



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20321231

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

31 December 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee,
ISN US9SU-000081DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Walid Haj
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Walid Muhammad Hajj Muhammad Ali, Walid al-Sudani, Abu Dajjanah al-Neeli
- Place of Birth: Donkallah, Sudan (SU)
- Date of Birth: 6 June 1974
- Citizenship: Sudan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SU-000081DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall fair health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer out of DOD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Transfer out of DOD Control (TRO) on 1 January 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and a fighter in Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) 55th Arab Brigade. Detainee admitted participating and being wounded in hostilities during US and Coalition action against al-Qaida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan (AF). Al-Qaida operative, Anjasha, recruited detainee for jihad, and detainee's name was recovered on an al-Qaida affiliated document. Detainee acknowledged receiving militant training from an al-Qaida commander, and is assessed to have received

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DECLASSIFY ON: 20321231

S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20321231

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SU-000081DP (S)

more extensive training. Detainee is also assessed to be affiliated with the Jama'at Tablighi (JT).¹ JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **LOW** intelligence value

- **(S//NF) Summary of Changes:** The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Provided corrections to Detainee's Account of Events
- Included detainee's acknowledgment of being wounded during hostilities
- Added background information on detainees recruiter
- Added detainee's affiliation with the JT
- Added assessment of detainee's training

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee noted he was born in Sudan and provided the next event in his life as 1990 when his father, Bilal Muhammad Haj Muhammad Ali, left Kuwait to settle in Sudan. Detainee claimed he moved from Sudan to Saudi Arabia (SA) in 1997, where he stayed for approximately three to four years working odd jobs.²

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee responded to a call for *dawa* (missionary work) and discussed conducting *dawa* to "convey the message of Islam" with his cousin who was a member of the *dawa* group. Detainee traveled to Lahore in February or March 2001 where he met a Saudi or Yemeni national named Anjasha at the Raiwind Mosque.³ Anjasha convinced detainee to travel to Afghanistan to teach "the correct" Islam.⁴ Detainee, Anjasha and two Pakistanis traveled to Quetta, PK, where they stayed in a Taliban house for

¹ Analyst Note: The JT is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Counterterrorism Priority 2A Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2A TSEs are defined as those having demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack U.S. persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2A terrorist groups.

² ➤ IIR 6 034 0734 02, Analyst Note: Detainee has not stated whether or not he was in Kuwait with his father.

³ ➤ IIR 6 034 1227 04

⁴ ➤ IIR 6 034 0734 02, Analyst Note: See Reasons for Continued Detention for additional information on Anjasha.

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SU-000081DP (S)

approximately one month. Detainee, Anjasha, and fifteen other men then boarded a truck and traveled to Kunduz. Anjasha gave detainee the option to stay in Kunduz for *dawa* or join Anjasha and the other men on the front lines to fight the Northern Alliance. Detainee chose to fight the Northern Alliance.⁵

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Subsequently, detainee as well as some Pakistanis, Arabs, and Uzbeks boarded a truck and traveled north of Kunduz to Khwajah Ghar, AF where they split into different groups. Detainee was assigned to an Arab group occupying a bunker area on the “second line,” while the Taliban forces went to the front line approximately two to three kilometers away. A Yemeni named Gharib gave detainee one day of training on the use of the AK-47 assault rifle and detainee was then assigned as a guard at a camp in Khwajah Ghar. The leader in the area was a Yemeni named Abu al-Hassan, who was killed and replaced by Gharib approximately five to six weeks before detainee and the other fighters retreated from the area. During the retreat, detainee was ordered to leave his possessions but take his weapon.⁶ Detainee claimed the Taliban informed him and others that the Taliban had reached an agreement with the Northern Alliance which would allow the Taliban and foreign fighters to withdraw through Mazar-e-Sharif, AF.⁷

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Northern Alliance forces captured detainee along with other Taliban and al-Qaida fighters approximately 24 November 2001. Dostum’s forces took the prisoners to the Qala-i-Jangi prison located outside Mazar-e-Sharif. After one night in captivity, the prisoners revolted leading to the deaths of members of the Northern Alliance forces and CIA officer Johnny “Mike” Spann. US air strikes were called in to assist in quelling the uprising and prevented the prisoners from escaping.⁸ Detainee stated he was shot in the arm during the uprising and he and several other JTF-GTMO detainees survived by hiding in the basement until they were re-captured about a week later.⁹ Detainee was transferred to US custody on no later than 19 January 2002.¹⁰

b. (S) Property Held:

⁵ IIR 6 034 0266 02

⁶ IIR 6 034 0027 03, Analyst Note: Gharib is assessed to be 55th Arab Brigade sub-commander Gharib al-Sanaani who assumed command from Salam al-Hadrami on the front lines when Salam was killed.

⁷ IIR 6 034 0266 02, Analyst Note: The al-Janki Prison, as identified by detainee in reporting, is the Qala-i-Jangi located in Mazar-e-Sharif.

⁸ Operation Enduring Freedom – Part 3 – November 2001

⁹ Deception at QALA-i-Jangi Prison – USSOC – May 2005, 000079 302 17-APR-2002 6

¹⁰ IIR 6 034 0297 02, 0000081 DA 4137 20-Jan-2002

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SU-000081DP (S)

- Miscellaneous personal items including pills and a clothes tag with Arabic writing on the back¹¹

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 20 January 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: Detainee's file does not indicate why he was transferred to JTF-GTMO; however, based on his capture events and acknowledged association with the Taliban, he was probably transferred to provide information on the following:

- Taliban leadership
- Front line hostilities and fighters
- The Qala-i-Jangi uprising
- 55th Arab Brigade commanders (i.e., Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), Abd al-Salam al-Hadrami, and Gharib al-Sanaani

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee is assessed to be withholding information. Detainee's timeline appears fairly consistent, but lacks detail on detainee's activities and associates. There has been limited information from other sources to corroborate or discredit detainee's statements other than his capture and general activities on the front lines.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and a fighter in UBL's 55th Arab Brigade. Detainee admitted participating in hostilities during US and Coalition action against al-Qaida and Taliban forces. Al-Qaida operative Anjasha recruited detainee and detainee's name was recovered on an al-Qaida affiliated document. Detainee acknowledged receiving militant training from an al-Qaida commander, and is assessed to have received more extensive training.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and UBL's 55th Arab Brigade. Detainee participated in armed hostilities against US and Coalition forces.¹²
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated he was shot during hostilities in November 2001.¹³

¹¹ Analyst Note: The Arabic appears to be a list of names and phone numbers.

¹² See 55th Arab Brigade 01-FEB-1998 for details on the Brigade.

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SU-000081DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee admitted he served on the front lines under Abd al-Salam, and then Gharib following Abd al-Salam's death. Detainee described Abd al-Salam as the "leader of all the Arabs on the front lines in the northern area of Afghanistan."¹⁴ Detainee described Gharib as a Yemeni leader in charge of an Arab fighting force consisting of 100 to 120 fighters, which augmented the Taliban on the front lines in northern Afghanistan between Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sharif.¹⁵
- (S//NF) Detainee remarked that he performed guard duties on the front lines for several months until the US bombing started, and then moved to the hills on the front line. Detainee claimed he was told to take his weapon during their retreat.¹⁶
- (S//NF) Sad Ibrahim Ramzi al-Jandubi al-Zahrani, US9SA-000204DP (SA-204, transferred) identified detainee as fighting on the front line and carrying an AK-47. SA-204 stated Yasir Talal Abdallah al-Zahrani, ISN US9SA-000093DP (SA-093, deceased) was also in detainee's front line group.¹⁷
- (S//NF) Ali Abdul Motalib Awayd Hassan al-Tayeea, ISN US9IZ-000111DP (IZ-111), identified detainee as a friend of Abd al-Salam, aka (Muammar Said Abbud Dayan).¹⁸ Dayan reported directly to senior al-Qaida commander IZ-10026.¹⁹
 - (S//NF) Sulayman Saad Muhammad Awshan al-Khalidi, ISN US9SA-000121DP (SA-121, transferred), reported Abd al-Salam, aka (Abd al-Salam al-Hadrami), and Gharib al-Sanani were subordinate commanders in charge of Arab forces at Kunduz.²⁰
 - (S//NF) SA-204 identified Abd al-Salam al-Hadrami as the commander of all the Arabs in the Kunduz area, who was killed during a US bombing raid. Gharib al-Sanani (later killed at Mazar-e-Sharif) replaced Hadrami.²¹
- (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged receiving one day of training on the AK-47 with a known al-Qaida commander, but is assessed to have received more extensive training.
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated Gharib gave detainee one day of training on the use of the AK-47 assault rifle.²²
 - (S//NF) Analyst Note: Detainee probably received the complete basic militant training course at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp. It is unlikely that detainee

¹³ >000081 SIR 21-NOV-2005, IIR 4 201 0377, Analyst Note: In 2002 detainee stated he was shot on the front lines during hostilities with the US and Coalition. Prior to that, he stated that he was shot during the uprising at Qala-i-Jangi. Detainee may have been deceptive about being wounded on the front lines to avoid appearing to have been in direct conflict with US and Coalition troops.

¹⁴ IIR 6 034 0673 02

¹⁵ IIR 7 739 3014 02

¹⁶ IIR 6 034 0734 02

¹⁷ IIR 6 034 0386 02

¹⁸ IIR 6 034 0015 04, IIR 6 034 1474 03

¹⁹ IIR 2 340 6093 02

²⁰ IIR 6 034 0265 02

²¹ IIR 6 034 0385 02

²² >IIR 6 034 0027 03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SU-000081DP (S)

was sent to the front lines without training and that he only received one day of training while on the front lines. The al-Faruq basic training lasted approximately eight weeks. Numerous al-Qaida members and detainees have reported fighters were not sent to the front lines untrained:

- (S//NF) John Walker Lindh reported he was informed the Arab Group was UBL's group, the al-Qaida group, and that he would have to undergo their basic militant training before going to the front line. IZ-10026 informed Lindh the training Lindh received prior to arriving in Afghanistan was insufficient and he needed more training before going to the front lines.²³ (Analyst Note: The Arab Group is a reference to the 55th Arab Brigade.)
- (S//NF) Jumah Bin Muhammad Bin Abdul Latif al-Wadaani al-Dawsari, ISN US9BA-000261DP (BA-261, transferred), reported he chose to attend a training camp in Afghanistan as he had had no prior training and he could not go to the front lines [until completing the training].²⁴
- (S//NF) Senior al-Qaida member Mustafa Faraj Muhammad Muhammad Masud al-Jadid al-Uzaybi, aka (Abu Faraj Al-Libi), ISN US9LY-010017DP (LY-10017), stated a person had to complete basic training before becoming an al-Qaida member and added, whoever joined al-Qaida would be sent to fight on the front lines in Kabul.²⁵
- (S//NF) Detained al-Qaida facilitator Hassan Ghul reported, in training and before going to the front lines, the mujahideen mentioned jihad and martyrdom all the time.²⁶
- (S//NF) Asif Iqbal, ISN US9UK-000087DP (UK-087, transferred), reported in late September 2001, he and a group traveled to a camp in Kabul for training before going to Konduz [front lines], where they were captured by general Dostum's forces.²⁷
- (S//NF) Mr-760 reported he thought he was informed it was a necessity to be trained prior to going to the front lines.²⁸
- (S//NF) Saudi-based al-Qaida operative Ibrahim Husayn Ali al-Harithi, aka (Anjasha), recruited detainee to participate in jihadist combat.²⁹
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted Anjasha convinced him to travel to Afghanistan and to join Anjasha on the front lines to fight the Northern Alliance.³⁰ (Analyst Note:

²³ >TRRS-03-FO-0017, IIR 4 201 3088 05

²⁴ >TRRS-03-02-0440, IIR 4 201 2475 05

²⁵ >TD-314/75454-05

²⁶ >TD-314/70467-06

²⁷ >TD-314/26071-02

²⁸ IIR 6 034 0627 04

²⁹ IIR 6 034 0266 02, Analyst Note: In TD 314/43756-02, GZ-10016 comments about Anjasha.

³⁰ IIR 6 034 0734 02, IIR 6 034 0266 02

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SU-000081DP (S)

Recruitment by al-Qaida operative Anjasha supports the assessment that detainee was a member of al-Qaida.)

- (S//NF) Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), stated Anjasha came to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia in 2000. While in Saudi Arabia, Anjasha facilitated funds and mujahideen for Khaldan Camp. GZ-10016 was aware that Anjashah fought on the front lines in Afghanistan in July and August 2001.³¹ (Analyst Note: At the time of detainee's recruitment, the Khaldan Camp was reported to be closed. Detainee, therefore, would have received training at the al-Faruq Training Camp.)
- (S//NF) A Saudi Security Service reported Anjasha recruited Saudi youth to attend training at the al-Faruq Training Camp in Afghanistan.³²
- (S//NF) Other detainees have corroborated Anjasha's recruiting activities in Saudi Arabia. Anjasha, visited the home of Abdul al-Hadi Abdallah Ibrahim al-Sharikh, ISN US9SA-000231DP (SA-231, transferred), approximately ten times. Anjasha was a friend of Abd al-Latif, aka (Abbad), SA-231's deceased elder brother. During these visits, Anjasha spoke to SA-231 and his other brothers, Abd al-Rahman and Abd al-Razzaq Abdallah Ibrahim al-Sharikh, ISN US9SA-000067DP (SA-067, transferred), about jihad and the duty of Muslims to join jihad.³³
- (S//NF) Detainee's name and alias were found on an al-Qaida affiliated document.
 - (S//NF) A variant of detainee's name and alias, Waleed Muhammad Ali aka (Abu Dajjanah al-Neeli), was found on a document recovered during a Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISID) raid on a suspected al-Qaida safe house in Karachi. The list identified the contents of detainee's trust account as his Sudanese passport and a wallet.³⁴
 - (S//NF) Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were simply storage compartments, such as envelopes or folders, which guesthouse administrators used to secure the individual's personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity.
- (S//NF) Detainee has admitted affiliations with a missionary group assessed to be the JT.
 - (S//NF) Detainee responded to a call for *dawa* and discussed conducting *dawa* to "convey the message of Islam" with his cousin who was a member of the *dawa* group. In early 2001, Detainee traveled to Lahore where he met Anjasha at the Raiwind

³¹ TD-314-43756-02

³² TD 314/47512-02

³³ IIR 6 034 1258 03, Analyst Note: Numerous other detainees have reported affiliations with Anjasha.

³⁴ >TD-314/40693-02, paragraph number 300

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SU-000081DP (S)

- Mosque.³⁵ Anjasha convinced detainee to travel to Afghanistan to teach “the correct” Islam.³⁶ (Analyst Note: The term “teach” is synonymous with “preach” when discussing traveling for Islam in response to the call for dawa. The JT performs dawa throughout the world and is headquartered in Raiwind, where detainee met Anjasha. Affiliation with the JT has been identified as an al-Qaida cover story. Al-Qaida used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels of its members.³⁷)
- (S//NF) Detainee stated if he were in a combat situation he would attack Americans to defend his country and his family, and he would “fight again for the sake of his religion or his family.”³⁸

c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective. Detainee’s overall behavior has been semi-compliant and rarely-hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 37 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 17 November 2007, when he was reported wearing a towel on his head. Detainee has one Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault occurring on 04 February 2006, when he threw water and feces. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow instructions and camp rules, threatening guard force, damage to government property, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2006, detainee had a total of ten Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and ten so far in 2007.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed as being of **LOW** intelligence value. Detainee’s most recent interrogation session occurred on 15 January 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was a member of UBL’s 55th Arab Brigade active on the Kunduz front lines. Detainee probably had direct access to notable al-Qaida personnel such as IZ-10026 and Abd al-Salam al-Hadrami. Both individuals were known to have commanded the 55th Arab Brigade in mid-to-late 2001. Detainee also has information on recruitment tactics from his contact with assessed al-Qaida recruiter Ibrahim Husayn Ali al-Harithi, aka (Anjasha).

³⁵ > IIR 6 034 1227 04

³⁶ > IIR 6 034 0734 02

³⁷ > For additional information see: IIR 2 227 0131 03, Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover as of 20051228, JTFCT Special Analysis US Jamaat Tabligh, AFOSI Report on Jamaat Tabligh 27-OCT-2004, Jamaat Al Tabligh (JT) Members - TRRS-04-03-1083 10-MAR-2004

³⁸ IIR 6 034 0790 03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SU-000081DP (S)

c. **(S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** Detainee's account and other reporting indicate detainee is a fighter who held no leadership or operational position. Detainee has been described as a "good friend" of one of the 55th Arab Brigade commanders and may have knowledge of other leaders. However, reporting on detainee's activities and actions is not extensive. Given the commonality of detainee's placement and access, it is assessed that his ability to provide unique, exploitable information is limited.

d. **(S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**

- UBL's 55th Arab Brigade including leadership
- Islamic extremist recruitment in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
- Al-Qaida associations to the JT
- Support to Terrorists through Mosques
- Terrorism Radicalization Factors
- Terrorist Recruitment of Juveniles
- Communications

9. **(S) EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 23 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

V/K.



MARK H. BUZBY
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.