

would find it difficult to preserve peace in our district.

In the meanwhile the Chinese people who were indignant at the defeat of Ma Chan-shan once extolled as the greatest hero of the age attributed responsibility to Chang Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shek who looked on with folded arms and they became active in the anti-Chiang and Chang Movement in connection with the complicated internal problems.

It was expected, therefore, that Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang would take positive actions to some extent to keep themselves in countenance, no matter how they felt in their hearts. About this time all over Liaosi, with Chinchow as its centre, the rumour was prevalent that China would open hostilities against Japan and the people either danced for joy or began to take refuge for fear of the disasters of war. Then the situation in North China was very uneasy and the Tientsin expeditionary force suffered great hardship with very small strength (estimated less than 1,000). If an incident should breakout in that district, the Kwantung Army must save our comrade force (i.e. the Tientsin force) from crisis and clear the neighbourhood of Chinchow of Chinese forces; indeed we felt that need.

When the Kwantung Army was in an atmosphere of such unrest, on the night of November 26th the commander of the Tientsin force unexpectedly reported that hostilities had opened between Japanese and Chinese forces in the neighbourhood of Tientsin and that they were spreading all over the district. Receiving the demand for rein-

forcements, the Kwantung Army were resolved to save the Tientsin force from the crisis. The 4th Mixed Brigade which had been newly reinforced from Japan and had been stationed near Mukden was ordered on the 27th to start from the line of the Liao River and advance at first to near Aoupantzu in order to cover the gathering of the Army's main force and began its operation. Rec a report however that the serious situation in the Tientsin dist. was somewhat relieved and concurrently receiving the order of the Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo to stop the operation, we withdrew the above-mentioned forces to the line of the South Manchurian Railway.

Prior to this, the Nanking government which had expected an imminent attack on Chinchow by Japanese forces implored the British American and French ambassadors to establish a neutral zone in the neighbourhood of Chinchow on November 24. But once we withdrew our forces east of the Liao River, the Nanking government declared that it was opposed to the establishment of the neutral zone and even issued a false statement that the proposal had been offered by the Japanese forces. That was judged to have been a cunning trick characteristic of China to mitigate the attack on Chinchow and the cessation of our operations raised the morale of the Chinese as usual and they grew more and more presumptuous. Knowing that, the officers and men of the Kwantung Army became very incensed and public opinion stiffened, too.

In the middle of December the positions near Chinchow were

made stronger and the Chinese strength which gathered in the vicinity of the city reached 35,000 and the number of volunteer bandits, detached forces, incited by the Chinese forces reached from 50,000 to 60,000: disturbances plotted east of the Liao River gave direct threats to the South Manchurian Railway and the bandits along the Antung-Fengtien Railway appeared to be co-operating. The destruction of railroad and stoppages of traffic occurred in rapid succession. Though we adopted the policy of localizing the affair, the situation became so serious that we could not tolerate the Chinese insults any longer, and from the point of view of securing the self-defense of the Japanese army and the welfare of the Japanese residents in Manchuria and Mongolia it was a pressing need to capture the base of their operations. The Kwantung Army reported the above situation to the central authorities of the army. The Japanese Government took measures to make the League of Nations have an ample understanding of this situation and reserved the right to suppress the bandits. Then as the bandits in Liaosi were clearly supported by the Chinese regular forces, their suppression made it inevitable that we should have an encounter with the Chinchow force. The Japanese Government, therefore, issued necessary statements and opened negotiations in Nanking, Peiping and other places demanding the withdrawal of the Chang Hsuehliang force from the inside of the Wall. But the latter's activity became such that by permission of the central authorities of the army the 2nd Division advanced along the Yingkow branch-line starting from the

line of the Liao River on December 28th in order to drive away the enemy from the neighbourhood of Tienchuangtai and Fanshan which was the strongest base of operations of the volunteer force, a detached one, in Liaosi. Just as we had expected, near Tienchuangtai the Chinese regular forces reinforced the volunteers with armoured trains and in Fanshan the bandits mixed with powerful regular forces made a night attack upon us. In other places we had encounter with such mixed forces. Therefore Honjo, the Commander made up his mind and from the 30th on he began to suppress the enemy along the Fengtien-Shanhaikwan Railway, but the enemy unexpectedly retreated without fighting. The consequence was that Chinchow and district was in a state of anarchy for a while and the peace was disturbed so that the 2nd Division was moved there and the other main force of was withdrawn to the South Manchurian Railway.

IX. THE DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO HARBIN

Hsi Hsia, acting-chief of Kirin Province, took the lead of the other provinces in the establishment of a new regime late in September of 1931, and broke off relations with Chang Hsueh-liang and Chang Tso-hsiang, while the military caste of the Chang Tso-hsiang faction betook themselves to Harbin and its south-eastern vicinity and established a regime in Pinhsen (about sixty kilometres north-east of Harbin) in opposition to this move.

Def. Doc. # 885

(Hsi Hsia's regime will be called the "Kilin Regime", the other the "Anti-Kilin Regime" in the following.)

The Kirin Regime, seeing that there was no way to solve the matter except by force, set about forming new forces, and their strength was computed at nine thousand towards December of at year. Hsi Hsia left the neighbourhood of Kilin on Jan. 5 of the 7th year of Showa(1932), and started on a suppression mission. Pressing the Anti-Kilin forces he reached the suburbs of Harbin, and a battle between the two main forces took place from Jan. 27. About that time some quarters of the Anti-Kilin forces entered Harbin and began to pillage, so the whole city was thrown into an uproar, and the inhabitants filled with alarm. About 5500 Japanese residents (4,000 Japanese and 1,500 Koreans) were there. They urgently demanded that troops be despatched. Though the Kwantung Army also foresaw the aggravation of the situation, it kept observing the situation impartially and carefully, for it was not desirable to be involved in a conflict between Chinese factions. But it was reported on the night of Jan. 27 that four Japanese had been killed and many Koreans arrested. Furthermore, Captain SHIMIZU, a pilot of a Japanese aeroplane, was murdered by the Anti-Kilin Army when he made a forced landing in the suburbs of Harbin while he was reconnoitering the city on the same day, so that the Army decided to dispatch two infantry battalions in order to protect the residents, having communicated

Def. Doc. # 885

with the central military authorities and having given both of the two forces notice that there was no intention but that of protecting the Japanese residents.

At that time there were 4 locomotives and 400 carriages and waggons at the Eastern Chinese Railway's Kuanchingtzu station, and the consent of the Eastern Chinese Railway had already been obtained for the transportation of our troops. It was therefore optimistically considered that things would be easy. At the case of the transportation, however, as most of the workers of the Eastern Chinese Railway had already fled, workers of the South Manchuria Railway had to be dispatched promptly from Changhung. Furthermore as these workers did not know well the condition of the stations and railway-line of the Eastern Chinese Railway and the construction of its cars was different from those of the South Manchuria Railway, unexpected hitches occurred. What with wasting time in assembling trains and a derailment the preparation of the trains was much delayed, and the first train started about 11 p.m. of the 28th. But the trains met on the way with resistance from a part of Anti-Kilin Army and destruction of the railway lines, so progress was very slow, and it was 5 p.m. of Jan. 30 when the trains reached Shuangching station.

The Kwantung Army feared that the opportunity of protecting the residents should be lost, as the progress of the trains was so slow, but nothing could be done. Furthermore it was reported that the Anti-Kilin Army was ill-disposed toward us at that time,

so the Kwantung Army feared that unexpected accidents would occur due to the independent advance of small units. And indeed some two thousand Anti-Kilin troops set for Shuangcheng before dawn of Jan. 31, and there broke out a confused fight. At this report also the Kwantung Army was very alarmed, for the four available locomotives were all at Shuangcheng and there was no means of reinforcement. Commander HONJO specially, would have suffered in his mind, because we would not have been able to force, although knowing of its critical situation. For the above mentioned reasons it proved to be dangerous to small units advance solely, by so the main force of the 2nd Division was added to the two battalions.

Reaching Harbin on Feb. 4, the 2nd Division was challenged by the Anti-Kilin force which had occupied a position near there and was compelled to fight back, then entered Harbin on the 5th.

Of course Commander HONJO troubled himself with the policy of localizing the affair and of withdrawing the 2nd Division promptly to Nanpu district in order to avoid the occurrence of useless trouble with Soviet Russia, because Harbin heavily involved her rights and interests. But once a severe battle with the Anti-Kilin Army had been fought, unrest could not be dispelled easily, and the division also could not evacuate there immediately.

(End)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TAKEDA, Hisashi (seal)

On this 13th day of January, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT TAKEDA, Hisashi (seal)

I, TAKEDA, Hisashi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: (signed) BAWNO, Junkichi (seal)

Def. Doc. # 885

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 20th March 1947

WITNESS: TAKEDA, Hisashi

IV. RELEVANCY: He was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army and connected directly with the operations at Chinchow, Nonni Bridge, Harbin and Angangchi, Manchuria. The Kwantung Army did not carry out these operations with aggressive plan.

V. PERSONAL DATA:

1894	Born, Nagano Prefecture
1916	Graduated, Military Academy 2d Lt, Imperial Guards, 2d Infantry Regiment
1917	Attached to 74th Infantry Regiment
1920	1st Lt
1923	Entered Army Staff College
1925	Captain
1926	Graduated, Army Staff College
1927	Company Commander, 74th Infantry Regiment
1928	General Staff Officer, 74th Infantry Regiment
1929	Judge, Army General Court Martial
1930	Concurrently, Staff Officer, Kwantung Army
1931	Major
1936	Lt Colonel
1937	Instructor and Member of Research Section, Infantry School
1938	General Staff Officer, 12th Division
1938	Commander, 24th Infantry Regiment
1938	Colonel
1938	General Staff Officer; 18th Division
1942	Major General
1945 Apr	Lt General
1945 Jul	Commander, 355th Division

Source: CIS Intelligence Files

VI. SUMMARY OF PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE

Exh. 57, Lytton Report, p. 71

"All the forces in Manchuria, and some of those in Korea, were brought into action almost simultaneously.. .. over the whole area of the South Manchuria Railway from Chanchun to Port Arthur."

ibid. p. 77, from Japanese sources.

Reinforcements arrived with imperial sanction in Dec. 1931 (Note: Harbin was occupied Feb 5th, 1932)

Ibid. p. 80

"....the 10th Division had arrived at Harbin and took over the sector from the 2nd Division ... In the earlier part of May, the Japanese forces in the north of Manchuria were further reinforced by the 14th Division."

ARAKI's interrogation, Exh. 188c, p. 2,220-2,221

"Until this time there had been no fixed policy, and it was realized that the absence of policy would result in the spreading of hostilities. It had been decided that the three provinces comprising Chang Hsueh-liang's territory required pacification...Chang Hsueh-liang was originally at Chinchow." The decision to occupy all Manchuria was made about 17 Dec. 1931.

*I read this
document + translation
3-31-47*

*See the telegrams from Honyo
immediately upon the
breaking out of the incident*

Ibid. Exh. 188E p. 2,240

The Government sent troops to Fengtian Province. The plan was made in the War Ministry's order to General Headquarters. The principle plan was signed by ARAKI.

Exh. 57, Lytton Report, p. 72-80

8 Oct	bombing of Chinchow
Now	Nonni River Bridges
19 Nov	Occupation of Tsitsihar
Oct - Nov	Negotiation and attack upon Tao-nan - Anganchi Railway
29 Nov	Japanese evacuated from Hsinmin, Chinese Army re-entered.
23 Dec	Attack begun on Chinchow
3 Jan	Occupation of Chinchow
5 Feb	Occupation of Harbin.

TAKEDA, Hisoshi

Request by: ITAGAKI, OKAWA, MINAMI, UMEZU, HOSHINO

Address: No. 9, 215, Ina, Ina Machi, Kamiinagun
Naganoken, Japan

Facts to be proved - He was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army and connected directly with the operations at Chinchow, Nonni Bridge, Harbin and Angangchi, Manchuria.

Relevancy - The Kwantung Army did not carry out these operations with aggressive plan.