

Folder No. 4

~~SECRET~~

MISSION #33

SINGAPORE
1 Feb 45

"PILICAN 3"

Classification

~~SECRET~~

5-7-46

By Authority of

U. S. AIR, BY


Ray H. Baker
Capt, USAF, USAF

MISSION #33 SINGAPORE "PILICAN 3"
1 Feb 45

2-5240-56

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *AW 7600 63*
By *CD* NAPA Date *11/1/88*



TELETYPE CONFERENCE

19

WASHINGTON PARTIES

KHARAGPUR HONOLULU PARTIES

Lt. Col. Hewitt

Col. Herman Col. Ankenbrandt

TELECON MSG G-31-8 SECRET 312310Z

SUBJECT PLAN FOR "PLILICAN 3-1// BUST

TLECON MSG G-31-8 SECTET 312310Z

SUBJECT PLAN FOR ~~"177 PILICAN 3"~~ - OPERATION NO. 33

TO COMGENBOMCOM 21 ^{"PILICAN 3"} FROM COMGENAF 20

INFO DEPCOMAF20

EFFORT: 112

TARGET: PRIMARY-FLOATING DRYDOCK IN JOHORE STRAIT (SINGAPORE AREA)

FIRST ALTERNATE: DRY CO// RPT DRY DOCK & WEST WALL AREA

LAST RESORT: MARTABAN RAILROAD YARDS

TIME OVER TARGET:

TNXSET 934/111 SW

PLST SET 934/111 SW

TIME OVER TARGET : 010200Z

METHOD OF BOMBING: 12 PLANE FORMATIONS, AT MINIMUM INTERVAL TRAIN, FROM 19,000 TO 20,000 FT PRESSURE ALTITUDE

BOMB LOAD: MINIMUM OF 4 - 1000 LB GP FUSED .1 NOSE, .025 TAIL

FLIGHT TIME: 16 HOURS, 54 MIN


TOTAL DISTANCE: 3725 STATUTE MILES

END


TOD 010015Z WCR

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*do not type
Take 8/0p*



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II/dn/6819 3
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<input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED
<input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SECRET
By Authority of Commanding General Twentieth Air Force
DATE 30 Jan 45
INITIALS JB
DATE 30 January 1945

EXTRACT OF TELETYPE CONFERENCE
BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND

KHARAGPUR

WASHINGTON PARTIES

TERMINAL PARTIES

Lt. Col. Hewitt

Colonel Herman

TELECON MESSAGE NO.

SUBJECT

E-1646

Amendment to Field Order

(From: DEFCOMAF 20 IBC To: COMAF 20)

1. Plan to change alternate target for PILIGAN No. 3 to read AAF Target AO.O--OL reference my telecon message No. E-1611, recent reconnaissance has shown the dry dock operational. Aiming point for alternate target is center of dry dock gate.


92.2-20 Dry Dock + West Wall Area

B

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ACTION COPY

DISTRIBUTION →	ACTION	DC/S Opr (2)
	INFORMATION	C/S ; A-2



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5-33, AF (REV 14 OCT 44)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *now* 7600 63
By *CD* WAPA Date *12/1/88*

TELECON MESSAGE NO. E-1633 - SECRET

SU BJECT: PLAN FOR PILICAN NO. 3

FROM DEPCOMAF TWENTY TO COMGENAF TWENTY

DOG DAY FOR PILICAN NUMBER 3 IS 1ST FEBRUARY, WEATHER PERMITTING.

...END...

TOD: 300120Z DEC

~~TOP SECRET~~ *John B 1*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *now 760063*

By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

TELETYPE CONFERENCE

19

WASHINGTON PARTIES

KHARAGPUR HONOLULU PARTIES

Lt. Col. Hewitt

Col. Herman Col. Ankenbrandt

SUBJECT :

go opp (P) B

SECRET

TELECON MSG K-28-1

SECRET

282310Z

SUBJECT PLAN FOR PILICAN NUMBER 3

TO COMGENBOMCOM 20

FROM

COMGENAF 20

(PERSONAL TO RAMEY FROM NORSTAD)

PLAN GIVEN IN YOUR D-1611 IS APPROVED . WHAT IS YOUR PROPOSED DATE?

...END...

TOD: 280055Z JDM

ORIGINATOR OF MESSAGE _____

DISTRIBUTION

	C/S	DC/S OPR	DC/S Adm	A-1	A-2	A-3 Tng	A-3 OC&R	A-4	A-5 Plan:
ACTION	AG	Surg	Air Insp	PRO	COMM	OP ANAL	STAT CON		
INFORMATION	C/S	DC/S Opr	DC/S Adm	A-1	A-2	A-3 Tng	A-3 OC&R	A-4	A-5 Plan:
	AG	Surg	Air Insp	PRO	COMM	OP ANAL	STAT CON		

SECRET

TELECON MSG NO. D-1611 - SECRET
TO: COMAF 20 FROM: DEPCOMAF 20

SUBJECT: PLAN FOR PILICAN NUMBER 3

1. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR PLAN FOR PILICAN NUMBER 3:

A. EFFORT: 112 AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT.

B. TARGET:

*Dry Dock
Work Well
Real Tell E-1646*

(1) PRIMARY: FLOATING DRYDOCK IN JOHORE STRAIT (SINGAPORE AREA)

(2) FIRST ALTERNATE TARGET: ^{92.2 21 workshop area} AO.O - OD (VISUAL AND/OR RADAR)

(3) SECONDARY: ^{92.24} AO.B - ON. *(Don't pier?)*

(4) LAST RESORT: MARTABAN RAILROAD YARDS.

*Posted
Int. Ops.
G.S.K.*

C. ROUTE: BASE AREA - ROEPOT ISLAND (02 DEGREE 07' N, 101 DEGREE 39' E) - GREAT LARIMONEN ISLAND (01 DEGREE 08' N, 103 DEGREE 23' E) - TARGET - BASE AREA.

D. TIME OVER TARGET: ^{312200 Wash} 010200Z

** 311330 Wash TO*

E. AXIS OF ATTACK: 53 DEGREE MAGNETIC

F. AIMING POINTS:

(1) PRIMARY: CENTER OF FLOATING DRYDOCK.

(2) FIRST ALTERNATE: ^{Dry Dock} CENTER OF ~~ENGINEERING SHOP~~.

(3) SECONDARY: WAREHOUSE AREA EAST OF OLD FORT.

(4) LAST RESORT: ROLLING STOCK.

G. METHOD OF BOMBING: TWELVE PLANE FORMATIONS, AT MINIMUM INTERVAL TRAIN, FROM NINETEEN TO TWENTY THOUSAND FEET PRESSURE ALTITUDE.

H. BOMB LOAD: MINIMUM OF FOUR 1000 POUND GP FUSED .1 NOSE, .025 TAIL.

I. FLIGHT TIME: 16 HOURS 54 MINUTES

J. TOTAL DISTANCE: 3725 STATUTE MILES.

SECRET

...END...

TOD: 270122Z DEC

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *760063*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

1945 JAN 28 02 18

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET IVI

Headquarters
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ACTION COPY TO *DC/S apr*
INFO. COPY TO *c/s*

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Opr.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
A. G.	

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India
To: War Department
No: CMDX 8918 D 4 February 1945

COMAF 20 from Ramey info DEPCOMAF 20 MacArthur
Stratemeyer Davidson CMDX 8918 D.

Bound for Singapore are Superforts of 20th BOMCOM on mission number 33. Floating drydock is primary target but is not visible from reasonable distance, drydock and west wall area of Singapore Naval Base becomes primary.

Secondary is Swettenham pier and storage area, Georgetown, Penang Harbor Malaya and last resort is railroad jetties and yards Martaban, Burma.

114 aircraft were airborne, the first at 311707 and the last at 1930 both Z. Minimum bomb load per field orders is four general purpose 1,000 pound bombs and at estimated 010200Z is over target time.

End

ACTION COPY

ACTION: CG AAF
INFO : OPD, G-2, Log
CM-IN-3633 (4 Feb 45) DTG 040310Z m/m

SECRET


AAF
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RDB
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DAO
ABI

18

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SECRET



To: CG, 20th Bombardment Group, Bangalore, India

From: War Department

No: OMA 8418 D 8 February 1945

Subject: 20. From Army into Department 20. (Priority)

Bound for Singapore and Borneo, the 20th Bombardment Group is to be reconstituted as a heavy bomber group. It is to be reconstituted as a heavy bomber group and is to be reconstituted as a heavy bomber group.

Secondary to the reconstitution of the group is the reconstitution of the group as a heavy bomber group. This is to be done by the reconstitution of the group as a heavy bomber group.

The aircraft were assigned to the group on 1 February 1945. The group is to be reconstituted as a heavy bomber group and is to be reconstituted as a heavy bomber group.

FEB 4 45 AM

FEB 4 45 AM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

1945 FEB 4 7 37

16/114
8
TV8

SECRET

YFK

TELECON MSG NO. D-1656 - S E C R E T

TO: COMGENAF 20 FROM: COMGENBOMCOM 20

SUBJECT: INITIAL INFORMATION MISSION33.

1. TARGETS ARE AS FOLLOWS: PRIMARY - FLOATING DRYDOCK, SINGAPORE; ALTERNATE TARGET (IF PRIMARY NOT VISIBLE FROM REASONABLE DISTANCE) - DRYDOCK AND WEST WALL AREA, SINGAPORE NAVAL BASES AREA; SECONDARY TARGET - SWETTENHAM PIER AND STORAGE AREA, GEORGETOWN, PENANG HARBOR, MALAYA; AND LAST RESORT TARGET - RAILROAD JETTIES AND AND YARDS, MARTABAN, BURMA.

2. TOTAL AIRBORNE WAS 114 WITH 28 AIRCRAFT EACH FROM 2 GROUPS AND 29 EACH FROM THE OTHER TWO. FIRST OFF WAS AT 311707Z AND LAST OFF WAS AT ~~300107Z~~ 193020Z WFS.

3. BOMB LOADING (SUBJECT TO CHANGE) IS AS FOLLOWS (FIELD ORDERS SPECIFIED A MINIMUM OF 4 1000-POUND GP BOMBS FUSED .1 SECOND NOSE AND .025 SECOND TAIL): 40TH GROUP - NOT REPORTED; 444TH GROUP (ALL M-65) - 2 A/C WITH 6 BOMBS, 16 A/C WITH 5, AND 20 WITH 4; 462ND GROUP (ALL M-44) - 12 A/C WITH 5 BOMBS AND 17 WITH 4; AND 468TH GROUP (ALL M-65) - ALL A/C CARRIED 4 BOMBS. FUSING IN 3 GROUPS REPORTING WAS AS ORDERED.

4. ESTIMATED TIME OVER TARGET IS 010200Z

KC

SECRET

---END---

TOD:02010242Z RRR

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

1945 FEB 1 03 21

SECRET

S E C R E T

S E C R E T
By authority of
CG Twentieth AF

Copy for _____
Officer Section Date Initials
1 Feb.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
Washington, D. C.

Information for Briefing on Bomber Command
Mission No 33 - 1 February 1945
Date

Mission Code Name "Pilican #3" (As of Z - 1 Feb.)
Date

Targets: Primary - Floating Drydock, Singapore Naval Base Area
Secondary - Swettenham Pier and Storage Area, Georgetown, Penang Harbor,
Malaya.
Last Resort - Railway Jetties and Yards, Martaban, Burma.

Take-off Times: 311707Z - 311930Z 311307-311530 Washington

Time Over Primary Target: 020214Z, Time for first airplane Bombs Away.

Tactics: 12 plane formation from 19,000 to 20,000 ft. pressure alt.

Aircraft Bombing: 112
Primary Target - 92 (75 visual)
Secondary Target - 13 (11 ")
Other Targets - 7 (all ")

Bomb Load: Minimum of 4-1000 lb, GP fused .1 nose, .025 tail

Losses: _____

Target Weather: _____

Fighter Opposition: _____

Anti-Aircraft Encountered: _____

Results of Bombing: _____

Remarks: This information is fragmentary and is subject to change so
Should not be used or presented as final.

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 760063
By CD NAPA Date 12/1/88

TELECON MSG NO. D-1660 - SECRET

TO: COMGENAF 20 FROM: COMGENBOMCOM 20

SUBJECT: BOMBS AWAY SUMMARY.

FOLLOWING IS ESTIMATE OF BOMBS AWAY SUMMARY AS OF 010600Z.

PA1 - 18

PA2 - 39

PA3 - 12

PA4 - 5

PA5 - 1

PB3 - 17

SA1 - 04

SA2 - 02

SA3 - 03

SA4 - 02

SB5 - 02

LA1 - 01

LA2 - 01

LA3 - 02

LA4 - 02

OA5 - 01

JETTISONED - 02

114

END

TOD 02010647Z RRR

KCKCKC

OK OK MIN

KCKCKC

SECRET

TELECON MSG NO. D-1658 - S E C R E T

TP: COMAF 20 FROM: DEPCOMAF 20 (IB&C)

SUBJECT: BOMBS AWAY.

FIRST BOMBS AWAY AT 010214Z - PA2 - QRPT - PA2 - 12.

SECRET

END

TOD: 02010243Z RR

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

1945 FEB 1 03 22

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

Washington, D. C.

SECRET
By authority of
CG Twentieth AF

1 Feb. 45
Date Initials

PRELIMINARY MISSION REPORT OF XX BOMBER COMMAND

OPERATION NO. 53 - 1 FEBRUARY 1945

"PILICAN 3"

Targets: Primary - Floating Drydock, Singapore Naval Base Area
Drydock and West Wall Area
Secondary - Swettenham Pier & Storage Area, Georgetown, Penang
Harbor, Malaya
Last Resort - Railroad Jetties and Yards, Martaban, Burma

Take-off: 311307 - 311530 Washington Time (311707Z - 311930Z)

Time of Attack: 312209 - 312322 Washington Time, 010839 - 010952 Theater Time
(010209Z - 010322Z)

Aircraft: Total Bombing 110
Primary 89 (74 - Floating Dock
Secondary 15 (15 - Drydock & West Wall Area
Other Targets 6

Aircraft Lost or Missing: 1 missing - probably ditched near primary - in contact
with rescue submarines

Casualties: 1 killed, 1 wounded, 12 missing

Bomb Load: Minimum of 4-1000 lb. GP fused .1 nose, .025 tail

Bomb Tons Dropped: 247.5 short tons of which 200.25 tons were dropped on primary

Tactics: 12 plane formation from an altitude of 17,000 to 20,000 ft. -
visual bombing

Weather: 4/10 - 7/10 broken undercast

Fighter Opposition: Primary - weak (15 to 25 Oscars, Tojos, Zekes and Tonys - mostly
Tojos)


Flak: Moderate and accurate

Claims: 2 destroyed, 6 probably destroyed, 8 damaged

Results: Mostly good to excellent

Remarks: This information is fragmentary and subject to change, therefore
should not be used for official records.

As of 1400, 1 February 1945



LAURIS NORSTAD
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

SECRET

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4631

HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL



FEB 1 1953

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HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Opr.	
A. G.	

SECRET I VI
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Mission 33
XX Be *Preliminary Report*
From: CG 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area,
Leyte, Philippines
CG Army Air Forces, India Burma Sector,
Calcutta, India
CG 10th Air Force, Myitkyina, Burma
CG, US Army Forces, India Burma Theater,
New Delhi, India
CG, US Army Forces, China Theater, Chungking, China
CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China
CG, AACS Hsainching Air Base, Chengtu, China

Nr: CMDX 8582 1 February 1945

COMAF 20th from Ramey info Ramey info DEPCOMAF 20th,
MacArthur, Stratemyer, Davidson, Sultan, Wedemeyer, Chennault,
Monteith CMDX 8582D.

Report preliminary and subject to revision on
mission number 33 follows:

Airborne against primary target floating dry dock at
Singapore with alternate the *Singapore Naval* base area, secondary Swetenham
piers Georgetown and last resort Martaban rail road facilities
were 113 Superforts with first off at 311707 and last off
at 1930 (at).

89 bombed primary (74-floating dock, 15-dry dock and
west wall area) 15 bombed secondary, 5 bombed last resort
and 1 opportunity. 2 jettisoned and 1 returned bombs.

CM-IN-1560 (2 Feb 45)

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SECRET IVI

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 2

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

Nr: GMDX 8582 1 February 1945

Primary was bombed between 010209 and 010322 from 17,000 to 20,000 feet through four to seven tenths broken undercast with good to excellent results.

Observed results at secondary were mostly good to excellent with some haze, at last resort poor to excellent and at opportunity poor. Bombs were 1000 pound GP and total of 200.25 estimates short tons were dropped on primary, 33.75 on secondary, 11.25 on last resort and 2.25 on opportunity at Bassein. All bombing was visual except one aircraft by radar on secondary.

Enemy fighter opposition was weak with 15 to 25 fighters at the primary target mostly Tojos with a few Oscars, Zekes and Tonys; nil to weak at secondary and nil at last resort our claims are 2 destroyed, 6 probably destroyed, and 8 damaged.

Heavy antiaircraft at primary was moderate and accurate, meager and inaccurate at secondary and last resort. 1 of our aircraft is missing, having probably ditched near primary target.

Casualties are 1 killed, 1 wounded, and 12 missing. 9 aircraft landed at Coxs bazaar, 3 at Chittagong and others at home base with last down of main formations at 011214. Observations include a smoke screen being laid by boats in Singapore middle strait area, 1 twin engine Jap patrol aircraft at 0749 north-9824 east at 3000 feet.

CM-IN-1560

(2 Feb 45)

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SECRET I VI

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 3

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

Tr: CMDX 8582 1 February 1945

Enemy aircraft were seen as follows:

On airfield at 0588 north-10024-12 single engine,
and 12 twin engine aircraft; on airfield at 0614 north-
10020-5 single engine and 5 twin engine aircraft; on air-
field at 0532 north-10050 east 8 to 10 single engine air-
craft.

Extensive mine sweeping activity by many small craft
throughout target area extending up straits 30 miles
completed visual sightings being sent separately to interest-
ed recipients. Photo interpretation report will follow.

End

*Being serviced

ACTION: CG AAF

INFORMATION: OPD
G-2
Adm King
Log

CM-IN-1560 (2 Feb 45) DTG 011653Z hrt

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FEB 2 '45 PM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

FEB 2 '45 PM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

**WAR DEPARTMENT
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HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Opr.	
A. G.	

SECRET "IVI"
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
SUPPLEMENTARY COPY

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces, China Theater, Chungking, China
CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China
CG, 20th Bomber Command, Hsingching, China
CG, US Army Forces, India Burma Theater New Delhi India
CG, Army Air Forces, India Burma Sector, Calcutta India
Headquarters, 10th Air Force, Myitkyina, Burma
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Leyte P.I.

Re: CMDX 8582 D 1 February 1945

COMAF 20th from Ramey info DEPCOMAF 20th, MacArthur, Stratemeyer, Davidson, Sultan, Wedemeyer, Chennault, Monteith CMDX 8582 D.

Please make the following corrections:

Page 1, line 7;
Singapore with alternate the Singapore Naval Base area, secondary Swetenham.

End.

Footnote: Supplementary Copy of CM-IN-1560 (2 Feb 45) CG AAF

ACTION: CG AAF

INFORMATION: OPD, G-2, Adm King, Log

CM-IN-1784 (2 Feb 45) DTG 011653Z hrt

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TELECON MSG NR D-1663 - S E C R E T

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY MISSION REPORT - MISSION NO. 33

FIGURES AS OF 011400, ALL TIMES ZEBRA

TO: COMGENAF TWENTY FROM: COMGENBOMCOM XX

1. DESIGNATION OF UNIT: XX BOMBER COMMAND.
2. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TAKING OFF: 113 (DOES NOT INCLUDE PHOTO SHIP WHICH WA REPORTED IN OUR D1656 AS PARTICIPATING)
3. TIME OF TAKE-OFF (FIRST TO LAST): ^{311307 - 311530 Washington} 311707Z - 1930Z.
4. TIME DOWN LAST PLANE (OF MAIN FORMATION): 011214. **SECRET**
5. TIME OVER PRIMARY TARGET (FIRST AND LAST): ^{312209 - 312322 Wash} 010209 - 010322. ^{010809 - 010952 Theater}
6. ALTITUDE OF ATTACK ON PRIMARY TARGET: 17 - 20,000.
7. WEATHER OVER PRIMARY TARGET: 4 TO 7/10 BROKEN UNDERCAST.
8. NUMBER OF A/C BOMBING (ALL TARGETS): 110.
9. NUMBER OF A/C BOMBING PRIMARY: 89 (74 ON FLOATING DOCK - 15 ON DRYDOCK AND WEST WALL AREA).
10. NUMBER OF A/C BOMBING SECONDARY: 15. ^{110 tot bombing}
11. NUMBER OF A/C BOMBING LAST RESORT: 5. ^{PT-89} ^{ST-15} ^{other-6} **SECRET**
12. NUMBER OF A/C BOMBING T ON O: 1.
13. NUMBER OF A/C UNKNOWN AS TO BOMBING: 0.
14. NUMBER OF A/C FAILING TO BOMB: 3 (2 JETTISONED - 1 BROUGHT BACK)
15. NUMBER OF A/C LOST TO ENEMY OPPOSITION: 0.
16. NUMBER OF A/C LOST TO ENEMY AA: 0.
17. NUMBER OF A/C LOST BY ACCIDENT: 0.
18. NUMBER OF A/C MISSING: 1. (PROBABLY DITCHED) ^{near PT (in contact with submarines)}
19. DISPOSITION OF BOMBS: (SHORT TONS) (ESTIMATED) **SECRET**
 - A. TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED ON ALL TARGETS: 247.5.
 - B. TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED ON PT: 200.25.
 - C. TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED ON ST: 33.75.
 - D. TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED ON LRT: 11.25.
 - E. TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED ON T OF O: 2.25. (BASSEIN)
 - F. TOTAL TONNAGE UNREPORTED AS TO DISPOSITION: 0.
 - G. TOTAL TONNAGE JETTISONED: 4.50. **SECRET**
 - H. TOTAL TONNAGE RETURNED TO BASE: 2.25.
20. OBSERVED RESULTS OF BOMBING:
unob
PRIMARY: MOSTLY GOOD TO EXCELLENT WITH SOME FAIR, AND SOME UNOBSERVED.

SECONDARY: MOSTLY GOOD TO EXCELLENT, WITH SOME FAIR TO GOOD.

LAST RESORT: POOR TO EXCELLENT.

TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY: POOR.

21. METHOD OF BOMBING:

- A. PRIMARY: ALL VISUAL.
- B. SECONDARY: 14 VISUAL; 1 RADAR.
- C. LAST RESORT: ALL VISUAL.
- D. OPPORTUNITY: VISUAL.

SECRET

22. CASUALTIES: KILLED: 1 WOUNDED: 1 MISSING: 12.

23. CLAIMS: DESTROYED: 2 PROBABLY DESTROYED: 6 DAMAGED: 8.

24. ENEMY FIGHTER OPPOSITION:

- A. PRIMARY: WEAK - 15 TO 25 OSCARS, TOJOS, ZEKES AND TONYS
(MOSTLY TOJOS)
- B. SECONDARY: NIL TO WEAK.
- C. LAST RESORT: NIL.
- D. OPPORTUNITY: NIL.

SECRET

25. ENEMY HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT:

- A. PRIMARY: MODERATE AND ACCURATE.
- B. SECONDARY: MEAGER + INACCURATE.
- C. LAST RESORT: MEAGER - INACCURATE.
- D. OPPORTUNITY: NIL.

26. STATUS OF A/C LANDED AT THEIR HOME BASE: 9 A/C LANDED AT COX'S BAZAAR AND 3 AT CHITTAGONG. 1 A/C PROBABLY DITCHED NEAR PRIMARY TARGET AND WAS IN CONTACT WITH RESCUE SUBMARINES.

27. CREW OBSERVATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE ITEMS OF INTEREST: WILL FOLLOW LATER.

28. PRELIMINARY STRIKE PHOTOGRAPHS: WILL FOLLOW LATER.

THIS REPORT IS PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO REVISION. A FINAL INTELLIGENCE STATISTICAL SUMMARY WILL BE SENT ON D-DAY PLUS FIVE.

SECRET

...END...
TOD: 021642Z PM

SECRET

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Headquarters
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ACTION COPY TO SCO
INFO. COPY TO DC/SO/ops

SECRET-IVE

PRIORITY

NO ACTION COPY

From: CG 20th Bomber Command Kharagpur India
To: War Department
Nr: CMD 9186 YB 14 February 1945

Arnold attention Statistical Control Division from
Ramey CMD 9186 YB

Correcting our YB 9021.

Aircraft lost report for mission number 33 on
1st February 45.

A. 42-24736

B. Number one engine shot out by flak and prop
governor on number two engine stuck at 2000 revolutions
per minute, crashed on landing at home base.

C. Alongside of runway at Dudhkundi.

D. Entire crew safe.

End

ACTION: CG AAF

CM-IN-13837 (14 Feb 45) DTG: 140332Z pa

SECRET

AAF
ACTION
CST
INFO
AEP
MSC
DMA
AMS-3
ABI

4

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SECRET-1

PRIORITY

From: CG 50th Bombardment Group, Kharagpur India

To: War Department

Re: GND 518 TH 14 February 1945

Amplify attention Statistical Control Division from
Heavy GND 518 TH

Concerning our YB 2001

Attached is report on mission number 57 on
14 February 1945

A. 14 2475

B. Number one engine shot out by flak and prop
governor on number two engine struck at 2000 revolutions
per minute, crashed on landing at home base.

C. Alongside of runway at Durnford.

D. Marine crew safe.

FEB 14 45 PM



OUT

HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

FEB 14 45 PM



IN

HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
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HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	<i>[Signature]</i>
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Deputy C. of S. Opr.	<i>[Signature]</i>
A. G.	

SECRET "IVI"

PRIORITY

Headquarters
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ACTION COPY TO *SCD*
INFO. COPY TO *DC/SCA*

*Mission 33
a/c Lost Report
~~XX~~ BC*

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department

Nr. CMD 9021 YB

10 February 1945

Arnold attention Statistical Control Division from
Ramey CMD 9021 YB.

Aircraft lost report for mission number 33 on 1st
February '45.

A. 42-247 by flak and prop governor on number two
engine stuck at 2000 revolutions per minute, crashed on
landing at home base.

C. Alongside of runway at Dudkundi.

D. Entire crew safe.

ACTION: CG AAF

INFORMATION: TAG
G-2

CM-IN-9852 (10 Feb 45) DTG 100816Z bjm


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ACTION
CST
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DMA
AMS-3
ABI

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HQ TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

EXTRACT OF TELETYPE CONFERENCE BETWEEN
WASHINGTON AND KHARAGPUR

INITIALS

CHIEF OF STAFF	
DC/S ADM.	
DC/S OPR.	<i>[Signature]</i>
AG	

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INCOMING MESSAGE

TELECON MSG NO. YB-1724	SUBJECT <i>Aborts Mission 33</i> A/C Failing to Bomb Primary Target	DATE 9 Feb 45
-----------------------------------	--	-------------------------

(To: COMGENAF 20 From: COMGENBOMCOM 20)

In accordance with your telecon K-4-7, we submit report on airborne aircraft failing to bomb primary on mission 33 on 1 Feb 1945, target Singapore.

A/C Serial Number	Specific Mechanical Malfunction	Local Action To Prevent Recurrence	Unsatisfactory Report Submitted
40th Group 63455	Macelle doors would not close, after retracting main gear on emergency system	None	Nr. 45-81
65233	Electrical trouble caused by over-heating of voltage regulator.	Replaced regulator. Checked system and rebalanced regulation	Nr. 45-84
24522	Airspeed indicator for power settings low. Went to secondary.	Airspeed indicator re-calibrated and dropping allens corrected. Considered faulty maintenance.	None
24587	Fuel transfer failure due to carbon vanes in fuel pumps.	Replaced pumps (Chronic trouble).	Nr. 45-80
24729	Two spark plus leads of Nr. 3 engine broken down, oil in distributor.	Leads replaced. Distributor seal replaced.	None
444th Group 24472	Engine running rough intermittently back-firing	Carburetor changed. Engine checked o.k.	None


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	INFORMATION	C/S

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
5-33, AF (REV 1 JAN 45)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *now* 7600 63
By *CD* WAPA Date *12/1/88*



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HQ TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

EXTRACT OF TELETYPE CONFERENCE BETWEEN
WASHINGTON AND KHARAGPUR

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AG	

INCOMING MESSAGE

TELECON MSG NO. YB-1724	SUBJECT A/C Failing to Bomb Primary Target (Cont.)	DATE 9 Feb 45
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24580	Fuel transfer inoperative.	Flushed system, replaced fuel transfer pumps.	Nr. 45-49
24873	Electrical trouble, inter communications system out.	Replaced amplifier unit.	None
24730	Nr. 1 engine trouble, excessive fuel pressure.	Fuel pump changed.	Nr. 45-61
462nd Group			
24800	Nr. 4 prop governor stuck at 2700 rpm. Pulled electric head and found ground lead had opening in line.	Inspection all prop governor heads at 25 hour inspection.	Nr. 45-67
24838	Nr. 2 engine running rough. Feathered.	Can find nothing wrong. Still running test.	None
63502	High fuel consumption due to hot running engines.	Not available. Will carry corrective action in our stat summary.	None
65232	Whole electrical system malfunctioning.	System being checked and put in commission. Nr. 4 outboard regulator replaced.	Nr. 45-76
468th Group			
63417	Electrical system out. Ground wire on voltage regulators of Nr. 1 outboard, Nr. 1 inboard, and Nr. 2 generators broken.	Replaced wire.	Nr. 45-83
24487	Nr. 3 booster pump out. Rheostat for Nr. 3 fuel booster pump burnt out.	Premature wear on part that normally lasts life of airplane.	

DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	- 2 -
	INFORMATION	

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
5-35, AF (REV 1 JAN 45)

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Authority now 760063
By CD WAPA Date 12/1/88



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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

EXTRACT OF TELETYPE CONFERENCE BETWEEN
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DC/S OPR.	
AG	

INCOMING MESSAGE

TELECON MSG NO. YB-1724	SUBJECT A/C Failing to Bomb Primary Target (Contd)	DATE 9 Feb 45
-----------------------------------	--	-------------------------

63460

Nr. 4 supercharger
maximum output was
26" HG at altitude.
Waste gate linkage
was binding.

Linkage clearance increased.
This was a new installation
done by the depot.

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	Stat Con (2) - 3 -
	INFORMATION	DC/SVOpr; A-4 (2); Flying Safety

5-35, AF (REV 1 JAN 45)

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By CD WAPA Date 12/1/88

RECD D-1664 1824Z WCR

RECD D-1664 011824Z WCR

RECD TELECON NOTE 011831Z WCR

TELECON MSG NO K-1-3 ((RESTRICTED)) ((011843Z))

SUBJECT: COMMUNIQUE NUMBER 53

TO: COMGENBOMCOM 20 FROM: COMAF 20

THE FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE WILL BE RELEASED HERE AT 012000Z.

QUOTE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE SUPERFORTRESSES IN A LARGE FORCE
ATTACKED JAPANESE NAVAL INSTALLATIONS AT SINGAPORE, 1 FEBRUARY 45
(INDIAN CALENDAR) AND GOOD RESULTS WERE REPORTED FROM THE MISSION,
GENERAL OF THE ARMY H. H. ARNOLD, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE TWENTIETH
AIR FORCE ANNOUNCED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

THIS DAYLIGHT ATTACK WAS CARRIED OUT BY GRIGADIER RPT BRIGADIER
GENERAL ROGER M. RAMEY'S XX BOMBER COMMAND FROM INDIA BASES AND
NONE OF THE B-29'S HAVE BEEN REPORTED LOST TO ENEMY ACTION. VISUAL
BOMBING WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH GOOD TO EXCELLENT RESULTS. ENEMY
FIGHTER OPPOSITION WAS WEAK AND ANTI-AIRDRAFT FIRE WAS REPORTED AS
MODERATE. THE B-29 CREWS TURNED IN CLAIMS OF 2 ENEMY AIRCRAFT DES-
TROYED, 6 PROBABLY DESTROYED AND 3 DAMAGED. UNQUOTE.

(TO GLASS FROM REES)

---END---

TOD: 011950Z WCR

RECD D-161//// D-1665 011842Z WCR

TELECON MSG NR G1

RESTRICTED

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SUBJECT PRESS FLASH

TO CONGENBOMCOM 21 INFO DEPCOMAF 20 FROM COMAF 20

GA WITH UR MESSAGE

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

HEREWITH IS PRESS FLASH FOR RELEASE 011000Z: TWENTIETH AIR
FORCE SUPERFORTRESSES BOMBED JAPANESE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN
THE SINGAPORE AREA TODAY ((FEBRUARY 1, INDIA CALENDAR)) GENERAL
OF THE ARMY H. H. ARNOLD, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE 20TH AIR FORCE,
ANNOUNCED AT HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON. THE MISSION WAS A DAYLIGHT
ATTACK BY B-29'S FROM BRIGADIER GENERAL ROGER M. RAMEY'S XX BOMBER
COMMAND, BASED IN INDIA. DETAILS WILL BE ANNOUNCED WHEN OPERATIONAL
REPORTS ARE RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON. (TO MCKELWAY INFO HARTWELL
FROM REES).

S - 1
YFK

TELECON MSG K-1-1 ((RESTRICTED))

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: PRESS FLASH.

((TO COMBOMCOM 20 FROM COMAF 20))

HEREWITH IS PRESS FLASH FOR RELEASE 011000Z: TWENTIETH AIR
FORCE SUPERFORTRESSES BOMBED JAPANESE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN
THE SINGAPORE AREA TODAY ((FEBRUARY 1, INDIA CALENDAR)) GENERAL
OF THE ARMY H. H. ARNOLD, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE 20TH AIR FORCE,
ANNOUNCED AT HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON. THE MISSION WAS A DAYLIGHT
ATTACK BY B-29'S FROM BRIGADIER GENERAL ROGER M. RAMEY'S XX BOMBER
COMMAND, BASED IN INDIA. DETAILS WILL BE ANNOUNCED WHEN OPERATIONAL
REPORTS ARE RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON.

((TO GLASS FROM REES))

END

RESTRICTED

TOD: 010742Z EHB

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1945 FEB 1 08 07

WAR DEPARTMENT
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1945 FEB 1 08 07

SECRET

Combat Report
* SECRET *
* By Auth of the C. G. *
* XX Bomber Command *
* 11 Feb 45 *
* Date Initials *
* * * * *

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE
Deputy C. of S. Adm.
Deputy C. of S. Opr.
A. G.

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
Intelligence Section
APO 493

11 February 1945

* CORRECTION to REPORT #30-31 1 February 1945 *
* Section 5, page B-I-3, third paragraph, line 2, "reported as *
* meager but intense" should be changed to read "inaccurate but intense" *
* * * * *

PRELIMINARY REPORT

ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

MISSION NUMBER 33. (DAYLIGHT), 1 FEBRUARY 1945

Enemy Attached XX BC
Primary Target - SINGAPORE NAVAL BASE AREA, JOHORE STRAITS,
Secondary Target - GEORGETOWN, PENANG ISLAND, Target of Last
Resort - MARTABAN, BURMA.

A. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED

1. NAVAL BASE AREA, JOHORE STRAITS, SINGAPORE (01°18'N - 103°51'E)

Moderate and inaccurate (42%) to accurate (58%) heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered by all aircraft bombing this area from 0209Z to 0322Z from 18,500 to 21,400 feet altitude through an average undercast of 5/10. The following table shows aircraft over the area in relation to time and heavy AA fire encountered:

Table I: Formations vs. Fire Encountered

Formation	Number of A/C	Bomb Release Time	Time Encountered	Average Fire Encountered	Altitude in feet	Undercast	Heading
1	4	0209Z	0206-14Z	Moderate-Inaccurate	19,900	CAVU-5/10	54°M
2	4	0211Z	0210-14Z	Moderate Accurate-Inaccurate	19,800	CAVU-5/10	53°M
3	11	0214Z	0203-13Z	Moderate-Inaccurate to Accurate	20,600- 21,300	CAVU-6/10	60°M
4	10	0225Z	0223-30Z	Moderate-Inaccurate	20,000	2/10-7/10	56°M
5	19	0233Z	0230-32Z	Moderate Accurate-Inaccurate	19,000- 20,900	4/10-7/10	65°M
6	6	0234Z	0231-35Z	Moderate Accurate-Inaccurate	20,000	5/10-7/10	54°M
7	3	0242Z	0241-43Z	Moderate - Accurate	21,000	6/10-7/10	245°M
8	7	0248Z	0246-49Z	Moderate - Accurate	21,000	5/10-8/10	56°M
9	5	0251Z	0247-51Z	Intense - Accurate	20,000	7/10	56°M
10	18	0259Z	0255- 0300Z	Moderate - Accurate	19,400- 21,000	4/10-9/10	36°M
11	3	0322Z	0322-28Z	Meager - Accurate	20,500- 20,700	7/10	53°M

Following are reports of intensity, accuracy and deviations. The percentages have been determined from the total number of affirmative reports in any one group, as above, level, or below:

B-I-1

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Table II: Intensity, Accuracy and Deviations.

<u>Reports of Accuracy</u>		<u>Reports of Intensity</u>	
Struck	10 percent	Intense	21 percent
Rocked	13 percent	Moderate	48 percent
Within 150'	35 percent	Meager	31 percent
Outside 150'	42 percent		

<u>Reports of Deviations</u>					
Above	28 percent	Ahead	24 percent	Left	21 percent
Level	42 percent	Abreast	30 percent	In Line	46 percent
Below	30 percent	Behind	46 percent	Right	33 percent

Black bursts were observed by all aircraft while 26 observed white and 9 observed phosphorous AA in addition to reports of purple, red, yellow and brown. It is not believed that the elevation of the sun but possibly variations in the development of these bursts were responsible for the multi-colored sightings. A more persistent flash (red, yellow or orange) concomitant with less smoke (black or white) could result in observations as received. These same multi-colored bursts, however, were also reported for Mission #15 over the NAVAL BASE Area when formations were engaged by a NACHI Class CA. And in addition naval reports of heavy antiaircraft opposition encountered by Task Force 58 in the Battle of the Philippine Sea states that "there is strong evidence . . . that the Japanese use colored bursts as an aid to the individual ships in filling their allotted segment of the sky . . ." (Flak Information Bulletin No. 3, Oct 44, Confidential, OPNAV-16-V#51). Continuing reports of multi-colored bursts would establish their application for purposes of identification of fire by Japanese units (naval) responsible for the employment of this type of ammunition.

Naval shipping present and contributing antiaircraft opposition consisted of a NACHI Class CA in the #1 Dock, an ATAGO Class CA, and a 285 foot DD. Approximately 25,000 tons of merchant shipping was also present in the JOHORE STRAITS, but it is not believed that these vessels contributed effective opposition, if any. It was reported by A/C 492 (Formation #8) of the 444th Group that fire from the two CA's burst in teardrop shape (rather than mushroom) and that bursts were "noticeably larger in diameter", than that from land-based sites. Also observed by A/C 424 (Formation #3) of the 468th Group were two "large flaming bursts" approximately 3 times the size of the usual flak burst. Black smoke was first seen followed by a sheet of flame like that from "a flame thrower". Other aircraft of this same formation reported these same bursts accurate for altitude but trailing in addition to the normal phosphorous antiaircraft bursts. Aircraft of Formation #5 reported a very large "plume of white smoke" in the concentration of fire directed at Formation #4. Further peculiar fire was observed by A/C 546 (468th Group) of Formation #10 consisting of "one white burst below and ahead which spun in a circle in the vertical plane". The burst was not similar to recognized phosphorous AA.

From 3 to 30 bursts were observed at any one instant while from 12 to approximately 250 were reported for any one encounter. No distinction could be made regarding types of fire employed by land-based and ship-borne guns, but it is known that the total defense utilized Continuously Pointed, Predicted Concentration and possibly Barrage types of fire. Identifying Predicted Concentration A/C 884 (444th Group) of Formation #6

B-I-2

SECRET

SECRET

reported that "bursts appeared at once at one particular point, never following the formation, and as each formation passed the given point, the concentration would appear". The Flak Officer of the 40th Group also stated, "Observations of bursts stretching out leave no doubt that Continuously Pointed fire was employed while on the bomb and camera run. However, grouping of bursts in a small air volume as well as scattered bursts covering all deviations, in relation to the formation, in a fairly wide area influenced some observers to believe that Predicted Concentration and Barrage fire were also employed".

With an average heading of approximately 55°, aircraft passed just within the maximum envelope of the SINGAPORE TOWN defense where meager and inaccurate anti-aircraft fire was encountered. Several aircraft reported that the first fire encountered from the NAVAL BASE Area originated from the NAVAL Vessels at about the same time land-based installations in the KING'S DOCK Area (SINGAPORE TOWN) commenced firing, followed by land-based units at the NAVAL BASE. It was also reported that just prior to bomb release, the intensity of heavy anti-aircraft fire increased for all formations.... Gun flashes were reported from along the north wharf area of the NAVAL BASE and from the CA anchored in the JOHORE STRAITS just NW of the Floating drydock." Heavy AA fire was encountered on an average of 2.3 prior to and 1.7 minutes following the bomb release time (Table I).

Formations #5, 9 and 10 reported lone enemy aircraft flying parallel courses at the same altitude. Coincident and following reports of "thistle" aircraft, the Accuracy of Heavy AA opposition improved (Table I) indicating that these "pacer" aircraft were possibly reporting present position data or deviations to anti-aircraft installations. The enemy aircraft reported by Formation #9 flew a parallel course from the North-east tip of GREAT KARIMONEN ISLAND (01°08'N - 103°23'E) to the NAVAL BASE Area. No other enemy aircraft were reported by other formations.

Meager and inaccurate automatic weapons fire was also encountered by several formations from sections of SINGAPORE ISLAND enroute to the NAVAL BASE Area. It was reported as white and light gray, as bursting from 5,000 to 10,000 feet below the formations, and as originating from both land-based installations and Naval units in the area.

There is a possibility but no definite indication of the use of gun-laying radar through R.C.M. intercepts or undercast conditions.

2. KALLANG AIRDROME, SINGAPORE (01°23'N - 103°52'E)

Two aircraft of Formation #4 pinpointed anti-aircraft opposition encountered from the SINGAPORE Town area as originating from KALLANG AIRDROME at 0223Z while enroute to the NAVAL BASE Area on a heading of 56°T and at an altitude of 20,000 feet through a 7/10 undercast.

Both heavy anti-aircraft and automatic weapons fire was encountered with white and black bursts. Fire was described as moderate and inaccurate with the number of bursts observed at any one instant varying from 8 to 10 resulting in a total count of 40. Deviations were level or below, behind, and in line or to the right. No enemy aircraft were observed on the same course and altitude. Continuously Pointed fire is believed to have been used.

3. Southwest Tip of SINGAPORE ISLAND (01°20'N - 103°38'E)

Two aircraft of Formation #8 (Table I) pinpointed black heavy anti-aircraft opposition encountered while enroute to the NAVAL BASE at 0239Z

B-I-3

SECRET

S E C R E T

at 20,000 feet under CAVU conditions as originating from the southwest tip of SINGAPORE ISLAND.

Fire was described as moderate and inaccurate with 3 bursts observed at any one instant resulting in a total of 15 for the encounter. Deviations were above and below, behind, and either in line or to the right. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

4. CAPE FIAI (01°16'N - 103°31'E)

One aircraft of 10 (Formation #4) encountered light gray meager and inaccurate heavy antiaircraft fire at 0216Z at 20,000 feet through a 2/10 undercast. A total of 6 bursts was observed for the encounter with deviations of level, behind, and to the right. No enemy aircraft were observed on the same course and altitude. Barrage type fire is believed to have been used. This fire probably originated from sites on SINGAPORE ISLAND.

5. ROEFAT ISLAND (02°07'N - 101°39'E)

Three aircraft of a total of 30 (Formations #3 and #5) reported meager and inaccurate heavy antiaircraft and automatic weapons fire at 0113Z and 0140Z from 19,900 to 21,000 feet through 3/10 to 9/10 undercast. One phosphorous AA burst was reported at 0113Z level, abreast and to the right with no enemy aircraft on the same course and altitude.

A total of 4 AW bursts was also observed at 0113Z approximately 15,000 feet below, ahead and to the right. Three brown heavy AA bursts, occurring independently with deviations of below, abreast and to the right, were reported for the 0140Z encounter. No enemy aircraft were on the same course and altitude.

Although this island was used as the Assembly Point for all aircraft attacking the SINGAPORE AREA, the above three encounters consisted of the total opposition.

6. BEKOK AIRFIELD (02°20'N - 103°05'E)

One aircraft of a total of 4 (Formation #2) reported meager and inaccurate heavy antiaircraft fire at 0227Z (16 minutes after bombs away) at an altitude of 18,500 feet under CAVU conditions. A total of 3 bursts were observed, occurring independently, with deviations of above, ahead and abreast, and to the left. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude. Continuously Pointed fire is believed to have been used.

7. SHIPPING

a. Unidentified Shipping at 04°32'N - 100°10'E

One aircraft reported meager and inaccurate black and white heavy antiaircraft fire at 0055Z at 20,000 feet under CAVU conditions. Deviations were below, abreast and in line and no enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

b. Unidentified Shipping at 03°40'N - 100°23'E

One aircraft reported meager and inaccurate black heavy anti-aircraft fire at 0100Z at 20,000 feet under CAVU conditions. A total of from 5 to 6 bursts were seen with deviations of below, behind and to the

B-I-4

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

left. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude and fire is believed to have been Continuously Pointed.

8. BAYAN LEPAS A/F, PENANG ISLAND (05°17'N - 100°16'E)

One aircraft encountered meager and inaccurate white automatic weapons fire at 0032Z at 19,000 feet under CAVU conditions. A total of 3 bursts, occurring independently, with deviations of below, behind and in line were reported. No enemy aircraft were on the same course and altitude.

9. Vicinity of POINT STUART, ANDAMANS ISLANDS (13°20'N - 92°50'E)

One aircraft encountered meager and inaccurate automatic weapons fire (red tracers) at 2058Z at 3,000 feet altitude under CAVU conditions. A total of 25 bursts, occurring 5 at a time, were observed level, ahead and to the right.

10. GEORGETOWN, PENANG ISLAND (05°25'N - 100°21'E)

Four aircraft of a total of 16 over the area encountered meager and generally inaccurate black heavy antiaircraft fire from 0023Z to 0316Z at altitudes of from 15,000 to 21,000 feet as follows:

Table III: Aircraft vs. Fire Encountered.

Formation	Number of A/C	Bomb Release Time	Time Encountered	Fire Encountered	Altitude in feet	Undercast	Heading
1	1	0024Z	0023Z	Meager-Inaccurate	18,000	5/10	150°M
2	1	0029Z	-----	None	19,500		156°M
3	1	0041Z	0040Z	Meager-Inaccurate	15,000	3/10	30°M
4	1*	-----	0100Z	Meager-Inaccurate	15,000		-----
5	1	0108Z	-----	None	20,100		95°M
6	1	0124Z	-----	None	20,000		120°M
7	1	0135Z	-----	None	17,000	CAVU	155°M
8	1	0208Z	-----	None	20,300		335°M
9	1	0227Z	-----	None	20,000		155°M
10	1	0230Z	-----	None	19,500		013°M
11	1	0233Z	-----	None	21,250	from	140°M
12	1	0247Z	-----	None	19,000		355°M
13	1	0315Z	0314-16Z	Meager - Accurate	21,000		338°M
14	1	0315Z	-----	None	19,400	Varied	335°M
15	1	0359Z	-----	None	20,000		340°M
16	1	0359Z	-----	None	21,300		320°M

* This aircraft encountered fire while enroute to SINGAPORE which it bombed at 0214Z.

The number of bursts observed at any one instant varied from 2 to 4 with a resulting total for any encounter of from 2 to 7. Deviations were generally level, or below, behind, and in line or to the left or right. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude, and the fire encountered by formations #1 and #3 is believed to have been Continuously Pointed.

11. MARTABAN-MOULMEIN AREA (16°33'N - 97°36'E)

One aircraft of a total of 5 bombing the area encountered meager and inaccurate black heavy antiaircraft fire at 0016Z at 17,000 feet under

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CAVU conditions. The following table shows aircraft over the area in relation to fire encountered:

Table IV: Aircraft vs. Fire Encountered

Formation	Number of A/C	Bomb Release Time	Time Encountered	Heavy AA Fire Encountered	Altitude in Feet	Undercast	Heading
1	1	2222Z	-----	-----None-----	10,000	CAVU	90°M
2	1	2339Z	-----	-----None-----	19,000	CAVU	77°M
3	1	0014Z	-----	-----None-----	18,000	CAVU	75°M
4	1	0016Z	0016Z	Meager-Inaccurate	17,000	CAVU	72°M
5	1	0042Z	-----	-----None-----	19,000	CAVU	20°T

A total of 10 bursts, all occurring at approximately the same time, were observed below, behind and in line with the aircraft. No enemy aircraft were observed on the same course and altitude. Fire is believed to have been Predicted Concentration.

12. BASSEIN (16°44'N - 94°45'E)

One aircraft bombed this area from 10,600 feet at 0230Z under CAVU conditions but no antiaircraft opposition was encountered.

B. GROUND-TO-AIR ROCKETS AND BARRAGE BALLOONS

None reported.

C. HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOONS

One possible high-altitude balloon was sighted by one aircraft of the 468th Group at 0053Z from 20,000 feet over the northwest side of PENANG ISLAND (03°25'N - 100°21'E). The balloon, described as teardrop in shape and silver, was reported at an altitude of approximately 10,000 feet. No photographs were obtained.

D. SMOKESCREENS

Based on interpretation of strike photos and crew observations, an ineffective attempt was made to screen NAVAL BASE INSTALLATIONS, JOHORE STRAITS, Singapore.

An inspection of the Table V shows that the enemy initiated operation of generators located at the NAVAL BASE and on 2 small craft cruising about the FLOATING DRYDOCK concurrent with the appearance of the first formation of aircraft bombing the area. Additional generators were placed in operation at the NAVAL BASE and the TANK FARM up to 0214Z when a maximum of 12 were identified.

After 0233Z no generators were in operation in the area, but by this time the ship in the FLOATING DRYDOCK had been hit and set afire resulting in better concealment of the area than when the generators were in operation.

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Table V: Smokescreen - NAVAL BASE Area

Total Generators in Operation	Time	Location of Generators
3	0209Z	1 - Land based in the Naval Base Area 2 - On small craft cruising about the Floating Drydock
9	0211Z	6 - Land based in the Naval Base Area 2 - On small craft cruising about the Drydock 1 - At the Tank Farm approximately 8000' WSW of Floating Drydock
12	0214Z	9 - Land based in the Naval Base Area 0 - On small craft, no longer cruising about the Floating Drydock 3 - At the Tank Farm
8	0225Z	3 - Land based in the Naval Base Area 5 - (Approximately) At the Tank Farm
6	0233Z	1 - Land based in the Naval Base Area 5 - (Approximately) At the Tank Farm
0	0234Z	
0	0251Z	

E. BLACKOUT

None - daylight mission.

F. DAMAGE FROM HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

Two aircraft sustained major damage and 7 aircraft minor damage as a result of flak while over the NAVAL BASE AREA, JOHORE STRAITS, Singapore Island as follows:

Table VI: Damage

Formation	A/C	Group	Bomb Release	Heading	Altitude	Classification
3	536	468th	0214Z	60°M	21,300'	Minor
5	720	444th	0233Z	65°M	19,000'	Minor
6	464	444th	0234Z	54°M	20,000'	Minor
8	736	444th	0248Z	56°M	20,000'	Major
9	275	468th	0251Z	56°M	21,400'	Major
9	719	468th	0251Z	56°M	21,400'	Minor
10	451	444th	0259Z	36°M	19,500'	Minor
10	590	462nd	0259Z	36°M	19,500'	Minor
10	711	462nd	0259Z	36°M	19,500'	Minor

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As this formation was experiencing weak and ineffective enemy fighter attack and air-to-air bombing (no encounters reported by A/C 711 or 454 with 13 E/A encounters and 6 air-to-air bombing encounters reported by the formation with no damage) in addition to moderate and generally accurate heavy antiaircraft fire, the origin of the two phenomena cannot be definitely determined.

It is possible that these two encounters are similar to events reported by the 28th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron in Intelligence Summary Number 47, 26 August 1944, Headquarters 7th Air Force, APO 953, as follows:

"On 22 August during a photo reconnaissance flight over PAGAN Island Captain Taylor, 28th Photo Reconnaissance pilot came back with this report:

"The dive bombers (P-47's) were going in at six to seven thousand feet and diving to two to three thousand feet to release their bombs. Captain Taylor was flying at 13,000 feet making photographic coverage of the assault. The light and medium AA was intense and accurate. Three P-47's were hit and 1 pilot bailed out. At two different times during the run Captain Taylor reports that his plane, an F-5B, vibrated severely as if an AA shell had burst very close to it. The first time it happened Captain Taylor looked in every direction and changed his altitude and speed but could not see any evidence of an AA burst. The second time it occurred he did the same thing. No AA bursts at his altitude could be seen. Captain Taylor reported that general flying conditions were smooth.

"This squadron has made 12 photo reconnaissance flights over PAGAN Airfield and on 3 occasions this same type vibration has been reported. If the Japs have any so-called smokeless AA bursts it is our pilots belief that they are used at PAGAN."

Unfortunately the 7th Air Force report does not mention the extent or lack of concurrent enemy fighter opposition. But it is known that aircraft experiencing these similar occurrences were under accurate antiaircraft fire at the appropriate times. The possibility of an air-to-air projectile should not be ruled out, but preliminary conclusions indicate that the Japanese may be employing smokeless and fragmentless antiaircraft projectiles designed to cause damage through concussion alone.

H. WARNING NETS

It is evident that the enemy did not utilize the prior warning he should have had as aircraft were tracked by early warning radar from the GREAT COCO-ANDAMAN ISLANDS Area to SINGAPORE. The PENANG early warning radar was in operation in addition to units in the SINGAPORE Area.

The first enemy fighter attack occurred at the first bombs away time (0209Z) and no sightings were reported prior to this time. Also, the attempted smokescreen was in process of development at 0209Z, not reaching maximum effort until approximately 0214Z (Table V).

Frank L. Scott, Jr.
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Intelligence Section.

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As the location of the aircraft was not known, the search was conducted in the area of the crash site. The search was conducted by the 2nd Air Force, and the aircraft was located on the 15th day of the search. The aircraft was found in a field near the crash site, and the wreckage was recovered. The aircraft was identified as a B-29, and the wreckage was transported to the crash site. The wreckage was then transported to the crash site, and the wreckage was then transported to the crash site.

It is reported that the wreckage was found in a field near the crash site. The wreckage was found on the 15th day of the search, and the wreckage was then transported to the crash site. The wreckage was then transported to the crash site, and the wreckage was then transported to the crash site.

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HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL



FEB 21 1945

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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

S E C R E T
By authority of -
C. G. Twentieth Air Force
14 Feb. 45
(Date) *gg*
(Initials)

EXTRACT TELETYPE CONFERENCE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND KIRARAGPUR

Washington Parties

Lt. Col. Hewitt

Telecon Number D-1751

Kharagpur Parties

Colonel Herman

Subject: JAPANESE FIGHTER TACTICS - MISSION NO. 33

XXVC

From: COMBOMBOM 20 To: COMAF 20

Following is a detailed description of enemy fighter opposition encountered on Mission No. 33.

I. Japanese Fighter Tactics - Mission No. 33
Target: Singapore, Malaya
Time: Day Mission Date: 1 February 1945

1. General

A. Enemy air opposition was rated weak. Of the 109 B-29's bombing all targets 56 were intercepted. A total of 121 individual encounters developed from 87 attacks by single planes and 15 coordinated attacks which employed 34 enemy planes. Aerial bombs were employed in 36 encounters. One B-29 is missing due to enemy fighter action (presumed to have ditched near the primary target), two B-29's received major damage, and five suffered minor damages. Preliminary claims against enemy air craft were three destroyed, four probably destroyed and 14 damaged. The enemy force opposing B-29's was estimated at 29 Oscars, 16 Tojos, 8 Zekes, 4 Vals, 3 Tonys, 1 Mick, 1 Hufe, 2 Zeke 32, 10 unidentified single engine aircraft and 1 unidentified 2 place enemy fighter.

B. 119 encounters (98% of the total) were in the Primary target area, one over the Secondary target, and one about midway between Singapore and Penang Island, the latter occurring as the B-29 was enroute home from Singapore. Of the 119 encounters in the Primary target area, 28 (23%) occurred before bombs away, 2 (2%) during bombs away, and 89 (75%) after bombs away. The percentage of encounters after bombs away is higher than on Mission No. 27 (57%), but closely parallels the first mission to Singapore, Mission No. 15 (76%). Air action extended over a period of 1 hour and 18 minutes, from 0209Z to 0327Z, at altitudes from 17,500 to 21,000 feet.

C. The number of encounters by individual types of enemy aircraft is shown in the following table:

Table No. 1 - Details of Encounters

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of Encounters</u>	<u>Type of E/A</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Altitude</u>
Primary Target (Singapore)	119	40 by Oscars 31 by Tojos 15 by Zekes	0209Z to 0327Z	17,500 to 21,000

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Location	No. of Encounters	Type of E/A	Time	Altitude
		6 by Vals		
		5 by Tonys		
		1 by Nick		
		1 by Zeke 32		
		19 by unidentified S/E fighters		
		1 by unidentified		
		2 place fighter.		
Secondary Target (Georgetown)	1	1 by Rufe	0040Z	15,000
03°18'N-101°55'E	1	1 by Tojo	0232Z	19,000

2. Directions and Levels of Approach

A. The majority of the encounters, 39%, originated from the frontal quarter, comparing closely to Mission No. 27, when it was 38%. Changes, however, were noted in other quarters, with 19% of the encounters originating from the right side, 9% from the rear, and 33% from the left quarter. The percentage of encounters from the left quarter was more than twice that of Mission No. 27 (16%) and encounters on the right quarter were less, comparing to 29% on Mission No. 27. Analysis of directions of approach indicated that a greater than usual number of coordinated attacks on Mission No. 33 originated from the 10 o'clock position, and conversely, a lesser number came from the right side, from the usual 2 and 3 o'clock positions. The azimuth of the sun in relation to the axis of attack and the turn for the course home after bombing was considered in an attempt to determine a reason for the shift, but it was found that left side attacks (from about 10 o'clock) were executed with the sun on the left beam of the enemy fighters before bombs away, and almost directly into the sun after bombs away. Thus, it is difficult to explain the shifting from right side to left side approaches.

B. As to levels of approach, an unusual number were high, 71%, in comparison to Missions No. 27 (57%), and No. 15 (38%). A partial explanation for this may exist in the fact that average altitudes flown on the two previous missions were higher than on Mission No. 33. On Mission No. 15, B-29's were intercepted up to 22,750 feet and on Mission No. 27 up to 25,200 feet, while the highest reported interception on Mission No. 33 was 21,000 feet. Of the remainder on this Mission, 17% were level, and 12% were low. The small number of low approaches is not surprising as KC indications were that the Japanese had sufficient warning of the approach of B-29's to have their fighters airborne and waiting over Singapore.

C. A summary of directions and levels of approach for all encounters is shown in Tables No. 2 and No. 3.

Table No. 2 - Direction and Level of Approach

Direction of Encounter	Front		Left				Rear			Left		TOTAL	
	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		10
High	19	11	8	11	4	2	2	2	3	2	3	19	85(71%)
Level	2	1	2	3	2	0	1	2	1	2	3	1	20(17%)
Low	3	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	5	1	15(12%)
Total	24	13	10	15	6	2	3	4	4	8	11	21	
	47(39%)		23(19%)				11(9%)			40(33%)		121(100%)	

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Table No. 3 - Level Of Approach

Level of Approach	Front	Right	Rear	Left
High	38 (81%)	17 (75%)	7 (64%)	24 (60%)
Level	5 (11%)	5 (22%)	4 (36%)	6 (15%)
Low	4 (8%)	1 (4%)	0 (0%)	10 (25%)
Total	47 (100%)	23 (100%)	11 (100%)	40 (100%)

3. Exchange of Fire:

A. Japanese pilots opened fire in 51 known encounters, 42% of the total. This is considerably lower than Missions No. 27 (61%), and No. 15 (54%), but is accounted for to a certain extent by the large number of encounters (40, or, 33% of the total) in which enemy fire was reported as "unknown"; it is probable that the enemy fired in more than 51 encounters. The majority of enemy pilots opened fire at longer ranges than on these previous missions and, as a result, observations were difficult. B-29's opened fire in 115 of the 121 encounters (95%), a slightly higher than usual figure, but consistent with a rising trend of B-29 fire which has become evident on recent missions to other areas as well as Singapore.

Table No. 4. - Distances Opened Fire

Distance (Yards)	Enemy Fire		B-29 Fire	
	No. of Attacks	Percent	No. of Attacks	Percent
0 - 499	1	2	8	7
500 - 799	15	29	23	20
800 - 999	14	28	34	30
1000 & over	21	41	50	43
Totals	51	100	115	100

4. Aggressiveness of Enemy Attacks and Pilot Ability

A. Japanese pilots exhibited about the same degree of aggressiveness noted on the previous mission, No. 27, to the same area. 34% of the encounters were pressed to distances under 250 yards. Several instances were reported of enemy pilots flying through formations in their breakaways but, on the whole, crew reports indicated that Japanese pilots in the Singapore area did not attack with the same determination as those based in China, Manchuria and Kyushu. The flying skill of these enemy pilots appeared to be on a fairly high level notwithstanding their evident reluctance to press the attacks closely. There were 15 coordinated attacks, in which enemy elements varying from 2 to 5 aircraft were employed, and for the most part were well executed as to flying ability even though they were not closely pressed.

B. A clear and definite estimate of enemy pilot aggressiveness in the Singapore area was difficult to make. For example, one crew reported that some enemy pilots were aggressive and determined even to the extent of flying through their own anti-aircraft in order to attack B-29's; another unit of Japanese pilots in the same area were reported as merely performing acrobatics and other aerial maneuvers, making no attempt to attack. The latter group was probably composed of green and inexperienced pilots sent up to get the planes off the ground, to observe the tactics of the more seasoned Jap pilots and possibly to impress B-29 crews with Jap flying skill.

C. Table No. 5 shows distances to which enemy fighters pressed their attacks.

Table No. 5 - Distances to which attacks were pressed

Distance (Yards)	No. of Encounters	Percent
1000 & over	7	6
800 - 999	20	17
500 - 799	21	17
250 - 499	32	26
0 - 249	41	34
Total	121	100

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5. Aerial Bombing Attacks

A. 36 aerial bombing attacks (30% of total encounters) were reported, a higher number than encountered on either of the two previous missions. The majority of bombs were of the phosphorous type and, as usual, ineffective.

B. Bombs were dropped during both single plane and coordinated attacks, and by various methods. Some enemy fighters flew high overhead, out of range, and bombed from level flight. Others dived at formations in typical divebombing fashion, releasing their bombs at the bottom of the dive then zooming out of the way, and still others approached very close to formations and "flipped" their bombs. Explosions occurred above, below and on all sides of formations, but none was close enough to cause any damage. The fact that most attacks were made after bombs away also reduced the "nuisance" value of these aerial bombing attacks to a far greater degree than if they had occurred before bombs away, and, particularly, during the bomb run.

C. One formation reported that two enemy aircraft were observed doing aerobatics out in front in a possible attempt to divert attention from other Jap planes attacking with aerial bombs.

D. An Oscar, flying parallel about 1000 yards above and to the right of a formation of B-29's, banked sharply to the left, "flipped" a bomb from its belly and flew over the formation in its breakaway. The bomb was seen to ignite at almost the same instant it left the Oscar's belly, and resembled a red ball of fire. No further observations were made at the time and the question arises whether it involved some hitherto unencountered type of aerial projectile, some form of firing mechanism for a rocket projectile (or the projectile itself) or whether it was simply a premature explosion of some ordinary aerial bomb.

E. An extremely large aerial bomb burst was reported by one crew. The bomb, possibly a phosphorous-type, exploded violently, and greyish white smoke expanded to about 100 feet, with long streamers extending in all directions. B-29's have encountered similar large bursts in other target areas, notably Omura, where, on Mission No. 17, streamers from several phosphorous-type bomb bursts mushroomed out to distances of 150 to 500 feet.

F. One enemy aircraft (unidentified) was reported to have either ejected smoke or dropped a quickly exploded aerial bomb which resembled in every way a small cloud. It was without the usual tentacles which characterize phosphorous-type bombs.

6. Coordinated Attacks

A. There were 15 coordinated attacks, employing 34 enemy aircraft and resulting in 34 individual encounters, 28% of the total. This was a smaller percentage than on Mission No. 27 when 45% of the encounters resulted from coordinated attacks, but still represents an increase over Mission No. 15 (18%), and shows evidence of increased planning and teamwork in the Singapore area during recent months. 13 attacks were made by elements of two enemy fighters, one by an element of three and the remaining attack by five enemy fighters. For the most part, no new or unusual tactics were employed by the Japanese, and attacks were not closely pressed. Two coordinated attacks, however, were different in some respects than those encountered by B-29's to date and are described in the following paragraph:

B. Two single engine fighters (Oscars or Zekes) attacked in line astern from 1 o'clock high. It looked like a typical high frontal attack until one of the fighters broke off, still some distance out, and slipped and skidded in a possible attempt to draw fire from the center of the formation. One crew reported that two 20mm wing guns were firing as it slipped off to the side. The other fighter kept coming in, and before breaking off at about 250 yards dropped an aerial bomb near the formation. No claims were made against the enemy aircraft nor was damage from the attack reported by the B-29. The second coordinated attack was executed by five Oscars, and described as a "strafing" attack. The enemy fighters circled high above the formation and when reaching a position between 10:30 and 11 o'clock nosed down toward the formation and sprayed it with gunfire. Each Oscar attacked once (one dropping aerial bombs in addition to shooting), opened fire at 1500 yards and closed to about 400 yards be-

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fore peeling off to a breakaway. One B-29 reported damage to a prop governor from enemy gunfire. There were no claims against the Oscars.

7. Rammig Attacks: There were no reports of enemy attempts to ram, nor of any instances of near collisions.

8. Rockets: None

9. Evasive Action: Three of the four groups participating reported no evasive action taken against enemy aircraft. The fourth group reported closing and shifting one formation in order to uncover guns.

10. New Weapons

A. A Tojo was reported by one crew to have fired at them with possible off-set wing guns. The enemy plane flew parallel to the formation, level and to the right rear, and while about 2000 yards out, appeared to fire with off-set guns. No damage was inflicted on the B-29's. Tojo then moved ahead, gained altitude, turned and attacked the formation frontally with a normal firing attack.

11. New or Unusual Tactics

A. Crews reported that a great many Japanese pilots half-rolled at the point of breaking away and kept their bellies exposed as they dived. This maneuver in the breakaway has not been common with enemy pilots in the experiences of B-29 crews in such quantity.

B. The dive-bombing technique (mentioned in a previous section) in some cases involved almost vertical dives by enemy fighters from above B-29 formations.

12. New Aircraft

Two observations of previously unencountered Japanese fighters were reported. The first was described as shaped like a Val but with retractable landing gear and a wing span estimated at 50 feet. The second had a thick, round tapered fuselage, retractable landing gear, radial engine and severely swept-back wings. The fuselage tapered sharply to a pointed tail. No further descriptive details were observed.

13. Attacks Against Formations

A study of attacks on various positions within the formations showed that they were well scattered. While examination indicated that some formations had heavier attacks on one side or the other the average indicated no preferences for Japanese pilots. High planes and elements showed a slightly heavier number of attacks but this is believed to have been caused by the over-large number of high approaches, particularly in aerial bombing attacks. The differences, however, were too slight to be of appreciable significance.

14. Claims against Enemy Aircraft

Following are details of combat on preliminary claims of 3 destroyed, 4 probably destroyed and 14 damaged.

Table No. 6 - Details of Combat - Preliminary Claims

<u>Enemy Aircraft</u>	<u>Claim</u>	<u>No. of B-29's in Formation</u>	<u>Direction and Level of Approach</u>	<u>B-29's Opened Fire (Yards)</u>	<u>Distance E/A Brokeaway or Disintegrated (Yards)</u>
Tojo	Destroyed	4	11 High	500	300
Tojo	Destroyed	10	10 Level	900	300
Zeke	Destroyed	10	9 Low	1000	600
Tony	Probably Destroyed	3	11 Low	1000	550
S/E	Probably Destroyed	11	10 High	800	300
Zeke	Probably Destroyed	11	10 High	1000	200
Tojo	Probably Destroyed	5	8 Low	800	500
Tojo	Damaged	3	3 High	900	450
Tojo	Damaged	4	8 Level	900	900
Oscar	Damaged	4	11 High	800	500
Val	Damaged	10	6 Level	500	500
Oscar	Damaged	4	2 High	600	400
Tojo	Damaged	4	1 High	1000	800

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Oscar	Damaged	11	12 High	1500	1500
S/E	Damaged	11	11 High	1000	400
Oscar	Damaged	11	2 High	1000	200
S/E	Damaged	5	10 High	800	300
Tojo	Damaged	5	12 High	800	300
Zeke	Damaged	5	9 High	1000	1000
Val	Damaged	10	9 Low	1500	500
Tojo	Damaged	19	11 High	900	50

15. Summary

A. Air opposition was rated weak, with 56 of 109 B-29's sustaining 87 single and 15 coordinated attacks, resulting in 121 individual encounters. 119 encounters were in the Primary target area, one in the Secondary target area and one midway between Singapore and Georgetown. Due to enemy fighter action, one B-29 is missing, two received major damage and five suffered minor damage. Preliminary claims against enemy aircraft were three destroyed, 4 probably destroyed and 14 damaged. The enemy intercepting force was estimated at 65 fighter aircraft.

B. The majority of encounters (39%) originated from the frontal quarter, and the next highest number came from the left side (33%) a distinct change from former tactics. 71% of the approaches were high (an unusually high percentage), 17% were level and 12% were low.

C. Japanese pilots opened fire in 42% of the total encounters (a lower than usual figure) and B-29's opened fire in 95% of the encounters. Enemy pilots were rated with the same degree of aggressiveness as on the previous mission to the same area.

D. 36 aerial bombing attacks were reported, mostly with phosphorous type bombs, and, all were ineffective. Coordinated attacks were 28% of total encounters, mostly executed by two plane elements.

E. There were no attempts to ram B-29's nor were there any instances of near collisions. No rocket attacks were reported.

F. A Tojo was reported with off-set wing guns. A possible new type Japanese Fighter was reported. It had a thick, round, tapered fuselage, retractable landing gear, radial engine and severely swept back wings.

16. Enemy aircraft markings

<u>Color</u>	<u>Enemy Aircraft</u>	<u>Markings</u>
Olive-drab	Zeke	Red diagonal stripes on fuselage; red balls on wings.
" "	Zeke	No markings observed
" "	Tojos	No markings observed
" "	Tojos	Rising sun insignia
" "	Hick	Red tips on each wing.
" " (dark)	Rufe	Light colored pontoons
Silver	Tojos & Zekes	Red circles
" "	Tojos & Zekes	No markings observed
" "	Tojos	Red stripes on fuselage.
" "	Oscars	Red circles on wings.
Camouflaged	Tojos, Oscars & Zeke 32's	No markings observed
Bluish-grey	Oscar	No markings observed
Brownish-grey	Oscar	No markings observed.
Yellow & grey	Tojo	Yellow fuselage, grey wings.
Grey	Zeke	No markings observed
" "	Oscar	Red balls on wings
Brown	Oscars & Tojos	No markings observed.
White	Tojo	No markings observed
Color unreported	Zeke 32	Red wing lips on underside.
" "	Tojos	Red stripes across bright green wings.

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DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: None

INFORMATION: C/S; DC/S Opr (2); A-2 (16); A-3 OCAR (6); COM (3); Stat Control (2)
Op Analysis (1) (5 extra)

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By *CD* WAPA Date *12/1/88*

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SECRET I VI

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Ops.	
A. G.	

opr *Mission 33*
XX BC
Photo

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department
Deputy Commander 20th Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area,
Leyte, Philippines
CG, Army Air Force, India Burma Sector, Calcutta, India

Nr: CMDX 8648 2 February 1945

COMAF 20, DEPCOMAF 20 pass to CINCPOA from Ramey info
MacArthur, Stratemeyer CMDX 8648 D.

Now comes word of photo recon 5MR14, 2nd February;

Over Singapore and Georgetown take off 011706Z, landed
020900Z. Photos at 30,000 feet thru 5/10 cloud at Singapore,
at 21,000 feet CAVU Georgetown. No interception, moderate
and inaccurate flak over Singapore. Crew reports sighting
aircraft carrier outside Singapore harbor.

Good to excellent photos of Johore Strait from
causeway to Tangi Point and from Kalang airfield to Deppel
harbor docks. Full cover Georgetown, Penang Island.

Now follows first phase interpretation:

Singapore naval base-large floating drydock is now
on even keel, very low in water but shops and cranes atop
bulkheads are above water. Damage to port bulkhead is
apparent. 460 foot vessel has decks awash apparently rest-
ing on bottom of dock. Hits on transit sheds number 3 and
2, formerly smoke obscured are confirmed. No change in number
1 dock or small floating dock. Merchant vessels include 185
foot, 165 foot AK's.

CM-IN-2658 (3 Feb 45)

SECRET

AB1
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IPH
RWX
MSC
CST
RER
INFO
AB1
INFO
INFO

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SECRET IVI

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 2

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

Nr: CMDX 8648

2 February 1945

Johore Straits-naval vessels include Atago class CA (damaged stern), 285 foot DD2-250 foot torpedo boats, 225 and 2-270 foot patrol craft. Merchant vessel tonnage aggregates 42,000 gross tons including 465, 375, 200, 225, 160, 365 foot AK's and 180, 465, 230, 460 (decks awash in floating dock), 190, 410 (stern damages) foot engines aft cargo 11-335 foot tankers plus four type X fuel barges.

Singapore area-naval vessels include 275 foot SS at Sheers wharf and 165 foot patrol craft. Merchant vessel tonnage for south Singapore Island aggregates 76,000 tons gross as follows:

- (1) Phillip Channel-4-210 foot standard type engines aft cargo, 165 foot engines aft cargo, type X fuel barge.
- (2) Outer roads-10 ft standard type engines aft cargo, 465 foot transport after deck awash.
- (3) Keppel harbor area-310 foot tanker, 400 (King's Dock) 295 foot engines aft cargoes, 175, 260 (dock number 2), 435 foot AK's.
- (4) South pier-150, 170 foot engines aft cargoes. (East wharf-430 foot tanker) Tow 60 foot AK.
- (6) Victoria Dock-200 foot engines aft cargo.
- (7) Main wharf-415 foot tanker, 320 foot AK, 270 foot engines aft cargo.
- (8) West wharf-3-435 foot engines aft cargoes, 260 foot AK.
- (9) Seaplane approach-200 foot tanker. Georgetown-285 foot mine layer, no large merchant shipping. Tangi Point airfield-3 small single engine, two twin engine medium.

CM-IN-2658

(3 Feb 45)

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SECRET I VI

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 3

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

Re: GMDX 8648

2 February 1945

Partial cover Kalang airfield shows five twin engine
medium.

End interpretation.

End

ACTION: CG AAF

INFORMATION: OPD
G-2
Adm King
Log

CM-IN-2658

(3 Feb 45)

DTG 021925Z

aj

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 3

Room 00, 50th Bombardment Group, Kharagpur, India

5 February 1945

0800Z

Parade cover Kharagpur airfield shows five twin engine

and investigation


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FEB 3 45 AM

FEB 3 45 AM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

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egk
Paraphrase
25K
3/26
@

SECRET I VI

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Op.	
C. S.	

Mission 33
XX BC
Photo

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department
 Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area,
 Advance Echelon, Leyte, Philippines
 CG, US Army Air Forces, India Burma Sector,
 Calcutta, India
 CG, US Army Forces, India Burma Theater,
 New Delhi, India
 CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China
 CG, US Army Forces, China Theater,
 Chungking, China

No: CMDX 8585 D 2 February 1945

COMAF XX, DEPCOMAF XX pass to CINCPOA from Ramey
 info MacArthur, Stratemyer, Chennault, Wedemeyer, Sultan,
 CMDX 8585 D.

Comes now word of Twentieth Bomber attack on Singa-
 pore gleaned from strike photos and post-strike mission 5
 MR 13, 1 February, over target at 0425Z hours.

First strike photos show dock partially submerged
 and 460 foot vessel therein to have steam up presumably
 ready to leave. First formation over scored direct hit amid
 ships on vessel and at least one hit on dock. Succeeding
 ten formations scored several more direct hits on dock and
 several near misses. Post strike photos show vessel blazing
 furiously in two places and dock sunk for over two thirds
 of its length, only extreme east portion showing above water.
 Number one dock now has Nachi class CA with seventy feet
 stern destroyed (previous damage) dock partially flooded.

CM-IN-1677 (2 Feb 45)

SECRET

AAF
ACTIONS
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INFO
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AEP
RDB
RER
DAO
CST
ABI

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SECRET IVI

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 2

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

No: CMDX 8585 D 2 February 1945

Only visible damage is hit on edge of dock chipping off fifty foot section. No new damage to cruiser. Damage to Naval Base facilities include following (all bombs 1,000 pound general purpose).

Two hits on Engineering block, destruction of air compressor house, heavy damage to gun shop, hit on construction block, damage to power house, two hits on electrical workshop, one third destruction of saw mill and timber store, hit on boat house, at least one hit each on number two transit shed and on storehouses numbers one, two, four and five. Several small miscellaneous buildings damaged and several more destroyed.

Georgetown, secondary target, attacked by fifteen aircraft shows following damage:

Three medium sized warehouses destroyed, one damaged, several business/residential areas hit.

Now follows first phase interpretation of strike and post-strike for shipping and airfields:

Full cover Jahore Straits from causeway to just south of Naval Base shows departure of two Nachi class CA, and 610 foot seaplane tender. Naval vessels visible include Nachi class CA in number one dock, Atago class CA (damaged stern), 285 foot DD, 2-250 foot torpedo boat, 240 foot patrol craft, 190 foot patrol craft.

CM-IN-1677 (2 Feb 45)

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SECRET IVI

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 3

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharegpur, India

No: CMDX 8585 D 2 February 1945

Merchant tonnage aggregates 25,500 gross tons including 180, 230, 465,410 (damaged stern), 475 foot engines aft cargoes latter ablaze in floating dock and 185, 200, 320 (small floating drydock) foot AKs.

Full cover Georgetown reveals 285 foot minelayer, 185 patrol craft both underway, no large merchant shipping.

Butterworth Airfield shows 17 medium twin engine and four small single engine. Sewbaweng shows 13 single engine small, one twin engine medium. Crew reported sighting convoy of 50 small ships at 0410 north-10037 east course 138 at ten knots; three tankers at 0255 north-10105 east heading 320 at ten knots. Take off for photo was 311930Z, landing 011300Z. Altitude of photos 26,000 feet.

End

ACTION: CG AAF

INFORMATION: OPD
G-2
Adm King
Log

CM-IN-1677 (2 Feb 45) DTG 020120Z hrt

SECRET


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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY


FEB 2 45 AM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

OUT

FEB 2 45 AM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

IN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 760063
By CD NAPA Date 12/1/88

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3

HEADQUARTERS, TWENTIETH AIR FORCE * SECRET *
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL * By authority of CG, *
WASHINGTON 25, D. C. * Twentieth Air Force *
* 1 Feb 45 *
* (Date) (Initials) *

EXTRACT OF TELETYPE CONFERENCE BETWEEN WASHINGTON & KHARAGPUR

Washington Parties

Kharagpur Parties

Lt. Col. Hewitt

Col. Ankenbrandt

Telecon Message No. D-1665 Subject: Flash Photo Report

(To: COMAF 20 From: COMGENBOMCOM 20)

Following is flash first phase interpretation report gleaned from post-attack reconnaissance over Singapore at 0425Z hours.

(1) Floating dock, 50,000 tons:

The dock is seen to be sunk except for extreme eastern edge. Outline of dock is only faintly visible for over 2/3 of its length. 460 feet merchant vessel therein has been hit, is low in water and is seen to be burning furiously in two places. A large oil slick surrounds dock.

Only one set strike photos available at this time taken approximately midway in the attack. Post-strike shows dock has settled considerably in the interim.

(2) No. Q dock:

Nachi class CA with 70 feet of stern ^{no new damage} (previous damage) is now in dock. Dock is about half-flooded, new gate in place. Only visible damage is one hit on edge of dock just south of caisson recess chipping off about 50 feet of edge of dock. No new damage to cruiser.

(3) Naval base facilities:

- A. Engineering block took 2 direct hits, shows structural damage.
- B. Air compressor house is destroyed.
- C. Gun shop has been heavily damaged.
- D. Construction block took a direct hit.
- E. Power house damaged by near miss.
- F. Electrical workshop took 2 direct hits.
- G. Approximately 1/3 of saw mill and timber store is destroyed.
- H. Boat house took a direct hit.
- I. Storehouse No. R is damaged.
- J. No. E transit shed took one direct hit.
- K. Five or 6 small miscellaneous buildings are destroyed and equal number damaged. Several hits noted in base store areas and among trackage.
- L. Smoke from burning vessel obscures virtually all of transit shed area including small floating drydock.

(4) Complete first phase on mission will follow later by radio.

DISTRIBUTION:

Action: None
Information: C/S; DC/S Opr (2 cys); A-2 (12 cys); A-3(OC&R) (6 cys);
Stat Con (2 cys); Op Anal (1 cy); Anti-Aircraft (1 cy)
Note: 5 extra copies for file.

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HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET
By authority of
C.G., Twentieth Air Force

(Date) _____ (Initials) *E.H.*

EXTRACT TELECON CONFERENCE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND KHARAGPUR

Washington Parties

Kharagpur Parties

Lt. Col. Hewitt

Colonel Herman

Telecon Number YB-1748

Subject: RATE OF RECOVERY

(To: COMNAF 20 From: COMSOPCOM 20)

*Stat
XXBC*

Rate of recovery from mission No. 33 against Singapore on 1 Feb.

GROUP	TOTAL TACTICAL A/C ON MISSION	LOST ON MISSION	CAPABLE OF RECOVERY	RECOVERED BY D-11	PARTICIPATED in 7 Feb. 45 MISSION
40th	28	1	27	27	21
44th	28	1	27	27	22
462nd	28	0	28	28	26
468th	29	0	29	28	24
TOTAL	113	2	111	110	73

Recovery: No. of A/C Combat Operations (Cumulative) February

GROUP	D-Day	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
40th	19	21	23	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	27	27
44th	10	14	21	23	26	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
462nd	12	14	15	24	26	26	26	26	26	27	28	28
468th	11	25	26	27	27	28	28	28	28	28	28	28
TOTAL	52	74	85	100	105	107	107	107	107	108	110	110
	E-Day	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Percent of those capable of recovery which recovered												
		47PC	67PC	77PC	90PC	95PC	96PC	96PC	96PC	97PC	99PC	99PC


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ACTION: None

INFO: CS; DC/S Opr (2) A-2 (1); A-3 OC&R (6)
Stat Control (2); Op Analysis (1); (5 cys for file)


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Authority *760063*
By *CD* Date *12/1/88*

FEB 15 45 AM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

FEB 15 45 AM



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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

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PRIORITY

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Opr.	/
A. G.	

From: CG 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur India

To: War Department
CG 14th Air Force, Kunming China
CG 10th Air Force, Myitkyina, Burma
CG Army Air Forces, India Burma Sector Calcutta India
Deputy Command, 20th Air Force, Guam

Nr: CMDX 8838 YB *Stal* *Mission 33* *XXBC* 7 February 1945

Arnold attention Statistical Control Division info
Stratemeyer, Chennault, Davidson, DEPCOM AF 20th also pass
to CG ADVONBOM COM 21st from Ramey CMDX 8838 YB

Format for mission number 33 run on 1st February 1945
against Singapore. Mission run from rear area bases,
columns A, B and C blank D number of aircraft airborne
near area. E and F number of aircraft bombing the different
targets. G and H number and type of bombs on target.
I number of aircraft failing to bomb. J through L. personnel
losses, killed missing and injured. M through O negative.
P aircraft missing. Q through S claims against enemy aircraft,
destroyed, probably destroyed and damaged.

Mission number 33: 40th Group:

D. 28 a/c *airborne in food area*
E. and F 22 primary, two secondary, three last resort.
G. and H. 107 *bombs* - 1,000 pound GP (*type*)
I. One a/c *failed to bomb*
J. None *killed*
K. 12 - *missing (personnel)*
L. None *injured*
P. One *a/c missing*
Q. Three *E/A destroyed*
R. None *E/A prob. "*
S. Five. *E/A damaged*

CM-IN-7102

(7 Feb 45)

SECRET

AEP
INFO
M SC
ACTION
AAF

22

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SECRET "IVI"
PRIORITY

page 2

From: CG 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur India
Nr: CMDX 8838 YB 7 February 1945

444th Group:

D. 28
E. and F. 21 primary, five secondary, one last resort.
G. and H. 126 - 1,000 pound GP.
I. One
J, K, L, P, Q None.
R. One
S. None.

462nd Group:

D. 28
E. and F. 24 primary, two secondary, one last resort.
G. and H. 119 - 1,000 pound GP.
I. One
J. and K. None
L. One
P, Q, R, None
S. One.

468th Group:

D. 29
E. and F. 21 primary, six secondary, one opportunity.
G. and H. 112 - 1,000 pound GP.
I. One
J. One
K. None
L. One
P. and Q. None
R. Three
S. Eight.

CM-IN-7102

(7 Feb 45)

22

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET "IVI"
PRIORITY

page 3.

From: CG 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur India

Nr: CMDX 8838 YB

7 February 1945

Totals:

D. 113
E. and F. 88 primary, 15 secondary, five last resort
and one opportunity.
G. and H. 464 - 1,000 pound GP
I. Four
J. One
K. 12
L. Two
P. One
Q. Three
R. Four
S. 14.

End

ACTION: CG AAF

INFORMATION: OPD
G-2

CM-IN-7102

(7 Feb 45)

DTG 07447Z

aj

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22

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
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HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

FEB 8 45 AM



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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

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HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
WASHINGTON, 25, D. C.

SECRET

By order of C. G.
Twentieth Air Force

4 Feb. 45
(Date)

(Initials)

EXTRACT OF TELETYPE CONFERENCE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND KHARAGPUR

Washington Parties

Kharagpur Parties

Lt. Col. Hewitt

Col. Herman

Telecon Message No. D 1684

Subject: Intelligence Statistical Summary of Mission No. 33

(To: COMAF 20 From: COMENBOMCOM 20)

Intelligence statistical summary of mission No. 33 follows:

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
INTELLIGENCE SECTION
AFO 493

INTELLIGENCE STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF MISSION NO. 33
1 February 1945

(Based on preliminary statistics as of 031000Z)

Disposition of Aircraft:	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
1. A/C Airborne	28	28	28	29	113
2. A/C Returned to XX BC Bases	24	26	24	25	99
3. A/C landed Elsewhere	3 nd	2 nd	4 th	4 th	13
4. A/C Missing	1 st	0	0	0	1

"40th - 3 A/C landed at Chittagong.

444th - 2 A/C landed at Cox's Bazaar.

462nd - 3 A/C landed at Cox's Bazaar; 1 A/C landed at Chittagong.

468th - 4 A/C landed at Cox's Bazaar.

" A/C 589 presumed to have ditched near target.

II. Bombing Record:

1. Total Bombing Targets	27	27	27	28	109
2. PT - A	21	14	12	20	67
3. Alternate PT - B	1	7	12	1	21
4. ST - C	2-E	5-F	2	6	15
5. LPT - D	3	1	1	0	5
6. Tgts. of Opp - G	0	0	0	1	1
7. Jettisoned Bombs	0	1	1	1	3
8. Returned bombs	1	0	0	0	1
9. Bombing Altitudes at					
PT's - Low	18500	19000	18800	21300	18500
- High	20600	20500	19000	21400	21400

A. Floating Drydock, Singapore

B. Drydock and rest wall area, Singapore Naval Base area.

C. Swettenham Pier and Storage Area, Georgetown.

D. Railroad jetties and yards, Martaban, Burma.

E. A/C 522 dropped 3 Gr on ST and jettisoned 1.

F. A/C 375 dropped 1 Gr on ST and jettisoned 4.

G. Bassein, Burma

-1-
SECRET

S E C R E T

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III. Method of Bombing:	40th	444th	462nd	468th	TOTAL
1. PT - visual	21	14	12	20	67
radar	0	0	0	0	0
2. Alternate PT -visual	1	7	12	1	21
radar	0	0	0	0	0
3. ST - visual	1	4	2	6	13
- radar	1	0	0	0	1
- blind	0	1	0	0	1
4. LRT - visual	3	1	1	0	5
- radar	0	0	0	0	0
5. T of O - visual	0	0	0	1	1
radar	0	0	0	0	0

IV. Disposition of Bombs:

1. On all targets	107	122	119	112	468
2. On PT	84	66	52	80	282
3. On Alt. PT	4	33	53	4	94
4. On ST	7	19	9	24	59
5. On LRT	12	4	5	0	21
6. On Opp. Tgts.	--	--	--	4	4
7. Jettisoned	1	10	5	4	20
8. Returned	4	--	--	--	4
9. Total Bombs	112	132	124	116	484
10. Tonnage on Tgts. (Short Tons):					
A. All targets	54.48	62.18	60.59	57.08	234.33
B. PT	42.77	33.64	26.48	40.77	143.66
C. Alt. PT	2.04	16.82	26.99	2.04	47.89
D. ST	3.56	9.68	4.58	12.23	30.05
E. LRT	6.11	2.04	2.54	---	10.69
F. Opp Targets	---	---	---	2.04	2.04
11. Average No. Bombs per A/C Airborne	4.0	4.7	4.4	4.0	4.03
12. Average tonnage per A/C airborne	2.04	2.39	2.25	2.04	2.18

"The 40th and 462nd groups carried M-44 1000 pound (actual weight 1018.4 pounds) GP bombs and the 444th and 468th carried M-65 1000-pound (actual weight - 1019.4 pounds) GP bombs. Both types were fused .1 second nose and .025 second tail.

V. Observed Results of Bombing:

	40th	444th	462nd	468th	TOTAL
1. PT	Excell.	Excell.	Good-Excell	Excell	Good-Excell
2. Alt. PT	Unrept.	Good	Good-Excell	Unrept.	Good-Excell
3. ST	Fair-Good	Excell	Good	Unob-Excel	Unob-Fair-gOOD- excell
4. LRT	Poor-Excel	Unobs	Good	---	Unob-Poor-Good- excell
5. Opportunity	---	---	---	Poor	Poor

VI. Time and Weather

1. PT - - First	0209	0232	0233	0214	010209
Last	0233	0248	0322	0258	010322
2. Alt. PT-First	0258	0242	0259	0259	010242
Last	0258	0259	0259	0259	010259
3. ST - First	0029	0024	0135	0108	010024
Last	0041	0315	0247	0359	010359
4. LRT - First	2339	2222	0016	----	312222
Last	0042	2222	0016	----	010042
5. T/O - First	----	----	----	0230	010230
6. Weather - PT	-----	-----	5/10 Undercast	-----	-----

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ST -----CAVU to 4/10 Undercast-----
LRT -----CAVU-----

VII. Casualties:

1. Killed	0	0	0	1	1
2. Wounded	0	0	0	1	1
3. Missing	12	0	0	0	12

VIII. Claims

1. Destroyed	3	0	0	0	3
2. Probably Dest.	0	1	0	3	4
3. Damaged	5	0	1	8	14

DISTRIBUTION:

Action: None

Information: C/S, DC/S Opr; (2); A-2 (10); A-3 OC&R (5); Stat Con (2); AA (1); Op Anal(1).

-3-

SECRET

FOR ALL INFORMATION FOR THE RECORDING OF MILITARY INFORMATION
ON THIS SUBJECT IS LIMITED TO THE AUTHORITY SUBJECT TO
THE ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

-----CAVU to A/JO Unrecovered-----
-----CAVU-----

1110000
1100000
1100000

VII. Casualties:

- 1. Killed
- 2. Wounded
- 3. Missing
- VIII. Status
- 1. Destroyed
- 2. Probably Destroyed
- 3. Damaged

FEB 5 45 AM



IN

HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

FEB 5 45 AM



OUT

HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

Information: C/S, DC/S, O/S, (S), A-3 (JO), A-3 (CCR), (B), Staff Com (E), A (1), Op Anal (1)
Action: None
Distribution:

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AC/AS, INTELLIGENCE

XX Bomber Command

Mission No. 33 - 1 Feb 1945

Targets: Floating Drydock, Singapore
Drydock in the Naval Base Area, Singapore

HEADQUARTERS	
TWENTIETH	
AIR FORCE	
Chief	
Deputy	
C. of S.	
P & A	
Deputy	
C. of S.	
Op.	
Deputy	
C. of S.	
T.M.&E.	
A. G.	

Handwritten signature and initials in red and black ink.

RADAR INFORMATION

NAVIGATION AND BOMBING: The importance of radar in navigation and bombing was again illustrated by: (1) its use in navigating through a tropical disturbance and the identification of severe weather conditions along the route; (2) the identification of check points enroute at an average distance of 48 miles by 102 aircraft; (3) the use of radar for assembly and start of the bombing run; (4) the use of the radar-bombsight procedure on the bombing run allowing visual bombing through a 7/10 undercast over the primary target area.

The target offered poor identification. However, the target area could be clearly seen. Two formations were unable to visually identify the primary target in time to bomb but bombed the docks visually in the target area with good success.

One case of bombsight malfunction over the secondary target required bombing by radar.

SCOPE PHOTOGRAPHY: Scope photography was excellent on this mission. Thirty-six out of a possible 55 sets were returned usable. Of these, 31 sets traced the bombing run.

The increased efficiency in obtaining good scope photographs is attributed to better operation on the part of the radar operator and also to the use of a faster type film.

AC/AS, INTELLIGENCE COMMENT: Scope photographs of the bombing run of four separate formations show that these formations made their bombing run along the briefed axis of attack. This is proof of excellent radar navigation along a well-chosen briefed course.

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RECEIVED
1. MERRILL W. V. LOBE
HEADQUARTERS

RCM INFORMATION

GENERAL: Eleven RCM search aircraft, each equipped with a bottom mount DF antenna, participated in this mission. RCM observers searched for early warning radar enroute to and from the target and for radar fire control equipment while in the target area.

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RESULTS: Many early warning intercepts were detected and logged on this mission. The increase of DF antenna equipped aircraft obviously lead to more definite locating of enemy radar sites. It was noted that the great Coco radar was definitely in operation again. This particular radar site had been positively located and verified by RCM intelligence and photographs. The result was a tactical bombing mission was planned to destroy this radar site and apparently it accomplished its mission because no signals were intercepted for several weeks. This new interception on Mission No. 31 (on a new frequency - 195 Mcs) indicates that the radar in that location has been put in operation again.

POSSIBLE RADAR FIRE CONTROL EQUIPMENT: There were 12 radar signals intercepted in the target area, initial point, and the assembly area. Two of these signals had pulse lengths of five microseconds. All other signals had frequencies ranging from 190 to 210 Mcs, while the PRF ranged from 916 CPS to 1065 CPS and pulse lengths of 7 to 12 microseconds. These signal characteristics are similar to Mark 2 Model 1 or Mark 1 Model 2 radars. Although these intercepts do not have those characteristics generally associated with radar fire control equipment, it is possible that the enemy was using these early warning type radars as gun laying equipment.

AC/AS, INTELLIGENCE COMMENT: The report was most informative and, since 11 DF antenna equipped aircraft participated, much more thorough intelligence in relation to locations and radar characteristics was written in this report. The use of this equipment enabled the analyzer to obtain more conclusive and definite information because there was substantial evidence logged during the mission. In relation to the early warning signals picked up in the target area it may be said that although the intercepts do not have characteristics generally associated with radar fire control equipment, it is possible that the enemy was using this radar for fire control. Obviously only crude computations could be gathered for the gun crews but the fact that the enemy is beginning to concentrate on using radar (no matter how low the quality) for gun laying perhaps gives us a new insight to his philosophy of warfare. Accumulated reports show that the Japanese have had fairly good early warning nets and that our aircraft have been consistently tracked from the borders of enemy occupied territory to the target area. Even though he had this information he did not use it effectively either because he did not know how, or because he did not have adequate communications between the early warning sites. Perhaps the Japs have realized that their early warning information was doing them no good as such; so they may be concentrating much of their equipment around important military and industrial sections in an effort to develop more accurate and more intense anti-aircraft fire.

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VLRCO

17 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR AC/S, COMBAT OPERATIONS

Analysis

Subject: Analysis of Report of XX Bomber Command Mission No. 33.

In accordance with Hq Twentieth Air Force Memorandum dated 15 September 1944, Subject: Study and Analysis of Twentieth Air Force Combat Operations, comments on the employment of communications, radar and countermeasures during XX Bomber Command Mission No. 33 are submitted herewith.

1. RADAR

From the indications of this report this is judged to be the best mission radar-wise of any so far accomplished. Cooperation of radar operator and bombardier in the bombing operation led to excellent bombing results. Cloud cover over the assembly and initial points necessitated the use of radar for assembly and start of bomb runs. Radar was also used in navigating through a tropical front. Scope photography was excellent with 36 sets of useable pictures being obtained, 31 of which showed the bomb run. Serviceability was substantially above average with 95% of the equipments operative over the target. It is particularly gratifying to note in the report of the staff navigation officer a statement "Quality of radar cooperation on this mission can be characterized as being very satisfactory, to excellent.

2. RCM

RCM activity was confined, as usual, to searching for enemy radar signals. All eleven aircraft participating were equipped with DF antennas. The usual types of early warning signals were intercepted to and from the target.

Some twelve different signals between 190-210 mc were intercepted in the target area. Although the PRF of 1000 and the pulse width of 5-15 microseconds are not ordinarily associated with gun laying radar, it is possible that these are, in fact, GL signals.

3. COMMUNICATIONS

Frequencies were in use for approximately 18 hours. During this time reception was good except for a period between 0030Z and 0500Z when participating aircraft were passing through local weather disturbances which caused increase in static. Heavy interference was encountered by one aircraft from station LDO, Colombo, Ceylon but an urgent radiogram to the Theatre Signal Officer resulted in the channel being cleared.

Position reports of aircraft returning accounted for 97% of the aircraft for which messages could be expected. Due to more than one aircraft in a formation reporting bombs away, more aircraft were reported in the bombs away messages than were actually airborne.

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MEMO TO DC/S, COMBAT OPERATIONS, dtd 17 March 1945
Subject: Analysis of Report of XX BomCom Mission No. 33.



Violations recorded included one of transmission security, one of cryptographic security, and one of XX Bomber Command Tactical Doctrine.

Seventy-eight aircraft used nine different radio beacons as navigational aids. The most frequently used was Piardoba (24) on initial contact of which was reported at 630 miles. Only one group reported aircraft using Direction Finding facilities, probably due to good terminal weather conditions. Two groups employed air-to-air homing. One aircraft accomplished a rendezvous after homing on a signal from 100 miles.

S. S. LAMB
Colonel, Air Corps
Asst Communications Officer

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NND 760063*
By *[Signature]* NARA Date *11-25-01*