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1 FEB 46

36-11

CONTINUED INTERROGATION

- of -

SHIMADA, Shigetaro (Admiral)

Date and Time: 1 February 1946 , 1420-1615 P. M.
Place : Sugamo Prison
Present : Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro
John Darsey, Esq., Interrogator
Rickey Yamaguchi, T/3, Interpreter
Miss Evelyn Cordell, Stenographer

(Shimada, cont'd) 1 February 1946, 1420-1615 P. M. -94 -

- Q. Now, after Japan consolidated its position in Manchuria after the Manchurian Incident, it began to take over the competitive railroads, didn't it?
- A. I don't think so, because the railroads besides the Manchuria railroad were attached to the Manchuria Railroad and they were under the control of it, and they also set up new railroads.
- Q. During these years, weren't there two schools of thought in Japan- one, that they should expand to the South in China, and two, that they should expand to the North?
- A. That opinion was in Japan always from the beginning of Meiji, not just in this time.
- Q. And obtained throughout the period of the Manchurian Incident?
- A. Always.
- Q. Then after the Manchurian Incident and Japan had consolidated its position in Manchuria, they gradually began to expand to the North, didn't they?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Isn't it a fact that the capitalization and investments of the South Manchuria Railroad grew enormously in the period of 1931 to 1935?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And continued to increase, and the railroad continued to be developed up until the time of the war with the United States, didn't it?
- A. I think so; always.
- Q. And isn't it a fact that the underlying policy of Japan's activities in Manchuria during this period was that they would use their rights and special privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia as a basis and on the presumption of trade and commerce to expand its influence into China?

- A. I don't think so. It was not only their purpose to gain something from China, but it was necessary for Japan proper. For example, surplus of iron, coal, beans, etc., was brought to Japan proper, and some went to North China.
- Q. So that in addition to wanting to expand so far as territory was concerned, they wanted to exploit the resources in order that Japan proper could have the surplus; is that what you mean to say?
- A. The real intention was to form a barrier in Manchuria against the Russians, and they also wanted the natural resources from Manchuria.
- Q. In your previous interrogation you said that Russia kept oppressing the Japanese Army in Manchuria, and that Japan had to take Manchuria in order to stop this oppression. Did you say that in your interrogation last September?
- A. In Yokohama we spoke for only a short while, and there were many other points that were essential to talk about; therefore, we did not talk about Manchuria so much.
- Q. Will you read this paragraph and tell me whether you said anything to that effect in your previous interrogation at Yokohama?
- A. (The witness reads again the statement which appears on page 82 of this record). I don't remember saying anything like that, because I don't believe it to be true.
- Q. Don't you remember that at the time just prior to the Manchurian Incident Japanese militarists were urging a more positive policy in Manchuria?
- A. As I said yesterday, the Army wished to settle the situation, I think. We had shed much blood in the Russian War, and we wanted to settle the Manchurian Incident.
- Q. Now, after the China Incident Japan set up the Manchukuo Government, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. To whom was the Manchuria General Affairs Board responsible?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 96 -

- A. In Manchuria we had a Chinese Premier, and we had an assistant to the Premier, and I think the General Affairs Board was there.
- Q. Well, the South Manchuria Railway Company obtained a Power-of-Attorney over rights of the other railroads in Manchuria then, didn't it?
- A. Yes, to manage, as I said before, all railroads in Manchuria.
- Q. This brought about a continued increase in Japanese investments in the Manchuria Railway, didn't it?
- A. I think it did not increase the investments, because they were always setting up new railroads and the expenditures exceeded the investments.
- Q. The demands on the part of the South Manchuria Railway Company for China from Japan constantly increased until the war with the United States, didn't they?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you ever hear of the expression, "Niki Sansuke"? It was an expression used to characterize a group of important Japanese people, or leaders, four or five who were exercising influence in the development of Japanese policy in Manchuria. Did you ever hear of it?
- A. I don't have the faintest idea as to what it is. There must be some mistake in the name.
- Q. Of course you know that Premier Tojo at one time was in charge of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria?
- A. Yes, he was Chief of Staff.
- Q. Did you ever know of Naoki Hoshiro?
- A. Yes, he was the Chief of the General Affairs Board, and he was also in the Tojo Cabinet as Chief Secretary.
- Q. Of course you know Matsuoka?
- A. Not quite well; I saw him in Shanghai.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 97 -

- Q. You know that at one time he was President of the Manchuria Railway Company?
- A. Yes, he was
- Q. Do you know Shinsuke Kishi?
- A. Yes, he was in Manchuria at the same time.
- Q. He was Vice-President of the Economic Section of the Manchucuo Government, wasn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you know Giusuke Ayukamo?
- A. Yes, he was president of a company.
- Q. He was President of the Manchuria Heavy Industry Company, wasn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And that was a holding company of the railway company, wasn't he?
- A. Yes, a holding company for the South Manchuria Railway Company.
- Q. It represented the interests of Japan in acquiring war materials, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you ever hear that group of men whom I have just identified characterized by the expression "Niki Sansuke"?
- A. Yes, I remember now. Niki Sansuke means these 5 men.
- Q. In other words, that group of men were known as the Japanese brain trust in Manchuria?
- A. They say so.
- Q. Who says so?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 98 -

A. The people.

Q. Didn't the Army recognize that group as the Japanese brain trust in Manchuria?

A. I don't think so. Only at this time they worked together.

Q. They were formulating Japan's policy in Manchuria, were they not?

A. At that time, I think so.

Q. And that policy was a very positive policy insofar as Japan was concerned, wasn't it?

A. In that point I don't know, but it may be so.

Q. Don't you know that the results of their policy definitely proved that it was a positive policy, comparatively speaking, with that which obtained in past years?

A. I heard that this policy carried out new experiments sometimes.

Q. Tojo was representing the Army point of view with respect to Manchuria at that time, was he not?

A. Yes, he was Chief of Staff.

Q. Who else in the army was out-spoken in sustaining Tojo and his positive policy in Manchuria?

A. I don't know quite well. I had not interest in that point at that time; therefore, I did not care about that, but the military officers in Manchuria at that time were his assistants.

Q. Do you think they were supporting Tojo's policy?

A. Yes.

Q. In other words, the officers under Tojo were uniformly supporting a more positive policy with respect to Manchuria, weren't they?

A. At that time, yes.

Q. And their voices were being heard, weren't they? They were being able to make their point, and to carry that point?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 99 -

A. It may be so.

Q. And this Niki Sansuke group and the army wanted that positive policy to be predicated upon the original 21 demands which Japan had made upon China, didn't they?

A. I don't know quite well about that.

Q. Don't you know that they wanted the right and privilege of leasing land for commercial, industrial and agricultural purposes in China and Manchuria?

A. I did not hear about that. It was very easy to take on any lease in Manchuria at that time.

Q. They wanted Japanese subjects to have the right to travel and reside in the eastern part of Manchuria and engage in commercial and industrial activities, didn't they?

A. Yes.

Q. And this positive policy contemplated that the movements of Japanese subjects should be free from Chinese law, didn't it?

A. I think so, yes.

Q. Don't you know so?

A. Those rights we got from the beginning of the treaty after the Japanese War between China and Japan said that, but China had failed to set up laws that the Japanese had the right of way.

Q. But this positive policy contemplated the expansion of those rights, didn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And this positive policy or program contemplated that Japan should have the right of exploring the 19 iron and coal mines in Fengtien and Kurin, as well as the right of timbering, didn't it?

A. I don't know quite well about that.

Q. What do you think about it?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 100 -

A. I don't know, but I do know that always in Fengtien and Kurin there were large forests, but I don't think at that time it was so difficult to get a lease or rights.

Q. Japan did just that, didn't she?

A. I don't know the truth about that.

Q. Now, this positive policy with respect to Manchuria existed in the years immediately preceding the Manchurian Incident, the period from 1929 to 1931, didn't it?

A. Before the Manchurian Incident I don't know quite well. But Niki Sansuke was after the Manchurian Incident.

Q. I know that this group came into existence after the Manchurian Incident, and that is what I was talking about in the first instance. But this positive policy which was espoused by Niki Sansuke was beginning to develop in 1929, wasn't it?

A. I don't know in that point, because in those years I was on board.

Q. You don't know that Japan was insisting upon its rights to explore this mining and timbering in Manchuria prior to the Manchurian Incident?

A. Before the Manchurian Incident I don't know.

Q. You are familiar with the 21 demands made by Japan upon China, aren't you?

A. Yes.

Q. When were they made?

A. In ancient times, I think. That is a very old story; before the 9-Power Treaty.

Q. Then those demands were compromised, weren't they?

A. Since there wasn't much talk about it then I believe there may have been some compromise.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 101 -

Q. But don't you know that in the period from 1927 to 1930 there developed in Japan a movement to revive in different form most of its original 21 demands?

A. I don't know.

Q. When was the first time you heard of the development of a positive policy on the part of Japan toward Manchuria and China?

A. After the Manchurian Incident.

Q. Don't you know that in the period 1927 to 1930 Japan was insisting upon its right of exploring the iron and coal mines in Fengtien and Kurin?

A. No, I don't know.

Q. Wasn't Japan insisting upon its right in that period to build railroads in Manchuria and East Mongolia?

A. No, I don't know.

Q. Don't you know that Japan was insisting that its political financial and military advisors in the Manchurian Government should be increased?

A. No, I didn't hear about that.

Q. And wasn't Japan insisting upon its right to place police over the Koreans in China?

A. I don't know.

Q. Don't you know that Japan was insisting that the administration and development of the Kirin-Changchun Railway should be extended to 99 years?

A. No, I don't know.

Q. Don't you know that Japan was insisting upon its priority in the sale of special products from Manchuria to Europe? And America?

A. I don't know.

- Q. And wasn't Japan insisting upon its exclusive rights of mining in Heilung Kiang?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Wasn't Japan insisting upon its right to construct a Kirin-Hueining Changchun-Talai Railway?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Wasn't Japan insisting upon harboring rights in Antung and Yingkow, and the right of through transportation from those harbors?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. And wasn't Japan insisting upon the right of partnership in establishing a central bank of the Three Eastern Provinces?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. And wasn't Japan insisting upon the right of pasturage?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Now, you say you are not aware that these demands which I have just recounted formulated component parts of a positive policy on the part of Japan with respect to Manchuria prior to the Manchurian Incident?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Well now, you do know that each of these demands which I have just recounted came into reality subsequent to the Manchurian Incident, don't you?
- A. After the Manchurian Incident it had come to pass. We could have done it very easily if we had wanted it.
- Q. And Japan did impose those demands after the Manchurian Incident, didn't it?
- A. Since the contents are not very clear I can't very well say yes or no, but it may be according to what you have just read from the book.

- Q. Well now, after the Manchurian Incident, this Niki Sansuke group espoused a still stronger positive policy than that which was in existence prior to the Manchurian Incident, didn't they?
- A. It may be.
- Q. And this new policy on the part of the Niki Sansuke group resulted in Japan taking over the supervision of all of the existing competitive railroads in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And resulted in the construction of additional railroads, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, prior to the Manchurian Incident the Japanese railroads were in the South of Manchuria, were they not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. After the Manchurian Incident under the guise of building a barrier for defense against possible Russian aggression, Japan began to expand in the North in Manchuria, didn't it?
- A. Yes, for defense.
- Q. And it was in the North that they constructed these new railroads, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Prior to that time Japan had no way of transportation by which to exploit the natural resources of North Manchuria, had it?
- A. No; that is true.
- Q. Now, the railroads Japan had in the South of Manchuria did not have the encircling lines necessary for mobilization and transportation, did they?
- A. That is right, yes.

(Shimada, cont'd)

Q. So that for mobilization and transportation purposes these additional railroads were extended in the North, weren't they?

A. Yes.

Q. And this was predicated upon the principle of hampering Chinese military, political and economic development on the one hand, and to prevent the penetration of Russian influence on the other, wasn't it?

A. I think it had no relation to China, but to Manchuria only, and the anti-Soviet move.

(The interrogation adjourned at 1615 P. M.)



1 PS. DOC No 4197

5 FEB 46

CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

ADMIRAL SHIMADA, SHIGETARO

Date and Time: 5 February 1946, 1430-1615 P. M.
Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
Present : Admiral SHIMADA, Sheigetaro
John Darsey, Esq., Interrogator
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Evelyn Cordell, Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, Administered by Mr. Darsey:

MR. DARSEY: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

COMMANDER HUGGINS: I do.

Questions by: Mr. Darsey.

Q. Do you want to make a statement?

A. I would like to have the following statements appear in the record.

"ABOUT SHINTOISM: The other day, in connection with Shintoism, the questions with what seemed to be mysterious in some points were asked. Also actions which were taken by the MacArthur's Headquarters against the shrine temple gave me a strange impression and it reminded me of the sacrifice made by the Christian people in Rome who encouraged and propagated the teaching of Christianity. I believe that the actions taken against Shintoism were due to misunderstanding on the part of Americans.

"The principle of Shintoism is only concerned with worship of the ancestors, and Shrine Temple, from an olden time, deified, a great man as a God, the same as Pantheon of Paris and Rome or Westminster Abbey of London. In Japan from an olden era it was a custom that having nothing concerned with body, only a spirit of greatman is deified in the Shrine Temple.

(Shimada, cont'd)

"In worshipping of Shrine Temple, spirit of God is represented as a pattern, and refine one's mind and pray for a happiness. Through the mirror presented in Shrine Temple, a worshipper reflects its mind and thereby making its mind - pure, clear, and straight (right). (This is what is called the ideal. The ideal of which was questioned the other day, appeared to be forge).

"Before worshipping the God, they do some of the following procedure of penance: "Harai" (Purification with sale or an evergreen tree's branch); "Misogi" (Purification with water by washing or dipping); "Furi Tama" (Unifying of soul by shaking body).

"During the war a great majority of Japanese people ardently prayed for a victory worshipping the Shrine Temple which was most natural for the nation. The same prayer was given to the Buddhist temple and not a peculiarity of the Shintoism only. For the mission schools in Japan, the men who were ignorant of the concept that Christianity's incompatibility to worship other than God, seemed to have encouraged and forced the mission schools to worship the Shrine temple, according to hearsay. I am inclined to believe that this incident might have caused the misunderstanding and ill-feeling of the Christians of Japanese and foreigners in Japan and abroad. "

"ABOUT H. M. THE EMPEROR: Emperor's hearty and zealous aspiration for lasting peace and hatred of war were often heard directly by all those who were in the positions of the Emperor's advisers (such as Cabinet Ministers, Chief-of General Staffs, etc.), and those who closely served the Emperor. Emperor accepted whole-heartedly a matter that was not even justifiable to him, if it were favored by majority after due deliberation. It clearly indicated that Emperor avoided from being a dictator. In a paragraph of the note of the late Prince Konoye, the following memo was found: 'The reason of the Emperor's being reserved and refrained and very seldom expressed his view upon the subject, was attributed to the fact that the late Prince Saionji and the late Count Makino who favoring the practice of the British Constitutional form in Japan, advised the Emperor to refrain from taking an initiative'. However, in the cases of using the armed forces, often times the Emperor had not give sanction immediately. The Emperor was

lamentably worried for the tendency existed in a part of Japanese Army, in view of the past trifle success in the Manchuria Incident, that the use of the armed force was a common matter. To this tendency the Emperor endeavored with effort to straighten unbiasedly. With respect to the policy of the localization of the Chino-Japanese Incident, it was the Emperor's utmost desire and aspiration warning an extremity of the actions and bring forth a peace between two nations, but unfortunately the Emperor's advisers had failed to satisfy his aspiration. In connection with the negotiation between U. S.- Japan, 1941, Emperor expressed that the negotiation be successful and thereby avoid a war by some means. In the month of Sep. 1941, Emperor, having heard the unavoidable circumstances to prepare for the war at the Court Council, deplorably regretted expressing his dissatisfaction to the situation and quoted the poem composed by the late Emperor Meiji, "All brothers on the earth, methought, Alas! Tempest roared the serene seas".

"October, next month, when Imperial order was given to Tojo to organize the Cabinet, Emperor, unprecedentedly spoke to Tojo to discuss and study entirely anew to see if any hope of concluding U. S.-Japan negotiation exists by forgetting the result of the Court Council held last month. Emperor having been informed of no hope of avoiding the war through the reply of Nov. 25, 1941, from U. S. that the war was inevitable and having heard of the views of the former 7 premiers Emperor lamented deplorably seeking some means of avoiding war. In a note of the late Prince Konoye the following memo was found that, "The Emperor as a head of the Constitutional Government, his attitude was passive as described here, but his intention was definitely for maintaining of peace in the Pacific and avoid entanglement with war by some means. Emperor's ardent wish and aspiration for peace were so sincere that I had no words of expressing the Emperor's depressed thought".

"In the Rescript of Declaration of War, the Emperor himself added a phrase "against my will" which can be easily understand the Emperor's depressed thought. Sitting in the Court Council which pros and cons as to the cessation of hostility which prolonged and failed to reach its decision, the Emperor immediately sanctioned in favor of cessation of hostility. It is clearly

self-explanatory how Emperor was always in favor of peace when he expressed himself that peace must be made whatever my fate may be. After the termination of war, in spite of numerous articles in the newspapers regarding the instigations of overthrowing of the Emperor, in the mind of great majority of the Japanese people (99% of Japanese people, according to the contribution of Dr. Tanaka, prof. of the Imperial University, Tokyo), the concept of respect and love for the Emperor unchanged. With the exception of ultra-ideologists and proletariats a great majority of the Japanese people respect the Emperor because of his great benevolence, virtue and prestige. Whatever a malicious propaganda may be, it can not be wiped out their great love and devotion for the Emperor.

"A man such as former Ambassador Grew, staying for a long time in Japan, with clear and concise knowledge of Japan and Japanese will be in the best position to understand this concept".

- Q. Now, in the last interrogation we dealt with the background of the Manchurian Incident and covered its culmination in the establishment of the Manchukuo Government, and then Japan taking over the China Eastern Railroad and other railroads in Manchuria and came down to the Shanghai Incident, and I want you to tell me now what you consider to be the underlying causation of the Shanghai Incident.
- A. About the Shanghai Incident, looking at the 1932 Shanghai Incident from the point of view of the Chinese I would say that following the Manchuria Incident and the anti-Japanese feeling which grew among the Chinese there, culminated in their sending troops to the area of Shanghai. From the Japanese point of view, when you asked me the other day whether Japan had instigated an incident in Shanghai, at this time I can truthfully say that in my official capacity as Chief of Staff at the time I know that there was no such intention. Rather, we wished to avoid any incidents at that time in that area, as we were fully occupied with the events occurring in Manchuria. To interject at this point, Admiral Nomura specifically warned me as Chief of Staff to avoid any overt acts or demonstrations which might lead the Chinese to believe that war was unavoidable.

In this regard, in entering Shanghai I did not go to General Headquarters nor point our guns in the direction of the forts in that vicinity. To continue, China had quite a large Japanese population, and in addition we had a force of Japanese Special Naval Landing Force troops there. As I understand the Incident, a Nichiren Sect Priest was killed by some Chinese and when the Special Naval Landing Force went to guard the area clashes occurred with the Chinese troops which had already surrounded the vicinity.

Q. China had just previous to the Shanghai Incident invoked a boycott on Japanese trade, had it not?

A. I don't recall.

Q. You know nothing of the Chinese boycott on Japanese trade after the Manchurian Incident?

A. I don't recall a boycott, and I don't feel that a boycott was a pressing problem in that moment.

Q. And you don't know that the reason for the concentration of the Japanese Naval forces in Shanghai was the invocation of this boycott?

A. I don't think so. The situation at that moment was ticklish enough and fighting was already going on in Manchuria, so that trade was certainly not one of the most pressing problems.

Q. Now, the Niki Sansuke group was in control of the Japanese policy insofar as Manchukuo and Shanghai were concerned at that time, weren't they?

A. I don't believe so. In this period men like Tojo were still fairly junior officers, and while very recently I heard of the Niki Sansuke group, at that time I am certain that they were not yet powerful enough to mold any such policy.

Q. Where was Matsuoko then?

A. I believe he was in the Foreign Office at the time of the Shanghai Incident, which continued for a period of one month, or after--- I am not certain which....he came to Shanghai as a consultant to Shigemitsu, who was Minister at the time.

- Q. Now, no sooner had the Shanghai Incident been settled than did the Manchukuo Government begin an effort to extend its influence and jurisdiction into Mongolia, didn't it?
- A. Yes, I believe so, although I am not certain of the dates.
- Q. That is when the Jehol expedition was begun, wasn't it?
- A. I don't recall such an incident. Where is Jehol?
- Q. Jehol is that province of Mongolia that is just East of the Great China Wall.
- A. I don't recall the dates, but it is my recollection that they started pushing towards Nekka, which might or might not have been what you call Jehol.
- Q. What do you consider to be the justification, if any, for that further effort of expansion on the part of Japan?
- A. This was an army matter, and outside the ken of my experience, but their reasons must have been that they felt in order to consolidate the national structure of Manchukuo they would have to extend what was an international boundary of the Great Wall, which would involve moving into Nekka.
- Q. So that Manchukuo moved troops into a corridor which is East of the Great Wall, running from Peking to Tientsin, didn't it?
- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. Now, was the name Nekka which you used to describe that territory - did it include Peking and Tientsin?
- A. No, it was outside the Great Wall.
- Q. Will you look at this map and describe what territory you refer to by the name Nekka?
- A. It is the territory outside the Great Wall, running from around Shanghai-Kwan, including Chihfeng and the surrounding territory.
- Q. Now, Manchukuo occupied that territory and drove the Chinese out, didn't it?
- A. Yes.

(Shimada, con'td)

Q. And subsequently settled the matter by making a treaty with China declaring the area to be a non-military area, and subject to the jurisdiction of the Manchukuo Government, didn't it?

A. This could not apply to Nekka. I recall there being some sort of agreement regarding a strip of territory which we called Kitō. If Nekka is not Jehol then my answer of a little while ago is incorrect, as there was no necessity of going outside the Great Wall to strengthen the Manchukuo Government, or national structure. This was simply a series of incidents arising from the necessity of driving Chinese troops outside the borders.

Q. Didn't Manchukuo at that time occupy a strip of territory running from Chengde South through Peking to Tientsin?

A. This I believe was simply an extension of the battles which took place with Chinese troops, chasing them out of certain areas. I don't recall hearing that the borders of Manchuria, or Manchukuo, were to be enlarged any further than the Great Wall.

Q. By virtue of the settlement of that incident the jurisdiction of the Manchukuo Government was extended to include that corridor which I have just described, wasn't it?

A. No. It had no connection with Manchukuo at all. A Chinese administrator; of course, a puppet of Japan, administered this territory.

Q. Under the settlement?

A. I believe so.

Q. Prior to the time the Manchukuo forces went into that territory and occupied it Japan exercised no control or jurisdiction over it in the way of a government whatsoever, did it, and had no rights in it?

A. Yes, it had no government. However, there were a great many Japanese there, and also Japanese interests had been established there for some time, so that quite naturally it was an area which might foster difficulties, and so when the agreement was drawn up it was decided to keep it a non-military zone.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 112 -

- Q. The truth of the matter is that Japan bodily took the territory from China, didn't it?
- A. After driving out the Chinese troops the Japanese troops withdrew into Manchuria to the best of my knowledge.
- Q. But the territory became a part of Japan, didn't it?
- A. I could not call it a part of Japan.
- Q. It no longer belonged to China, did it?
- A. Yes, it was a part of China. There was a Chinese Administrator.
- Q. But he was a Japanese puppet, wasn't he?
- A. Yes. However, this government was entirely different from that set up on Manchukuo, and this man carried out a mild policy under the eyes of the Japanese.
- Q. From then on the territory was no longer subject to the supervision of the Chinese Government, and was administered by the Japanese puppet in a manner compatible with Japanese interests, was it not?
- A. While I was in the Navy then and am not well acquainted with the subject matter, I don't believe that this man entirely divorced himself from the Chinese Government. Naturally as a puppet he listened to the wishes of the Japanese interests, but we always regarded it as a part of the territory of China.
- Q. Now, the truce in settlement of that incident was known as the Tangku Truce, wasn't it?
- A. Yes, I think so.
- Q. And after that truce the territory involved never became subject to the jurisdiction of the Central Chinese Government again, did it?
- A. I am not sure about that. However, I don't believe it was considered either a part of Japan or Manchukuo.

Q. Now, during this period Japan had concluded as a matter of public policy that it should not undertake any further expansion in the North in Manchuria for fear that it would encounter the opposition of Russia, hadn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And also during this period Japan was lending active support to the opposition to the formation of a strong Central Government in China, wasn't it?

A. I don't know whether they did or not.

Q. Don't you know that Japan vigorously resented the support which was being lent by America to the formation of a strong Central Government in China?

A. Yes, in a sense. Japan could not appreciate the position taken by the United States, as it seemed unable to understand Japan's sincere policy.

Q. It was Japan's policy to keep China divided among itself so that it would have less difficulty in establishing puppet governments favorable to Japanese interests, wasn't it?

A. From the point of view of the United States you might be able to use those words. However, from Japan's point of view following the Manchurian Incident, we wished to bring to a close the whole matter in an opportune time.

Q. Japan wished to insure the peace of Greater East Asia by establishing puppet governments in the various provinces which would administer the affairs of those areas in a manner compatible with Japanese interests, didn't it?

A. If you put it that way it might be possible to say that there was a period when such a thing occurred. However, this is entirely erroneous, and no peace in East Asia can be guided by setting up puppet governments here and there, nor was this Japan's policy.

Q. How do you reconcile Japan's opposition to the establishment of a strong Central Government in China with that statement?

A. You are speaking of a Central Government in China, but looking at it from Japan's point of view there existed no strong Central Government, and Chiang Kai-Shek was only in the process of building his governmental structure. As you know, it was after the movements of such men as Chang Tso-Lin and others that he finally took a prominent place. It was not to Japan's interest to have trouble occurring in China, as Europe and the United States would then interfere with her national affairs. From the United States' point of view Chiang Kai-Shek was possibly the Central figure, but not from Japan's point of view.

Q. And Japan never lent any support to Chiang Kai-Shek's efforts to establish a strong Central Government in China, did it?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. When was that?

A. In the days when Wang Ching Wei and Chiang Kai-Shek were working together to build the government Japan gave her support to it.

Q. Wang Shing Wei was sympathetic with Japan's interests, wasn't he?

A. He was a man who had been educated in Japan and understood Japan well, and during this period I would not say he took the position he took later following the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War when he clasped hands completely with Japan.

Q. He was considered a Japanese advisor to Chiang Kai-Shek, wasn't he?

A. No. Not at that time. You are confusing him with the man he was later. Confusing him with the man he was later would be a mistake.

Q. It was through Wang Ching Wei that Japan hoped to influence the policies of the Chiang Kai-Shek Government, wasn't it?

A. I know nothing of that; however, it is only natural that Japan should wish to have a man in the government who understood Japan.

Q. As Chiang Kai-Shek began to crystalize his strength Japan grew further and further away from Chiang Kai-Shek, didn't it?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 115 -

A. Yes, that might be true, but the days when Chiang Kai-Shek began to crystalize his national structure and manifested his strength was in the days following the Manchurian Incident when anti-Japanese feeling was rife in China and had been for some time, so that the two events naturally coincided.

Q. Well now, will you tell me as best you can why it was that Japan felt that it was not good for East Asia that a strong Central Government should be established in China?

A. I have never heard that Japan did not desire a strong Central Chinese Government.

Q. You have heard that it did all it could to preclude the establishment of one, haven't you?

A. I have never heard of such a thing. That is a figment of the imagination of foreigners.

Q. You opposed the rise of Chang Tao-Leing as a strong leader in China, didn't you?

A. I don't know.

Q. Japan supported the opposition to his son Chang Hseuh-Lin in his efforts to establish a strong Central Government for China, didn't it?

A. I don't know.

Q. And as soon as Chiang Kai-Shek began to demonstrate powers of leadership in the formation of a strong Central Government for China, Japan began to support the opposing forces to him, did it not?

A. There may have been some cases of Japan supporting a man who understood Japan well, but as for active opposition to Chiang Kai-Shek I know nothing about it.

Q. How did Japan conclude that it knew ^{better} what was for the best interests for East Asia than any other leadership knew?

- A. I would say that Japan was the most powerful nation in East Asia; I imagine you mean following the China Incident, at which time there was no other nation which would take the position of leadership.
- Q. Chiang Kai-Shek might have taken that leadership, if he had had any support and cooperation from Japan, might he not?
- A. Yes, that would have been a very desirable turn of events, but even today with all the power of the United States behind him, as you well know, Chiang Kai-Shek is barely able to control the communists, but in the days that you were speaking about he was far from being as powerful as he is today.
- Q. Don't you know that the circumstances which you have just related are largely attributable to the support which these elements received from Japan through this period, and in opposition to Chiang Kai-Shek?
- A. No, I don't know. Nor did Japan have the power to do such a thing. China's problem has been so complex that a simple statement like that, such as Japan hindering Chiang Kai-Shek, or something of the sort, cannot be given as the factor for the rise of the communists today, or any other faction. Just as the United States had trouble with Mexico many years ago, and supported this faction or that, Japan has continuously been involved in Chinese affairs and actually has never been able to put up a man who had sufficient strength to further her own interests. That is how complex the Chinese problem is.
- Q. On the contrary, Japanese interests could be well served by Japan lending sufficient support to opposing forces to keep a strong Central Government from being established, couldn't it?
- A. That is an entirely erroneous concept which has been the subject of discussion since the days of Meiji, and which I think Japan realized was wrong long ago. Japan's only hope insofar as China was concerned was to have a strong and united China which we might deal with, and thereby foster trade between the two nations, provide for the safety of Japanese nationals in China, and in all respects benefit mutually by this state of affairs.
- Q. Don't you think that the so-called leadership on the part of Japan to establish the peace and stability of East Asia would be in considerably better grace if it were not invariably accompanied by the use of force and the acquisition of territory of other nations in its expression?

(Shimada, cont'd)


- A. Yes, that's true. However, all this occurred following the Manchurian Incident which I spoke to you about the other day, and the reasons I believe were explained to you.
- Q. Now, you stated that during this period, 1933 to 1937 and 1938, it was the public policy of Japan not to endeavor to develop or expand any further in the North, because of anticipated opposition from Russia, conversely speaking, it was the policy of Japan to expand in the South, wasn't it?
- A. If you sum up a very complex matter into a very simple statement, such as that, it places me in a very embarrassing situation to know what to answer. The matter is not as simple as that.
- Q. However that may be, the end result is that you continued to expand in the South for the next few years, didn't you?
- A. I don't know whether that would be putting the cart before the horse, as I think the reasons for Japan's southward movement lay in the fact that in her clashes with the Chinese following the Manchurian Incident, which resulted from her efforts to consolidate the Manchukuo Government, she was forced to move Southward-----this movement finally culminating in the China Incident.
- Q. You think about those things over night and we'll talk about them some more tomorrow.

(The interrogation adjourned at 1615 P. M.)

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, (Serial Number) 167619,

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 13 pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.



Subscribed and sworn to before me,

this 11 day of February, 1946.



Duly detailed investigating officer,
International Prosecution Section,
GHQ, SCAP.

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6 FEB 46

CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

ADMIRAL SHIMADA, SHIGETARO

Date and Time: 6 February 1946, 1430 - 1615 P. M.

Place : Sugamo Prison

Present : Admiral Shimada, Shigetaro
John Darsey, Esq., Interrogator
Lt. Robert Boyd, Interpreter
Miss Evelyn Cordell, Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, Administered by Mr. Darsey:

MR. DARSEY: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

LT. BOYD : I do.

Questions by: Mr. Darsey.

Q. On yesterday we talked about Japan's policy of expansion to the South after the consolidation of the Manchukuo Government and of Japan having occupied the corridor just outside the Great Wall from a place just north of Peiping to Tientsin, having driven the Chinese out, and subsequently by treaty having declared the area a non-military area. Then we talked about the further expansion to the North in China and the extension of the jurisdiction of the Manchukuo Government to the province of Jehol. Now, there seemed to be some confusion in your mind as to what territory was referred to as Jehol. I want you to make reference to this map, now, and see if you recognize Jehol as being a territory immediately East of the Chahar territory North of Kalgah, South of the Great Hsingan Mountains, and West of the province of Liaoning.

A. In Japanese we called it Nekka.

Q. So that Jehol and Nekka is one and the same; is that right?

A. I think so.

(Shimada, cont'd)

-119-

Q. And Jehol does comprise the territory which I have just described?

A. Yes, it was a part of Manchukuo.

Q. It was a part of China originally, wasn't it?

A. In that point I don't remember. I think Jehol was a part of ancient China.

Q. And at the time Manchukuo projected itself into Jehol it was at peace with the world, wasn't it?

A. Jehol was an ancient parish of the Emperor. It was an ancestral palace of the ancestors of the King of Manchuria.

Q. But it was originally a part of China?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was at peace with the world, wasn't it, at the time it was occupied by Manchukuo?

A. Yes.

Q. It did not request Manchukuo to come in and occupy it, did it?

A. No.

Q. So that Manchukuo decided that for its best interests it should occupy Jehol and place it in its sphere of influence, didn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. What justification do you give for that action on the part of Manchukuo?

A. The boundaries were thought to be the Black Dragon River to the North and the Great Wall to the South; that is what the Government in Manchukuo at that time thought.

Q. During this period Japan always thought, or Manchukuo always thought that its boundaries were further South than they were construed by others to be, didn't it?

- A. I don't know what the other countries construed or thought about the matter.
- Q. Japan and Manchukuo had no boundaries in Manchuria prior to the conclusion of the Manchurian Incident, did they?
- A. Manchukuo wished to have some boundaries, and fixed them.
- Q. I don't believe you understood my question. Prior to the Manchurian Incident and the consolidation of that Incident in the formation of the Manchukuo Government, Japan had no boundary rights in Manchuria, did it?
- A. No.
- Q. It only had some special treaty rights there?
- A. Yes.
- Q. So that when Japan conquered Manchuria and set up the Manchukuo Government if it did not have any previous boundaries, or boundary rights, with respect to China, what claim could it lay to the extension of the jurisdiction of the Manchukuo Government to territory further South than had ever been included in Manchuria?
- A. In that point I don't know quite well. I was not concerned, but I only guess the Manchukuo Government was very eager to have Jehol, because it was very familiar to the Emperor of Manchukuo, and it was very desirable to him.
- Q. However desirable it might have been to Manchukuo to take Jehol into the jurisdiction of Manchukuo, you don't personally think that it was fair, that there was much justice in that position, do you, to just go and arbitrarily take territory away from another national?
- A. It was necessary to talk with China, of course.
- Q. But they didn't do that, did they? They just went in and took it.
- A. In that point I don't know. Probably afterwards China understood, but at that time I don't know.

- Q. You know that Manchukuo acquired the province of Jehol, don't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, what was the next expansion move on the part of Japan and Manchukuo to the South in China?
- A. To the Hopeh Province. The Japanese Army pursued the Chinese Army.
- Q. You pursued the Chinese Army through the Great Wall and through Hopeh?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And in pursuing the Chinese army you occupied the territory of Hopeh?
- A. Yes, but we withdrew afterwards.
- Q. And you drove out the Chinese?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How did you settle the Hopeh territory then? You brought it into the Manchukuo sphere, didn't you?
- A. We tried to neutralize Hopeh---no Chinese and no Japanese Army.
- Q. You mean you made it a non-military zone?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And extended the influence of the Manchukuo Government into that area, didn't you?
- A. I don't think so; it was neutral.
- Q. But you brought it into the sphere of the influence of the Manchukuo Government?
- A. I don't think so. It was not necessary to have the Japanese Army there.

- Q. But you drove the Chinese out of there, and made it a non-military zone?
- A. Yes.
- Q. By the Tanghu Treaty?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was the next expansion move on the part of Japan to the South in China?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Don't you know you drove into the territory of Shantung?
- A. No.
- Q. You never did do that?
- A. No; But I believe we went in there between the Sino-Japanese War and the China Incident.
- Q. And then you started thinking about the North in China, didn't you?
- A. General Li was then in Mongolia; I don't think Japanese troops were there.
- Q. When did you move over into the province of Chabar?
- A. I think after the Sino-Japanese Incident.
- Q. After the Incident in July, July 7, 1937?
- A. Yes, after that.
- Q. Now, was all peace and quiet on the front between Manchukuo and China between the time you occupied Jehol and the time of the China Incident in 1937?
- A. It was quiet by then.

Q. The European situation was developing at a fast pace at about that time, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Hitler was on the march during those years, and while war had not broken out, he was acquiring territory rather promiscuously, wasn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. And the situation was growing very tense in Europe in 1937, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you consider that this tense situation which was occupying the attention of all of the European powers, as well as the United States, had anything to do with the breaking out of the China Incident in July of 1937?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Well now, had Japan inaugurated its New Order in East Asia and its Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere program by this time?

A. No, the Co-prosperity Sphere wasn't talked about in that time. Prince Konoye first began the principle of co-prosperity in 1938.

Q. The New Order program was in operation during those years, wasn't it?

A. No, it was at the same time. The Manchurian Incident occurred spontaneously and didn't come from any well-laid plan.

Q. Was the group referred to as Niki Sansuke operating in Manchukuo during this period?

A. I don't know quite well the period of the Niki Sansuke. Tojo was Chief of Staff in 1938 and 1939.

Q. Japan was opposing Chiang Kai-Shek's policies with respect to China during this period, wasn't it?

A. After the Sino-Japanese Incident we conflicted with Chiang Kai-Shek.

Q. Now, will you proceed and relate to us as briefly as possible your version of the China Incident of July 7, 1937?

A. In that time, actions for an effective result by the Japanese Army in Manchuria and North China while China was in a disadvantageous stage sometimes were not fair. However, due to the circumstances such consequences were often unavoidable and likely to occur between neighboring nations, thereby causing a rise or barrier of ill sentiment---taking advantage of this situation China had planned propoganda spreading anti-Japanese feeling throughout China. It resulted in occurrences at random of unlawful and outrageous incidents against Japanese nationals in China. Life and property of the Japanese in China had no longer become safe. The British and Americans in China were secretly supporting this policy, encouraging anti-Japanese movements, as well as humiliation against the Japanese. This antagonism between Japan and China became deeper and deeper in China, and incidents became unavoidable. Of course, the incident of the Marco Polo Bridge was the beginning of the China Incident. China, disregarding the cessation of hostilities in the year 1932, continued to shout "Dump all the Japanese nationals and the Japanese Landing Force in Shanghai into the Wampoo River at once," and concentrated a large force in Shanghai. The Consulates of both the United States and Great Britain, in spite of being representative parties for the treaty of the cessation of hostilities as signatories, utterly failed to act accordingly to make the Chinese forces withdraw. This failure on the part of the Consulates aided the rapid spread of the incident, and finally became to the stage that they were unable to place the situation under control.

Q. What treaty do you refer to that the United States and Great Britain became parties to resulting in the cessation of hostilities in Manchuria?

A. After the Shanghai Incident of 1932 we made a treaty with the Chinese, with the American and Great Britain ministers as intermediaries and signatories, to make the treaty effective and to guide the proprieties of that treaty.

Q. That treaty only provided for the cessation of hostilities in Shanghai and the withdrawal of troops in there, didn't it?

A. Yes.

- Q. You don't mean that the United States or Great Britain ever recognized the Manchukuo Government, do you?
- A. No, I don't think so.
- Q. I want to clarify the fact that you don't think that the United States or Great Britain ever recognized the Manchukuo Government?
- A. Oh, No, they did not.
- Q. This general situation which you describe as existing in the relations between China and Japan was the basis for the breaking out of the Sino-Japanese War, rather than any circumstances which came to pass at the Marco Polo Bridge, wasn't it?
- A. The China Incident broke out in North China at the Marco Polo Bridge. Every effort was made to localize and control the situation around the Marco Polo Bridge by an express command of the Emperor, but when the Chinese failed to abide by the treaty of 1932 and entered Shanghai the situation went out of control.
- Q. At the time the Chinese Army entered Shanghai Japan had taken the initiative at the Marco Polo Bridge, had it not?
- A. By the terms of the treaty of 1900 various countries, including Japan, had been given the right of maintaining troops in the vicinity of Peiping, so that during this time when the Japanese Army was carrying out the treaty they were shot at by the Chinese.
- Q. And from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident the fighting spread between the Japanese and the Chinese throughout the Manchukuo-China boundaries, did it not?
- A. No, I don't think so. Such spreading as it was sprang from out of Shanghai and Peiping.
- Q. And Japan from that time continued to invade China until the outbreak of the war with the United States, did it not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, during this time, or at about this time, Japan projected its Monroe Doctrine with respect to China, didn't it?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Didn't Japan adopt the policy of protecting China against what it considered the imperialism of the Western States?

A. I didn't hear about that.

Q. You don't recall that in 1934 the Japanese Foreign Office declared as follows: (The witness reads)

" 'It goes without saying that Japan at all times is endeavoring to maintain and promote her friendly relations with foreign nations, but at the same time we consider it only natural that to keep peace and order in Asia we must even act alone on our own responsibility, and it is our duty to perform it. At the same time there is no country but China which is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in East Asia.

'Accordingly, unification of China, preservation of her territorial integrity as well as restoration of order in that country, are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows that these can be attained through no other means than awakening and voluntary efforts of China herself.

'We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan; we also oppose any action taken by China calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after Manchurian and Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire political significance. Undertakings of such nature, if carried through to the end, must give rise to complications that might eventually necessitate discussion of problems like division of China and at the same time would have most serious repercussion upon Japan and East Asia.

'Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to peace in East Asia.

'However, supplying China with war aeroplanes, building aerodromes in China, and detailing military and naval instructors or military advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to alienate friendly relations between Japan, China, and other countries, and to disturb peace and order in Eastern Asia, Japan will oppose such projects.'

A. Was that a memorandum to a specific country?

Q. This was by the Japanese Foreign Minister, making a statement, announcing a policy.

A. I don't know about it.

Q. You mean you don't know whether that was made by the Foreign Minister or not?

A. I did not know about that statement.

Q. Did that statement which you have just read state correctly Japan's policy with respect to China at that time?

A. I don't know; but it must be true.

Q. Well now, if Japan felt that way about China why was she always fighting China?

A. China didn't hold precisely the same feeling on the subject.

Q. So that Japan was imposing its leadership upon China, was it not?

A. It may be said so, I think.

Q. Do you think Japan had any right to tell China that it should not align itself with the United States and Great Britain, in an effort to maintain the peace of Greater East Asia?

A. No, I don't think so. It had not the right.

Q. But that is what Japan did, isn't it?

A. By that statement, yes.

- Q. Japan through all these years tried to persuade and force China not to align itself with the United States and Great Britain, did it not?
- A. It was not a question of forcing them as much as it was a question of ideas; they felt the problems of the Orient should be handled by the Orientals.
- Q. The long and short of it is that all through these years Japan arbitrarily arrogated to itself the role of leadership in determining what it thought was good for Greater East Asia?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you went about your efforts in imposing that role of leadership through the use of force whenever the occasion arose, didn't you?
- A. No, I don't think so.
- Q. You opposed every effort on the part of China to receive aid and assistance from America and Great Britain, which might result in China adopting a policy contrary to Japan's program in East Asia, didn't you?
- A. In the point of view of America and Great Britain it might be so, but from the view point of Japan it is quite to the contrary. Of course, we had intentions, and America and Great Britain also intended something. Therefore, the intentions were to the contrary, and we could not coincide, but from the view point of Japan it was quite to the contrary.
- Q. Simply stated, it was Japan's policy that America and Great Britain should stay out of East Asia and let Japan determine what was best for China to do, wasn't it?
- A. It depended upon the case, I think. Sometimes it may be so.
- Q. That was Japan's policy from 1932 through the China Incident, wasn't it?
- A. Yes, I think so.

(The interrogation adjourned at 1615 P. M.)

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Lt. Robert Boyd, (Serial Number) 236713,

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 11 pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Robert Boyd

Subscribed and sworn to me before me,

this 13 day of February, 1946.

John James

Duly detailed investigating officer,
International Prosecution Section,
GHQ, SCAP.

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Dear Sir,
I am pleased to hear that you are well and hope you are enjoying the winter season.

I have been thinking about you and the work you are doing. It is a very interesting and important task, and I hope you are making good progress.

I am sure you will find the time to complete the project by the end of the year. I will be glad to help you in any way I can.

I am looking forward to hearing from you again soon.

8 FEB 46

CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

ADMIRAL SHIMADA, SHIGETARO

Date and Time: 8 February 1946, 1430-1615 P. M.

Place : Sugamo Prison

Present : Admiral Shimada, Shigetaro
John Darsey, Esq., Interrogator
Hiroshi Matsuda, Interpreter
Miss Evelyn Cordell, Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, Administered by Mr. Darsey:

MR. DARSEY : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

MR. MATSUDA : I do.

Questions by Mr. Darsey.

Q. Now, in the last interrogation we talked about Japan's Monroe Doctrine with respect to China and covered the circumstances of the China Incident for the first year or two. As the intensity of the China Incident progressed there was a virtual simultaneous increase in the intensity of the European situation with respect to war, wasn't there?

A. Yes.

Q. And Japan in the first one or two years after the beginning of the China Incident in July of 1937 was growing progressively closer in its alignment with the Axis, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you account for this merging of Japanese foreign policy with that of the Axis?

- A. I think it was the isolation of Japan from the international situation.
- Q. Do you mean by that that at this time the only friends Japan could find in the international picture were Germany and Italy?
- A. Germany and Italy also wanted a friend, and there might have been some others whom Japan might accept as friends, but Germany and Italy offered their hands to Japan.
- Q. Were you personally sympathetic with this growing alignment between Japan and Germany and Italy?
- A. No, quite to the contrary.
- Q. Did you feel that Japan should not align itself with Germany and Italy?
- A. At that time I was on the outside of the political affairs, in Kure and also in China. Therefore, I can't say anything except my personal opinion, and I was quite to the contrary with this alignment. Most of the naval officers were very much against it.
- Q. In these years from the establishment of the Manchukuo Government in Manchuria through the China Incident, did you have any operational assignments in the Navy in support of the expansion movement in China?
- A. In 1937 just at the beginning of the China Incident I was Assistant Chief of the Naval General Staff until November of that year.
- Q. In that capacity did you support Japan's policy with respect to the China Incident?
- A. As I told you how it happened day before yesterday, I assisted it like that, but the Naval General Staff, containing myself, endeavored to their utmost to localize near Peiping on the Emperor's orders; that was the Japanese policy at that time.
- Q. But serving in that capacity you did dispatch naval forces to support Japan's position in China, didn't you?
- A. The Navy sent a naval force to China after the Incident expanded to Shanghai; before that we did not send forces.

- Q. And you are willing to assume your full share of the responsibility for the manner in which the Japanese Navy supported Japan's policy with respect to the China Incident, aren't you?
- A. Oh, yes.
- Q. Now, ^{it was} during this period, 1937 to 1939, that the so-called program of the New Order in East Asia was promulgated as a policy by Japan, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And this New Order in East Asia was synonymous with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere program, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And this program had as its foundation the principle that Japan should be permitted to assume the leadership in the Greater East Asia Sphere, and that the United States and Great Britain should stay out of its way, didn't it?
- A. We didn't object as long as the United States and Great Britain didn't interfere with the peace of the Orient.
- Q. Do you mean by that that Japan didn't want the United States and Great Britain to interfere with its efforts to assume leadership in the Greater East Asia Sphere?
- A. We wanted the peace of the Orient, and we suffered very much from interference by the United States and Great Britain for many years. Therefore, we asked them not to interfere.
- Q. In other words, you felt that Japan would have been more successful in affording leadership in the Greater East Asia Sphere and in putting into effect its New Order in East Asia if the United States and Great Britain would stay out of Japan's way?
- A. The word "leadership" you use now is not the same idea. Our purpose was to obtain peace of the Orient. Great Britain and America disturbed us very much by affording arms, materials of war, etc., to China. Therefore, we wanted to have peace and for them not to interfere.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- Q. But in any event this New Order program and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere program contemplated that Japan would afford the leadership for Greater East Asia, did it not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And for that program to be put into effect and made successful by Japan it contemplated a change in the status quo with respect to East Asia, didn't it?
- A. No, I don't think so, because as I have just said, if there was no interference from the Western people I think the Orient would be quite at peace, and would have been many years ago. That was the object.
- Q. Do you mean to say that this New Order program didn't contemplate a change in the relationship between Japan and Thailand?
- A. For Thailand we had not so much interest. We received rice, etc., from it, but not so great an interest in it, I think.
- Q. But this New Order program contemplated that Thailand would be brought into the sphere of Japan's leadership, didn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. It contemplated that the Philippines would be brought into the sphere of Japan's leadership, didn't it?
- A. If the Philippines agreed we would receive it with great pleasure.
- Q. Whether the Philippines agreed or not Japan considered that from a natural point of view the Philippines should be in its sphere of leadership, did it not?
- A. In that point I don't know quite well, but I think it was after the Far Eastern War we considered the Philippines, because the Philippines was an American territory at that time.
- Q. Yes, I know the Philippines was an American territory, but I mean that this New Order contemplated that the Philippines naturally fell within the sphere of the Japanese leadership, didn't it?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 132 -

- A. If it were possible, I think, but I think most of these people who thought about the New Order did not think about the Philippines at that time. I think it would have been very difficult.
- Q. This New Order program contemplated that India naturally fell within the sphere of Japan's leadership, didn't it?
- A. I think it was too difficult. Even during the Far Eastern War India generally was outside of the New Order.
- Q. Japan was to be the central power in the development of this New Order in East Asia, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In order for Japan to put this New Order into effect and to make its leadership successful it was necessary to change the status quo in the relationship between Japan and the various countries which were to fall within its sphere of leadership, wasn't it?
- A. I don't think it was necessary to change so much, as Japan was a great power in the Orient at that time.
- Q. Irrespective of how strong a power in the Orient Japan was at that time, other countries which Japan felt naturally fell within its sphere of influence and leadership had not voluntarily recognized Japan as such a leader, had they?
- A. Of course, we could not force other countries to obey the Japanese order. It was not possible, but the idea of the New Order was that they would want the New Order, but of course we could not force them.
- Q. You did force them, didn't you?
- A. I don't think so; that was only the opinion of the Japanese people. It was not the policy of Japan to force it.
- Q. But the effect was that you did impose that leadership, by force, didn't you?
- A. No, I don't think so.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 132 -

- A. If it were possible, I think, but I think most of these people who thought about the New Order did not think about the Philippines at that time. I think it would have been very difficult.
- Q. This New Order program contemplated that India naturally fell within the sphere of Japan's leadership, didn't it?
- A. I think it was too difficult. Even during the Far Eastern War India generally was outside of the New Order.
- Q. Japan was to be the central power in the development of this New Order in East Asia, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In order for Japan to put this New Order into effect and to make its leadership successful it was necessary to change the status quo in the relationship between Japan and the various countries which were to fall within its sphere of leadership, wasn't it?
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- Q. But the effect was that you did impose that leadership, by force, didn't you?
- A. No, I don't think so.

- Q. Did Japan ever enter into any negotiations with Great Britain in regard to its rights in Hongkong and the Malay Peninsula about this territory coming within the sphere of the leadership of Japan?
- A. We did nothing to Hongkong or the Malay Peninsula. We did not force at all into that territory.
- Q. You never did negotiate with Great Britain, did you?
- A. No.
- Q. You never did declare war on Great Britain?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When did you do that?
- A. In December, 1941.
- Q. You made a formal declaration of war on Great Britain?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You are sure.
- A. Yes, we did against the United States and Great Britain.
- Q. Had you previously tried to negotiate with Great Britain about the questions involved between Japan and Great Britain?
- A. We always spoke with America and America spoke with Great Britain, and we thought America represented Great Britain.
- Q. You never had any direct dealings or negotiations with Great Britain?
- A. Not directly; I don't think so.
- Q. Now, if Japan had been victorious you would have imposed your New Order program in Greater East Asia whether the countries involved wanted it or not?
- A. I don't think so. It was not the idea of Hakko Ichiu, which meant good-will and benevolence, not by forcing them.

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 134 -

- Q. Do you mean to say that Japan would have withdrawn from all of the territories in the Pacific which it had conquered and occupied during the war voluntarily?
- A. I don't think so; it was quite necessary at the time.
- Q. Isn't it a fact that the basic cause of the war with the United States and Great Britain was because they would not agree to Japan's plan for setting up its New Order in East Asia?
- A. No, I don't think so.
- Q. Was it not contemplated by Japan under its New Order and its East Asia program that certain British possessions should gain their independence?
- A. If we had had victory it might have occurred.
- Q. In other words, if you had been victorious you anticipated that certain British possessions in the Greater East Asia Sphere should be granted their independence?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was Burma^{one}/of those possessions?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And was it contemplated that Japan would set up a puppet government there such as it did in Manchuria?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And that as a result of that Burma would come within the sphere of Japan's leadership in Greater East Asia?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, was the questions of the independence of Burma ever taken up by Japan with Great Britain prior to the war?
- A. Before the war we did not think about that.

Q. Now, prior to the China Incident did the people of China or any representative government of China ever approve of Japan's New Order and its East Asia program?

A. The New Order I believe began after the Incident- in about 1938 by Prince Konoye. I think the military people had many opinions about China.

Q. Well, for many years prior to the China Incident, prior to 1938, Japan had a policy of a Monroe Doctrine with respect to Greater East Asia similar to the New Order and the East Asia program, as you have stated, didn't it?

A. You say an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine, but I don't think so. We only objected to arms and war materials being supplied to unfortunate China; that was Japan's statement, but you cannot call that the Monroe Doctrine; it is quite different.

Q. You felt that Japan should be left free to extend leadership in the Greater East Asia Sphere without interference with that leadership on the part of Great Britain and the United States, didn't you?

A. From the Manchurian Incident especially the United States interfered very much with Japan, and after the China Incident it did not at all recognize the Japanese position at all.

Q. You mean by that statement that if the United States and Great Britain would permit Japan to afford the leadership for the establishment of what it considered to be a New Order for East Asia you would have had no objection to the United States and Great Britain?

A. No, you go always to the New Order. I am not talking about that. We had special interests in Manchuria, but in spite of that position America did not understand it at all. Therefore, the situation grew deeper and deeper.

Q. Well, Japan has always considered that the United States and Great Britain should not in any way offer any political leadership so far as East Asia was concerned, has it not?

A. I think the very cause of this great war and the collision was against our interests and America's interests.

Q. Were you personally sympathetic with Japanese policy with respect to China during these years?

A. That is a very difficult question. Sometimes I could not personally coincide with Japanese politics, but looking at it from Japan's view point and America's view point, I felt that America should sometimes recognize Japan's position. Especially the army did not do well, very often. At the same time America did not recognize at all Japan's position. This was the reason for the conflict.

Q. With respect to the New Order program sponsored by Japan which contemplated that certain British possessions should have their independence, and that Japan should set up the puppet governments for them in order to bring them into the sphere of Japan's leadership, were you personally sympathetic with that program and those policies on the part of Japan.

A. That program was after the war. Of course, in peace time it was not good at all. It was very bad. But in war times it was sometimes necessary to have puppet governments to govern the states, because military forces could not govern them.

Q. Well, if you hadn't had a war you would not have been able to have any puppet governments, would you?

A. That was the effect of the war, not the object of Japan's policy.

Q. Wasn't it the object of Japan's New Order in East Asia program that certain British possessions should have their independence? Such as Burma?

A. I don't think so, because this plan courted by Prince Konoye in 1938 had nothing like that. Even for China we did not think so. We were always thinking to talk with Chiang Kai-Shek, but it was not possible until the last time.

Q. Don't you know that Japan considered that Burma naturally fell within the sphere of its leadership?

A. I don't know quite well about Burma when Konoye courted this idea, but I think we thought about Burma after the war.

- Q. You consider that as a result of the war if you had been victorious Burma would have been granted its independence and that Japan would have set up a puppet government?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And therefore Burman would have come within the sphere of Japan's leadership under its New Order program?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You also considered that if Japan had been victorious it would have granted similar independence to the Philippines, didn't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you would have established a puppet government there?
- A. If we had been victorious it would not have been a puppet government. It would have been a natural government.
- Q. But you would have brought the Philippines within the sphere of Japan's leadership if you had been victorious?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Were you personally sympathetic with those war aims?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you are willing to assume your share of the responsibility for the support which you lent to it?
- A. Oh, yes.
- Q. Now, after the relationship between Japan and the Axis became closer, Japan executed some agreements with the Axis, didn't it?
- A. I was not in Japan at that time; I was in China, and don't know quite well.
- Q. But you have learned that Japan did execute a series of treaties and pacts with Germany and Italy? The first one was in 1939.

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you remember the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Italy by Japan?

A. When I was in China, yes.

Q. Were you in sympathy with Japan making any such agreement as that with Germany and Italy?

A. I was quite to the contrary, as I said before. Most of the naval officers thought to the contrary; that caused the confusion of the Hiranuma Cabinet.

Q. You personally felt then that Japan should not have any part of that association with Germany and Italy. Is that right?

A. Yes, it was very bad.

Q. What do you think was the purpose of the execution of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939 between Japan, Germany and Italy?

A. I don't know. I learned by a note of Prince Konoye, and it was a very impressive statement.

Q. Have you learned that at the time of the announcement of the execution of the Anti-Comintern Pact by Japan that a secret agreement was also executed by Japan, Germany and Italy at that time?

A. I don't know.

Q. You have never heard of that secret agreement?

A. No.

Q. You never heard that Japan, Germany and Italy entered into a secret pact at that time by virtue of which Germany and Italy would not lend any support to Russia in the event Russia got into a war with Japan?

A. No, I don't know.

Q. Of course you are familiar with the organization of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in 1940, aren't you?

A. Only by the newspapers. I was in China at that time.

Q. Were you sympathetic with the purposes of that organization, as you learned them to be?

A. It depended upon if this society would do a good thing for the country, then I would coincide, because until that time the political position did a great deal of wrong, and whether I was for it or not was determined by their position.

Q. You are familiar with the execution of the Tri-partite Pact in September of 1940 between Germany, Italy and Japan, aren't you?

A. About this I did not know at all, as I said before, but learned from the newspapers by Konoye's note.

Q. That is the first you heard of it?

A. Yes.

Q. What position did you occupy then?

A. Commander-in-Chief in China, the China fleet.

Q. Do you recall the Foreign Minister Matsuoko making this statement in the Diet with respect to the Tri-partite agreement?

"Needless to say, the aim of Japanese foreign policy is that of enabling all nations of the world each to take its own proper place in accordance with the spirit of Hakko Ichiu, the ideal which inspired the foundation of our Empire. The object of the Three-Power Pact, concluded between Japan, Germany, and Italy, on September 27 last, is none other than the realization of the same great ideal.....The pact states that Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of the Japanese in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia."

A. That is the same idea expressed as when you read from the book the other day.

Q. Do you recall such a statement?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 140 -

- A. No, but of course I may have read it in the newspapers, but I don't recall.
- Q. Were you sympathetic with such a public policy as referred to in that statement?
- A. Quite to the contrary.
- Q. What do you consider to be the reason for the execution of that pact by Japan?
- A. I can't guess, because I was always quite to the contrary, and I can't find any good purpose in that pact.
- Q. Now, the China Incident continued up until the outbreak of war with the United States and Japan during that period kept pushing further and further into China, did it not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And of course continued to do so until after the war with the United States broke out?
- A. To the extent that Japan's power would permit.
- Q. And you say if Japan had been victorious it would have granted independence to those peoples and governments which it considered to fall within its sphere of leadership; is that right?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, previously in this interrogation we talked about the Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941. I want to know if you remember who convoked that conference, or called it?
- A. Premier Tojo.
- Q. Who normally calls an Imperial conference?
- A. I think always Tojo. The Emperor only attends.
- Q. Do I understand you to say that normally speaking the Premier calls the Imperial conference?
- A. With the Emperor's permission, and the Emperor came to the assembly. Ordinarily Tojo sends the letter to the assembly.

- Q. Do you think the Emperor of his own initiative ever convenes an Imperial Conference, normally speaking?
- A. Sometimes. That depends upon the circumstances. Sometimes he calls one of his own initiative, but generally the Premier asks the Emperor to call it, or asks for permission to call it.
- Q. Sometimes the Emperor calls it, but usually the Premier calls it.
- A. Yes.
- Q. On this occasion, December 1, 1941, who called this conference?
- A. Premier Tojo.
- Q. And it was ^{not} suggested by the Emperor?
- A. No, Tojo.
- Q. The procedure for convening an Imperial Conference is not provided for constitutionally, is it?
- A. No, I don't think so.
- Q. Now, who usually attends an Imperial Conference?
- A. It depends upon the program, I think.
- Q. Does the entire Cabinet always attend the Imperial Conference?
- A. Sometimes no. In this case I think so, as the problem was very grave.
- Q. But there are occasions, you say, when all the Cabinet members do not attend an Imperial Conference?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Does the General Staff always attend an Imperial Conference?
- A. It depends upon the program. Sometimes they may not attend.

Q. Who determines who is to attend an Imperial Conference?

A. I think whoever asks the Emperor's permission to call a conference, if other persons ask the Emperor other than the Premier, but in most cases it is the Premier.

Q. In most cases the Premier determines who is to be invited to attend the conference?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think the Emperor sometimes suggests particular people to be invited?

A. It depends upon the case. I don't remember the present Emperor ever having called anyone to attend a conference, or ever having called an Imperial Conference.

Q. Would it be unusual for the Emperor to specifically ask any particular person to be invited to attend an Imperial Conference?

A. If the Emperor wanted someone about some grave deed, but I think the present Emperor has not done that until now, by my memory.

Q. If I understand you correctly, you say that usually Imperial Conferences are called by the Premier?

A. Yes.

Q. Sometimes they may be suggested to the Emperor by other members of the Cabinet?

A. In very rare cases it may be.

Q. But any Cabinet member would be privileged to suggest that an Imperial Conference be called if he wanted to do so, wouldn't he?

A. Yes, if the Cabinet would agree to that suggestion.

Q. And while the Emperor might call an Imperial Conference of his own initiative, if he wanted to, this has not been done by the present Emperor insofar as you know?

A. No.

Q. Now, you say you have refreshed your memory and recall the persons who attended the Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941?

(Shimada, cont'd)

- 143 -

A. Yes, they were as follows:

Tojo (Premier) (Army)
Shimada (Navy)
Toga (Foreign Minister)
Kaya (Finance)
Hashida (Education)
Koizumi (Welfare)
Suzuki (Without portfolio)
Ino (Agriculture)

Hara (Pres. of Privy Council)
Sugiyama (Chief of Army
General Staff)
Hagano (Chief of Naval
General Staff)
Associate - Hoshino
(Chief Secretary of Cabinet)
(He had no vote or voice unless
questioned).

Q. And this conference was held in the presence of the Emperor?

A. Yes.

Q. And as you have previously stated, it was at this conference the decision was made to go to war?

A. Yes.

Q. The decision of the Imperial Conference was unanimous, wasn't it?

A. Yes, oh yes.

Q. You agreed to this decision, and actively supported it?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. And I believe you said that decision was reduced to writing?

A. Yes.

Q. And as you have previously stated, the Emperor approved that decision by signing it either the day of the Imperial Conference or the next day afterwards?

A. Yes, I don't remember whether it was that day or the next.

Q. Now, we have had quite a long interrogation. Do you consider that you have had fair and just treatment by us in this interrogation?

A. Oh, yes, I am very much grateful to you in that point, because you were so kind and very fair.

Q. And if you should be charged formally you would expect to receive this same kind of treatment in any trial that you might be made a party to, wouldn't you?

A. I would be very happy if it would be so.

Q. You of course understand we are only conducting an investigation now to determine the facts in the matter?

A. Yes.

Q. And that should you be charged with any crime you would be served with a formal indictment?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, I understand you have a statement which you wish to be placed in the record?

A. Yes. (The statement follows):

"The main cause of the Far Eastern War has its root in the Manchuria and China-Japan Incidents. In the actions of Japanese Army there was sometimes unfair manner, losing the sympathy. With this opportunity the U. S. and Great Britain utterly disregarding and failing to show any sign of understanding for the Japanese positions, favored China in ex-parte manner. The U. S. and Britain, taking these incidents as the opportunity for an intervention in the Orient, encouraged China by giving the aid in large quality by all the means and thereby made the prolongation of the China-Japan Incident as Anglo-American policy together with arms, material aid to China. On the other hand U. S. hurrying the expansion and preparation of the armed forces, oppressed Japan high handedly and at last brought Japan to the verge of life and death.

"The fundamental cause of the Far Eastern War has its root in the collision of interests of America and Britain against Japanese interest in China including Manchuria. It takes two men to fight, and now Japan is defeated. Is it true, 'No victory is illegal but defeat is illegal'?"

(The end)

OATH OF INTERPRETER

I, HIROSHI MATSUDA, (Serial Number) _____,
being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions
and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to
English respectively, and that the above transcription of such
questions and answers, consisting of 17 pages, are true and accurate
to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Hiroshi Matsuda

Subscribed and sworn to me before me,

this 18 day of February, 1946.

John J. J. J.

Duly detailed investigating
officer, International Prosecution
Section, GHQ, SCAP.

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, EVELYN CORDELL, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

This the 12 day of February, 1946.

Evelyn Cordell

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, JOHN DARSEY, certify that on February 5, 6, and 8, 1946, personally appeared before me, SHIMADA, Shigetaro, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Lt. Robert Boyd and Hiroshi Matsuda, Interpreters, respectively, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

John Darsey

Tokyo, Japan

15 February 1946.

INTERROGATION OF

Admiral Shigerato SHIMADA

Date and Time: 14 March 1946 - 1400-1630 hours
Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
Present : Admiral Shigerato SHIMADA
Mr. John A. Darsey, Interrogator
2nd Lieutenant F. E. Kennamer
T/Sgt. Tatsuo R. Fujii, Interpreter
Lillian Anderson, Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter: Administered by Mr. Darsey

Mr. Darsey : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English as may be required of you in this proceeding?

T/Sgt. Fujii : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Darsey

Q. You are familiar with the fact that in December 1941, a joint military commission was established in Berlin, aren't you?

A. I don't remember quite well, but it may be, I think.

Q. Don't you remember that the Japanese members of that commission in 1943 were Admiral NOMURA, Rear Admiral YONAI and Lieutenant-General BANZAI?

A. There is no Rear Admiral YONAI, so there must be an error somewhere.

Q. Give us the names of the Japanese members of that commission in 1943?

A. I don't remember quite well. I don't know the commission quite well.

Q. You know that Japan had representatives in Berlin from 1941 to 1943 collaborating on military matters, don't you?

A. I do not know the actual facts, but I think that is most likely.

Q. You know that Admiral NOMURA was there, don't you?

A. Oh yes, he was there.

Q. Was there an Admiral YOKOI there as naval attache?

A. YOKOI, oh, yes, he was there.

Q. YOKOI was there in the capacity of naval attache, wasn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. And were he and NOMURA attending meetings with Field Marshal Keitel and Admiral Doenitz representing Germany?

A. I think so. I don't remember quite well. Of course, it must be so I think.

Q. Well, you know you received communications from them indicating that they had attended such meetings?

A. Many telegrams were received at that time, but I don't remember quite well.

Q. Are you acquainted with the fact that Lieutenant General BANZAI was there?

A. I don't know quite well about military officers.

Q. You say you have heard about it?

A. I have heard about BANZAI, but when he was there I don't know quite well.

Q. Did the communications from NOMURA and YOKOI indicate that he was in attendance at meetings with KEITEL and DOENITZ representing Germany?

A. I don't know quite well about that.

Q. Now, I am well aware of the fact that normally speaking, operational orders do not come within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Navy, but when such orders involve political affairs such as possible violation of treaties and of international law and the laws of war, they do fall within the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Navy, do they not?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Now OSHIMA was ambassador to Berlin in 1942 and 1943, wasn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall when he had a conference with HITLER in January of 1942 in connection with which HITLER announced the German policy of exterminating crews of allied merchant ships sunk by submarine action?

A. I don't remember.

Q. You don't remember anything about that?

A. No.

Q. Do you remember in March of 1943 that OSHIMA talked with RIBBENTROP who also advised him of the German policy of destroying merchant crews and suggested that Japan take similar measures?

A. I don't know. If I had heard of such matters, I would surely have remembered it.

Q. You did not receive any communications through the Foreign Minister's office advising you of such a conversation on the part of OSHIMA with RIBBENTROP?

A. If I had received such a communication, I would never have coincided with it. It wasn't necessary for us.

Q. Did you receive any communication through the foreign office or otherwise to the effect that Germany was urging intensification of Japanese submarine warfare in the Indian Ocean?

A. There might have been such communications. However, if so, it would most likely have come to the Naval General Staff.

Q. Didn't you learn that such communications did go to the Naval General Staff?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Well, did Japan intensify its submarine warfare in the Indian Ocean in 1943?

A. The submarine warfare depended upon the circumstances. Sometimes it was in the Pacific, other times in the Indian Ocean and towards Australia and the South Pacific. I do not remember as to when the Indian Ocean was the arena.

Q. Who was Chief of the Naval General Staff at that period?

A. Admiral NAGANO.

Q. Now, isn't it a fact that you had many conferences with NAGANO during that period to the end of the determining, pursuant to the German request, how Japanese submarine warfare should be coordinated with that of Germany?

A. I do recall that Japanese submarines were sent to Germany to procure materials. However, I do not remember of any request made by the German government in regards to the method of submarine warfare, nor do I remember that such requests were made by Germany.

Q. You did not discuss with NAGANO the manner in which Japanese submarine warfare might best be coordinated with that of Germany?

A. I did not speak to NAGANO about that, no.

Q. You are familiar with the fact that Germany offered to transfer German submarines to Japan, aren't you?

A. Yes, because German submarines were better than Japanese submarines. I think we got two submarines from Germany to use as a model since their construction was much better than ours.

Q. Now, these submarines were transferred to Japan on the basis of an understanding that the submarine warfare of the two countries should be coordinated, weren't they?

A. The submarines were received not on the basis of transferring tactical knowledge between the two nations but rather for the purpose of transferring technical information. The submarines were received as well as other technical equipment for the purpose of furthering our combat in the Pacific area. However, the tactical situation was taken care of solely by Japan. Japan had her hands full in the Pacific area and therefore she was receiving aid from Germany in whatever respects that may further the Pacific cause.

Q. Well now, don't you know that under the Tripartite Pact, Japan and Germany became allies in the war and that to the extent that it was possible, the tactical maneuvers on the part of Germany and Japan were coordinated throughout the war with Japan receiving as much war material from Germany as she could afford to give?

A. I did not know the exact contents of the pact, but in principle that is correct.

Q. Now, who arranged the transfer of these submarines from Germany to Japan?

A. I think NOMURA, I think so.

Q. Now, did you see the exchange of telegrams between OSHIMA, NOMURA, YOKOI, and the Naval General Staff with respect to the transfer of these submarines?

A. Yes, I remember it, yes.

Q. Now, didn't these telegrams make reference to the intensification of submarine warfare on the part of Japan?

A. It will naturally become so if the Japanese submarine is improved.

Q. In other words, Germany was protesting that Japan was not placing enough emphasis on submarine warfare, wasn't she?

A. To that question I can not answer either yes or no. In Japan, there was not enough submarines and whether Germany was protesting that we were not putting enough emphasis on submarine warfare is not known to me.

Q. Don't you know that in these cablegrams which you saw that your representatives in Germany advised that HITLER and RIBBENTROP took the position that Japan should become more ruthless in submarine warfare?

A. I don't remember.

Q. What was the purpose of the creation of this joint military commission in Berlin?

A. To better understand the tactical situation of the two nations.

Q. In short, it was to accomplish the coordination of the war effort of the two countries to the end of making the best use of the combined resources, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you become cognizant of the policies of Germany in its submarine warfare with respect to the disposal of all survivors of merchant ship sinkings?

A. No, I don't know.

Q. Do you mean you served in the capacity of Minister of the Navy in Japan during this war and didn't learn of the protests which were being made with respect to the German strafing of merchant ship crews after sinkings by submarines?

A. I don't know. I have heard that after the sinking of merchant ships, the Germans didn't help give aid to the survivors. However, I have not heard that they had strafed the survivors.

Q. Now, I show you a document which is identified as "Evidentiary Document #548 of the International Prosecution Section", and which is further identified as an extract from J.I.C. P.O.A. Navy #128, and ask you to read the paragraph identified as paragraph #4 and state whether or not you, in your capacity as Minister of the Navy became familiar with that order?

A. I presume that I have read that once before, but I do not recall it very clearly.

Q. Well, whether you recall verbatim the language of the paragraph which you have just read, you well know that that was the substance of an order in effect so far as the Japanese Navy was concerned in the war, don't you?

A. It is the same in the American Navy, I think. The Navies are the same--American, Japanese.

Q. That is a wholly evasive answer. The question is not what standards or orders prevail in any other Navy, but whether or not such an order did prevail with respect to the conduct of war on the part of the Japanese Navy.

A. If there was such an order, it must have been carried out in that manner, but I do not remember clearly.

Q. Do you mean to say now that in your capacity as Minister of the Navy, you did not know that such an order in substance as that indicated in paragraph 4 which you have just read, prevailed insofar as the activities of the Japanese Navy were concerned during the war?

A. That would be the policy of the Navy to pick up any survivors. However, beings as submarines are limited in space, maybe such an order as the one I have just read had been issued. To forsake the survivors is cruel, but under the circumstances, it could not be helped.

Q. So that you do know that such an order did exist on the part of the Japanese Navy during the war?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in your capacity as Minister of the Navy, did the foreign office or any other source submit to you protests with respect to the destruction of crews after sinkings by Japanese submarines?

A. I do not remember too clearly since during war time numerous messages are sent to the Ministry, but it might be that such a message had been received by the Ministry.

Q. Well, whether you remember the details or the exact language or not, don't you well remember that your office received from the Foreign Office or from other sources many messages, the substance of which protested vigorously the destruction of crews of merchant ships which had been sunk by Japanese submarines?

A. No, I have not heard that strong protests had been made very frequently. What year are you referring to?

Q. I am referring to the period of your tenure of office as Minister of the Navy from December 8, 1941, to its end. So that we will have no misunderstanding at all, let us leave out the adjectives such as "frequent" and "many" and answer the question simply, whether or not you received any message of protest with respect to the destruction of crews of merchant ships which had been sunk by Japanese submarines?

A. No, I do not remember.

Q. Well, if you had received any such messages or any such information, you think you would recall it, don't you?

A. Yes, I would remember such an incident if I had received protests in that respect. However, I am quite certain that the Japanese Navy have not disposed of the survivors. It is unfortunate that a submarine can not pick up many survivors, but I am sure that the Japanese Navy did not kill the survivors unnecessarily.

Q. Before we leave the subject, I want an unequivocal answer if you can give it to the question of whether or not you ever received any message or any information with respect to protests having been lodged with the Japanese government concerning the destruction of crews of merchant ships sunk by Japanese submarines?

A. I would like to know by destruction of crews as to whether you mean killing them off such as machine gunning them, or by just leaving them without rescuing them.

Q. I mean such complete destruction as is contemplated by your Navy Order #128, whatever form that might take.

A. I do not know the exact contents of Japanese Navy Order #128. However, I am quite certain that the orders did not specify that the survivors be killed unnecessarily. It is true that the orders stated that no survivors will be picked up. After any ship is destroyed, it is imperative that a submarine leave the area as quickly as possible, and therefore it would be foolish for a submarine to linger in that area to machine gun any survivors. I would have to read the orders mentioned above as written in Japanese to get its full meaning.

Q. Well now, you understand, of course, that you will be permitted to make any explanation that you care to make to any answer that you may make to any question propounded to you, but I do think that you should not want to evade a direct answer to any question in the first instance, so I want us to go back now to the first question which I propounded, and have you say to me whether or not you ever received any information from any source that protests had been lodged with respect to the destruction of crews of merchant ships sunk by Japanese submarines.

A. I have no recollection of ever receiving any protests from any sources in regards to the killing by machine gunning of survivors after a merchant ship has been destroyed.

Q. You must have had enough experience with me by this time to realize that qualified answers are not going to suffice. Did you receive any information about protests which had been lodged with the Japanese government concerning the abandonment to drowning of the surviving crews of merchant ships which had been sunk by Japanese submarines?

A. I do not recall each detail. However, I am sure that the Japanese government had received such a protest. However, in regards to the destruction of survivors by machine gunning is something that I do not know for certain, nor do I know that a protest in that respect had been received by the Japanese government.

Q. Did you receive any information about any protests that had been lodged with the Japanese government concerning submarine warfare on the part of Japan in violation of international law, the laws of war, or inhumane submarine warfare of any kind?

A. I do not recall as to whether protests had been received as to the Japanese submarine warfare being inhumane or against the principles of international law. I presume that the methods are very much alike in any nation. However, if a protest had been lodged to the effect that the survivors had been machine gunned by the Japanese Navy, I would most likely remember the incident.

Q. Do you remember receiving any information about any protests of any kind concerning the conduct of Japanese submarine warfare?

A. I do not remember.

Q. And during your entire tenure of office as Minister of the Navy, did you ever have any occasion to discuss with the Naval General Staff, the question of whether or not Japanese submarine warfare was in compliance with the rules of international law or the laws of war?

A. I am certain that Japan is not the only nation that had violated the principles of war. I have not discussed such matters with anyone. I think both sides have carried out the war in much the same manner.

Q. And you say that the subject of the conduct of Japanese submarine warfare in compliance with international law and the laws of war never came up in conferences between you and members of the Naval General Staff?

A. No.

Q. Now if the Foreign Office had received any protests about the manner of the conduct of Japanese submarine warfare, that office normally would have transmitted such protests to the Navy Ministry, wouldn't it?

A. Yes, it is transmitted to the Navy Ministry. However, unless it is a matter of grave importance, it will not be brought to my attention.

Q. Such a matter as a protest over the conduct of submarine warfare in violation of the laws of war would be of sufficient importance to come to your attention, wouldn't it?

A. If the protests includes such matter as machine gunning the survivors it would undoubtedly be brought to my attention. However, if the protests were in regards to some matter which is being done by both sides, it would not be brought to my attention. Both England and the United States are nations which sends a great number of protests and if the Minister is informed of them all, he will not be able to conduct his business.

Q. And it is your statement now that you never received any information during your tenure of office as Minister of the Navy from any source with respect to a protest as to the conduct of submarine warfare in violation of international law and the laws of war?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Would you say that if Foreign Minister TOGO states that such information was forwarded to your office and to you, that he was mistaken?

A. No, he would not be mistaken, but as I have stated previously a great deal of the messages which are brought to the Ministry are never forwarded to me and therefore I would know nothing.

Q. Insofar as you are concerned, you did not take any action predicated upon any such protests, did you?

A. No, I do not remember of any.

Q. And you do not recall ever having any conferences with any members of the General Staff with respect to whether or not paragraph 4 of Japanese Navy Order #128 constituted a violation of international law or the laws of war, did you?

A. No, I am quite certain that I have not.

Q. Are you willing to assume responsibility for the policy expressed in paragraph 4 of the Japanese Navy Order #128?

A. First of all I must read the original of that order #128 in Japanese to get the full meaning of the order. If the orders are implied that the survivors be disposed of by machine gunning, then it is of grave importance and it is the responsibility of the Navy Minister to have known of such orders.

Q. My question did not have any relation to the administration of the order by the operations branch of the Navy. You have previously stated that while you do not remember the exact terminology, you did know that an order to the effect and in the substance of that which you read as paragraph 4 in document #548, which reads as follows:

"Do not stop with the sinking of enemy ships and crews; at the same time that you carry out the complete destruction of the crews of the enemy's ships, if possible, seize part of the crew and endeavor to secure information about the enemy."

was in existence during the war. Now, the question is whether or not you are willing to assume the responsibility for such an order.

A. I can not at the present time state whether or not I can take full responsibility for the simple reason that I am not certain as to whether the English translation of the original document is absolutely correct. However, if there are any instances brought to light where the crews were destroyed by machine gunning, then it would be my responsibility.

Q. In other words, if I should present you with the Japanese version of Navy Order #128 and it should prove to be in substance the same as that which is indicated by paragraph 4 in document #548, you would be willing to assume responsibility for such an order, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in your previous interrogation you stated that when you came back to Japan from China in September of 1941, you learned that YAMAMOTO had submitted a plan for an attack upon Pearl Harbor to NAGANO early in 1941, isn't that right?

A. It was not immediately after returning from China. It was after I had become Minister of the Navy that I heard of such plans. That was just shortly before the outbreak of the war.

Q. Do you mean to say that you learned after you became Minister of the Navy that YAMAMOTO had presented such a plan to NAGANO early in 1941?

A. Yes.

Q. And you stated further in your previous interrogation that such a plan received the informal approval of NAGANO early in the summer of 1941 and that thereafter YAMAMOTO was authorized to proceed with the perfection of such a plan?

A. Yes.

Q. And I believe you stated further that this plan was made a basis of practice in the annual maneuvers which were held in the summer of 1941, is that right?

A. At that time I was in China and therefore I do not know the full particulars about the maneuvers. However, I had been told that a maneuver was held during the summer of 1941.

Q. And that YAMAMOTO's plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor was made the basis of practice in such maneuvers?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, from whom or from what sources did you learn this information after you became Minister of the Navy in the TOJO Cabinet?

A. I heard it from the Naval General Staff.

Q. Did you learn it in your conferences with Admiral NAGANO?

A. When I became the Navy Minister, I received a brief explanation of operational plans.

Q. And those operational plans indicated to you that NAGANO gave his informal approval for the perfection of a plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor in the summer of 1941, didn't they?

A. I heard the over-all plans. However, I do not recall as to exactly what plans included the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Q. Well, now, you have stated that when you became Minister of the Navy, you learned that a plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor had been practiced at the annual maneuvers held in the summer of 1941, is that right?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Now, what I want to know is from whom did you learn that information?

A. Naval General Staff--one member of the Naval General Staff--the Chief of Naval Operations, I think.

Q. Who was that?

A. Admiral FUKUTOME, at that time Rear Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.

Q. And who was the member of the Naval General Staff who gave you such information?

A. FUKUTOME.

Q. He was the only one?

A. Yes, he explained to me.

Q. And in that explanation, he told you that YAMAMOTO's plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor had been practiced early in the summer of 1941?

A. Yes.

Q. And he told you that NAGANO had previously authorized the practice of such a plan at the annual maneuvers in 1941, didn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. Did NAGANO ever advise you to the same effect?

A. I do not think that I had been informed by NAGANO since it was enough to have received the information from FUKUTOME who was the Chief of Naval Operations.

Q. Do you know when the annual maneuvers were held in 1941?

A. No, I do not remember as to when or where the maneuvers were held since I was in China at that time and didn't have much interest in it.

Q. What was the date of your return from China?

A. September 15, 1941.

Q. The annual maneuvers were held in advance of that date, weren't they?

A. I think so.

Q. They were held in August?

A. I don't know quite well--I don't know--I don't remember.

Q. After you became Minister of the Navy, and received this report from FUKUTOME and as you progressed with your administration of that office, the information that such a plan was practiced in the summer of 1941 became confirmed, didn't it?

A. Yes. However, I did not ask as to exactly when or where the maneuvers were held.

Q. Now, did you in any talks you had with YAMAMOTO after you became Minister of the Navy learn from him that such a plan was practiced at the annual maneuvers in the summer of 1941?

A. No, I heard nothing from YAMAMOTO.

Q. But from the information which you got after you became Minister of the Navy, you have no doubt in your mind that the plan was practiced at the annual maneuvers in 1941, do you?

A. I have no doubt in my mind that the plan was practiced. I confirm it.

Q. Now, what was the date of the first Imperial Conference which you attended after you became Minister of the Navy?

A. December 1 or 2, 1941.

Q. And it is your statement that no Imperial Conference was held on November 5, 1941?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall attending any unusual conference on that date?

A. I don't remember. I have no special recollection.

Q. Don't you recall attending an unusual meeting of the Supreme War Council, the Marshals and Fleet Admirals, the General Staffs of the Army and Navy, which meeting was also attended by Premier TOJO and the Foreign Minister on November 5, 1941?

A. I don't remember November fifth, but it might be November fifth. Very often we had conferences in that period, how to negotiate with the United States.

Q. I know that many cabinet meetings were held during that period, but it is unusual for the combination which I named to attend a conference, isn't it?

A. There was a conference of the above named members held quite frequently in regards to very grave matters.

Q. And such a conference was held in the first part of November, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And didn't Premier TOJO at this meeting on November 5, 1941, indicate very clearly that negotiations with the United States could not be successfully conducted and that his Cabinet was determined to go to war?

A. No, as far as I can remember, he made no such statements.

Q. Admiral OIKAWA was a member of the Supreme War Council at that time, wasn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. Didn't he attend this meeting on November 5, 1941?

A. The position as a member of the Supreme War Council is more or less an honorary position and therefore they do not always attend important conferences. Rather they await the reports after such a conference is held.

Q. I have just concluded the interrogation of Admiral OIKAWA in which he states as follows: "On November 5, 1941, Premier TOJO called a meeting of the Supreme War Council of which I was a member, and the marshals and fleet admirals, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of the Navy, and the Chief of the Army General Staff, and the Chief and Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff. At this meeting, the Chiefs of Staff made reports as to their plans for and their ability to conduct a war with the United States, and Premier TOJO then explained in a very determined manner that his Cabinet could find no basis upon which to conduct negotiations with the United States and that it was making plans to go to war with her." Will you point out for us in what respects this information is in error?

A. First, Admiral OIKAWA was not in position to attend such a conference at first. Second, November fifth was a grave period for us, how to negotiate with America and it is too early to give up the negotiation at that time. If the date was December fifth, then it may be, but I don't remember December fifth either.

Q. Then it is your statement that the Supreme War Council did not attend any such meeting on November 5, 1941?

A. No.

Q. They did not?

A. No. To the War Council, I can not explain such a grave matter at all.

Q. Now, in your previous interrogation you told about the decisions made at the Imperial Conference on December 1 or 2 and you stated that a liaison conference was held immediately prior thereto at which you learned of the plan that no more than an hour's notice prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor should be given the United States, isn't that right?

A. In regards to the operational matters, it isn't discussed in the liaison conferences because there are some other members such as the Minister of Finance who are attending. It must have been at some other conference where only the members directly concerned with the operation was in attendance.

Q. Whatever the conference may be called, a conference was held immediately prior to the Imperial Conference on December 1 or 2 at which you learned of the plan that no more than an hour's notice was to be given the United States prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, didn't you?

A. In the previous interrogation, I didn't state that there were any conferences held. It was just an understanding among the personnel directly concerned.

Q. Yes, and you stated that the personnel consisted of the Chiefs of the General Staffs, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And the Foreign Minister?

A. Yes.

Q. The Finance Minister?

A. No.

Q. Who else?

A. That's all.

Q. Yourself?

A. Oh, of course. Army and Navy Ministers, Chiefs of General Staffs and the Foreign Minister.

Q. That meeting was held immediately prior to the Imperial Conference on December 1 or 2?

A. It was not a meeting or conference. We just talked about that.

Q. But you talked about that plan immediately prior to the Imperial Conference on December 1 or 2, didn't you?

A. I don't remember quite well the date, but of course before the Imperial Conference, of course.

Q. Before the Imperial Conference?

A. I think so.

Q. And you stated that this plan was approved by that group?

A. Yes.

Q. Including yourself?

A. Oh sure.

Q. Now, in those talks as you call them, isn't it a fact that quite a difference of opinion arose between the Navy General Staff and the Foreign Minister with regards to notice to the United States?

A. No, I don't remember because as I said, it was a conference or meeting to discuss anything.

Q. Isn't it a fact that with respect to that subject, Vice Chief ITO insisted vigorously that the attack should be made a surprise attack and that no notice should be given?

A. I don't know.

Q. You are not certain?

A. I don't know quite well.

Q. Well, don't you know that the Navy General Staff insisted that this attack must be made a surprise attack?

A. I think his idea was, if possible, to do a surprise attack, but as I said before, it is necessary to obey the treaty and that was the intention, to comply with the treaty of the Hague Convention.

Q. But that is not responsive to my question. What I want to know is, didn't the Naval General Staff take the position very vigorously that this attack on Pearl Harbor should be made a surprise attack?

A. No, I don't remember. It isn't a meeting. They talk with each other. Therefore, if someone said so it may be, but the Foreign Minister, his idea, of course, we had the intention to comply with the treaty.

Q. Didn't the Naval General Staff finally compromise on the proposition that no more than an hour's notice should be given?

A. I do not know whether such a matter was discussed at that meeting. I presume it was among only a few members that were present at that gathering. At least, I wasn't one of the members who took part in that talk.

Q. Well, in any event, you finally approved a plan which had for its purpose that no more than an hour's notice should be given the United States prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And that became the official policy of the Japanese Government, didn't it?

A. Yes.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Tatsuo R. FUJII, T/Sgt
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 18 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Tatsuo R. Fujii

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16 day of March, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Lillian Anderson, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lillian Anderson

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, ~~was~~ John A. Darsey, _____,
and _____,

certify that on the 14 day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (us) Admiral Shigerato SHIMADA and according to T/Sgt. Tatsuo R. FUJII, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

March 16, 1946
Date

John Darsey

Albany, O.P.S.

4197

INTERROGATION OF
Admiral Shigerato SHIMADA

Date and Time: 14 March 1946 - 1400-1630 hours
Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
Present : Admiral Shigerato SHIMADA
Mr. John A. Darsey, Interrogator
2nd Lieutenant F. E. Kennamer
T/Sgt. Tatsuo R. Fujii, Interpreter
Lillian Anderson, Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter: Administered by Mr. Darsey

Mr. Darsey : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English as may be required of you in this proceeding?

T/Sgt. Fujii : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Darsey

Q. You are familiar with the fact that in December 1941, a joint military commission was established in Berlin, aren't you?

A. I don't remember quite well, but it may be, I think.

Q. Don't you remember that the Japanese members of that commission in 1943 were Admiral NOMURA, Rear Admiral YONAI and Lieutenant-General BANZAI?

A. There is no Rear Admiral YONAI, so there must be an error somewhere.

Q. Give us the names of the Japanese members of that commission in 1943?

A. I don't remember quite well. I don't know the commission quite well.

Q. You know that Japan had representatives in Berlin from 1941 to 1943 collaborating on military matters, don't you?

A. I do not know the actual facts, but I think that is most likely.

36-20

MAR 16 1946

Q. You know that Admiral NOMURA was there, don't you?

A. Oh yes, he was there.

Q. Was there an Admiral YOKOI there as naval attache?

A. YOKOI, oh, yes, he was there.

Q. YOKOI was there in the capacity of naval attache, wasn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. And were he and NOMURA attending meetings with Field Marshal Keitel and Admiral Doenitz representing Germany?

A. I think so. I don't remember quite well. Of course, it must be so I think.

Q. Well, you know you received communications from them indicating that they had attended such meetings?

A. Many telegrams were received at that time, but I don't remember quite well.

Q. Are you acquainted with the fact that Lieutenant General BANZAI was there?

A. I don't know quite well about military officers.

Q. You say you have heard about it?

A. I have heard about BANZAI, but when he was there I don't know quite well.

Q. Did the communications from NOMURA and YOKOI indicate that he was in attendance at meetings with KEITEL and DOENITZ representing Germany?

A. I don't know quite well about that.

Q. Now, I am well aware of the fact that normally speaking, operational orders do not come within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Navy, but when such orders involve political affairs such as possible violation of treaties and of international law and the laws of war, they do fall within the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Navy, do they not?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Now OSHIMA was ambassador to Berlin in 1942 and 1943, wasn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall when he had a conference with HITLER in January of 1942 in connection with which HITLER announced the German policy of exterminating crews of allied merchant ships sunk by submarine action?

A. I don't remember.

Q. You don't remember anything about that?

A. No.

Q. Do you remember in March of 1943 that OSHIMA talked with RIBBENTROP who also advised him of the German policy of destroying merchant crews and suggested that Japan take similar measures?

A. I don't know. If I had heard of such matters, I would surely have remembered it.

Q. You did not receive any communications through the Foreign Minister's office advising you of such a conversation on the part of OSHIMA with RIBBENTROP?

A. If I had received such a communication, I would never have coincided with it. It wasn't necessary for us.

Q. Did you receive any communication through the foreign office or otherwise to the effect that Germany was urging intensification of Japanese submarine warfare in the Indian Ocean?

A. There might have been such communications. However, if so, it would most likely have come to the Naval General Staff.

Q. Didn't you learn that such communications did go to the Naval General Staff?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Well, did Japan intensify its submarine warfare in the Indian Ocean in 1943?

A. The submarine warfare depended upon the circumstances. Sometimes it was in the Pacific, other times in the Indian Ocean and towards Australia and the South Pacific. I do not remember as to when the Indian Ocean was the arena.

Q. Who was Chief of the Naval General Staff at that period?

A. Admiral NAGANO.

Q. Now, isn't it a fact that you had many conferences with NAGANO during that period to the end of the determining, pursuant to the German request, how Japanese submarine warfare should be coordinated with that of Germany?

A. I do recall that Japanese submarines were sent to Germany to procure materials. However, I do not remember of any request made by the German government in regards to the method of submarine warfare, nor do I remember that such requests were made by Germany.

Q. You did not discuss with NAGANO the manner in which Japanese submarine warfare might best be coordinated with that of Germany?

A. I did not speak to NAGANO about that, no.

Q. You are familiar with the fact that Germany offered to transfer German submarines to Japan, aren't you?

A. Yes, because German submarines were better than Japanese submarines. I think we got two submarines from Germany to use as a model since their construction was much better than ours.

Q. Now, these submarines were transferred to Japan on the basis of an understanding that the submarine warfare of the two countries should be coordinated, weren't they?

A. The submarines were received not on the basis of transferring tactical knowledge between the two nations but rather for the purpose of transferring technical information. The submarines were received as well as other technical equipment for the purpose of furthering our combat in the Pacific area. However, the tactical situation was taken care of solely by Japan. Japan had her hands full in the Pacific area and therefore she was receiving aid from Germany in whatever respects that may further the Pacific cause.

Q. Well now, don't you know that under the Tripartite Pact, Japan and Germany became allies in the war and that to the extent that it was possible, the tactical maneuvers on the part of Germany and Japan were coordinated throughout the war with Japan receiving as much war material from Germany as she could afford to give?

A. I did not know the exact contents of the pact, but in principle that is correct.

Q. Now, who arranged the transfer of these submarines from Germany to Japan?

A. I think NOMURA, I think so.

Q. Now, did you see the exchange of telegrams between OSHIMA, NOMURA, YOKOI, and the Naval General Staff with respect to the transfer of these submarines?

A. Yes, I remember it, yes.

Q. Now, didn't these telegrams make reference to the intensification of submarine warfare on the part of Japan?

A. It will naturally become so if the Japanese submarine is improved.

Q. In other words, Germany was protesting that Japan was not placing enough emphasis on submarine warfare, wasn't she?

A. To that question I can not answer either yes or no. In Japan, there was not enough submarines and whether Germany was protesting that we were not putting enough emphasis on submarine warfare is not known to me.

Q. Don't you know that in these cablegrams which you saw that your representatives in Germany advised that HITLER and RIBBENTROP took the position that Japan should become more ruthless in submarine warfare?

A. I don't remember.

Q. What was the purpose of the creation of this joint military commission in Berlin?

A. To better understand the tactical situation of the two nations.

Q. In short, it was to accomplish the coordination of the war effort of the two countries to the end of making the best use of the combined resources, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you become cognizant of the policies of Germany in its submarine warfare with respect to the disposal of all survivors of merchant ship sinkings?

Interrogation of Admiral Shigerato SHIMADA - cont'd 14 March 1946

A. No, I don't know.

Q. Do you mean you served in the capacity of Minister of the Navy in Japan during this war and didn't learn of the protests which were being made with respect to the German strafing of merchant ship crews after sinkings by submarines?

A. I don't know. I have heard that after the sinking of merchant ships, the Germans didn't help give aid to the survivors. However, I have not heard that they had strafed the survivors.

Q. Now, I show you a document which is identified as "Evidentiary Document #548 of the International Prosecution Section", and which is further identified as an extract from J.I.C. P.O.A. Navy #128, and ask you to read the paragraph identified as paragraph #4 and state whether or not you, in your capacity as Minister of the Navy became familiar with that order?

A. I presume that I have read that once before, but I do not recall it very clearly.

Q. Well, whether you recall verbatim the language of the paragraph which you have just read, you well know that that was the substance of an order in effect so far as the Japanese Navy was concerned in the war, don't you?

A. It is the same in the American Navy, I think. The Navies are the same--American, Japanese.

Q. That is a wholly evasive answer. The question is not what standards or orders prevail in any other Navy, but whether or not such an order did prevail with respect to the conduct of war on the part of the Japanese Navy.

A. If there was such an order, it must have been carried out in that manner, but I do not remember clearly.

Q. Do you mean to say now that in your capacity as Minister of the Navy, you did not know that such an order in substance as that indicated in paragraph 4 which you have just read, prevailed insofar as the activities of the Japanese Navy were concerned during the war?

A. That would be the policy of the Navy to pick up any survivors. However, beings as submarines are limited in space, maybe such an order as the one I have just read had been issued. To forsake the survivors is cruel, but under the circumstances, it could not be helped.

Q. So that you do know that such an order did exist on the part of the Japanese Navy during the war?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in your capacity as Minister of the Navy, did the foreign office or any other source submit to you protests with respect to the destruction of crews after sinkings by Japanese submarines?

A. I do not remember too clearly since during war time numerous messages are sent to the Ministry, but it might be that such a message had been received by the Ministry.

Q. Well, whether you remember the details or the exact language or not, don't you well remember that your office received from the Foreign Office or from other sources many messages, the substance of which protested vigorously the destruction of crews of merchant ships which had been sunk by Japanese submarines?

A. No, I have not heard that strong protests had been made very frequently. What year are you referring to?

Q. I am referring to the period of your tenure of office as Minister of the Navy from December 8, 1941, to its end. So that we will have no misunderstanding at all, let us leave out the adjectives such as "frequent" and "many" and answer the question simply, whether or not you received any message of protest with respect to the destruction of crews of merchant ships which had been sunk by Japanese submarines?

A. No, I do not remember.

Q. Well, if you had received any such messages or any such information, you think you would recall it, don't you?

A. Yes, I would remember such an incident if I had received protests in that respect. However, I am quite certain that the Japanese Navy have not disposed of the survivors. It is unfortunate that a submarine can not pick up many survivors, but I am sure that the Japanese Navy did not kill the survivors unnecessarily.

Q. Before we leave the subject, I want an unequivocal answer if you can give it to the question of whether or not you ever received any message or any information with respect to protests having been lodged with the Japanese government concerning the destruction of crews of merchant ships sunk by Japanese submarines?

A. I would like to know by destruction of crews as to whether you mean killing them off such as machine gunning them, or by just leaving them without rescuing them.

Q. I mean such complete destruction as is contemplated by your Navy Order #128, whatever form that might take.

A. I do not know the exact contents of Japanese Navy Order #128. However, I am quite certain that the orders did not specify that the survivors be killed unnecessarily. It is true that the orders stated that no survivors will be picked up. After any ship is destroyed, it is imperative that a submarine leave the area as quickly as possible, and therefore it would be foolish for a submarine to linger in that area to machine gun any survivors. I would have to read the orders mentioned above as written in Japanese to get its full meaning.

Q. Well now, you understand, of course, that you will be permitted to make any explanation that you care to make to any answer that you may make to any question propounded to you, but I do think that you should not want to evade a direct answer to any question in the first instance, so I want us to go back now to the first question which I propounded, and have you say to me whether or not you ever received any information from any source that protests had been lodged with respect to the destruction of crews of merchant ships sunk by Japanese submarines.

A. I have no recollection of ever receiving any protests from any sources in regards to the killing by machine gunning of survivors after a merchant ship has been destroyed.

Q. You must have had enough experience with me by this time to realize that qualified answers are not going to suffice. Did you receive any information about protests which had been lodged with the Japanese government concerning the abandonment to drowning of the surviving crews of merchant ships which had been sunk by Japanese submarines?

A. I do not recall each detail. However, I am sure that the Japanese government had received such a protest. However, in regards to the destruction of survivors by machine gunning is something that I do not know for certain, nor do I know that a protest in that respect had been received by the Japanese government.

Q. Did you receive any information about any protests that had been lodged with the Japanese government concerning submarine warfare on the part of Japan in violation of international law, the laws of war, or inhumane submarine warfare of any kind?

A. I do not recall as to whether protests had been received as to the Japanese submarine warfare being inhumane or against the principles of international law. I presume that the methods are very much alike in any nation. However, if a protest had been lodged to the effect that the survivors had been machine gunned by the Japanese Navy, I would most likely remember the incident.

Q. Do you remember receiving any information about any protests of any kind concerning the conduct of Japanese submarine warfare?

A. I do not remember.

Q. And during your entire tenure of office as Minister of the Navy, did you ever have any occasion to discuss with the Naval General Staff, the question of whether or not Japanese submarine warfare was in compliance with the rules of international law or the laws of war?

A. I am certain that Japan is not the only nation that had violated the principles of war. I have not discussed such matters with anyone. I think both sides have carried out the war in much the same manner.

Q. And you say that the subject of the conduct of Japanese submarine warfare in compliance with international law and the laws of war never came up in conferences between you and members of the Naval General Staff?

A. No.

Q. Now if the Foreign Office had received any protests about the manner of the conduct of Japanese submarine warfare, that office normally would have transmitted such protests to the Navy Ministry, wouldn't it?

A. Yes, it is transmitted to the Navy Ministry. However, unless it is a matter of grave importance, it will not be brought to my attention.

Q. Such a matter as a protest over the conduct of submarine warfare in violation of the laws of war would be of sufficient importance to come to your attention, wouldn't it?

A. If the protests includes such matter as machine gunning the survivors it would undoubtedly be brought to my attention. However, if the protests were in regards to some matter which is being done by both sides, it would not be brought to my attention. Both England and the United States are nations which sends a great number of protests and if the Minister is informed of them all, he will not be able to conduct his business.

Q. And it is your statement now that you never received any information during your tenure of office as Minister of the Navy from any source with respect to a protest as to the conduct of submarine warfare in violation of international law and the laws of war?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Would you say that if Foreign Minister TOGO states that such information was forwarded to your office and to you, that he was mistaken?

A. No, he would not be mistaken, but as I have stated previously a great deal of the messages which are brought to the Ministry are never forwarded to me and therefore I would know nothing.

Q. Insofar as you are concerned, you did not take any action predicated upon any such protests, did you?

A. No, I do not remember of any.

Q. And you do not recall ever having any conferences with any members of the General Staff with respect to whether or not paragraph 4 of Japanese Navy Order #128 constituted a violation of international law or the laws of war, did you?

A. No, I am quite certain that I have not.

Q. Are you willing to assume responsibility for the policy expressed in paragraph 4 of the Japanese Navy Order #128?

A. First of all I must read the original of that order #128 in Japanese to get the full meaning of the order. If the orders are implied that the survivors be disposed of by machine gunning, then it is of grave importance and it is the responsibility of the Navy Minister to have known of such orders.

Q. My question did not have any relation to the administration of the order by the operations branch of the Navy. You have previously stated that while you do not remember the exact terminology, you did know that an order to the effect and in the substance of that which you read as paragraph 4 in document #548, which reads as follows:

"Do not stop with the sinking of enemy ships and crews; at the same time that you carry out the complete destruction of the crews of the enemy's ships, if possible, seize part of the crew and endeavor to secure information about the enemy."

was in existence during the war. Now, the question is whether or not you are willing to assume the responsibility for such an order.

A. I can not at the present time state whether or not I can take full responsibility for the simple reason that I am not certain as to whether the English translation of the original document is absolutely correct. However, if there are any instances brought to light where the crews were destroyed by machine gunning, then it would be my responsibility.

Q. In other words, if I should present you with the Japanese version of Navy Order #128 and it should prove to be in substance the same as that which is indicated by paragraph 4 in document #548, you would be willing to assume responsibility for such an order, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in your previous interrogation you stated that when you came back to Japan from China in September of 1941, you learned that YAMAMOTO had submitted a plan for an attack upon Pearl Harbor to NAGANO early in 1941, isn't that right?

A. It was not immediately after returning from China. It was after I had become Minister of the Navy that I heard of such plans. That was just shortly before the outbreak of the war.

Q. Do you mean to say that you learned after you became Minister of the Navy that YAMAMOTO had presented such a plan to NAGANO early in 1941?

A. Yes.

Q. And you stated further in your previous interrogation that such a plan received the informal approval of NAGANO early in the summer of 1941 and that thereafter YAMAMOTO was authorized to proceed with the perfection of such a plan?

A. Yes.

Q. And I believe you stated further that this plan was made a basis of practice in the annual maneuvers which were held in the summer of 1941, is that right?

A. At that time I was in China and therefore I do not know the full particulars about the maneuvers. However, I had been told that a maneuver was held during the summer of 1941.

Q. And that YAMAMOTO's plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor was made the basis of practice in such maneuvers?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, from whom or from what sources did you learn this information after you became Minister of the Navy in the TOJO Cabinet?

A. I heard it from the Naval General Staff.

Q. Did you learn it in your conferences with Admiral NAGANO?

A. When I became the Navy Minister, I received a brief explanation of operational plans.

Q. And those operational plans indicated to you that NAGANO gave his informal approval for the perfection of a plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor in the summer of 1941, didn't they?

A. I heard the over-all plans. However, I do not recall as to exactly what plans included the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Q. Well, now, you have stated that when you became Minister of the Navy, you learned that a plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor had been practiced at the annual maneuvers held in the summer of 1941, is that right?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Now, what I want to know is from whom did you learn that information?

Interrogation of Admiral Shigerato SHIMADA - cont'd 14 March 1946

A. Naval General Staff--one member of the Naval General Staff--the Chief of Naval Operations, I think.

Q. Who was that?

A. Admiral FUKUTOME, at that time Rear Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.

Q. And who was the member of the Naval General Staff who gave you such information?

A. FUKUTOME.

Q. He was the only one?

A. Yes, he explained to me.

Q. And in that explanation, he told you that YAMAMOTO's plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor had been practiced early in the summer of 1941?

A. Yes.

Q. And he told you that NAGANO had previously authorized the practice of such a plan at the annual maneuvers in 1941, didn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. Did NAGANO ever advise you to the same effect?

A. I do not think that I had been informed by NAGANO since it was enough to have received the information from FUKUTOME who was the Chief of Naval Operations.

Q. Do you know when the annual maneuvers were held in 1941?

A. No, I do not remember as to when or where the maneuvers were held since I was in China at that time and didn't have much interest in it.

Q. What was the date of your return from China?

A. September 15, 1941.

Q. The annual maneuvers were held in advance of that date, weren't they?

A. I think so.

Q. They were held in August?

A. I don't know quite well--I don't know--I don't remember.

Q. After you became Minister of the Navy, and received this report from FUKUTOME and as you progressed with your administration of that office, the information that such a plan was practiced in the summer of 1941 became confirmed, didn't it?

A. Yes. However, I did not ask as to exactly when or where the maneuvers were held.

Q. Now, did you in any talks you had with YAMAMOTO after you became Minister of the Navy learn from him that such a plan was practiced at the annual maneuvers in the summer of 1941?

A. No, I heard nothing from YAMAMOTO.

Q. But from the information which you got after you became Minister of the Navy, you have no doubt in your mind that the plan was practiced at the annual maneuvers in 1941, do you?

A. I have no doubt in my mind that the plan was practiced. I confirm it.

Q. Now, what was the date of the first Imperial Conference which you attended after you became Minister of the Navy?

A. December 1 or 2, 1941.

Q. And it is your statement that no Imperial Conference was held on November 5, 1941?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall attending any unusual conference on that date?

A. I don't remember. I have no special recollection.

Q. Don't you recall attending an unusual meeting of the Supreme War Council, the Marshals and Fleet Admirals, the General Staffs of the Army and Navy, which meeting was also attended by Premier TOJO and the Foreign Minister on November 5, 1941?

A. I don't remember November fifth, but it might be November fifth. Very often we had conferences in that period, how to negotiate with the United States.

Q. I know that many cabinet meetings were held during that period, but it is unusual for the combination which I named to attend a conference, isn't it?

A. There was a conference of the above named members held quite frequently in regards to very grave matters.

Q. And such a conference was held in the first part of November, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And didn't Premier TOJO at this meeting on November 5, 1941, indicate very clearly that negotiations with the United States could not be successfully conducted and that his Cabinet was determined to go to war?

A. No, as far as I can remember, he made no such statements.

Q. Admiral OIKAWA was a member of the Supreme War Council at that time, wasn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. Didn't he attend this meeting on November 5, 1941?

A. The position as a member of the Supreme War Council is more or less an honorary position and therefore they do not always attend important conferences. Rather they await the reports after such a conference is held.

Q. I have just concluded the interrogation of Admiral OIKAWA in which he states as follows: "On November 5, 1941, Premier TOJO called a meeting of the Supreme War Council of which I was a member, and the marshals and fleet admirals, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of the Navy, and the Chief of the Army General Staff, and the Chief and Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff. At this meeting, the Chiefs of Staff made reports as to their plans for and their ability to conduct a war with the United States, and Premier TOJO then explained in a very determined manner that his Cabinet could find no basis upon which to conduct negotiations with the United States and that it was making plans to go to war with her." Will you point out for us in what respects this information is in error?

A. First, Admiral OIKAWA was not in position to attend such a conference at first. Second, November fifth was a grave period for us, how to negotiate with America and it is too early to give up the negotiation at that time. If the date was December fifth, then it may be, but I don't remember December fifth either.

Q. Then it is your statement that the Supreme War Council did not attend any such meeting on November 5, 1941?

A. No.

Q. They did not?

A. No. To the War Council, I can not explain such a grave matter at all.

Q. Now, in your previous interrogation you told about the decisions made at the Imperial Conference on December 1 or 2 and you stated that a liaison conference was held immediately prior thereto at which you learned of the plan that no more than an hour's notice prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor should be given the United States, isn't that right?

A. In regards to the operational matters, it isn't discussed in the liaison conferences because there are some other members such as the Minister of Finance who are attending. It must have been at some other conference where only the members directly concerned with the operation was in attendance.

Q. Whatever the conference may be called, a conference was held immediately prior to the Imperial Conference on December 1 or 2 at which you learned of the plan that no more than an hour's notice was to be given the United States prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, didn't you?

A. In the previous interrogation, I didn't state that there were any conferences held. It was just an understanding among the personnel directly concerned.

Q. Yes, and you stated that the personnel consisted of the Chiefs of the General Staffs, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And the Foreign Minister?

A. Yes.

Q. The Finance Minister?

A. No.

Q. Who else?

A. That's all.

Q. Yourself?

A. Oh, of course. Army and Navy Ministers, Chiefs of General Staffs and the Foreign Minister.

Q. That meeting was held immediately prior to the Imperial Conference on December 1 or 2?

A. It was not a meeting or conference. We just talked about that.

Q. But you talked about that plan immediately prior to the Imperial Conference on December 1 or 2, didn't you?

A. I don't remember quite well the date, but of course before the Imperial Conference, of course.

Q. Before the Imperial Conference?

A. I think so.

Q. And you stated that this plan was approved by that group?

A. Yes.

Q. Including yourself?

A. Oh sure.

Q. Now, in these talks as you call them, isn't it a fact that quite a difference of opinion arose between the Navy General Staff and the Foreign Minister with regards to notice to the United States?

A. No, I don't remember because as I said, it was a conference or meeting to discuss anything.

Q. Isn't it a fact that with respect to that subject, Vice Chief ITO insisted vigorously that the attack should be made a surprise attack and that no notice should be given?

A. I don't know.

Q. You are not certain?

A. I don't know quite well.

Q. Well, don't you know that the Navy General Staff insisted that this attack must be made a surprise attack?

A. I think his idea was, if possible, to do a surprise attack, but as I said before, it is necessary to obey the treaty and that was the intention, to comply with the treaty of the Hague Convention.

Q. But that is not responsive to my question. What I want to know is, didn't the Naval General Staff take the position very vigorously that this attack on Pearl Harbor should be made a surprise attack?

A. No, I don't remember. It isn't a meeting. They talk with each other. Therefore, if someone said so it may be, but the Foreign Minister, his idea, of course, we had the intention to comply with the treaty.

Q. Didn't the Naval General Staff finally compromise on the proposition that no more than an hour's notice should be given?

A. I do not know whether such a matter was discussed at that meeting. I presume it was among only a few members that were present at that gathering. At least, I wasn't one of the members who took part in that talk.

Q. Well, in any event, you finally approved a plan which had for its purpose that no more than an hour's notice should be given the United States prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And that became the official policy of the Japanese Government, didn't it?

A. Yes.

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