

Dr. Varona will be given the opportunity to select between the two lists and the
 delegate and Minister of State will be offered to Dr. Varona and to Dr. Varona.
 Dr. Kiro has also informed Mr. Carr that the positions of Minister of
 State and
 Government activity prior to the actual setting up of the Provisional Government
 probably be a great deal of planning to be done in the various fields of
 If this is true, the reasoning behind it is not too clear as yet. There will
 the Provisional Government in a position to establish itself on Cuban soil.
 appointment of these Council Members and they will assume no functions until
 Dr. Kiro has informed Mr. Carr that there will be no announcement of the

- Dr. Manuel Antonio "Tony" Varona
- Dr. Carlos Maria
- Dr. Juan Castillo
- Dr. A. Garcia Neco
- Ing. Manuel Ray (or Dr. Felipe Pardo)
- Dr. Manuel Artime

Council are the following:
 in the underground. The six persons whom Dr. Kiro plans to invite into his
 men and women who are now in Cuba carrying on the revolution in the hills and
 most of these - if invited to their original aims - will be selected from
 all and only be considered eligible - namely, to twenty three persons.
 to select only six members of his Council when, after the fall of Castro,
 other members of his Council. As of this time, Dr. Kiro apparently intends
 Mr. Carr has been in close contact with Dr. Kiro concerning the selection of
 Dr. Kiro and Mr. Carr returned, separately, to Miami. Since their return
 Dr. Kiro works to the position of chairman of the Revolutionary Council,
 following the official announcement in New York of the election of

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other post will automatically go to Mr. Horta. Dr. Miro said he personally would prefer Mr. Horta for the post of Minister of Defense but indicated the post may very well go to Mr. Varas. Our suggestion - transmitted through Mr. Carr - that Dr. Artibe might be an excellent choice for the position of Minister of Defense in view of his popularity with the men in the camps, his youth, his ability to work in with the Strike Force on D-Day as a representative of the Council - was flatly turned down by Dr. Miro who said the position is an important one and must be filled by a man of experience and maturity. He said that Mr. Artibe has considerable promise but he is not ready, as yet, to assume a position of such responsibility.

4. Dr. Miro made it very plain to Mr. Carr that he wished to cooperate as fully as he can with us but that he will accept no dictation from us and will resign his position if there is any attempt to force decisions on him which he cannot conscientiously go along with. At the same time he assured Mr. Carr that he does not intend, in any way, to interfere with the military aspects of the project. However, he says it is vital that he be able to confer as soon as possible with a person on "the highest level" to discuss the military question and the appointment of a "Jefe de operaciones."

5. VISIT TO CAMP. Dr. Miro informed Mr. Carr that he would like to visit the Camp accompanied by all six members of the Council and by an aide. If this is not acceptable he will take only his aide. He will not, as we had suggested, take Mr. Artibe along with him except as a member of his six-man council. When it was pointed out to him that Mr. Artibe's great popularity with the troops might be an important factor in influencing the troops to support the Revolutionary Council, Dr. Miro's response was: "If the Council as constituted by me and under my leadership can't stand on its own merits, we'd better find that out right now". (In a conversation on the evening of 24 March 1961 (after our discussion with Mr. Carr) Mr. Horta informed Mr. Urelier that Dr. Miro had told him that he

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would like to take Mr. Miró and ~~Hamilton~~ ^{1/17-52/11} ~~Reformer~~, a Cuban man who had escaped from La Cabaña a few months ago, with him to the Camp. We have not received any confirmation of this from Mr. Carr as of this writing.)

6. VIO ANCHAMIZO A. DELUCIONARIO (Cuban white paper). Dr. Miró informed Mr. Carr that he had charged Judge Antonio Silla with the writing of the so-called "white paper" which we have asked him to prepare and that the paper will be ready by Monday, 27 March.

7. Propaganda Chief. Dr. Miró informed Mr. Carr that Roberto Espín has not been officially appointed as Propaganda Chief of the council and that he himself will wish to examine any important propaganda issued in the name of the Revolutionary Council before it is disseminated.

8. Conclusions and Recommendations

It is already evident that Dr. Miró intends to be a President in fact and not in name only. We feel that this is a healthy sign and that in the long range it will redound to our interests, so long, of course, as he is willing to maintain an open mind and a desire to cooperate, and will honor his commitment not to interfere with the military operation. It would, in our opinion, be a serious mistake to try to impose any person or any course of action on Dr. Miró. This does not mean that we must not try to persuade him along a certain course when the issue is an important one and our arguments are logical and valid. Specifically we would recommend that we let Dr. Miró ~~tell us~~ ^{decide} who he wants to take the Camp with him and that we gracefully abide by his decision. Also we feel it of utmost importance that Dr. Miró and his party be received at the camp by our officials with courtesy and deference and that they be accorded all due honors and a free and unhampered hand in their contact with the troops. Any attempt on the part of our officials at the camp to tell Dr. Miró how he will conduct himself, how long he will talk, what he will say, etc., could do us lasting harm and jeopardize

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the ultimate aim of the overall project, which is the replacement of the Castro
Government by a government which will be friendly to the United States. We
feel that this point cannot be over emphasized and propose that unequivocal
instructions be transmitted to the Camp for its guidance.

[Redacted]

Gerard Droller