受，或妨礙彼等對於改善其社會，經濟或政治

social, economic or political conditions. In our view human freedom and human progress are inseparable.

We want to give the common men and women of this world who have borne the burdens and sufferings of war a chance to enjoy the blessings of peace and freedom. We want the common men and women of this world to share in the rising standards of life which science makes possible in a free, peaceful and friendly world.

條件之努力。由吾人之見地視之，人類之自由與進步係不可分離者。

吾人欲對於曾經負擔戰爭及其痛苦之世界普通男女，予以享受和平與自由之機會。吾人希望此一世界之普通男女均分享提高生活標準之幸福，此種幸福在自由，和平與友善之世界中，由於科學之賜而成爲可能。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "to devolve on", 『歸……負責』。 The responsibility devolves on you, 歸汝負責。 2. 雅爾達協定見「當代文獻」第三卷合訂本第九十八面至一百零七面，又第四卷合訂本第二百四十六至二百四十九面。 3. 大西洋憲章見「當代文獻」第一卷合訂本第十四面至第十六面。 4. "at the instance of" 『提議』，『要求』。 He wrote this book at the instance of his readers, 彼應讀者之提議而著此書。 5. "to mind one's own business", 『勿管閒事』，『各掃門前雪』。 Mind your own business! 勿管他人閒事。 6. "a European", 凡名詞或形容詞之第一字爲母音字，如 eu 合成或 u, 其音讀 u 字長音者，用 a 不用 an, 除本處外，他如 "a unit", "a university", "a useful man", 等等。 7. "help finish", 美國人用法，英國人用 "help to finish". 8. "on that score", 『關於此點』。 you may be easy on that score, 關於此點汝可安心。 9. 下棋之小卒，意謂犧牲物，西棋以小卒可掩護或換取重要棋子，有如中國象棋小卒過河掩護車馬砲之作用。 10. "close" 係虛擬動詞，用於命令，要求，建議，第三人稱，單數，現在時不加 "s"。

CHURCHILL'S APPEAL FOR FRANCO-GERMAN FEDERATION TO PROTECT PEACE

Delivered at the University of Zürich in Switzerland on September 19, 1946

邱吉爾呼籲法、德攜手維持歐洲和平之演詞

一九四六年九月十九日在瑞士沮利克大學講演

Ladies and Gentlemen: I am honored today by being received in your ancient university and by the address which has been given to me on your behalf and which I greatly value.

I wish to speak to you today about the tragedy of Europe. This noble continent, comprising on the whole the fairest and the most cultivated regions of the earth, enjoying a temperate and equable climate, is the home of all the great parent races of the western world. It is the foundation of Christian faith and Christian ethics.

It is the origin of most of the culture, art, philosophy and science, both of ancient and modern times. If Europe were once united in the sharing of its common inheritance, there would be no limit to the happiness, the prosperity and the glory which its 300 million or 400 million people would enjoy. Yet it is from Europe that has sprung *that series of* frightful and nationalistic morals originated by the Teutonic nations in their rise to power, which we have seen in this 20th century and which have for a long time wrecked the peace and marred the prospects of all mankind.

諸位先生、諸位女士：余今日受歷史悠久之貴大學款待，並承代表各位向余致珠玉之詞，深為榮幸。

余今日欲向諸位一談歐洲之悲劇。此一崇高之大洲，大體包有地球上最美麗、教化極深之地區，享有溫和適度之氣候，乃西方一切偉大母系民族發祥地，亦即基督教與基督教理則之基地。

歐洲為古今文化、藝術、哲學與科學之發源地。設使歐洲對分享共同遺產一旦能團結一致，則歐洲三四萬萬人民所受之快樂、繁榮與光輝將無止境。然歐洲因條頓民族之強盛卻成為吾人在二十世紀所目擊之長期破壞和平，損害人類前途一連串令人可畏侵略道德之濫殺。



And what is the plight to which Europe has been reduced? Some of the smaller states have indeed made a good recovery, but over wide areas a vast quivering mass of tormented, hungry, careworn and bewildered human beings gaze on the ruins of their cities and scan the dark horizon for the approach of some peril, tyranny or terror.

Among the victors there is a *babel*² of voices, among the vanquished a sullen silence of despair.

That is all that Europeans—grouped in so many ancient states and nations—that is all that the Germanic races have got by tearing each other to pieces and spreading havoc far and wide. Indeed, *but for the fact that*³ the great republic across the Atlantic Ocean has at length realized that the ruin or enslavement of Europe has involved their own fate as well, and has stretched out hands of succor and guidance—but for that, Dark Ages would have returned in all their cruelty and squalor.

They may still return. There is a remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously adopted by the great majority of people in the many lands, as if by a miracle, transform the whole scene and would in a few years make all Europe, or the greater part of it, as free and as happy as Switzerland is today.

What is this sovereign remedy?

It is to recreate the European family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living.

然則歐洲已陷入何種狀態乎？若干小國固已恢復良好原狀，然在廣大地區之內，有因苦惱、飢餓、焦慮、惶惑而般靈之衆多人民於俯視殘破家城，仰測暗淡天際之時，皆料有暴政或恐怖之新禍到臨。

戰勝國之間，有怪聲雜出，戰敗國之間則因失望而悲戚無言。

此乃甚多歷史悠久國家民族集成之歐洲人民，日爾曼各民族，因彼此傾軋，廣佈災禍之遭遇。確然，若非大西洋彼岸之偉大共和國最後認明歐洲之毀滅與淪為奴役必連帶彼等於相同命運出而協助與引導，否則黑暗時代必已盡殘酷卑污之能事而到臨。

黑暗時代仍有到臨之可能。目前有一補救之道，如為各地大多數人民普遍自動採納，或可有如奇蹟改變全局，並可於數年之內使整個歐洲或其大部得享瑞士今日之自由與快樂。

此一妙藥為何？

妙藥為重建歐洲家庭，或其可能之一部，使其能有一和平、安全、自由相處之組織。吾人必須建立一歐洲合衆國。使千千萬萬勞苦人民能重獲有價值生活，簡單快樂與希望，唯此一道而已。

The process is simple. All that is needed is the resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women to do right instead of wrong and to gain as their reward blessing instead of cursing. Much work has been done upon this task by the exertions of the Pan European Union, which owes so much to Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and which demanded the services of the famous French patron and statesman, Aristide Briand.

There is also that immense body of doctrine and procedure which was brought into being amid high hopes after the first World War. I mean the League of Nations. The League of Nations did not fail because of its principles or conceptions. It failed because these principles were deserted by those states which had brought it into being. It failed because the governments of those days feared to face the facts and act while time remained.

This disaster must not be repeated. There is, therefore, much knowledge and material with which to build, and also bitter, dear-bought experience to spur the builders.

I was very glad to read in the newspapers two days ago that my friend President Truman had expressed his interest and sympathy with this great design. There is no reason why a regional organization of Europe should in any way conflict with the world organization of the United Nations.

On the contrary, I believe that the larger synthesis will only survive if it is founded upon coherent natural grouping in the Western Hemisphere. We British have our own commonwealth of nations. These do not weaken. On the contrary, they strengthen

此種步驟頗簡單。其所需要者為千千萬萬男女具有為善而不為惡之決心，以求獲得幸福而非詛咒為其報酬。汎歐洲聯合會努力於此種工作業已獲得成績，其大部歸功於古敦霍夫，加來吉伯爵，並得力於著名法國愛國政治家白裏安氏之服務。

此外並有第一次大戰後，由崇高希望中所產生具有偉大理論與實踐之機構。余於此蓋指國際聯盟。國際聯盟之失敗非在原則與觀念。其所以失敗之原因端在產生此一機構之國家背棄原則，同時不敢當機立斷採取行動應付事實。

此種慘禍必不能任其重演。因此，吾人於創立新機構不但有豐富知識與材料，並有由堅苦代價換得之經驗予從事創立者以砥礪。

余前日閱報得悉余友杜魯門總統對此一大計劃表示興趣並同情，不勝欣慰。歐洲之局部聯合組織在任何方面不能謂為與全世界聯合國組織有所抵觸。

反之，余深信此一更大組織反因西半球自然結合得有垂久之基礎。吾英人有吾人之聯邦。此類組織並不削弱，反之，可增強世界組織，且事

the world organization. They are, in fact, its main support. And why should there not be a European grouping which can give a sense of national patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and mighty continent, and why should it not take its proper, rightful place with other great groupings and help to shape the destinies of man?

In order that this may be accomplished, there must be an act of faith in which millions of families speaking many languages must consciously take part. We all know that the two world wars through which we have passed arose out of a vain passion of a newly united Germany to play a dominating part in the world. In this last struggle, crimes and massacres have been committed which have no parallel since the invasion of the Mongols in the 14th century and have no equal at any time in human history.

The guilty must be punished. Germany must be deprived of the power to rearm and make another aggressive war. But when all this has been done, as it will be done, as it is being done, then there must be an end to retribution.

There must be what Mr. Gladstone called a blessed act of oblivion. We must all turn our backs upon the horrors of the past. We must look to the future. We cannot afford to drag forward across the years that are to come the hatreds and revenges which have sprung from the injuries of the past.

If Europe is to be saved from infinite misery, and indeed from final doom, there must be this act of faith in the European family and this act of oblivion against all the

實上為世界組織之重要支持力。因此，吾人為何不應有一歐洲結合使此一激盪之偉大歐洲所有惶惑不安之人民得有民族自愛而同時有大同公民之意識，為何此一結合不應與其他同類偉大結合各以適當應有之地位共謀人類命運之定向，實令人不解？

為達成此一目的，操各種語言之千千萬萬家庭必須自動參加一不可缺乏之信念上之表現。吾人經過兩次世界大戰皆知其係由一團結不久之德國意圖控制全世界之虛榮心所致。第二次大戰期間所造成之罪惡與屠殺實為十四世紀蒙古民族侵犯歐洲以來，人類史中任何時代所不可比擬者。

犯戰罪者應受懲處。德國必須削弱實力使其不能重新武裝再從事侵略戰爭。但在目下及未來正着手進行所有之措施完成後，懲處必須停止。

將來吾人對德國必須有葛拉德斯吞所謂不咎既往的善行。吾人對過去之恐怖毋須再過問。吾人必高瞻遠矚。由於過去傷害所產生之恨惡與報仇心理，吾人不能在未來年月猶不釋於懷。

如吾人欲拯救歐洲使其不至受無限痛苦與滅亡，則歐洲國家必須有此一信念，對過去之罪行與愚妄必須有

crimes and follies of the past, and the free peoples of Europe must rise to the height of these resolves of the soul and of the instincts of the spirit of man.

If they can, the wrongs and injuries which have been inflicted will have been washed away on all sides by the miseries which have been endured.

Is there any need for any further conflicts or agony? Is the only lesson of history to be that mankind is unteachable? Let there be justice, mercy and freedom. The people have only to will it in order to achieve their hearts' desire.

I am now going to say something which will astonish you. The first step in the recreation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany.

In this way only can France recover the moral and cultural leadership of Europe.

There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany,

The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important.

Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honor by their contribution to the common cause. The ancient states and principalities of Germany, newly joined together into a federal system, might take their individual place among the United States of Europe.

I shall not try to make a detailed program for hundreds of millions of people who want to be happy, free and prosperous and wish to enjoy the Four Freedoms, of which the great

不符既往之表示，歐洲各自由民族必須達到人類根據心靈與精神本能所作之最大決心。

如歐洲人果能如此，則過去對於彼等所加之傷害必將因過去痛苦所有包容洗滌殆盡。

繼續衝突與痛苦豈有必要乎？歷史之唯一教訓豈謂人類之不可教乎？吾人當促進正義、憐憫與自由。歐洲人民為滿足心願祇須有此決心即可。

余茲有所主張，諸位聞之必為震驚。余認為歐洲家庭之改造，其第一步端賴法、德之聯合。

法國欲在道德、文化上恢復其固有領導地位祇此一途。

精神方面偉大之法、德若不存在，則歐洲之復興必不可能。

此一歐洲合衆國之機構，其組織如能完善而實現，則某一單獨國家實力之舉足輕重問題實無大重要。

小國將因其對共同目的之貢獻得視如大國相等，享有榮譽。德國所包括之過去國家與領屬於組成新聯邦後，得在歐洲合衆國之下各保持其原有地位。

余不擬詳細計劃如何使歐洲千萬萬民衆能獲得快樂、自由與繁榮，享受偉大羅斯福所主張之四大自由，

President Roosevelt spoke, and live under the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter.

If this is the wish of Europeans in so many lands, then they have only to say so and means can certainly be found and machinery erected to carry that wish to full fruition. But I must give warning—time may be short. At present, there may be a breathing space. The cannons have ceased firing. The fighting has stopped, but the dangers have not stopped.

If we are to form a United States of Europe, or whatever name it may take, we must begin now. In these present days we dwell strangely and precariously under the shield, and I will even say protection, of the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb is still only in the hands of a state and nation which we know will never use it except in the cause of right and freedom, but it may very well be that in a few years this awful agency of destruction will be widespread and the catastrophe following from its use by several warring nations will not only bring to an end all that we call civilization but may possibly disintegrate the globe itself.

I must now sum up the propositions which are before us. Our constant aim must be to build and fortify the strength of the United Nations Organization. Under and within that world concept, we must recreate the European family in a regional structure called, it may be, the United States of Europe, and the first practical step would be to form a Council of Europe.

If at first all states of Europe are not willing or able to join the union, we must nevertheless proceed to assemble and combine those who will and can. The salvation of the

並在大西洋憲章所包括之原則下得以共存。

如各國籍之歐洲人民有此願望，彼等僅需有此表示即可謀得確切方法建立機構俾彼等願望能達成碩果。惟余必須警告勿失時機。目下僅有喘息餘暇。第二次大戰砲聲方息。戰爭固已停止，然其危機並未滅跡。

設使吾人決心組織一歐洲合衆國，或與以其他名稱，此即時矣。吾人在目下時日中，於原子炸彈披護，甚至可謂保障之下，生存狀況實為渙散不安。惟吾人蓋知惟一擁有原子炸彈之國家與人民決不至不為正義自由而使用原子炸彈，但在數年之時間，此一駭人之破壞工具可能傳播各地，而為若干好戰國家使用，其災禍不但將根絕吾人所謂之人類文明，亦且可能破裂地球本體。

余茲有必要將吾人當前之各種問題作一結論。吾人必有恆心以求聯合國組織之奠立並加強其實力。吾人必須在此一世界觀念之下，並在其範圍之內，改造歐洲國際家庭之地區組織，稱之為歐洲合衆國亦無不可，其實際步驟首在建立歐洲聯合會。

如在建立初期歐洲所有國家不願或不能參加此種聯合組織，而吾人仍須進行集合其願參加並能參加之各國

people, of the common people of every race and land, from war and servitude must be established on solid foundations and must be guarded by the readiness of all men and women to die rather than to submit to tyranny.

In all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America and, I trust Soviet Russia—and then indeed all would be well—must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe. Let Europe arise.

。拯救歐洲各國各地之普通民衆使其不至受戰爭與奴役之苦則吾人必具有堅固之基礎，而且必須以所有男女民衆寧死不願對暴政屈服之決心以作防範而後可。

關於所有此種緊急工作，法德兩國必共同負領導之責。英國、英聯邦、偉大之美國，余深信包括蘇聯在內然後一切定可順利，皆願爲新歐洲之好友與發起人。請容歐洲興起。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. 指威廉第二及希特勒所倡侵略學說及主義。 2. "babel" 聖經載古昔巴比倫人欲建一世界最高之摩天塔，後因塔愈高其中怪聲愈大，遂中止，故形容人聲嘈雜之地爲 the tower of Babel. 3. "but for the fact that" 或 "but for that" = "if it had not been for the fact that" 或 "if it had not been for that" 之替代用法。 I should have failed but for your help = I should have failed if you had not helped me. 4. 此一問題爲修詞問題 (rhetorical question)，強調正面必然答案，並不需將答案寫出或說出。

HULL'S APPEAL FOR WORLD UNITY (1)

Made on the occasion of his 75th birthday, October 2, 1946

赫爾呼籲世界團結之演辭

一九四六年十月二日於七十五壽辰發表

Many old friends have been asking from time to time for my views on the trend of world affairs. Today, my 75th birthday, presents me with a rather unusual occasion for complying with these requests. It also offers me a good vantage point from which to look ahead.

As I reflect on the course of international developments, I am more impressed than ever by the extraordinary growth of progress of our own country. In my own lifetime, I have seen the influence of our nation steadily expand. Today it is a potent, world force in the cause of peace and humanity. The immense power and success which our country has now attained have brought us the opportunity for greatness and with it new responsibilities in the community of nations.

The heaviest of these responsibilities, which our country has accepted, is that of providing our full share of world leadership for the attainment of international unity and co-operation in the service of peace, justice, freedom and progress.

The acceptance of responsibility for such

許多老朋友不時問我對於世界局勢的看法。今天我七十五歲生日正給了我實現這些要求的一個難得的機會。同時也給了我一個瞻望前途的好場合。

當我回憶到過去國際局勢發展的過程時，特別對於美國的非常進展感到欣慰。我有生以來，曾看到美國的勢力逐漸擴展。今天美國已成為和平與人道運動中一個有威勢的世界巨強。我們美國所得的巨大力量與成就當使我們獲有日臻偉大的機會，並在世界上擔任了新的責任。

我們所接受的最艱巨的一項責任是竭盡我們世界領導的地位，以爭取世界團結與合作，為和平、正義、自由與進步而努力。

接受為這種工作的領導是每一個

leadership is the duty of every peace-loving nation. But this is especially true for each of the large nations, *into whose keeping*² the facts of geography and history have placed great agglomerations of political, economic and military power.

In that desperate struggle for the preservation of human freedom, which we call the Second World War, there were soul-searing moments when the very survival of free nations and free institutions hung by a *thread*³. It was then that the nations fighting for freedom achieved, in the face of mortal danger, an unparalleled unity of purpose and action both within and among themselves. It was then that they fully realized that mortal danger would always hang over the free world unless the peace-loving nations, before it was too late, established among themselves an effective system of relations based upon principles and rules of international behavior under which the appalling tragedy of another world war could be avoided.

Since the end of the war, the world has been passing through troublesome and hazardous times. Victors and vanquished alike have suffered untold hardships and indescribable miseries. Internal political and economic instability and social unrest have harassed the people and statesmen of many nations. As a consequence of these and other difficulties of the transition from war to peace, great strains have been placed upon that unity of purpose and action which was so superbly maintained in the critical years of the war. Points of difference among nations have tended to *loom far larger*⁴ than the **comparably broader areas of their common**

愛好和平國家的責任。而這對大國的每一國尤為如此，它們因地理與歷史關係負有保管巨大的政治、經濟與軍事力量之責。

最近這次為保存人類自由的大戰爭，我們所稱為第二次世界大戰，當時若干自由國家與自由制度的再生繫於千鈞一髮的患難時，真使人焦心。當時這些為自由而戰的國家面臨存亡絕續的危險，在國內與盟國之間獲得意志與行動的團結，實歷史空前不可比擬。同時也就是在這時候，他們都充分認識，除非愛好自由的國家能及早插足以避免另一次世界大戰悲劇的國際行為的原則與規律，建立有效的邦交制度，否則自由世界仍永遠面臨着存亡絕續的危機。

自從戰事結束以來，全世界已幾經紛擾與危險的時期。戰勝國與戰敗國一致遭受着不可言喻的艱苦與困難。許多國家的人民與政治家都因為內部政治與經濟的不安以及社會的失寧，咸受苦惱。就由於這種由戰時向平時過渡的種種困難，戰時歷經巨險的國際意志與行動的團結也感到了嚴重威脅。各國間的爭點竟日趨擴大，大大超過它們彼此間共同利益廣大不

interest.

These are dangerous conditions and tendencies. If unchecked, they would undermine the international unity and co-operation so essential to the restoration and maintenance of world peace and security and to the advancement of human welfare. Yet their existence is no reason for anyone to have hesitation or doubt as to the true course of peace and security.

All of this was not unforeseen. The victor nations in the Second World War knew all along that the end of the conflict would bring with it issues and difficulties which could not be evaded. But they knew, too, that unless all peace-loving nations were prepared to meet these issues and to solve these difficulties in the spirit of unity and through co-operative action, the end of the war might well be followed by political and economic chaos from which the world could not recover for generations.

As I look ahead, it is perfectly clear to me that all nations must, with wholehearted devotion, continue to base their relations upon the paramount fact that the primary interests of each of them alike lie in the assuring of its security in a world at peace and the fostering, in such a world, of the economic and social well-being of its people. They must never fail to act on the principle that these great common interests cannot be attained except by the practice of justice and fair dealing toward each other and through mutual confidence and mutual respect.

So long as the governments and the peoples keep their eyes fixed on their common interests and are resolved to act in

可衡量接近之處。

這種都是危險的情狀與趨勢。如果不予制止，勢將根本摧毀國際團結與合作；國際團結與合作既為恢復與維持世界和平與安全以及促進人類福利所切需。然而它們的存在，不能成為任何人對和平安全採取正確路徑抱懷疑態度的理由。

所有這些情形也並不是事先沒有預料到的。第二次大戰的戰勝國都預料衝突的終止將與不可避免的爭執與困難俱來。但是他們同時也明瞭，除非愛好和平的國家能秉團結精神，循合作行動，處理爭端與解決問題，戰事結束將有政治與經濟的紛擾接踵以來，致令世界經過幾十年也還恢復不過來。

本人瞻念前途，深感世界各國必須全心全力，根據一高於一切的事實確立其關係，這事實即，每一國家的最大利益繫於天下太平，並能為它的人民能在一和平世界之中得有安全保證，在這樣的一個世界裏面造成經濟和社會福利。他們的一切行為須按國際相處合理公平，而互信互尊的原則，否則這些巨大共同利益就不能獲致。

只要各國政府與人民真能關心於共同利益，並決心按上述明確的原則

accordance with this manifest principle, they will find ways to adjust their differences.

Only if each nation is united within itself behind policies designed to promote these common interests, and only as the nations continuously co-operate with each other in support of those interests, can we assure for ourselves and for those who come after us enduring peace and free institutions. Only thus can we have a world order by enlightened reason and just law rather than by stark terror and brute force.

During the war, our nation and each of the other large nations exerted its share of leadership both in effecting wartime unity and in laying the foundation of continued unity of all peace-loving nations in the post-war period. Not since the darkest days of the war has it been so necessary as now for the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China and France to work together.

A special responsibility still rests upon these nations to exercise jointly, both inside and outside the United Nations Organization and other machinery of international arrangements, world leadership toward unity and co-operation among all nations. Achieving and maintaining that unity and co-operation must continue to be the predominant duty of statesmanship.

No matter how laborious the task, if the large nations can agree and act together to that end, then there is hope that our military victories of a year ago will be turned into enduring peace. Incalculable disaster would result if these nations should become irreconcilably divided, either within or among themselves.

行動，他們定能覓得調解紛爭的途徑。

只有每個國家內部，能按促進共同利益的政策團結起來，只有各國繼續相互尊重彼此利益而合作下去，我們才能為我們自身和我們的子孫確保持久的和平自由的制度。也只有做到這樣，我們才能有一種不受恐怖與暴力脅制，而按開明的理性以及公正的法律治理的世界秩序。

大戰期間，美國與其他每一大國，都曾一致努力領導促成戰時團結，並為戰後愛好和平國家繼續團結奠立基礎。而今日美英蘇中法的亟需團結也不亞於當年戰事最艱危的時期。

今天在聯合國組織以及其他國際規劃機構的內外，這些國家依然負有聯合運用領導世界的地位而為全體國家促成團結合作的責任。當今政治家的莫大責任，依然是獲致並維持團結與合作。

只要大國能一致到底，那末不論工作是如何艱巨，一年以前的軍事勝利一定會變成為持久和平。如果這些國家內部或國際之間存有不可挽救的分裂，那末後患之巨，無可計量。

There is an overwhelming need today for every one of the United Nations, whether large or small, to keep faith with those ideals of a brotherhood of peace, justice and freedom which inspired our wartime unity and our wartime efforts to insure unity among us after victory.

All mankind will be eternally grateful to those statesmen who follow this course unswervingly and thus demonstrate their courage, their ability and, above all, their unyielding devotion to peace and humanity at one of the most perilous junctures in history. I am confident that man will not fail his fellow men in this crucial test.

聯合國每一會員國家，不論大小，今天的最大任務，就是對於和平正義自由三者關聯的思想要保持信仰，這種思想曾促成戰時團結，也曾促成戰時對確保戰後團結的努力。

當代的政治家們果能在這個歷史最危險的關頭運用其勇氣，力量以及百折不撓的毅力，堅持上述方針，那末全人類將永遠對他們感激無已。我相信在這種嚴重的試驗之中，他們是不會辜負人們的期望的。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. 此為赫爾辭去國務卿以來之首次公開談話。
2. "into one's keeping", 『由某某保管』。 My money is in his keeping, 金錢由彼保管。
3. "to hang by a thread", 『一線之機』。 His life hangs by a thread, 彼僅有一線生機。
4. "to loom large", 『現巨大影形』。 The eagle looms larger and larger toward us in the morning mist, 鷹在晨霧中漸向吾人現其巨大之影。



GEN. MACARTHUR'S REPORT ON JAPAN

*Made by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur on September 1, 1946, the
first anniversary of the surrender of Japan*

麥克阿瑟關於管制日本之報告書

於一九四六年九月一日日本投降一週年發表

A year has now passed since the *surrender terms*¹ were signed on the battleship *Missouri*. Much has been accomplished since then—much still remains to be done. But, over all things and all men in this sphere of the universe hangs the dread uncertainty arising from impinging ideologies which now stir mankind. For our homeland there is no question, and for the homelands of others, *free as are we*² to shape their own political order, there is no question. But which concept will prevail over those lands now being redesigned in the aftermath of war? This is the great issue which confronts our task in the problem of Japan—a problem which profoundly affects the destiny of all men and the future course of all civilization.

The philosophy underlying the first year of occupation was written at Potsdam and reaffirmed on the *Missouri*. It is a simple philosophy embodying principles of right and justice and decency—those social qualities in human relationship which through the ages have animated free men and those who longed to be free. Its impact and its lasting imprint upon the Japanese character and conscience and mind can only properly be visualized and

自密蘇里戰艦簽訂投降書迄今業已一年。一年來之成就固為甚多，其有待努力者亦復不少。惟籠罩宇宙此一天球之萬物與人類者厥為目下由於煽惑人類之矛盾思想所產生可怖之不安定心理。此對於吾人本國並無問題，對於其他國家能自由決定其政治秩序一如吾人者，亦無問題。然在第二次大戰後被重建各國中，何種觀念究佔優勢，此為吾人所欲知者。吾人於處理日本問題所面臨之重大問題即在此，亦即深刻影響整個人類命運及整個人類文明前途之問題。

佔領日本第一年之工作理論，係在波茨坦所擬具及密蘇里戰艦上所確定者。此一理論極為簡單，包有正義、公平與合禮諸原則，此為人類社會關係之特點，亦即自有人類以來使自由人民與渴望自由人民之所以蓬勃有生氣者即此。其銘刻於日本人民性格、天良與思想之深切，僅於了解由歷

assayed by an understanding of the Japanese philosophy evolved through generations of feudalistic life.

For centuries the Japanese people, unlike their neighbors in the Pacific Basin—the Chinese, the Malaysians, the Indians and the whites—have been students and idolaters of the art of war and the warrior caste. They were the natural warriors of the Pacific. Unbroken victory for Japanese arms convinced them of their invincibility, and the keystone of the entire arch of their civilization became an almost mythological belief in the strength and wisdom of the warrior caste. It permeated and controlled not only all branches of government but all branches of life—physical, mental and spiritual. It was interwoven not only into all government processes but into all phases of daily routine.

It was not only the essence but the actual *warp and woof*³ of Japanese existence. Control was exercised by a feudalistic overlordship of a mere fraction of the population, while the remaining 70,000,000, with a few enlightened exceptions, were abject slaves to tradition, legend, mythology and regimentation. During the progress of the war, these 70,000,000 heard of nothing but Japanese victories and the bestial qualities of Japan's opponents.

Then they suddenly felt the concentrated shock of total defeat. Their whole world crumbled. It was not merely an overthrow of their military might—not merely a great defeat for their nation—it was the collapse of a faith—it was the disintegration of everything *they had believed in and lived by and fought for*⁴. It left a complete vacuum morally, mentally and physically. And into this

代封建生活演進之日本哲理，始能想像而玩味之。

日本人民，與其鄰人之太平洋區中國人、馬來人、印度人及白種人不同，數世紀以來，向為服膺並崇拜戰爭與戰士階級者。彼等為太平洋之自然戰士。日本軍隊之不斷勝利，更使彼等深信彼等所向無敵，因而日本整個文明穹窿之樞石造成人民相信戰士階級力量與智慧有若神話者然。此種信仰不僅透徹並控制全部政府機構，並深入生活之各方面——物質上、精神上及心靈上。它不獨織入政府整個系統中，並滲入日常生活之種種方面內。

此非僅為日本存在之素質，亦且為其真正實體。日本之統治權係由僅佔人口少數之封建大君主執行，而其餘七千萬人，除少數開明的例外，悉屬傳統、傳說、神話與統制之下賤奴隸。當戰事進行時，七千萬人所得聞知者，捨日軍大捷與夫敵人獸性消息外，別無其他。

其後，彼等突然感到完全戰敗的極度震驚。於是彼等之世界遂整個崩潰。此不僅為日本軍力之推翻，國家之大敗，亦為其信仰之瓦解——而亦即一切為彼等所信者、所賴以生活者，並曾為之鬥爭者之解體。結果，道德上、心理上、肉體上所餘者僅係絕

vacuum flowed the democratic way of life. The American combat soldier came with his fine sense of self-respect, self-confidence and self-control.

They saw and felt his spiritual quality—a spiritual quality which truly reflected the highest training of the American home. The falseness of their former teachings, the failure of their former leadership and the tragedy of their past faith were infallibly demonstrated in actuality and realism. A spiritual revolution ensued which almost *overnight*³ tore asunder a theory and practice of life built upon two thousand years of history and tradition and legend. Idolatry for their feudalistic masters and the warrior caste was transformed into hatred and contempt, and the hatred and contempt once felt for their foe gave way to honor and respect. This revolution of the spirit among the Japanese people represents no thin veneer to serve the purposes of the present. It represents an unparalleled convulsion in the social history of the world. The measure of its strength and durability lies in the fact that it represents a sound idea. Given encouragement and the opportunity to develop, it can become more deep-seated and lasting than the foundations upon which their false faith was built.

It represents, *above all else*³, the most significant gain during the past year of occupation—a gain for the forces of democracy in furtherance of a durable peace, which must be consolidated and extended if we would discharge our responsibility as victory has given us that responsibility. Its underlying concept, new to Japan but fashioned from the enlightened knowledge and experience of the

對空虛。而填入此空虛中者，則為民主之生活方式。美國軍人攜其所有之自尊、自信與自制之優美意識與以供來。

日人目視並感覺美國軍人之心靈素質——反映美國軍人在國內所受最高訓練之心靈素質。故彼等昔日所受教訓之虛妄，彼等舊時領導者之失敗，以及彼等以往所有信仰之悲慘結局，由此遂得以實質上之揭開。精神革命於是隨之以興，幾建築於兩千年歷史與傳統之生活理論與實踐幾於旦夕間粉碎無遺。昔日對其封建君主與武士階級之盲目崇拜，今日一變為怨恨與藐視；而對其敵人之怨恨與藐視，則一變為為崇敬與尊重。日本民間之此種精神革命，決非適應現實目的之矯飾作偽。此實為世界社會史上無可倫比之激變。其力量與耐久性之尺度，則在其所代表者實為一健全理想。苟予以鼓勵暨發展之機會，則可成為較其虛妄信仰立足所在之基礎更為鞏固耐久焉。

其最尤要者，為此種革命實代表佔領一年期間最重要之收穫——增加促進永久和平之民主力量之收穫。吾人苟欲卸下勝利所給予吾人之責任，首須鞏固並加強此種民主勢力。此種革命之根本觀念，在日本固覺新鮮，但實係模倣自由世界之開明知識與經

free of the world, will remain the cornerstone to Japanese freedom unless uprooted and suppressed by the inroads of some conflicting ideology which might negate individual freedom, destroy individual initiative and mock individual dignity. Ideologies of the extremists too often gain converts and support from the true liberals, misguided by slanted propaganda and catch phrases which hold as "reactionary" all things which spring from the underlying concept of the past. Such a propaganda seeks too often to exploit the knowledge common to all men that sociological and political changes from time to time are mandatory if we would keep our social system *abreast of*⁸ the advance of civilization.

Should such a clash of ideologies impinge more directly upon the reorientation of Japanese life and thought, it would be no slight disadvantage to those who seek, as intended at Potsdam, the great middle course of moderate democracy, that a people so long regimented under the philosophy of an extreme conservative right might prove easy prey to those seeking to impose a doctrine leading again to regimentation, under the philosophy of an extreme radical left.

If we would in the furtherance of this task guide the Japanese people *the*⁹ more firmly to reshape their lives and institutions in conformity with those social precepts and political standards best calculated to raise the well-being of the individual and to foster and preserve a peacefu¹ society, we must adhere unerringly to the course now charted—*destroying here what yet should be destroyed, preserving here what should be preserved, and erecting here what should be erected*¹⁰. This would require

驗，而將成爲日本自由之基礎，除非因受某種外來之矛盾意識形態將其根除或抑止而此種矛盾意識形態也許否認個人自由，摧毀個人發動力，甚至嘲弄個人之尊嚴。過激的意識形態，常用歪曲宣傳及口號謂一切以往根本觀念所產生者爲反動，使真正自由主義者改變初衷而支持之。此種宣傳，恆利用人類通有知識以自圓其說謂，若吾人欲使吾人之社會制度趕上文化發展，則社會與政治不時更革勢在必行。

苟有如此的意識形態之衝突直接打擊日本生活與思想之復甦，則對波茨坦協定主張寬致適度民主政治之中庸之道之不利決非小可。蓋久受極端保守之右傾思想統治之人民，甚易受騙而成爲以極左之過激思想統治一切主義之俘虜。

吾人爲欲推進吾人之工作，領導日本人民以更大決心，按照最足以提高個人福利，發育並保持和平社會之社會戒律與政治標準重建其生活與社會，則吾人務須正確堅持現定途徑，其應予摧毀者即摧毀之，其應予保留者即保留之，其應予建立者即建立之

all of the patience, all of the determination, and all of the statesmanship of democratic peoples". The goal is great—for the strategic position of these Japanese islands render them either a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous springboard for war.

。此需要絕對忍耐，絕對決心並民主國家政治家所有之作風。吾人之目標實甚偉大，蓋日本三島之戰略地位，既可作為和平之屏藩，亦可化為危險的戰爭跳板也。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "the surrender terms", 日本投降條款見「當代文獻」第四卷合訂本，或第四卷第二分冊第 35 至第 37 面。
2. "free as are we" 不能寫作 "free as we are" (因 "free as we are" = "although we are free") 此為受字句次序及習慣用法之牽制。
3. "warp and woof", "warp" 為布之經(直紗)，"woof" 為緯(橫紗)，故轉為仍何事物之「實體」。
4. "they had believed in and lived by and fought for" 即 "in which they had believed and by which they had lived and for which they had fought"。省 "which" 一字可使文字構造簡單生動。
5. "overnight", 「旦夕間」，「過一夜」，「瞬息」，「驟」。
- He became a famous author overnight, 彼驟然成為名作家。
6. "above all else" = "above all others".
7. "to keep abreast of (或 with = "keep up with")", 「趕上」，「並駕齊驅」。
- You must keep abreast of the times by reading newspapers and magazines 君須閱覽報紙雜誌以免淪為時代之落伍者。
8. "the", 「更」。
9. "destroying here what yet should be destroyed, preserving here what should be preserved, and erecting here what should be erected", 各片語構造平行 (parallel construction) 為強調作用。
10. "all of the patience, all of the determination, and all of the statesmanship", 用法同上。

WHAT WE ARE DOING IN JAPAN - AND WHY

Prepared by the U. S. State Department, published in "Building the Peace,"

No. 2, Autumn, 1946

盟國管制日本政策

美國務院「建設和平公報」第十二號於一九四六年秋季發表

THE SITUATION

Americans In Japan—More than 160,000 Americans in uniform and 2,000 civilian Americans are in Japan doing a job. Their job is occupation.

The Country They Are Occupying—Japan is operating under its own Government, which is subordinate to and carries out the orders of the Allied Powers. The Japanese people, who suffered 300,000 civilian and an estimated 400,000 military casualties in the war out of a total population of 70,000,000 have been docile and obedient—despite the pangs of wide-spread hunger. The Japanese for 700 years lived under a feudal regime; yet their nation is by far the most highly industrialized and the greatest trading power in the Far East—a vital factor, for good or ill, in the economy and life of the Far East and the world.

OBJECTIVE OF OCCUPATION

The First Is Demilitarization—To insure that never again shall Japan be able to become an aggressor nation.

The Second Is Democratization—To insure that there shall be established in Japan a responsible, democratic government which

局勢分析

駐日美人——美國為管制日本現在日本工作人員計有武裝官兵十六萬人，文官二千人。

日本現狀——日本現由其本國政府統治，對各戰勝的同盟國負責，並推行盟國命令。日本人口七千萬，大戰中平民死亡卅萬，官兵四十萬，雖然普遍遭受饑餓的困難，但仍馴良而恭順。日人曾於封建政權下度過七百年之久，但它在遠東確為工業最發達，是最大的一個貿易國家，同時也是遠東與世界經濟生活中可作好作歹的一個重要因素。

管制的目的

首先是解除武裝——要確保日本不再成為侵略國。

其次是民主化——要確保日本建立一個負責而民主的政府，與其他國

will cooperate with other nations for lasting world peace and security.

The Ultimate Purpose Is World Stability—The occupation of Japan is part of the program of the United States and its associates among the nations to create in the Far East and the whole world a peaceful order based upon political stability, economic progress, intellectual freedom, and social well-being.

LENGTH OF OCCUPATION

Pledges—Democratization of a totalitarian, militaristic nation takes many years. Uniformed and civilian Americans will remain in Japan until the job is finished. This is the solemn pledge of the Government of United States, made against the backdrop of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the death march on Bataan, the invasion of the Aleutians, and the entirety of World War II.

Personnel—Occupation is a cooperative, international job. Troops representing Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand, and India are also in Japan, and they may be joined soon by forces of others of the Allied Powers. They too have memories on which they have based their own pledges—Hong Kong, Singapore, Java, Burma, and Darwin.

MACHINERY OF OCCUPATION

Planning—The policies which control the course of action followed by the forces of occupation are developed by two organizations which have headquarters in Washington, D. C. One is the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), made up of representatives of 11 nations—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, India, and

家共同爲世界永久和平與安全而工作。

終極的目的是世界安全——佔領日本爲美國及其盟國在遠東及整個世界按政治安定，經濟進步，文化自由與社會豐裕等要求而建立和平秩序計劃的一部分。

佔領的期限

保證——一個集權而黷武國家的民主化需要若干年時間。美國軍政人員將至工作完成始行撤退。過去由於美國遭受過珍珠港的襲擊、巴丹的戰俘游行、阿留申的攻佔，以至於形成第二次世界大戰，美國政府特提出此項嚴肅的保證。

人員——佔領是一項國際合作的工作。此刻駐日部隊有澳、英、紐與印度等國，今後或將有其他盟國部隊參加。它們也分別具有香港、新加坡、爪哇、緬甸與達爾文港等受辱的史實，因此願意擔負這種工作。

佔領的機構

設計——佔領軍行動所依循的政策係由兩個設在華府的機關擬訂，一個是遠東委員會，內有美、英、蘇、中、法、荷、加、紐、澳、印、菲等十一國代表。它負責確定盟國對日的

the Philip, ines. FEC formulates general policy for Japan. The other is the States' War and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), a United States Government organization. SWNCC formulates those policies which the Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States Army and leaders) transmit as directives to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. SWNCC also formulates those policies which are submitted by FEC.

Administration—From the time of Japan's surrender, on September 2, 1945, occupation has been administered by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). In Tokyo, SCAP works closely with the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ), which is composed of SCAP or his deputy as chairman and U. S. member, one representative from the Soviet Union, one from China, and one representing jointly Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and India. It is ACJ's job to consult with and advise SCAP on problems of occupation, according to policies laid down by FEC.

To carry out the job of occupation, SCAP has a carefully planned and specially staffed organization. This organization is made up of staff sections set up within General Headquarters at Tokyo. These special sections are concerned with virtually every phase of life in Japan—government, economy, natural resources, education, public health, communications, war crimes, et cetera. They recommend what should be done to achieve the objective of occupation and evaluate progress. Their recommendations, after approval by SCAP, are issued to the Japanese Government which carries out the orders.

基本政策，另一個是「國務院陸軍部海軍部配合委員會」，它是一個美國政府機構，負責策劃美國參謀長混合會議給盟國最高統帥指令所及的事項，並確定由「遠東委員會」所交辦的政策。

行政——從一九四五年九月二日日本投降時起，佔領的政務即由盟國最高統帥麥克阿瑟元帥施行。統帥部設於東京與盟國管制日本委員會合作極為密切，該會以麥帥或其助手為主席及代表美國，包括中國代表一人，蘇聯代表一人，英澳紐印共同代表一人。管制委員會負責按遠東委員會所定政策與麥帥會商或向渠建議，處理有關佔領的各項問題。

盟國最高統帥部為實行佔領工作，設有曾經完密計劃與聘用專責人員之機構，其工作範圍推廣至日本每一方面如政府、經濟、自然資源、教育、公共衛生、交通、戰爭罪犯等。它們分別為達到佔領目的與估計進度而提供建議。建議一經統帥部核准，即交由日本政府推行。

ROOTS AND GROWTH OF POLICY

The Allies—The development and building of policy for occupation of Japan began during the war. They are the products of long-time planning and concrete commitments by the United States and other Allied Powers. The first step was taken in November 1943 at the Cairo Conference of the Chiefs of State of the United States, Great Britain, and China. The second was taken in February 1945 at the Yalta Conference of the Chiefs of State of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The third step—a projection of the Cairo and Yalta Conference—was the proclamation drawn up during the Potsdam Conference. The Potsdam Proclamation, also known as the Potsdam Declaration, was issued on July 26, 1945 by the United States, Great Britain, and China, and concurred in by the Soviet Union after she entered the war against Japan on August 9, 1945. The document states that until a new order of peace, security, and justice is established in Japan “and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed; points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objective we are here setting forth....”.

The Potsdam Proclamation was given added force through references in subsequent historic documents. The Instrument of Surrender, signed by the Japanese and nine Allied Powers, stipulated the complete acceptance and fulfilment by Japan of the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation. The Allied Power’s statement of General MacArthur’s authority as SCAP declared that “the statement of

管制政策溯源

盟國——佔領日本政策的發展與形成開始於戰時。它們是美國及其他盟國長期計劃的結果。其第一步係開始於一九四三年十一月中英美三國領袖於開羅集議的時候。第二步係完成於美英蘇三國領袖一九四五年二月於雅爾達集議時。第三步就是補充開羅與雅爾達等會議的波茨坦會議時所擬定的聲明。「波茨坦聲明」又稱「波茨坦宣言」，係美英中三國於一九四五年七月二十六日發表，並於一九四五年八月九日於蘇聯加入對日作戰後獲得其同意。該項文件內稱在日本和平安與公平的新秩序建立後，「並俟日本作戰力量確具消滅的明證以前，盟方應確定日本各要點，並加以佔領達到吾人所確立的基本目標....」。

以後若干歷史性的文件又補充了波茨坦宣言的不足。例如日本伏降書，曾由日本與九個聯合盟國簽字，曾明定日本接受並實踐波茨坦聲明所包括的條件。至於盟國所予盟國最高統帥麥克阿瑟的職權曾有聲明稱「波茨

intentions contained in the Potsdam Declaration will be given full effect....”。

The United States—A consolidation and projection of all Allied planning for Japan was drafted by SWNCC, approved by the President, and published by the United States on August 29, 1945. The document, the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, reiterated that the policies of the occupation would be regulated by consultation among the advisory bodies of the Allied Powers concerned.

Ten months later, on June 21, 1946 the United States published a proposed treaty which it had offered for the consideration of China, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. This draft of a treaty for the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan pointed out that the four powers had “declared their intention to effect the total disarmament and demilitarization of Japan. This intention was expressed in the Potsdam Declaration.” But, the proposed treaty emphasized, “It remains to ensure that the total disarmament and demilitarization of Japan will be enforced as long as the peace and security of the world may require. Only this assurance will permit the nations of Asia and the world to return singlemindedly to the habits of peace.”

POLICY IN ACTION

The Job as a Whole—The task of translating the policies of the United States and its Allies into the actuality of demilitarization and democratization, toward the goal of world stability, is a gigantic one. Demilitarization and democratization, which are being carried on simultaneously, involve:

Disarmament—Military disarmament was

坦聲明所包含意旨的說明應予以充分實現....」。

美國——盟國所有對日的設計以後由美國「國務院陸軍部海軍部配合委員會」加以綜合與補充，所得方案於一九四五年八月廿九日美國總統核准並公開發表。這個文件——美國對投降後日本的初步政策——重復聲明佔領政策將由有關盟國的顧問機構磋商後擬訂。

十個月以後，即一九四六年六月廿一日，美國公佈一建議之條約，此條約係經送交中、蘇、英三國考慮者。此一日本裁軍及解除軍備之條約草案指出四強曾「宣佈彼等對澈底實行日本裁軍及解除軍備之意旨。此意旨曾在波茨坦會議中表達。」但該建議條約強調「現尚須加保證對日本裁軍及解除軍備之澈底實施將加以實行以合世界和平與安全繼續需要。惟有此保證始能使亞洲及世界各國無慮地回復和平之習慣。」

政策的施行

全部工作——實施美國及其盟國關於日本解除軍備與民主化之實現以達到世界安定之目的的政策，是一項巨大的工作。解除軍備與民主化實現之工作同時推行者包括：

裁軍——裁軍為佔領中迫切的工

the immediate task of occupation. SCAP issued the orders and the Japanese Government disbanded the Imperial General Headquarters, the nation's war-planning organization. It disarmed and demobilized the well-equipped and undefeated armies in Japan which far outnumbered the forces of occupation. Disarmament of Japanese forces outside Japan proper was placed in the hands of the local Allied commanders. At the same time steps were taken in Japan toward economic disarmament, which would prevent the Japanese from building up another war-machine. The manufacture of arms, munitions, and airplanes and aviation research were banned.

The Economy—Economy disarmament is part of the task of tearing down the highly centralized and highly militarized economy of Japan and rebuilding it on a new basis. Japan's economic life was in the hands of the Zaibatsu, which are economic combines or cartels comparable to the Nazis world-girdling I. G. Farbenindustrie. The bigger Zaibatsu combines often controlled, through one board of directors, such diverse interests as mines, plantations, factories, steamship lines, steel mills, banks, railroads, newspapers, and political parties. The Zaibatsu, from the 1930's onward, had converted their industrial and financial empires from a peacetime to a wartime economy and thus made it possible for the militarists to carry on aggressive warfare.

SCAP ordered certain steps to be taken in preparation for the dissolution of economic combines and the termination of monopolistic practices. On the basis of a detailed report

作。盟國統帥部下令後日本政府已解散日本作戰策劃機關參謀本部，解散了數量遠大於盟國佔領軍的日本本土陸軍。至於國外的日本部隊概由當地盟軍司令官處理。同時經濟方面的解除武裝工作也開始進行，以資防止日本再度建立戰爭機構。所有軍火、子彈、飛機的生產與航空研究一概禁止。

經濟——經濟上的解除武裝是摧毀日本高度集中與軍事化而按新基礎重建的工作之一部分。日本的經濟完全操諸財閥之手，他們的那些經濟組合與卡特爾在規模上可比德國的法賓工業公司。較大的組合由若干廠主所組董事會主持，管轄着礦場、種植園、工廠、船公司、煉鋼廠、銀行、鐵路、報紙與政黨。從一九三〇年以來這些財閥已逐漸將他們那些工業與金融帝國由平時性質改為戰時性質，因此使軍閥有了從事侵略戰爭的可能。

統帥部下令採行某些步驟，以便解散各經濟組合，並消滅獨佔行爲。統帥部按日本政府所作關於工業製造

secured from the Japanese Government on industrial, manufacturing, and mining companies, SCAP ordered permanently liquidated 21 major banks and development companies and placed restrictions on the activities of 180 firms and subsidiaries.

Concurrently SCAP began securing the necessary facts for the exaction of reparations to indemnify those nations which had suffered from Japanese aggression. Data is being compiled for reparations—materials, machinery, and industrial equipment available beyond Japan's needs for a peacetime economy.

On the premise that a spreading of ownership of basic industry will provide a wider distribution of income and a more democratic ownership of the means of production, the Japanese Government has been ordered to prepare to sell to the general public, shares in Zaibatsu companies. Meanwhile, the Diet—the Japanese legislature—prepared a law to create a Holding Company Liquidation Commission. The Diet also legislated to improve the legal status of labor, granting the right to organize and bargain collectively, and to amend the Agricultural Lands Adjustment Law, which had kept farming land in the hands of a few and had restricted most Japanese farmers to share cropper status.

The Japanese Government was ordered to work on this agrarian-reform project and submitted a plan to help tenants and small farmers and stimulate production. The plan called for forced sale by absentee owners and "gentlemen farmers". Farmers would get technical information, cheap credit, and in-

與礦業公司的詳細報告，曾下令永久清算廿一個大銀行與發展公司，並對一百八十個公司與附設機關加以種種限制。

同時統帥部爲了令日本賠償受侵略禍害的國家，開始調查各項必需的事實。爲日本平時經濟需要以外的物資、機件與工業設備都經過調查，以便充作賠償之用。

爲了使基本工業的所有權分散可達到更普及之所得分配並使若干生產工具的所有權更爲民主化，日本政府奉命將財閥各公司的股票公開出賣。同時日本議會奉命起草產生一「操縱公司清理委員會」的立法。議會並立法以改善勞動者之法律地位，賦予彼等集體組織及交易之權利，修正「耕地調整法」，此法曾在過去使耕地得以操縱於少數人之手同時限制大部日本農民佃農之地位。

日本政府同時奉命起草土地改革計劃，以資協助佃農與小農，並促進生產。該計劃並要求不在當地的地主與紳農出售土地。農民可以獲得技術智識的輔導、低廉的貸款、荒收的保

insurance against crop losses. Farmers' cooperatives would be democratized. SCAP was not satisfied that this plan went far enough and ordered further measures to be taken.

Government—Japan's political and social system, which focused all power in the instrument of the Emperor, had made it possible for the Government to control the people, for the Zaibatsu to achieve control over the economic life of the nation, and for the militarists to wage aggressive war against other peoples. SCAP issued orders and instructions on specific steps to be taken to replace dictatorship with democracy.

SCAP's "Bill of Rights" directive ordered the Japanese Government to release political prisoners and said what should be done to "remove restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties and discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion."

The Government was ordered to stop all financial assistance to the cult of State Shintoism, which every Japanese previously had had to embrace in addition to his personal religious beliefs. The cult officially linked love of country and the duties of Japanese subjects with Emperor-worship and belief in the divine origin and destiny of the Japanese people. State Shintoism fostered beliefs that the Japanese people were destined to bring all mankind under the rule of the Japanese Emperor.

The Japanese Government was ordered to abolish its secret police forces, dismiss undesirable from public office (what was meant by undesirable was specifically defined),

險金。農民合作社應力求民主化。統帥部對此項計劃仍未滿意，已下令推行進一步的措施。

政府——日本的政治與社會制度集大權於天皇一身，因而政府極易控制人民，同時也使財閥得能控制全國的統濟生活，使軍閥得能發動侵略戰爭。統帥部的命令旨在以民主代替獨裁。

統帥部「權利法案」的指令要求日本政府釋放政治犯，並指示關於「消除政治，公民與宗教自由的限制以及基於種族、國籍、信仰與政見等所發生的歧視」的辦法。

日本政府奉命停止對神道教之津貼，神道教係過去每一日人除其個人信仰之宗教外，應當信奉者。該教正式將日人對愛國心和臣民義務與崇拜天皇和相信日本人民之神聖來源及命運聯系在一起。神道教培養日人確信日本人民保命定強令全世界人類歸日，本天皇統治的思想。

日本政府奉命取消秘密警察，開除公務人員之不良份子（關於不良之意義另有專文解釋），禁止反民主之

and put an end to anti-democratic political parties, associations, and societies such as the terroristic Black Dragon Society. As a result of these "purge" orders, 5,000 police officials were fired and approximately 150,000 other persons were affected.

The greatest step away from dictatorship and toward political democracy was the drafting, by the Japanese Government on SCAP's orders of a new constitution. This new constitution, in the words of General MacArthur, "places sovereignty squarely in the hands of the people. It establishes government authority with the predominant power vested in an elected legislature, as representative of the people, but with an adequate check upon that power, as well as upon the power of the executive and the judiciary, to insure that no branch of government may become autocratic or arbitrary in the administration of affairs of state". The document also radically reduces the power of the Emperor, permitting him no more than the role of a figurehead, and renounces war "forever", prohibiting the maintenance by Japan of an army, navy, or air force.

The Japanese were ordered to hold elections to replace those members of the Diet who had been affected by the purge orders and to bring true representatives of the people into this legislature which now had become, in fact, a law-making body. Under a law enacted by the purged Diet, women voted for the first time in Japan's history. Political parties of all complexions, banned under the dictatorship and encouraged by SCAP, were active in the democratically run elections.

PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

一切黨派會社如含恐怖性之「黑龍會」。由於此清除命令之結果，五千名警局官員被開除，同時大約一千五百名其他人員受影響。

脫離獨裁走向民主政治之最大邁步為日本政府接麥帥之命令而草擬一新憲法。此新憲法如麥帥所言「將國家主權完全授於人民之手中。它建立政府權力代表人民而以絕大權力授於民選之立法機構，但對政府權力須有適當之節制，同時對行政和司法方面的權力也加以相當節制，以保證政府內之任何部門不至在處理國家事務時成為獨裁與武斷。」該文件並根本減削天皇之權力，除為國家名義上之元首外不予任何其他職務，並「永遠」放棄戰爭，禁止日本保持海陸空軍。

日本人民受命舉行選舉以代替議會議員受清除令所罷免者，並使真正人民代表加入此立法機構，此機構事實上已成為制法機構。根據清除後之議會制定之一法令，婦女在日本歷史上第一次參與選舉。各種性質之政黨，過去在獨裁專制下被禁止者已受盟國最高統帥之鼓勵，在民主方式進行下之選舉中非常活躍。

戰犯的審訊

By 1946 more than 600 Japanese have been accused of war crimes on the basis of documentary evidence and handed over by the Japanese Government for trial. There was set up an International Military Tribunal to try major culprits according to the new legal concept set up for the trials at Nuremberg. Persons in public, or private roles who had formulated policies which the military had put into effect against other nations shared the guilt for those acts of aggression. The Allied machinery of justice is removing from the Japanese scene the most powerful directors of dictatorship and natural opponents to the growth of democracy. The Japanese people are being informed of the evidence and testimony at the trials and thus are getting an insight into how they, as well as other peoples, were victimized by dictatorship.

Education—Under occupation the press, radio, motion pictures, and other media of information were freed from the strait-jacket of dictatorship. With the influence and assistance of reliable and qualified Japanese these media now are being used not only to inform the people but also to educate them in such things as the fundamentals of democracy, the democratic meaning of the vote, and the responsibility of the people to use the ballot.

In the schools, teachers who were anti-democratic were removed from their jobs and replaced by reliable educators. Military training was abolished and replaced by sports programs. The aggressively nationalistic Student's Corps was disbanded and replaced by new, localized youth organizations. An end was put to discrimination in favor of

在一九四六年以前，根據書面證據被控有戰爭罪行的日人爲數在六百名以上，均已由日本政府提交盟國審訊。一國際軍事法庭經已成立根據紐倫堡審判時所建立的新法律觀念以審訊主要罪犯。無論任公私職之人曾經計劃政策而爲陸軍實施以反對其他國家者分負此侵略行爲之罪。盟國司法機構正從日本政治舞台上除去強有力之獨裁的主持者及對民主生長之自然敵人。日本人民在審判時被告知一切證據，這樣使他們洞察彼等一如其他國家人民過去是如何因獨裁而犧牲。

教育——日本被佔領後，報紙、電台、電影與其他報導業務均由獨裁者手中解放出來。在可靠及合格日人之力量及協助下，它們已不僅被用以報導，並用以教育人民以民主，選舉的民主意義以及人民使用選票的責任等。

學校方面反民主的教師已均令其去職而以可靠的教育者代替之。軍訓取消，代之以體育課目。那充滿國家主義思想的「學生團」已被取消，代之以新的分區的青年組織。對以前軍

applications for admission from former military-school students. State Shintoism was abolished. All school texts containing false or anti-democratic content were banned, and teaching in those subjects was halted while new texts were prepared.

A mission of United States educators visited Japan to investigate the Japanese system of education and to make recommendations. One of their recommendations was that some sort of Roman alphabet be substituted for the involved ideographs used in Japanese printed matter. They pointed out that it takes a knowledge of at least 2,000 of these ideographs just to read a newspaper, and the average Japanese knows far less than that number. They declared that the Japanese people must be given a writing system which will not require the excessive time now necessary to master the ideographs if the people are to be able to read intelligently and acquire the information they need to understand political, economic, and social issues—basic requisites for democratic living and action.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Problems--Demilitarization, the first necessity of occupation, often adds difficulty to the problems of democratization. Demobilized soldiers and purged job holders mean additions to the army of the unemployed—already swelled by the thousands who were thrown out of work when the arms, munitions, and aviation industries were shut down. Jobless people are not good recruits for democracy.

The Japanese economy is burdened by (a) the unsettled problem of reparations, (b) the lack of raw materials which can be

軍事學校學生入學請求之優待亦已被廢止。國家性神道教業已取消。課本中所有虛偽與反民主教材一概刪去，在新教本未改訂以前，這種課目寧可停止施教。

美國教育家所組訪日團曾調查日本教育制度並提供改革建議。建議之一為將羅馬字母代替日文印刷品所用之複雜符號。他們指出光是閱讀一張報紙即須認識至少二千個這種符號，而平日人所知者遠少於此數目。他們宣稱如果要彼等能夠理解地閱讀及為了解政治、經濟及社會事情而獲得民主生活及行動之基本所需的情報，日本人民應有使彼等無須如目前為熟習符號所需用之多量時間去學習之文字。

前途

當前問題——佔領首要任務之裁軍一事常使政治民主化增多困難。因為復員的士兵與黜退的工作者的增多也就是失業者的增多。日本失業者早已因軍火與航空工廠等的停頓而為數驚人。失業之民素決非民主之良好後備軍。

日本經濟上有三個難題：(甲)是賠償問題迄未解決，(乙)是缺乏若干

supplied only from abroad and (c) the lack of food which is handicapping production.

Disarmament and physical demilitarization can proceed under such conditions. They are the will of the forces of occupation. Democratization is another matter. That must stem largely from the Japanese people themselves. We can give them the teachings and trappings of democracy and even install democratic procedures. But only they can destroy permanently the pattern of thinking and behavior set by 300 years of repression and feudalism and replace this pattern with a functioning, democratic way of life. So far the job of democratization we have helped the Japanese to do is only skin deep. A long and difficult job lies ahead.

原來仰給國外的原料，(丙)食糧缺乏，每使生產受妨礙。

在這種情形下裁軍與解除軍事設備將繼續進行。這都是佔領軍的決心。民主化是另一件事。民主必須由日本人民中自己產生。盟國可以提供民主的經驗與教訓且導以民主程序。但是要永久打破三百年壓制與封建主義形成的意識形態與行爲，並開始一種能有作用而民主的生活方式那就非日本人民莫辦。截至目前爲止，我們協助日人從事民主化的工作還做得非常有限。今後的工作還很艱巨。

GEN. MACARTHUR'S STATEMENT ON THE STATUS OF THE EMPEROR IN JAPAN

*Made in connection with the decision of the Japanese Public Procurator not to
prosecute several members of the editorial staff of the Communist newspaper*

Red Flag for lese majesty.

麥克阿瑟關於日皇在國內地位之聲明

對日檢察官署關於共產黨紅旗報編輯數人被控對天皇犯違害罪予以不起訴判決一事而發表

The Decision of the Japanese Public Procurator's office not to prosecute several persons indicted on charges of lese majesty has appropriately applied the basic spirit implied within the new Constitution passed by the Diet—namely, that all individuals are equal in the eyes of the law.

In other words, in Japan no one—and this includes the Emperor—is permitted to hide under the protection of laws which are not applicable to the general public. The present decision not to prosecute is an indication that the noble spirit of the new national Constitution has begun to be truly understood.

It certifies the dignity of the entire populace, and guarantees the right to act freely on all problems, political, social, and economic, related to the people of a democratic nation. This is so because the liberal exchange of ideas, free speech, and the expression of free criticism against Government officials and various organisms, are the basic elements essential in the development and internal existence of a democratic government.

日本檢察官公署對若干被控對天皇犯違害罪予以不起訴之判決一事，業已適當應用日本國會所通過新憲法內含之基本精神，即，所有日本人民在法律上皆為平等是也。

換言之，今日在日本，包括天皇在內，無人能得許可利用不能施用於一般人民之法律以作保障。上述不起訴之判決，蓋表示日本國家新憲法之高貴精神業已開始獲得正確之瞭解矣。

新憲章承認日本全體人民之尊嚴，保證凡有關民主國家人民之一切政治、社會及經濟問題，日本人民皆有自由參加之權利。蓋因自由交換意見、自由言論及對政府官員及政府各機構之自由批評乃民主政府發展過程及存在之內部基本要素。

Since democracy is dynamic and spirited in nature, unless the people freely express their ideas it is absolutely impossible for a democracy to exist.

Under the new Constitution, the Emperor does not inherit his political power and authority from his ancestors. He is but merely the symbol of the state. The people of Japan, male or female, have all been elevated to a new height of political dignity. In actuality, they have been given the role of guiding Japan.

The new function of the Emperor is to symbolize the nation's friendship. National dignity is based on the dignity of each individual. The protection which is accorded the Emperor must neither exceed nor be less than that which is accorded to a layman.

To violate this is to directly discredit the basic principle of a democratic government, and merely acts as an impetus for continuation of the feudalistic system and a despotic form of government. Also, this would be violating the basic freedoms, which the Emperor himself has given his heart-felt indorsement and which similarly have been indorsed by the Japanese nation.

Needless to say, public opinion must be uttered with some politeness and restraint from a moral viewpoint. Government officials and public servants must be protected from being subjected to defamation, which must insure the over-all respect which is naturally accorded them as public representatives of a free people, and also as free individuals in a free society.

民主之本質既為富有動性與精神，若人民不能自由發表其意見，則民主之存在為絕對不可之事。

按新憲法規定，日本天皇並非自其祖先而承襲其政治權力。天皇不過僅為政府之象徵。日本人民，無論男女，其政治上尊嚴業已提高至一新地位。以實質言之，日本人民已受有領導國家之權力。

日本天皇之新職權為民族友誼之象徵。民族尊嚴係以每個人民之尊嚴為基礎。日本天皇所享受之法律保障既不可超過亦不可少於每個人民所享受之法律保障。

違反此一點實為直接玷辱民主政府之基本原則，而僅為促成封建制度及專制政體之繼續而已。此外，違反憲法之此一點即為危及日本天皇本人及日本全國人民同聲贊成之各種基本自由。

由道德立場而論，發表輿論必須帶有禮貌及約束態度，此為不待言者。蓋政府官員及公務人員必須得有保護不至受人誹謗，彼等以自由人民公共代表地位並以自由社會之自由人民地位當然所有之全面尊嚴必須得有保障也。

WALLACE'S LETTER TO TRUMAN URGING A CHANGE OF U.S. MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICIES AND THE DISCLOSURE OF ATOMIC INFORMATION

Dated August 23, 1946; disclosed by the U.S. State Department on September 17.

華萊士致函杜魯門主張美改變軍事外交政策 並公佈原子能情報

原函日期爲一九四六年八月二十三日，此函原爲秘密保存後爲人竊出
美國務院與華商權後，於九月十七日公布

My dear Mr. President:

I hope you will excuse this long letter. Personally I hate to write long letters, and I hate to receive them.

My only excuse is that this subject is a very important one—probably the most important in the world today. I checked with you about this last Thursday and you suggested after the Cabinet meeting on Friday that you would like to have my views.

I have been increasingly disturbed about the trend of international affairs since the end of the war, and I am even more troubled by the apparently growing feeling among the American people that another war is coming and the only way that we can head it off¹ is to arm ourselves to the teeth.² Yet all of past history indicates that an armament race does not lead to peace but to war. The months just ahead may well be the crucial period which will decide whether the

親愛的大總統：

我這封信很長，希望你原諒。在我個人，實是討厭寫冗長的信，同時也討厭接到冗長的信。

我所以寫這封長信唯一的理由是：我請你討論的問題極其重要，可以說是目下最重要的世界問題。上星期四我曾和你檢討過這個問題，當時你提議在第二天國務會議之後聽取我的意見。

我自戰事結束後，直到現在對國際大勢所感到的不安，實與日俱增，而我對美國人民認爲又有一個世界大戰快要發生，從事武裝是唯一防止的辦法，這種明顯日漸得勢的感覺，更爲憂慮。但是人類整個的歷史指明軍備競爭，非但不能免致和平，反而引起戰爭。當前的幾個月可以說是判定

civilized world will go down in destruction after the five or ten years needed for the several nations to arm themselves with atomic bombs. Therefore I want to give you my views on how the present trend toward conflict might be averted.

You may think it *strange*, in reading further, that I *should express*³ so much concern at this particular time, just after the Foreign Ministers' Conference at which real progress was made on peace treaties for several eastern European countries and for Italy. Others have expressed a feeling of increased optimism that still further progress could be made through continued negotiations on the same basis, even though the remaining European issues are much more difficult than those on which a measure of agreement has already been reached. I am fully appreciative of the efforts that have been made and the patience that has been exercised by our various representatives who have carried on negotiations with the Russians during the last few years. I am conscious of the aggravations they have put up with and of the apparent inconsistencies on the part of Russian representatives. On the other hand, I feel these very difficulties make it necessary for some of us, who, from the outside, are watching the course of events, to voice our opinions.

Incidentally, as Secretary of Commerce, I talk to a good many businessmen, and I find them very much concerned over the size of the federal budget and the burden of the national debt. For the next fiscal year and for the year immediately ahead *by far*⁴ the largest category of federal spending is the

在少數國家需要五年或十年作原子彈軍備的準備後，整個文明世界是否將要毀滅的決定期間。我因此要把我對於怎樣可以避免目下世界戰爭趨勢的意見供獻給你。

你往下看這封信也許會詫異，我爲什麼在外長會議對東歐幾個國家和對意和約得有確實進步後的現階段，要表示這樣的焦慮。很多的別的人卻表示增強的樂觀感想，以爲即使歐洲其他未解決問題比業已獲得相當協意的一些問題更難解決，如果用同樣的方式繼續談判，或者可以獲得更大的進步。我對我國幾位代表在最近幾年和蘇聯進行談判所作的努力和所用的苦心，深爲感佩。我知道他們對節外生枝的困難所表示的忍耐，同時也知道蘇聯代表方面顯然有前後矛盾的情形。反過來說，我感覺這些困難使我們若干從旁觀察世界趨勢的人們實有發表意見的必要。

我以商務部長的地位，偶然地得與很多的商人談話，發覺他們對聯邦預算和國債的担負表示極爲焦慮。在下一會計年度和當前的一年中間，聯邦政府支出之最大的項目就是國防費

national defense. For example, the total recommended federal appropriations for the fiscal year 1947 submitted to the Congress in the official budget amounted to about US\$36,000,000,000. Of the total budget some US\$13,000,000,000 was for war liquidation activities. Ten billion represented interest on the public debt and veterans benefits, which are primarily the continuing costs of past wars. These items total US\$23,000,000,000, or about 80 percent of the total recommended expenditures.

Clearly, a large reduction in the federal budget would require a cut in military appropriations. These appropriations are now more than ten times as great as they were during the thirties. In the 1938 budget appropriations for national defense were less than a billion dollars, compared with US\$13,000,000,000 for the present fiscal year. Thus, even from a purely dollars and cents standpoint American business and the American people have an interest in organizing a peaceful world in which the completely unproductive expenditures on national defense could be reduced.

Of course, dollars and cents are not the most important reason why we all want a peaceful world. The fundamental reason is that we do not wish to go through another war—and especially an atomic war which will undoubtedly be directed primarily against civilian populations and may well mean the end of modern civilization.

Yet are we really *concentrating* all our efforts on a program to build a lasting peace? There can be no doubt that the American people want and expect that their

。舉個例子，提交參議院通過的一九四七年會計年度正式預算的聯邦動支款項總額是三百六十萬萬。這個預算總額項下，就有一百三十萬萬是為結束戰事活動用的。又有一百萬萬是指定作償付戰時公債利息和退役軍人福利的用途，原來這兩項都是因為過去戰爭繼續下來的費用。這兩項的總額是二百三十萬萬，換句話說，就佔通過的全部支出的百分之八十。

如果要把聯邦預算大為減縮，軍費勢必需要減少，這是很明白的事。目下的軍費比三十年代的軍費增加十倍以上。一九三八年預算裏面的國防費比起目下會計年度的一百三十萬萬，還不到一百萬萬。因此，就是從純粹金錢立場上講，美國商業和美國人民都關心有一個和平世界的組織，這可以減少完全不生產的國防費。

當然，金錢不成爲我們大家需要一個和平世界的最重要的理由。基本的理由是我們不願意再有另一次的戰爭，尤其不願意有一個原子戰爭，原子戰爭無疑地是以平民爲主要目標，同時就等於毀滅近代文明。

然而，我們是不是真正在集中全力計劃永久和平呢？無疑地，美國人民不但要求而且期望他們的領袖們將

leaders will work for an enduring peace, using specific ways and means to this objective. I think that at the moment the people feel that the outlook for the elimination of war is dark, that other nations are wilfully obstructing American efforts to achieve a permanent peace.

How have American actions since *V-J Day*⁶ appeared to other nations? I mean by actions the concrete things like US\$13,000,000,000 for the War and Navy departments, the *Bikini tests*⁷ of the atomic bomb and continued production of bombs, the plan to *arm Latin America*⁸ with our weapons, production of B-29's and planned production of B-36's, and the effort to secure air bases spread over half the globe from which the other half of the globe can be bombed. I cannot but feel that these actions must make it look to the rest of the world as if we were only *paying lip service*⁹ to peace at the conference table.

These facts rather make it appear either (1) that we are preparing ourselves to win the war which we regarded as inevitable or (2) that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind. How would it look to us if Russia had the atomic bomb and we *did not*?¹⁰ If Russia had 10,000-mile bombers and air bases within a thousand miles of our coast lines and we did not?

Some of the military men and self-styled "realists" are saying: "What's wrong with trying to build up a predominance of force? The only way to preserve peace is for this country to be so well armed that *no one will dare attack*¹¹ us. We know that

當永久和平而努力，用特種方法和手段以達到這個目標。我以為當美國人們感覺到撲滅戰爭的前途是暗淡的時候，那麼其他國家就會蓄意阻礙美國覓致和平的一切努力。

自我們戰勝日本以來，我們的行動在其他的國家看起來是怎樣呢？我所說的行動是指一些具體的東西，如同我們陸海軍兩部所花的一百三十萬萬，比基尼原子彈試驗和原子彈的繼續製造，拿美國的武器武裝拉丁美洲的計劃，B-29堡壘式機的製造和在計劃中的B-36型原子彈飛機【註30】的製造，以及在遍及地球的一半地帶裏面覓求可以從這些地方轟其他的一半地帶的空軍基地。我不禁的感覺到這些行動在世界其他各國看來，好樣是我們美國人在和會裏祇是給他們一些口惠的模樣。

這些事實很可以使這種現象有兩種的表現，不是表現我們美國人對我們所認為不可避免的戰爭正在積極的作戰勝準備，就是我們為威嚇世界其他的國家起見正積極地企圖建立優越的武力。假設蘇聯有原子彈而我們却沒有，又假設蘇聯有能飛一萬哩的轟炸機和接近我們沿海一千哩以內的一些空軍基地，而我却沒有，那麼，我們對這種情勢是怎樣的看法呢？

若干軍人又自稱作「現實觀念者」說：「建立一個優越的武力又何以不可呢？保持和平的唯一方法是美國充分的武裝起來使別人不敢攻擊我們。我們知道美國是不會發動戰爭的。」

America will never start a war.” The flaw in this policy is simply that it will not work. In a world of atomic bombs and other revolutionary new weapons, such as radioactive poison gases and biological warfare, a peace maintained by a predominance of force is no longer possible.

Why is this so? The reasons are clear:

First. Atomic warfare is cheap and easy compared with old-fashioned war. Within a very few years several countries can have atomic bombs and other atomic weapons. Compared with the cost of large armies and the manufacture of old-fashioned weapons, atomic bombs cost very little and require only a relatively small part of a nation's production plant and labor force.

Second. So far as winning a war is concerned, having more bombs—even many more bombs—than *the other fellow*¹² is no longer a decisive advantage. If another nation had enough bombs to eliminate all of our principal cities and our heavy industry, it wouldn't help us very much if we had ten times as many bombs as we needed to do the same to them.

Third. And most important, the very fact that several nations have atomic bombs will inevitably result in a neurotic, fear-ridden, itching-trigger psychology in all the peoples of the world, and because of our wealth and vulnerability we would be among the most seriously affected. Atomic war will not require vast and time-consuming preparations, the mobilization of large armies, the conversion of a large proportion of a country's industrial plants to the manufacture of weapons. In a world armed with

這種政策的缺點很簡單，那就是它不能發生效力。在一個原子彈和其他革命性新武器——例如輻射能毒氣和生物戰爭——的世界裏面，用優越武力保持和平是再不可能的了。

這是什麼道理？理由是明白的：

第一，原子能戰爭比舊式戰爭，是輕而易舉的。在幾年以內，有幾個國家是能夠有原子彈和其他原子武器的。原子彈的費用比起龐大陸軍同製造舊式武器的費用，很是渺小，而且需要國家製造廠和勞力比較的小。

第二，以對戰爭求得勝利一點而論，比對方有較多的，甚至更多的原子彈已不再成爲決定性的優勢了。假設有另外一個國家有足以毀滅我們主要城市和重工業數目的原子彈，即使我們有足以對敵人得到同樣效果所需要的原子彈數目多十倍，這對我們也是無濟於事的。

第三，最重要的是這個事實：幾個擁有原子彈的國家會在全世界人民心中不可避免地造成神經的，恐懼的和忐忑不安的心理，而我們美國人因爲富庶和不能倖免的關係，會成爲受這種影響最嚴重的一個國家。原子彈戰爭不需要巨大的，和耗費時間的準備，或大規模軍隊的動員，或把一個國家大部分的工業工廠改充製造武器的工廠。在原子武器武裝的世界裏面，祇要有一件意外的事件發生就會引

atomic weapons, some incident will lead to the use of these weapons.

There is a school of military thinking which recognizes these facts, and recognizes that when several nations have atomic bombs, a war which will destroy modern civilization will result and that no nation or combination of nations can win such a war. This school of thought therefore advocates a "preventative war,"¹³ and attack on Russia NOW¹⁴ before Russia has atomic bombs. This scheme is not only immoral but stupid. If we should attempt to destroy all the principal Russian cities and her heavy industry, we might well succeed. But the immediate counter measure which such an attack would call forth is the prompt occupation of all continental Europe by the Red Army. Would we be prepared to destroy the cities of all Europe in trying to finish what we had started? This idea is so contrary to all the basic instincts and principles of the American people that any such action would be possible only under a dictatorship at home.

Thus the "predominance of force" idea, and the notion of a "defensive attack" are both unworkable. The only solution is the one which you have so wisely advanced and which forms the basis of the Moscow statement on atomic energy. That solution consists of mutual trust and confidence among nations, atomic disarmament, and an effective system of enforcing that disarmament.

There is, however, a fatal defect in the Moscow statement, in the Acheson report, and in the American plan¹⁵ recently presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. That defect is the scheme, as

起原子武器的使用。

軍事思想家有一派認識這些事實，並認識一天幾個國家擁有原子彈，結果就是現代文明的毀滅，沒有一個國家或幾個國家聯合起來對原子戰爭可以得到勝利的。因此抱着這種思想的一派人們主張發動一個「防止戰爭」，在蘇聯還沒有原子彈以前趁早向蘇聯進攻。這種計劃不但不道德，而且很愚笨。假如我們要企圖毀滅蘇聯所有主要城市和它的重工業，我們可能有相當成功的。但是這種進攻所引起的直接對策會是紅軍用敏捷行動佔領全歐洲大陸。那麼，我們為企圖完成我們原來所發動的攻勢，是不是要準備把歐洲所有的城市都要毀滅掉呢？這種觀念與美國人民的天性和原則既是那樣根本違反，所以祇有在美國國內實行獨裁這種行動纔有可能。

因此，「優越武力」和「防禦襲擊」兩種觀念都是不能生效的。你所作賢明的主張，也就是成為莫斯科關於原子能聲明的精髓，實是唯一的解決辦法。這種解決辦法要求世界各國互信互賴，取消原子軍備，並要求建立一個實行取消原子軍備的制度。

但是莫斯科聲明，艾契生報告和美國最近提交聯合國原子能管制委員會的美國計劃裏面，都有一個嚴重的缺點。照一般人所了解，這種缺點是

It is generally understood, of arriving at international agreements by "easy stages," of requiring other nations to enter into binding commitments not to conduct research into the military uses of atomic energy and to disclose their uranium and thorium resources, while the United States retains the right to withhold its technical knowledge of atomic energy until the international control and inspection system is working to our satisfaction. In other words, we are telling the Russians that if they are "good boys"¹⁶ we may eventually turn over our knowledge of atomic energy to them and to the other nations. But there is no objective standard of what will qualify them as being "good" nor any specified time for sharing our knowledge.

Is it any wonder that the Russians did not show any great enthusiasm for our plan? Would we have been enthusiastic if the Russians had a monopoly of atomic energy, and offered to share the information with us at some indefinite time in the future at their discretion if we agreed now not to try to make a bomb and give them information on our secret resources of uranium and thorium? I think we would react as the Russians appear to have done. We would have put up counter-proposal for the record, but our real effort would go into trying to make a bomb so that our bargaining position would be equalized. That is the essence of the Russian position, which is very clearly stated in the *Pravda* article of June 24, 1946.

It is perfectly clear that the "step-by-step" plan in any such one-sided form is not workable. The entire agreement will

因爲它企圖用「寬大步驟」達到國際協議，要求其他國家受約束不從事軍用原子能的研究並要它公佈鈾和鈾的資源，而同時美國則據有保守原子能專門知識的權利，以至到國際管制和檢查制度能發生效用使我們滿意的時候爲止。換一句話說，我們是對蘇聯人民說：假使他們是「好孩子」的話，我們終久會把原子能知識交給他們和其他的國家。但是却沒有一個客觀標準怎樣可以使他們合格成爲「好孩子」，也沒有指定時間使他們分得他們對原子能份內應有的知識。

情形既是這樣，蘇聯對我們的計劃不表示熱誠，有什麼可以詫異的呢？假若蘇聯據有原子能的獨佔，要求我們如果現在同意不企圖製造原子彈並要求我們把鈾和鈾的祕密資源的情報供給他們，他們纔斟酌情形在一個不確定的未來時期和我們共有原子能情報，我們能夠表示熱誠嗎？我認爲我們也會像蘇聯所表現的一樣。我們會提出反對的提案去備案，而我們真正的努力會是設法製造原子彈，使我們得到同等的討價還價的地位。這是蘇聯地位的實質，一九四六年六月二十四日真理報評論說得很明白的。

任何像這樣一個單方面形式的「逐步」實施計劃不能收效，這是十分明白的事。原子能管制協定應該全部

have to be worked out and wrapped up in a single package. This may involve certain steps or stages, but the timing of such steps must be "agreed to in the initial master treaty. Realistically, Russia has two cards¹⁷ which she can use in negotiating with us: (1) Our lack of information on the state of her scientific and technical progress on atomic energy and (2) our ignorance of her uranium and thorium resources. These cards are nothing like or as powerful as our cards—a stockpile of bombs, manufacturing plants in actual production, B-29's and B-36's. We are, in effect, asking her to reveal her only two cards immediately—telling her that after we have seen her cards we will decide whether we want to continue to play the game.

Insistence on our part that the game must be played in our way will only lead to a deadlock. The Russians will redouble their efforts to manufacture bombs, and they may also decide to expand their "security zone" in a serious way. Up to now, despite all our outcries against it their efforts to develop a security zone in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East are small change from the point of view of military power as compared with our air bases in Greenland, Okinawa and many other places thousands of miles from our shores. We may feel very self-righteous if we refuse to *budge on*¹⁸ our plan and the Russians refuse to accept it, but that means only one thing—the atomic armament race is on in deadly earnest.

I am convinced therefore that if we are to achieve our hopes of negotiating a treaty which will result in effective international

擬具起來，並且應該歸納到一個整個的前題。這也許不免需要若干步驟或階段纔行，但是在開始的主要條約裏面必須對這些步驟時間的配合取得協議。在現實上講，蘇聯和我們談判原子能管制有兩個優點可以利用：(一)我們對蘇聯關於原子能的科學上和技術上進展的實況缺乏情報，(二)我們對蘇聯的鈾和鈾的資源完全不明瞭。這兩個優點遠不如我們的優點強有力——我們儲存有原子彈，有正在製造原子彈的製造廠，有B-29堡壘式機和B-36型原子彈飛機。我們現在實是要求蘇聯把它的兩個優點即刻揭開，對它說，在我們明瞭它的優點以後纔決定我們是否要繼續的競賽下去。

我們堅持要照我們的意見競賽下去，那就會造成僵局。蘇聯將加倍努力製造原子彈，而且也許會決定着實擴張它的「安全區」。它不顧我們大聲疾呼的反對，它以直到現在在東歐和中東努力擴張安全區，這從軍事實力立場和我們在格林蘭，沖繩島和離開美海岸千哩的其他地方的空軍基地比較起來，是大同小異的。假使我們對我們的計劃拒絕讓步，而蘇聯拒絕接受，我們固然認為自己是公正的，但是這就指明祇有一件可能的事發生，即，原子彈軍備競爭就會熱烈地向前展開。

因此我深信假使我們要美國的國際解除原子能軍備條約得到效果，談判能達到我們的希望，我們必須放棄

atomic disarmament we must abandon the impractical form of the "step-by-step" idea which was presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. We must be prepared to reach an agreement which will commit us to disclosing information and destroying our bombs at a specified time or in terms of specified actions by other countries, rather than at our unfettered discretion. If we are willing to negotiate on this basis, I believe the Russians will also negotiate seriously with a view to reaching an agreement.

There can be, of course, no absolute assurance that the Russians will finally agree to a workable plan if we adopt this view. They may prefer to stall until they also have bombs and can negotiate on a more equal basis, not realizing the danger to themselves as well as the rest of the world in a situation in which several nations have atomic bombs. But we must make the effort to head off the atomic bomb race. We have everything to gain by doing so, and do not give up anything by adopting this policy as the fundamental basis for our negotiation. During the transition period toward full-scale international control we retain our technical know-how, and the only existing production plants for fissionable materials and bombs remain within our borders.

The Russian counter-proposal itself is an indication that they may be willing to negotiate seriously if we are. In some respects their counter-proposal goes even farther than our plan and is in agreement with the basic principles of our plan, which is to make violations of the proposed treaty a

美國提出聯合國原子能管制委員會「逐步實施」觀念的不着實際的那個形式。我們必須覓致一個協議，委托我們公佈原子能情報，不由美國不受拘束地斟酌情形，而由其他國家指定時間，詳訂辦法要美國毀滅所有原子彈。假使我們願意根據這一點談判，我相信蘇聯也可誠意地為達到一個協議和我們談判的。

當然，我們如果採取這個態度，不一定能絕對担保蘇聯最後會同意一個有效的計劃。蘇聯也許不會認清幾個國家據有原子彈的情勢對本身和對世界其他國家的危險，有意規避直到他們也據有原子彈并能以更平等的地位來和我們談判為止。但是我們必須努力防止原子彈競爭。我們這樣地做有百利而無一弊，我們採取這個政策作我們談判的基本根據，並不有所損失。我們在趨向整個國際管制原子能的過渡時期內，仍然保有我們對原子能的技術知識，目下所僅有的製造分裂性的原料和原子彈的工廠仍然在美國境內。

蘇聯的相反提案本身指明，假使我們誠意地從事談判，他們也可以誠意地談判。他們反對提案在若干方面比我們的提案更進一步，同時是符合我們的提案的基本原則，那就是規定破壞通過的條約即成爲某一國的威國

national and international crime for which individuals can be punished.

It will have been noted that in the preceding discussion I have not mentioned the question of the so-called "veto." I have not done so because the veto issue is completely irrelevant, because the proposal to "abolish the veto," which means something in the general activities of the Security Council, has no meaning with respect to a treaty on atomic energy. If we sign a treaty with other nations, we will all have agreed to do certain things. Until we arrive at such a treaty, we as well as the other major powers will have the power of veto. Once the treaty is ratified, however, the question of the veto becomes meaningless. If any nation violates the treaty provision, and of permitting inspection of suspected illegal bomb-making activities, what action is there that can be vetoed? As in the case of any other treaty violation, the remaining signatory nations are free to take what action they feel is necessary, including the ultimate step of declaring war.

I believe that *for the United States and Russia to live together*¹⁹ in peace is the most important single problem facing the world today. Many people, in view of the relatively satisfactory outcome of the recent Paris Conference, feel that good progress is being made on the problem of working out relations between the Anglo-Saxon powers and Russia. This feeling seems to me to be resting on superficial appearances more productive of a temporary truce than of final peace. On the whole, as we look beneath the surface in late July of 1946, our

際的罪行，個人可因犯此種罪行而受懲處的。

你也許注意到我前面所討論的，沒有提到所謂「否決權」。我沒有提到是因為否決權一個爭點實是不切題的，因為建議「取消否決」是指安全理事會一般活動的事，對原子能條約是毫無意義的。假使我們和別的國家簽訂一個條約，我們大家當然先要同意某一些的事。等到我們快到簽訂原子條約的時候，我們和其他主要列強一樣會有否決權的。然而條約一經批准之後，否決的問題就無意義了。假使任何國家破壞條約規程，關於許可檢查違法嫌疑製造原子彈活動，有什麼行動能被否決呢？其餘簽字國就在和其他任何破壞條約情形一樣地採取各人所認為必需的行動，這就包括最後一着宣戰在內。

我深信目下全世界所面臨的惟一最重要問題的關鍵在美蘇兩國和平相處。從最近巴黎和會所得比較滿意的結果看起來，很多人感到安格魯撒克遜列強和蘇聯間的接近問題正有良好的進步。在我看起來，這種感覺似乎是根據皮相的，這與其可以說是能產生最後和平，不如說產生了暫時的休戰。我們在一九四六年七月底的今天從事實內幕看，我們的行動，在大體

actions and those of the western powers in general carry with them the ultimate danger of a third world war—this time an atomic world war. As the strongest single nation, and the nation whose leadership is followed by the entire world with the exception of Russia and a few weak neighboring countries in Eastern Europe, I believe that we have the opportunity to lead the world to peace.

In general, there are two overall points of view which can be taken in approaching the problem of the United States-Russian relations. The first is that it is not possible to get along with the Russians, and therefore war is inevitable. The second is that war with Russia would bring catastrophe to all mankind and therefore we must find a way of living in peace. It is clear that our own welfare as well as that of the entire world requires that we maintain the latter point of view. I am sure that this is also your opinion, and the radio address of the Secretary of State on July 15 clearly indicates that he is prepared to negotiate as long as may be necessary to work out a solution on this basis.

We should try to get an honest answer to the question of what the factors are which cause Russia to distrust us, in addition to the question of what factors lead us to distrust Russia. I am not sure that we have as a nation or an administration found an adequate answer to either question, although we have recognized that both questions are of critical importance.

Our basic distrust of the Russians, which has been greatly intensified in recent

上說，和一般西歐列強的行動都表現着終久隱伏着第三次世界大戰，世界原子大戰的危機。我深信我們美國以世界唯一最強的國家地位，除蘇聯和在中東的少數弱國外，以美國為全世界領導國家的地位，能獲得領導全世界進入和平的機會。

我們在研討美蘇關係問題的時候，廣泛的說，可以採取兩個不同綜合的立場。第一個就是：我們和蘇聯和平相處是不可能的，所以戰爭是不可避免的。第二個就是：我們對蘇作戰會貽禍整個人類，所以我們必須去求和蘇聯和平相處的路徑。我們自身和全世界的幸福，很明白地，都要求我們採取第二個立場。我確信你的意見也是這樣，國務卿七月十五日廣播演說明白地指出他準備用最大最必需的時間，根據這一點去計劃一個解決辦法。

我們除了對什麼一些因素引起我們不信任蘇聯一個問題要求得到一個老實的答案之外，還要對什麼一些因素使蘇聯不信任我們一個問題求得一個老實的答案。我們雖然明瞭這兩個問題都是很嚴重，而我個人不相信我們以整個國家而論，或是以全體行政當局而論，對這兩個問題的任何一個能有適當的答案。

最近幾個月以來，由於報紙挑撥離間大為增強的美對蘇根本的不信任

months by the playing up of conflict in the press, steps from differences in political and economic organization. For the first time in our history defeatists among us have raised the fear of another system as a success rival to democracy and free enterprise in other countries and perhaps even in our own. I am convinced that we can meet that challenge as we have in the past by demonstrating that economic abundance can be achieved without sacrificing personal, political and religious liberties. We cannot meet it as Hitler tried to by an anti-comintern alliance.

It is perhaps too easy to forget that despite the deep-seated differences in our cultures and intensive anti-Russian propaganda of some twenty-five years standing, the American people reversed their attributes during the crisis of war. Today, under the pressure of seemingly insoluble international problems and continuing deadlocks, the *tide* of American public opinion is again *turning against*²⁰ Russia. In this reaction lies one of the dangers to which this letter is addressed.

I should list the factors which make the Russian distrust of the United States and of the western world as follows: The first is Russian history, which we must take into account because it is the setting in which Russians see all actions and policies of the rest of the world. Russian history for over a thousand years has been a succession of attempts, often unsuccessful, to resist invasion and conquest—by the Mongols, the Turks, the Swedes, the Germans. To the Russians all of the defense and security measures of the western powers seem to have

，實是由彼此政治經濟的組織不同而產生的。美國的戰敗論者在美國有史以來第一次提出對另外一個制度，在其他國家甚至在我們國內成爲對民主和自由企業一個強有力的敵對者的一種恐懼。我深信我們可以像在過去一樣的答辯，指明經濟上的豐裕可以不犧牲個人的，政治的或宗教的自由是可以求到的。我們不能像希特勒那樣用反第三國際聯盟的方式去應付的。

有一件事也許很容易忘記的，那就是：美國人不管美蘇有深刻的文化上的差別，和有二十五年之久的強烈反蘇宣傳，在第二次世界戰爭的危機當中他們的特性轉變了。目下呢，他們受了表面上似乎不能解決的國際問題和不斷僵局的壓力的緣故，美國輿論的趨勢又變了反蘇了。在這反動趨勢中潛伏着我這封信所針對的危險之一。

我把蘇聯對美國和西方國家不信任的因素列陳於下：第一是俄國的歷史，這是我們必須要注意的，因爲它是俄國人民觀察世界其他國家的行動和政策的背景。俄國的一千多年的歷史表示不斷的企圖，抵抗蒙古人，土耳其人，瑞典人，德意志人的侵略和征服，這些企圖常常是失敗了。在俄國人看來，西方列強所有的防禦和安全辦法似乎都帶着侵略意味。我們美國擴張軍事安全制度，如擴張門羅主

an aggressive intent. Our actions to expand our military security system—such steps as extending the Monroe Doctrine to include the arming of the Western Hemisphere nations, our present monopoly of the atomic bomb, our interest in outlying bases and our general support of the British Empire—appear to them as going far beyond the requirements of defense. I think we might feel the same if the United States were the only capitalistic country in the world, and the principal socialistic countries were creating a level of armed strength far exceeding anything in their previous history. From the Russian point of view, also, the granting of a loan to Britain and the lack of tangible results on their request to borrow for rehabilitation purposes may be regarded as another evidence of the strengthening of an anti-Soviet bloc.

Finally, our resistance to her attempts to obtain warm water ports and her own security system in the form of “friendly”²¹ neighboring states seems, from the Russian point of view, to clinch the case. After 25 years of isolation and after having achieved the status of a major power, Russia believes that she is entitled to recognition of her new status. Our interest in establishing democracy in Eastern Europe, where democracy by the people at large has never existed, seems to her an attempt to reestablish the encirclement of unfriendly neighbors, which was created after the last war and which might serve as a springboard of still another effort to destroy her.

If this analysis is correct, and there is ample evidence to support it, the action to

義包括西半球各國的武裝，目下獨佔原子彈，我們在國外謀基地和廣泛的支持英國種種措施，在他們看來是超過我們國防的要求。我以為假若美國是世界的唯一資本主義國家，而主要社會主義國家造成一個超過他們歷史未有前例的武力水準的情形下，我們的想法也是一樣的。我們對英借款的批准和對蘇聯申請善後借款的不得明白結果，這兩件事在蘇聯立場看起來，可能認為是加強反蘇集團之另一證明。

最後，我們對蘇聯覓求溫水港口和它自身用友善隣邦形式的安全制度種種企圖加以阻撓，從蘇聯立場看起來，是對它的要求有當頭一棒的模樣。蘇聯在孤立二十五年達到了一個主要強國之後，相信它有權要求其他國家承認它的新地位。我們對一般人民向來沒有民主的東歐意圖建立民主，在它看來，似乎是企圖對蘇聯友邦重新建立第二次世界大戰後所造成的包圍圈，並且可用作更進一步毀滅蘇聯的手段。

假使我這個分析是對的，而這個分析有充分的證明以作支持，那麼改

improve the situation is clearly indicated. The fundamental objective of such an action should be to allay any reasonable Russian grounds for fear, suspicion and distrust. We must recognize that the world has changed and that today there can be no "one world" unless the United States and Russia can find some way of living together. For example, most of us are firmly convinced of the soundness of our position when we suggest the internationalization and defortification of the Danube or of the Dardanelles, but we would be horrified and angered by any Russian counter-proposal that would involve also the internationalizing and disarming of Suez or Panama. We must recognize that to the Russians these seem to be identical situations.

We should ascertain from a fresh point of view what Russia believes to be essential to her own security as a prerequisite to the writing of the peace and to cooperation in the construction of a world order. We should be prepared to judge her requirements against the background of what we ourselves and the British have insisted upon as essential to our respective security. We should be prepared, even at the expense of risking epithets of appeasement, to agree to reasonable Russian guarantees of security. The progress made during June and July on the Italian and other treaties indicates that we can hope to arrive at understanding and agreement on this aspect of the problem.

We should not pursue further the question of the veto in connection with atomic energy, a question which is irrelevant and should never have been raised. We should

善這個局勢的行動是很明顯的指出來了。這種行動的基本目標應該是減少蘇聯方面可能的恐懼，猜忌和不信任的理由。我們必須認清世界情形已經改變了，除非美蘇兩國能得到一個共同生存的辦法，一個「天下一家」的觀念是不可能的。舉個例子說：大半美國人都深信我們提議多腦河和達坦尼爾海峽的國際共管並拆卸軍事設備，我們的立場是合理的，而假使蘇聯有任何反對提案牽涉蘇彝士或巴拿馬運河的國際共管和拆卸軍事設備，我們就會感到恐懼和憤慨了。我們必須認識這兩個情形在蘇聯看起來正是相同的。

我們應該從新的立場推測什麼是蘇聯認為是它本身安全的必要，作它訂立和約和合作建立世界秩序的先決條件。我們應該對照我們自身和英國所堅持各個安全所必要的背景，立即對蘇聯的要求加以評斷。我們應該甚至不惜冒險用綏靖的語句立即同意蘇聯合理的必要安全保障。六月和七月對意和對其他國家和約的進展指明我們關於整個對蘇問題的這一方面，能有獲得諒解和協議的希望。

關於原子能，我們不應該進一步繼續研究否決問題，這個問題是不合理的，而且原來就不應該提出的。我

be prepared to negotiate a treaty for the establishment of international control and development of atomic energy. This, I believe, is the most important single question, and the one on which the present trend is definitely toward deadlock rather than ultimate agreement.

We should make an effort to counteract the irrational fear of Russia which is being systematically built up in the American people by certain individuals and publications. The slogan that communism and capitalism, regimentation and democracy, cannot continue to exist in the same world is, from a historical point of view, pure propaganda. Several religious doctrines, all claiming to be the only true gospel and salvation, have existed side by side with a reasonable degree of tolerance for centuries. This country was for the first half of its national life a democratic island in a world dominated by absolutist governments.

We should not act as if we too felt that we were threatened in today's world. We are *by far*²² the most powerful nation in the world, the only allied nation which came out of the war without devastation and much stronger than before the war. Any talk on our part about the need for strengthening our defenses further is bound to appear hypocritical to other nations.

We should also be prepared to enter into economic discussion without demanding that the Russians agree in advance to discussion of a series of what are to them difficult and somewhat unrelated political and economic concessions. Although this is the field in which my department is most

們應該立即從事談判建立一個國際管制和發明原子能的條約，我個人相信，這是最重要的一個單獨問題，也就是使目下世界大勢不是趨向最後協議而是趨向僵局的問題。

我們應該努力來鎮壓美國人民中間由於一些個人和刊物有系統地造成不合理的憂懼蘇聯。共產主義和資本主義，統制和民主不能在同一個世界裏面存在的口號，從歷史的立場看起來是純粹的宣傳作用。有幾個不同的宗教，各個宣稱它所傳的是唯一真正的救世福音，好幾百年彼此都能有合理程度的容忍而彼此並存着。美國的歷史頭一半猶如一個抱民主主義，在專制政府所控制的世界裏面的小島能孑然獨立着。

我們不應該在行動上表現着我們好像也是感覺受到目下世界的威脅。我們是世界上惟一極其強盛的國家，同時是經過第二次世界大戰沒有受到摧殘而比戰前更強的唯一盟國。在我們方面關於需要加強我們國防的任何論調，在其他國家看起來，勢必是虛偽的。

我們不應在和蘇聯預先討論一些對它認為是困難而且多少是無關聯的政治經濟讓步之前，要求它同意經濟方面的討論。雖然這是和我的一部門直接有關，我要說明，照我的意見看來，整個對蘇問題的這一方面不是

directly concerned, I must say that in my opinion this aspect of the problem is not as critical as some of the others, and certainly is far less important than the question of atomic energy control. But successful negotiation in this field might help considerably to bridge the chasm that separates us. The question of a loan should be approached on economic and commercial grounds and should be disassociated as much as possible from the current misunderstandings which flow from the basic differences between their system and ours. You have already early disassociated yourself and the American people from the expressions of anti-Soviet support for the British loan. If we could have followed up your statement of signing the British Loan bill with a loan to the USSR on a commercial basis and on similar financial terms, I believe that it would have clearly demonstrated that this country is not attempting to use its economic resources in the game of power politics. In the light of the present Export-Import Bank situation, it is now of the greatest importance that we undertake general economic discussions at an early date.

It is of the greatest importance that we should discuss with the Russians in a friendly way their long-range economic problems and the future of our cooperation in matters of trade. The reconstruction of program of the USSR and the plans for the full development of the Soviet Union offer tremendous opportunities for American goods and American technicians.

American products, especially machines of all kinds, are well established in the Soviet

像其他的一些問題那樣嚴重，更遠不及管制原子能問題那樣重要。但是這一方面談判的成就，對彌補美蘇間的裂痕是大有幫助的。對蘇借款的問題應該以經濟商業為根據而予以研究，而且應該儘量將目前的誤會撇開，這些誤會都是由於美蘇根本不同的制度所引起的。關於對英借款，你早已為你自己和美國人民表白這並不是一種反蘇作用的支持。假使我們能夠在你簽訂對英借款法案的聲明之後繼續根據商業和同樣的金融條件磋商對蘇借款，我相信這可以明白地照示美國並不在利用它的經濟力量從事強國政治的把戲。以進出口銀行目下狀況看起來，美國及早進行廣泛的經濟討論是目下極為重要的事。

美國對蘇聯的長期經濟問題，和美蘇間未來的商業合作，應該以友誼的方式和它討論，這是極關重要的。蘇聯的重建計劃和它全面充分發展的各種計劃，使美國商品和專家都得有極多的機會。

美國工業成品，尤其是各種的機器，在蘇聯已是有名。舉個例子，在

Union. For example, American equipment, practices and methods are standard in coal mining, iron and steel, oil, and non-ferrous metals.

*Nor would this trade be*²³ one-sided. Although the Soviet Union has been an excellent credit risk in the past, eventually the goods exported from this country must be paid for by the Russians by exports to the U.S.A. and to other countries. Russian products which are either definitely needed or which are regarded as non-competitive in this country are various non-ferrous metal ores, furs, linen products, lumber products, vegetable drugs, paper and pulp, and native handicrafts

I feel that negotiations on the establishment of active trade might well help to clear away the foe of political misunderstanding. Such discussions might well be initiated while we are endeavoring to reach a common ground on the security issue, and if conducted in an understanding manner, could only serve to make the problem easier. In the memorandum which I sent to you in March and which I suggested should be given to General Smith to take to Moscow, I made certain suggestions for trade discussions and a trade mission. In preference to proposed discussions in this country I want to renew my original proposal and urge the appointment of a mission to Moscow. Such a mission might have as its objective the drafting of a proposal involving reconstruction and collaboration with Russia in the industrial and economic development of areas in which we have joint interests, such as the Middle East. As I stated at that time, I am pre-

蘇聯煤礦，鋼鐵，油和非鐵性金屬工業裏面，美國的設備，技術和方法已經公認是標準的。

這種商業也不會是片面的。雖然在過去對蘇信用很是帶有冒險性的，但是美國輸出的商品終久會由蘇聯對美輸出抵償。蘇聯產品，不是我們必定需要的，就是公認在美國沒有競爭性的，是各種非鐵性金屬礦苗，毛皮，麻產品，木材，植物藥品，紙和紙漿和手工業土產。

我以為談判建立積極的商業關係大可有助政治誤會濃霧的明朗化。當我們目下對安全爭點正努力覓致共同立場的時際，大可開始從事這一類的討論，並且如能以諒解的態度進行，可能使整個對蘇問題得以和緩。我在三月送給你的，提議交斯密士將軍帶到莫斯科的備忘錄裏面，曾提出關於美蘇商業討論和訪問團的一些建議。我目下要重新提出我原有的建議，極力主張派遣商業訪問團到莫斯科，代替在美國討論的建議。這個訪問團的目標可能和蘇聯會同草擬一個關於美蘇共同權益地帶，如中東，工業和經濟發展的重建和合作的提案。我準備照我上次說明的現在提出訪問團的組織，應該增加討論的若干特殊經濟問

pared to make suggestions for the composition of the mission and some of the specific economic questions to be discussed. The Department of Commerce has already arranged, with the cooperation of the State Department, to send two representatives to Moscow for the months of July and August for preliminary discussions of a much more limited scope. I think it is very significant that most of the more optimistic reports about the possibilities of getting along with the Russians have come from American observers who were businessmen. I have in mind such men as Wendell Willkie, Eric Johnston, and former Ambassador Joe Davies. The Russians seem to be friendly to, and to have respect for, capitalist businessmen.

A number of observers have reported that the Soviet leaders are "isolationists" and appear to be lacking a true insight into the principles, motives, and ways of thinking in other nations. We must admit, however, that they pointed out the symptoms and the way to prevent World War III in their promotion of the concept of collective security. And *aside from*²⁴ that, it seems to me we should try to do something constructive about their isolationism and ignorance, and I believe the aforementioned transmission could accomplish much in that direction. I *gather*,²⁵ too, that is part of what you have had in mind in inviting Premier Stalin to visit America.

Many of the problems relating to the countries bordering on Russia could more readily be solved once an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence is established

題的一些建議。商務部已經與國務院進行合作在七八兩月派遣代表兩名到莫斯科從事範圍限制更大的初步討論

。我以為關於對蘇和好相處有可能的樂觀報告大部分從過去從事商業的觀察家方面得來，這一點是很有意義的。我想到的是威爾基，約翰斯敦，前大使台維斯的報告。蘇聯的人民對資本主義國家的商人是友善，並且尊敬的。

有一些觀察家報告蘇聯領袖們是孤立主義者，對其他國家的原則，動機和思想方法缺乏真正的深切認識。然而我們必須承認蘇聯推進集體安全觀念，就已指明第三次世界大戰的徵候和避免的方法。此外，我個人覺得我們對他們的孤立主義和無知，應該作建設性的努力，我相信上面所說的交換訪問，在這一方面可得很大的成就。我猜想這也就是你打算請斯達林來美的一部分用意。

美蘇間互信互賴的空氣一經造成之後，同時美對蘇經濟辦法達到某種形式的計劃，許多關於毗隣蘇聯國家

and some form of economic arrangements worked out with Russia. These problems might be eliminated by discussions of an economic nature, Russian economic penetration of the Danube area, for example, might be countered by concrete proposals for economic collaboration in the development of the resources of this area, rather than by insisting that the Russians should cease their unilateral penetration and offering no solution to the present economic chaos there.

This proposal admittedly calls for a shift in some of the policies about international matters. It is imperative that we act at once as we have little time to lose. Our postwar actions have not yet been adjusted to the lessons to be gained from the experience of Allied cooperation during the war and the facts of the atomic age.

It is certainly desirable that, as far as possible, we achieve unity on the home front with respect to our international relations, but unity on the basis of building up conflict abroad would prove to be not only unsound but disastrous. I think there is some reason to fear that in our earnest efforts to achieve *bi-partisan*²⁶ unity in this country we may have given way too much to isolationism masquerading as tough realism in international affairs.

The real test lies in the achievement of international unity. It will be fruitless to continue to seek solutions for the many specific problems that face us in the making of the peace and in the establishment of an enduring international order without first achieving an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. The task admittedly is not an

的問題就可能迎刃而解。這些問題可能由於經濟性質的討論而消逝的，舉個例子，蘇聯對多腦河地區的經濟擴張可能由發展這個地區的資源的經濟合作的具體計劃可以應付的，而不是由堅持要蘇聯停止片面的擴張，對該地目下經濟混亂不拿出解決辦法去應付的。

這個提案實質上是要求美國對若干國際事務的政策加以改變。我們因為時間迫切需要立即採取這種措施。我們戰後的措施，對我們從戰時盟國合作經驗和原子時代一般事實，所得到的教訓還沒有調整。

我們所確切希望的是：關於美對國際關係我們要有後方的統一陣線，但是以國外衝突為根據的國內統一陣線不但是不合理，而且是很危險的。我以為我們有理由憂懼的是：我們在國內熱誠地努力覓致兩黨團結的當兒，對孤立派讓步也許太大了，孤立派對國際事務是抱堅強現實主義做幌子的。

我們成敗的真正關鍵是在國際間團結的能否覓致。我們不先覓得互信互賴的環境，而對我們當前締造和平和永久國際秩序的許多細題，想繼續覓得解決會是無效的。這個任務，實質上是不容易的。因為蘇聯文化上的

easy one. . . here is no question, as the Secretary of State has indicated, that negotiations with the Russians are difficult because of cultural differences, their traditional isolationism, and their insistence on a visible *quid pro quo*²⁷ in all agreements. But the task is not an insuperable one if we take into account that to other nations our foreign policy consists not only of the principles that we advocate but of the actions we take. Fundamentally, this comes down to the point discussed earlier in this letter, that even our own security, in the sense that we have known it in the past, cannot be preserved by military means in a world armed with atomic weapons. The only type of security which can be maintained by our own military force is the type described by a military man before the Senate Atomic Energy Committee—a security against invasion after all our cities and perhaps 40,000,000 of our city population have been destroyed by atomic weapons. That is the best that “security” on the basis of armaments has to offer us. It is not the kind of security that our people and the people of the other United Nations are striving for.

I think that progressive leadership along the lines suggested above would represent and best serve the interests of the large majority of our people, would reassert the forward looking position of the Democratic Party in international affairs, and, finally, would arrest the new trend towards isolationism and a disastrous atomic world war.

*Respectfully,*²⁸

*Henry A. Wallace.*²⁹

不同，傳統的孤立主義和它對一切協定堅持要求明顯的交換條件，我們對蘇談判，正如國務卿所指明，毫無問題地是很困難。我們如果想到在別的國家看來，我們的外交政策不僅是包括一些原則而是包括我們所採取的行動，這個困難任務並不是不能克服的。在根本上講，這就歸納到我這封信前面所討論的一點，即按照我們在過去對安全所已了解的意義，甚至我們美國本身的安全，在目下一個原子武器武裝的世界裏面是不能夠藉武力可以保持的了。我們藉我們自身武力所能保持的一種安全是參議院原子能委員會裏面一位軍人所描述的那種安全，即，在我們美國，所有的城鎮和我四千萬左右的人口被原子武器毀滅後，所有抵禦侵略的安全。這是軍備的「安全」對我們的最大貢獻。這不是我們美國人民和其他聯合國的人民正在努力覓致的那種安全。

我以為有進步思想的領導者照上面所建議的進行，庶幾可代表美國人民大多數的利益並可為彼等利益服務最能圓滿，可重申民主黨對國際事務高瞻遠矚的立場，最後並可阻遏美國走向孤立主義和殘酷的原子世界戰爭的新趨勢。願請

鈞安

華萊士謹上

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "to head off", 『阻遏』。He wanted to come to have it out with you, but I headed him off, 彼欲來與汝辯白, 但余已阻之。
 2. "to arm oneself to the teeth", 『全身武裝』。Like a soldier armed to the teeth, he gathered all the materials he could get for answering the counts against him, 彼如一全身武裝之軍人搜集可能覓致之資料, 以答辯對彼所控各罪。
 3. "strange... should express", 在"strange", "no wonder"等字, 表示(意外之事及"natural", "good", "right"表示當然之事)均用"should", 4. "by far"="much", 常用在adjective及adverb之比較級, 最高級之前, 如:"by far better", 或"better by far"="much better", "by far the best"="much the best." Your handwriting is by far better than mine. His is by far the best.
 5. "to concentrate... on", 『集中力量』, 『專注』。You must concentrate your thoughts on this difficult problem, 汝必須集中所有思慮應付此一難題。
 6. "V-J Day"="Victory over Japan Day", 『對日勝利日』。
 7. "Bikini tests", 見「當代文獻」第五卷第二分冊。
 8. "to arm Latin America", 五月六日杜魯門會咨文參院建議與南北兩美洲其他各國軍事合作(見本卷合訂本)。
 9. "to pay lip service", 『口惠而實不至』。He paid you only lip service by saying he would help you at some other time, 彼告汝謂將於他日予汝協助, 實予汝以口惠耳。
 10. "had"及"did not (have)"皆為subjunctive mood, 指現在與事實相反之事。If the U. S. S. R. had (事實沒有) but the U. S. A. did not have (或had not, 事實是有) the atomic bomb, the world would be quite different, 假設蘇聯據有原子彈, 而美國則無, 世界或將有變矣。
 11. "no one will dare attack", "dare"因有"no"之限制其後之infinitive "attack"不用"to"=One dare not attack
 12. "the other fellow", 『對手方』。
 13. "preventive war"即美主戰派之措詞。
 14. "NOW"原文全大橫表示強調。
 15. "the American plan", 即巴洛茨及艾契生兩氏所建議者, 關於前者參考「當代文獻」第五卷第二分冊。
 16. "good boys", 以大人(強者)待孩童(弱者)態度哄之。
 17. "cards"賭牌, 未公開前有利之牌, 轉喻有利立場。
 18. "to budge", 『讓步』, 『動』。I won't budge an inch, 我絲毫(寸步)不動(讓)。
 19. "for the United States and Russia to live together", 為infinitive clause, "for" + object + infinitive之假主詞。For you to do that is strange.
 20. "tide turns against", 『大勢於...不利』(tide turns in favour of 大勢於...有利)。The tide of public opinion has turned against him, 輿論趨勢業已於彼不利。
 21. "friendly"係引證蘇聯所用之字。
 - 22 見 4
 23. "Nor would this trade be", 凡"nor", "neither", "never"等adverbs置於一句之首需要將助動字置於主詞之前, 或加"do"及"did"。Nor shall I go. Neither has he seen them. Never have I done such things. Neither do I know him; Nor did he come.
 24. "aside from", 『離開』, 『除外』。Aside from the question of time, the journey will be a very uncomfortable one, 時間問題除外, 旅程極為不舒適。
 25. "gather", 『推察』。I gather from his talk that he is going soon, 予由其所言者推測彼將行矣。
 26. "bi-partisan"共和民主兩黨聯合外交政策。
 27. "quid pro quo", 拉丁語"something for something", 『交換』, 『報償』。
 29. "respectfully"為英文書信結尾客套語, 對位高年尊者用之。
 29. 華萊士被迫辭職(見「當代文獻」第五卷第三分冊)後充任美"the Republic"雜誌總編輯。
- 【註30】B-36式原子彈飛機係新型重轟炸機, 可載原子炸彈至世界上有人跡之任何地區而飛返本國, 中途無須加油, 航程一萬哩, 載重一千磅, 最高速度每小時二百哩, 可載十二至十七人, 而祇需一人駕駛。

WALLACE'S SPEECH ON "REALISTIC U.S. POLICY FOR PEACE"

Delivered on September 12, 1946, at a Madison Square Garden political rally sponsored by the National Citizens' Political Action Committee and the Independent Citizens' Committee of Arts, Sciences and Professions, supporting the New York State Democratic and American Labor Party candidates, Herbert H. Lehman for U.S. senator, James M. Mead for governor.

華萊士講演美國應有現實性和平政策

一九四六年九月十二日在紐約麥迪森廣場花園國民政治活動委員會及國民文藝科學自由職業委員會爲支持紐約州民主黨及工黨參議院議員及州長候選人雷門及密德所舉行之政治集會發表。

Tonight I want to talk about peace—and how to get peace. *Never*¹ have the common people of all lands so longed for peace. Yet, never in a time of comparative peace have they feared war so much.

Up till now peace has been negative and unexciting. War has been positive and exciting. Far too often, hatred and fear, intolerance and deceit have *had the upper hand over*² love and confidence, trust and joy. Far too often, the law of nations has been the law of *the jungle*;³ and the constructive spiritual forces of the Lord have bowed to the destructive forces of Satan.

During the past year *or so*,⁴ the significance of peace has been increased immeasurably by the atomic bomb, guided missiles and airplanes which soon will travel as fast

今晚我要談一談和平及怎樣獲取和平。各地普通人民從未有如今日之切望和平，然而他們也從未有今日之畏懼戰爭。

一直到現在，和平一向是否定而不刺激的，戰爭一向是肯定而刺激的。仇恨和恐懼，專制和欺騙，往往戰勝了愛心和信念，信任和快樂。國家的法律往往是草莽的法律，上帝的建設性的精神力量已向撒旦的破壞性的力量低首。

在過去一年左右，和平的重要性已因原子彈，火箭和不久將飛得和聲音一樣快的飛機而更加增大。不要弄

as sound. *Make no mistake about it*⁶—another war would hurt the United States many times as much as the last war. We cannot live in the assurance that we invented the atomic bomb—and therefore that this agent of destruction will work best for us. He who trusts in the atomic bomb will sooner or later perish by the atomic bomb—or something worse.

I say this as one who steadfastly urged preparedness throughout *the thirties*.⁶ We have no use for namby-pamby pacifism. But we must realize that modern inventions have now made peace the most exciting thing in the world—and we should be willing to pay a just price for peace. If modern war can cost us 400 billion dollars, we should be willing and happy to pay much more for peace. But certainly the cost of peace is to be measured not in dollars but in the hearts and minds of men.

The price of peace—for us and for every nation in the world—is the price of giving up prejudice, hatred, fear and ignorance of certain races. The recent mass lynching in Georgia was not merely the most unwarranted, brutal act of mob violence in the United States in recent years; it was also an illustration of the kind of prejudice that makes war inevitable.

Hatred breeds hatred. The doctrine of racial superiority produces a desire to get even on the part of its victims. If we are to work for peace in the rest of the world, we here in the United States must eliminate racialism from our unions, our business organizations, our educational institutions, and our employment practices. Merit alone

錯：如果再來一次戰爭的話，美國所受的損害，將數倍於上次大戰，我們不能爲了發明原子炸彈而可以高枕無憂，以爲它將爲我們特別效勞。信任原子彈的人遲早將被原子彈或一種更厲害的武器所滅亡。

我在一九三〇年代，始終主張，凡事必須有準備，現在我所以這樣說法，也是這個意思，我們用不着無聊的和平主義，但是我們必須明瞭：近代的種種發明已使和平成爲世界上最刺激的東西。所以我們應該願意以合理的代價來獲取和平。如果近代戰爭需要我們付出四千億元的代價，那末我們應當願意並樂於付出更大的代價以獲取和平。但是和平的代價當然不能用金錢來計算，而用人類的心和思想來計算。

和平的代價，對於我們以及對於世界每一個國家，是放棄若干種族的偏見、仇恨、恐懼和無知的代價。最近喬琪亞州羣衆擅自施用私刑，不但是近年來美國國內最無理的羣衆暴動的野蠻行爲，而且也是一種偏見造成戰爭不可避免的說明。

仇恨引起仇恨，種族優越的主義，在受害人方面產生一種企求平等的願望。如果我們要在世界各處爲和平而工作，那末我們必須先在美國的職工會，商業機構，教育機關和僱傭習慣當中消除種族仇視主義。祇有才能

must be the measure of man.

In payment for peace, we must give up prejudice, hatred, fear and ignorance in the economic world. This means working up a most rapid industrialization in Latin America, China, India and the Near East, for as the productivity of these peoples increases, our exports will increase.

We all remember the situation, not so long ago, when the high tariff protectionists blindly opposed any aid to the industrialization of Canada. But look at our exports to Canada today. On a per capita basis, our Canadian exports are seven times greater than our exports to Mexico.

I supported the British loan of almost four billion dollars because I knew that without this aid in the rehabilitation of its economy, the British Government would have been forced to adopt totalitarian methods and economic warfare of a sort which would have closed the markets of much of the world to American exports.

For the welfare of the American people and the world it is even more important to invest four billion dollars in the industrialization of undeveloped areas in the so-called backward nations, thereby promoting the long-term stability that comes from an ever-increasing standard of living. This would not only be good politics and good moral. It would be good business.

Governor Dewey has expressed himself as favoring an alliance of mutual defense with Great Britain as the key to our foreign policy. This may sound attractive because we both speak the same language and many of our customs and traditions have the same

才是民族的標準。

我們俯付和平的代價，必須在經濟世界中放棄偏見，仇恨，恐懼和無知。這個意思就是工作，使拉丁美洲，中國，印度和近東迅速工業化，因為這些國家的生產力增加，那末我們的輸出也將增加。

我們還記得：不久以前，高稅則的保護主義派，盲目地反對予加拿大工業化的任何協助。但是試看我們今日對加拿大的輸出。以每個人計算，我們對加拿大的輸出，較之對墨西哥的輸出，大上七倍。

我擁護近四十億美元的對英貸款，因為我知道如果我們對英國的經濟重建不予協助，那末英政府將被迫採用集權方法和一種經濟戰爭，使美國的輸出，失去了不少市場。

爲了美國人民和世界的福利起見，重更要的，我們必須將四十億美元投資所謂落伍國家未開發區的工業化上面，藉以促進來自生活標準不斷提高的長期安定。這不但是好的政治，好的道德，而且是好的商業。

杜威州長曾表示贊同英美軍事聯防，說它是我們外交政策的關鍵。這種論調或許很動聽，因為英美兩國的語言相同，我們的習慣和傳統也多有同樣的歷史背景。而且，在軍事人員

historical background. Moreover, to the military men, the British Isles are our advanced air base against Europe.

5 Certainly, we like the British people as individuals. But to make Britain the key to our foreign policy would be, in my opinion, *the height of folly*.⁷ We must not let the reactionary leadership of the Republican Party force us into that position. We must not let British balance-of-power manipulations determine whether and when the United States gets into war.

Make no mistake about it—British imperialistic policy in the Near East alone, combined with Russian retaliation, would lead the United States straight to war unless we have a clearly-defined and realistic policy of our own.

Neither of those two great powers wants war now, but the danger is that whatever their intentions may be, their current policies may eventually lead to war. To prevent war and insure our survival in a stable world, it is essential that we look abroad through our own American eyes and not through the eyes of either the British Foreign Office or a pro-British or anti-Russian press.

In this connection, I want one thing clearly understood. I am neither anti-British nor pro-British — neither anti-Russian nor pro-Russian. And just two days ago, when President Truman read those words, he said that they represented the policy of his Administration.

I plead for an America vigorously dedicated to peace—just as I plead for opportunities for the next generation

看來，英倫三島又是我們對歐洲的空軍前哨基地。

誠然，個人對個人我們自然很愛英國人民。然而我認爲把英國作爲我們外交政策的關鍵是一件極端愚蠢的事。我們不應放任共和黨的反動領袖迫令我們採取那種立場。我們不應放任英國的均勢論者決定美國應於何時加入戰爭。

毫無疑義地，僅就英國在近東的帝國主義政策和蘇聯的報復言之，除非我們自行決定正視現實的自我政策，美國就有被直接捲入戰爭漩渦的危險。

並不是說這兩個國家現在都要戰爭，而是說無論它們的用意何在，它們目前的政策就有引起戰爭的危險。爲了防止戰爭和確保我們在穩定世界中的生存，我們美國人亟應就我們的眼光出發看全世界，而不應以英國外交部的視線爲觀點，也不應以親英或反蘇的報紙觀點爲出發點。

關於此點，我要聲明一件事，我既不反英亦不親英——既不反蘇亦不親蘇。就在兩天以前，當杜魯門總統也這麼說時，他說這些話足以代表目前他的施政的方針。

我祈求美國將成爲致力和平的國家——正如我祈求世界下一代人民將

throughout the world to enjoy abundance which now, more than ever before, is the birthright of man.

To achieve lasting peace, we must study in detail just how the Russian character was formed—by invasions of the Tartars, Mongols, Germans, Poles, Swedes, and French, by the Czarist rule based on ignorance, fear and force; by the intervention of the British, French and Americans in Russian affairs from 1919 to 1921; by the geography of the huge Russian land mass situated strategically between Europe and Asia; and by the vitality derived from the rich Russian soil and the strenuous Russian climate. *Add to all this the tremendous emotional power which Marxism and Leninism gives to the Russian leaders,—and then we can realize⁸ that we are reckoning with a force which cannot be handled successfully by a 'get tough with Russia' policy. 'Gettin tough' never bought anything real and lasting—whether for schoolyard bullies or businessmen or world powers. The tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get.*

Throughout the world, there are numerous reactionary elements which had hoped for Axis victory—and now profess great friendship for the United States. Yet, those enemies of yesterday and false friends of today continually try to provoke war between the United States and Russia. They only long for the day when the United States and Russia will destroy each other. We must not let our Russian policy be guided or influenced by those inside or outside the United States who want war with Russia.

享受富庶的生活的機會一樣，這在現在比以前更多的是人類的權利能力。

爲獲致永久和平，我們應研究蘇聯人士氣質的成因——從韃靼人，蒙古人，德國人，波蘭人，瑞典人，和法國人的侵犯入手，從沙皇的統治入手，從一九一九至一九二一年英、法、美干涉俄國內政的事入手，從蘇聯橫跨亞歐兩洲廣大土地的地理戰略關係上入手，從蘇聯的天然富源和氣候關係入手。加以馬克斯及列寧主義所給予蘇聯領袖們的感情上的力量，這樣一來，我們會明白我們若用強硬的政策，我們就很難與之周旋，強硬不會產生任何真實而且恆久的結果，我們愈益強硬，蘇聯人士也會將跟之愈益強硬。

世界各地不乏希望軸心國勝利的反動份子，今日並向我們表示友誼。但是，這些昨天是敵人，今天爲虛僞朋友的人正在繼續鼓動美國和蘇聯之戰爭。他們僅希望美蘇兩國有互相摧殘的一天。我們不應放任我們的對蘇政策爲國內外盼望美蘇戰爭的人所左右或受其影響。這並非說我們應採取

This does not mean appeasement.

We most earnestly want peace with Russia—but we want not to be half way. We want co-operation. And I believe that we can get co-operation *once*⁹ Russia understands that our primary objective is neither saving the British Empire nor purchasing oil in the Near East with the lives of American soldiers. We cannot allow national oil rivalries to force us into war. All of the nations producing oil, whether inside or outside of their own boundaries, must fulfil the provisions of the United Nations Charter and encourage the development of world petroleum reserves so as to make available the maximum amount of oil to all nations of the world on an equitable peaceful basis—and not on the basis of fighting the next war.

For her part, Russia can retain our respect by co-operating with the United Nations in a spirit of openminded and flexible *give-and-take*.¹⁰

The real peace treaty we now need is between the United States and Russia. On our part, we should recognize that we have *no more* business in the political affairs of eastern Europe *than*¹¹ Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, western Europe and the United States. We may not like what Russia does in eastern Europe. Her type of land reform, industrial expropriation, and suppression of basic liberties *offends*¹² great majority of the people of the United States.

But whether we like it or not, the Russians will try to socialize their sphere of influence just as we try to democratize

經濟政策。

我們對蘇俄望和平——我們般望互相方面的和平，我們所般望者為合作。我相信當蘇聯了解我們的初衷，既不在顧全英帝國，亦不在於以美國將士的生命購買近東石油時，我們將獲得蘇聯的合作。我們不能放任國家的石油競爭迫令我們走向戰爭。所有出產石油的國家無論在其疆界以外或以內，均須遵從聯合國憲章規定和鼓勵開發世界石油蘊藏儘量供應世界各國基於公允的和平的石油要求，石油的供求不應以從事另次戰爭為基礎。

在她的本身來講，蘇聯如果能以開誠的和有彈性的互換精神與聯合國合作，當能保持我們的尊敬。

今日我們所需要的真正和約是美蘇兩國間的和約。在我們這方面，我們應承認我們不應更事間問東歐的政治事務，一如蘇聯的不再問問拉丁美洲，西歐和美國政治事務。我們對蘇聯在東歐的作為或許不很贊成，它的土地改革，工業公有和壓迫基本自由的方式，美國人民對之多感不滿。

然而無論我們的態度怎樣，蘇聯終要在它的勢力範圍內實行社會化，

our sphere of influence. This applies also to Germany and Japan. We are striving to democratize Japan and our area of control in Germany, while Russia strives to socialize eastern Germany.

As for Germany, we all must recognize that an equitable settlement, based on a unified German nation, is absolutely essential to any lasting European settlement. This means that Russia must be assured that never again can German industry be converted into military might to be used against her—and Britain, western Europe and the United States must be certain that Russia's German policy will not become a tool of Russian design against western Europe.

The Russians have no more business in stirring up native Communists to political activity in west Europe, Latin America and the United States than we have in interfering in the politics of eastern Europe and Russia. We know what Russia is up to¹³ in eastern Europe, for example, and Russia knows what we are up to. We cannot permit the door to be closed against our trade in eastern Europe *any more than*¹⁴ we can in China.

But at the same time we have to recognize that the Balkans are closer to Russia than to the United States, and that Russia cannot permit either England or the United States to dominate the politics of that area.

China is a special case, and although she holds the longest frontier in the world with Russia, the interests of world peace demand that China *remain*¹⁵ free from any

一如我們民主化我們的勢力範圍然。這也適用於德國和日本。在蘇聯社會化東歐中。我們正促使日本和德境美軍佔領區民主化。

關於德國，我們也應承認澈底解決歐洲問題亟需一種基於統一德國原則的合理辦法。這就是說事實應使蘇聯確信德國的工業永遠不致再流為軍用而對付它——事實也應使英國，西歐和美國確信蘇聯的對德政策，不致成為蘇聯對西歐實現野心的工具。

蘇聯應停止在西歐，拉丁美洲和美國鼓勵當地共產黨人從事政治活動，一如我們不應干涉東歐和蘇聯政事然。例言之，我們曉得蘇聯在東歐企圖些什麼，蘇聯也曉得我們企圖些什麼。我們不能在東歐對我們的貿易關閉門戶，同樣我們也不能把中國貿易獨佔。

同時，我們應承認巴爾幹隣近蘇聯，巴爾幹與美國的距離則較遠，以是蘇聯不能允許英美支配該區政事。

中國情形特殊，它和蘇聯接壤地區雖然最長，然而世界和平要求中國無論在政治上或經濟上不受任何勢力

sphere of influence, either politically or economically. We must see that the door to trade and economic development opportunities be left wide open in China as in all the world. However, the open door to trade and opportunities for economic development in China are meaningless unless there is a unified and peaceful China, built on the co-operation of the various groups in that country and based on a hands-off policy of the outside powers.

We are still arming *to the hilt*.¹⁶ Our excessive expenses for military purposes are the chief cause of our unbalanced budget. If taxes are to be lightened, we must have the basis of a real peace with Russia—a peace that cannot be shaken by extremist propagandists. We do not want our course determined for us by master minds operating out of lobbies in Moscow or Nanking.

Russian ideas of social-economic justice are going to govern nearly a third of the world. Our ideas of free enterprise democracy will govern most of the rest. The two ideas will endeavor to prove *which*¹⁷ can deliver the most satisfaction to the common man in their respective areas of political dominance. But by mutual agreement, this competition should be put on a friendly basis.

Under friendly peaceful competition, the Russian world and the American world will gradually become more alike. The Russians will be forced to grant more and more of the personal freedoms; and we shall become more and more absorbed with the problems of social-economic justice.

¹⁸ Russia must be convinced that we are

範圍約束。我們必須使中國貿易門戶和經濟發展機會像世界各地一樣廣大的開放。雖然，除非中國統一和平，並基於國內各團體之合作和不受外來干涉的基礎，中國的貿易門戶開放和經濟發展機會也就會成為毫無意義的事。

我們依然在積極武裝着自己，軍事用途的過度支出，就是收支不平衡的主要原因。如果要減輕納稅負擔，我們必須具有與真正蘇聯和平的基礎——一種不為極端宣傳家所動搖的和平。我們不需要莫斯科或是南京政府方面的智多星替我們決定路徑。

蘇聯對於社會，經濟正義的觀念，將要遍及世界三分之一，我們的自由企業民主將遍及其餘的部份。這兩種觀念都亟欲證明那一種確能把最大的滿意給予他們本身政治統治區內的普通人民。但是在互相同意之下，他們的競爭應置於友好原則上。

在友好和平的競爭之下，蘇聯的世界與美國的世界將逐漸變為相似，蘇聯將被迫給予更多的個人自由，而我們也將更為注意社會，經濟正義問題。

我們必須使蘇聯相信我們並沒有

not for war against her, and we must be certain that Russia is not carrying on territorial expansion or world domination through native Communists faithfully following every *twist and turn*¹⁸ in the Moscow party line.

But in this competition we must insist on an open door for trade throughout the world. There will always be an ideological conflict—but that is not reason why diplomats cannot work out a basis for both systems to live safely in the world side by side.

Once¹⁹ the fears of Russia and the United States Senate have been allayed by practical political reservations, I am sure that concern over the veto power would be greatly diminished. Then the United Nations would have a really great power in those areas which are truly international and not regional. In the world-wide, as distinguished from the regional field, the armed might of the United Nations should have atomic bombs and its military establishment, should give special emphasis to air power. It should have control of the strategically located air bases with which the United States and Britain have encircled the world. And not only should individual nations be prohibited from manufacturing atomic bombs, guided missiles and military aircraft for bombing purposes, but no nation should be allowed to spend on its military establishment more than perhaps 15 percent of its budget.

Practically and immediately, we must recognize that we are not yet ready for world federation. Realistically, the most we

要向他作戰，同時我們也要確信蘇聯並沒有由各國共產黨忠實的奉行莫斯科的訓示，進行擴展領土或是統治世界。

但是在這競爭中，我們必須堅持世界貿易門戶開放，思想的衝突總是存在的，但是外交家決不能把這理由充作藉口，說是雙方無法並肩存在世界上。

蘇美兩國的恐懼，一旦由實際地政治的保留而分析之後，我敢保證對否決權的關心必大為減少，然後在那些真正國際而並非地方性的區域之內，聯合國必能擁有真正的巨大力量，在廣遍全世界而不限於當地的區域中，聯合國的武力才應該有原子炸彈，而它的軍事機構將特別着重空中的威力，凡英美在世界四週所有的戰略空軍基地，它都應該予以控制，不特任何國家都不准製造原子彈，無線電控制飛彈，軍用轟炸飛機等，而且任何國家都不准把軍費超過總預算百分之十五。

我們必須現實的而且立即的承認我們對於世界聯盟，尙未有充分的準備。現實的講，我們可能希望的祇是

can hope for now is a safe reduction in military expense and a long period of peace based on mutual trust between the big three.

During this period, every effort should be made to develop as rapidly as possible a body of international law based on moral principles and not on the *Machiavellian*²⁰ principles of deceit, force and distrust—which, if continued, will lead to modern world to rapid disintegration.

In brief, as I see it today, the world order is bankrupt—and the United States, Russia and England are the receivers.

These are the hard facts of politics on which we have to build a functioning, powerful United Nations and a body of international law. And as we build, we must develop fully the doctrine or the rights of small peoples as contained in the United Nations Charter. This law should ideally apply as much to the Indonesians and Greeks as to the Bulgarians and Poles—but practically, the application may be delayed until both the British and Russians discover the futility of their methods.

In the full development of the rights of small nations, the British and Russians can learn a lesson from the good-neighbor policy of Franklin Roosevelt. For under Roosevelt, we in the Western Hemisphere built a workable system of regional internationalism that fully protected the sovereign rights of every nation.

In the United States, an informed public opinion will be all powerful. Our people are peace-minded. But they often express themselves too late—for events today move much faster than public opinion.

軍費的裁減，以及基於三強互信原則的悠久和平。

在這和平的時期中，我們應盡每一份的力量去儘速發展一個國際法的組織，這組織所根據的是道義上的原則，而並不是可使世界迅速沉淪的欺詐，武力和不信任的原則。

簡單的講，由我看來，世界的秩序，已經破產——而受其後果的則是英美蘇三國。

我們必須在這些鐵一般的事實上，建立一個堅強的聯合國和國際法機構而在我們建立的程序中，我們必須充分發展聯合國憲章中所規定的弱小民族權利的信條。這法律的施用，對於印度尼西亞，希臘和保加利亞，波蘭人民，應該一視同仁，但是事實上在英蘇方面沒有發現他們的方法已屬錯誤之前，法律的實施是要被延擱的。

在充分發揚弱小民族權利的程序中，英蘇雙方可自羅斯福的睦隣政策中，獲得很好的教訓，因為在羅斯福指導之下，在西半球的我們已建立一種可資實行的地方國際主義，這種主義已充分保障每一國家的主權。

在美國，消息充分的輿論將發揮極大力量，我們的人民是心地和平的，然而他們往往未能及早表示其意見——因為今日的時事變遷較輿論來得

The people here, as everywhere in the world, must be convinced that another war is not inevitable. And through mass meetings such as this, and through persistent pamphleteering, the people can be organized for peace—even though a large segment of our press is propagandising our people for war in the hope of scaring Russia. And we who look on this war-with-Russia talk as original foolishness must carry our message direct to the people—even though we may be called Communists because we are to speak out.

I believe that peace—the kind of peace I have outlined tonight—is the basic issue, both in the Congressional campaign this fall and right on through the presidential election in 1948. How we meet this issue will determine whether we live not in 'one world' or 'two worlds'—but whether we live at all.

快。這裏的人民，和世界其他各地的人民一般，應相信另一次戰爭並非不可避免的，經過羣衆集合和呼籲，人民將結合起來爲和平而奮鬥——不管若干報紙仍在高呼口號，鼓吹對蘇戰爭。我們這些深知對蘇戰爭言論是愚蠢的，應該直接向人民呼籲——雖然我們或因敢於大聲疾呼而有被人目爲共產黨人的危險。

我認爲在今秋的國會議員和一九四八年的總統競選中，和平都是主要問題之一。我們怎樣對付此項問題，不是將決定，我們是否能夠在「一個世界」，或是「兩個世界」裏面生存乃是根本決定能不能生存問題。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "never" 用於一句之首時須將居中之助動詞調置於主詞之前，故本句中之助動詞 "have" 在主詞 "the common people" (complete subject) 之前。(依同理，"neither" "nor" "never" 等字用作 adverbs 時，助動詞皆調置於主詞前，如：you have not seen him; neither have I. They will not go; nor shall I. 如無助動詞，則用 "do" 或 "did"，視動詞之爲現在或過去而定(未來必有 "shal." 或 "will" 無問題)，如 you don't know him; neither do I. He didn't come; nor did I. you) 2. "have the upper hand over" 或 "get the upper hand of", 『佔上風』，『勝過』。In the long run the honest will have the upper hand over the dishonest, 誠實之人終久勝過欺詐之人。 3. "the jungle" (爲熱帶叢林野蠻人居地) 『荒蠻』，『野蠻殘忍』(喻混亂無定之局面)。 4. "or so", 『左右』。"a day or so", 『一日左右』。"a mile or so", 『一哩左右』。 5. "make no mistake about it", 獨立句 (independent construction), 此處爲 clause 式，他如 "I think", 正如 phrase 式之 "in fact" "of course", 及 word 式之 "indeed", "perhaps", 在構造上與句子本身某一字不生文法關係，而與整句發生關係，皆爲主觀評語。 6. "the thirties", = 自1930 (nineteen thirty) 至1939 (nineteen thirty-nine), 『三十年代』即二十世紀自第三十年起至三十九年止) 1940 至 1949 則爲 the forties, - 四十年代；亦可指過去，如十九世紀之三十年代, the eighteen thirties) the Japanese imperialists were at the zenith of their power in the thirties of the present century, 在本世紀之三十年代日本軍閥之勢力達於頂點。 7. "the height of folly" (= most foolish), 『愚妄至極』。To appeal to Philip drunk is the height of folly, 對醉漢呼籲實爲愚極之事。(同樣有："the height of the battle", 『大戰方酣』；"the height of

the banquet", 『酒酣耳熱』; the height of the storm", 『暴風雨正盛』; "the height of summer", 『炎夏之時』; "the height of the season", 『極盛時節』; "the height of fashion", 『時髦之至』; the height of fortune", 『幸運正隆』。 8. "Add to all this the leaders, and we can realize", 爲 compound sentence 表示非強調的條件意味 (此種構造有限制條件, 卽第一 clause 須爲 imperative mood, 連接字須用 "and") = complex sentence: "If we add to all this the leaders, we can realize。 例: Study hard, and you will succeed=if you study hard, you will succeed, 9. "once" 爲 "when once" 或 "if once" 之省略連接字 "when" 或 "if" (視某一句之需要而確定其爲 "when" 或 "if" (而以 adverb "once" 代替作 conjunction 用), 『一旦』, 『一經』。 Once you commit this poem into memory(=when once you commit this poem into memory), you will not forget it, 汝一旦將此詩背熟, 汝將不忘記。 10. "give-and-take", (此處作 noun 用, 又可作 adjective 用, 拆開作 compound verb 用), 『交換』, 『有所予並有所取』。 A socialistic community is supposed to base on the principle of give-and-take, 社會主義社會爲假定基於服務與報酬兼而有之之原則。(作 adjective 用 "a give-and-take policy"; 作 verb 用 All the members of the English club both give and take, 交換練習英文利益, 卽助人如何學英文, 以他人學英文之法爲個人借鏡。 11. "no more..... than" = "as little.....as", 『同無』, 『...之無...正與...之無...』。 you have no more right to do this than he has(=you have as little right to do this as he has), 汝之無權利爲此, 無異於彼。 12. "offends" 之主詞爲 "type"。 13. "up to" = "doing", 『正當』。 What have you been up to, 汝何所企圖? 14. "not.....any more than" = "no more than", 見 11.。 15. "remain" 爲 subjunctive verb 表示 "China" 由外力 (the interests of world peace) 決定其須 "remain" (非自動), 故用 Subjunctive mood. 16. "to the hilt", 『完全』, 『充分』。 He is armed to the hilt, 彼配帶全付武裝。(此處 "armed" 爲形容字。本句中 (we) "are arming" 爲動詞, 現在進行式, 表示積極之意。) 17. "which" 爲 pronoun, 表示選擇意味。 Which of the boys is the most brilliant? 18. "twist and turn" (多用 "turn and twist"), 『曲折』『轉折』。 The path has many turns and twists, 路多轉折。 19. 見 9. 20. "Machiavellian", 『有如 Machiavelli 的』, 轉爲『險詐的』, 『陰險的』, 『權謀術數的』。 Machiavelli 卽 Niccolò di Bernardo Machiavelli (1469-1527) 意大利之政治家, 外交家, 權謀術數家, 著有 Il Principe 一書。

TRUMAN'S STATEMENT RE WALLACE'S SPEECH ON SEPTEMBER 12

Made at a press conference on September 20, 1946

杜魯門關於華萊士九月十二日演說之聲明書

一九四六年九月二十日在招待新聞記者會發表

The foreign policy of this country is the most important question confronting us today. Our responsibility for obtaining a just and lasting peace extends not only to the people of this country but to the nations of the world.

The people of the United States may disagree freely and publicly on any question, including that of foreign policy, but the government of the United States must stand as a unit in its relations with the rest of the world.

I have today asked *Mr. Wallace*¹ to resign from the Cabinet. It has become clear that between his views of foreign policy and those of *the Administration*²—the latter being shared, I am confident, by the great body of our citizens—there was fundamental conflict. We could not permit this conflict to *jeopardize*³ our position in relation to other countries.

I deeply regret *breaking off*⁴ a long and pleasant official association, but I am sure that Mr. Wallace will be happier in the exercise of his right to present his views as a private citizen. I was confirmed in this belief by the very friendly telephone conversation I had with Mr. Wallace this

本國之外交政策為吾人今日當前重要之問題，吾人不但對於本國人民負有獲致公正與持久和平之責任，而且對於世界各民族，亦負有此種責任。

美國人民雖可自由公開表示對任何問題不同意——包括外交政策在內，但美國政府必須在其對國際之關係中，保持單位之立場。

余已於今日要求華萊士辭去其在內閣中之本職。事實已極明顯，渠之外交政策觀點與行政當局——余深信後者足以代表大多數民衆之觀點——有基本上之衝突。吾人不能允許此項衝突危害吾人在國際關係間之地位。

對於長期而愉快之職務上合作之破裂，余至以為憾，惟余深信華萊士於運用其權利發表私人之意見時，渠將有更大之愉快。今晨余曾與華萊士通話，在電話中作極友好之談話，余

morning.

Our foreign policy, as established by the Congress, the President and the Secretary of State, remains *in full force and effect*⁵ without change. No change in foreign policy is contemplated.

No member of the executive branch of the government will make any public statement as to foreign policy which is in conflict with our established foreign policy. Any public statement on foreign policy shall be cleared with the Department of State. In case of disagreement the matter will be *referred to*⁶ me.

As I have frequently said, I have complete confidence in Mr. Byrnes and his delegation, now representing the country at the Paris peace conference. Mr. Byrnes consults with me often, and the policies which guide him and his delegation have my full *endorsement*.⁷

之此項信念亦得以證實。

吾人之外交政策係經國會建立者，總統國務卿亦應完全秉承此項政策，不應有所更改。吾人迄未考慮變更外交政策。

政府行政部門之任何官員均不應發表與吾人既定之外交政策衝突之公開聲明。任何有關外交政策之公開聲明均應與國務院商討後發表，遇有不同意見之點，亦應向余提出。

一如余所言者然，余完全信任貝爾納斯及其現正代表本國出席巴黎和會之代表團。貝爾納斯常與余商討，渠與渠之代表團所奉行之政策亦完全經余同意。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. 即美前羅斯福政府副總統，不久以前美商務部長，曾訪問中國之 Henry A. Wallace.
2. "the Administration" 現在美行政當局，即杜魯門所組織之行政機構。
3. "jeopardise" 〔危害〕，〔危及〕。We must not let political dissensions jeopardize national unity, 吾人不能任政爭危害國家團結。
4. "breaking off" 係 gerund 為 "regret" 之受詞。
5. "in full force and effect", 〔完全有效力〕。A constitution, once adopted, will be in full force and effect, 憲法一經通過即生完全效力。
6. "refer to", 〔提出〕。This matter must be referred to the general meeting for discussion, 此事必須擬交大會討論。
7. "endorsement", 〔贊成〕。His proposal has won endorsement of the whole nation, 彼之提案已獲得全國國民之贊助。

STALIN'S REPLIES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS BY
A CORRESPONDENT OF THE LONDON
"SUNDAY TIMES"

Made on September 24, 1946 at Moscow

斯達林對倫敦星期泰晤士報記者書
面問題之答覆

一九四六年九月二十四日在莫斯科發表

QUESTION: Do you believe in the real danger of a "new war" about which at the present time so much irresponsible talk is being carried on? What steps should be taken for preventing the war if such a danger exists?

ANSWER: I do not believe in the real danger of a new war. The noise being raised about a new war is mainly by military and police scouts and their few supporters from the ranks¹ of civilian officials. They need this noise *if only*² in order, *firstly*,³ to frighten with the specter of war some *naive*⁴ politicians from the ranks of their counter agents and thereby aid their Governments to extract more concessions; *secondly*, to make difficult for some time the reduction of military budgets in their countries; and *thirdly*, to check demobilization of troops and thereby prevent the quick growth of unemployment in their countries. It is necessary to distinguish sharply between the noise about a new war which is

問：目前關於再起戰爭之真正危機，傳說紛紜，君信以為然否？此種危機倘果存在，應採取何種步驟，加以防止？

答：余不信有再起戰爭之真正危機。戰爭再起之喧聲，大部由於軍警探員及少數支持彼等之普通文官而起。若輩對此種喧聲，如有需要，則係以遂其下列企圖：第一，以戰爭之恐怖，威嚇其反對派份子代表中之老實政治家，使其促使本國政府取得更多之權利。第二，使其本國裁減軍事預算，暫時發生困難。第三，制止軍隊復員，藉以防止失業者之迅速增加。戰爭再起之喧聲固甚囂塵上，但再起

being carried on now and the real danger of a new war which does not at present exist.

QUESTION: Do you think Britain and the United States consciously are forming a "capitalistic encirclement" of the Soviet Union?

ANSWER: I do not think the ruling circles in Britain and the United States of America could create a capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union even if they wanted to do this which, however, we cannot affirm.

QUESTION: Speaking in the words Mr. Wallace used in his last speech, can England, Western Europe and the United States be assured that Soviet politics in Germany, will not be turned into a weapon of Russian efforts directed against Western Europe?

ANSWER: I believe using Germany by the Soviet Union against Western Europe and the United States of America is excluded. I believe this is excluded not only because the Soviet Union is bound by a treaty of mutual assistance against German aggression with Britain, France and with the United States of America by the decisions of the Potsdam Conference of the three Great Powers; but also because the politics of using Germany against Western Europe and the United States of America would mean a departure of the Soviet Union from its fundamental national interests. Speaking briefly, the politics of the Soviet Union in the German question comes down to the demilitarization and democratization of Germany. I think the demilitarization and

戰爭之危機則並不存在，兩者之間有嚴格區別之必要。

問：君以爲英美兩國正對蘇聯形成資本主義之包圍陣線乎？

答：余不以爲英美統治階級能對蘇聯樹立資本主義的包圍陣線，即使有意於此，亦不可能，但若輩是否有意於此，吾人不能斷定。

問：依照華萊士君最近之說法，英國，西歐各國與美國能否獲得保證，蘇聯在德國所行政策不致成爲蘇聯直接反對西歐之武器？

答：余信蘇聯利用德國反對西歐與美國絕無其事。此不僅由於蘇聯與英法訂有防德侵略互助條約，並由於蘇聯與美國受有波茨坦會議協定之約束，且因其違反蘇聯自身國策。簡言之，蘇聯對德政策在於解除其武裝及實行民主而已。余以爲德國之解除武裝與民主化，乃爲樹立健全的與持久

democratization of Germany presents one of the most important guarantees for the establishment of sound, lasting peace.

QUESTION: What is your opinion regarding the accusation that the policies of Communist Parties in Western Europe are "dictated by Moscow?"⁶

ANSWER: I consider this accusation absurd and borrowed from the bankrupt arsenal of Hitler and Goebbels.

QUESTION: Do you believe in the possibility of the friendly, lasting collaboration of the Soviet Union and the Western democracies despite the existence of ideological discord and in friendly competition between the two systems of which Wallace spoke in his speech?

ANSWER: I *do*,⁷ unconditionally.

QUESTION: During the sojourn here of the British Labor Party delegation you, as I understood it, expressed belief in the possibility of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Britain. What could help in the establishment of these relations which are so eagerly desired by the broad masses of the English people?

ANSWER: I really believe in the possibility of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Britain. The establishment of such relations would be appreciably helped by the strengthening of political, trade and cultural relations between these countries.

QUESTION: Do you believe the quickest withdrawal of all American forces in China is vitally necessary for future peace?

ANSWER: Yes, I do.

的和平之最重要保證之一。

問：關於西歐各國共產黨之政策係受莫斯科指揮一項責難，尊意云何？

答：余以爲此種責難實屬妄誕，不過掇拾希特勒與郭培爾之唾餘而已。

問：君是否相信蘇聯與西方民主國間，思想雖不同，仍有友誼的永久合作之可能性，而由兩種制度作友誼的競爭，一如華萊士君所言？

答：余無條件信其可能。

問：英國工黨代表團訪蘇期間，閣下向之表示英蘇有促進友誼之可能。此固爲英國大多數民衆所渴望者，然則如何有助於此種關係之樹立？

答：余確信蘇英有促進邦交之可能。此種邦交之樹立，可由兩國政治，商務，文化關係之增強而得。

問：君以爲美國軍隊速自中國全部撤退，係未來和平所必要乎？

答：誠然。

QUESTION: Do you believe the actual monopoly-possession of the atomic bomb by the United States of America is one of the principal threats to peace?

ANSWER: I do not believe the atomic bomb to be as serious a force as certain politicians are *inclined to*⁸ regard it. Atomic bombs are intended for intimidating weak nerves but they cannot decide the outcome of a war since atomic bombs are by no means sufficient for this purpose. Certainly the mere secret of the atom bomb does create a threat but at least two factors exist against it: 1. Monopoly-possession of the atomic bomb cannot last long. 2. Use of atomic energy in war will be prohibited.

QUESTION: Do you suppose, with the further advance of the Soviet Union toward Communism, the possibilities for peaceful collaboration with the outside world will not increase as this concerns the Soviet Union? Is "Communism in one country" possible?

ANSWER: I do not doubt that the possibilities for peaceful collaboration not only will not decrease but can even increase. Communism in one country is fully possible.

問：君是否以爲美國切實壟斷原子炸彈，爲和平之一種主要威脅？

答：余不以爲原子炸彈之力量有如若干政客所視之嚴重。原子彈意在恫嚇神經孱弱者，但不能決定戰爭之勝負，原子彈實不足以完成此種任務。原子彈製造法保守秘密誠足構成威脅，但至少有一種事實足以抵消之：即一，壟斷原子彈秘密不能持久；二，利用原子能於戰爭將予以禁止。

問：君是否以爲蘇聯進一步向共產主義邁進，則與其他各國之和平合作可能性將不致增加？共產主義限於一國，是否可能？

答：余並不懷疑和平合作之可能性，且信其必能有增無減。共產主義限於一國完全可能。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "ranks", (由軍隊之『橫列』轉爲)『低層』，『大眾』，『集團』。"the ranks"或"the rank and file" (=common soldiers), 故『下層』，『下流社會』。He works for the welfare of the ranks of the people, 彼爲普通人民謀幸福而工作。2. "if only"="if it is needed only"之省略。3. "in order to"爲 preposition-phrase, "firstly"爲插入用法。4. "naive"="artless", "amusingly simple", 『天真』，『純直』，『老實』。All poets are naive, 詩人皆純直。5. "capitalistic encirclement"係邱吉爾對蘇聯在中東歐勢力範圍所加之"iron curtain"一名詞之反對字。(見當代文獻第四合訂本邱吉爾在美西寺學院講演「和平實力」)。6. "dictated by Moscow"見上開邱吉爾演詞。7. "do"爲"do"字之代表用法。此處代表本條問題中之"believe"一字。問：Do you know that? 答：yes, I do (=know)。8. "inclined to", 『有意』，『頗……之趨勢』。He inclines to think so, 彼頗作如此想法。

BYRNES'S BROADCAST SPEECH TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THE PROGRESS OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Made on October 18, 1946

貝爾納斯向國人廣播報告巴黎和會經過 謂蘇美關係緊張

一九四六年十月十八日播送

It is now 15 months since the decision was reached at *Potsdam*¹ to set up the Council of Foreign Ministers to start the preparatory work on the peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Those months have been hard, difficult months.

At the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the Paris peace conference, your representatives were a united and harmonious delegation acting under the guidance and instructions of the President of the United States. The difficult tasks were immeasurably lightened by the splendid work and cooperation of my associates, Senator Connally, Democratic chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Vandenberg, spokesman for the Republican Party in foreign affairs. In the conference, we have represented no political parties. We have been united in representing the United States.

After every great war, the victorious allies have found it difficult to adjust their differences in the making of peace.

自吾人在波茨坦獲致舉行外長會議展開與義大利，保加利亞，羅馬尼亞，匈牙利和芬蘭訂立和約籌備工作以來，爲時已達十五個月。這幾個月是艱苦而且困難的日子。

在外長會議和巴黎和會中，諸位的代表是一個在美國總統指導下進行工作的和諧一致的代表團。由於我們的同僚康納利參議員（外交委員會民主黨主席），和范登堡參議員（共和黨外交發言人）的輝煌工作和合作，我們的困難的工作爲之減輕不少。在會議中，我們並不代表政黨。我們已一致代表美國。

每次大戰之後，勝利國都遭遇到消除異見締造和平的困難。

Before the fighting stopped, President Roosevelt warned us that "the nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies, the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the Allies." That was why President Roosevelt was so insistent that the United Nations should be established before the peace settlements were made.

It was inevitable that in the making of concrete peace settlements the Allies should discuss and debate the issues on which they disagree and not those on which they agree. It was also inevitable that such discussions should emphasize our differences. That is one reason I have continuously pressed to bring about agreements upon the peace settlements as rapidly as possible. Leaving unsettled issues which should be settled only *serve*² to increase tension among the Allies and unrest among the peoples affected.

We cannot think constructively on what will or will not contribute to the building of lasting peace and rising standards of life until we liquidate the war and give the peoples of the world a chance to live again under conditions of peace. It is difficult to deal with the problem of a convalescing world until we get the patient off the operating table.

These treaties are not written as we would write them if we *had a free hand*.³ They are not written as other governments would write them if they had a free hand. But they are as good as we can hope to get by general agreement now or within any reasonable length of time.

Our views on reparations are different from the views of countries whose territories

在戰事終了以前，羅斯福總統曾向我們警告：「我們愈益接近勝利，我們就無可避免地愈益感到盟國間的異見。」這也就是羅斯福總統堅持聯合國應於和約訂立前設立的原因。

在締造具體和約的工作中，盟國將商討辯論它們不同意的問題，這是不可避免的事，這種討論將強調我們的異見也是不可避免的事。這也就是我始終主張儘速獲致和約協議的原因之一。應該解決的問題懸而未決，將增加盟國間的緊張及有關人民的不安。

在我們清算戰爭並以再度在和平的情形下生活的機會給予世界人民之前，我們不能確定地想到怎樣建立永久和平和提高生活水準纔能有所貢獻。在我們請出手術床上的病人前，我們很難解決重病新癒世界的問題。

假如我們能隨心所欲地擬具，這些和約就不會成爲那個樣子。如其他政府也得隨心所欲地擬具，它們也不會成爲那個樣子。不過它們是我們現在或任何合理時期內所能希望得到共同認可的最完善和約。

我們的賠償觀點和那些領土人民備受敵人蹂躪和敵人軍警壓迫的國家

were laid waste⁴ by military operations and whose peoples were brought under the yoke of⁵ alien armies and alien Gestapos.⁶ The reparation payments are heavy—excessively heavy in some cases. But their burdens should not be unbearable if the peoples on which they are laid are free from the burdens of sustaining occupying armies and are given a chance to rebuild their shattered economic lives.

For Europe, with her mingled national economies, there are no ideal boundary settlements. The proposed settlement for the Trieste area was long and warmly debated. The conference approved the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers that this area should become a free territory under the protection of the United Nations. The conference also, by a two-thirds vote, made recommendations for an international statute defining the responsibilities of the United Nations in relation to the free territory. Such recommendations are an expression of world opinion and cannot be arbitrarily disregarded. Those recommendations of the conference provide that the governor appointed by the Security Council should have sufficient authority to maintain public order and security, to preserve the independence and integrity of the territory, and to protect the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the inhabitants.

The minority proposal, which was supported by the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and other Slav countries, would have made a figurehead of the United Nations governor and would have given Yugoslavia virtual control of the customs, currency, and foreign

觀點不同。賠償負擔很重大——在若干情形下，實為過分重大。雖然，假如担負這種重荷的人民，要免去維持佔領軍的重荷，和獲得重建其支離破碎經濟生活的機會，這種賠償負荷就不應該那樣重。

就歐洲而言，由於它的混淆不清的國民經濟，很難有理想的疆界解決方案。擬議中之特里雅斯特區方案會引起長期而且熱烈的辯論。和會通過外長會議的建議案，認為該區應成為聯合國保護下之自由區。和會並以三分之二票通過建議該區應以國際地區之狀態與聯合國建立關係。這種建議是世界輿論的表示，不能加以片面的反對。和會並有其他建議，規定安理會任命之總督應擁有充分之權力，以維持該區的公共秩序和安全，確保其獨立及完整，並保障該區人民的人權及基本自由。

少數建議案曾經蘇聯，南斯拉夫和其他斯拉夫國家支持，按照該建議案，聯合國將任命總督一人，同時並以管制該區關稅，貨幣及外交之實權

affairs of the territory. Certainly we could not agree to that. It would make the territory a protectorate of Yugoslavia and leave the United Nations powerless to prevent it becoming a battleground between warring groups. There must be no seizure of power in Trieste after this war as there was in Fiume after the last war.

The Yugoslav delegation advised the conference that it would not sign the treaty recommended. My hope, however, is that after consideration Yugoslavia will realize that just as other states have made concessions she must make concessions to bring about the peace.

Although the Council of Foreign Ministers were unable to agree to any change in the Austrian-Italian frontier, the representatives of Austria and Italy at Paris are encouraged by the American delegation to reach an agreement which should help to make the South Tyrol a bond, rather than a barrier, between the two peoples.

It is my earnest hope that Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and Rumania and Hungary may find by common agreement a somewhat similar solution to their complicated nationality problems on the basis of working together as friends and neighbors. We in America know that people of many different races and stocks can live together in peace in the United States. They should be able to live together in peace in Europe.

At Potsdam, in the summer of 1945, President Truman stressed the importance of providing for free navigation of the great international rivers in Europe on terms of

授與南斯拉夫。我們對這種建議案着實不能贊同。按照這種建議，特里雅斯特區將成爲南歐的保護國，使聯合國無權防止它變成好戰團體間的戰場。本次戰爭後，誰都不能獨攬統治特里雅斯特區的權力，一如第一次大戰以後於費澳姆區然。

南斯拉夫代表團曾敦勸和會切莫簽署那個擬議中的條約。不過我總希望南國於考慮後將和其他國家同樣地表示讓步。

外長會議雖不能同意任何關於奧國和義大利邊界的變更，奧國及義大利代表都在美代表團的鼓勵下獲致協議。這種協議將協助使南泰洛爾成爲該區人民間的聯繫，而不致成爲劃分他們的壁壘。

我會殷切希望捷克，匈牙利及羅馬尼亞與匈牙利將獲致類似之協議，在友人和鄰居的合作態度下解決其錯綜複雜的民族問題。在美洲，我們曉得不同種族的人能共同相處於美國。他們應當能相安無事地共同生活於有和平的歐洲。

一九四五年夏間，杜魯門總統在波茨坦闡明歐洲國際性大河應基於平等條件，得自由航行之重要性。杜魯

equality for the commerce of all states. President Truman was not seeking any special advantage for the United States. He was seeking to promote peace. He was seeking to ensure that these great waterways should be used to unite, and not divide, the peoples of Europe.

The delegations representing the Soviet Republic and the Slav countries vigorously opposed the proposal. The Paris conference recommended by a two-thirds vote that the treaties should ensure freedom of commerce on the Danube on terms of equality to all states. I hope that when the Foreign Ministers meet we can agree upon the adoption of this recommendation.

In recent weeks much has been said about the acrimonious debates and the divisions in the Paris conference. Back of those debates and divisions were real and deep differences in interest, in ideas, in experience, and even in prejudices. Those differences cannot be dispelled or reconciled by a mere gloss of polite words. And in a democratic world those differences cannot and should not be kept from the peoples concerned. In a democratic world, statesmen must share with the people their trials as well as their triumphs. It is better that the world should witness and learn to appraise clashes of ideas rather than clashes of arms.

If this peace is to be lasting, it must be a peoples' peace. The peoples of the world who long for peace will not be able to make their influence felt if they do not know the conflicts in ideas and in interest that give rise to war, and if they do not know how

門總統並非為美國覓取特別利益，他的動機在於促進和平。他的動機在於覓取這些大河應用以團結，而非分化，歐洲人民的保證。

代表蘇維埃共和國和斯拉夫國家的代表團極力反對這種建議。巴黎會議以三分之二票建議各和約應保證多瑙河商業之自由，應基於各國平等條件。我希望外長會議時我們能同意採納此項建議。

在最近數星期內，關於巴黎會議中激烈的辯論和分裂，已有不少人說起過，在這些辯論和分裂的背後，有着利害上，觀念上，經驗上，以及甚至成見上真正的深切的異議。這些異議，單憑一些客氣言語的註解，實無法加以消弭或調和。而在一個民主的世界上，這些異議不能也不應瞞住各國有關的人民，在一個民主的世界中，政治家必須和人民同甘共苦。世界應當察覺並力求評估意見的衝突，不能候武力的衝突發生再加以評估。

如果需要和平持久的話，那麼它必須是一種各民族和平。世界希望和平的各民族將無法使他們的勢力被人覺得，除非他們知道引起戰爭的意見上和利害上的衝突，除非他們知道

the statesmen and the peoples of other countries view those conflicts.

But it is our hope that in international democracy, as in national democracy, experience will prove that appeals to reason and good faith, which unite people, *count for*⁸ more in the long run than appeals to prejudice and passion which divide people.

In a world where no sovereign state can be compelled to sign or ratify a peace treaty, there is no perfect peace-making machinery. Where boundaries, colonies and reparations are involved, a peace treaty cannot be made effective unless it is satisfactory to the principal powers.

Under these circumstances, the Paris conference provided as adequate an opportunity for the smaller states and ex-enemy states to express their views on the proposed treaties as it was practical to provide.

The thing which disturbs me is not the lettered provisions of the treaties under discussion, but the continued, if not increasing, tension between us and the Soviet Union. *The day*⁹ I took office as Secretary of State I said that "the supreme task of statesmanship the world over is to help them, the people of this war-ravaged earth, to understand that they can have peace and freedom only if they tolerate and respect the rights of others to opinions, feelings and ways of life which they do not and cannot share." It is as true now as it was then that the development of sympathetic understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States is the paramount task of statesmanship. Such understanding is necessary to make the United Nations a true

政治家和其他國家人民用何等樣的目光觀察這種衝突。

但是我們希望在國際的民主中，如同在國家的民主中一樣，經驗將證明：向聯絡人民的理智與信心呼籲，結果較之向分離人民的成見和感情呼籲更有效力。

在一個世界上，如果沒有被迫簽署或批准和平條約的主權國家，那末就沒有完善的產生和平的機構。在牽涉邊界，殖民地和賠償等問題的地方，和平條約無法生效，除非和平條約在各個主要列強對之，都認為滿意。

在這種環境之下，巴黎會議向各小國及前敵國提供機會，使他們對於所建議的條約實際上需要之規定，有發表意見的機會。

最使我不安的事情，並不是目下在討論中的文字上的規定，而是在吾人與蘇聯之間如果不是增加着的話，則是繼續不斷的緊張。在我就任國務卿的那天，我曾說：「全世界政治家最高的任務是幫助人民明瞭，他們祇須容忍並尊重他人的權利，就能得到和平與自由」，這是真實的。那時如此，現在亦然；就是美蘇之間同情諒解的發展是政治家的至上任務。欲使聯合國成為真正國際的社團，那末這種諒解是必要的。

community of nations.

From the Potsdam conference, which took place at the beginning of his administration, President Truman and I have worked, and we shall continue to work, to bring about an understanding with the Soviet Government. Two states can quickly reach an understanding if one is willing to yield to all demands. The United States is unwilling to do that. It is equally unwilling to ask it of another state. Every understanding requires the reconciliation of difference and not a yielding by one state to the arbitrary will of the other. Until we are able to work out definite and agreed standards of conduct, such as those which govern within the competence of the International Court of Justice, and such as those which, we hope, may be agreed upon for the control of atomic energy, international problems between sovereign states must be worked out by agreement between the sovereign states. But if states are to reach such agreements they must act in good faith and in the spirit of conciliation. They must not launch false and misleading propaganda against one another. They must not arbitrarily exercise their power of vote, preventing a return to conditions of peace and delaying economic reconstruction.

No state should assume that it has a monopoly of virtue or of wisdom. No state should ignore or veto the aggregate sentiments of mankind. States must not unilaterally, by threats, by pressure or by force, disturb the established rights of others. Nor can they arbitrarily resist or refuse to consider changes in the relationships between

在波茨坦會議中，杜魯門總統和我曾一起工作，我們並將繼續工作，以便促成對蘇聯政府的諒解。如果有一國願意遷就一切的要求，那末兩國就能迅速達成諒解。美國不願這樣做，也不願期望另一國這樣做。每一種諒解，必需要摒除異議，而不是一國屈服於他國的武斷的旨意。直至我們能擬定確切而經兩方同意的行為標準，例如國際法庭的資格，和原子能的管制，在這樣之前，各主權國家之間的國際問題，必須用協定來解決。但是如果該國會達成這樣的協定，他們必須要用信守和協調的精神來行動。他們不應彼此互相進行虛偽和引人誤解的宣傳戰。他們不能濫用否決權，阻止回復和平狀態和經濟重建。

沒有一個國家應該自以為美德和智慧是他的專利。沒有一個國家應該藐視或是否決人類所有一切的情感。任何國家都不應單方面地威迫或武力妨礙他人業已建立的權利。凡是正義，公正或是人類正當情感所需求的各

states and peoples which justice, fair play and the enlightened sentiments of mankind demand.

We must cooperate to build a world order, not to sanctify the status quo, but to preserve peace and freedom based upon justice. And we must be willing to cooperate with one another—vote or no vote—to defend, with force if necessary, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

Those are the policies we have pursued. In following those policies we have been criticized at times for being too “soft” and at times for being too “tough.” I dislike these words. Neither accurately describes our earnest efforts to be patient but firm. We have been criticized for being too eager to find new approaches after successive rebukes in our efforts to effectuate those policies. And we have likewise been criticized for not seeking new approaches. We will not permit the criticism to disturb us nor to influence our action.

We will continue to seek friendship with the Soviet Union and all other states on the basis of justice and the right of others, as well as ourselves, to opinions and ways of life which we do not and cannot share. But we must retain our perspective. We must guard against the belief that deep-rooted suspicions can be dispelled and far-reaching differences can be reconciled by any single act of faith.

The temple of peace must be built solidly, stone upon stone. If the stones are loosely laid, they may topple down upon us.

We must equally guard against the be-

國，與各民族間關係的更動，他們都不能予以抵抗或拒絕。

我們必須合作，建立一個世界和平秩序，不是承認現狀，而是根據正義維持和平與自由。不論有否決權還是沒有否決權，我們必須願意彼此合作。如果事實需要，我們應該用武力來維護聯合國憲章的目的。

這些都是我們所追隨的政策。在追隨此種政策的時候，我們時常受到外面的批評，有些人說我們「太軟」，也有人批評我們「太硬」。這兩種說法一個都不準確，我的努力是有耐心而且堅決。有人批評在我們執行政策一再受到譴責的時候，我們是過份希望覓取新的出路。而同樣有人批評我們不覓取新的出路。我們決不容許這些批評妨礙或是左右我們的行動。

在維護正義和尊重別人以及我們本身的見解和生活方式的原則下，我們將繼續追尋蘇聯和其他各國的友誼。但是我們必須維持我們本身的前途。有人以為根深蒂固的猜疑和廣泛的不同觀點，可以由單獨一種信心表現予以消弭，我們必須謹戒這種信念。

和平的廟宇必須用一塊一塊的石頭固地建造起來。假使石頭砌得不堅固，可能地壓在我們的身上。

有人以為我們遭遇挫折或延遲後

belief that delays or setbacks in achieving our objective make armed conflict inevitable. It is entirely possible that the failure or inability of the Soviet leaders to rid themselves of¹⁰ that belief lies at the very root of our difficulties. We will never be able to rid the world of that belief if we ourselves become victims to it.

For centuries devout men and women thought it was necessary to fight with one another to preserve their different religious beliefs. But through long and bitter experience they learned that the only way to protect their own religious beliefs is to respect and recognize the rights of others to their religious beliefs.

War is inevitable only if states fail to tolerate and respect the rights of other states to ways of life they cannot and do not share. That is a truth we must recognize.

Because in the immediate aftermath of war our efforts to induce nations to think in terms of peace and tolerance seem to meet with rebuff, we must not lose faith. What may be unrealizable now may be realizable when the wounds of war have had a chance to heal. We must not lose faith nor cease to struggle to realize our faith, because the temple of peace cannot be completely built in a month or a year. But if the temple of peace is to be built, the idea of the inevitability of conflict must not be allowed to dominate the minds of men and tear asunder a world which God made one. It is that idea of the inevitability of conflict that is throttling the economic recovery of Europe. It is that idea that is causing artificial ten-

，武力的衝突將無法避免，我們也必須謹戒這種信念。很可能的，我們困難的基本原因，也就是在於蘇聯領袖不能消除這種信念。假使我們受了這種觀念的毒害，我們是永遠不能把世人的這種信念，予以消除。

已經有幾百年了，熱心的男女以為他們應該為維持他們不同的宗教觀念去彼此鬥爭。但是經過久遠和痛苦的經驗之後，他們知道唯一維護他們本身宗教觀念的方法，是在於尊重和承認別人對他們的宗教觀念有一切權利。

除非各國不能容忍和尊重他們本身不願或事實上不能有的，其他各國生活方式的權利，戰爭才無法避免。這是我們所必須承認的真理。

在大戰剛剛過去的時期中，我們勸導各國保守和平與寬大的努力，似乎已經受到挫折，但是我們決不能因此而失去信念。現在所不能實現的，在戰爭創傷有機會恢復的時候，也許能予以實現。我們決不能失去信念，或終止奮鬥以求它能實現，因為和平的廟宇，決不能在一月或一年予以完成。但是假使我們要建立這和平廟宇，那末，戰爭無法避免的觀念，決不能存在人們的腦海中，把上帝所創造的一個整個的世界弄得四分五裂。目前阻止歐洲經濟復興的，就是因為這「戰爭無法避免」觀念存在的緣故。這種觀念，正在造成國與國之間和一國

sions between states and within states.

The United States stands for freedom for all nations and friendship among all nations. We shall continue to reject the idea of exclusive alliances. We shall refuse to gang up against any state.

But we stand with all peace-loving, law-abiding states in defense of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Any nation that abides by those principles can count upon the friendship and cooperation of the United States, irrespective of national difference or possible conflict of interests.

No country desires unity among the principal powers more than we or has done more to achieve it. But it must be unity founded on the Charter and not unity purchased at its expense.

We deplore the tendency upon the part of the Soviet Union to regard states which are friendly to us as unfriendly to the Soviet Union, and to consider as unfriendly our efforts to maintain traditionally friendly relations with states bordering on the Soviet Union.

We deplore the talk of the encirclement of the Soviet Union. We have it from no less authority than *Generalissimo Stalin*¹¹ himself that the Soviet Union is in no danger of encirclement.

During the war, the Baltic states were taken over by the USSR. The Polish frontier and the Finnish frontier have been substantially modified in Russia's favor. Koenigsberg, Bessarabia, Bukowina and Ruthenia are to be given to her. In the Pacific, the Kuriles, Port Arthur and Sak-

之內的緊張局勢。

美國所支持的，是各國的自由和友誼。排斥他國的聯盟觀念，我們決繼續予以拒絕。我們決拒絕從事對付任何一個國家的結合。

我們決與愛好和平與守法的國家共同保衛聯合國憲章的原則。

凡是遵守這些原則的國家，決可獲得美國的友誼和合作，國家的區別和利益的衝突均在所不顧。

我們對於促成大國團結的願望甚于任何國家。但是這種團結應該基於憲章，而不是損害憲章所換得的團結。

蘇聯有一種傾向，它認為對我們友好的國家，是對它不友善的國家，認為我們與那些和蘇聯接壤的國家維持傳統的友好關係是不友善的舉動，我們對這種態度至以為憾。

對於包圍蘇聯之說，我們也引以為憾。斯達林自己就曾對我們說過蘇聯並無被包圍之危險。

在戰時，波羅的海各國曾經蘇聯佔領。波蘭疆界和芬蘭疆界已在對蘇聯有利條件下變更。哥寧斯堡，白沙刺比亞，布柯溫拿及盧森尼亞均將割讓給它。在太平洋方面，千島羣島，

halin have been assigned to her. Certainly the Soviet Union is not a dispossessed nation.

We know the suffering and devastation which Nazi aggression brought to the Soviet Union. The American people came to the support of the Soviet Union even before the United States was attacked and entered the war. Our people were allies of the Soviet people during the war. And the American people in time of peace desire to live on terms of friendship, mutual helpfulness and equality with the Soviet people.

Before the Paris peace conference, the United States spared no effort to reconcile its views on the proposed peace treaties with those of the Soviet Union. Indeed, it was the Soviet Union which insisted that our views be reconciled on all questions which the Soviet Union regarded as fundamental before the Soviet Union would consent to the holding of the conference. If, therefore, in the conference we differed on some questions, they were not questions that were fundamental from the Soviet viewpoint.

While there were many issues which attracted little public attention on which the Soviet Union and the United States voted together, it was regrettable that on many issues which did command public attention the Soviet Union and the newly established governments in central and southeastern Europe voted consistently together against all the other states.

Whatever considerations caused this close alignment of the Soviet Union and her Slav neighbors on those issues, other states were not constrained to vote as they did by

旅順口和庫頁島都給與它。真的，蘇聯不能算是一個被剝奪的國家。

我們曉得納粹侵略給與蘇聯的痛苦和破壞。甚至在美國被襲和參戰以前，美國人民即支持蘇聯。我們和人民是戰時蘇聯人民的盟友。美國人和平時並願與蘇聯人民在友好，互助和平等的條件下相處。

巴黎和會之前，美國極不惜一切努力遷就蘇聯對於擬議中之和約的觀點。真的，蘇聯曾堅持我們對那些它認為重要的問題的觀點，應於蘇聯同意舉行和會前重新檢討。因此，如果我們在和會中發生意見不同的問題，那應該是蘇聯認為不大重要的問題。

對很多未引起世人若何注意的問題，蘇聯和美國曾一致投票贊同，然而至以為憾的是：關於很多引起世人注意的問題，蘇聯和中歐及東南歐新建立的政府却常常一致投票反對其他所有國家。

不論蘇聯和它的新拉夫鄰邦為什麼對這些問題有如是密切的結合，其他國家在投票時並不經常像它們那樣

any causes or bloc action. It requires a very imaginative geographic sense to put China, or Ethiopia into a Western bloc. And it was quite evident to discerning observers at Paris that not only China and Ethiopia but Norway and France were particularly solicitous to avoid not only the fact, but the suspicion, of alliance with any Western bloc. If the voting cleavage at Paris was significant, its significance lies in the fact that the cleavage is not between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between a Western bloc and the Soviet Union. The cleavage is based upon conviction and not upon strategy or hidden design.

I should be less than frank if I did not confess my bewilderment at the motives which the Soviet delegation attributed to the United States at Paris. Not once, but many times, they charged that the United States had enriched itself during the war, and, under the guise of freedom for commerce and equality of opportunity for the trade of all nations, was now seeking to enslave Europe economically.

Coming from any state, those charges would be regrettable to us. They are particularly regrettable when they are made by the Soviet Government to whom we advanced more than ten billion dollars of lend-lease during the war and with whom we want to be friendly in time of peace.

The United States has never claimed the right to dictate to other countries how they should manage their own trade and commerce. We have simply urged in the interest of all peoples that no country should make trade discriminations in its relations

採取一致或集團行動，若就地理上言，說中國和阿比西尼亞是西方集團裏的一員，就顯得毫無根據。而且顯而易見地，在巴黎的明察的觀察家都曉得非但中國及阿比西尼亞，就是挪威和希臘不但是力求避免被認為是西方集團的一員而且避免有這嫌疑。假如巴黎的投票裂痕有任何意義，其意義亦在於某種事實，即其裂痕並不在美蘇之間，或西方集團與蘇聯之間。裂痕係由信念之不同而起，非由於戰略或陰謀計劃而起。

我要說我對蘇聯代表團在巴黎應付美國的動議大感不解，否則我就不夠坦白。不僅一次地，它們曾聲訴說美國已在戰爭中自肥，而且現在還在機會均等和商業自由的藉口下，企圖在經濟上奴役歐洲。

無論這種聲訴出自那一國，我們都將引以為憾。尤其是出自蘇聯政府，對於它，戰時我們會協助以十億元以上的租借物資，而且在平時我們還願和它和好相處。

美國並未要求有權指揮他國應該如何處理其自身貿易和商業。我們僅為全民利益呼籲，說任何一國與他國

with other countries.

On that principle the United States stands. It does not question the right of any country to debate the economic advantages or disadvantages of that principle. It does object to any government charging that the United States enriched itself during the war and desires to make "hand-outs" to European governments in order to enslave their peoples.

Long before we entered the war, President Roosevelt took the dollar sign out of the war. He established lend-lease as the arsenal of democracy and opened that arsenal to all who fought for freedom. Europe did not pay and was not asked to pay to build or to replenish that arsenal. That was done with American labor and American resources. The lend-lease settlements inaugurated by President Roosevelt have been faithfully and meticulously carried out by President Truman.

We want to assist in European reconstruction because we believe that European prosperity will contribute to world prosperity and world peace. That is not dollar democracy. That is not imperialism. That is justice and fair play.

We in America have learned that prosperity, like freedom, must be shared, not on the basis of hand-outs, but on the basis of the fair and honest exchange of the products of the labor of free men and free women.

America stands for social and economic democracy at home and abroad. The principles embodied in the social and economic reforms of recent years are a part of the

建立關係時均不應帶有貿易歧視。

這個原則就是美國的立足點。對於這原則的經濟利益和害處的任何一國的爭辯權，美國決不過問。但是如果任何政府指斥美國，它正在戰爭中獲了利，並且企圖對歐洲各政府作命令式的要求，以便奴役他們的人民，那末美國便要反對了。

早在我們參加戰爭之前，羅斯福總統正是把戰爭贏利的目標從這次戰爭裏面消除了。他成立了租借案，作為民主的兵工廠，把這兵工廠開放給所有為自由而鬥爭的人們。對於建立或是充實這兵工廠，歐洲並沒有付出分文，而美國也沒有請他們付款。這兵工廠是用美國人力和資源建成的。關於羅斯福總統所發起的租借案一切協定，已由杜魯門總統忠實的和細心的予以執行。

我們要幫助歐洲的重建，因為我們相信歐洲的繁榮，將裨益世界繁榮和世界和平。這不是美元民主。這不是帝國主義。這是正義和公平的辦法。

我們堅持國的人已經學知繁榮是和自由一樣，決不能在命令式的原則下造成，而必須建立在自由男女汗血所造成的產品的公平交易的原則之上。

美國贊成國內和國外的社會與經濟民主。近年來美國的社會與經濟改革裏面所包括的原則，是美國傳統的

American heritage.

It would be strange, indeed, if in this imperfect world our social and economic democracy were perfect. But it might help our Soviet friends to understand us better if they realized that today our social and economic democracy is further away from the devil-take-the-hindmost philosophy of bygone days than Soviet Russia is from Czarist Russia.

Whatever political differences there may be among us, we are firmly and irrevocably committed to the principle that it is our right and the right of every people to organize their economic and political destiny through the freest possible expression of their collective will. We oppose privilege at home and abroad. We defend freedom everywhere. And in our view, human freedom and human progress are inseparable.

The American people extend the hand of friendship to the people of the Soviet Union and to all other people in this war-weary world. May God grant to all of us the wisdom to seek the paths of peace!

一部份。

如果在這個不完美的世界中，我們的社會和經濟民主是完美的，那真是一件奇怪的事。然而如果我們的盟友蘇聯曉得今日我們的社會和經濟民主，已距離昔日弱肉強食的哲學甚遠，較之今日蘇聯與帝俄時代，距離有過而無不及的話，這對蘇聯進一步了解我們顯有莫大助益。

無論我們之間有什麼政治上的異見，我們所深信的原則是：我們有借助儘可能自由表現的共同意志而決定其政治和經濟命運的權利，這也是每個民族權利。我們反對在國內和國外的特權。我們隨處聲援自由。我們並認爲人類自由和人類進化是不可分的。

美國人民謹向蘇聯及世界中所有苦於戰爭的其他國家人民伸出友誼的手。願上天以覓取平坦途的智慧賜與我們。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "Potsdam", 見「當代文獻」第三卷合訂本第302面至第330面。
2. "serves" 之主詞爲 gerundial phrase, "Leaving unsettled issues which should be settled."
3. "to have a free hand", 『隨意處理』, 『自由行動』。 An absolute monarch has a free hand in governing the people, 專制君主可自由治理其人民。
4. "to lay waste(=devastate)", 『蹂躪(他國土地)』。 By whom was our country laid waste, by whom were our young women and girls raped and by whom were our millions killed, 蹂躪我國土者其誰乎, 淫亂我少婦幼女者其誰乎, 殺害我千百萬同胞者其誰乎?
5. "under the yoke of", 『受壓迫』, 『受支配』。 The Formosan people are happier now than they were under the yoke of the Japanese, 目下台灣人民較過去在日人壓迫下爲快樂。
6. "Gestapo" 爲納粹秘密警察, 特務人員。
7. "on terms of", 『根據……條件(原則)』。 we agree to your proposal on terms of reciprocity, 吾人同意君互惠條件之建議。
8. "count for", 『有價值』, 『有效』。 Scholarship counts for nothing in these days, 當今學術不受人重視。
9. "The day" 之後 "when" 可省略。
10. "to rid oneself (or some one) of", 『除去』, 『免於』。 I want to rid myself of this trouble, 予欲免此困難。
11. 見「當代文獻」第五卷第三分冊『斯達林對倫敦星期泰晤士報記者書面問題之答覆』。

STALIN'S REPLIES TO A QUESTIONNAIRE BY PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED PRESS

Made on October 28, 1946, in an exclusive interview to Hugh Baillie, President of the U. P., by an exchange of message between London and Moscow, the 31 questions having been wired by the latter on October 21.

斯達林答覆合衆社長提出之詢問書 否認「蘇美關係緊張」

一九四六年十月二十八日電覆合衆社長貝利於同月二十一日由倫敦電達斯氏之該社特有通電訪問

Question 1: Do you agree with the opinion Secretary of State Byrnes expressed in his broadcast speech¹ of last Friday about the increased tension between the USSR and the United States?

Reply: No.

Question 2: If such an increasing tension exists, could you indicate the reason or reasons for it, and what are the main means for eliminating it?

Reply: This question does not apply in view of my answer to the preceding question.

Question 3: Do you consider that the present negotiations will lead to the conclusion of peace treaties which will establish amicable relations between the peoples who were allied in the war against Fascism, and will they remove the dangers of an outbreak of war on the part of the former Axis countries?

Reply: I hope so.

Question 4: What, in the contrary case, are the fundamental obstacles to the establishment of such amicable mutual rela-

問題一：美國務卿貝爾納斯上週五廣播演說，對於蘇聯兩國關係益趨緊張所表示之意見，閣下亦以爲然乎？

答：否。

問題二：如果有此益趨緊張之情形在，閣下能說明其原因，及消除此情形之主要方法乎？

答：前一問題，已有答覆，此一問題，並不成立。

問題三：閣下認爲現行談判，將使和約訂定，從而建立對抗法西斯主義戰爭中各盟國人民間之和睦關係，並將消弭前軸心各國再度發動戰爭之危險乎？

答：余希望如此。

問題四：如果不然，則在大戰各盟國間建立此和睦關係之根本障礙何

tions between the nations which were allies in the Great War?

Reply: This question does not apply in view of the answer to the preceding question.

Question 5: What is Russia's reaction to Yugoslavia's threat to refuse to sign a peace treaty with Italy?

Reply: Yugoslavia has *grounds*² to be dissatisfied.

Question 6: What in your opinion is at present the most serious threat to peace in the whole world?

Reply: The incendiaries of a new war, foremost among them being Churchill and those who think like him in Great Britain and the United States, constitute the worst threat to peace.

Question 7: Should such a threat arrive, what steps should be taken by the peoples of the world in order to avoid a new war?

Reply: It is necessary to unmask and bridle the incendiaries of a new war.

Question 8: Is the United Nations organization a guarantee of the intactness of small nations?

Reply: So far it is difficult to say.

Question 9: Do you think that the four zones of occupation in Germany should in the near future be thrown together insofar as economic administration is concerned, with a view to restoring Germany as a peaceful economic unit and thus lessening the burden of occupation to the four powers?

Reply: It is necessary to reestablish not only the economic but also the political unity of Germany.

Question 10: Do you feel that, as has been suggested in some quarters the level of

在?

答：前一問題，已有答覆，此一問題，並不成立。

問題五：南斯拉夫以拒不對義大利簽訂和約相脅，蘇聯之反響如何？

答：南斯拉夫有其不滿之理由。

問題六：閣下認為目前全世界和平之最嚴重威脅為何？

答：新戰爭之煽動者，以邱吉爾及英美兩國與邱氏思想相似之人為最，實為世界和平之最嚴重威脅。

問題七：如果有此威脅，世界人民應取何種步驟，以避免新戰爭？

答：必須揭破新戰爭煽動者之假面具而約束之。

問題八：聯合國機構為各小國家完整之保證乎？

答：迄今難以斷言。

問題九：閣下以為德境四個佔領區在經濟管理方面，應於不久將來結合一體，俾恢復德國為一個和平的經濟單位，減輕四國之佔領重負乎？

答：不僅經濟方面，且在政治方面，均須重行樹立德國之統一。

問題十：若干方面曾建議將原已容許德國保留之工業水準，予以提高

permitted industry should be raised above the agreed level, to permit Germany to pay her own way more fully?

Reply: Yes, I do.

Question 11: What should be done beyond the present four-power programme to prevent Germany from again becoming a world military menace?

Reply: It is necessary to extirpate in practice the remnants of Fascism in Germany and to democratize her most thoroughly.

Question 12: Do you feel it feasible at this time to create some sort of general administration to be placed in the hands of the Germans themselves, but under Allied control, which will make it possible for the Council of Foreign Ministers to draft a peace treaty for Germany?

Reply: Yes, I think so.

Question 13: Do you feel confident, in the light of the elections which have been held in the various zones this summer and autumn that Germany is developing politically along democratic lines which give hope for its future as a peaceful nation?

Reply: I am not sure of it, for the time being.

Question 14: Should the German people be allowed to reconstruct their industry and trade, and become self-supporting?

Reply: Yes, they should.

Question 15: Have the provisions of Potsdam, in your opinion, been adhered to? If not, what is needed to make the Potsdam declaration effective?

Reply: They are not always adhered to, especially in the field of the democratiza-

• 以使德國更能自足，閣下以爲如何？

答：然，余以爲如此。

問題十一：防制德國重新成爲世界和平之威脅，在目下四強計劃之外，更應有何舉動？

答：必須在實際上根絕德國法西斯主義之殘餘，并使之澈底民主化。

問題十二：創立某種由德國人自行管理之一般行政機構，而由同盟國加以控制，以便利外長會議草擬對德之和約，閣下以爲此項計劃目下是否可行？

答：然，余以爲如此。

問題十三：由今夏今秋在若干區域舉行之選舉看來，閣下是否相信，德國在政治上正沿民主的道路發展，有在將來成爲和平國家之希望？

答：在目前，余尙不能確信。

問題十四：德國人應否被允許重建其工商業而獲自給自足？

答：然。

問題十五：在閣下看來，波茨坦協定之條文，是否已被切實遵行？如若不然，欲使波茨坦協定有效實施，必需有何舉措？

答：波茨坦協定之條文并不常被切實遵守，尤以德國民主化一事爲最

tion of Germany.

Question 16: Do you feel that veto power had been used to excess during discussions among the Big Four Foreign Ministers and in the meetings of the United Nations Council?

Reply: No, I do not.

Question 17: Does the Kremlin⁸ feel that the Allied powers should go on hunting down and trying minor war criminals in Germany? Does it feel that the Nuremberg decisions created a sufficiently strong basis for such action?

Reply: The farther they will go, the better.

Question 18: Does Russia consider the western frontiers of Poland permanent?

Reply: Yes, it does.

Question 19: How does the USSR regard the presence of British troops in Greece? Does it feel that Britain should supply more arms to the present Greek government?

Reply: An answer to this is unnecessary.

Question 20: What is the extent of the Russian military contingents in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Austria, and how long do you feel that in the interests of securing the peace these contingents must be maintained?

Reply: In the West, that is, in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland, the Soviet Union has at present 60 divisions (infantry and tank forces together) the majority of them not in full strength. There are no Soviet troops in Yugoslavia. In two months' time, when the decree of the

問題十六：閣下是否以為在四強外長會議及聯合國理事會中，否決權會曾被過分使用？

答：否。

問題十七：克里姆宮方面是否以為同盟國必需繼續搜索并審理德國之次要戰犯，是否以為紐倫堡之決定已為此項行動奠定夠結實之基礎？

答：審訊戰犯，愈多愈好。

問題十八：蘇聯是否認波蘭之西方國界是永久的？

答：然。

問題十九：對於英國軍隊之在希臘，蘇聯以為如何？是否以為英國應以更多軍火供給現在之希臘政府？

答：對此問題的答復，是不必要的。

問題二十：駐在波蘭、匈牙利、保加利亞、南斯拉夫、奧地利之蘇聯派遣軍共有若干？為保證和平，閣下以為此項軍隊應維持多久？

答：在西方，即在德、奧、匈、保及波蘭，目下共有蘇聯駐軍六十師，（包括步兵及機械化部隊）其中大部份且并不足額。在南斯拉夫并無蘇聯駐軍。在二個月之時間內，當本年十月二十二日最高蘇維埃主席團關於

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of October 22 of this year concerning the last demobilization classes will be implemented, 40 Soviet divisions will remain in the said countries.

Question 21: What is the attitude of the government of the USSR toward the presence of American warships in the Mediterranean?

Reply: Indifference.

Question 22: What is the present outlook for a commercial agreement between Russia and Norway?

Reply: Difficult to say, for the time being.

Question 23: Is it possible for Finland again to become a self-sufficient nation after reparations have been paid, and is there any idea in contemplation of revising the reparations programme so as to expedite Finland's recovery?

Reply: The question is wrongly put. Finland was and remains a fully self-sufficient nation.

Question 24: What will trade agreements with Sweden and other countries mean with regard to reconstruction in the USSR? What outside aid do you consider desirable for the accomplishment of this great task?

Reply: The agreement with Sweden constitutes a contribution to the cause of economic cooperation between nations.

Question 25: Is Russia still interested in obtaining a loan from the United States?

Reply: She is interested.

Question 26: Has Russia yet developed her own atom bomb or any other similar weapon?

最後一批復員者之命令被執行完成時，繼續留駐於上述國家內之蘇軍，將減少為四十師。

問題二十一：關於美國軍艦之出現於地中海上，蘇聯政府之態度如何？

答：無關重要。

問題二十二：目下蘇聯與挪威間商業協定之展望如何？

答：在目下尚難說。

問題二十三：當賠贖付出後，芬蘭是否能重新成為自給自足之國家？或者，目下蘇聯有無考慮修改賠贖計劃之意向，以求加速芬蘭之復原？

答：此一問題錯了，芬蘭過去是個完全自給自足之國家，現在依然完全自給自足。

問題二十四：與瑞典以及其他國家訂定商業協定，對蘇聯之重建將有何種意義？為完或此一鉅大工作，閣下以為必需何種外來援助？

答：與瑞典訂立商業協定，係對國家間經濟合作完成一大貢獻。

問題二十五：蘇聯是否依然有意於自美國獲得借款？

答：然。

問題二十六：蘇聯已否完成其原子炸彈或其他類似之武器？

Reply: No.

Question 27: What is your opinion of the atom bomb or a similar weapon as an instrument of warfare?

Reply: I already gave my evaluation of this atom bomb in a known answer to Mr. Werth.⁴

Question 28: How in your opinion can atomic power be controlled? Should this control be created on all international basis, and to what extent should the powers sacrifice their sovereignty in the interests of making the control effective?

Reply: A strong international control is needed.

Question 29: How long will it require to rebuild the devastated areas of Western Russia?

Reply: Six or seven years, if not more.

Question 30: Will Russia permit commercial airlines to operate across the Soviet Union? Does Russia intend to extend her own airlines to other continents on a reciprocal basis?

Reply: Under certain conditions this is not excluded.

Question 31: How does your government view the occupation of Japan? Do you feel it has been a success on the present basis?

Reply: There are successes, but it would be possible to attain better successes.

答：否。

問題二十七：對於以原子彈或其他類似武器作為戰爭工具，閣下有何意見？

答：余早已於答覆華斯先生之詢問中，說明余對原子彈之估價。

問題二十八：閣下對於原子能控制之意見如何？此項控制是否應建立於國際基礎之上，為使控制有效，列強主權之犧牲應至何種程度？

答：強有力之國際控制係屬必需。

問題二十九：西部蘇聯之被戰火毀破之地區，其重建需時多久？

答：至少六七年。

問題三十：蘇聯能否允許商業航空線通過蘇聯？蘇聯是否有意基於互惠之基礎，擴展其航空線至其他大陸？

答：在某種條件下，對此並不拒絕。

問題三十一：貴國政府對佔領日本一事之看法如何？對於目前之事實，閣下是否認為成功？

答：可算成功，然仍可獲致更進一步之成功。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

2. "his broadcast speech" 即前篇貝爾納斯廣播詞。 s. "grounds", 『理由』。 There are no grounds for thinking so. 無理由作如是想法。 3. "the Kremlin", 『克姆林』宮，昔為沙皇皇宮，今為蘇維埃最高政府辦公處。 4. "Mr. Alex Werth" 為倫敦星期泰晤士報訪員前會訪斯氏，見『當代文獻』第五卷第三分冊。

CHURCHILL'S REPLY TO STALIN

A statement issued on October 29, 1946, from his country home at Westerham, Kent, re Stalin's statement to president of the UP the day before, saying "The incendiaries of a new war, foremost among them being Churchill and those who think like him in Great Britain and the United States," constitute the worst threat to peace. (Note).

邱吉爾答覆斯達林之書面聲明

一九四六年十月二十九日在其鄉村別墅發表針對斯氏二十八日答合衆社長謂「新戰爭之煽動者，以邱吉爾及英美兩國與邱氏思想相似人之人爲最，實爲世界和平之最嚴重威脅。」（註）

I have regard and respect for Premier Stalin and always remember all we went through together. I also wish to see the Russian people, who fought so bravely for their native land, safe, glorious and happy. It was always my desire that when the war was won the Soviet Government should play one of the leading parts in the rebuilding of the old shattered world.

By the Anglo-Russian treaty made when I was Prime Minister in 1941 we are bound not to interfere in each other's internal affairs or system of society. Therefore, I do not see why we cannot all be friends and help each other and thus advance the whole basic standard of livelihood of the broad masses of people in every land.

I am glad to see Premier Stalin's statement about Russian forces in occupied territories, but even 60 divisions on a war footing would, of course, greatly exceed the British and American forces in enemy occupied territory in Europe.

I asked His Majesty's Government whether my estimate of 200 divisions applied to

余對斯達林元帥頗爲尊重，且常回憶過去吾人合作時之一切。余並願見曾爲祖國非常勇敢地作戰之蘇聯人民安全，光榮與快愉。余始終願望在戰爭勝利後，蘇聯政府能在重建殘破之舊日世界中佔領導之一席。

根據在一九四一年當余爲首相時所訂立之英蘇條約，吾人互約不得干預彼此之內政及社會制度。因此余不解何以吾人不能成爲友人及互相幫助從而提高每一國家廣大民衆之生活標準。

余獲閱斯達林元帥關於在佔領各國蘇軍之公告至爲欣喜，惟即使戰時編制之六十師亦當然遠超英美在歐州敵國佔領區之軍隊數字。

余曾詢諸英皇陛下政府關於余估計二百師蘇軍駐於西歐是否言過其實

the West was excessive, and I asked the question in such a form that it could be answered by 'Yes' or 'No.'

Considering the difference between 200 divisions and 60 divisions it ought to have been possible, if I was in error, for a contradiction to have been given. None was forthcoming. On the contrary, statements of the Prime Minister and Minister of State showed only anxiety at the strength of the Soviet mobilized forces.

No one would have been more pleased than I to be told that I was misinformed. No one will be more pleased if this proves to be the case. It is clearly most important that the facts should be made known. It is difficult to believe that Allies occupying enemy territory recently gained with their blood should not know about the strength of each other's garrisons.

Now one would have thought they would have interchanged and shared this information between themselves as a matter of course, and that there would be reciprocal inspection of forces mobilized in their respective zones.

We hear a great deal about suspicions. Nothing sweeps away suspicions like facts, and I consider it my duty to continue to press for facts. I should add that my information, which of course is not official information, contemplated a strength of 100,000 men per Soviet division. However, during the last war American and British divisions sometimes ran as high as 40,000 and 50,000 men, and 30,000 would be a fairly good average figure, including of course auxiliary services corps, troops, and lines of com-

，而余之問題所提方式使其能用「是」或「否」答覆。

鑒於二百師與六十師間之差異，如果余之估計係錯誤者，則必有提出反證。但並未有人提出反證，相反地，首相及國務大臣之文告僅對蘇聯武裝部隊之實力表示焦慮。

如有人告余余之聽聞係錯誤時則余將較任何人為喜悅。無人將比余喜慰如能證明余係聽聞失實。顯而易見，將事實公諸於世實為重要。難於令人置信者，盟國佔領不久以前彼等流血而獲得之敵國領土竟不知彼此駐軍之實力。

任何人均將認為彼等當然應互換情報，並互相視察在各該佔領區內之武裝部隊。

吾人所聞猜忌之言甚多。掃除猜忌之最有力者莫過於事實，因而余認為繼續追求事實為余之責任。余應再告者，余之情報，當然非官方情報，揭示每一蘇聯師團包括十萬人。然在上次戰爭美英師團曾包含多至四萬及五萬人，最恰當之平均數字為三萬人，當然包括輔助部隊及交通人士在內。

munication.

≡ It is not possible to judge the strength of an army unless not only the number of organized divisions is known but also and at the same time the total division strength. It seems to me that the clearing up of this matter would be highly beneficial from every point of view, and surely the present meetings of the UNO and Security Council should be the occasion for the fullest and fairest disclosure of all military forces that may cause concern to any of those who fought and won.

在未悉其師團數字以及其每師人數以前，實無法評定一國軍隊之實力。以余觀之使此問題明朗化，不論從任何觀點而言，均將非常有利，目前聯合國大會及安全理事會正在舉行之會議自為引起各戰勝國關切之軍隊員額一點澈底地並忠實地揭佈之時機。

NOTE

見前篇斯氏答合衆社長之第六題。

STALIN'S REPLIES TO QUESTIONS BY THE LATE PRES. ROOSEVELT'S SON ELLIOT ROOSEVELT

Made in the latter's interview with the Generalissimo on December 21, 1946

斯達林答羅故總統子愛里奧·羅斯福問

一九四六年十二月二十一日愛里奧·羅斯福於訪問斯達林元帥時談話

Question 1: Do you believe it is possible for a democracy such as the United States to live side by side in this world with a communistic form of government like the Soviet Union's and with no attempt upon the part of either to interfere with the internal political affairs of the other?

Answer: Yes, of course. This is not only possible. It is wise and entirely within the bounds of realization. In the most strenuous times during the war differences in government did not prevent our two nations from joining together and vanquishing our foes. Even more so is it possible to continue this relationship in time of peace.

Question 2. Do you believe that the success of the United Nations depends upon agreement as to fundamental policies and aims between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States?

Answer: Yes, I think so. In many respects the fate of the United Nations as an organization depends upon a state of harmony being reached by these three powers.

Question 3. Do you believe, Generalissimo, that an important step toward world peace would be the attainment of an economic

問：您相信，像美國這樣的一種民主政體和像蘇聯這樣的一種共產主義政體，共處在這個世界中而任何一方都並不企圖干涉另一方的國內政治事務，這是可能的嗎？

答：是的，當然相信。這不但是可能。而且這是賢明的，是完全在現實的範圍以內的。在最奮發緊張的戰爭時期，政體方面的差異，並不會阻撓我們兩國聯合在一塊以消滅我們的敵人。在和平時代，繼續這種關係，就更加可能的了。

問：您相信聯合國的成就是要看蘇英美之間對於基本的政策與目標方面的協議而定的嗎？

答：是的，我想是這樣。在許多方面，作為一種機構的聯合國的命運，都要看這三個強國所達成的和諧融洽的情形而定。

問：大元帥，您相信我們兩國之間，為了製成品與原料的交換而達成

agreement of broader scope for the interchange of manufactured and raw materials between our two countries?

Answer: Yes, I believe that it would be important for the establishment of world peace. Of course I agree. Expansion of world trade would benefit in many respects the development of good relations between our two countries.

Question 4: Is the Soviet Union in favor of the immediate creation by the United Nations Security Council of an international police force composed of all United Nations which would step in immediately wherever armed warfare threatens peace?

Answer: Of course.

Question 5: If you believe that the atomic bomb should be controlled by the United Nations, should not they, through inspection, control all research and manufacturing facilities for armaments of any nature and the peace-time use and development of atomic energy?

(At this point Elliot Roosevelt parenthetically says, "Stalin shot back a quick question: 'In general?' I said, 'Yes, but especially as to the agreement in principle by Russia to such a plan.'")

Answer: Of course. Upon the principle of equality no exception should be made in the case of Russia. Russia should be subject to the same rules of inspection and control as any other nation must.

(Here Roosevelt says in parenthesis, "There was no hesitancy in his answer, and no question of reserving the right of veto was even mentioned.")

Question 6: Do you think it would serve a useful purpose if another Big Three

的一種範圍更加廣大的經濟協定，會成爲走向世界和平的一個重要步驟嗎？

答：是的，我相信這對於確立世界和平是具有重要性的。我當然贊同。世界貿易的擴張在許多方面都會對於我們兩國之間的良好關係的發展有所裨益。

問：蘇聯贊成聯合國安全理事會立刻成立一種由聯合國全體會員國組成的國際警察，以便隨時能立刻開進有武裝戰事使和平受到威脅的任何地方去嗎？

答：當然贊成。

問：如果您相信原子彈應由聯合國管制，那末聯合國是否應該經由監督的方式來管制任何性質的軍備的一切研究和製造，並且管制和平時期原子能的運用與發展呢？

【說到這裏，愛里奧·羅斯福插了一節：『史大林反問了一個機敏的問題：「就一般而言嗎？」我說：「是的，不過，特別是就俄羅斯在原則上對這一種計劃的協議而言。」】

答：當然相信。根據平等的原則，不應該爲了俄羅斯而作出例外來。俄羅斯理應遵守與任何其他國家必須遵守的同樣的監督與管制的規則。

【小羅斯福在這兒又插了一節：『他的回答毫不遲疑，而且關於保留否決權的問題連提都沒有提起。』】

問：您想，如果舉行另一次三強會議，以討論目前使世界和平感受威

meeting were held for discussion of all international problems presently threatening peace in the world?

Answer: I think there should be not one meeting but several of them. If there were several, they would serve a very useful purpose.

(Here Roosevelt noted in parenthesis, "At this point my wife asked whether he thought that such meetings would help toward achieving closer relations upon lower levels among officials of the respective governments. She also asked whether such a result was achieved by wartime conferences. His answer came with a smile in her direction: "There is no question of that. Wartime meetings and results achieved greatly helped cooperation at lower levels.")

Question 7: Sir, I know that you are a student of many other political and social problems existing in other countries. And so I should like to ask whether you feel that the elections in the United States last November indicate a swing away, on the part of the people, from belief in the policies of Roosevelt and toward the isolationist policies of his political adversaries?

Answer: I am not so well acquainted with the internal life of the people of the United States, but I would think that the elections indicated that the present government was wasting the moral and political capital created by *the late president*² and thus facilitated the victory of the Republicans.

(At this point Roosevelt parenthetically said, "In answering my next question the Generalissimo became very emphatic.")

脅的一切國際問題，這對於一種有益的目標會有貢獻嗎？

答：我想，應該不是有一次會議而是要有幾次會議。如果有好幾次會議就會對於一種有益的目標有所貢獻了。

【在這裏，小羅斯福插了一節：『說到這裏，我的妻問他以為這樣會議對於各該政府官員之間在較低的水準上達成較為親密的關係，是否會有幫助。她又問戰時的會議是否已達成過這樣的結果。他向她微笑着回答說：「那是沒有問題的。戰時的會議以及已達成的結果，對於在較低的水準上實行合作會大有幫助。」』】

問：先生，我知道，您是對其他各國中所存在着的其他許多政治問題與社會問題研究有素的學者。所以我要請問：您是否覺得十一月間美國的選舉指示出人民方面已對於故羅斯福的政策信仰發出動搖，而傾向於故羅斯福的政敵們的孤立政策了嗎？

答：我不怎麼熟悉美國人民的國內生活，不過，我想，那次選舉是指示出美國現政府在浪費故總統所創造的道義上與政治上的資本，因而使共和黨人輕而易舉的博得了勝利。

【在這裏，小羅斯福插了一節：『大元帥回答我的下一問題時的語氣十分加重了。』】

Question 8: To what do you ascribe the lessening of friendly relations and understanding between our two countries since the death of Roosevelt?

Answer: I feel that if this question relates to the relations and understanding between the American and Russian peoples, no deterioration had taken place but, on the contrary, relations improved. As to relations between the two governments, there have been misunderstandings. A certain deterioration had taken place and then a great noise was raised that their relations would even deteriorate still further. But I see nothing frightful about this in the sense of a violation of the peace or military conflict. Not a single great power, even if its government was anxious to do so, could presently raise a large army to fight another Allied power, another great power, because at present one cannot possibly fight without one's people—and the people are unwilling to fight. They are tired of war. Besides, there are no understandable objectives to justify a new war. One will not know for what he has to fight, and therefore I see nothing frightful in that some representatives of the United States government are talking about the deterioration of relations between us. In view of all these considerations, I think the danger of a new war unreal.

Question 9: Do you favor a broad exchange of cultural and scientific information between our two nations? Also, do you favor the exchange of students, artists, scientists, professors?

Answer: Of course.

Question 10: Should the United States and the Soviet Union form a common long-

問：自從羅斯福逝世以來，我們兩國之間的好友關係與了解程度的減低，您認為應歸罪於什麼？

答：我覺得，這個問題如果是指美蘇兩國人民之間的關係與了解而言，那就並沒有發生什麼惡化的情形，而且正相反，關係是增進了。至於兩國政府之間的關係，是有過誤解的。曾經發生過某種惡化的情形，後來更發出許多叫囂，說這種關係還要更加惡化下去。但是，就破壞和平或軍事衝突的意味說，我看不出這一方面有什麼可怕的地方。沒有一個強大的國家，能在目前驅使大軍去攻打別一個同盟強國，別一個大國，即使她的政府要想這麼幹的話，也是做不到的，因為目前一個國家如果沒有人民參加就不可能打仗——而人民却都是不願意打的，他們都厭倦戰爭。而且，也沒有可使大家理解的目標來替新戰爭辯護。人們將不知道為什麼要打仗，因此，關於美國政府某些代表談論我們之間的關係惡化一節，我看不出有什麼可怕的地方。由於這種種的考慮，所以我認為新戰爭的危險是不存在的。

問：您贊成我們兩國之間廣泛交換文化與科學的知識嗎？而且您也贊成交換學生，藝術家，科學家和教授嗎？

答：當然贊成。

問：美蘇應該制定一種長期的協

term policy of aid to the peoples of the Far East?

Answer: I feel it will be useful if it is possible. In any case, our government is ready to pursue a common policy with the United States in Far Eastern questions.

Question 11: If a system of loans and credits is arranged between the United States and the Soviet Union, would such agreements be of lasting benefit to United States economy?

Answer: A system of such credits is of course mutually advantageous both to the United States and the Soviet Union.

(Here Roosevelt said in parenthesis, "Then I asked a question that is creating obvious concern in many countries of Europe.")

Question 12: Does the failure in the American and British zones of occupied Germany to carry out denazification give serious cause for alarm to the Soviet government?

Answer: No, it has not been the cause for serious alarm, but of course it is unpleasant for the Soviet Union that this part of our common program is not being put into effect.

助遠東各民族的共同政策嗎？

答：我覺得，如果可能，這是有用的。無論如何，我們政府是準備在遠東問題方面奉行與美國共同的政策。

問：如果美蘇之間商定一種借款與信用放款的制度，這類的協定會對美國經濟永久有利嗎？

答：這類信用放款的制度，當然對美蘇兩國雙方都是有利的。

【在這裏，小羅斯福插了一節：『於是我提出了一個顯然是與歐洲許多國家有關的問題。』】

問：德境美英佔領區沒有貫徹肅清納粹的工作，這一點使蘇聯政府有重大理由表示驚惶嗎？

答：不，這並不是表示重大驚惶的理由，不過，我們共同綱領的這一部份沒有予以貫徹，蘇聯當然是不快意的。

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "is" 調在 主詞 "it" 之前是因為副詞 "so" 的關係，其他副詞如 "never", "nor" 等等，如置於句首皆將動詞或助動詞調置於主詞前。 2. 指老羅斯福。 "the late", 「已故」。

中國文化服務社

最新書



大學文庫

中國親屬法原理

· 吳岐著 ·

本書係作者歷年在中山大學、武漢大學教授民法親屬篇的講義，屢經整訂而成。著者先就中華民族受宗法社會影響的親屬生活，窮究其發展演變之原委，以明其根本觀念之所在。再對現行法，推溯歐美先進國立法例之沿革，以明其立法指導原理之為何。然後於根本觀念與指導原理之間，研求可能統合兩者之最高觀念。取材旁徵博引，行文深入淺出，研讀法律者，此書不可或缺。

定價八元三角

現代銀行原理

· 王傳曾著 ·

本書係作者歷年在湖南大學、復旦大學教授貨幣銀行學的講義，屢經增修而成。採用分編體裁，將貨幣銀行，分別評述，各成一編。對於銀行的性質、業務、經營組織，多用歷史的眼光，作系統的論述。關於近代演變的趨勢，如其組織的集中化，業務的專門化及經營的社會化，尤為深加注意，均經詳細說明。於說明原理時，并就中英美德法等國銀行，舉示實例。作為大學課本，洵屬相宜。

定價七元八角

英漢對照

英文報紙讀法

· 編履端施 白慕李 ·

本社為引起閱覽英文報紙興趣，鼓勵研究實用英文起見，編「英文報紙讀法」一書，其中選有最近英文長短報章共一百三十五篇，分軍事、政治、外交、經濟、工商、教育、文化、社會、交通、運輸、國際和平安全等項，英漢對照，俾讀者對直接閱讀英文報紙得有門徑。本書所有英文單字及短句，均切實用（附有注解），故讀者有此一書，既可訓練閱讀報紙能力，又可增加實用字彙，外又附世界各通訊社及英美各著名報紙內容之詳細介紹及新聞略語，使讀者於澈底瞭解英文報紙得有所指。

定價六元七角

商業英語會話

· 編履端施 ·

本書係根據教授之中國商業與經濟新環境編者而成，全書分三篇，英漢對照，便於了解。第一篇為個人及商業方面實用之會話三十課，材料新穎，適合需要。第二篇為商業及經濟方面常用之單字。第三篇為商業上常用縮寫，皆係依字母次序編列，便於檢查。可作教本用，可作自修用。

定價三元六角

當代文獻

合訂本內容摘要

第一卷合訂本

定價十五元

本合訂本包括第二次世界大戰初期及第二次戰場開闢以後有關我國與各國及國際間之重要文件。
1 我政府對軸心國宣戰布告。2 羅斯福、邱吉爾、赫爾、斯達林、希特勒重要演詞。3 大西洋憲章、蘇美軍事商洽、羅邱會談、英蘇同盟條約、北非登岸、第二戰場開闢、卡港會議聯合公報、珍珠港被襲報告等國際性要件。4 中美租借協定、英美放棄治外法權、中美新約。5 關於印度問題要件。

第二卷合訂本

定價十二元四角

本合訂本包括第二次世界大戰歐洲戰爭結束前後有關戰後中國與其他列強關係及國際合作之重要文獻。
1 莫斯科、開羅、德黑蘭等會議聲明書。2 太平洋戰事之末期軍事觀察。3 關於聯合國安全機構及戰後之國際間經濟、金融、善後救濟之文件。4 我國對美及對國際方面之政治、經濟、商業關係。5 盟軍攻歐登陸始末。

第三卷合訂本

定價十四元

本合訂本內有盟軍對歐勝利以至日本投降前之重要文獻。
1 德國投降、歐洲善後各種文獻。2 迫使日本投降文件。3 克利米亞、波茨坦等會議公報。4 關於舊金山聯合國機構之重要演詞。5 聯合國憲章、世界法院組織法。6 美國動員局局長關於美國對日作戰之軍事、經濟、復員詳細報告書。

第四卷合訂本

定價十元九角

本合訂本包含日本投降以後中、美、英、蘇對國際問題之立場有關之文獻。
1 日本投降及中、美對日政策。2 外長會議中之各國立場。3 美、英、蘇之外交政策。4 中蘇友好條約及有關處理東北日產重要文件。5 關於中美關係之文件。6 外長會議公報、原子能會談公報。7 邱吉爾與斯達林間接舌戰。

