



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330328

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

28 March 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention in DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000692DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Hala Bin Ali
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Alaa Ali Bin Ali Ahmad, Ali Bin Ali Aleh, Alaa al-Adeni, Adel al-Adeni, Bilal, Bilal al-Adeni, Bilal al-Yemeni
- Place of Birth: Aden, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 15 April 1983
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000692DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention in DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) on 1 March 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a committed member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan (AF) to receive training and participate in jihad. Detainee is further assessed to be a member of a Faisalabad, Pakistan (PK) cell created by senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), and al-Qaida military operations commander Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), with the purpose of returning to Afghanistan to conduct remote controlled and improvised explosive

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REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
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device (IED) attacks against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is reported to have received training at a camp near Kabul, AF in late 2001, and is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee adheres to a known al-Qaida cover story and traveled to Afghanistan via an al-Qaida facilitation network. Detainee's travel in Pakistan prior to his capture was facilitated by the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)¹ and his alias was found on a hard drive associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024). **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Added alias Bilal al-Yemeni
- Added detainee's training in Afghanistan
- Updated analysis of detainee's activities and associates resulting in increase of detainees threat from **MEDIUM** to **HIGH** and subsequent recommendation for CD
- Incorporated information about the activities at GZ-10016 and Issa Safe Houses
- Revised capture information

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: In 2000, detainee graduated from high school in Aden and reported no other activities to include employment.²

¹ Analyst Note: The LT is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Priority 2 counterterrorism (CT) target. Priority 2 targets includes issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests.

² 000692 302 20-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee alternately stated he graduated in 2001 – see 000692 SIR 06-APR-2006.

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b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee wished to study *Salafiah* (a form of fundamentalist Islam).³ Detainee's plan was to travel to Pakistan, locate a suitable school, return to Yemen to inform his mother, and then return to Pakistan to attend schooling. Detainee's mother agreed to the plan and provided detainee with the equivalent of \$800 US for detainee's ticket and expenses.⁴ Approximately September 2001, detainee traveled from Aden, to Sanaa, YM. On 10 September 2001, detainee arrived in Karachi, PK, traveling via Dubai, United Arab Emirates (AE).⁵

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee stayed at the Dubai Hotel in Karachi for approximately ten days where he met two Yemenis, Abdallah and Wabah. Detainee stayed with the men for a month and a half before moving in approximately November 2001 to the Issa Safe House in Faisalabad.⁶ Detainee remained at the Issa Safe House for up to four and a half months,⁷ passing the time by talking to other residents and playing badminton as there were no books or televisions present. Detainee left the house only a couple of times.⁸ Although detainee originally intended to enroll in classes, detainee squandered his money.⁹ Detainee explicitly denied entering Afghanistan.¹⁰

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Pakistani authorities conducted raids at two Faisalabad safe houses on 28 March 2002, arresting suspected al-Qaida fighters under the command of GZ-10016 and killing one. At the Issa Safe House, Pakistani police and intelligence officials arrested at least 15 suspected al-Qaida members including detainee. At the other safe house, Pakistani officials arrested GZ-10016 and at least seven other suspected al-Qaida members along with manuals, tools, and components consistent with the assembly of explosive detonators.¹¹ These safe houses were operated by the LT¹² and were part of a network of LT houses and operatives

³ 000692 302 20-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee claimed he wanted to see Pakistan and obtain higher education, but in the same report, he claimed he did not decide to travel to Pakistan until he was at the Sanaa airport. Reporting in 000252 FM40 05-JAN-2005b disputes detainee's reasoning for traveling to Pakistan to attend schooling.

⁴ 000692 FM40 30-JUL-2003

⁵ 000692 MFR 03-FEB-2003, Analyst Note: Detainee's visa was valid for 45 days.

⁶ 000692 FM40 30-JUL-2003, 000692 MFR 03-FEB-2003, Analyst Note: Numerous detainees used one of several hotels in this area including the Dubai, Mustafa, and Embassy hotels during their travel to Afghanistan. At least one of the 11 September 2001 hijackers used hotels in this area approximately four months before the attacks.

⁷ 000692 FM40 12-DEC-2003

⁸ 000692 FM40 05-AUG-2003, 000692 FM40 30-JUL-2003.

⁹ 000692 FM40 12-DEC-2003

¹⁰ 000692 SIR 29-JUL-2005

¹¹ IIR 6 034 0286 05, 000694 KB 22-JUN-2002

¹² Analyst Note: Issa's safe house was also called the Yemeni house and the Crescent Textile Mill house. Suspected al-Qaida members captured at Issa's safe house include (YM-679); (YM-680); (YM-681); (YM-683);

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enlisted by GZ-10016 after the fall of Kandahar, AF to help al-Qaida's Arab fighters escape Afghanistan.¹³ Detainee and other suspects were held by Pakistani authorities first in a prison in Lahore, PK and then at a prison in Islamabad, PK. All suspects were transferred to US custody sometime in May 2002.¹⁴

b. (S) Property Held:

- One watch and prayer beads
- Although not held at JTF-GTMO, the following item was reported in detainee's possession at the time of capture:
 - Yemeni Passport, No. 00469009¹⁵

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 19 June 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Individuals arrested at the Issa Safe House in Faisalabad

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee is currently non-responsive to questioning and his cover story is assessed to be false. Detainee provided conflicting details on his mode of travel, dates of travel, and duration of stay at various locations. Detainee denied ever entering Afghanistan; however, other JTF-GTMO detainees reported detainee was present in Afghanistan at a training camp and in areas of hostilities. Detainee has not admitted to any extremist activities in Pakistan or Afghanistan and his actions indicate continuing support to extremism.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

(WE-684); (AG-685); (YM-686); (LY-688); (YM-689); (YM-690); (YM-691); (YM-692); (YM-693, deceased); (LY-695); (RS-702) and (YM-728). See IIR 6 034 0979 03, 000684 SIR 14-Oct-2004.

¹³ TD-314/18169-02, IIR 6 034 0911 04, SAP20020408000048 08-APR-2002, SAP20020330000051 30-MAR-2002, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005b

¹⁴ IIR 6 034 0144 03, IIR 4 201 4063 05, IIR 6 034 0470 03, IIR 6 034 0911 04, IIR 6 034 0043 03, IIR 6 034 0872 02, TD-314/20711-02

¹⁵ 000692 PASSPORT 29-APR-2000

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b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan to receive training and participate in jihad. Detainee's alias appeared on a hard drive associated with KU-10024 and he is reported to have received training in Afghanistan. Detainee was identified in Afghanistan in late 2001, and is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee adheres to a known al-Qaida cover story of traveling to Pakistan for education, and acknowledged staying at a facility associated with the movement of al-Qaida recruits. Detainee is assessed to be a member of GZ-10016's Martyrs Brigade, a Faisalabad cell intending to conduct IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is assessed to have escaped Afghanistan with the members of this cell and traveled with them through Pakistan. Detainee was captured at the Issa Safe House, and is assessed to have served in supporting roles for individuals undergoing remote controlled detonator training at the Abu Zubaydah Safe House.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan to receive training and participate in jihad.
 - (S//NF) Analyst Note: Detainee's alias is listed on an al-Qaida associated document and his account is assessed to be false. Detainee adopted his story to prevent disclosure of his activities in Afghanistan and his association with al-Qaida contrary to other reporting. In light of reporting from other JTF-GTMO detainees, detainee's use of the cover story, his escape from Afghanistan, and the individuals with whom he was captured, detainee is assessed to have attended al-Qaida associated training in Afghanistan, supported al-Qaida forces during Operation Enduring Freedom, and intended to conduct hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee's refusal to cooperate indicates continuing support for extremism.
 - (S//NF) Detainee's alias, Bilal al-Adani, was found on a list of captured mujahideen on a hard drive associated with KU-10024.¹⁶
 - (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have received basic militant training in Afghanistan consisting of at least small arms, physical fitness, and religious training to support jihad indoctrination. Jabran Said Bin Wazir al-Qahtani, ISN US9SA-000696DP (SA-696), identified detainee as Bilal. SA-696 reported detainee attended training at the camp near Kabul.¹⁷ (Analyst Note: SA-696's timeline is questionable and the training in Kabul could have occurred as early as August 2001. It is possible detainee attended the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp in Kandahar at the time the camp was abandoned in September 2001. Some trainees were then sent to the Malik Camp near Kabul to complete their training.)
 - (S//NF) Although detainee repeatedly denies traveling to Afghanistan, other JTF-GTMO detainees place him in Afghanistan. Additionally, detainee is assessed to have served alongside al-Qaida forces occupying Khowst, AF fighting positions

¹⁶ TD-314/13174-03

¹⁷ >000696 SIR 17-Jun-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee is listed in the report with his MP number 191.

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during Operation Enduring Freedom, from approximately mid-September through mid-November 2001, and then in Zormat, AF from mid-November 2001 through January 2002.

- (S//NF) Musab Omar Ali al-Mudwani, ISN US9YM-000839DP (YM-839), photo identified detainee as Bilal al-Yemeni, part of a group of Arabs with whom YM-839 traveled from Zormat to Bannu, PK.¹⁸ YM-839 also stated detainee was in his group in Afghanistan. The group was commanded by Abu Jarrah and occupied camps in the vicinity of Khowst for approximately two and a half months. YM-839 and detainee then traveled to Kabul in order to obtain their passports. However; they could not retrieve their passports from Kandahar as the situation was too dangerous for them.¹⁹
 - ◆ (S//NF) YM-839 spent two and a half months in Khowst before returning to Kabul. Three days after YM-839 returned to Kabul, the city fell to US forces and he fled to Zormat.²⁰ YM-839 received his passport from Abu al-Faraj, who was possibly from Morocco or Libya, and spent 15 days in Zormat before crossing the border into Pakistan en route to Lahore.²¹ (Analyst Note: Detainee is assessed to have accompanied YM-839 to Kabul, and fled hostilities in Kabul to Zormat where he joined GZ-10016's group. Abu al-Faraj is assessed to be al-Qaida operations chief Mustafa Faraj Muhammad Muhammad Masud al-Jadid al-Uzaybi, aka (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN US9LY-010017DP.)
- (S//NF) Ayoub Murshid Ali Saleh, ISN US9YM-000836DP (YM-836), photo identified detainee as Bilal, who YM-836 saw at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.²²
- (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeab Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), reported he overheard conversations which indicated detainee was previously in Afghanistan.²³
- (S//NF) Detainee adheres to a known al-Qaida cover story of traveling to Pakistan for education (normally Islamic education) and stated he never traveled to Afghanistan.²⁴

¹⁸ IIR 6 034 1077 04, 000839 FM40 08-NOV-2002

¹⁹ >000839 SIR 13-Dec-2002; Analyst Note: The other men who traveled to Kabul with detainee were: Abu Safwan (possibly SA-230); Abu Motasim (possibly SA-185 or YM-029); Abu Hozaiifa (possibly SA-074, YM-840, SA-768, or YM-027); Abu al-Waleed Al-Hadrami (YM-550); Abu Hamza (possibly SA-226); Abu Rawaha (SA-073); Abu Akrima al-Ghamidi (probably YM-836); Abu Malik From Ibb, YM (possibly YM-1453 or YM-838); Noor Eddine San'ani (possibly YM-223); Abu Abdullah al-Janubi and another 4 or 5 unidentified individuals.

²⁰ Analyst Note: Kabul fell to Coalition forces on about 11 November 2001.

²¹ Analyst Note: Abu al-Faraj was possibly Mustafa Faraj Muhammad Muhammad Masud al-Jadid al-Uzaybi, aka (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN US9LY-010017DP (LY-10017).

²² IIR 6 034 0309 03, 000836 MFR 04-NOV-2002

²³ >000252 FM40 05-JAN-2005b

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- (S//NF) Although detainee stated he traveled for education, he informed the ARB his visa was only valid for a little over a month.²⁵ This is assessed to be the tourist visa in detainee's recovered passport.²⁶ Detainee did not obtain a student visa which would be valid for an extended period and would be renewable on an annual basis. This indicates detainee had no intention of receiving additional, structured, accredited Islamic education in Pakistan.
- (S//NF) Detainee stated he took \$800 US to pay for his education in Afghanistan, but noted he did not actually attend the Salafist University in Faisalabad. He also provided conflicting reports on the length of his stay at the Issa Safe House, ranging from several days to over four months.²⁷
- (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged he stayed at the Dubai Hotel in Karachi for approximately ten days.²⁸ (Analyst Note: Numerous other al-Qaida affiliated detainees are known to have used the Dubai Hotel during their travels to Afghanistan. The Dubai Hotel is assessed to be part of the al-Qaida facilitation network within Pakistan assisting new recruits.)
- (S//NF) YM-252 reported he believed detainee's story of travel for education was a lie, qualifying his belief with the statement that students travel to Yemen specifically to attend school. Therefore, it made no sense for detainee to have left Yemen to study elsewhere.²⁹
- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of GZ-10016's Martyrs Brigade, a Faisalabad cell intended to conduct IED attacks against US and Coalition forces.
 - (S//NF) Analyst Note: When escaping from US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan in late 2001, GZ-10016 and IZ-10026 devised a plan to train individuals in explosives and detonators. These individuals would then return to Afghanistan where they would create the devices and teach others to use and create them as well. GZ-10016 fled to Lahore and then Faisalabad with a group of al-Qaida associated fighters which is assessed to include detainee and the others captured on 28 March 2002. Remote detonator training was conducted at the Abu Zubaydah Safe House, while the Issa Safe House occupants (including detainee) are assessed to provide

²⁴ 000692 302 20-JUN-2002, 000692 FM40 30-JUL-2003, 000692 FM40 12-Dec-2003; For additional information on al-Qaida/extremist cover stories, see TD-314/30470-02, TD-314/15939-04, TD-314/33510-04, TD-314/44880-03, TD-314/18438-06, TD-314/15642-06, TD-314/38253-02, IIR 2 120 0104 04, IIR 2 103 0142 02, IIR 4 201 2380 05, IIR 4 201 5495 07, IIR 6 034 0024 08, IIR 6 044 6018 03, The 9-11 Commission Report 24-Jul-2003, Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis, A Case Study in Extremist Tradecraft - CIA 1-Nov-05, and DIA Dynamic Threat Assessment 1-Nov-2006.

²⁵ >000692 ARB3 Transcript Final 25-Apr-2007

²⁶ >000692 PASSPORT 29-APR-2000

²⁷ >000692 302 20-Jun-2002, 000692 ARB3 Transcript Final 25-Apr-2007; Analyst Note: A variant of Salafist University is Jamia Salafia Univeristy.

²⁸ >000692 FM40 30-JUL-2003, 000692 MFR 03-FEB-2003

²⁹ IIR 6 034 1255 04

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support functions for the detonator trainees. Occupants at the Issa Safe House included individuals with explosives expertise who GZ-10016 may have intended to produce the explosives for use with the detonators and provide other services such as security and surveillance of targets.³⁰ GZ-10016 also intended for the trainees to create explosives which Arab suicide operatives would detonate at checkpoints in Afghanistan.³¹ It is possible some individuals at the Issa Safe House were designated for this task. Detainee is not assessed to be inclined to commit suicide, but he has indicated support for the suicides which occurred at JTF-GTMO,³² and identified suicide as an acceptable religious action which the detainees attempt due to their love of Islam.³³ The following describes the plan, specific participants, and their movement to Faisalabad. Due to detainee's willingness to withhold information of intelligence value, reports from other JTF-GTMO detainees of the detainee's true activities in Afghanistan, and his association with the Martyrs Brigade, detainee is assessed to be a willing cell participant who intended to conduct further attacks against US and Coalition forces.

- (S//NF) As previously noted, Pakistani authorities captured detainee and about 30 other suspected al-Qaida fighters under the command of GZ-10016 during raids on LT operated Faisalabad safe houses identified as the Issa Safe House and the Abu Zubaydah Safe House. Detainee was captured at the Issa Safe House. GZ-10016 stated he created the Martyrs Brigade, a unit conceived to conduct attacks against US-based targets employing remotely detonated explosives activated by Pakistan-based triggermen using cell phones.³⁴

- (S//NF) Muhammad Noor Uthman, ISN US9SU-000707DP (SU-707), stated GZ-10016 was the director of the Issa Safe House in Faisalabad.³⁵ (Analyst Note: GZ-10016 has denied a direct association with the Issa Safe House.)

- (S//NF) GZ-10016's original plan was to flee Afghanistan and travel via Pakistan to Iran, where he would set up a base of operations for the Brigade. GZ-10016 claimed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had agreed to send 15 of his best men to join with members of GZ-10016's Khaldan group to form the Brigade. GZ-10016's long-term intent was to train and place suicide bombers or remote controlled explosive devices in an effort to attack US targets. (Analyst Note: Al-Qaida operative Jose Padilla, the American suspected in the "dirty bomb" plot to attack targets in Washington, DC

³⁰ >TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/35879-02, TD-314/39716-03, NCTC Terrorist Threat Assessment 4-May-2006

³¹ >TD-314/18008-04

³² >000692 SIR 08-Jun-2007

³³ >000692 SIR 03-Nov-2005

³⁴ TD-314/33836-02, TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02

³⁵ 000707 302 11-SEP-2002

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with a radiological dispersion device, briefly stayed with GZ-10016 at the Faisalabad safe house where GZ-10016 was captured.)³⁶

- (S//NF) SA-696 reported IZ-10026 was responsible for identifying recruits for al-Qaida related terrorist activities and putting them in contact with GZ-10016.³⁷
- (S//NF) Talha al-Kini, aka (Binyam Ahmad Muhammad), ISN US9ET-0001458DP (ET-1458), reported GZ-10016 and IZ-10026 talked with him (ET-1458), SA-696, and Ghassan Abdallah Ghazi al-Sharbi, ISN US9SA-000682DP (SA-682), in Zormat about electronics training. ET-1458, who was also captured with GZ-10016, stated everyone understood they were to receive electronics training in remote controlled IEDs and then return to IZ-10026 in Afghanistan to train Afghans to build and/or use the devices.³⁸
- (S//NF) GZ-10016 described his escape from Afghanistan with a group of other al-Qaida operatives under his command via Birmal and Zormat, as well as Bannu and Lahore to Faisalabad with the assistance of the LT network of facilitators. According to GZ-10016, the safe houses, transportation, and security for these moves was provided by LT operatives.³⁹ GZ-10016 stated he chose 20 fighters to take with him to Pakistan and sent the group to Faisalabad to await training.⁴⁰ (Analyst Note: Detainee is assessed to be a member of the group of al-Qaida operatives who fled Afghanistan with GZ-10016.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have followed the same route of escape from Afghanistan to the safe house in Faisalabad as used by GZ-10016, ET-1458, and other detainees.⁴¹ SA-682 wrote a poem venerating several detainees, assessed to include detainee, who were captured at the Issa Safe House and the Abu Zubaydah Safe House. The poem noted “Abu Zubaydah” was “pushing us to glory.”⁴²
 - (S//NF) Senior al-Qaida facilitator Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti, aka (Abu Yassir al-Jazairi), reported Fahmi Abdallah Ahmad Ubadi al-Tulaqi, ISN US9YM-000688DP (YM-688), was with a large group of Yemenis in Faisalabad,

³⁶ >TD-314/33836-02, TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/16969-02, TD-314/17373-02, TD-314/59808-05, For SU-707's reporting on Padilla, see 000707 MFR 17-JAN-2003, IIR 6 034 0657 02, IIR 6 034 0755 02, and IIR 6 034 0827 04

³⁷ IIR 6 034 1126 03

³⁸ >001458 FM40 28-Jul-2004, For additional information on these individuals and their associations, see TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/18041-02, TD-314/39716-03

³⁹ >TD-314/16265-02, TD-314/18169-02, IIR 6 034 0911 04, SAP20020408000048 08-APR-2002, Multiple ISNs FBIS SAP20020330000051 30-MAR-2002, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005b, 000114 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 23-DEC-2004, LASHKAR E TAYYIBA, NGIC - Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 1-Jan-2001

⁴⁰ >TD-314/18008-04

⁴¹ TD-314/20711-02, 001458 FM40 27-JUL-04

⁴² >000682 Pocket Litter 00-XXX-2004, Analyst Note: Detainee is assessed to be the individual identified as Ibn al-Muali Ala in the poem.

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- all of whom fled Afghanistan for Pakistan and were seeking to return to Yemen.⁴³ GZ-10016 provided corroboration of Boulghiti's statement, noting the Yemenis were moved out of Afghanistan to a safe house in Faisalabad to wait for new documents.⁴⁴ (Analyst Note: YM-688 was captured with detainee.)
- (S//NF) YM-688 admitted he fought in Afghanistan and fled to the Issa Safe House. YM-688 photo-identified detainee and stated he was present at the Issa Safe House upon YM-688's arrival.⁴⁵ (Analyst Note: The group was not transported to the safe house en mass, with some detainees arriving from the Lahore safe houses days or weeks after others.)
 - (S//NF) Awad Khalifah Muhammad Abu Bakr Abu Uwayshah al-Barasi, ISN US9LY-000695DP (LY-695), admitted receiving explosives training. LY-695 reported detainee was not a student at the Salafist University.⁴⁶ (Analyst Note: LY-695 was captured with detainee.)
 - (S//NF) Ravil Mingazov, ISN US9RS-000702DP (RS-702), received instructions on making small bombs using C-4 and other ingredients during his training at al-Faruq from mid-August through mid-September 2001.⁴⁷ (Analyst Note: RS-702 was captured with detainee.)
 - (S//NF) GZ-10016 stated Abd Muhaymin sent two engineers (SA-696 and SA-682) to GZ-10016 for remote controlled explosives training. GZ-10016 stated he began instructing the individuals but they had not completed their training prior to the 28 March 2002 raid on the Abu Zubaydah Safe House in Faisalabad.⁴⁸ (Analyst Note: Abd Muhaymin is a variant of IZ-10026's alias Abd al-Muhaymin. Another detainee captured at the Abu Zubaydah Safe House included Sufyian Barhoumi, ISN US9AG-000694DP (AG-694), who provided explosives and electronic detonator training.⁴⁹)
 - (S//NF) SA-696 confirmed the IED plan, stating he intended to make circuit boards at the safe house to be used with explosives for operations against US forces in Afghanistan. SA-696 purchased enough components to produce 30 detonators and had produced two test units at the time of their capture.⁵⁰

⁴³ TD-314/44476-03

⁴⁴ >TD-314/41623-02

⁴⁵ 000688 SIR 14-MAY-2005

⁴⁶ >IIR 6 034 0911 04, IIR 6 034 0196 05

⁴⁷ IIR 6 034 1483 03, 000695 FM40 24-SEP-2003, 000691 FM40 16-SEP-2003

⁴⁸ TD-314/30299-03, TD-314/18041-02, TD-314/18041-02, TD-314/39716-03, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/17440-02

⁴⁹ >000696 SIR 17-Jun-2002, Analyst Note: AG-694 is listed with his MP Number – 198, and the alias Shafeeq in the report. YM-696 reported on other individuals involved in the training in this report as well.

⁵⁰ TD-314/35879-02

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Electronic schematics, electrical components, and a voltmeter were recovered in the raids.⁵¹

- (S//NF) ET-1458 acknowledged GZ-10016 instructed ET-1458 and others to go to Pakistan for training in remote control detonators and subsequently to return to Afghanistan to train the Afghans. If they did not train the Afghans, then they were to build the devices and provide them for the Afghans to use.⁵²

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been generally compliant but sometimes hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 55 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 14 October 2007, when he failed to follow guard instructions when told to stop talking during shackling procedures. He has four Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 7 January 2004, when he threw food on a guard. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of four Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and none so far in 2008.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 1 February 2008.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee stayed in Pakistani safe houses for at least four months. During that time he was probably exposed to a number of other mujahideen and al-Qaida members who resided there, but no evidence points to his having long-term or in-depth knowledge of significant extremist personalities or operations. His youth and passport entry stamp suggest detainee's exposure to al-Qaida operatives and mujahideen was limited, beginning when he arrived in Pakistan. Detainee was reportedly smuggled out of Afghanistan into Pakistan.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee's approximate five month stay in the Issa Safe House provides him with the ability to give biographical information on individuals who transited through the Issa Safe House. Detainee can possibly provide information on the recruitment and facilitation of Islamic extremists from Yemen to Afghanistan via Pakistan.

⁵¹ >TD-314/63481-03, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005(b)

⁵² IIR 6 034 0282 05, 001458 FM40 27-JUL-2004, 001458 FM40 28-JUL-2004

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
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Detainee is possibly withholding information relating to detainee's involvement with activities at the Issa Safe House and hostilities against US and Coalition forces.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Detainee's activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan
 - Kabul training camp (possibly the Malik Camp)
 - Combat actions in Khowst
 - Combat actions in Kabul
 - Combat actions in Zormat
- Martyr's Brigade
 - GZ-10016 and IZ-10026
 - Issa Safe House and Abu Zubaydah Safe House personnel and activities
 - Planned attacks against US and Coalition forces
 - Potential suicide operatives
 - LT facilitation
- Recruitment and facilitation techniques in Yemen
- Egyptian extremists in Yemen
- Terrorist biographical and psychological information

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 6 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



MARK H. BUZBY
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.