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Captain MASANORI ODAGIRI Born Oct. 2, 1904. Entered the Naval Academy, 1921. Midshipman, 1924. Sub-Lt. after one year and a half on a training ship and submarine. Lieutenant after three years' service on destroyer and cruiser. After one year at the advanced class of the Naval Academy, assigned to a battleship for one year. Promoted to Lt. Commander, 1934. Entered the Naval Staff College, Nov., 1934 - Nov., 1936. Served ona cruiser for one year before assigned to ground duties (the Naval Staff College, the Bureau of Naval Construction, the Naval General Staff).

Promoted to Commander, 1940. Served on an aircraft carrier, May, 1941 - July, 1942. The Naval Academy, July, 1942 - March, 1945. Promoted to Captain, Oct., 1944. Assigned to the Headquarters of the China Seas Fleet, March, 1945.

Captain TAKEO KATO Born May 24, 1902. Entered the Naval Engineering School, and Engineer Midshipman, 1924. After three years on sea, entered again the Naval Engineering School. Seven years on sea duties. Entered the Naval Engineering College, 1934. Promoted to Engineer Lt. Commander, 1936. After one year on sea, served as instructor at the Naval Engineering School. Again sea duties, Dec., 1939 - May, 1941. Staff officer of the Naval Station June, 1941 - April, 1942. Assigned to the Bureau of Naval Construction, May, 1942 - August, 1943. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, August, 1944. Promoted to Captain, May, 1945.

Captain TOSHIO KONDO Born Nov. 8, 1904. Entered the Naval Academy, 1921. Midshipman, 1924. After two years of sea duties, studied at the Naval Torpedo School, the Naval Gunnery School, Six years of sea duties, 1927-33. Entered the Naval Communications School, 1933-34. Again five years on sea. Promoted to Lt. Commander, 1937. Served as instructor at the Naval Communications School, June, 1939 - April, 1940. Staff officer of a combat unit, May, 1940 - Sept., 1940. Instructor at the Naval Submarine School, Oct., 1940 - March, 1942. Fleet staff officer, April, 1942 - Nov., 1943. Promoted to Commander, 1942. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Nov., 1943. Promoted to Captain, Sept., 1945.

Commander HEIHACHIRO TANIOKA Born Dec. 29, 1905. Entered the Naval Academy, 1923. Midshipman, 1926. After two years' sea duties, entered the Naval Staff College as junior student, majoring in Chinese language. Served at the Shanghai Naval Base Command, the Shanghai Japanese Special Naval Landing Party, the Naval General

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Staff, Sept., 1934 - Nov., 1938. Promoted to Lt. Commander, 1938. Entered the Naval Staff College, 1938-40. Staff officer of the Amoy Naval Base Command, April 1940 - Oct., 1940.

Adjutant to the Naval Attache, the Japanese Embassy at Nanking and concurrently adjutant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval Office at Nanking, Nov., 1940 - Oct., 1941. Served as investigation official of the East Asia Affairs Ministry, Nov., 1941 - Oct., 1944. Promoted to Commander 1943. Adjutant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai, and concurrently staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Nov., 1944.

Commander TADASHI SHIMURA Born Feb. 9, 1906. Entered the Naval Academy 1924. Midhsipman 1927. After one year on sea, studied at gunnery, torpedo and communication classes. After six years on sea duties, entered the Naval Torpedo School, Oct., 1934 - July 1935. Again sea duties for three years and entered the Naval Staff College. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1939. Assigned to the Navy Ministry, March 1941 - Jan., 1945. Promoted to Commander 1934. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Jan., 1945.

Commander TAKESHI HIROKI Born Feb., 16, 1908. Entered the Naval Academy 1926. Midshipman, 1929. After three years on sea, trained as a naval aviator, 1929 - 1932. The Sasebo Flying Corps, 1932 - 33. After one year on sea, served as instructor at the Kasumigaseki Flying Corps, 1935 - 36. Trained as an advanced flying student for one year. The Tateyama and Kisarazu Flying Corps, 1937 - 39. Placed on the waiting list, March 1939 - Sept., 1939. For next five years, served at the Sasebo and Yatabe Flying Corps. Promoted Lt, - Commander, 1941. Staff officer, Sept., 1944 - July 1945. Promoted to Commander Nov., 1944. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, July, 1945.

Commander GENICHIRO KONISHI Born Nov., 14, 1906. Entered the Naval Academy, 1924. Midshipman 1927. After one year on sea, attented to the gunnery, torpedo and communication classes. Another year on sea duties. Inactive for one year due to illness. Assigned to the Yokosuga Naval Station, 1930 - 1934. After two years on sea, served as instructor at the Yokosuga Marine Corps. Sea duties, 1936 - 38. Advanced student at the Gunnery School, 1938. Instructor at the Naval Academy Nov., 1939 - Oct., 1940. Promoted to Lt. -Commander 1939. Sea duties Oct., 1940 - Nov., 1942. Instructor at the Naval Engineering School, Nov., 1942 - Feb., 1945. Promoted to Commander 1944. Adjutant, the China Seas Fleet, March 1945.

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Commander TOSHINO AKAGI — Born Jan. 31, 1908. Entered the Naval Academy 1927. Midshipman 1930. After one year on sea, attended to the torpedo, gunnery and communications classes. Sea duties, 1931 - 36. Attended the Naval Staff College, 1936 - 37. Sea and ground duties in China, 1937 - 38. Sea duties, 1938 - 40. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1941. Sea and ground duties in China, March 1940 - May 1945. Promoted to Commander, 1944. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, May 1945.

Commander KAZUTOSHI ASADA — Born July 15, 1911. Entered the Naval Academy 1929. Midshipman, 1932. After one year on sea, attended to the gunnery, torpedo and communications classes. Three years on sea before assigned tothe Japanese Special Naval Landing Party in Shanghai, 1937 - 38. Advanced student at the Naval Gunnery School, 1939. Fleet staff officer 1939 - 44. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1941. Assigned to the Kure Naval Station and Tateyama Gunnery School, Dec., 1944 - Feb., 1945. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Feb., 1945. Promoted to Commander, Sept., 1945.

Captain TAKESHI SHIMIZUTANI — Born Dec. 21, 1901. Entered the Naval Academy, and midshipman, 1922. Sea duties 1925 - 28. Attended the Naval Torpedo School before another five years on sea. Assigned to the wireless station on Chichijima Island, 1934 - 35. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1939. Sea duties and fleet staff officer, Dec., 1935 - Nov., 1939. Naval adjutant to the Imperial family, 1939 - 40. Sea duties for two years. Promoted to Commander, 1940. Assigned to the Maozuru communication corps and staff officer of the Maozuru Naval Station, Aug., 1942 - Dec., 1943. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Dec., 1943. Promoted to Captain, May 1944.

Rear-Admiral TOKUJI MORI — Born Sept. 24, 1891. Entered the Naval Academy 1909. Midshipman 1912. Seven years of sea duties. Entered the Naval Gunnery School, 1919. Three years on sea before entered the Naval Staff College. Promoted to Lt.-Commander, 1925. Three years on sea. Instructor of the Naval Torpedo School and concurrently instructor of the Naval Communications School, 1938 - 32. Promoted to Commander, 1931. Staff officer of the Maizuru Naval Port command. 1932 - 34. Fleet staff officer 1934 - 36. Assigned to the Naval General Staff and concurrently to the Navy Ministry, 1936 - 37.

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Promoted to Captain 1936. Four years of sea and ground duties. Chief of the Personnel Affairs Section of the Maezuru Naval Port Command. Promoted to Rear-Admiral 1942. Assigned to theCentral Naval Academy of the Chinese Navy, May 1943 - July 1944. Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Special Naval Landing Party in Shanghai, August 1944.

Captain SADAE IKEDA Born Dec., 2, 1902. Entered the Naval Academy 1920. Midshipman 1923. After two years of sea duties entered the Naval Torpedo School. After three years of sea duties, assigned to the Japanese Naval Landing Party in Hankow, 1928 - Dec., 1928. One year training in navigation 1929 - 30. Sea duties for next eight years. Promoted to Lt. - Commander 1936. Assigned to the Hydrographic Department in Tokyo for one year. Sea duties 1939 - 44. Promoted to Commander 1941. Assigned to the Shanghai Special Naval Landing Party and the Shanghai Naval Base Command as staff officer, May 1944. Promoted to Captain May 1945.

Lt.-Commander ISAMU KOMIYAMA Born May 29, 1917. Entered the Naval Engineering School 1934. Engineer Midshipman 1938. After two years on sea, attached to the Yokosuga Naval Station and the Yokosuga Marine Corps. Entered the Naval Construction School 1943 - 44. Sea duties 1944 - 1945. Promoted to Lt. - Commander 1944. Staff officer and adjutant of the China Seas Fleet, April 1945.

Rear-Admiral MINORU KATSUNO Born June 17, 1891. Entered the Naval Academy 1909. Midshipman in 1912. Assigned to sea duties for next six years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School, 1918. Again sea duties for 12 years. Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Commander, November 1926.

Assigned to the Yokosuga Naval Station, Nov., 1932 - Oct. 1932, and Adjutant to the Naval Academy Nov., 1932 - Oct. 1935. Promoted to Commander Nov., 1932.

Sea duties Nov., 1935 - Oct., 1938. Assigned to the Kure Marine Corps, Nov., 1938 - Aug., 1944. Promoted to the rank of Captain in Nov., 1939, and to Rear-Admiral Nov., 1943.

Assigned to the Japanese Naval Special Landing Corps, (Commander-in-Chief), Aug., 1944.

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Captain KOJIRO FUKUSHIMA Born Mar. 10, 1902. Entered the Naval Academy 1919. Midshipman in 1922. Assigned to sea duties for next five years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School, 1927. Again sea duties in 1928. Instructor at the Naval Gunnery School, 1931 - 1934. Again sea duties in 1934. Promoted to the rank of Lt. - Commander in 1934.

Assigned to Adjutant at the Bako Naval Base, Nov., 1933 Nove. 1937. Sea duties, Dec., 1937 - April 1938. Assigned to the Kure Naval Base, April 1938 Oct., 1940. Promoted to Commander in Nov., 1939. Sea duties, Nov., 1940 - July 1943. Assigned to the staff of the Shanghai Naval Base Command, Aug., 1943 - July 1944. Promoted to Captain in May 1944. Assigned to the Staff of the Japanese Naval Special Landing Corps in Shanghai, Aug., 1944.

Lt.-Commander YOSHIO KAWADA Born Feb. 28, 1899. Entered the Naval Academy, 1917. Midshipman in 1920. Assigned to the sea duties for next two years. Entered to the Naval Gunnery School 1922 and the Naval Torpedo School 1923. Again sea duties Mar., 1923 - July 1927. Assigned tothe Sasebo Naval Base, Aug., 1927.

Placed on the reserve-list, Nov., 1927. Mobilized as replacement in January 1941. Sea duties, Jan, 1941 - June 1943.

Promoted to the rank of Lt. - Commander, May 1943. Assigned to the Yokosuga Naval Base, July 1943 - Feb., 1944. Sea duties, Mar., 1944 - Dec., 1944. Assigned to the Head-quarters of the Japanese China Seas Fleet, Jan., 1945 - March 1945. Assigned to the Staff of the Japanese Naval Special Landing Corps in Shanghai, April 1945.

Captain UNOSUKE UMEZAKI Born Jan. 6, 1890. Entered the Naval Academy 1909. Midshipman in 1913. Assigned to sea duties for next five years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School. 1918. Again sea duties, Dec., 1919 - Mar., 1937. Promoted to ~~Lt.~~ - Commander in December 1925. Assigned to the Personnel Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Navy, March 1927 - Dec., 1931. Promoted to the Commander, Dec., 1931. Assigned to the staff of the Yokosuga Naval Base, Dec., 1931 - Dec., 1937.

Promoted to Captain Dec., 1937. Assigned to the Chief of the Personnel Affairs Section of the Ministry of Navy, Dec., 1937 - Sept., 1942. Placed on the reserve list in Sept., 1942, but mobilized as replacement on the same date. Assigned to Commander of the Japanese Navy Air Force in Shanghai District, Sept., 1942.

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Commander KENKI NATORI — Born May 2, 1897. Entered Naval Academy, 1915. Midshipman in 1918. Assigned to sea duties for next two years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School in Dec., 1920. Again assigned to sea duties, Dec., 1921 - Dec., 1924.

Entered the Naval Staff College, 1924. Assigned to sea duties, Dec., 1925 - Dec., 1932. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1931. Placed on the reserve list in Dec., 1932.

Mobilized as replacement in May, 1938. Assigned to the Port Affairs Office in Tsingtao, China, May 1938 - May 1939. Assigned to the Yokosuga Naval Base May 1939 - June, 1941. Assigned to the instructor at the Chinese Navy Training Station, June 1941 - Aug., 1944.

Promoted to Commander in June, 1943. Assigned to Commander of the 2nd Meteorological Observation Corps, Aug., 1944.

Captain YUKIHIKO IMAMURA — Born Jan. 4, 1925. Entered Naval Academy 1910. Midshipman in 1914. Assigned to sea duties for next three years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School, Dec., 1917. Entered the Naval Torpedo School in May 1918. Again sea duties for two years. Entered the Naval Staff College, Dec., 1920. Sea duties, Dec. 1921 - June 1942. Promoted to Lt. - Commander Dec., 1927 and ito Commander, Nov., 1933, and then to Captain Nov., 1939. Assigned to the Chief of the Navigation Office in Shanghai June 1942.

Rear-Admiral KEIJO MINATO — Born Aug. 30, 1896. Entered Naval Academy 1913. Midshipman in Dec., 1916. Entered the Tokyo School of Foreign Language, as Chinese Class student, April 1923. Promoted to the rank of Lt. - Commander in Nov., 1926. Attached to the Naval General Staff Office, Nov., 1926 - Oct., 1929.

Attended at the London Naval Conference as one of the suites, of the Japanese Representative, Nov., 1929 - June 1930. Assigned sea duties, June 1930 - June 1931. Assigned to one of the adjutants to the Naval General Staff Office, July 1931 - Oct., 1933. Sea duties, Nov., 1933 - Oct., 1934.

Promoted to the rank of Commander, Nov., 1934. Assigned to the Japanese Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy in China, Nov., 1934 - Sept., 1937. Sea duties, Oct., 1937 - May 1938. Again assigned to the Japanese Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy in China, June 1938 - March 1939.

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Promoted to Captain Nov., 1938. Assigned to the Staff member of the Ministry of Navy, April 1939 - Nov., 1941. Sea duties as Captain of carrier, Dec., 1941 - Feb., 1943. Commander of the Naval Air Force Stationing at Iwakuni Mar., 1943 - Oct., 1943. Assigned to the surmaster of the Naval Academy, Nov., 1943 - Oct., 1944.

Promoted to Rear - Admiral in May 1944. Assigned to the Chief of the Naval Liaison Office in Shanghai.

Captain SHIJETO KUWABARA Born Mar. 31, 1896. Entered Naval Academy, 1915. Midshipman in Nov., 191[illegible] Assigned to sea duties for next five years. Entered the Tokyo School of Foreign Language as Chinese class student in April 1923. Sea duties April, 1925 - Nov., 1929. Assigned to the staff member of the Naval General Staff Office, Dec., 1929 - Nov., 1932.

Promoted to the rank of Lt. - Commander in Dec., 1930. Again assigned to the staff member of the Naval General Staff Office, Dec., 1932 - May 1935. Assigned to the assistant to the Japanese Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy in China, June 1935 - Nov., 1937. Promoted to Commander, Nov., 1935. Instructor at the Naval Staff College, Dec., 1937 - May 1939. Staff member of the East Asia Board, June 1939 - Oct., 1940.

Assigned to the assistant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval Liaison Office in Shanghai and concurrently staff of the Japanese China Seas Fleet, Oct., 1940 - Nov., 1941. Promoted to the Captain in November 1941. Assigned to the staff member of the Ministry of Navy, Nov., 1941 - July 1944. Again assigned to the assistant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval Liaison Office in Shanghai, July 1944 - Aug., 1945.

Lt.-Commander MASAKUMA FUGIWAKI Born Nov. 29, 1912. Entered the Naval Academy in April 1930. Midshipman in 1933. Assigned to sea duties for next four years. Assigned to the Sasebo Naval Base Sept., 1937 - Jan., 1938. Again sea duties, Feb., 1938 - Mar., 1938. Entered the Tokyo School of Foreign Language in April 1938 as Chinese Class student. Assigned to the Sasebo Naval Base, April, 1940 - Oct., 1941. Sea duties, Nov., 1941 - Oct., 1942. Assigned to the Ministry of Navy, Nov., 1942 - Dec., 1943.

Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Commander Nov., 1943. Assigned to the staff of the Yangtze River Patrol, Jan., 1944 - Feb., 1945. Assigned to the assistant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval Liaison Office in Shanghai in March, 1945.

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Paymaster Vice-Admiral BUMPEI OMATSUZAWA — Born Nov. 2, 1893. Assistant-Paymaster in Dec., 1916. Sea duties for next five years. Instructor at the Naval Paymasters School, Dec., 1921 - Nov., 1929. Promoted to the rank of staff-paymaster, 1926. Sea duties, Dec., 1929 - Mar., 1931. Assigned to the staff of the Accountants Bureau of Navy Ministry, April 1931 - Sept., 1941. Promoted to the fleet-paymaster in December, 1931. Promoted to the rank of paymaster-inspector in December 1936. Sea duties, Sept., 1941 - Oct., 1942.

Promoted to the Paymaster-Rear-Admiral in November, 1942 and to Paymaster Vice-Admiral in November, 1945.

Paymaster Inspector YASUO SHIBUYA — Entered Naval Paymasters School 1920. Midshipman in 1923. Sea duties for next four years. Assigned to the Naval Air Force in Yokosuga Dec., 1927 - March 1928. Again sea duties, April 1928 - 1932. Assigned to the Maizuru Naval Base, Dec., 1932 - Mar., 1935. Sea duties, April 1935 - Nov., 1935. Entered the Paymasters School again as Special Course student, Dec., 1935 - Oct., 1936. Assigned to the 1st Accountant Office of the Navy, Nov., 1936. Promoted to staff-paymaster in December 1936 and Fleet-Paymaster Nov., 1941, and then Paymaster-Inspector, May 1945.

Captain SHIGEYUKI MATSUBARA — Entered Naval Engineering School in 1919. Midshipman in 1922. Sea duties for next three years. Instructor at the Kure Marine Corps, Dec., 1925 - Dec., 1928. Sea duties, Dec., 1928 - Aug., 1941. Promoted to Engineer Lieut.-Commander in December, 1936. Assigned to the Naval Plant at Hiroshima, Sept., 1941 - Feb., 1943. Sea duties, Feb. 1943 - Jan., 1945. Assigned to the 1st Naval Supplies Office, Jan., 1945. Promoted to Captain in May 1945.

Paymaster Inspector HIROSHI KUNITSUKA — Entered Navy Paymasters School in 1921. Midshipman in 1924. Sea duties for next one year. Again entered the Naval Paymasters School as Class B. student in December 1925. Again sea duties for next seven years, 1926 - 32. Assigned to instructor to the Kure Marine Corps, Dec., 1932 - Nov., 1933. Sea duties, Dec., 1933 - Mar., 1939. Promoted to the rank of staff paymaster in Dec., 1937. Entered the Naval Paymasters School as Class A student in April, 1939 - Nov., 1939. Assigned to the Japanese China Seas Fleet, Dec., 1939 - Oct., 1942.

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Promoted to Fleet-Paymaster in Nov., 1942. Sea duties Nov., 1942 - Aug., 1943. Assigned to the 1st Naval Supplies Office in August, 1943. Promoted to Paymaster Inspector in September 1945.

Surgeon Rear-Admiral SHINTARO KANAZAWA — Born May 3, 1894. Graduated from the Medical Section of the Tohoku Imperial University in April 1916. Second assistant surgeon in July 1916. Entered Naval Medical College as Class B. student, July 1916. Assigned to the Naval Hospital at Kure, Dec., 1916 - May 1917. Sea duties, June 1917 - Mar., 1918. Inspection trip to Europe April 1918 - July 1920. Sasebo Naval Hospital, Aug., 1920 - Mar., 1921. Again sea duties, April 1921 - Sept., 1921. Naval Gunnery School, Oct., 1921 - Nov., 1922. Sea duties, Dec., 1922 Mar., 1923. Naval Academy April 1923 - Oct., 1923. Kure Naval Hospital, Nov., 1923 - Jan., 1924. Sea duties, Feb., 1924 - July 1924. Entered Naval Medical College as Class A student Aug., 1924 - Nov., 1925.

Promoted to Surgeon Lieut.-Commander, Dec., 1926. Sea duties, Dec., 1926 - Nov., 1930. Promoted to Surgeon Commander Dec., 1930. Kure Naval Hospital, Dec., 1930 - Nov., 1931. Received doctor's degree in December 1932. Inspection trip for Europe, Dec., 1932 - Oct., 1933. Maizuru Naval Hospital, Dec., 1933 - Nov., 1937.

Promoted to the rank of Surgeon Captain in Dec., 1936. Chief of the Medical Corps at Port Arthur, Dec., 1938 - Oct., 1939. 1st Section Chief at the Kure Naval Hospital, Dec., 1939 Oct., 1941. Sea duties, Nov., 1941 - Nov., 1942.

Promoted to the Surgeon Rear-Admiral in November, 1942. Chief of Medical Section of the 11th Naval Aircraft Plant, Nov., 1942 - Nov., 1944. Assigned to the Jzpanese China Seas Fleet, and Concurrently appointed to the Chief of the 1st Naval Hospital in Shanghai, Nov., 1944.

Technical Captain KEIICHI FUJITA — Born May 2, 1899. Graduated from the Technical Section of the Tokyo Imperial University, Mar., 1924. Graduated from the Construction Section of the Imperial University in March 1927. Appointed the Naval engineer in April, 1927. Assigned to the Construction Board of the Navy Ministry, April 1927 - Feb., 1933.

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Assigned to various offices in Kure, Yokosuga, Sasebo successively, Mar., 1933 - Jan., 1945. Promoted to Technical Commander, Nov., 1942, and to Technical Captain Nov., 1944. Assigned to the chief of the 1st Construction Office in Shanghai, Feb., 1945.

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SUMMARY REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF:

EUGENE HOVANS, with aliases: Piek-Hovans, Carl E. Gilge, Kurjansky, Kojevnikoff

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INTRODUCTION:

EUGENE HOVANS, as he is more popularly known, was the only foreigner directly connected with the Japanese Naval Office. HOVANS was in charge of the Russian desk in the Liaison Room. According to information received from Rear Admiral KAIJO MINATO and other top-ranking Japanese Naval officers, and also from associates in other branches of the Liaison Room, HOVANS was a minor figure. However, from outside sources and from newspaper reports appearing in Shanghai papers, it was indicated that HOVANS was one of the most important men in Japanese Naval Intelligence. HOVANS gained further notoriety after heading a mission to Manila, the alleged purpose of which was to penetrate Allied intelligence organizations and expose the Filipino underground. Because of many rumors to the effect that HOVANS and his group were responsible for extortion and killings in Manila, extensive investigation was conducted by this office at the request of War Crimes Commission of the China Judge Advocate General's Office. Results of the investigation failed to show sufficient evidence of a war crimes violation.

BACKGROUND:

HOVANS' police record disclosed that he was born in Riga, Latvia, on 19 February, 1900. According to a French source, HOVANS first made his appearance in China in 1927 in the company of General BORODIN, who was the Red Russian Advisor to the Chinese. It is rumored that subject sold out BORODIN to the British, and when this was discovered by the Soviets, subject was arrested and tortured by pouring hot oil on his head. As a result, subject's head was severely scarred and to cover these scars, he usually wears a black Chinese-style skull cap.

Subject later escaped to Shanghai and was contacted by British Intelligence. He is reported to have bled them for large sums of money for long and devious reports on Communistic activities in China. After exhausting the British, subject became an informer for the United States Treasury Department, where he sold a tip-off to subjects of a treasury investigation for a reported $2,000. After a short period with the Treasury Department, he became associated with the Chinese. A few years later, he became an informant for Major WILLIAMS, USMC, of the Naval Intelligence Office. Reportedly, it was well-known in Shanghai that HOVANS was double-crossing WILLIAMS by also

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working for the Japanese. At the same time he was hawking pamphlets and books, purported to have been stolen from the Soviet Consulate.

As war with Japan became more evident, Japanese money came easier for HOVANS. He had made connections with the Shanghai WANG CHING-WEI Government through the Japanese. Then he succeeded in convincing the Nanking Reform Government that one MAMANTOFF was a Soviet agent working against them, and should be liquidated (MAMANTOFF had previously written an article about HOVANS in the nature of an expose). HOVANS received permission to arrange for the liquidation and accordingly hired some Chinese to do the job. Largely through the efforts of the French Police, the Chinese were arrested and implicated HOVANS. HOVANS was tried and convicted for inciting the murder and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. This was on 24 November, 1941. On 8 December, 1941, the Japanese Naval Landing Party released HOVANS from prison, and he was installed in a suite at the Cathay Hotel and given an office at Japanese Navy Headquarters, 27 The Bund. According to a chart furnished by Admiral KEIJO MINATO of the Japanese Naval Resident's office, HOVANS was employed in the Liaison Room of the Japanese Naval Office on the Russian Desk. His immediate superior was a Russian-speaking Japanese named FUKUHARA. The Liaison Room, at that time, was under the command of Commander OTANI and a civilian officer named KICHIZO IKUSHIMA. Both were transferred to Japan in early summer of 1945. (See Outline of Japanese Naval Resident's Office in Summary of Imperial Japanese Navy at Shanghai).

When Admiral MINATO was questioned concerning HOVANS' connection with the Japanese Navy, MINATO replied that subject was known to him by the name of CLIGE.

The following is a report on HOVANS submitted by Admiral MINATO:

"JAPANESE NAVAL LIAISON OFFICE IN SHANGHAI
December 12, 1945

"The man known as HOVANS was connected with the Liaison Section of the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai since the time when Commander M. OTANI was Chief of the Section, (Dec. 1941 - Nov. 1943) and YOSHIZO IKUSHIMA (civilian employee) was member of the Section.

"HOVANS mainly reported on:

"1. The activities and tendency of neutral nationals in Shanghai; and

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"2. The opinion and reaction of Shanghai citizens in general with regard to the progress of the war and its accompanying effects.

"He also made comments on the international situation through his personal observation.

"HOVANS was sent to the Philippines upon a request from the Japanese Naval Office in Manila. Therefore, the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai has no knowledge of his activities or work in the Philippines.

"His connections with other offices than the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai are not clear to us. In view of the fact that he organized and led a theatrical group in Shanghai, we believe that he had wide contact. However, we do not believe that he had an intelligence net-work. We considered him as an 'information broker' common in Shanghai.

"As to his whereabouts, we knew that he was in Shanghai up to the time of the Japanese surrender.

"We then noticed a press report saying that immediately after the Japanese surrender, HOVANS went to Tsingtao where he was arrested a month ago."

With reference to MINATO'S statement concerning HOVANS' main duties, the following information is submitted:

Shortly after the capitulation of Japan in August, 1945, the U.S. Naval Landing Party discovered three letters purportedly written to Commander OTANI and signed "C. E. CLIGE". Only one letter is dated, that date being 14 January, 1942. The other two letters are undated and signed with the initials "C.E.C." The substance of these letters is as follows:

1st letter, dated 14 January, 1942:

A request to organize a Special Judicial Investigation Section under IKUSHIMA, because the M.P. or Gendarmerie of the Japanese Army did not have the qualifications to carry out foreign espionage. The M.P.'s business is the handling or exposing of Chinese agents from Chungking and the Wang Ching-Wei Government. The Judicial Investigation Section would have two sub-sections consisting of an Espionage Section and a Sabotage Section. Most of the letter is a diatribe against the Gendarmerie and their incompetency in handling espionage cases.

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2nd letter, undated:

Wherein he discusses a method to prevent Allied air-raids upon Japan, stating that "Public opinion of Britain and the United States demands from Roosevelt and Churchill some victory....." "No doubt, American and British circles will try to effect an air-raid on Japan, no matter how costly it may prove, just for the prestige and for the pacification of the population....."

"If you gather all the citizens of the Allies and transport them to Japan, placing them there under the protection of various patriotic organizations, you will have a good insurance against air-raids. For the prisoners, could be chosen the most important cities with factories and other industrial enterprises. All should be settled in various parts of the cities, in barracks, and diplomats in hotels and former schools. Certain missionaries with their families should also be deported from China to Japan, as well as all men of military age, also with families. You may rest assured that there will be no air-raids on those cities where they will be settled under adequate and strict protection because your spokesman will broadcast that, on account of the unhealthy climate in the Philippines and awful sanitary conditions in China, as well as in view of great excitement and anti-foreign feelings of the Asiatics, the Japanese Government had transported the prisoners of war to Japan where the climate is excellent and where they are well protected. Thus, the air-raids on the cities, having no military importance, but possessing factories and works, would be prevented, for neither Americans nor Britains would attack such cities from the air."

3rd letter, undated:

Contains a discussion of present conditions in Shanghai under Japanese occupation and proposals to restore Shanghai to normalcy. He advocated formation of a Russian Auxiliary Detachment under Japanese command, so that food and shelter would be provided to the large number of watchmen and body-guards now unemployed.

He suggested ".....there is no need to stand on ceremonies with the Jews. Control over the Jews should be strengthened. They should be compelled to revive the life of Shanghai. They need a good whip and a clenched fist. Your union with Germany - however you may pamper them - is an order for them for underground

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hostilities, sabotage and discrediting of you."

Concerning Soviet activities in the International Settlement, HOVANS noted that the Soviet Radio Station in the Settlement was broadcasting in Russian, English, German and Chinese, all Allied news and propaganda in the guise of Tass reports. He suggested that the Soviet radio be limited to broadcasts in Russian and also be bound to broadcast all Domei reports.

In an effort to establish the validity of the above letters, Mr. TOSHIO NAMBA, 146 Quinsan Road, B-18, Shanghai, who headed the General Affairs Desk of the Liaison Room was questioned. NAMBA, a graduate of University of Southern California, tentatively identified the signature of "C. E. CLIGE" as that of subject's, but stated he would not be able to swear to it because he had only seen subject's signature on a few occasions. Certain excerpts of the letters were read to NAMBA and he expressed doubt as to subject's ability to write such a well composed letter. NAMBA said subject's English was very poor, and suggested the letters had probably been ghost-written. NAMBA further said it was not usual for HOVANS to send communications to Commander OTANI in English, but that subject usually gave them to FUKUHARA in Russian and FUKUHARA would translate them into Japanese for OTANI.

With regard to subject's main duties, NAMBA said that HOVANS' chief value lay in the fact that he had many contacts in the Russian community. He said that he had read some of subject's reports and thought that they were childish. He also added that the Japanese Naval Office did not trust HOVANS completely.

Also, with regard to subject's ability in the Japanese Naval Office, Admiral MINATO stated that he doubted if subject ever contributed any worthwhile intelligence information, because he (MINATO) could not recall any of subject's reports although they undoubtedly passed through his hands. MINATO said he could only speak for the period from November, 1944, at which time he took over command of the Naval Office.

FUKUHARA was questioned concerning his knowledge of HOVANS' activities and he furnished two statements which are contained in Appendix D. The substance of these statements is as follows: In his first statement given on 7 December, 1945, FUKUHARA hedged and submitted only general information concerning HOVANS. He was interrogated again and the translation of his statement given December 24, 1945, states that

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HOVANS gathered intelligence chiefly on world conditions from the radio, newspapers, magazines and conversations with people familiar with foreign affairs. A schedule of HOVANS daily activities as given by FUKUHARA reveals that HOVANS listened to world wide news broadcasts from Moscow, Honolulu, San Francisco, and London between 0400 and 0500. Between 0600 and 0700 he made and received phone calls acquiring the local intelligence on Shanghai. From 0800 to 0900 he read three or four different Russian newspapers. About 1000 he went to the office of the Resident Naval Officer where his duties consisted of writing a report, interviewing visitors, etc. He had lunch at 1300, always with a guest. After lunch he usually took a nap and at 1500 he had another appointment. Later in the afternoon he made arrangements for his theatrical group, visited sick people, obtained free hospitalization for needy actors, etc. In the evening he dined with friends and admirers and usually went to a night club until late at night. However late he returned home, he usually began his day at 0400.

Regarding HOVAN's character, FUKUHARA states that he was a highly emotional individual and gave vent to his emotions easily. He wasn't anxious for material wealth but desired position and honor in life. He met many people but quickly tired of them. Therefore, he had many enemies and no intimate friends.

FUKUHARA said that HOVANS had confidence in the opinions of Mr. AWALD (FREDERICK WIEHL - German agent in Shanghai) on problems concerning Germany, England and America, and used them in his report.

In the course of the investigation concerning FREDERICK ANTON WIEHL, WIEHL made the following statement concerning HOVANS:

> "HOVANS worked from Room 741 of the Cathay Hotel, and from the fourth floor of the Jardine Matheson Building which had been the Navy Building under the Japanese.
>
> "He, himself, did little or no personal outside work, relying as he did upon informers and employed workers. Among these were Captain CARNEIRA, PAUL LOJNIKOFF, KASHIN, ARNHEIM, GERSHOWITZ and a few others, such as TERNI, etc.
>
> "These people were known in the Russian and foreign community as seeking information for the Japanese. Those who wanted to make money in this way sold their information to either one of HOVANS'

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workers, total about 12.

"HOVANS mostly used a system of stealing information from the various Japanese Gendarmerie Offices, from the Army and from the Police Headquarters. Thus, while GERSHOWITZ was working as a sergeant in the Detective Bureau of the Police Headquarters, he would sell his information, gathered around the police files, to HOVANS. The result of tactic brought a general hatred of HOVANS from the Gendarmerie and the police. HOVANS was branded as a scoundrel by the police, and, as a result of this, the police and Gendarmerie spread negative stories about HOVANS in Shanghai which resulted in HOVANS being hated by most Shanghailanders. In this way, HOVANS mishandled his intelligence work.

"In addition to information gathered about anti-Japanese activities in Shanghai, and about gangs who were cutting in on Japanese rackets and which HOVANS 'smashed' for 'political reasons', HOVANS was responsible for many deaths of foreigners and Chinese in Shanghai who were arrested on framed up information gathered by CARNEIRA and LOJNIKOV, etc. and allegedly executed or imprisoned at the Japanese Bridge House. HOVANS once boasted of '18 pieces finished', which was the way he described the liquidation of 'gangsters' by the Japanese as the result of his work.

"Incidentally, it must be stated that every two weeks, HOVANS performed as an actor at the White Russian Club House on Avenue Foch in a Russian play. While this has nothing directly to do with his intelligence work, it was basically an effort on his part to suppress the antagonism of the public to his racketeering by donating the proceeds of the performances to Russian charity.

"Outside of Shanghai, he once took a group of his workers to Singapore and Manila for the purpose of counter-intelligence against the Americans and the British there. The plan was to infiltrate his men into the British-American intelligence workers there, and to pose as British-American intelligence workers, and to thus ensnare the foreign intelligence and turn them over to the Japanese authorities.

"HOVANS used the name of EUGENE HOVANS, but this is not his correct name, but he has been known by this name since his conviction and imprisonment in 1941 in connection with the murder of MAMANTOFF, who

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was head of the White Russian Emigrant Committee. HOVANS, on behalf of the Japanese, hired a Chinese to kill MAMANTOFF. He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, but has not served this and is still under sentence. During his trial he claimed that he was working for the Germans, which turned the German Intelligence against him. When he came out of jail, (released by the Japanese), he used the name C. E. KLIEGE, or at least his car was registered in this name, and was hired as 'advisor to the Japanese Navy.'

"After his trial, during which as above-mentioned, HOVANS incurred the enmity of the German intelligence, I was given the assignment of trying to pin something on him so that rival Japanese factions would rid us of him - HOVANS was at outs with all Japanese except the Navy. As a result, I learned the following about him:

"HOVANS came from the Ukraine to the Far East in 1917, first to Harbin where he made connections with the Communists. In about 1927, he became associated with the Hankow Government which was at that time communistic and was headed by CHEN KUNG-PO, later Mayor of Shanghai and acting President of the Nanking Government. HOVANS was a Captain in the Chinese Communistic Army, as 'Captain PICK'. He helped the organizers on the political side, who were constantly harassed by other Chinese.

"BORODIN, the Russian organizer of the Hankow Communist Government eventually returned to Moscow, after which they ran out of funds and the whole set-up blew up. HOVANS came to Shanghai in about 1932 to 1935. He got in touch with LUCHICH, a White Russian writer who received a contract from the British Government to write a book called the 'Red Menace Over China'. The author was allegedly Captain EUGENE PICK, or HOVANS, but the photograph which purports to be that of Captain PICK is actually a photograph of LUCHICH. Very few people know that the photograph was not of HOVANS, but HOVANS let this information out to me when I detected this. HOVANS claimed that he used the name Captain PICK in Hankow. HOVANS managed to sell the Japanese the idea that he was the author of the book, although the language of the book is not that of HOVANS. It was written in English for the North China Daily News, Shanghai, a British daily newspaper. There were quotations in the book from British papers and from the New York

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Times. LUCHICH and HOVANS apparently had previously furnished the material to these publications. The book was published in Shanghai about 1932 to 1935.

"HOVANS was, during the years immediately following this, mixed up in all sorts of rackets, prostitution, gambling, etc., and was in and out of jail constantly. In about 1937, he became friendly with NATHAN ('NAT') RABIN (or RABINOVITCH), a Latvian who was a gangster mixed up in 'protection' rackets, etc., and who is now under arrest by the Chinese Gendarmerie since September for some offense. He is very tough - a real strong-arm man. RABIN and HOVANS were closely associated in the various rackets, though each worked on his own.

"RABIN, in addition to his racket activities, trapped some of the Chinese guerilla generals, many of whom had to switch to the Japanese to save their lives. The Japanese paid him well and he had a lot of money. He was the owner of the 'Little Club'. These incidents took place during 1937. HOVANS was not involved in them, but only in commercial rackets, but he was linked up with the Japanese.

"HOVANS told me that he had an assignment from Admiral OTANI to infiltrate into the American Intelligence work at the time the war broke out. He also told me how he had (for the Japanese) put small time bombs in egg crates on British ships plying along the coast in order to spoil the refrigeration systems. He said that the British knew he had been responsible for this and had quite a grudge against him for it.

"HOVANS often voiced to me his wonder at the Japanese hiring him. He thought it was only to keep him out of guerilla work. He was not a Communist, but was selfishly interested in making money and could do very well as a guerilla. HOVANS' activities consisted of terrorist activities to keep the foreigners in line. People knew he worked for the Japanese and were afraid to cross him. HOVANS received from the Japanese free food and Room 741 at Cathay Hotel, gasoline for his Austin car, presents, expenses and a small salary. He was

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very foolish and didn't save much so now has nothing in Shanghai.

"I started working against him about end of 1942 on orders of Dr. KLARE, trying to pin something on him to get him into disfavor with the Japanese, so that either the Japanese or the Germans could take care of him. I wanted to pin a German killing or something of that sort on him which would have enabled the Germans to have him arrested. HOVANS didn't like the Germans as he had previously (a long time before) worked for the German Intelligence, and they didn't treat him well financially. HOVANS often sent people around to try and catch me out at the beginning. When he got no results from his informers, he came once to 304 Kiangse Road to investigate personally and bragged on my set-up (which bragging was only 'sour grapes').

"HOVANS description is: Height 5'7", weight 175 to 180 lbs, age 54, Russian appearance - Mongolian cast of countenance, round face, pointed nose, good teeth with gold fillings, no hair at all, wears black skull cap, has burn scars on his head on top to the rear from the time when he was tortured by the Communists. He looks husky. He sings in Russian opera. He is a heavy vodka drinker, especially when in any trouble. He is a flashy dresser; wears a large gold ring with Chinese characters on his left little finger; gold pocket watch with gold chain across vest; has a sport coat with pleats; black shoes; flashy, loud silk socks; brown suit with interwoven stripes; blue rain coat, very faded; usually wears a light grey hat. Most of his suits are sportsstyles. He walks with his shoulders straight, very erectly, with a military manner. He had a cheap chromium plated cigarette lighter of the Ronson type, with release on the right. He usually went armed with a pearl handled revolver, 38, chrome or nickel plated. He speaks very broken or pidgin English and has a very deep voice, coarse and loud. He also speaks Chinese, Japanese, Russian and German. He used to have a picture of his wife, 6 x 8 inches, also a picture of himself as an actor, in a part from the Renaissance Period, with long hair, etc."

MANILA MISSION:

According to information furnished by Admiral MINATO,

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the Manila Mission was requested by the Japanese Naval Office at Manila. They requested that a number of neutrals be sent to Manila for intelligence purposes. Since HOVANS was the only neutral in the Shanghai Office, he was given that assignment. However, other sources who were closely connected with the Manila trip claim that the trip was conceived by IKUSHIMA, the Civilian officer in the Liaison Room. IKUSHIMA submitted plans to Commander OTANI who drafted final plans and sent them to Tokyo for approval. After they were approved, IKUSHIMA was placed in charge of the Mission. According to members of the Mission, the following personnel made the trip: HOVANS, FRANCISCO CARNEIRO, PAUL LOJNIKOFF, PIETRO TERNI, FRITZ ARNHEIM, MORRIS GERSHOVITZ, (a.k.a. BORIS MEJOFF), SLAVA TOROPOVSKY, PETER KAZAK, TRIA, a Filipino, and Japanese named - IKUSHIMA, MORI TAKAMI, TADASHI HAYASHI, PETER UTSUNOMIYA, KUBO, S. ICHIJIMA and YOSHIDA.

The Mission left Shanghai early in June, 1944, and last remnants of it returned late in December, 1944. HOVANS is reported to have returned from Manila on August 9, 1944.

Concerning the activities of the group while in Manila, SLAVA TOROPOVSKY submitted a statement, the full text of which is quoted in Appendix E. The substance of that statement is as follows:

He arrived in Manila with KAZAK, LOJNIKOFF and ICHIJIMA June 12, 1944, and was taken to the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank Compound (409 Aviles Street) where IKUSHIMA had his headquarters. This was the residence of Admiral HIRAIDE, Japanese Naval Attache in Manila. They had a few words with HIRAIDE and were then introduced to Commander AOYAMA, IKUSHIMA's superior.

TOROPOVSKY and KAZAK were billeted in a small bungalow away from the other members of the group. A listening post was set up there under YOSHIDA and they were told to copy CW traffic from VHM, a station in Port Darwin, Australia, which was used by the U.S. Navy for sending orders to all ships in five letter code.

PAUL LOJNIKOFF soon after arrival met a girl named ESPANITA DE VIDAL, who seemed to be well acquainted in Filipino society. She furnished LOJNIKOFF with typewritten sheets of information in English which he passed on to IKUSHIMA.

CARNEIRO was usually with LOJNIKOFF.

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TERNI became acquainted with a Dr. MARSONI who once told TOROPOVSKY he had travelled through guerilla territory in Batangas and Camarines Nortes Provinces of Luzon.

ARNHEIM and GERSHOVITZ worked together mingling in the lower strata of Manila and acted as "stool-pigeons" for HOVANS.

TOROPOVSKY did not know much of HOVANS' activities, other than the fact that he was blackmailing a Polish merchant in Manila named ZALEVSKY because ZALEVSKY'S wife, an American, had not been interned.

TAKAMI, an American-born and educated Japanese, was answerable only to IKUSHIMA and Commander AOYAMA. TOROPOVSKY knew nothing of his activities.

TOROPOVSKY said that his contact with the group was very limited and that he had not heard of any terroristic acts or killings on the part of the group. He said the only information he had was from a story which appeared in the Shanghai Russian Daily News sometime in November, 1945, which told of the killing of six clergymen, believed to have been Spanish Catholic Missionaries, by HOVANS and LOJNIKOFF during their stay in Manila. (Mr. CHILIKIN, Editor of the Daily News was later contacted and said the story had no foundation in fact, and was written by a number of his reporters, based on various rumors that they had heard).

PAUL LOJNIKOFF and PIETRO TERNI were both arrested on authority of the War Crimes Commission in November, 1945. When questioned by this office, both repeatedly denied being sent to Manila for intelligence or terroristic purposes. Both claimed that they went to Manila to "buy cargo" for the Japanese Navy Purchasing Office. They claimed that IKUSHIMA and HOVANS saw a chance to make money in Manila and as friends of HOVANS they were invited along to share in the profit.

Further information concerning the activities of the group in Manila is contained in the Counter-Intelligence Corps investigation of BORIS GREGOROVICH MEJOFF alias MORRIS GERSHKOVITCH. MEJOFF accompanied the group to Manila and when the group was evacuated he was left behind as was FRITZ ARNHEIM and MORIHIKI TAKAMI. MEJOFF later was reported to the Counter-Intelligence Corps by ESPANITA DE VIDAL. During the course of that investigation MAX ZALEVSKY, Elizalde Paint Co., Tanduay St., Manila, was interviewed and stated, in substance, as follows:

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He first met MEJOFF in Escolta Cafe some time in July, 1944. ZALEVSKY had formerly lived in Shanghai and remembered MEJOFF as a uniformed policeman in that city. MEJOFF told ZALEVSKY that HOVANS had a letter from ZALEVSKY'S parents. MEJOFF also told him that he, with the others who had come to Manila with him, were refugees from Singapore.

Although HOVANS was the leader of the group, he stayed in the background. ZALEVSKY met the others, including MEJOFF, frequently. When they became better acquainted with ZALEVSKY, they told him that they were purchasing agents for the Japanese Navy.

On one occasion, HOVANS phoned ZALEVSKY and asked him to call at his office. Arriving there, ZALEVSKY was told that the Japanese Navy had a great deal against ZALEVSKY and that ZALEVSKY could clear himself by furnishing information. HOVANS was particularly interested in locating a guerilla radio station said to be operated by a man named JOHNSON. ZALEVSKY disclaimed any knowledge of it and was later picked up by the Japanese for questioning. He was allowed to go after interrogation.

On another occasion, HOVANS told ZALEVSKY that in order to stay out of trouble, he would have to pay him (HOVANS) 30,000.00 Pesos. ZALEVSKY paid 20,000.00 and made a date to pay off the balance. HOVANS failed to keep the appointment but instead sent MEJOFF to pick up the money. This money was given to MEJOFF.

After HOVANS left Manila in August, 1944, LOJNIKOFF set himself up as head of the group. Never very popular with the rest of the group, MEJOFF fared even worse after HOVANS left. LOJNIKOFF and CARNEIRO spoke deprecatingly of MEJOFF, and whereas the others appeared prosperous, MEJOFF looked ragged and poor.

At one time, LOJNIKOFF and CARNEIRO offered to set ZALEVSKY up as a purchasing agent for the Japanese Navy. ZALEVSKY refused.

From time to time, LOJNIKOFF asked ZALEVSKY for information about Americans and American property. When ZALEVSKY refused to give him the information, LOJNIKOFF threatened to turn him in to the Japanese. In this way LOJNIKOFF collected about 180,000.00 Pesos in bribes from ZALEVSKY.

The questioning of MORIHIKO (or MOROSI KAI) TAKAMI by Counter-Intelligence Corps in Manila disclosed the following:

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In May, 1944, TAKAMI had a proposition with MANWA, a Japanese firm in Shanghai which possessed a powerful connection with the Japanese Navy. Whereas, other companies were unable to obtain shipping space for exports, MANWA was able to get this shipping space. TAKAMI was exporting lamps to the Southern territories to sell on the black market.

During May, 1944, Mr. IKUSHIMA, a first-class member of the Shisei-Kan, the highest branch of the Gunzoku (civilians attached to the military), called TAKAMI into his office. He let TAKAMI know that he was acquainted with his activities in the black market through the Manwa Company and threatened him with conscription.

As TAKAMI is an American citizen and also since he had no stomach for active military duty, he listened to IKUSHIMA's proposition that he join IKUSHIMA. IKUSHIMA promised to get TAKAMI a good position in the Navy counterpart of the Gunzoku. TAKAMI did not want to identify himself with the military in any way, so he countered with the proposal that he would give his services to IKUSHIMA gratis in exchange for IKUSHIMA'S protection against conscription. IKUSHIMA agreed to this proposal.

On or about 26 May, 1944, IKUSHIMA told TAKAMI something of the mission that they were to perform. IKUSHIMA told him that there was to be a group composed of Japanese, Koreans and Europeans which was to be sent to Manila. TAKAMI was to be included in this group. He did not elaborate on the work that was to be done but told TAKAMI that he would divulge its mission in due course. On 28 May, 1944, TAKAMI was sent by plane to Taihoku, Formosa, where he was to act as an interpreter for these Europeans when they stopped there on their journey to Manila.

He recalled that MEJOFF came to Taihoku with CARNEIRO and LOJNIKOFF. HOVANS and IKUSHIMA, with two or three others, came later, but took off for Manila first. TAKAMI came to Manila from Taihoku with MEJOFF, TERNI, LOJNIKOFF and CARNEIRO. This group arrived in Manila on 11 June, 1944.

TAKAMI said that he was shocked at the group of Europeans that IKUSHIMA had picked for this mission, whatever it was. HOVANS, the leader, had been a notorious crook in Shanghai, and, at one time, had been convicted of murder and sentenced to 15 years. (When questioned by TAKAMI about this, IKUSHIMA had stated that HOVANS had done important espionage work for the Japanese Government, and, therefore, was highly

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respected and trusted by high Japanese officials.) LOJNIKOFF, another member of the group, was lightweight boxing champion of the Orient and had been mixed up in the "buy and sell racket" in Shanghai. LOJNIKOFF had also been involved in the theft of diamonds in Shanghai. TAKAMI stated that the other men, including MEJOFF, had been unknown to him before coming here.

On or about 15 June, 1944, IKUSHIMA called a meeting of the group which was held at the residence of the president of the Hongkong Shanghai Bank in Aviles Street near Malacanan Palace. At this meeting, IKUSHIMA stated, meagrely, the mission of this group in Manila. He told the group, including MEJOFF, that of all the territories conquered by the Japanese, the Philippines had taken the least kindly to the Co-Prosperity Sphere and was the most recalcitrant. He stated that the Army and Navy were doing what they thought best to relieve this situation, but it still persisted and was going from bad to worse. Therefore, it was the mission of this group of Europeans and Orientals to investigate and study this condition from every angle to attempt to find the answer to this situation and to bring the Philippines into the line. This group was to analyze the Filipino way of life, to study the Filipinos' ideology, and to find the answer to this most pressing problem.

In addition, they were to study the other nationals in the Philippines to learn what their sympathies were, to find out how the Japanese had failed to win them over to their side. Further, they were to investigate the Japanese Army and Navy, and observe the methods that they were using to alleviate this situation, and to make recommendations as to the improvement of these methods. Japanese controlled utilities, such as Meralco, were to be investigated to learn if corruption existed and to root out the causes if such a condition existed. IKUSHIMA stressed the point that each man had been carefully chosen because of his past experience and each man was to do a specific job.

TAKAMI stated that it was a grandiose scheme and a very noble one in purpose, but it was evident to him that IKUSHIMA had been deceived by HOVANS, and certainly the men that HOVANS had selected for IKUSHIMA were in no way qualified to carry out such a mission. In TAKAMI's opinion, they were as fine a group of opportunists, blackmailers and swindlers as could be found in the Far East.

It was TAKAMI's job to get the overall picture. He was to observe and in that way acquaint himself with the work to

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be done, so that, if necessary, he could take over the leadership of the group. He also acted as interpreter and contact man between HOVANS and IKUSHIMA for about two months, at which time HOVANS returned to Shanghai. In August, 1944, TAKAMI took over the leadership of the group working directly under Ikushima.

Takami went on to say that almost from the beginning the thing was a farce. IKUSHIMA was jealous of his position and appeared to be reluctant about giving out any information lest someone of the group learned too much. He would issue silly orders. For instance, he would detail a man to find out the names of the members of a certain foreign chamber of commerce when the information was open to everybody. He would detail another man to find out which puppet government officials had what friends among the foreign colony. He would ask for voluminous reports and a great deal of effort would be spent gathering information that could have been gotten out of a business directory or telephone book. It appeared to TAKAMI that IKUSHIMA was more interested in getting a lot of nonsensical reports that might impress his superiors than he was in solving any problems or promoting any better relations between the Filipinos and Japanese which he had announced as his intention originally.

IKUSHIMA set up CARNEIRO and LOJNIKOFF in the "buy and sell" business so that they could observe this racket from the "inside". This did not work out because the Filipino "buy and sell" men distrusted these foreigners and would have nothing to do with them. As CARNEIRO and LOJNIKOFF were interested only in the money that they could make out of this business, they were not interested in observing the Filipino members of the "profession" and made no effort to promote any better understanding. In fact, they did more harm than good because they swindled the Filipinos.

About the end of September, 1944, TAKAMI had a long talk with IKUSHIMA in which he tried to point out the fallacy of attempting to rectify the Philippine situation by using these men. IKUSHIMA, who had by now become quite disillusioned, agreed with TAKAMI and the group just fell apart. Little or no attempt was made after September to accomplish anything. The members of the group were left on their own to work out their own salvation.

Originally, the men had been paid 3,000 Pesos per month which was ample. After a couple of months, this became too little on which to live and the true character of these men came to the front. They became involved in all sorts of schemes to make money and they all had pretty bad reputations around town. IKUSHIMA, in order to save face, called for an accounting of their activities from time to time, but he had lost control over them.

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CONCLUSION:

Although allegations had been made that HOVANS and his group were responsible for the deaths and torturing of American and Filipino nationals, investigation has not shown that to be the case. Undoubtedly, they participated in some intelligence and espionage investigations of a minor nature in an attempt to ferret out allied collaborators. It appears that the real mission of the trip to Manila was a combination of two things: (1) An investigation of the sympathies of the Filipinos and reasons for the Japanese failure to win them over to the Co-Prosperity Sphere; and (2) A trip to Manila offered the HOVANS group a good opportunity to extend their black market and swindling operations. HOVANS and his group would never have consented to make the trip on reason number one alone and the Japanese Navy would never have permitted the trip based only on reason number two.

It seems apparent that the group accomplished little of an intelligence value for the Japanese, and when it became obvious that the Philippines would be invaded by American forces the group disintegrated into selfish individuals each attempting to make as much money as possible.

Inasmuch as the China Theater Judge Advocate General's office has indicated that there is not sufficient evidence of a War Crimes violation against American citizens by HOVANS or any member of his group, intensive investigation of the case has ceased. However, informants of this office are still attempting to locate HOVANS in order that he may be questioned concerning intelligence activities of the Japanese Navy.

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Section II

JAPANESE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN CHINA

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EXHIBIT VIII - Japanese - South China Intelligence Group Five Provinces Information Department

EXHIBIT IX - Kempei Tai at Tsingtao, North China

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A. INTRODUCTION

The Military Intelligence Service was the most important branch of the Japanese China Expeditionary Forces. Its leaders, most of whom were rabid radicals, influenced and in most cases controlled the tactical planning staffs of Headquarters and the Armies under its command.

The conquest of China, the control of its people and exploitation of its wealth was both directly and indirectly supervised by intelligence.

The functions of this vast organization were as extensive and elaborate as any in the world, the main sections included the following: field or combat intelligence within Armies, counter-espionage, espionage, sabotage and fifth column, policing and peace preservation, propaganda and economic control through government monopolies. The responsibility for the performance of most of these functions did not lie strictly with the Chief of Intelligence at Headquarters, China Expeditionary Forces, but was for the most part the responsibility of the army commanders and his intelligence staff; the commanders, in turn, were not obligated to report every detail concerning intelligence activity to Headquarters. It was in the interest of the Army of a certain area to operate its own organizations. to successfully execute its duties of either combat or occupation.

Besides organizations of the Armies, other intelligence units, better known as Kikans or Special Service Organizations, were created by higher Headquarters for the performance of special missions. These independent Kikans operated for and reported only to Headquarters.

The Military Police (Kempei), in many respects independent of Headquarters, had many intelligence duties to perform, the most important of which was counter-espionage.

Within the Army alone there did not exist a properly coordinated intelligence system, one with a proper flow of intelligence to the supreme authorities, the Imperial Headquarters, Tokyo. The system was for the most part conducted as a service to the area in which it operated and in this respect it was extremely thorough. Such thoroughness was exemplified by the constant repetition and over-lapping of duties by different organizations with the same Army.

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B. Higher Echelon

The Imperial General Headquarters was the body responsible for strategy and the prosecution of the war, and controlled both branches of the armed forces. It was made up of senior Army and Navy officers, with representatives of the Foreign Office for purposes of liaison and advice.

The relation of Imperial General Headquarters to intelligence work paralleled its relation to the prosecution of the war in general, Through its Third Bureau, it directed and coordinated the intelligence activities of all subsidiary organizations. The function of coordination was performed by an Inter-service Supervisory Control Board within the Third Bureau.

The General Staff was responsible for the conducting of military operations and the collection of intelligence. The latter function came under the direction of the Second Department (DAI NIKA, JOHO) of the General Staff. This department was in turn divided into a series of numbered sections, each with particular functions or with direction toward a particular area. Subdivision of which are not known in detail, however it has been reported that the divisions are as follows: Europe and US Division, German and Soviet Division and Propaganda Division. All intelligence received from army units in the field was routed to the Second Department, which was principally the main coordinator of Army intelligence.

The Ministry of War, although a body on the same level of authority as the General Staff, was responsible for military administration and played no part in command functions or intelligence. In actuallity the Kempei Tai, (Gendarmerie or Military Police) was responsible to the War Ministry, but intelligence affairs of the Kempei were channeled the Commanding General of the area in which it operated, for transmittal to the General Staff.

C. China Expeditionary Forces (CEF)

The China Expeditionary Forces functioned under the Imperial Headquarters on the same rank as the Southern Forces (Nambosegun) and the Manchurian forces (Kwangtung Army - Kantogun). The intelligence section (Dai Nika) of Hq. CEF was charged with the strategic collection and coordination of intelligence as received from the North, Central and South China Commanders to be used by the commanding general for war plans and dissemination to the General Staff and Imperial Headquarters.

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1. Headquarters and Staff Officers

The Officer in charge of the Dai Ni Ka was the most important man in the CEF and although according to the headquarters organization the Dai Ichi Ka (First Section) was the section responsible for planning and execution of the war, the Intelligence Section in China controlled this function. This circumstance existed since most of the Staff Officers of the CEF were the radical element who had been expelled from Japan to the fighting front by Premier Tojo because of their political intrigue and military purges. These radicals controlled with tremendous power the direction and execution of warfare in China, regardless of the policies or directives of the Commanding General, who was most frequently a Tojo appointed officer. This power went to the extent of defiance toward orders issued by the General Staff and often deliberate independent action on the part of the Headquarters CEF.

Prominent radicals who held intelligence posts in the CEF were Lt. General WACHI, Lt. General TSUJI, Major General KAWAMOTO, Colonel OKATA and Colonel OGAWA, all of whom were opponents to Hiddeki Tojo's government and policies.

WACHI served as right-hand man to General MAZAKI and with the rank of Colonel was Chief of the Dai Ni Ka in 1938 - 1939 and had as his assistant Colonel TSUJI. In 1939 WACHI, after promotion to Major General, and TSUJI were removed to the front at Hankow. At the end of the war Lt. General WACHI was Assistant Chief of Staff of Nambosogun (Southern Forces)

TSUJI, after serving in Hankow, returned in 1943 to Nanking as Officer in Charge of the Dai Ni Ka, however, later in the same year was dispatched to the South Pacific. Successors, such as KAWAMOTO, OKATA and OGAWA carried on the influence of the Second Department.

The policy which WACHI and TSUJI were endeavoring to enforce was complete military domination of China and the dividing of China into two states, the North China Provisional Government and Taido Puppet Regime. They strongly opposed the formation of the Wong Ching Wei Puppet Government.

As a result of the insubordinate activity by these individuals, Tojo sent HARUKE and SAKATA in 1939 as supervisors to the Headquarters, CEF, but they were gradually influenced by the radicals and became involved in exploitation and fortune seeking rackets.

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By 1943 Tojo had managed to eliminate most of the radical Staff Officers from CEF headquarters, usually by sending them off to the front, and there was a rapid decline of influence on the part of the Second Department. Inferior and inexperienced graduates of the Nakano Special Military Officers School were placed in staff positions.

The Dai Ni Ka devoted its attention equally toward Chungking and Communist affairs until the outbreak of the war against the United States and England, at which time attempts were made to compromise with the Communist forces, especially the New Fourth Army, and some success resulted, since active warfare subsided, trade developed between the two areas and prominent Communist personalities were permitted to travel within occupied areas. As a result the Second Department could devote its entire attention to the war against the Allies. During the closing months of the war and shortly after the surrender, the Staff of Headquarters CEF supported the Communist Armies with supplies and equipment in deliberate violation of the surrender terms.

The Dai Ni Ka was responsible for the forming and supervising of Special Service Organizations, developed for special missions in combat areas for penetration purposes or for economic or counter espionage activities in occupied cities. These missions were most frequently the inspiration of the radical militaristic Staff Officers at Headquarters.

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2. NORTH CHINA

a. Organization:

The 2nd Section of the Headquarters, North China Expeditionary Force was merely an office through which intelligence flowed, in irregular spurts, toward Nanking Headquarters. It played only a small role in supervising, directing or instructing its rather loosely connected subordinate organizations. The scope of investigation conducted by the 2nd Section included collection of information on Chungking, American, Soviet and Chinese Communist forces; the first two only by means of radio "listening posts"; the third by the same means, through liaison with German, Italian and French agencies, and by supervision of White Russian communities; and the fourth, Communist forces, by means of agents and through the flow of combat intelligence from fighting units. As would be natural in the North China Area, the Chinese Communist forces were the greatest menace to the Japanese, and as a result most of the agencies directed their efforts toward collecting information about them.

b. The subordinate agencies were as follows:

Third Independent Guard Unit

The Third Independent Guard Unit was a part of a Group Army garrisoned in the Peiping Area whose intelligence section reported to 2nd Section, North China Army Headquarters, upon information concerning Communist elements as obtained from the Hsin Min Hui, Cooperatives, and other native organs cooperating with the Japanese. It proved difficult to obtain accurate information due to guerrilla type warfare conducted by the Communists. (For further details re duties, organizational structure, training, cases of success and failure, see Appendix, Exhibit I .)

Peiping Information Organ (Skigekawa Kikan)

The Peiping Information Organ (Skigekawa Kikan), receiving its name from its commanding officer, was charged with collecting information on both Chungking and Communist forces, utilized both soldiers and civilians in its offices and Chinese agents. (For details re make-up, training, dispatching of agents, expenses, activities, etc., see Appendix, Exhibit II .)

Peiping Special Intelligence Corps

Peiping Special Intelligence Corps was a "listening post" collecting information from foreign broadcasts along political lines. (Appendix pg. III)

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Hidaka Organ

Hidaka Organ was in complete charge of collecting information on and from the foreign national groups and organizations in Peiping and Tientsin, mainly by liaison activity. This organization overlaps the functions of both the above-mentioned organs since activities in Chungking and Yenan were also in its scope, and this kind of information was also collected by radio interception. (Appendix, Exhibits IV & V).

Other agencies devoting their efforts to intelligence in the Peiping-Tientsin area are the Kempei-tai, the Intelligence and Investigation Corps of the Ambassadorial Office, North China Telephone & Telegraph Co., North China Communications Co., North China Development Co. However, these are covered in other parts of this summary.

It is apparent from reports received concerning the North China area that this part of the country, furthest removed from strategic fighting fronts, was simply in a state of occupation and there was little need to stress intelligence activities other than to prevent subversive uprisings and to suppress the guerrilla menace on the part of Communist bands. Therefore, the various Japanese Armies in this area dealt with intelligence affairs in the manner that the commanding officer wished to conduct them. The evolution of intelligence activity in the port of Tsingtao, Shantung Peninsula, is a good example of how the highly organized system, on the part of both the Navy and Army, since 1938, changed to meet the prevailing situation.

In 1938, the 5th Brigade of 43rd Japanese Army Intelligence Department, known as Tokumu Kikan, swept into the city and "occupied", but in time most activity was conducted against Communists through combat intelligence teams who collected information concerning enemy disposition, peace and order in occupied areas, climatic conditions, and topography and terrain; their sources were through agents, voluntary informers among inhabitants, Imperial Collaboration Army, Peace Preservation Units, and the Puppet Armies.

Economic, political and counter-intelligence functions, although conducted by the Army, Navy and Gendarmerie agencies, were mainly the duty of civilian organizations as the Koain, under the Great East Asia Ministry.

The general method of collecting intelligence from agents, both Chinese and Japanese, was by extortion or subjection means, such as granting privileges, contracts, etc. in return for information. There was little security or concealing of identity of agents; training was at a minimum; and pay was

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negligible. All of these factors existed because North China, particularly on the Shantung Peninsula, was actually too far from the war in China and the Pacific to be of tactical importance. This area was simply heldmand had only a need for occupation forces to maintain public peace and suppress skirmishes on the part of guerrilla "bandits" and small Communist forces. (For details, see Appendix VI.)

In order to explain in further detail the methods of operation, the training of personnel, and to give an estimation of the value of information obtained, a general statement of The Rehabilitation and Liaison Department of the Japanese Officers and Soldiers, entitled "Outline of Intelligence Collecting Machinery of Japanese Forces", 2 December, 1945, follows:

OUTLINE OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTING MACHINERY OF JAPANESE FORCES

Since the Manchurian Incident, a bad habit of neglecting the intelligence service was created among the Japanese forces in North China as they had always fought against weaker enemy forces. The Japanese forces always were confident of winning over the enemy. The Chinese forces were weaker in quality and equipment. Information obtained regarding the Chinese forces was not the deciding factor for the victory of the Japanese forces. It was useful only for the Japanese forces to keep the Japanese casualties to a minumum. Under such circumstances, an evil habit of neglecting the value of the intelligence service gradually grew.

It has to be admitted under the circumstances that almost all of those members who were engaged in the intelligence service were not of first ranking men in their line; that enthusiasm of the commander in leading the service was not sufficient; and that machinery for collecting intelligence was also not sufficient.

Recently, however, importance of intelligence service was strongly urged in some quarters in favorably leading campaigns against Chinese Communist forces. But this advocacy, after all, failed to attract general attention. Here may be traced one of the causes which lead Japanese forces gradually to an unfavorable war situation.

Along with such general situation, the information collecting machinery of the Japanese forces in North China was also very poor, it has to be admitted.

In North China information was collected chiefly through interception of enemy radio communications and from secret agents of Chinese nationality. But those who had facilities for intercepting enemy radio communications were confined to Army Headquarters or much higher army unit headquarters. Furthermore, the capacity of the facilities was extremely limited.

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Of the Chinese secret agents employed, those who apparently seemed excellent did not really cooperate with the Japanese forces and the rest were generally of low mentality and most were so-called double agents far from sharing the same fate with the Japanese.

Most of them, taking advantage of their positions with the Japanese forces, indulged in lootings or other unlawful conduct among the Chinese populace with the result that the Chinese public gradually came to entertain bad feeling against the Japanese forces and efforts were made to collect information voluntarily brought from the local inhabitants by rendering aid to them and winning their popularity and success was obtained to some extent.

Those which supplemented the insufficiency caused by the afore-mentioned poor radio interception facilities and inferior Chinese secret agents were the enemy documents obtained by our garrison units during their small engagements, examination of war prisoners when captured and also cooperation offered by local Chinese. In view of special circumstances taken into consideration in operations against the Chinese Communist forces, one division of Japanese troops usually had to defend about 140-160 separate localities. In those areas where Japanese troops kept friendly relations with local Chinese inhabitants and checked the infiltration of the Chinese Communist troops, the local Chinese inhabitants always volunteered valuable information although there were exceptions. Furthermore, after each small battle, all enemy documents captured as well as information obtained from prisoners of war were sent to their upper units and they were of great value.

Since Japanese forces held their commanding system in high respect, thousands of small garrisons scattered in North China might have well been regarded as advance units of information collecting machinery. Under such circumstances, it was very seldom that a special intelligence unit was dispatched to a certain specified locality directly by Headquarters respectively of each Brigade, Division, Army and the Japanese North China Army. The Chinese military authorities entertain some doubt on this point, but this is groundless suspicion on their part.

In addition to negligence of intelligence service as aforementioned, the following two factors may be accounted additionally for the failure to obtain successful results in the intelligence service:

1. Small advanced Japanese garrisons were stationed at isolated places where communication was difficult, and no adequate education regarding the collection of information given to them.

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ii. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, there were frequent shifts of troops, and no thorough-going training had to be given up.

General speaking, it took at least six months for the troops to acquaint themselved with special tactics to be employed for engaging the Chinese Communist troops. Most of the Japanese troops, however, had to be shifted to other theaters of war when they somehow learned it, and the fresh troops had to repeat the same thing.

In short, the information collecting machinery of the Japanese forces in North China was insufficient either in its structure or in its capacity. It was rather annoyed by unreliable information offered by professional Chinese secret agents. When the war situation was generally good for Japan effects caused by such bad information were apparently negligible, but with the progress of the war gradually unfavorable, various weak points were disclosed in every direction and the Japanese forces had difficulty in grasping the true nature of the Chinese Communist forces.

With the above description in mind, it will be interesting to look into the following table:

TRAINING OF MEMBERS ON INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND VALUE OF INFORMATION OBTAINED

i. Training:

Headquarters of the Japanese North China Army, with a view to enhancing the ability of those in complete charge of intelligence service of each Brigade, Division and Army under its command and control as well as giving instructions in carrying out the service, assembled those members twice a year, spring and autumn at Peiping, or, if necessary, special officers were dispatched to each Brigade's, Division's or Army's intelligence section for training of personnel.

In 1944 when general inspection of all Divisions in North China was conducted for the first time, the intelligence sections at each Army, Division and Brigade Headquarters were also inspected and necessary instructions were given.

In addition, general instructions were given to each intelligence section by means of telegrams, reference booklets published from time to time and official circular letters.

In training and giving instructions, emphasis was especially laid on the characteristic feature of the Chinese Communist forces and the special fighting tactics to be

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employed against the Chinese Communist forces. For that purpose, the following booklets were published:

A series of the "Extermination of Communists" published once in two or three months.

"A Guide for Extermination of Communists" Vol. 1 & Vol. 2.

"Suggestions on Punitive Operations against Chinese Communist Forces".

"A Desk-Book on Intelligence Service", etc.

The authorities of each Division and Army, besides making use of the above material, distributed among the members of the intelligence section some reference booklets necessary for giving special knowledge peculiar to each locality concerned.

On the other hand, an exchange of information was conducted with similar information organs other than the military once a month as a rule and they were asked to submit a report from time to time on the information they obtained.

Originally, special training was not given Japanese troops before being put on intelligence service. They were given necessary training while they were on routine duties. Here we find another trend of neglecting the value of intelligence service.

At the end of 1944, it was felt necessary to have specially trained members in intelligence service and plans were made to train those officers graduated from the cadets' training corps at Paoting and Shihmen for two or three months so they might be appointed as chiefs of the intelligence sections of the respective Divisions and Armies. Before these plans bore fruit, the war was brought to an end.

ii. Value of Information Obtained:

Headquarters of the Japanese North China Army achieved quite satisfactory results intercepting radio communications transmitted by Chungking forces as the latter's supervision and control of radio communication was poor. During actual operations the Japanese forces could relatively accurately perceive in advance attempts and movements to be carried out by Chungking forces.

On the contrary, it was very difficult or in some cases almost impossible for Japanese forces to know in advance the

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secrets relative to military operations of Chinese Communist forces, despite considerable efforts made for the interception on the part of the Japanese forces. Such being the case, the Japanese forces had to depend on a rough estimation based on incomplete information to infer the enemy attempts and movements. But it was, after all, inaccurate. Probably this might be attributed to the following facts:

a) The elusive character of the Chinese Communist forces.

b) Inferiority of secret agents employed by the Japanese forces.

c) Strict supervision and control of the Chinese Communist forces over their radio communication as well as the poor facilities of the Japanese forces for intercepting the enemy radio communication.

Consequently, with the progress of the general war situation unfavorable to Japan and with the gradual withdrawal of Japanese troops scattered in various areas, it became all the more difficult to grasp an accurate conception on the strength and equipment of Chinese Communist forces.

On the other hand, Japanese forces had no facilities for intercepting radio communications transmitted by the Soviet-Mongolian forces in the Outer Mongolian area, and also it was almost impossible for the Japanese forces to dispatch their secret agents to that area. It is not too much to say, therefore, that no information was obtained regarding the Soviet-Mongolian forces.

Circumstances being as such, the Soviet attacks on the Japanese forces launched on August 9 were, frankly speaking, unexpected ones, and it was not until hostilities began between Japanese and Soviet troops north of Kalgan that the Japanese forces could get the general idea on the strength and equipment of enemy troops.

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3. Central China

a. Organization

The Second Section of the Headquarters, Central China Expeditionary Forces was located at Nanking and acted as the supervising and directing office of the intelligence departments in the armies under its command. The scope of its activity was greatly limited since the Area Armies Intelligence Departments furnished only matters of extreme importance to be relayed to higher headquarters. Most frequently, the Commanding General of the respective armies utilized information obtained without relaying it to Headquarters, CEF.

Under the command of Central China was the Sixth Area Army, and under it came the 34th, 20th, 13th and 11th Armies. The Staff Departments, containing the Intelligence Officer,as well as other sections, placed officers responsible for the collection of intelligence in the subordinate divisions, brigades, and regiments. It was the privilege of these officers to select the men under them to carry on their investigative functions. Many of these investigators were civilians who had a knowledge of the locality or language qualifications.

b. Methods of Operation

1. The Army, by means of combat patrols, collected information concerning both Communist and Nationalist forces at the fronts, and also utilized agents in penetration operations in the guise of merchants, smugglers, etc. The small towns near the fronts were covered by native informants at local shops, eating places, and rest houses as well as by the local Peace Preservation Corps.

2. In the large cities, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Soochow, etc., a much vaster network of informants and agents existed, however, their duties were more of a counter espionage and economic nature. The Army played only a small role in these areas since this activity was mostly of gendarmerie function.

Shanghai, at which city the 13th Army (NOBORI BUTAI), had its headquarters, is an example of the tremendous overlap of activity on the part of the numerous Japanese intelligence agencies, and showed the wast of effort and the interservices' jealousy which existed, and yet the extreme thoroughness to which the services conducted espionage and counter-espionage, propaganda, and subversive activities. The Army, with its allied Army Bureau

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(RIKUGUNBU) and Peace Preservation Corps and Puppet Armies, the Gendarmerie and its subordinate Police Force, the Navy and its Landing Party and Resident Office, the Foreign Office and its Consular Police and various development companies, railroad police, etc., delved into every phase of intelligence and exploitation, and formed a tremendous and inpentratable wall around the city. Each service, jealous and completing, had its own channel of reporting, and instead of depending on extensive exchange of information to coordinate their activities, chose to have its own network of agents and informants.

C. Training

The training of intelligence officers for higher positions did not exist, their positions were granted only after long periods of service with the Army. Therefore the activities conducted by the officer were not always according to a formed plan but more according to his personal interests and desired field of endeavor. This was predominately the policy which resulted in the forming of special service units (KIKANS) which were created to serve a special mission and were then disbanded upon completion or failure of the mission.

Less important officers and civilian employees were selected to work in intelligence departments by the following qualifications:

Previous military services, particularly in intelligence.
Language abilities.
Residence in the area of service.

No training was given to these people; they were expected to learn by experience.

The only persons in the intelligence service who received specialized training were technicians who had studied radio operation and maintainance, cryptography, and photography, and usually these were enlisted men.

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4. SOUTH CHINA

a. Organization and Systematic Arrangements of Intelligence in South China: (See Chart; Exhibit VII)

Prior to the Japanese surrender, their South China intelligence work was under the direction of the Staff Department of the 23rd Japanese Army of Occupation with Kwangtung as their designated territory. The backbone of this organization was the Staff Department of the Army which utilized the Divisions, Brigades, Regiments and other intelligence units under its control to form its intelligence net. The Liaison Department and the Gendarmerie also assisted in such activities. The listed details are:

1) Service Units:

a) 104th Division
b) 129th Division
c) 130th Division
d) 23rd Brigade
e) The 8th Independent Infantry Regiment
f) The 13th Independent Infantry Regiment

2) Other assisting units:

a) Liaison Department (Renrakubu)
b) Gendarmerie

3) Other Special Intelligence Units (Kikans):

The above organizations were all under the control of the Staff Department of the Japanese Army. The Army designated an Intelligence Staff Officer to each Division, an officer to each Brigade and Regiment to assume charge of Intelligence. Under these officers-in-charge, a subordinate staff was formed from the rank and file. For other organizations and units, the same arrangement prevailed, an officer-in-charge, subordinate staff and interpreters. Details are shown on the accompanying chart.

b. Methods of Operation:

1) Army Organizations: (Service Units)

In this respect, the Army collected information directly concerning the disposition of the Chinese Army and other relevant information concerning Free China. Captured documents and/or prisoners of war were sources of information.

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2) Intelligence Organizations:

These units were scattered throughout the country headed by an Intelligence Officer who purchased documents, newspapers and other printed matter circulating in Free China. From this source a general survey was made concerning the economic and political conditions in Free China, the excesses or scarcity of materials, current commodity prices, national morale, etc. which all contributed to his deductions concerning current conditions in China. Furthermore, it was the job of the organizations to hire Chinese and Formosans as agents for infiltration into Free China for espionage purposes. Radio intelligence interception, code-breaking for military information and movements, information concerning the China-India Air Transport, and the disposition of the American Air Force and Navy Units - all these activities were the tasks of these Intelligence Units.

c. Reporting:

1) Documentary: (1) Monthly Reports
(2) Special Reports as occasion demands

2) Radio: This method was limited to urgent and/or important matters

3) Telephone: For use close to Army Units, or for urgent information

4) Close Liaison between Unit Heads: This was accomplished through conferences of Unit Officers. Important or complicated matters were decided by such conferences.

d. Sectional Intelligence Operational Activities:

1) The 23rd Army under orders from Headquarters of the Japanese China Expeditionary Force, collected all information pertaining to the equipment of the Chinese forces, their organization and movements, tactics, the condition and strength of the Chinese-American Air Force, coastal landing possibilities, naval unit movements, the study of American strength and the international aspect of Chinese-American picture, and report such information to the Imperial Headquarters through the Second Area Command at Hankow.

2) Important information obtained by the 23rd Army, the 13th Army, the Taiwan Army, the 5th Air Force (principally

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serial information), the 2nd Expeditionary Naval Squadron, the Southern Army and the Indo-China Army was circulated and exchanged among each other.

3) All intelligence departments under their respective divisions were responsible for the collection of intelligence and the information obtained by their subordinate units as well. Such information other than that relevant to immediate tactical purposes, and all necessary information, was reported to the 23rd Army. Units, besides serving as clearing houses for their sub-units, carried out intelligence operations of their own and reported to their respective superior Departments attached to the Army Divisions. There were no designated intelligence organizations attached to Brigades and Regiments. This work was handled by the service units themselves, who were primarily interested in combat information which might be of immediate concern to themselves; such information was reported to their immediate superior Units. In their ordinary operations, the intelligence units included pacification propaganda for which a special office was set up. In regard to the Units attached to the Army Division, their main objective chiefly concerned the territory or area under the Division's occupation, with main emphasis on information relating to the Chinese forces immediate to them and with secondary emphasis on the subjects of Communists and bandits.

4) All intelligence agencies were to collect and assimilate all information of economic and political value for reports to the 23rd Army. They also established close liaison with the German "Heise" intelligence agency collaborating in the study and breaking of the Allied (Chinese and American) code. Results were reported to the 23rd Army.

5) Assisting Intelligence Agencies:

a) Gendarmerie:

1. Responsible for information and the preservation of peace and order.

2. Investigation of Chinese intelligence agents and their activities.

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3. Collection of information from the South China Five Provinces Intelligence Group. (Exhibit VIII)

All reports were sent to the 23rd Army.

Personnel of the Liaison Department, 23rd Army:

Department	Name and Rank	Duties
Liaison Dept.	Maj. Gen. Matsui	In charge of entire Dept.
General Affairs	Capt. Harushima	In charge of personnel and general affairs.
Unit #1	Lt. Ikida	Administration, and director of strategy, collection of intelligence regarding China.
Unit #2	Col. Kawai	Director of affairs concerning Puppet Government, Army and the Police.
Unit #3	Lt. Togashi	Director of economic sabotage and the purchase of raw materials
Unit #4	Capt. Okagami (Okanoue)	In charge of the exchange of reports with other members of the Axis.
Liuchow Branch	Maj. Usuta	Similar to Liaison Department
Swatow Branch	Lt. Col. Yamaoka	-do-

e. General:

1) Before the assumption in charge by Lt. Col. KOBAYASHI, the "South China Espionage Agency" was headed by a person whose name was well known throughout China, Lt. Col. OKADA, an intimate friend of the German Espionage Agent, HEISE. When OKADA went to Shanghai in December, 1944, for the peace proposals, his duties were taken over by Lt. Col. SAIGO. When SAIGO went to Hengyang in March, 1945, KOBAYASHI took over until the end of the war.

2) During hostilities, various Japanese staff officers frequently had to leave for duty to the front and due to their lack or incomplete knowledge of the Chinese language it was difficult for them to hire and dispatch

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good agents. Because of these difficulties, Japanese ranking officers acknowledged the poor quality of their espionage reports.

3) At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Japan had already established many intelligence and espionage posts throughout China. Because of the friction that arose between the men in charge and the agents, the task was transferred to the Army in the field.

4) It can be said that the main source of enemy intelligence was obtained through the radio, because such reports were mostly military and political of comprehensive nature which Tokyo and Nanking considered to be of great value. The Japanese paid special attention to the German "Heise" Agency and their collaboration was very close, such as the relationship of ranking officers with HEISE, and the designation of specific personnel, technical and otherwise, for cooperation with HEISE. The list of Japanese personnel assisting HEISE is given below:

Unit Organization	Name and Rank	Collaboration Duties
23rd Army Hq.	Col. Hasegawa	Social relationship with Heise
23rd Army Staff Hq.	Col. Okada	Heise's intimate friend
" " " "	Capt. Aoyama	Liaison with Heise
" " " "	Sgt. Sasaki	Interpreter
" " " "	Cpl. Wada	"
Ume Organization	Major Ume	Message interception
Kagami Organization	Major Kagami	" "
" "	Pfc. Nitta	Interception of China-India air transport information
23rd Army Staff Hq.	Pvt. Nunome	"
" " " "	Pvt. Masuda	"

f. Special Intelligence Units (Kikana):

The material referring to the Special Intelligence Units of South China is located under a separate section entitled "Special Service Organizations (See Table of Contents.)

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g. Focal of Intelligence Activities

Since the tide of the Pacific war turned in favor of the Allies, especially since the American reoccupation of Leyte and Manila, the Japanese were contemplating the eventual landing along the South China coast. And from the reorganization and new equipment of the Chinese Army, they knew the time for the new Chinese offensive was near. Because of these facts, the primary concern of Japanese intelligence was directed toward the possible place and date of American coastal landings, the progress in tactics and offensive power of the rejuvenated Chinese Army, the new types of equipment and the probable time of the new Chinese offensive. Herewith is listed their primary objectives: and territory covered:

Objectives:

(1) Possible American landings along the South China coast:
  (a) points of landing
  (b) time
  (c) strength and strategy

(2) Time and strategy of Chinese offensive

(3) Information relating to air transportation over the Hump

(4) Degree of success pertaining to the sabotage of political division of China

(5) Actual condition of peace and order of occupied South China

(6) Information pertaining to concentration of forces.

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SECRET

THE POGI, AREA AND DIRECTION OF THE
SOUTH CHINA JAPANESE ARMY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Territory Covered:

SECRET

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5. SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS

a. Nomenclature:

Frequent changes in Japanese Special Service organizations, both in their names and in the functions which they imply, are apt to cause confusion. A glossary is therefore given in this paragraph, which sets out the names, meaning, and period of the organization of the Special Service Department (SSD).

CHUZAI BUKAN Resident officer 1929-37
(RIKUGUN: Army)

TOKUMU KIKAN SSD Army only
1. Army SSD for less important areas excluding cities Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, Shanghai, Canton 1929-37
2. SSD whole of China 1937-38
3. Solely for Puppet Government 1938-43

TOKUMU BU Special duties dept., Army whole of China excluding Shanghai and Nanking 1938-43

RENRAKU BU Army Liaison Department 1943-45
Used only for work with Puppet Gov.

RIKUGUNBU Army Department or Bureau 1943-45

b. Origins:

Although the first organized effort to develop special services was made by the Navy in 1929, it is believed that the Army had them some years earlier. They existed in the form of Military Attaches at Peiping. However, when the Chinese Government transferred to Nanking, the Japanese, with their increasing interest in China, desired to retain a representative in North China and in order to avoid diplomatic protest created the CHUZAI BUKAN (Resident Officer) in addition to the Attaches' office. Resident officers were installed in every city of importance, subsequently extending to Canton.

c. Functions:

From 1929 to 1937, the Army Special Service Department was virtually under the control of the Imperial General Staff (SAMBO), Tokyo. This was because the main functions of the Special Service Department during this period were espionage and counter-espionage (general heading GUNREI), for which the General Staff has always been responsible as against the

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function of cooperation with governments, propaganda, economic and industrial affairs (general heading GUNSEI), for which the War Office (RIKUGUNSHO) and Admirality (KAIGUNSHO) were responsible. Later, during the occupation, the SSD's were concerned primarily with the control of the native population, the establishment of Puppet regimes, and organization of labor and supplies for the occupation forces, in addition to intelligence activities.

d. Changes:

Changes took place as a result of prevailing circumstances, and took effect over a period of months. The first took place in 1930 when the RIKUGUN CHUZAI BUKAN activated the TOKUMU KIKAN (Special Service Organization) to conduct similar functions in less important areas where sections of the organizations were formed and disbanded as the situation in that area demanded.

At that time, sections of TOKUMU KUKAN were not given special code-names; e.g., UME, MATSU, etc., which applied to later Army organizations. Thus, during the period 1929 - 1937, there were the following SSD's:

CHUZAI BUKAN, answering directly to Tokyo, mainly to the General Staff.

TOKUMU KIKAN (AIKUGUN), from 1930, in less important areas, answering to Tokyo, mainly to the General Staff.

Following the opening of hostilities in China in the summer of 1937, and the subsequent occupation of Nanking by Japanese forces, the SSD was remodelled, and the office of CHUZAI BUKAN terminated, with the exception of Army Departments in Canton and Hankow, when the CHUZAI BUKAN remained in addition to the new organ.

Although the Navy retained their Attaches, the Army temporarily withdrew theirs until the Wang Ching Wei Puppet Government came into being.

The Army SSD throughout China adopted the name of RIKUGUN TOKUMU KIKAN, and was for the first time under direct control of Headquarters, China Expeditionary Forces, Nanking, which in turn was responsible to the Imperial Headquarters and/or War Office, Tokyo, according to the nature of the work. This change in name and of responsibility was ordered by Lt. Gen. KITA, Seiichi, who was later succeeded by Lt. Gen. HARADA, Kumakichi. HOKUSHI RIKUGUN TOKUMU KIKAN (North Army Special Service Department) had its headquarters in Peiping

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and was in control of Army SSD's in Tientsin, Tsingtao, and a few northern cities. Its jurisdiction did not extend to SSD's in Nanking, Shanghai and Hankow, who answered independently to Hq., C.E.F., Nanking. NANSHI RIKUGUN TOKUMU KIKAN (South Army Special Service Department) had its headquarters in Canton.

Some time in 1938 the Army SSD began to adopt the same title as used by the Navy; viz., TOKUMU BU. The name RIKUGUN TOKUMU KIKAN, especially as regards its espionage and counter-espionage functions, had become too well advertised in certain areas. This change in name did not apply to the Army SSD in Nanking and Shanghai, where their functions mainly were concerned with the engineering of and subsequent collaboration with Puppet Governments.

Thus, during the period 1937-1943, there were the following SSD's.:

RIKUGUN TOKUMU KIKAN - 1937-1938
" " BU - 1938-1943
" " KIKAN -
at Nanking - Shanghai - 1938-1943
CHUZAI BUKAN - retained at Hankow and Canton.

The third general change of names and functions of the SSD's began in the spring of 1943. RIKUGUN TOKUMU BU, TOKUMU KIKAN and CHUZAI BUKAN were disbanded. In so far as their functions vis-a-vis the Puppet Government were concerned, the three were amalgamated into the RENRAKU BU, (Liaison Department), with the exception of Shanghai, where the SSD continued to operate as the RIKUGUN BU.

The other branch of the Army SSD, that which dealt with espionage and counter-espionage, was centralized under an Intelligence Branch, known as BORYAKU JISSHI KIKAN at Headquarters, CEF, Nanking. This branch was commonly referred to as TOKUSHU KIKAN (literally Special Duties Organization), but was not known officially by this title. MATSU KIKAN and KIKU KIKAN came under the category of TOKUSHU KIKAN (literally Special Duties Organization), but was not known officially by this title. MATSU KIKAN and KIKU KIKAN came under the category of TOKUSHU KIKAN.

The RENRAKU BU had departments in all the important centers of the Chinese Puppet Government, viz., in Peiping, Nanking, Hankow and Canton, as well as in Shanghai, where it was named RIKUGUN BU, but differed from its predecessors in that it comes under the direct control of Army Headquarters in Nanking.

This latest organization was born out of several trial

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f. Relations between SSD and Axis Representatives:

Relations between the Japanese SSD in China and the German and Italian diplomatic representatives were maintained on the surface in the most cordial manner, but behind the scenes there was a strong undercurrent of resentment which the SSD centres had towards their Axis partners. Particularly was this the case in connection with the Germans, who were unwontedly meddlesome in the workings of the SSD.

The Japanese considered China, or at least occupied China, under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and, as such, was, without reservation whatever, Japan's affair; just as the Germans and Italians would have their share of occupied territory in Europe and Africa, should the war end in the Axis' favor.

After the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the concessions given to the Germans and Italians as regards information collected by the SSD were increased. However, it was difficult to satisfy the insatiable demands of the German representatives and even of the Italians who were prone to mimic their senior partner.

German interference in Japanese SSD operations reached its peak after Dunkirk. On not a few occasions, the Germans were caught redhanded in buying off Japanese agents, thus intercepting the information which should have reached the Japanese. The natural outcome of such occurrences was the tendency on the part of the Japanese SSD to become even more parsimonious in parting with information. With the deterioration of their position in Africa and Europe, and after Italy's elimination from the war, the Germans became less bold in their methods. Also they learned to their cost that Chinese did not make very trustworthy agents.

Italian representation became almost non-existent when Italy surrendered. Those pro-Fascist officials who were left, after the anti-fascists were interned, retained little of their diplomatic powers and as far as the Japanese SSD was concerned, there was little liaison to be conducted.

g. SSD Organizations:

Set out below are reports concerning all SSD organizations known to this office. This information concerning each organization explains briefly the objectives, key personnel, locations and time of activity.

1) UME KIKAN:

UME was organized in 1938 by Lt. General KAGEZA in Nanking for the purpose of supporting and promoting the

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Puppet Regime. In Chinese it was called MEI-HWA-TANG (Plum Flower Society) and was attached to the Military Adviser's Council. In the beginning it was active in the protection of Puppets from attacks by the C.C. Society and Blue Shirt Society (TAI LI) and assumed leadership in the Country Cleaning Movement.

In 1943, Lt. General MATSUI, Chief of Staff of the Headquarters, CEF, took charge of the organization and changed its function to one of strategic information gathering concerning the Chungking Government.

It has been highly difficult to obtain information concerning UME KIKAN as the Chinese authorities have shrouded it in secrecy, completely ignoring requests for information about it or permission to interrogate members of its staff.

Concerning the Shanghai office, it has been learned that Captain NAKAJIMA, Seichi, was in charge and had Lt. HIZAMATSU and Lt. KUROKI on his staff. The office had two departments: Political, devoted to espionage; economic, devoted to purchasing and exchange of war materials with the forward Chinese Armies. These transactions were made by the TONAN KIGYO KOSU (East Southern Development Co.) located in Shanghai, but with branch offices in Chekiang Province at Hangchow, Chinhwa, Fuyang, Lanchi and Niwoo.

According to a statement by Major General TOMI, Chief of Staff of the 23rd Army, it was this organization that engineered the desertion and flight of WANG CHING-WEI and TSENG CHUNG-MING from Chungking to Hanoi and thence to Nanking.

In 1938, the IWAI Mission, (sometimes called the Special Investigation Group), an independent office of the Foreign Office, cooperated very closely with UME KIKAN. IWAI, Aeiichi, who had served as Consul in Canton, organized the mission upon his arrival in Shanghai, and received full cooperation and financial support from Lt. General KAGEZA, Director of UME.

2) OBA KIKAN:

OBA, Masatoshi, once a loafer in Shanghai ingratiated himself with the military clique following the battle for Shanghai, 1937, and formed the OBA Organization. In the pretense of doing intelligence work, he caused many anti-Japanese to be jailed and destroyed many British and American industrial plants. He also assisted the UME KIKAN

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in the formation of the Puppet Army. During the search for Kuomintang personnel in outlying villages by the Puppet Government, OBA managed to appropriate a huge amount of grain for himself.

3) MATSU KIKAN (Pine Society):

MATSU KIKAN, organized in 1940, was directed by Lt. Col. OKADA, Yoshimasa, former Chief of Staff of the 23rd Army with offices in Shanghai, Hongkong, Canton and Hankow, and was responsible directly to Headquarters, Nanking. The objection of the organization was to collect information concerning political personalities and activities in Chungking, and utilized this information to persuade officials to collaborate with the Puppet Regime. Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific war, MATSU KIKAN was devoting its efforts to obtaining foreign capital (gold) by exporting Chinese native goods, bristles, wood-oil, etc. to the United States. This trade was financed by SHOWA TSUSHO. The organization was reported to have been disbanded in 1943 and that the information section joined UME KIKAN. However, a source in Canton reports that up to the surrender, the activities of MATSU were entrusted to a branch of the ITAGAKI HOUSE, with the aim of destroying the Chinese economic structure by the purchase of metals and ores.

4) FUJI KIKAN (Shanghai Kikan):

Shanghai Kikan was organized and operated during 1940-1941 by Captain URANO (now Lt. Colonel), who assigned directly from Headquarters, CEF. Its duties, as were the duties of most Kikans early in the war, were both the elimination of Chungking agents and persuasion of Chinese officials to join the Nanking Regime. FUJI KIKAN was more of a terrorist gang than intelligence organ, and carried out its acts by holding as hostages members of Chungking officials' families, and in the case of enemy agents, simply shooting them. Assistants of URANO were two Koreans, KANEZAWA (Kim Kyung Chai) and YAMASHIRO (Choi Kyung Su).

5) SAKURA KIKAN:

This organization, directed by Major-General OKADA, operated at Shanghai in 1940 until 1942. It's main activity was counter-espionage directed against Chungking agents.

6) SAKABA KIKAN:

This organization, originally started by SAKAKA, operated as an espionage organization for the 13th Army under the direction of Lt. Col. ICHIGAWA, _____, Intelligence Staff Officer. It was known as the New Trading Co., (Shin Wha Moi Kungsu), and had its offices in the Development Building, Shanghai. KOJIMA Takeo was the manager as his assistants, Capt. HASHIMOTO and Mrs. NOGAMI.

7) MISUMI ORGANIZATION:

This organization was originally directly under the Headquarters, Japanese China Expeditionary Force, but was

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transferred to the 23rd Army. The main duty was the interception of military radio messages sent by the Chinese and the American headquarters. It was divided into two sections: the China Section and the American Section.

The attention of the China Section was the Chinese 2nd Area Command, especially the 7th War Area, the 65th Army, the 63rd Army and the Border Region Headquarters. Messages from these headquarters concerning troop movements and supplies were the main objectives of interest. The main objectives of interception for the American Section were the messages and broadcasts from the Philippines, which was the center of the American Naval information, Honolulu and Oahu, and the messages that travelled between these points and the United States. When the tide of the Pacific War became evident, this organization devoted its entire energy towards the collection of information concerning the points of coastal landings which the Americans and the British forces were contemplating. But due to lack of equipment and shortage of personnel, their achievements in this respect up to the time of the surrender were poor.

In their study of intercepted messages, the important points of each message were made into copies and compared with other messages sent out. Their time of interception ranged from 0800 hours to 2400 hours.

China Section:
C-I-C : Captain Yano
Staff : 40 (including four officers) 40
Duty : Radio interception of Chinese messages

American Section:
C-I-C : Capt. Arakawa 22
Staff : 22 (including 1 officer)
Duty : Interception of American radio messages

Apparatus (Technical) Section:
C-I-C : Lt. Sako 6
Staff : 6 (including 1 officer)
Duty : Repair and maintenance of equipment

General Affairs Department:
C-I-C : Capt. Yano (assumes this post also) 8
Staff : 8 (including 1 officer)
Total number of personnel 76

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Equipment used in the China Section:
10 radio transmitter sets with 28 operators
9 sets require 3 men per set
1 set requires 1 man per set 10 sets
one to two translators.

Equipment used in the American Section:
7 sets with 20 operators
6 sets require 3 operators
1 set requires 2 operators 7 "
readers and translators together 2 men
Total ..... 17 sets

Types of Radio Transmitters:

R C A	4 sets
National	3 "
Others	10 "
Total	17 sets

This equipment was handed over to our 38th Division and the 50th Division by the Japanese.

8) The Asiatic Prosperity Organization:

This organization was directly under the headquarters, Japanese China Expeditionary Force whose headquarters was at Nanking. It was originally established in Hongkong, but in April, 1945, it was transferred to Canton under the 23rd Army. Its main activities were the collection of intelligence information from documents and newspapers and the dispatching of agents into Free China to carry out its activities, especially information concerning military movements in South China. From their own reports it was difficult to find good agents for this purpose, and due to the tight anti-espionage net set up by Chungking, these agents often were arrested or simply disappeared. Col. NINOUE, Capt. AOYAMA and Lt. Col. KOBAYASHI all expressed the same doubt whether these agents ever reached their objectives, and knew that results expected from these people could not be reliable and therefore confined themselves chiefly to documentary information. Whatever information they had been able to obtain was concerning the East River Communist and bandit activities.

Personnel:

Name and Rank	Duty	Present Address
Major Ninoue	Head of Organization	Deceased
Capt. Aoyama	Successor to Maj. Ninoue	Honam Concentration (POW) Camp
Sgt. Yatomi	Member of the Staff	Liaison Department 2nd Area Command
Mr. Masuda	Employee	Lingnan Concentration Camp
Kwing Chuen	Chauffeur (Chinese)	Unknown
Chang Yiu	Cook "	"

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SECRET

Sphere of Operation of the Asiatic Prosperity Organization

CHART # 2



NOTE: The chief agent for this organization was a Chinese, LI SHING WING, a native of Toishan, aged 36. Before the war he was said to have been connected with the Chinese "Blueshirts", and supplied information to the Japanese at Hongkong after the beginning of hostilities. He came to Canton in March, 1945, to continue his work by establishing a shop as his blind under the name of CHEUNG LEE HONG situated on Tai [illegible] Road, S. This was his headquarters where he dispatched agents to Chungking, Kunming, Kweiyang, San-nan district, the East River and Loting area. Once a month his men went out utilizing the river boats and trade-travelers as means of contact.

SECRET

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9) Kagami Organization:

This organization was part of the Japanese 5th Air Force at Nanking. Its main objective was the interception of messages relating to the movements of the American Air Force in China. Due to the expediency of the work, it maintained close collaboration with the German "Heise" Agency at Canton. From March, 1944, it began to undertake the main task of intercepting messages of the A.T.C. and Sergeant NITTA was designated to collaborate with the Germans. Before collaboration with the Germans, the only duty of the Kagami Organization was the interception of A.T.C. messages. In June, 1945, this unit moved to Central China, together with the 5th Air Force.

Personnel:

Major KAGAMI	Head of Organization
Capt. KIGENOI	Staff Member
Capt. OAITO (Ofuji)	" "
Capt. TAKAYA	" "
Lt. (Uncertain romanization)	" "
Sergeant NITTA	

10) YOSHINO Organization:

This organization was attached to the Headquarters of the Japanese China Expeditionary Force. It was set up in Canton on June, 1944, with Maj. Gen. YOSHINO as the head. Its objectives were sabotage directed against ranking Chinese military officers, sowing seeds of discord between local Governments and the Central Government, and the instigation of peace overtures through false propaganda of Sino-Japanese cooperation.

Upon the recall of Maj. Gen. YOSHINO to Nanking Headquarters in February, 1945, Maj. Gen. TOMITA (TONDA) took over the organization which he wound up and reorganized into what was known as "The South China Espionage Agency" whose main objective was the instigation of peace between the Chinese forces stationed in Kwangei and the Japanese. The results of this effort were nil.

Personnel:

Name and Rank	Duty	Present Address
Maj. Gen. YOSHINO	Head of Organization	In Japan, address unknown
Lt.Col.FUKUYAMA	Assistant Head	Staff Officer, 23rd Army, at present in Shanghai.
Lt.(Uncertain romanisation)	Secretary	Address unknown
Sgt. KITAGAWA	Secretary	Liaison Department 2nd Area Command

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11) Take Organization:

The duty of this organization was the study of the military, political, cultural and other subjects of the Chinese.

12) The Hunan Fukkobu Organization:

The principal duties of the HUNAN FUKKOBU Organization was to avoid coercive action against the people of the occupied area in order to gain the good will of the people, to maintain a popular support of the people, to gain the support of discouraged war-lords and politicians, to collect resources and food in order to maintain the Japanese occupation forces.

The FUKKOBU was organized under the guidance of the Sakurabutai and the Ministry of War. The Commanding Officer of the Changsha Organization was Major General SAKATO TOYOKI.

The following is a diagrammatic outline of the organization:

a) General Office:
   1. Commanding Officer - Colonel HORIE
   2. Principle - Same as Chinese Organization
   3. Direct Section:
      A. Service Section: Receiving and dispatching documents and wireless messages.
      B. Accounting Section: Receiving, paying, and auditing.

b) Economical Affairs:
   1. Commanding Officer - Colonel NAKASHIMA
   2. Principle - Cultivate resources, "oppress" economics, steal material in order to fulfil the military needs.
   3. Direct Section:
      A. Mining Dept.: Investigation, research and cultivation.
      B. Munition Dept.: Metal ware and all materials concerning munitions and to establish cigarette, wine and soy, leather, clothing and dyeing, soap, alcohol and bags factories.
      C. Collecting Dept.: Collecting material, drafting and buying or exchange.
      D. Finance Dept.: Currency, banks, increase production, loan and exchange (cooperate with merchants to transport important materials from interior).
      E. Technical Dept.: Economical planning, control planning, mining research, etc.,and concentrate the technical experts.
      F. Cooperation Assn.: To cooperate with the merchants in occupied area on economical affairs.

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12) The Hunan Fukkobu Organization (Continued)
b) Economical Affairs: (Continued)
3. Direct Section: (Continued)
G. Representative Organization:
1) Kodama Org.: Established by Naval Dept. and under FUKKOBU's direction. Collecting material to supply to Naval Dept. Pretended to be commercial organization, but in fact an organization to steal materials.
2) Showa Yoko: Established by Army Dept. and under FUKKOBU's direction. Same as Kodama to supply to Army Dept. service-metal ware, medicine and coin.
3) Manwa: Established by Army Dept. and under FUKKOBU's direction. Same as Showa Yoko. Service-collecting various food and grease.

H. Direct Companies:
1) Hsian Kiang Tdg. Co.: Supervised by Capt. TAKATORI. Service-exchange with daily use, commodities to military needs such as food and grease.
2) Hunan Dept. Store: Supervised by MATSUI. Service-supply to Changsha citizens commodities and salt. Principle - to hold people's goodwill by maintaining C.R.B. notes.
3) Kung Ping Shan Han: Supervised by Capt. TAKATORI Service and principle - same as Hunan Dept.
4) Koan Printing Co.: Supervised by Changsha FUKKOBU. Service-announcements and declarations and military lists.

c) Political Affairs:
1. Commanding Officer - Lt. Colonel TERAHIRA.
2. Principle - to hold people's goodwill by organizing Puppet Government in occupied area and to maintain social security in order to aid Japanese to carry on the war.

3. Direct Section:
A. Propaganda Dept.:
1) Consolation Unit: To hold consolation affairs in certain areas.
2) Cultural Unit: Cultural Society, to control the publishing of puppet papers.
3) Road Unit: (Maintenance) Organized roads maintaining units along highways and railways in order to keep peace and increase transportation.

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12) The Hunan Fukkobu Organization (Continued)
c) Political Affairs (Continued)
3. Direct Section (Continued)
B. Strategy Dept.:

1) Information Unit: (Civilian) Supervised by YANAGITA ( ). Duty-Commercial situation at Changsha. Securing information and surveilling guerrilla activities. Org. More than 10 at Takung Pao Association 2/3 were Hupei.

2) Special Service Unit: Supervised by Capt. SOMIYA ( ), relative of Japanese Emperor. Duty - to investigate Japanese thoughts and actions. Surveilling working comrades.

3) Economical Special: Service Unit: Supervised by HARAGUCHI ( ). Organising economical police and FUKKOBU's plainclothes men. Duty to maintain C.R.B. notes and prevent inflation (high cost of living).

4) Puppet Org. Unit: Supervised by CHANG I FUNG ( ). Duty - Organising Puppet, Provincial City and District Government and serial organisations.

Organizing special service group in Interior and working group in occupied area.

Communication Section: To collect information from newspapers and articles published in Interior.

BRANCH OFFICE: Established in every county, district and big cities of the occupied areas. The organization is same, but smaller.

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SECRET INTELLIGENCE GROUP: Source advised that there was a Secret Intelligence Group with the General Staff of the Japanese 20th Army. Source did not know if this Group had any special name, but said that it was always referred to by members of the Kempeitei as the "Secret Intelligence Group". This Group was headed by Capt. SOMIYA ( ) who is a relative of the Japanese Imperial family, and who also headed the Special Service Unit in the Political Affairs Section of the FUKKOBU. This Group consisted of only two Japanese, Capt. SOMIYA and a Sergeant, but they employed about 30 Chinese, most of whom came from Hupei Province. The main duty of this Group was to find out the number, plan, activity and equipment of Chinese forces.

Source also advised that Capt. SOMIYA had planned for a Group whose main purpose was to assassinate American and British officers. This plan was suggested a few weeks before the surrender and was never put into effect.

COOPERATION BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS: Source advised that all three organizations kept their own records and files, but exchanged copies of their records freely. Important cases were forwarded to Tokyo via Japanese Headquarters in Nanking.

Such free liaison and cooperation existed in advanced areas, but not at higher headquarters.

13) Shanghai Rikugunbu (Army Bureau):

The Japanese Army Bureau (Rikugunbu) was an independent intelligence collecting organization, located in Shanghai, under the direction of Major General KAWAMOTO YOSHITARO, AC of S, Nanking, and was under the direct supervision of Headquarters, China Expeditionary Forces, Nanking, from 1 October, 1942, to the end of the war.

a) Purpose:

The general purpose of the Army Bureau was to represent the Headquarters in Shanghai in a variety of intelligence affairs necessary in this large city which were not included in the functions of the 13th Army. It acted not only as a liaison body with the Army, Navy and Embassy offices, but also as an intelligence collecting, counter-espionage and propagenda agency.

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13) Shanghai Rikugunbu (Army Bureau) (Continued)

b) Functions:

1. Collection of political and economin intelligence concerning Chinese and Foreigners by means of agents and radio reception.
2. Liaison affairs concerning Chinese peace construction.
3. Liaison with Japanese agencies.
4. Liaison with agencies and officials of Axis and neutral countries.
5. Propaganda preparation and distribution.

c) Structure:

Director of the Army Bureau
Senior Staff Officers
1. First Department (Intelligence)
   A. Political and Economic Section:
      i. Political Information Sub-Section
      ii. Economic Sub-Section
      iii. Materials Sub-Section (Preparation and translation of publications)
   B. Foreign Affairs Section
   C. Foreign Information Section
      i. Reception and translation of radio broadcasts
      ii. Preparation and consolidation
2. Second Department (Liaison Office for Chinese Affairs)
3. Information Department (Press Bureau)
4. General Affairs Department (Administrative)

d) Methods of Operation:

Through interrogation with staff officers, only denials concerning the use of agents were received, and emphasis was placed upon the liaison duties of the organization. However, informants have volunteered that the Rikugunbu was the leading intelligence agency in Shanghai throughout the war, which employed numerous Japanese, Chinese and foreign plainclothes agents.

A special effort was made by the Rikugunbu to penetrate and play a role in White Russian affairs to the extent of operating a Russian language daily, the "Far Eastern Daily News" owned by K. KUROKI, who was also Assistant Chairman of the Russian Emigrant's Committee. Not only was this intended as a means of controlling and prejudicing Russian thought to favor Japan's war in China, but also a means of cultivating Russian informants.

In one sense, the Bureau was a special service organization (Kikan) on a very elaborate scale, working directly and independently as a strategic office of the Nanking Headquarters. However, unlike most of the Kikans, this organization had many more departments and sections and phases of intelligence activity to conduct than most Kikans operating usually on one particular assignment. It was the one organization in Shanghai which did most to coordinate the efforts of all intelligence gathering agencies.

(Source: Lt. Col. MORI, AKIRA, Senior Staff Officer, Rikugunbu, 15 November, 1945. Evaluation C-3).

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6. Gendarmerie (Kempei Tai)

a. Organization and Command

The Gendarmerie, a special branch of the armed forces, which conducted Military Police functions, served both the Army and Navy, although it was under the direction of the War Ministry and of the Provost Marshal General, and therefore more closely connected with the Army.

The Kempei Tai in China was not controlled from Japan but was directly responsible to General OKAMURA, Neiji, Commanding General, China Expectionary Forces; no orders or directives were received from any higher Kempei Tai, Headquarters in Tokyo. If any Kempei matter was of sufficient importance to report to the Imperial General Staff, it was reported through command channels by General Okamura. The Kempei, like the Army, was divided into the areas, North, Central and South China, the commanders of which were responsible both to their area commanders and the Commanding General; in the Armies, the Army commander did not decide policy matters of the Kempei but merely laid down rules and regulations which were to be enforced by the Kempei Tai.

In Japan, the Kempei Tai Commander had no control over activities in China but was solely responsible for operations in Japan proper under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry.

b. Duties - Generally, the Kempei is divided into two general sections:

General Affairs Section: Concerned with matters of policy, personnel, records, and thought control.

Services Section: Concerned with training of personnel, security, espionage, counter espionage, supervising civilian employees of the Army, policing occupied areas, guarding military installations, surveillance of Japanese in occupied areas and controlling black market.

The Army was responsible for handling of prisoners of war, and the only connection that the Kempei had with prisoners was when they were requested by the Army to provide guards for the transportation or detention of prisoners.

Reports from various parts of China, do not offer any consistant departmental structure of Kempei units, although all present as duties, the above mentioned.

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Two reports indicate that Kempei units, located at cities in Central China, had internal departments as follows:

TOKKO-KA (counter-espionage) - Employing mainly Orientals, and some foreigners, to expose Chungking and Communist agents.

KEIZAI-KA (economic affairs) - Devoting its efforts toward control of black market activities, such as exchange and dealing in gold bars, foreign currencies, forgery, sale of prohibited war materials.

GAIJI-KA (foreign affairs) - Investigation and control of activities of foreign nationals, arrest and detention of enemy nationals, confiscation of property, control of neutrals.

TEISATUSU-KA (investigation section) - The personnel of which was used by other sections for detective, investigation and surveillance activities who had this power of arrest according to warrants issued by their office.

KEIBI-KA (garrison units) - The duties of which were patrolling the streets in the interest of public safety, guarding of military installations, jails, and puppet personalities.

SHIHO-KA (justice section) The duties of which were the processing of preliminary investigative reports to determine need forfurther investigation, check the facts of the case through own sources, preparation of material for court case at the Military Court (Gumpo Keigi).

c. Strength

The units of the Kempei generally were classified into three catagories: province, zone and sub-zone levels under occupying Armies.

Province: 80-100 officers and men, commanded by a lieutenant colonel and included 25 civilians (SUNSOKU)

Zone: 70-80 officers and men, commanded by a captain, and included about 15-20 civilizns, and 12 Chinese auxiliary policemen.

Sub-zone: 20 officers and men, 10 Chinese and Japanese civilians.

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This does not include vast numbers of informants. Exceptions to these strengths existed in most large cities where there were numerous sub-stations; as for example, Shanghai where there were five important stations excluding Headquarters, each of which controlled sub-stations, and patrols.

d. Recruiting and Training

All gendarmerie personnel were obtained from other units of the army such as the infantry, artillery, and cavalry. No one was assigned to the Kempei Tai upon induction. The Kempei Tai always had a standing list of volunteers from other branches and when replacements were needed examinations were given to the volunteers and their background was investigated. The best qualified men were selected for the Kempei Tai, and sent to a school. Formerly the only school was in Japan, but in the last two years schools were set up in Peking, Manchuria, and Nanking. The school in Nanking was run by the Central China Gendarmerie Unit and furnished replacements for that command. The course in the school consisted of about four months training in police methods, gendarm policy, military discipline, etc.

There were only two KEMPEI schools in North Chani and Manchuria. One was located at Peiping, and the other was located at Chang Chun (SHING KING), Manchuria.

The curriculum at the Peiping school consisted of physical training: rough and tumble, judo, mob control, etc.; mental training (Shinto); superiority of the Japanese race, unconquerability; undercover training, espionage, agent nets, penetration, and interrogation methods. The courses varied in length from three months and six months to one year, depending on the type of work; police, espionage, etc. The school graduated from 200 to 300 students per year; all of these were Japanese personnel, both military and civilian.

The school at Chang Chun was very similar to the Peking school but it was considerably larger and graduated Japanese, Koreans, and White Russians.

Refresher training was given at most units every six months to officers and men alike in the form of trial cases, which were to be solved in theory by written paper.

e. Methods of Operation:

(1) Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction over persons of the Kempei Tai in law and order matters is restricted to military personnel and persons travelling with the Army.

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Japanese civilians come under the jurisdiction of the Consular Police and Chinese civilians were under the jurisdiction of the puppet police. One exception to this might be that in case of a riot the Kempei Tai would be ordered by the army commander to assist the civilian and consular police to restore order. Also, the consulate police might request the Kempei Tai to assist them if they were unable to cope with a situation. The Kempei Tai did not have a liaison officer with the consular andpuppet police. However, the army maintained a liaison office which dealt with the consulate and the puppet government and this army liaison office would handle the liaison between Kempei Tai and the puppet and consular police. Another exception concerning jurisdiction over Japanese and Chinese civilians was in the case of suspected espionage, in which matter the Kempei Tai had the right of arrest and prosecution over any person, may they be enemy nationals, Japanese civilians, or Japanese military or naval officers and men of any rank. In the case of neutrals, an arrest may be carried out but the neutral is usually turned over to his consular representative for punishment.

2. Trial of Offenders

The trial of a civilian either enemy or Japanese national was conducted in either a civil or military court depending upon the charge and the arresting organization. If the civilian in question was booked with a political charge, which most frequently was the case, since most offenses during time of war were considered political affronts at Japan, he was subject to a courts martial in the Japanese Military Court (Gumpo Kaigi), and if found guilty and sentenced to jail, would be placed in a military jail. Criminal trials against Japanese citizens (non-military) took place in the Consular Court; against Chinese in Puppet Courts; against neutrals at their respective consulates, unless these neutrals were not nationals of countries that had extra territoriality rights in China, in such a case the trial took place in a Puppet Court.

The Navy does not have an organization similar to the Kempei Tai, and Kempei Tai was responsible for order on the part of Navy personnel. In the event Navy personnel get into trouble, the Kempei Tai turned them over to the Navy for disciplinary action. The only time that the Navy might have any control over the Kempei Tai would be in a case where an island garrison was commanded by a Navy Commander, in which case the Navy Commander would also be the over all commander of the Kempei Tai in that area.

Exceptions to this rule existed in the cities of Shanghai and Tsingtao where the Navy, as the arrogantly superior branch of service, was undisputed in certain areas of the city; they were the sole economic exploiters and first-law enforcement agency in the area, followed by the gendarmerie, and finally the police. It wasn't until early 1945 that the Kempei Tai, because of the

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Navy's loss of prestige and strength in the Pacific, was able to challenge and counter Navy orders in these areas.

3. Agents

In outlying forward areas, the agents of the Kempei Tai were under the same covers as Special Service men, such as storekeepers, traders and merchants, inn keepers, etc., most of whom were unpaid and received only small priviledges in return for services, in the form of permits for trade, or permission to deal in illicit goods, or the priviledge of purchasing rice, clothing, and foods at lower cost than the market price.

In the larger cities, agents were of a variety of nationalities, predominantly Chinese however, although foreign agents and informants were most valuable in their understanding of black market, swindling, extortion methods, blackmail, etc. Again, these agents received only slight monetary remuneration, and the o only benefit they received for their services was to be able to carry on these criminal activities at the expense of the population and to the benefit of themselves and the officials for whom they worked.

Many gendarms worked in plainclothes and operated much like agents themselves, however, they were, toward the end of the war, very disconcerted about their personal security, since very little enemy espionage threatened their positions. Through the medium of terrorism and torture of arrested persons, a vivid and realistic threat existed in the minds of allied sympathizers and operators, who cautiously observed all rules and regulations laid down by the occupation forces, and enforced by the Kempei Tai, in every effort to retain their own security and safety.

Because of such a situation there were few strictly loyal Chinese agents working for the National Government, the Communists, or the American Forces; they only way they could exist and still carry on their intelligence role was to act as double-agents, and for their own benefit serve both sides. The Kempei Tai did not have the exclusive right to handle double agents, and if the Army caught an agent they might use him without notifying the Kempei Tai.

Exhibit IX - Kempei Tai at Tsingtao, N. China

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D. KWANTUNG ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE:

This army was considered to be the best of the Japanese Army Ground Forces until 1943, at which time it totalled 1,000,000 in strength. However, afterwards approximately 500,000 troops were withdrawn to fight on other fronts. Until 1943, this army was prepared and had plans to launch an attack on Russia.

The intelligence services of the Kwantung Army was likewise considered to be the best not only in China, but of the whole Japanese Army.

1. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE:

The 2nd Section, Headquarters, Kwantung Army, was charged with the collection of information, examination and appraisal of information collected, investigation into the prevailing military situation, and the planning for and supervision of land services. It was organized as follows: Chief of the 2nd Section, a Colonel in rank, was responsible to the Commander and the Chief of Staff, and reported directly to Imperial Headquarters, Tokyo, and had under his jurisdiction four sub-sections which are as follows:

a. General Affairs Section - in charge of personnel, records, etc.

b. Intelligence Section - Affairs connected with information collecting.

c. Military Investigations Section - in charge of investigations for military requirements.

d. Meteorological Section.

Besides the above duties, contact was maintained with and supervision was given to the Public Security Bureau of the Foreign Ministry of Manchukuo and the Investigation Section of the South Manchurian Railway Company.

2. METHODS OF OPERATION:

Generally speaking, the intelligence services of the Kwantung Army were of first rate although even they had much to improve. The results gained through the activity of its intelligence services were sufficiently fruitless in preparing any military operation. This was exemplified at the time of the Russian advance into Manchuria, their endeavor to reinforce their Army last summer, and also in a series of incidents occurring on the Russo-Manchurian Border. The means by which the intelligence service gathered its information falls into the following categories:

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a. Special information was secured from the decoding of Soviet Army radio messages of which only the simpler three letter codes were deciphered. By this means, information about the disposition of Army groups and their movements and maneuvers were obtained. However, no information was gained concerning the organization of the armies, their equipment and their potential fighting strength.

b. Aerial photography contributed much to the formulation of invasion plans by the Kwantung Army through preparation of topographical over-lay maps. Aerial photography was exclusively conducted by the 2nd Air Force and much information was gained concerning Soviet airfields and the stationing of their aircraft, military installations, warehouses, fleet disposition, etc., at such places as CHITA, KHAVALOVSK, VOLOSILOV and VLADIVOSTOK.

c. Land observations were conducted by reconnaissance patrols that sought information concerning the general enemy situation and their fortresses along the frontier.

d. Information from documents which were sent to Japanese Special Service organs in Harbin from such places as Moscow and Chita by Japanese diplomatic representatives were, after translation, distributed to all Army Division Headquarters in Manchuria. Such information as the transfer of army units and war materials in eastern Soviet territory, as well as books and documentary material were carried by diplomatic agents who traveled between Manchuria and Soviet Russia via the Siberian Railway.

e. Information gained through interrogating Soviet military deserters and civilian refugees gave little information other than that of organizations and equipment of small units, internal situation, and military discipline of the Red Army. In many cases, the Russian Army sent "fake" army deserters to willingly offer false information.

f. Sending of agents across the frontier never proved effective and the Kwantung Army never expected much from such missions. It was difficult to acquire qualified persons; the Soviets had an excellent anti-espionage network; and the racial differences too frequently led to the discovery of agents. Double agents were used, but proved unreliable and ineffective in the opinion of the

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EXHIBIT I

THE THIRD INDEPENDENT GUARD UNIT, PEIPING

(1) Duties:

The Intelligence Room of the Headquarters tried to gather information concerning the activities of the Communist elements and its armed forces, which were the most important factors obstructing construction and Japanese endeavors to establish stability in provincial districts. The information gathered was utilized whenever the Japanese forces started new operations against Red forces. The information, as soon as obtained, was immediately transmitted to higher command and various units velow.

For this purpose, a special section was organized in the Headquarters under the direction of an officer especially assigned to the task.

(2) Organization, Personnel and Duties:

Office in charge: Captain MAGRU IIZUKA

Sections	Remarks
Telephone & Telegrams General Affairs Reporting & Information	Collection of information, their study and examination
Special Investigation Corps Information by Documents Translation & Interpreting	Study of Communist forces, party and population in Red area

(3) Training & Training Equipments

A plan existed for giving education connected with the collection of information to intelligence officers attached to each battalion four times a year. However, this plan was never realized as the war came to an end only four months after the plan was considered.

No plan ever existed for special education to be given to non-commissioned officers and enlisted men.

Some documents and books were given from higher commands for the purpose of educating. Otherwise, no special equipment was employed for training.

(4) Cases of Success and Failure

While in most cases, information was gained through Chinese organs cooperating with the Japanese or from villagers, action promptly taken by Japanese forces on the basis of these informations rarely met with success as Communist forces had a very excellent system of preventing

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against any leakage of military secrets. In this, the racial traits of Chinese population, too, counted much.

Notable among the cases of success was the case in which the Japanese forces, after encircling the main body of Red forces in Hsincheng-hsien in June, 1945, successfully dealt a serious blow to a large body of Communist forces which tried to rescue their comrade units in Japanese encirclement. This was due to information the Japanese obtained in time.

In guerrilla warfare, on the whole, it has always been extremely difficult to get ahead of enemy movements. It was found that for an efficient working of our intelligence network, quite a number of personnel would be needed to work exclusively for that, while actually it was not the case.

Each battalion relied on necessary information on the agents of the Hsin Min Hui, Cooperatives and other native organs in close contact with local villagers for the same purpose. Enemy prisoners, too, sometimes, offered valuable information. Chinese spies, however, were seldom employed, because their efficacy was very doubtful.

(Source: "Summary Report on Enemy and Non-Enemy Intelligence Organizations in Tsingtao", 10 December, 1945. BH/80. Evaluation: C-3)

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SECRET

EXHIBIT II

PEIPING INFORMATION ORGAN (OR SHIGEKAWA ORGAN)

i. Make-up:

This organ was mainly in charge of collecting information on the Chungking forces and in the north-western part of China, and was organized as follows:

Chief of the organ:	Colonel K. Shigekawa
Assistant officer:	Sub-lieutenant Senda
Information Squad:	7 men
General Affairs Squad:	5 men

Note: No regular intelligence officers and men existed. As the Chief of the organ had long been in China, he himself called on many seniors and friends for the collection of necessary information.

ii. Training and Education:

As there were no regular intelligence officers or men, there was no necessity of considering this question.

Except giving necessary suggestions and guidance from the Chief of the Organ during his personal contact, no regular training was conducted for the members of the Organ.

iii. Dispatch of Intelligence Agents:

a) In the Muhamedan Circles:

Keeping close contact with the Muhammedans of the Chingcheng Temple (belonging to the North China Association of All-China Muhammedan Federation) the branch temples of which are scattered in various places in North China, the Peiping Organ gathered various information obtained from Muhammedan circles in North China.

The Peiping Organ gave no specified command or order to the Muhammedans concerned and only sought for useful information during the course of ordinary conversation with them. They were under no obligation. Those Muhammedans who were used to bring information were:

HAN _____, trader, at Hoehou, south-eastern part of Kansu province.

HAN SHOU-TANG, formerly soldier, at Hsining, east of Chinghai Lake, eastern part of Chinghai Province.

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PEIPING INFORMATION ORGAN (OR SHIGEKAWA ORGAN)

MA SHI-I, local Muhammedan, at Changkiachwan, south-eastern part of Kansu Province.

On the other hand, efforts were made to keep close contact with the Muhammedan traders coming to Peiping from the south-eastern part of Kansu Province. As they were large in number, their names in detail are not available here.

b) At the Time of the Honan Operation:

At the time of this operation, Chinese traders, farmers and Muhammedans of Honan Province were locally employed as secret agents and were dispatched to Loyang and Sian, but no success was obtained as almost all of them did not return.

c) Intelligence Agents in the Peiping-Tientsin Area:

As afore-mentioned under the heading of "Make-up", there were no regular intelligence agents at this Peiping Organ. However a number of the Chinese with whom the Chief of the Organ became acquainted during his long stay in China were utilized as medium of information required.

iv. Expense Required:

a) Current Expenditure: Y20,500 FRB monthly.

b) Extra disbursements were made in case of military operations. For instance a sum of Y80,000 was appropriated at the time of the Honan Operation in the spring of 1944.

v. Activities outside Peiping Area outlined:

a) With the outbreak of the Honan Operation in the spring of 1944, the Peiping Organ was order to transfer in Honan Province and was engaged in the main in the survey of military geography and was also in charge of the collection of information necessary for the maintenance of local public peace.

The members of the Organ returned to Peiping in the latter part of April, 1945. Later they went to the Japanese homeland on a furlough and came back to Peiping in the latter part of July. Before they were given a new duty the war was brought to an end.

b) The principal activities undertaken by the Peiping Organ in the past are as follows:

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PEIPING INFORMATION ORGAN (OR SHIGEKAWA ORGAN)

Just after the outbreak of the China Affair:

Participated in the formation of the Public Peace Maintenance Association of the special municipality of Tientsin.

Keeping close contact with the members of the Chinese Youth Corps who were residing in NorthmChina supported the development of the same Corps.

Created the Hsinmin College in Peiping and took care of the institute until the first students elapsed four months of study.

Participated in the campaign to support General Wu Pei-fu in 1939.

Participated in the conference between General Yen Hsi-shan and the Japanese forces in North China regarding the peace problem about 1941 or 1942.

After the Outbreak of the Greater East Asiatic War:

Attempted to make some connection with the Chungking authorities regarding peace negotiations, and launched various political activities. Despite much exertions it ended in failure.

Attempted to persuade General KO CHU-KUO to have his forces jointly carry out with the Japanese forces punitive operations against the Chinese communist forces, but it failed.

Engaged in launching peace negotiations with Chungking through Chang Hsueh-ming, Li Yu-liu and other generals, but it was in vain.

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EXHIBIT IV

PEIPING SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE CORPS

(1) Duty:

The main duty of this corps was to gather various information needed by the North China Army both from the political and strategical necessities. For this purpose, this corps at Normal times tried to gather information concerning the situation in the Northwest Region of China and the regions in the vicinity of Peiping, while at the time of the prosecution of specific operations, information concerning the movements of enemy forces in the specific areas.

(2) The Organization, and the equipment utilized:

I. Chinese Section

General Affairs Room:	5 Sub.-Lieutenants and 3 civilians
Sagyo (Work) Corps:	Captain and 5 officers
Accounts Room:	2nd Lieutenant and 2 civilians
No. 1 Room:	5 civilians, 3 engineers and 2 interpreters
Ordnance Room:	3 engineers
No. 2 Room:	10 engineers and 7 civilians

II. Direction of Detector Section

Chief: 2nd Lieutenant SHINGO YAMANAKA

1. Peiping Corps: 3 engineers and 3 enlisted men
2. Tsinan Corps: 5 enlisted men
3. Chinchow Corps: 5 enlisted men

TABLE OF THE EQUIPMENT EMPLOYED BY THE PEIPING SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE CORPS

Names	Quantity	Remarks
National Receivers	3	Peiping
R.C.A. Receivers	4	Peiping
Zenith Receiver	1	Peiping
Philco Receiver	1	Peiping
Radio Locators (Special receiving sets, type 94, model 5)	2	1 at Tsinan, 1 at Chinchow
Total	11	

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ACHIEVEMENTS GAINED BY THE PEIPING SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN DECIPHERING ENEMY'S CODED MESSAGES

Objectives	Extents of Success in Deciphering	Categories of Codes Used	Remarks
Northwest District Radio Station	Unable to decipher	None	Most information was gained in plain language messages
Radio Station with Lanchow as center, mostly re traffic	Able to decipher most of them	Unknown	Information was gained re traffic situation in Northwest area
Kansu Provincial Gov't.	Successful after one month	Unknown	Information gained here was useless and discarded
Headquarters, N.W. Supply District	Successful to a certain extent		Same code used for long period; most of informational messages deciphered
Yenan & its environs	Unsuccessful, especially those for military operations	Category No. 1 & No. 21, for political propaganda	Employed 25-word unit Ransu
Central-Chitung War Zone	Successful after one month	category No. 52, intended for political propaganda	Length of Ransu 1,000 words
Shansi-Chahar-Chitung War Zone	Successful after one month		Same as above
18th Group Army	Successful after one month		Same as above

NOTE: The Japanese were successful in deciphering some others, but the category of the codes used in these was similar to those mentioned above.

(3) Education & Training:

a. For the purpose of interception of wireless messages and deciphering of coded messages, no special systematic education has ever been given. Some general training was given the men in Nanking and was sent over to Peiping. All the education and training needed was intended to be given the men while

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actually on duty.

b. Direction Detector. Thirteen non-commissioned officers and soldiers were assigned about February this year for about three months since then to receive special education in this connection. The education, however, was confined to the treatment of the apparatus and measurement of the distance as the men assigned to this task had already been educated on communications. These thirteen men came from various communications units stationed in North China.

c. Equipment for training. There existed no special equipment, documents or books for the training.

d. Cases of success and failure:

1. Cases of Success:

Sometimes while military operations were in progress, the Chinese forces used easily-decipherable codes for the transmission of important messages, with the result that we gained access to important information. Sometimes, again, the Chinese failed to codify the names of the transmitting and receiving agents and naturally we could easily find hints to their identity.

During the Honan campaign, 1944, following cases occurred: The Chinese forces used codes, which had been in use for a long time and which the Japanese had already succeeded in deciphering. It was customary for General CHIANG TING-WEN, Commander-in-Chief of the 1st War Zone, to add his own signature and address in plain language, with the result that this afforded the Japanese an easy hint as to the whereabouts of the headquarters of the 1st War Zone.

The wireless stations used by local militiamen in Honan Province used to exchange messages among themselves asking about their respective location and their intention of future movements and so forth, supplying us with valuable information.

2. Cases of Failure:

The Japanese were unaware that the Communist forces were using the Ransu-type codes and that their coded messages were interspersed with those in conversation type, and were trying to decipher them in the same manner as applied to those sent by the Central Army forces. This resulted in our failure to find out any hints at all to decipher them.

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e. Actual Results Gained:

1. While important coded messages could never be deciphered by the Japanese, easier ones were successfully deciphered. However, the lack of strict discipline on the part of the men working for respective radio stations resulted in affording us many times with hints and valuable information.

2. Apparently the Communist forces were using three categories of codes; (1) for military operation, (2) for political propaganda, and (3) for transmitting messages and instructions. As for their deciphering, the Japanese side was never successful in deciphering that for military operations, while they were in a better position as regards the other two categories. The respective radio stations apparently used different kinds of call signs for transmitting and receiving messages connected with military operations.

3. As regards the actual results gained by the employment of direction detectors, it can be said that the results on the whole were entirely unsatisfactory, due, mainly, to the fact that we had little past experience and very scarce material to rely upon and also because we had to change the call signs so repeatedly and at such short intervals.

4. The actual results gained as regards our endeavors in deciphering the enemy's coded messages are shown in the table No. 4 attached hereto.

(Source: "Summary Report on Enemy and Non-Enemy Intelligence Organizations in Tsingtao", 10 December, 1945, BN/80. Evaluation: C-3).

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EXHIBIT IV

HIDAKA ORGAN

i. Make-up:

This organ was in complete charge of the collection of various information on and from the third states as well as the connection with the military and other intelligence organizations.

It was organized as follows:

Chief of the Hidaka Organ: Colonel Takaaki Hidaka.

The Hidaka Organ ——(Peiping Office
Tientsin Office

Peiping Office

Chief: Colonel T. Hidaka
Assistant: 2nd Lieutenant Shimura
Classification of Works:

1) General Affairs & Accounts:
   - Personnel
   - Miscellaneous Works
   - Guarding
   - Connection
   - Rations
   - Transportation

2) Guidance of White Russians & Problems dealing with
   - Great Britain
   - U.S.A.
   - Germany
   - Italy
   - France
   - Soviet Russia

   Warrant Officer: Yamashita
   Interpreter: Watanaba
   ditto Nagahara
   ditto Nakanishi
   Lance Corporal: Urano

3) Dealing with the Japanese Side:

   Sergeant-Major: Sasaki
   Junior Emp.: Idami
   ditto Sachimori
   ditto Ueda

ii. Outline of Activities:

As the main purpose of this organ was in the collection of information on and from the third states, there were no special intelligence agents. Information was chiefly gathered by the contact of the members of the Organ

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HIDAKA ORGAN

with the nationals of the third states residing in China.

Information on the Soviet Union was mainly obtained through the connection with the Soviet people in China while efforts were also made to smell out some information while assisting the white Russians without nationality or during the course of issuing travelling certificates for them.

Information on Great Britain, the United States, Germany, France and Italy was gathered through the contact with the members of the German, French and Italian Ambassadorial officers in China as well as by the translation of foreign books and journals, thus grasping the outline situation in foreign countries.

As auxiliary means for supplementing the above information interception of wireless message transmitted by Britain and the United States was carried out.

For carrying out the above duties, approximately Y50,000 FRB expense was disbursed monthly.

iii. Training and Education:

No special training or education was given to the member of the Organ. Accordingly there were no facilities and materials for the education although general cultural books and journals published in foreign countries were provided as many as possible for their general information.

iv. Success and Failure Experienced:

Since the Hidaka Organ was in North China, its object of activities was chiefly concentrated on the Soviet Union, and as its Tientsin Office had much opportunity to contact with the Soviet people, information on their movements were collected to some satisfactory extent. But as such information was only concerned with the Soviet people residing in North China, almost no information on the situation in the Soviet territory was obtained.

As to the United States and Britain, various information was gathered through then allied Germany and Italy and also France.

Information on the political and cultural fields of the foreign countries was generally obtained through the translation of the latest books and journals published in the respective countries. But the process to obtain these materials was not systematic, the information thus obtained was rather obsolete and not so much valuable as to be useful for the confronting operation or for taking suitable measures politically and financially.

In short, the activities of this Organ was not so effective considering the relatively large number of personnel it held. (Source: The Rehabilitation and Liaison Department of the Japanese Officers and Soldiers Report entitled "Outline of Intelligence Collecting Machinery of Japanese

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HIDAKA ORGAN

Forces" 2 December, 1945.) Evaluation: C - 3.)

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EXHIBIT V

(1) Functions and Personnel of HIDAKA Organization

Organization, functions and personnel as per attached chart.

Explanation:

1. The Organization is located in Peiping under the Chief of Second Section of North China Headquarters of Japanese Army Forces.

2. The organization has been receiving orders from the Commander-in-Chief of North China Forces up to end of war in order to collect various information as follows: (Besides this the organization has been instructed to supervise Non-nationals, the Chinese and Japanese residents.) Necessary information and data to observe the actigities of Britain and America, and to observe the anti-Japanese movements (both military and political) of Soviet Russia; general activities of Yenan, especially the propaganda system and necessary information to observe their anti-Chungking policy; military, political and economic activities of Chungking and its relations with Britain and America; movements of Outer-Mongolia; supervision of Chinese politicians and other personnel cooperating with the Japanese; supervision of important Japanese elements; and observance of popular feelings among other foreigners.

3. Sixty men worked under Colonel HIDAKA and about three hundred indirectly in order to accomplish the above mentioned duties.

4. The most important system used in collecting information was interception of wireless messages and this system was organized as follows: Yenan Interception Unit; Fukuyama Reception Unit; Tominaga Reception Unit; Italian Reception Unit; D.N.B. (German)Reception Unit; Broadcasting Stations Reception Unit; and Chunghwa Aviation Company Reception Unit.

(2) Outline of Activities in Various Sections

1. The Commanding Officer of the organization gives instructions to each section and collects the necessary information.

The examination of and report on the information obtained is done by the Commanding Officer himself. When reporting the information to the Army General Staff in Japan, War Ministry, General Headquarters in North China, Kwantung Army, Korean Army (Japanese Forces in Korea) and various armies under the North China Headquarters by telegram or in written report, he must get authorization from the Chief of Staff of North China Headquarters.

2. The Urano Organization in Tientsin is directly under the command of Colonel HIDAKA and collects information in compliance with the duties of above-mentioned Organization.

All the information collected in the Urano Organization is forwarded directly to Colonel HIDAKA in Peiping without being examined.

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Therefore, Colonel Urano has no responsibility whatsoever regarding the value of this information. The whole responsibility lies in Colonel HIDAKA alone, in the judgment of value of information collected by the whole organizations.

3. Outline of information collected through interception of wireless messages:

Collection of information from various countries is done by interception of broadcasting and news services. The Commanding Officer of the organization gives the instructions to each of the Reception Sections regarding the respective stations to intercept and have them report daily. All the information thus collected is classified as below and filed so as to be used as data in the judgment of the situation

a) American Affairs:
War situation in Asia
War situation in Europe
U.S. Army (Strength, Name of units, Names of Staff Members, armaments, morale, training, etc.)
U.S. Air Corps (Strength, names of units, names of Staff Members, types of planes)
U.S. Navy (Organization, names of Staff Members, Names of Warships, movements)
War Industries
Political movement
Economic situation
Diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia
Diplomatic relations with Great Britain
Diplomatic relations with Chungking
Diplomatic relations with Central Asia
Anti-Japanese propaganda.

b) British Affairs:
Classification as above.

c) Soviet Russian Affairs:
Soviet-German War situation
Anglo-Soviet relations
Activities of Comintern
Strength, movements and kind of troops in Eastern Siberia (movements of troops to or from European Theater)
Political situation in Soviet Russia
Economic situation in Soviet Russia
Transportation situation in Soviet Russia
Transportation of supplies from U.S. to Soviet Russia
Transportation of arms and planes fromU.S. to Soviet Russia
Anti-Japanese propaganda
Diplomatic movements against Chungking
Movements regarding Soviet aid to Yenan

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d) German Affairs:
   Military situation
   Political situation
   Economic situation
   Propaganda situation

e) Balkan Affairs:

f) Middle East, Near East and Central Asiatic countries

g) Chungking Affairs:
   Operation
   Organization
   Air Forces
   U.S. Air Forces and Army in China
   Political activities of Chungking
   Anti-Yenan movement
   Economy and Production
   Supplies through the India-Burma route
   Commerce and airway networks
   Anti-Japanese peace movements
   Political and Economic activities against the Northwestern Provinces

h) Yenan Affairs:
   Propaganda within themselves
   Propaganda against outside
   Activities of Yenan Army
   Economic situation
   Political situation
   Army forces, strength, organization and armaments

4. Yenan Reception Section (In Peiping and Tientsin)

The Yenan Reception Section in Peiping consisted of six men including its Chief, using four wireless sets of eight or ten tubes. All the operators excepting the section Chief were Chinese. The object of the reception were Yenan Hsin Hua News Service, Propaganda broadcast of the Japanese Liberation League in Japanese and messages in English sent from Yenan to Chungking.

The Reception Section in Tientsin under Urano Organization used the same system as in Peiping with one receiver and two operators.

5. Fukuyama Reception Section (Peiping)

This Section comprised twenty operators (all Japanese), two receivers in Turkish language, and thirty other employees. They used one set of high speed receiving sets and about eight sets of ten-tube receivers. The object of reception were U.P., A.P., and Reuter News Services sent from Chungking to America, telegrams sent from Chungking to New Delhi and Ankara Broadcast.

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6. Tominaga Reception Section (Peiping)

This Section was operating on messages (excluding code messages) sent within Soviet Russia, especially messages sent among the principal cities, world-wide broadcast from Moscow, Habarovsk broadcast, Ulan-Batoor broadcast and messages sent among the principal cities along the North-western China Route.

The Section comprised six Japanese operators, eight Chinese operators, ten Russians, four Mongolians and fifty other Japanese employees.

They used one set of high speed receiving sets and ten ordinary receivers.

7. Italian Reception Section (Peiping)

This Section comprised fifteen ex-Italian Marine operators using four sets of their own receiving apparatus, working mostly on Soviet news services sent out from Siberia. With one set they were taking air-transportation information of the Indo-China air route, and information concerning the passenger and cargo transportation by air in China.

8. D.N.B. (German News Agency) Reception Section (Peiping)

This Section operated with four Chinese operators, three Chinese employees and three German correspondents. The object of reception was concentrated on the Anglo-American information and in order to get the information concerning the European situation, they mostly listened in to the London Reuter news and partly to the U.P., A.P., and Reuter News Services sent out from New York and Washington.

9. Broadcasting Station Reception Section (Peiping)

They operated with six Chinese and four Japanese listeners, mostly catching the Chungking broadcast and partly listening in to the broadcasts from Los Angeles, San Francisco and Hawaii, etc.

10. Chunghwa Aviation Company Reception Section (Peiping)

They worked on the information concerning the air transportation on the Indo-China route and the passenger and cargo transportation in China, with fourteen Japanese operators and six Japanese employees.

11. Information Services by Agents and Informers:

Information was available through the Agents and Informers in Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Kalgan and other principal cities. The object was principally placed on Chungking and necessary information to watch the activities of Soviet Russians in North China. The organization and functions of this system is as follows:

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a) There are very few agents with a fixed salary, working exclusively in collecting information; but in general the information was made available through the organizations of the Russian Imigrant Bureau, German correspondents and the Axis organizations such as German and Italian officials etc. In these operations the instructions were directly given by Colonel HIDAKA or Lt. Colonel URANO and there were very few occasions when they used their men indirectly.

b) There were no instances whatsoever when the agents were sent to distant places outside North China, as, e.g. Chungking, Yenan, etc.

c) Through the Imigrant Bureau. This Bureau consisted of the White Russian Imigrant Bureau, Hebrew Association, Latvian Association, Lithuanian Association and Polish Association. The Central Organization to deal with these groups was situated in Tientsin and local organizations in Peiping, Kalgan, Tsingtao and Chefoo respectively. The Chairmen of the respective national associations were charged with taking control and directing various nationals under the order of Japanese Military Authorities. During this period, various meetings and conferences took place and this naturally enabled us to listen in to the information from various districts.

As the White Russians were mostly interested in the developments of Soviet Russia, their observations of Soviet Russia's secret propaganda activities were comparatively correct, but, other information was not so reliable. The Russian Imigrant Bureau in Tientsin was operating a newspaper called "Vozrojdenie Azii" in Russian language for propaganda purposes. The Chief Editor of this organ, PASTOOHIN, is an extreme anti-Soviet and anti-Communist element and had a fairly correct judgment concerning the Soviet information.

d) White Russian Agents.

Among two thousand White Russians in Tientsin, there were two hundred who were confirmed extreme anti-Soviet and anti-Communist elements. From these elements twenty persons were available as agents and they were very willing to cooperate with the Japanese Authorities.

e) Utilization of the German News Agency and German Correspondents.

The opinion and observations of the German news correspondents were fully utilized.

Dr. Herbert Mueller, Director of the Peking office of the D.N.B., had a personal taste in gathering news and information.

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Commanding English perfectly, he personally listened into the Reuter newscasts and was extremely clever in judging the developments in the situation.

In the same office were two other German correspondents, Herr Lueckenhaus and Dr. Abshagen. Working as the Director of the New York office of the D.N.B. up till America's participation in the war, Lueckenhaus was well versed in American affairs and his observations on American situation were worth listening to. Dr. Abshagen remained in England more than ten years as a correspondent and was well acquainted with the higher political classes of England and naturally thought much of as an expert on English and European affairs.

Dr. van Briessen, another German correspondent in Peking was more or less of liberal tendencies. While having a good brain, he was considered of anti-German inclinations.

Mr. Cordes, still another German correspondent, was a "Chinese Nisei", had a perfect command command of Chinese, enjoyed a wide and extensive friendship among Chinese colleagues and had a taste for Mongolian affairs.

Dr. Herbert Tichy, considered of a more or less anti-German idea, travelled extensively in various countries as a newspaper correspondent. His specialty was Indian and China's Northwestern affairs.

f) Special Correspondent in Peking of the German Fuehrer's Headquarters.

Siegfried Fulkrug, special correspondent in Peking of the Fuehrer's Headquarters, was working under the orders of Lt. Colonel Klnardt in Shanghai, and was entrusted, among other things, with the sounding out of developments in Soviet Russia. Besides this he was also spying on the situation in Japan and Chungking.

While Fulkrug was not considered as a big hand, he had a very able subordinate in the person of Dr. Heissig, an anthropologist and archaeologist, well versed in Mongolian tongue, who was capable to a high degree of judging developments in Siberia and Mongolia.

Fulkrug had his agents in Harbin, who gathered information on Russia. This information was offered to Colonel HIDAKA in exchange for some concerning Japan and so forth. Following Germany's capitulation, he was considering dispatching his own agents from Peking for the same purpose. However, this plan never materialized on account of Japan's surrender.

g) Communications & Equipment

The HIDAKA Organization primarily did not intend to employ to any large extent spying agents, nor did it send them over any long distances, with the result, naturally, that the Organization was not in possession or employment of any special means of communication. The only method they employed was to meet Agents

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at a secret place or else to obtain the necessary information by means of telephone, mail or by courier.

(3) Training Plans

The HIDAKA Organization never gave any special training to its staff members and its agents. However, it endeavoured to increase their efficiency along the following lines:

1. Whenever they committed any mistakes or blunders while executing their appointed duties, they were called to pay due attention to them. When they finished their appointed tasks, judgment on their results was given by responsible parties with a view to letting them become aware of their merit or the contrary.

2. The staff members and agents were afforded with opportunities to witness for themselves how the other organizations on similar lines, of the army or of the newspaper offices, were functioning.

3. Impetus was given to bring to a higher level their personal knowledge, common sense and so forth. For this they had a special fixed program for their education, subjects which comprised mathematics, foreign languages, physics, history, economics, history of ideology, military science and so forth. Lessons on these subjects were given by officers and able men among the staff members. And, for the education of these officers, the Director of the Organization, Colonel HIDAKA, took charge.

Emphasis was given on the education in Chinese language. They were asked to take lessons at night schools or else at the residences of teachers. For textbooks for these lessons, quite a number of documentary records, novels and other literature was employed up until the end of the war. Following the termination of hostilities, all of these were destroyed by fire.

According to the memory, principal among these books were those concerning the education of American G-men, secret agents of Japan, German spying system education given at the Chinese Military Academy for gathering information. A book specially recorded the activities of international spies on Siberia-Manchuria border area.

(4) Expenditures

1. Officers and civilians working for this Organization received salaries fixed by army regulations and did not get any special allowances.

2. Regular agents got salaries, according to their respective abilities, which were supposed to be barely enough for a minimum standard living. The lowerst was 500 Yen FRB. They, however, were allowed to make purchases at certain designated Japanese agencies at lower prices. The highest pay they got was around 1,000 Yen FRB.

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3. Irregular agents got payment in kind, e.g. flour, sugar, tobacco, coal, etc.

4. Whenever these irregular agents brought any valuable information, they got additional payment in cash, ranging from 100 to 1,000 Yen FRB.

5. Just prior to the termination of the war, the average monthly expenditure was around 200,000 Yen FRB, mostly for the purpose of employment of some liaison personnel, for maintaining special connections with the Chinese and also for keeping in contact with German and Italian organs.

(5) Evaluation of Information.

The evaluation of respective information brought in was undertaken by Colonel HIDAKA personally, under his own responsibility.

This was done on the following program:

1. Comparison of various information gathered from different sources.

2. Getting in contact with similar organs within the army. Inquiry is made whether these have also got the same information or not, and, if so, compare the accuracy or dependency of either of them.

3. In case particular information is considered of extreme importance, order is given to a responsible person to enquire into all circumstances, in an endeavour to ascertain the reliability of the same information.

4. In deciding on the reliability of a particular piece of information, the ability of the particular agent who brought it in was taken into consideration. Information was reported to responsible parties classified A, B and C, according to their degree of reliability. Any "rumour" or "propagandistic report" was reported as such.

(6) Cases of Success and their Causes

It often occurred that valuable information which came into its hand lost its intrinsic value through its failure to accurately evaluate or through the delay in reporting.

As the cause for all this, the following may be considered:

1. Prejudices of the man who receives the information stood in the way.

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2. Failure to correctly judge the ideological tendency of the particular agent who brings in such information.

3. Failure to afford ample assurances for livelihood to the agent.

4. Lack of patience in the employment and use of the agents.

Among the causes as enumerated above, Item 1 is considered the most important. This was especially true as regards the situation just prior to the outbreak of the hostilities between Russia and Germany and between Japan and Russia. The Organization failed to compare all information in hand in time or to report this information without delay to responsible quarters.

The Organization had no "scoop" to speak of.

Source: "Ohidaka Organ", 27 Dec 45, Eval: C-3

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EXHIBIT VI

EXCERPTS OF A REPORT ON JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE, TSINGTAO

INTRODUCTION

Japanese intelligence agencies have been active in Tsingtao since the initial landings by the Navy and Army Troops in 1938. The Navy landed three days before the Army and has since the landing exercised more control over the administration of the city than the Army. The Navy and Army have been jealous of each others' rights and have not cooperated too well. The lack of cooperation has extended to the exchange of intelligence information, and each has withheld valuable "Hot" information from the other. Methods used by the various agencies which have collected intelligence, varied somewhat, but in general followed a pattern of employing civilians directly to supervise the intelligence work, and having civilian agents to work under the civilians that were employed. The civilian employee would be under a staff officer if the agency was a part of the armed forces. Supposedly the Staff officer would be in charge, but actually the person in charge would be the civilian. This is especially true of the Naval Intelligence Section.

A distinction must be made between Combat Intelligence, General Intelligence, and Counter Intelligence. These will be discussed separately according to their separate functions.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Shortly after the Army and Navy landed in January, 1938, Intelligence Agencies were set up by each branch of the Service, and by the Kempei Tai as well. The Naval Unit was known as the Special Service Bureau (Tokumubu), and the Army Unit as the Special Service Agency (Tokumu Kikan).

The Tokumubu was established for the purpose of accelerating the restoration of peace and order in the area. The Bureau had the following Departments: Political Affairs, Harbor Office, Peace and order (including Propaganda Section), Management of Enemy Property, and Information. The Information Section was further divided into two Sections; Chinese Affairs and Foreign Affairs. The Information Section collected General Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence. Also the Section censored the mail and telegraph communications of Japanese, Chinese and foreign persons for the purpose of gathering information, particularly relating to Anti-Japanese movements, or espionage activities.

In March, 1939, the Bureau was dissolved and its functions were transferred to the KOAIN so far as Political Affairs were concerned, and to the Naval Resident Office so far as Naval Affairs were concerned. The Naval Resident Office set up the censorship duties as a separate Section. The Information Section performed the same duties as it had

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under the Bureau. In March, 1940, the Naval Resident Office was abolished and all functions were transferred to the Special Naval Base Force, Tsingtao. In 1938, the Special Naval Base Force (then named the 1st Combined Landing Force) had an intelligence Section (Special Service Department) principally gathering intelligence of an operational nature, and Counter-intelligence for the purpose of security within the City. Between 1940 and 1942, no information has yet been obtained as to what the complete intelligence activities of the Section were. However it is known that in 1942 it was divided into the following Sections:

Chinese---Mission to seek out agents within the City that were operating for the Chinese Central Government, or the Chinese Communists (Related to the security of the City). Since the Navy at times sent expeditions to fight in the outlying land areas, the section also gathered intelligence to assist these expeditions.

Economic---Gathered information relating to price fluctuations and the movement of commodities. Black market activities were investigated by the Consular or the Chinese Municipal Police.

Foreign Affairs Section---To ascertain the attitude of the foreign population toward the war.

The Intelligence Section also controlled censorship and the issuance of passports. In 1943 it was decided that the Intelligence Section should concentrate on operational intelligence, so the Economic and Foreign Affairs Sections were abolished. The passport function was transferred to the Sea Defense Department, and the Censorship function was set up separately. The mission of the Section now related to detection of any Chinese Central Government or 8th Route Army Agents within the City, investigation of the theft of Naval Supplies, and operational intelligence of one outlying area (Lao Shan). If the Section had spare time it did work relating to the activities of foreigners within the City. The Section continued in this manner until November 1944 at which time the Section was abolished and Naval Intelligence activities were reduced to a small scale. The Civilians connected with the Section were dismissed and any functions were carried on by the Staff Officer in charge. The Navy relied on other agencies for any information needed. About two months before the end of the War Lt. (j.g.) KAWASHIMA, KOHEI was placed under the Staff Officer and he began to collect information relating to foreigners. (The officer was concentrating on information relating to Soviet Russian citizens.)

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At the time of the establishment of the KOAIN, the Army was expected to transfer the activities of its "Special Service" Agency to the KOAIN. The Army, however, continued to carry on with the Agency for a period of time. Finally, most of the functions of the Army Special Service Agency were transferred to the successor of the KOAIN, The Greater East Asia Ministry. At the time of the transfer, the Army set up an investigation section. The section was small and did not achieve any notable success. It was almost exclusively concerned with information relating to the Anti-Communist Bureau and other White Russian activities.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

Combat information was needed by all units in contact with the enemy. (Enemy refers generally to what the Japanese called "Bandits", a name which covered both the Chinese Communists and the guerrilla forces. It should be stated that most of the fighting in the area and most of the intelligence collected involved the Chinese Communist forces.) The Navy had detachments up and down the coast and these detachments gathered combat information.

Most of the Combat Intelligence for the Army was gathered by the Intelligence Department of the 5th Independent Mixed Brigade. The Brigade had its Headquarters at Tsingtao and operated under the 43rd Army Headquarters at Tsinan, Shantung.

1. Supplying the Brigade Headquarters with all types of information concerning the enemy, but particularly combat information.

2. Information as to peace and order in the area.

3. Information as to climatic conditions.

4. Information as to topography and terrain.

The sources of information were as follows:

1. Various Chinese forces under Puppet Governments.

2. For giving people certain advantages such as additional rationing privileges, information was obtained.

3. Inhabitants of various areas voluntarily brought information.

4. The Imperial Collaboration Army was used as a network.

5. The Peace Preservation Unit, part of the Puppet Armies, was used.

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GENERAL INTELLIGENCE

General intelligence included economic and political intelligence as well as such intelligence as was necessary for the maintenance of peace and order within the City of Tsingtao. This type of intelligence was of primary importance to civilian activities, and although the Army, Navy and Gendarmerie gathered this type of information, it was generally turned over to civilian agencies. The KOAIN was founded partly to take care of such information, acting as it did as an advisory board to the Chinese Puppet Government. There were Japanese officials in all parts of the Puppet Government system. These were kept informed by the intelligence Section of the KOAIN and later by the Greater East Asia Ministry. Fluctuations in the value of gold and prices were investigated. An attempt was made to keep the authorities aware of anything that might affect the peace and order of the city.

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

All intelligence organizations in Tsingtao did Counter-Intelligence work. At the simplest, such work would merely involve the censorship of postal matter, telegrams and newspapers. A division of the censorship duties was effected between the Navy and the Gendarmerie. The former assumed responsibility for all correspondence in Western languages; the Gendarmerie was responsible for Eastern languages. In censoring mail, two factors especially were noted; obscurity of language and frequency of correspondence. A list was drawn up of persons who were suspected on either count and their mail was subject to the closest censorship. One Naval censor stated that there were insufficient persons available to do a competent censorship job and that only the mail of suspicious persons could be examined. He further stated that no person had ever been arrested as a result of censorship. Newspapers were also censored but the fact that the local press was Japanese controlled usually guaranteed harmlessness of content. Newspapers coming from other parts of China, such as Shanghai, were also censored.

During the war, a careful check was maintained on all occidentals living in Tsingtao. Those of the Germans who were reputed to be Anti-Nazi were placed on a "Black List", as were Russians, Jews and other nationals who were felt to be politically opposed to the Japanese system. After the surrender of Germany it was felt necessary to begin another investigation of German residents, with some emphasis placed on discovering possible agents of the German Government. Information was supplied by informants. Some of these volunteered information to persons whom they knew worked for Japanese Intelligence, while others received money either directly or indirectly from one or another of the intelligence organizations.

The main effort of Japanese Counter-intelligence activities was directed at the nationals of countries not at war with Japan, or, as in

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the case of France, only passively engaged. Close scrutiny was kept of their movements and correspondence. When one of them was due in Tsingtao from Shanghai, for example, notice was given by telegram or airmail to be on the watch for him. Such notice would be given if smuggling or manipulation of the foreign exchange were suspected, as well as if espionage activities were indicated.

Although it was known that there were many agents, both of the Communists, and of LI, HSIEN-LIANG (Mayor of Tsingtao) in Tsingtao, only a relatively small number were ever caught. There were almost invariably sentenced to death.

METHODS

With the Japanese Navy and Army in control of Tsingtao it was a simple matter for them to obtain free intelligence. For example all Naval contractors who supplied food to the American Fleet prior to the outbreak of the war were agents of the Japanese Navy. Naval contractors were told that they would be refused permission to go out on the docks if they refused to cooperate. The intelligence brought in by such persons had a very limited value. Generally they managed to get copies of the ship's news, plans of the day, and such information as could be obtained by emptying waste paper baskets on the ship. In that way the movements of ships could often be learned as well as such information as could be found by chance on scrap paper.

This extortion method of gaining intelligence was also practiced on all Japanese merchants. While there were certain Japanese civilians who supplied information systematically and went to great pains to obtain it, most of them attempted to furnish as much as came their way in return for the privilege of obtaining a license, etc. One Japanese broker was notorious for his activities, employing several persons who acted in turn as agents. One of these was a White Russian who reported on matters concerning his community.

The information supplied by such agencies was generally inferior because the persons engaged in obtaining it were untrained. A somewhat more satisfactory method was that of hiring Chinese agents. For example, several Japanese employed by Japanese Naval Intelligence each led a group of Chinese agents who gathered information. The Gendarmerie and the Consular Police had a similar arrangement. The agents were underpaid almost without exception, usually receiving their wages in other forms than money. As a result they would boast of their powers as agents, threatening to turn in various people if they did not furnish money for protection. All Chinese agents in the employ of the Japanese knew each other and competed with each other. This system of using agents proved so unsatisfactory to the Navy, that in June, 1943, (and in November, 1944),