

VMF 155

93  
21

Report # 124

IC(21)

6



# AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED  
(Reclassify when  
filled out)

5553  
9117

**SECRET**

## I. GENERAL

(a) Unit Reporting VMP-155 (b) Based on or at Majuro Atoll (c) Report No. 124  
 (d) Take off: Date 30 March, 1945 Time (LZT) 1350 M (Zone); Lat 07-05-35N Long 171-22-40E  
 (e) Mission Bomb Gasoline Storage Area, Parao I., Wotje Atoll (f) Time of Return 1605 M (Zone)

## II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	NUMBER			BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE) (f)	FUZE, SETTING (g)
		TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		
F4U-1D	VMP-155	5	0	5	Five Planes: 2 - 500# SAP	.1 Sec. Tail only

## III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE
SB2C-4	VMSB-231	1	Majuro Atoll (Observer)				
F4U-1D	NO-13	1	Majuro Atoll (Photo)				
PBY-5A	VPB-24	1	Majuro Atoll (Dumbo)				

## IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE	(b) NO. OBSERVED	(c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d) TIME ENCOUNTERED	(e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER	(f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED	(g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING
	None		(ZONE)			
			(ZONE)			
			(ZONE)			

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Did Any Part of \_\_\_\_\_  
 (i) Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? \_\_\_\_\_ If so, Describe Clouds \_\_\_\_\_ (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)  
 (YES OR NO)  
 Time of Day and Brilliance \_\_\_\_\_  
 (j) of Sun or Moon \_\_\_\_\_ (NIGHT, BRIGHT MOON; DAY, OVERCAST; ETC.) (k) Visibility \_\_\_\_\_ (MILES)

## V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE ENEMY A/C	(b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY:				(c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
	TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	PILOT OR GUNNER	GUNS USED		
None						







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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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## XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

- (a) Target(s) and Location(s) Gasoline Storage Area, Center (b) Time Over Target(s) 1445 M (Zone)  
(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)  
Parao Is., Wotje Atoll
- (c) Clouds Over Target 1000, Cumulus .8  
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
- (d) Visibility of Target Partially obscured by clouds. (e) Visibility Under 10 miles  
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)
- (f) Bombing Tactics: Type Dive Bomb Sight Used AN-MK-8  
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)
- Bombs Dropped per Run 5 Planes/2 bombs spacing ----- Altitude of Bomb Release -----  
(NUMBER) (FEET)
- (g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed ----- Probably Destroyed ----- Damaged -----

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO. HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1 Gasoline storage Area, center, Parao I., Wotje Atoll	20'x60'(est.)	5-F4U-1D VMF-155	Five Planes: 10 - 500# SAP	None	None
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

1. Gasoline storage Area, Parao Island, Wotje Atoll: Three of the ten bombs hit in the target area. Only one other burst was observed; that was in the ocean several miles from the aiming point. Since the planes were recovering in this direction, this burst must have been caused by a hung bomb. It is believed that the remaining 6 bombs were duds.

See diagrams attached

(p) Were Photographs Taken? No Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.



Gasoline Storage Area


Parao Island  
Wotje Atoll

Lagoon

X Indicates where bombs hit.

Arrows indicate direction of  
bombing run.

Ocean





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**XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA.** (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

**ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY**

**OWN AIRCRAFT**

- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

**ENEMY AIRCRAFT**

- Method of Locating, Distance
- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defensive Tactics

**COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Own Weaknesses
- Enemy Weaknesses
- Offensive Tactics, Own
- " " , Enemy
- Defensive Tactics, Own
- " " , Enemy
- Flexible Gunnery, Own
- Escort Tactics
- Fighter Direction
- Use of Radar
- Night Fighting
- Recognition, Aircraft

**ATTACK**

**OWN TACTICS**

- Method of Locating Target
- Approach to Target
- Altitudes, Speeds
- Approach
- Dive
- Pull-Out
- Dive Angle
- Strafing
- Retirement
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Jamming

**DEFENSE, ENEMY**

- Evasive Tactics, Ships
- Concealment
- Searchlights
- Night Fighter Tactics
- Use of Jamming

**COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Bombing Tactics
- Torpedo Tactics
- Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes
- Selection of Targets
- Fuzing
- Strafing Tactics
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Radar
- Reconnaissance
- Photography
- Briefing

**OPERATIONAL**

- Navigation
- Homing
- Rendezvous
- Recognition, Ships
- Communications
- Flight Operations
- Search and Tracking
- Base Operations
- Maintenance

Five fighters of this command took off at 1350 M for a strike at a gasoline storage area, reported by prisoners of war to be located near the geographical center of Parao Island, Motje Atoll. The planes joined up quickly and immediately set course for the target island using average power settings of 2100 RPM's and 32 inches.

The weather was average enroute to the target, but the target island itself was about 8/10's covered. The flight leader considered delaying his attack but there was a front east of the target which appeared to be moving in which would have made conditions worse instead of better. It so happened that the front did not move in and a 20 minutes delay would have given us a clear target.

Due to the indefinite location of the target, a dispersal of bombs was desired with the center of the island as a hub. The approach was made from the north on the lagoon side with all planes in column formation. They dove from a left hand turn at 10000 feet with wheels down, releasing at 2500 feet, and recovering in a left turn over the ocean at above 1500 feet.

Rendezvous was over the southern part of the lagoon at 5000 feet, which was above the clouds. Return to the base was without incident.

Pilots participating in the strike were:

TODD, T. A.,	Major, USMCR
MATAS, T. F.,	2dLt., USMCR
CHAMBERLAIN, J. F.,	2dLt., USMCR
WHITMORE, W. S.,	2dLt., USMCR
DUPKIN, A.,	1stLt., USMCR



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**XIII. MATERIAL DATA.** (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.  
Use additional sheets if necessary).

## ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights  
Turrets  
Ammunition  
Bombs, Torpedoes  
Bomb Sights  
Bomb Releases

## COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar  
Homing Devices  
Visual Signals  
Codes, Ciphers

## RECOGNITION

IFF  
Signals  
Battle Lights  
Procedures

## PROTECTION

Armor, Points and Angles  
of Fire Needing Further  
Protection  
Leak Proofing

## EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes  
Life Belts, Life Rafts  
Safety Belts  
Emergency Kits  
Rations, First Aid

## NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses  
Driftsights  
Octants  
Automatic Pilots  
Charts  
Field Lighting

## INSTRUMENTS

Flight  
Power Plant

## OXYGEN SYSTEM

## CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

## STRUCTURE

Airframe  
Control Surfaces  
Control System  
Dive Flaps  
Landing Gear  
Heating System  
Flight Characteristics  
At Various Loadings

## POWER PLANT

Engines  
Engine Accessories  
Propellers  
Lubricating System  
Starters  
Exhaust Dampers

## HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

## ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant  
Lights

## FUEL SYSTEM

## FLIGHT CLOTHING

## MAINTENANCE

## BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment  
Personnel Facilities

The planes were checked as soon as they returned to the field, and it was found that three planes had retained both arming wires, one plane had only one, and one plane had none. Pilots were questioned and all are equally positive that all switches were in the "up" or "on" position. That is the master arming switch, the bomb arming switch, and all selector switches. In addition the pilots are briefed to check the re-set buttons or circuit breakers just before entering their dives. All pilots claim to have done this. The fact that two planes returned without one or both of the arming wires does not mean that the bombs were dropped "safe", as many times these wires shake loose on the trip home due to vibration and slipstream.

In order to get an explanation for the six possible duds, the ordnance section is checking samples of the lot of fuses which were used. If they should be found to be defective, an immediate report will be made through regular channels.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

*R. D. ...* Capt., IntelO.

SIGNATURE R. D. ... RANK AND DUTY

APPROVED BY:

*J. A. Todd* Major, S.N.A.P. 31 March 1945

SIGNATURE J. A. TODD RANK AND DUTY

DATE