

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
APO #234  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

RESTRICTED

PLACE; At Prince Higashi-  
Kuni's Palace Grounds  
Tokyo.  
DATE: 14 November, 1945.

INTERROGATION NO. 426

Division of Origin: Chairman's Office.

Subject: Japanese War Economy.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

PRINCE HIGASHI-KUNI.

Where interviewed: At his Palace grounds, Tokyo.

Interrogators:

Mr. Bisson  
Captain Hedding  
Colonel Potts  
Lt. Cdr. Wilds  
Lt. Cdr. Spinks

Interpreters:


Mr. Suzukawa  
Mr. Millard

Summary:

Prince HIGASHI-KUNI expresses views typical of the group headed by Konoye, who was a close friend of long standing. He stresses the cliches that the Army interfered too much in political and economic affairs, that the controls over war production were badly handled, and that repression was extremely severe. It would have been much better, he thinks, if the Army had engaged only in strategy and the military conduct of the war, and business had taken care of the production side. He indicates that the Supreme War Council, of which he was a member, had no affirmative powers of any kind. Like others in his group, he concluded that the war was lost after the occupation of Saipan. He talked of the need of peace to his close friends in private, and claims that he urged both Tojo and Koiso of the necessity of ending the war. He believes Japan exerted its full effort in the China War.

RESTRICTED

426 - 1





HIGASHI-KUNI, Naruhiko.

H.I.H. Prince General Premier and concurrently Minister  
of War.

Born: Dec. 3, 1887, Kyoto; 9th s. of the late Prince  
KUNI Asahiko; great-grandson of the late HIH  
Prince FUSHIMI Kuniye, 17th generation from  
Emperor Gofushimi Tenno (1299-1302); m.  
Princess Toshiko, y.d. of the late Emperor  
MEIJI; has three sons.

Career:

Nov.1906 Established House of HIGASHI-KUNI by order of  
the late Emperor MEIJI.

1908 Graduated from Military Academy.

Dec.1908 Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant.  
Served as member of 3rd Regiment of Imperial  
Guards.

1910 Promoted to 1st Lieutenant.

Nov.1914 Grad. of Army War College.

1915 Commander of 29th Infantry Brigade and promoted  
to Captain.

May 18,1915 Married H.I.H. Princess Toshiko.

May 6,1916 Birth of son, Prince Morihiro.  
Attached to 3rd Infantry Regiment and Headquart-  
ers of the General Staff.

July 1918 Promoted to Major; Battalion Commander of 7th  
Infantry Division. Post in Military Academy.

Apr 18,1920- Lived in France; studied military tactics.  
Jan. 1927

1921 Promoted to Lt. Colonel.

1925 Promoted to Colonel.

1926 - Nov  
1943 Honorary President of Japan Newspaper Associa-  
tion (Nippon Shinbun Kyokai) or Nippon Press  
Assn., which was dissolved Nov.1943.

1928 Commander of 3rd Infantry Regiment of Imperial  
Guard Division.

Dec.1929 Promoted to Major-General; Staff Officer of  
General Staff Hdqts.

1930 Commander of 5th Infantry Brigade.

Aug.1934 Promoted to Lt.General and Commander of 4th  
Army Division.

Dec.1935 Appointed Supreme War Councillor.

RESTRICTED



Aug. 1937 Appointed Chief of Military Aviation Dept. as it was then known, succeeded by General TOJO Hideki, concurrently with Supreme War Council.

April 1938 Commander of 2nd Army; took part in China mainland fighting.

Jan. 1939 Apptd. Supreme War Councillor.

Aug. 1939 Promoted to General

1940 Again served in China; awarded Order of the Golden Kite, 1st class.

Dec.1941- Apr.1945 Commander-in-Chief of Home Defense Hdqts. and concurrently Supreme War Councillor; succeeded General YAMADA Otozo.

NOTE: In Army re-organization announced 4/7/45, the Home Defense Headquarters was superseded by the Home Ground Defense Commands under Field Marshals HATA Shunroku and SUGIYAMA Gen.

Apr 16,1945 Appointed Supreme War Councillor

Aug 18,1945 "Summoned before the Emperor at 9 AM this morning and was commanded to organize a cabinet. It is the first time in Japan's history that a member of the Imperial family has been commanded to head the Government. In selecting a successor to SUZUKI, His Majesty did not consult a conference of the Senior Statesmen as was customary since the death of Prince SAIONJI, but personally took the decision." (Donei in English to American Zone 8/16/45)

H.I.H. Prince Major HIGASHI-KUNI Morihiko. Born May 6,1916; m. H.I.H.Princess Shigeiko, e.d. of the Imperial Majesties, Oct. 13, 1943, and their first son Nobuhiko was born Mar. 16, 1945.

H.I.H. Prince HIGASHI-KUNI Akitsune. Born May 13, 1920.

H.I.H. Prince HIGASHI-KUNI Toshiko. Born March 24, 1929.

RESTRICTED



Mr. Bisson

- Q. I think Prince Higashi-Kuni understands we are interested primarily in the trend of the war economy; the successive phases of it. The group here is also one that is interested in the broad political setting of the war; developments before the war, during the war, and at the end of the war; in the critical turning-points which had a bearing on the general war development.
- A. I will answer anything I can.
- Q. We understand that the Prince, professionally, is a military man, but since we are interested primarily in economic subjects, we would be interested to know whether the Prince has any comments he would make on the war economy.
- A. The Prince, of course, is not an expert on economics, but this much he can say - that Japan imitated the German war economy during the war and that, he thinks, is the greatest factor which led to Japan's defeat. His Highness says that Japan did not imitate the economics of the present German system under the Nazis, but the economics of World War I. He is not an expert on economic affairs but a layman, and you will have to take that into consideration.
- Q. Is the essence of the point that there was too much control, or that the control should have been more strict?
- A. He thinks it was a control not in keeping with the actual conditions in Japan - not in line with the conditions existing in Japan.
- Q. Which means, the control was too extreme - it would have been better to have left more initiative to the industrialists?
- A. As a layman, he believes that the control was exerted too extremely by the bureaucrats. There may be other ways of looking at the thing, but that is his personal observation.
- Q. Going back just a little earlier, would the Prince think that the strategic-military planning, as Japan entered the war, was adjusted to the economic development and the economic plan? Was there coordination between the economic and the strategic planning?
- A. As his personal observation, he thinks there was no such coordination.
- Q. In carrying out the strategic plan, what was the major or most important economic lack or limiting factor?
- A. That is a very difficult question. He is not an economist or scholar on economics and it is rather difficult for him to answer that. It is a rather technical matter - economics.
- Q. If we take somewhat the same question, but push it a little further on into the war period, would he venture an opinion on what, as the war developed, was the primary economic weakness.
- A. It is rather difficult, the question - since he is not an expert on economics.
- Q. Maybe I can make the point clearer by a specific example. Let us suppose, if you take three factors - the existing economic resources, the administrative organization, and the technics and capital equipment - which of these would he think was the real problem?



- A. In regard to your first point on natural resources. His Highness says it was a mistake for Japan to launch a war with meager resources. The economy was too greatly controlled by the bureaucrats and the control was exercised without taking into consideration the actual existing circumstances in Japan. We understand that America also launched on controlled economics during the war, but her control system was in keeping with conditions in the United States whereas for us in Japan, it was not.
- Q. Would the Prince include interference by the military in the economic administration?
- A. He thinks yes.
- Q. We understand that the Prince was a member of the Supreme War Council throughout the war. What is the role of the Supreme War Council?
- A. In Japan, membership on the Supreme War Council was an honorary position and a position like that was usually filled by retired admirals and generals who had no other place to go. Actually, they had no power - it was just nominal.
- Q. Did this group have meetings in which there were discussions of the problems which Japan faced?
- A. They did have reports, but they did not have meetings like that very often. After something was done, they had reports of the fact that this had been done.
- Q. Was that presented by one of the Supreme War Councilors?
- A. Such a report was presented by the Minister of War and by the Chief of Staff after such and such a step was taken.
- Q. Where can those records be secured?
- A. They ought to be able to tell you in the War Ministry or the Chief of Staff Office.
- Q. Were those reports purely on strategic questions or also on economic questions?
- A. They were mostly on strategic problems. They were not on economic and political matters.

Lt. Cdr. Wilds

- Q. Did the War Council ever act in an advisory capacity to the War Minister or Chief of Staff?
- A. It was merely a matter of the Supreme War Councilors receiving reports and not one of giving advice. Since they received reports after such and such a step was taken, they were not in a position to offer any advice at all. For instance, they received reports of what the army did in regard to conscription (or other matters) after such a step was taken and not in regard to future plans.
- Q. There were no requests for advice from them?
- A. They did not ask for advice because the Army Minister or Chief of Staff did not place much weight on the Supreme War Councilors. From his point of view, he thought it was a body which could be done with or without. They received reports after a step was taken and not before.

RESTRICTED



- Q. In case they received a report after a step was taken and they thought it inadvisable or bad, could the members of the Council attempt to do anything about it?
- A. Even if they did have anything to say, there was nothing they could do after the government had decided upon a certain course. They were not able to change anything that was decided upon by the War Department or Supreme Headquarters.

Mr. Bisson.

- Q. I suppose there were informal contacts between members of the Council and members of the government?
- A. Yes, there were personal contacts.

Lt. Cdr. Wilds

- Q. When the Prince suggested that the present war-time economy was not stepped-up to the best productive capacities of Japan, did he have in mind such things as the intrusion of the military into the productive process, or did he mean that people who knew how to produce were not able to produce effectively, or did he mean something else? I would like the Prince to discuss the implications of that and tell us what kind of control plan he thought Japan should have had.
- A. He thinks it is both the intrusion of the army into the industrial system and the producers not being able to produce to full capacity. For instance, he thinks one of the greatest factors is that the military were not acquainted with the actual conditions existing in the economic world. As laymen, they moved into the economic sphere and tried to do certain things and, as a result, the industrialists were not any too happy to have the military come in.
- Q. Did the militarists intrude into production and industry and the economic life of the country because they had to in order to mobilize the country?
- A. It is a personal observation, but he thinks the army did that in order to make it easy for the army to control the whole country. It made it a lot easier for them to run the war. He thinks the army sent militarists into all phases of Japan's life in order to make it easy for them to run things.
- Q. Was that because they did not have the support and cooperation of the industrialists?
- A. It was not a matter of them having the support and cooperation of the industrialists - they did that because it would make it easier for them to run things. Militarists were sent into all of the governmental departments and the various civilian companies - business firms. Military men, both active and retired, were sent into these fields in order to make it easier for them to run the country. That was also one of the important factors. He thinks the primary reason for the defeat was that the militarists who should have looked after their own business, i.e., strategy - the military side, went into every field of Japanese life. They should have looked after their own business, i.e., fighting the war. It was a mistake for them to have butted into political and economic life.

RESTRICTED



- Q. Had they stayed to their own business of strategy, would they then have had the full cooperation of industrialists?
- A. He says that the militarists should have looked after their own business and the industrialists should have looked after their own also, i.e., their fields were clearly divided. If such was the case, it would have been easier for the industrialists to do their best in their own particular field.

Mr. Bisson

- Q. In the case of the control association, were not the business leaders really in control of such organizations and had they not organized them - thus being their own managers?
- A. He does not know very much about this, being a layman, but he can say this much - the control associations were run mostly by old retired bureaucrats and the people did not have much regard for these old bureaucrats. They had the power to run the control associations. For instance, the bureaucrats, after they came to the top of the bureaucracy, would leave the government service and assume a position in one of the control associations. The people did not have much regard for such men.
- Q. My understanding does not agree with this. If you take some of the old leaders like SUZUKI, Chuji; MATSUMOTO, Kenjiro; and YAMASHITA, Kamesaburo, they were all both business leaders in their fields and they were the ones who became heads of the control associations. Most of them were business leaders who had risen to the top of their profession.
- A. There were, of course, control associations controlled by such men as you mentioned, but there were also associations controlled by old bureaucrats.
- Q. A broader question lies back of this - if you have control associations as important as that with business leaders at the head, is it really true to say the army completely dominated and completely ran the business life of Japan? I am just questioning whether the emphasis is too strong and whether or not it should be modified.
- A. Of course, as a layman, I can see your point, but the cases that you mentioned are just a few and there were other matters being run by bureaucrats. Among the people - the civilians - many were opposed to the control associations, and they used to express the same opinion as stated now (by me).

Captain Hedding

- Q. I would like the Prince to comment and give his opinion on the further implications of army control over industry, which industry was essentially producing for a naval war.
- A. He thinks, as a layman again, that the reason was that the army was more powerful than the navy internally. That is why he thinks the army had more power.
- Q. But the question was did not the Navy suffer by the fact that the army exerted most of this control over industry?
- A. That is the reason why the navy could not fight as it should have.

RESTRICTED



Colonel Potts

- Q. What does the Prince think of the implications of having a predominant army and navy control over production for a war which was largely fought in the air?
- A. That is certainly true, but at first Japan did not see the point and did not stress aerial warfare. Toward the end she did see the point, but then it was too late. They did create a Ministry of Munitions but it was too late. At first, they were to have both the shipping and the aerial side in the Ministry of Munitions. Toward the end they laid stress on the aerial side, but it was too late.
- Q. Does he think they built too few carriers?
- A. We were not allowed to know how many carriers we had during the war; it was only after the war that we found out how many there were.
- Q. Do you mean he did not know, as a General, how many carriers Japan had?
- A. He did not know because the navy gave no information to the army. For instance, the defeat at Midway was not made known to us at all by the navy. Those of us in the army knew nothing at all about the navy. The fact that the army and navy were always on a competitive basis and they were always fighting against each other and keeping secrets from each other, was one of the primary factors (in our problem). During the war the Prince was head of the Home Defense Command of the army and had nothing to do with the navy at all.

Mr. Bisson

- Q. Would the Prince express his opinion as to the period when he thought the war already was getting so critical that it might be lost?
- A. He was Defense Commander during the war and he thought this period came when the Marianas were taken away from Japan and when he heard the B-29's were coming out. We were informed by foreign cable that the B-29's were in production in the United States. We were told that they flew at the rate of 600 Kilometres an hour at 13,000 metres high. We had nothing in Japan that we could use against such a weapon. From the point of view of the Home Defense Commander, he felt that the war was lost and he said so at that time. At the time he asked the experts whether a plane could be built to fly 13,000 metres high and he was told no, and then he decided the war was lost to Japan. He felt if the B-29's could come over Japan, there was nothing that could be done.
- Q. What steps could he take to make that fact known?
- A. He could not make his views public.
- Q. Later on in 1944, after the Koiso Cabinet had been formed, we understand that political conversations were begun informally, privately, among high members of the government, to the end that something should be done to take Japan out of the war.

RESTRICTED



- A. Being a member of the Royal Family, he could not express his opinion publicly at that time, but among his close friends, he did express an opinion over a cup of tea that all was lost. Privately he did tell his close friends that after Saipan was taken, and that after the B-29's should come over, everything would be lost.
- Q. When did this develop into what might be called serious political conversations among people who would have some political power and who would then be seeking measures to get out of the war?
- A. It is very difficult for him to answer the question - he does not know. It would be better if you asked Konoye or Kido or men like that.
- Q. His personal contacts did not take him into such consideration?
- A. His personal discussions were apart from such a movement, but he did tell Prince Konoye the fact that the war was lost. Prince Konoye was a very close friend and Konoye was of the same opinion - they had been at school together and fellow member of the House of Peers, and were not afraid of it leaking out.
- Q. Did these sort of conversations take place before the end of 1944?
- A. The Military Police were very rigid at that time; even the Prince could not discuss it openly.

Lt. Cdr. Wilds

- Q. We are concerned now with private conversations and off-the-record talks. What time did private conversations begin of the kind he has just described?
- A. He would say such talks were begun about the summer of 1944, because it was after Saipan was taken. His personal view was that when Saipan was taken, everything was lost to Japan.
- Q. In these conversations with Prince Konoye and others, what were the required steps considered to be to bring peace?
- A. He knew that even if we did ask America directly for peace, that they would not accept it, so his position was to effect peace with Chungking first and through them, to obtain peace with the United States.
- Q. Now, why did the Prince consider that the United States would not make peace, if approached directly?
- A. He heard that you were "sore" at us because of Pearl Harbor!
- Q. What kind of a peace did the Prince envisage at that time?
- A. Since Japan had lost, it would be a return to the conditions prior to the War.
- Q. Then why did the Prince believe that China would be less mad than the United States?
- A. No, it was not a matter of China being less mad than the United States, but that since we were neighbors, he thought it would be better to negotiate with China first.
- Q. Even on the basis that the peace would be the status of the fall of 1941, when Japan was occupying part of China?
- A. Not before the American-Japanese War, but before the Sino-Japanese War.

RESTRICTED



- Q. Now, just to summarize: In the summer of 1944, after Saipan, in private conversations with Prince Konoye and other people of that sort, the Prince's view was that an offer of peace to the United States should be made by way of China, which would be based on Japan's situation prior to 1937?
- A. That is true, and he thought so. And, at that time, he even thought to himself - he did not reveal this to anyone - but he thought since Japan had lost the war, she should return Manchuria.

Mr. Bisson

- Q. Were there contacts with the Chinese government?
- A. Not at that time.
- Q. But in 1945?
- A. They almost did it in 1945, but when the Koiso Cabinet quit, it all fell through. Another observation he had at that time was - what if Japan tried to obtain peace with America through Russia? It was his own personal view and was not accepted. It was last spring that he considered making peace with the United States through Russia.

Lt. Cdr. Wilds

- Q. At what time did you yourself take an active part in steps toward terminating the war?
- A. He was Commander of the Army which attacked Hankow in the Sino-Japanese War. At that time, he had the idea that Japan should make peace with China before the army attacked Hankow. He made his views known, but they were not taken up.
- Q. At what time thereafter did Prince Higashi-Kuni participate in the steps that ended the war?
- A. He is going back again to the early days of the Japanese-American War in December 1941. Just after the hostilities started between America and Japan, he made his opinion known that Japan should terminate the war immediately with the United States. He made his opinion known to Tojo at that time. At that time, Tojo was Premier and Prince Higashi-Kuni was head of the Home Defense Command.
- Q. What did Tojo say?
- A. He refused, saying that this was not the time. It was when Japan conquered the Malay Peninsula and areas down south, and then militarists were in high mood at that time, and his opinion was disregarded.

Lt. Cdr. Spinks

- Q. Right after the outbreak of the war, when the Prince discussed this with Tojo, did he express it to others like Konoye?
- A. No, he did not tell anyone else but Tojo and it was through him that he gave his opinion. It was Tojo, at that time, who was all-powerful in Japan.

Lt. Cdr. Wilds

- Q. When the steps were being taken to end the war, at what time did you participate?

RESTRICTED



A. He told Koiso his opinion this spring, but he was not in a position to take an active part in politics and the only thing he could do was to express his opinion to the one responsible. In Japan, a member of the Royalty is forbidden to take an active part in politics. Therefore, he could only express his personal opinion and not engage in active political discussions.

Mr. Bisson

Q. In that period, what were the main obstacles to bringing the war to a conclusion?

A. He cannot be absolutely sure of his statement, but he thinks it was the Army and the Foreign Ministry.

Q. As he sees the political situation, what seems to be the steps which overcame the opposition to ending the war?

A. He says that if a man powerful enough to control the Foreign Ministry and Army had engaged, he believed it would have been concluded much earlier.

Q. But in the actual course of developments, does he see any outstanding turning points which marked the gradual overcoming of the opposition?

A. Could you state the question more specifically?

Q. One of the things I would think of as a turning point was when leading political figures became confident enough of their position to decide to try to send a message to Russia. That was one of the things that marks a period when the strength of the opinion for ending the war had become so strong that, in spite of the army, steps were taken.

A. He says that what happened within the sphere of elder statesmen and the higher-ups was not made known to him and he is not in a position to answer the question. It would be different in your country. Repression existed in this country until the end of the war. Everything was kept under cover in fear of reprisals by the authorities. It was something unimaginable to you - even if he did try to explain it, you would not believe it.

Q. What time would he set when virtually everyone except the army and perhaps one or two navy men were already united in seeking peace, and it was only the army that was in opposition - how early did the unification of all other occur?

A. During the spring when your air raids became very frequent and very destructive, the people in general came to feel that the war should be ended in order to bring peace, but of course, they did not make any public utterances to that effect. Aside from the destructive nature of the air raids, another thing to consider was the effect of misleading propaganda. The people were told that Leyte was a decisive turning point of the war, and then they were told the whole Philippines, and they then were told Okinawa was a decisive turning point, and in each case, Japan lost. He thinks the Japanese people in general came to feel that the war was lost for them about this spring, but could not make their feeling public.

Q. That included virtually all in the government and among the elder statesmen, except the army?

RESTRICTED



- A. He thinks so. He thinks within the army, itself, there was such a feeling. For instance, some members of the Imperial Headquarters even felt that war was lost. At the time the members at Headquarters said openly that they were going to carry the war to the end, but he felt that was impossible.
- Q. Could you express an opinion as to the extent European developments affected sentiment in Japan? In June 1944, about the time Saipan was taken, the landings occurred on the European coast; later on, Germany began to collapse. Was the course of events in Europe an important factor?
- A. There were lots of people in Japan who felt that Japan was going to tread the same path.
- Q. Yes, but did the decline of Germany increase the feeling here that it was necessary to conclude peace?
- A. Yes, he thinks so, it did spur Japan on to an early peace.

Captain Hedding

- Q. You stated that with the fall of Saipan, you thought the war was lost for Japan. Was that perhaps due to the threat of the B-29 raids, or was it due to the condition in Japan itself - your material and your fleet?
- A. He says it was both. If Saipan was taken, the B-29's would build a base there and that would make conditions in Japan, which already were bad, even worse.
- Q. In the spring of 1945, when the effects of B-29 raids first became strong, how were conditions then?
- A. About what month?
- Q. In March?
- A. In March he had his palace burned down and he felt he could not continue at his post as Home Defense Commander, so he asked to be relieved. He was relieved at that time. He would say the war potential at that time was very, very low. After that point - March - he is not in a very good position to answer. He resigned the latter part of March. At that time, the war potential of Japan declined precipitately.

Mr. Bisson

- Q. We have been pursuing one question on China to which we find it difficult to get a complete answer. Prince Higashi-Kuni had some experience during the China War and we should like him to tell us how much Japan was trying to win a complete victory in China - whether she was putting in her all?
- A. About all we had. You should know better about this. He did not make a study of economic potentials, but he thinks Japan was exerting just about all she had to win that war. His understanding is that your people know more about this than ourselves. As a military man and being a member of Royalty, his view was very limited. He did not have much contact with the men in political life.
- Q. Many people in the United States, after the Pacific War began, suddenly began to think that Japan was very powerful, so it seemed strange that the war in China had lasted so long. After Japan took Hankow, in October 1938, would it have been possible to follow the Chinese Government to Chungking and occupy Chungking?

RESTRICTED



A. He does not think so with Japan's war potential at that time. Of course, he was in China at that time and was not following economic trends. Before he went to China, he was Chief of the Army Air Headquarters. At that time, as far as the air side of it was concerned, it was impossible.

Q. We have very interesting and very conflicting data on this problem. I find Japanese in important positions making conflicting statements about it. For instance, I will mention two just before and after the war with the United States. Kishi Shinsuke made a statement that was printed in one of the English language papers, stating that Japan was using only about 20% of its war potential against China. Similar statements were made by Colonel SATO Kenryo after the war had begun. Other persons, like yourself, claim that Japan was exerting her full strength to win the war in China. How would you explain this difference of opinion?

A. He thinks such a confliction statements might be due to the fact that these different people whom you mention were occupying different places. People in one position - one part of the country - might be exerting their all, and others, not so much. One might be able to see one factor and one another factor, but all in all, he thinks Japan exerted full strength in the China war. Now, for instance, after the end of the present war, there are some people who say that Japan did not exert her all in fighting the war against the United States. There was much waste. It is a matter of holding different vantage points in Japanese life. Even in the present war, there were certain industries and certain parts of the country which only exerted about 20% of their power, while others exerted all they had, so it is a matter of point of view.

Q. What did he think were the major economic contributions to Japan's war potential that were derived from China. I am speaking not of Manchuria but of China proper. What would he think were the most significant contribution from China?

A. He does not know exactly which are the most important ones. They could not have brought in much iron, because they did not have enough ships. A little cotton and wool, he would suppose, but he is not sure.

Lt. Cdr. Spinks

Q. The Prince mentioned that shortly after the outbreak of the war in December, 1941, he expressed the opinion that this war should be ended as soon as possible. Did any other people hold the same opinion that early, that the Prince may know of?

A. He does not know whether there were such persons or not, but it is his opinion that even before the war, there were such opinions. After Japan went to war, Japan should conclude a peace as soon as possible - this was his own idea.

Q. In the period just before December, 1941, was the organization of Konoye's known as the Golden Pheasant interested in promoting war, or what was its exact purpose?



- A. In his personal conversations with Konoye, Konoye expressed his personal opinion that they should not go to war with the United States. Konoye was of the opinion that Japan should not go to war and he was also of the same opinion. But, he was not in a position to make his opinion public, politically.
- Q. What was the purpose of Prince Konoye's organization, the Golden Pheasant?
- A. He does not know about it.
- Q. Does the Prince know about an organization formed some years ago, known as the Kinkei Gakuin?
- A. He has heard of its existence, but does not know any members.

- E N D -

RESTRICTED