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Guderian's views on the Political role of  
ex-soldiers

1. A well placed regular source has reported that early in August Guderian discussed with an acquaintance of right wing sympathies the formation of an overall ex-soldiers organisation (Soldatenbund), and stated that once this had been accomplished, he would concentrate on the formation of a political party which, he implied, he would be prepared to lead.

2. The formation of a Soldatenbund

He said he intended to visit Generaloberst Friesner and discuss the projected Soldatenbund. The existing "Bundversorgungsberechtigter ehemaliger Wehrmachtangehöriger" (BV) had been created to represent professional soldiers' interests on questions of welfare and pension rights. With the passing of the "Versorgungsgesetz" (welfare laws), its raison d'être had disappeared. It should either be dissolved or change its policy completely. The chief aim of the Soldatenbund would be to make its influence felt in the remilitarisation question.

3. Views on remilitarisation

On the actual remilitarisation programme, he praised the work of Spidell and Housinger, the military advisers. The present decisions would be adequate for the present situation. It would take two years to form and equip an army of 250,000, and only the U.S.A. would be able to deliver enough material for the task.

The political question, however, was the important one. Guderian's view was that American policy was mainly support, but that the politicians were lagging behind the military advisers. He said he had confidential information, for instance, that General Guderian had told American Congressmen that political stability would be an indispensable condition of a German contribution to Western defence. In this matter the Federal Government had not put enough pressure on the Allies. Then he noted the proposed contractual agreement (which he described as a treaty), and

8:11

WASII: [redacted]

said it was intolerable to stipulate that a foreign power should have the right to intervene if it thought democracy in Germany to be in danger, or that the Allies should retain a right of veto on all questions about "Westdeutschland".

He criticized the policy of Adenauer who, he said, was too much under French influence. If the present political parties could not solve the problem, some other organization would have to do it. He had already written two brochures on the subject, and in addition to writing another, he intended to meet any criticism that his attitude was only negative by taking a more important part in the necessary political activity.

#### 4. Possible formation of an ex-soldiers' Political Party

Gudrian mentioned the possibility of forming a political party. When it was pointed out to him that no personality had yet appeared who was strong enough to hold the various groups together, and that the only Right Wing party which had used the right tactics was the SRP, Gudrian remarked that there could be no question of using that party, in which Romer (whom he knew personally), was merely a tool in the hands of Doris. He then admitted in a round about way that he would be willing to accept the leadership of the kind of Right Wing party he had in mind. Baron von Stein (1) had already tried to get him to do this, and had wanted to organize a meeting in Frankfurt to which several ex-generals, and also Humann (2) and Amann (3) were to have been invited. But Gudrian thought it better to visit personally all those to be invited.

Work on the Soldatenbund and on the proposed political party he believed should be simultaneous. While the former was being made strong enough to influence the Bonn Government, preparations should be made at the same time to create the latter, to bring its views into Parliament.

In conclusion, he repeated that he proposed to concentrate on the Soldatenbund, using his influence to get persons with views like his own in the leading positions. When this was under way, he would immediately concentrate on the formation of a political party.

#### COMMENT

The first stage in Gudrian's plans has now presumably been carried out with the formation of the League of German Soldiers on September 2th, 1951, as reported in the press.

#### FIELD COMMENT

Baron von Stein, (1)

Probably identical with ex-Generalmajor Freiherr Johann von Stein, secretary of the "Schutz-Bund deutscher Soldaten" (BIS), SS-dominated ex-servicemen's association.

- \* \* Roumann (11) Possibly identical with Dr. Werner Roumann, former State-Secretary in Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda, who now maintains clandestine connections with Roumann (111) below and Franka-Gricksch's Deutsche Bruderschaft.
- \* \* \* Roumann (111) Presumably identical with Arthur Roumann, former Reichsjugendführer, now a clandestine contact of the Deutsche Bruderschaft.

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Excerpt of pertinent information :

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SEE [REDACTED] FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)

*The New York Times*

**The General Who Led Hitler's Panzers  
Discusses His Battles and His Politics**



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*Illustration from Panzer Leader*  
General Guderian on the banks of the Dnieper, 1941.

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Station number of document : Special Report #17 (O.S.S.) (17S)  
Date of document : no date (probably early 1944)  
Title of document : German troop movements to the east  
OK for Extract [ ]  
Unit (105)  
Document to be filed in : Circle Material 200-5-9 File  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...GUDERIAN, Inspector-General of Panzer Divisions, is forming a new army southwest of Brest-Litovsk."

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Station number of document : BERN 158-161 (CD 17043)  
Date of document : 6 Apr 43  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [redacted] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :  
"...among generals, Manstein, Guderian, and Dack are the most influential today..."

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Station number of document : Boston Series No. 174 (174X)

Date of document : April 1944

Title of document : Measures to effect closer Rumanian  
collaboration

Document to be filed in : Circle Material (File) (200-5-9)

Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

OK for Extract-- *Jays, [unclear] SD*

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...In reference to the matter of arming the Rumanian Panzer forces, either Minister Speer or Marshal GUDERIAN is reported to have been advised to summon General Rosin for discussion..."

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Station number of document : IN-7418 (BERN 2773-2777)  
Date of document : 12 Apr 44  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [redacted] to serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...the Nazis have been obliged during the past 10 days to shift 20 odd divisions to the Eastern Front from Germany and the West, as Der Fuehrer discovered himself short of troops on the Russian Front. GUDERIAN is forming a new army southwest of Brest-Litovsk..."

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Station number of document : IN-7431 (CAIRO 27024)  
Date of document : 13 Apr 44  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...It is possible that the Hqs of the new tank army commanded by General GUDERIAN may be situated at this point as GUDERIAN arrived Budapest on March 31st..."

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Station number of document : BERN 2992-3 (IN 7835)  
Date of document : 17 Apr 44  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] no serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...In reference to the matter of arming the Rumanian Panzer forces, advise that either Minister Speer or Marshal GUDERIAN summon General Rozin for a discussion..."

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Station number of document : IN-11045 (ISTANBUL RE-11045) #1387  
Date of document : 3 Jul 44  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [redacted] serial  
Excerpt of pertinent information :

CORRECTION

" ..General Heins GUDERIAN's headquarters are located in the vicinity of the town of Pecs. He heads the Hungarian and Nazi forces intended to repel the landing on the Adriatic Coast which it is expected the Allies will make in order to enter Hungary through Yugoslavia..."

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Station number of document : BT-182 (BERN Telephone)  
Date of document : 24 Jul 44  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : BT-182  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...General GUDERIAN has not always been in Hitler's favor. In Dec 1941 he was ordered to make a tank attack at Tula, near Moscow. He argued against it on account of the cold. The Fuehrer ordered him to proceed. He did, and in a few days, reported back to Hitler that all his tanks were frozen and what should he do next. He did not show any sense of humor and GUDERIAN was out of a job for more than a year..."

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Station number of document : IM-16748 (STOCKHOLM 351)  
Date of document : 8 August 44  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in :   no serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...He states, too, that the necessity of halting the Soviet advance was JODERMAN's plan and that it was he who persuaded Hitler to agree and change his mind about a strong defense in the west and fluid withdrawal in the east..."

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Station number of document : IN-18387 (BERN-4674-78)  
Date of document : Undated; rec'd 28 Aug 44  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in :   no serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...since General GUTERIAN has established the Panzer Stab, the Steyrwerke plant in Austria has been directed to begin serial manufacture of the new 120-tonAbwehr tank with 180 mm armor..."

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Station number of document : XX-704  
Date of document : 2 Sept 44  
Title of document : Report on "M. M.", Vicente Pelletie  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : XX-704  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

**Excerpt of pertinent information :**

(p.4) "...5. MURRIAN is reported from various sources to have been released about 5 or 6 months ago from imprisonment in a fortress where he was sent after a quarrel with Hitler..."

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Station number of document : IN-2046 (BERN 4750-52)  
Date of document : 18 Sep 44  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_   
\_\_\_\_\_   
Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...P. Breakers advised GUDERIAN that the Putsch was planned, and the latter agreed by implication. He is anti-Hitler..."

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ THERE IS NO OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN DOCUMENT

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Station number of document : XX-872  
Date of document : 18 Sep 44  
Title of document : German Revolt of July 44

Document to be filed in : T/S Room under X-2TS-173 (pp. 4, 5, 11-12)  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] to serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

T/S document #X-2TS-173. See pp. 4, 5, 11-12.

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Station number of document : 541-X (CIRCLE) (BOSTON SERIES)  
Date of document : Nov. 1944  
Title of document : Hungarian Transportation Service

Document to be filed in : RI/FILES  
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Excerpt of pertinent information :

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Station number of document : IN-21828 (BERN 4793-4800)  
Date of document : Undated; rec'd 4 Oct 44  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...A new plan for the overthrow of Hitler was described by a messenger sent to Pfeiffer..."

"...The opposition group is made up of prominent right-wing SS people, some members of the General Staff, among them GUDERIAN..."

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Station number of document : GRX-91  
Date of document : 8 Nov 1944  
Title of document : List of well known Germans and their attitudes towards National Socialism.  
Document to be filed in : GRX-91  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...e)The following generals will probably remain staunch supporters of Hitler till the end:...  
...Generaloberst GUDERIAN, Chief of the General Staff of the Army..."

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Report on information obtained from Senior Officer FI on 24 - 26 Nov 44

The following are the names and secret numbers of the PW referred to in this report :-

M 159 - (General) der Panzertruppen	Von THIEL (COO German AFRIKAKORPS)	Captured MIDDLE EAST	4 Nov 42
A 1200 - (Generalleutnant)	HEUFER (COO 20th Flakdivision)	Captured TUNISIA	9 May 43
CS/223 - (General) der Panzertruppen	KEBACH (COO VII Armee)	Captured ALIENS	31 Aug 44
CS/274 - (Generalmajor)	WILE (Korpannanten 27 ID)	Captured near MONS	4 Sep 44
CS/648 - (SS Oberführer)	MEYER (Kommandant 12 Pz. Div. Hitler Jugend)	Captured near LIEGE	7 Sep 44
LF/104 - Oberst	WILHELM (Monturskommandant LE HAVRE)	Captured LE HAVRE	12 Sep 44
CS/382 - (General) der Fallschirmtruppen	BAUER (COO WEST)	Captured WEST	19 Sep 44
CS/443 - (Generalleutnant)	WILHELM (COO COLOGNE)	Captured DOULOGNE	23 Sep 44
CS/605 - Oberst	WILHELM (COO AACHEN)	Captured AACHEN	21 Oct 44
CS/631 - (Generalmajor)	WILHELM (COO, 64 ID)	Captured KNOCKE	2 Nov 44
CS/644 - (Generalleutnant)	WILHELM (COO, 70 ID)	Captured MIDDLEBURG	6 Nov 44

Note :- The German text of S.R. conversations reproduced verbatim is given in the Appendix.

# INDEX

By C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.)  
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 N.I.D. Admiralty (9 copies)  
 A.D.I. (K) Air Ministry (12 copies)

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I. THE I.R. SITUATION

1. 'Division Hitler Jugend'

SS Oberführer MEYER gave Generalmajor BERNING the following account of the tank strength of his 'Division' and of its losses and successes in NORMANDY:- (German text:- Appendix (a))

MEYER : My 'Division' had one-hundred-and-eighty tanks, half of them 'Panzer IV' and the other half 'Panzers', and in addition a 'Pzgr Abt' (armoured train) consisting of the 'Korps' with forty-six 'Pzgr', and at E.L.I.S.E I got a second 'Pzgr Abt' as well, but that was smashed up later on. The 'Abt' had about ten tanks left. With those tanks - at E.L.I.S.E I had perhaps fifty tanks and in addition about twenty 'Pzgr'. These tanks were divided among three 'Division' sectors, with anti-tank guns, that is to say in hidden fire position and they were wonderfully effective. On one day I knocked out ninety-six tanks in one British division.

BERNING: The best thing is to wait until they are approaching and then open fire.

MEYER : Yes, but there must be at least ten to fifteen, if possible twenty, tanks or more placed together. One tank may protect the other, otherwise the whole fire of the attacking tank is concentrated on the flash of the tank which has fired - then the tank is blown up.

BERNING: Yes. I was supposed to run my show at E.L.I.S.E without a single tank or assault gun.

2. Tank and anti-tank tactics.

MEYER and BERNING had the following discussion of tactics. They dealt with anti-tank tactics, co-operation between tanks and infantry, and the difference between American and German tank tactics:- (German text:- Appendix (b))

BERNING: In your opinion, why is it that the assault guns have knocked out so many more tanks than the anti-tank guns?

MEYER : I have noticed that the assault guns and also the anti-tank guns, which were even larger than the assault guns, but looked similar to assault guns, were not taken at all seriously by the British and the Americans. When an assault gun is seen through a cornfield, it doesn't look like a tank at all, but like .....

BERNING: Oh no, they have generally taken the tanks - even by the Russians. The reason is that first, the assault gun arm, who can look out, has a much quicker effect, and secondly - you probably won't believe it, but it is so - because the assault gun arm is a product of the artillery instruction and as a result you can see had a much better training in firing than the crews of which I am thinking. Besides, in the case of assault guns, co-operation with the accompanying infantry is much easier.

MEYER : That's probably true. It depends what the infantry is like. If, for instance, they are working within the 'Panzerdivision' it is easier to co-operate with the tanks.



MEYER : difference being that they did not break through, but they pounded the line of defence and then softened the line of defence up with their artillery and then thrust through the middle. It was impossible to form a strongpoint. Our infantry 'Division' were just lamb for the slaughter.

SEERDING: Yes, it was a terrible performance and very few decorations were given.

3. German behaviour at BRIST

In the following conversation with Generalleutnant REITH, General RANCKE explained his behaviour at BRIST via A via the civilian authorities and the Maguis: (German text: Appendix (c))

RANCKE : Throughout the time I was in BRIST various actions were carried out by the mixed Intelligence Detachment of the 33rd 'Division', who held the coast and by Intelligence officer against members of the Maguis who were French carrying arms. In the case the Major I had there, applied a sanction in the following manner: He suddenly raided a house and brought out from it German pistols, and even a German machine pistol, which the butcher's pretty daughter had got from a German soldier; she was also in touch with the English across the CHANNEL, as they lived right on the coast. The intelligence officer took the man off to BRIST - at that time there was a naval commandant I think - I wasn't yet commandant - and he took the woman there as well. I don't know what they did with her, but the house was burned down - all that was very dangerous.

That was the only stopping measure undertaken by my 'Division', after however I had succeeded to two different places in my area the sub-prefect all the parish priests, all the teachers and all the mayors, and through a clever interpreter had made the following speech to the people in groups of 50 - 70 at a time: "Gentlemen: I have asked you to come here in order to say a few important words to you in the interests of your country's safety. Grave outrages against the military power are taking place everywhere, usually on the part of the Maguis, people who are to be found in the clandestine and do not belong to your parishes: Such-and-such cases have occurred. You know as well as I, that the American and British Secret Service are behind these people and are conspiring with them. That is even more or less officially stated on the wireless and generally spread around. There is, however, a French Government in VICHY which is the only existing one for the country and the only one recognised by the French people, and we are the de facto power. But imagine what it means to intrigue in this way against these authorities - that isn't honest, open warfare, it's treachery. You put yourself in the worst possible light and make yourselves accessories to the crime if you harbour such people in your parishes. Therefore you will observe the instructions which I have been given, that on the door of each house shall be written the number of people living there and names of harbouring in your parishes persons who are suspicious in any way!" Then afterwards I said to them: "Now I will tell you my own personal attitude towards it. I took part in the 1914 - 1918 war on the western front from 1915 - 1918 and of the soldiers who we faced as enemies we held, and we German ex-servicemen still hold, the French hold in the way I meant respect as our most gallant and chivalrous opponent who fought gallantly and chivalrously against us in the trenches for the defence of his native land, and I consider it the greatest misfortune for our two peoples that we face one another in the bloody struggle of 1914 - 18 and that we

BLACKS : are facing one another again now. If I had had my way, we should have maintained close co-operation in arms in EUROPE, and this misfortune would not have overtaken our countries!" I said that that was my personal attitude.

That made such an impression that all the priests preached the gist of my talk from the pulpit the next Sunday - I said it to them on the Friday. You see, the fact that I did that will go to my credit, in the event of those people saying anything later on, I can enumerate all those sayers of the various parishes.

At BREST itself three death sentences, signed by me, were carried out during that time, on German soldiers not on the local inhabitants, and I evacuated BREST and if I had not done so, the population would have suffered enormous losses. Apart from that it was all out and dried, I gave orders only for military installations and such installations as served to make the town available quickly again for service as a naval port, that is the power stations, railways and all that sort of thing.

II. THE POST-WAR SITUATION

1. General REEBACH and Oberst WILHELMUTH, both natives of MERTENBERG, held the following conversation in which they discussed personalities whom WILHELMUTH in particular considered suitable to take on the administration in post-war GERMANY: (German text: Appendix (3))

WILHELMUTH: I have a few people in mind, contemporaries of ours, people I know, who are in the ministries.

In the ministry of public worship and education, which is now called the Reich Ministry of Education and Science, I believe, there is a Ministerialrat ZIEBOLDT - they are all friends of mine. ZIEBOLDT would be the man whom one could make secretary of state and say: "How put our schools and universities in order again!"

From the Ministry of Economics I know Dr. BERGMANN(?), now in the Ministry of Transport - he is perhaps ten years younger than we are - he has had an amusing career; he was with the administrative head 'Economics' in BERLIN and now he is 'Ministerialdirektor' in the department 'Shipping'. He calls himself Reich Shipping Commissioner in the Ministry of Transport now.

A good brain at the Ministry of Economics is our fellow countryman NICHOLS(?), a man with whom one can work; perhaps, apart from BERGMANN(?), he is the strongest there.

In LAMPERT, who was Secretary of State in the former Prussian Ministry of Finance, is still alive, he is all right.

Then in the Ministry of Finance there is a clever and clever man - he's not a minister, but he may be a secretary of state - HAYHOFER, who is also on the Directorate of the 'Reichsbank' now.

In the Ministry of Labour one would have to get back Dr. SHIMP, who was once Minister of Labour and was head of the Reich Institute for Labour Exchanges. I don't know whether he is too old now, but in any case, it is only a question of the transition period.

At the Foreign Office, I know very well, but I know that he has faced a lot of opposition. IER is a great politician, he was in BERLIN and had good connections. They were all people whom I got to know in BERLIN. Now I am looking for people with whom I could start a political show, and I don't know of any more. People who are Party leaders, who is there there? I can only think of it like this, first of all we will form the people's party.

BERENSON : I only know of one man, who would be acceptable abroad too, because he is a quarter-Jew. That is, WISSEL, who is really the best of those who are still alive. WISSEL is out of the question, because, lastly, he has been so much with those people, now's the time.

WIDENBUTH: We mustn't allow ourselves to be taken by surprise this time. The others must write in support of WISSEL to face the Communists and Socialists. Now it is, they can't say yet. WISSEL would have been the man. Of the old papers only WISSEL (Mayor of DUISBURG) is left, WISSEL would be a suitable man.

I know WISSEL very well, he's an awfully decent man with a clean slate. I can tell you the following incident about WISSEL: I saw him in April of this year in BRUSSELS. He showed me in the greatest secrecy a memorandum containing twelve points which he had worked out for WISSEL and WISSEL, the Secretary of State for the Interior. It dealt firstly with the re-establishment of the WISSEL and secondly with relations with the Church. Well, they showed it to the WISSEL, with WISSEL. No-one had dared say all that the leaders of the party quite honestly and truly want, what everyone from the conservatives to the socialists realize, namely that we must do that and that, we shall then be back on the old birds which we'd deserted. He became involved in that, with the result that he was deprived of all his influence and cannot talk a word or speak a word without the 'Kreislager'. I don't know what they did with WISSEL or with WISSEL. They can't do much with WISSEL - he's too old.

Look, a man they might be able to bring in from abroad, is WISSEL. He's the most forceful personality there is, whose sincerity cannot be doubted; he has connections at any rate with the Catholic workers and is also trusted by the socialists. The only drawback is that WISSEL is that he was an emigrant man years. WISSEL isn't good enough. WISSEL isn't such a fool as people make him out to be.

There is one German national who is the greatest economic expert. I believe he was Prussian Minister of Agriculture for a short time. He is a big lumberer in POENZ. His name is something like WISSEL.

BERENSON : The man who was Minister of Agriculture under WISSEL was called WISSEL.

WIDENBUTH: He is a big, dark, very quiet man. He's a man of stature, who can be called upon. He's my a.s.

2. It should perhaps be pointed out that in view of what WIDENBUTH says in the latter part of the conversation in Section III the above personalities may well be less acceptable to the Allies than they are to WIDENBUTH.

3. General von WISSEL, General-Lieutenant WISSEL and General-major WISSEL speculated as follows upon the possible trend of post-war policy: (German text: Appendix (c))

WISSEL : We work as a WISSEL said: "To territorial demands." Now he is already talking quite differently. It will not come to a peace conference, but instead each one will seize the part of WISSEL which he wants.

WISSEL : Each one will keep what he has got.

- WELLS** : There will be no question of a repetition of VERMILLES or anything like that.
- NEWMAN** : Of course the English will have what they want, too.
- WELLS** : Yes, obviously. The English will probably try to take the French under their wing, that the French don't do anything too foolish.
- WELLS** : Things have gone so far that one can say that CHURCHILL is really the most favorable for us.
- WELLS** : Yes, if he manages at all to bring them all together to the conference table again. I don't think he will. If they had brought us to the conference table, it would have weighed heavily in our favor that we had held out so long. After all AMERICA will have some say in it, too. She has got five armies here. AMERICA wouldn't have invested so much here, if she hadn't wanted to have a decisive say in the matter later on. It won't be entirely without a struggle, but I have the feeling that they will present accomplished facts in the end.
- NEWMAN** : They want to do that already.
- WELLS** : The most important thing is that we shall not be allowed a basis, regarded geopolitically, on which we could build anything up.
- WELLS** : No, the next we can do is this: we can throw in our lot with one of them, and in my opinion that can't be RUSSIA or JAPAN, it can only be AMERICA.
- NEWMAN** : With the conditions there is the danger, as there was before, that one day they will think that it is all too stupid and too expensive and they will say: "Get in your own juices."
- WELLS** : Yes, but first of all they have their position to consider and after all they haven't brought over millions of men over just to say: "Get in your own juices." But, that we shall have to play our cards like that, that we shall have to throw in our lot with one of them: not them but with that one -
- NEWMAN** : Only we have no alternatives.
- WELLS** : Not yet.
- NEWMAN** : We have only one expectation still existing, the Catholic Church.
- WELLS** : The Russians have the best prospects.
- NEWMAN** : It depends entirely on who decides the larger part of AMERICA. I don't think that we are capable of making a withdrawal across the ISERE any more now.

Generalissimo Stalin stated to General BECHTOLD that he believed after the war the German people would turn violently against everything which had had anything to do with the Party; it would then, however, relapse into complete apathy.

III. THE TRIANGLE 'PUTSCH'

1. In the following conversation about WILDERMUTH told General BREERLOCH about a conversation he had with Dr. HESS, at whose house GOEBBELS was arrested after the July 'Putsch', in which Dr. HESS asked him whether he would collaborate with GOEBBELS and told him something of the plot: (German text: Appendix (f))

WILDERMUTH: HESS said to me: "GOEBBELS, who is looking after the political side of the thing, asks whether you are prepared to work with him." I replied: "Yes." I then requested him to say something further about the details of the thing, but he said nothing, and at the time I thought: "It's quite alright!" To-day I say: "I ought to have asked, because, when I got to GERMANY, GOEBBELS's circle is really the only ..... " I don't know anything more about the business. I said, I personally was prepared to work with GOEBBELS, and I found out more or less in what sort of a position; I would probably ..... as secretary of state or as minister possibly in the Ministry of Labour or Economics - probably the Ministry of Labour. It's rather strange, here they say that GOEBBELS was arrested in EAST PRUSSIA, over in the camp that Secret Service Kullow told me GOEBBELS was arrested at DANZIG, in the house of a Jew. That can only be HESS. CHOLWITZ maintains he was arrested in EAST PRUSSIA.

BREERLOCH: CHOLWITZ told a slightly different story each time.

WILDERMUTH: He told me that once.

During that conversation I was told that the 'Marschalle' had been asked and that by and large they had declared themselves neutral. They would do 'nothing for and nothing against'. I asked: "What about the 'Marschalle' too?" and HESS told me, most definitely, "Marschalle too."

BREERLOCH: I can confirm that.

WILDERMUTH: ..... what are the conditions?" he replied: "First we can't occupy the occupation. In case of GERMANY will be occupied, but certain territories will be ceded - POLAND is lost to us, the SAAR will be held ..... CHAMBERLAIN wants that." Then afterwards: "Occupation, demeritisation," I said: "What's the position regarding the army?" He replied: "The Armed Forces will of course be disbanded straight away, but it is intended to have a kind of militia." I said: "In that case it's all right" because I know that the old 100000 man army ..... the formation of the army, closely modelled on the Swiss pattern, which is excellent from the organization point of view; ..... and if we have a militia we've got what we want. The first is a question of the length of service and the strength of the active cadres, and when I'm somewhere else I can do my year's service without it being noticed and - from a tactical point of view - they are professional soldiers and if I extend that we're tactical considerations and for the staffs for the first, second, third, fourth wave - oh, things will be quite all right. Well, I was in agreement with all that. .... above all the fact that we should keep only a skeleton of the Armed Forces and as there's no question of war straight away its strength doesn't matter at all. Nor are heavy arms needed straight away, we have seen that these follow when the political situation is right; then we shall have tanks again, we shall have aircraft again!

- 2. WILHELM has gone to some trouble to leave L.00 with the impression that he is the 'right sort' of German officer. In view of this, the latter part of the above conversation is illuminating, since it shows once again, that if one scratches a German officer one finds - a German officer.

IV. HITLER AND HIS FOLLOWERS

1. The FÜHRER-Headquarters

In the following conversation SS Oberführer MEYER described to Generalmajor REICHING conditions at the FÜHRER's HQ: (German text: Appendix (E))

MEYER : If you know how things are in the FÜHRER's Headquarters you'd throw up your hands in despair. They all sit around from morning to night with nothing to do at all, nothing. The FÜHRER arrives in the morning and they go into conference about the situation. The FÜHRER talks, the others nod and say: "Yes, yes." Then the fellows from the front come in and the FÜHRER converses with them at great length and detail, then the political wallahs come in and at eleven o'clock in the evening there's another conference on the situation. The fellows nod and in a grin, nod their heads again, and at three o'clock in the morning they go off to bed. The fellows don't do a thing the whole time, they talk their heads off amongst themselves and don't tell anything to the FÜHRER. There is one man up there who really does work from morning to night, and that is GOEBBELS.

2. GOEBBELS

Generalmajor REICHING, continuing to SS-Oberführer MEYER on GOEBBELS' 'Das Reich' article as late as on 24 Nov, said that the article was really rubbish; it was untrue to say the defeat of ALLIY would give the lie to history, for the weather will always last.

MEYER, who said he had known GOEBBELS since 1931 and had been present at his wedding, said he admired GOEBBELS because, though compelled to produce an article every week for a national newspaper, he still found something to say. He paid a tribute to GOEBBELS' industry and wit.

MEYER went on to point out an elegant practical joke which GOEBBELS played on one HEBEL, an ambitious member of the Propaganda Ministry. GOEBBELS suborned members of the staff to circulate HEBEL on a special promotion to 'Staatssekretär' and even went as far as to have special issues of newspapers printed which carried special announcements. GOEBBELS then travelled with HEBEL to ITALY and looked over the promotion of his subordinate, who sat on tenterhooks, expecting his chief to make some reference to the promotion and unable himself to find the words in which to introduce the topic. It was only in Rome that HEBEL was finally disillusioned.

V. MISCELLANEOUS

1. Repatriated P.

Oberst HEBEL told Oberst HEBEL first there is an order whereby all repatriated or returning P. are arrested and segregated. This order was introduced by the Nazis because they feared that these men would talk too much.

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2. Moral outlook of the Nazis

Oberst WILDEWITZ told a number of his companions that, since the first days of the war, he had been struck by the moral outlook of the 'high-ups'. He stated that the majority did not see anything wrong in the massacre of Jews.

VI. LITERATURE SUPPLIED TO EV

D.W. HOGAN	<u>The Development of Modern France (1870 - 1939)</u> <u>American Foreign Policy</u>
Barbara HED	<u>American Foreign Policy</u> <u>Italian Foreign Policy</u>

VII. PERSONALITIES

(a) Recently captured Senior Officer

1. Generalmajor ZAHN

Generalmajor D.SEE discussed Generalmajor ZAHN with General von THOM in the following terms: (German text: Appendix (A))

D.SEE : The second 'General' who was taken prisoner was ZAHN. He was in SEIN for a long time and speaks perfect Spanish; that's why I wanted to ask you if you knew him. I met him in EUSSELS at a conference with KILGELUSSEN, the military commander, and later on - I went to the east and then came back again and got the 'Division' - he was area commander in GHEK. I then met him again at a conference with GILSA, to which he as commander of GHEK, had been summoned. Then, when my 'Division' was fighting in and on both sides of GHEK, I placed him under my command. One of my 'Regimentskommandeure' was severely wounded and dropped out, so I handed the 'Regiment' over to him and wanted to take him along as 'Regimentsführer'. Then, when I was ordered on to KIDZELUNG in advance, and the 'Regiment' didn't follow until two or three days later, he was no longer with them. I then heard he'd been withdrawn for some other job and he got a 'Volksrennlicher Division'. GILSA may have got him back.

ZAHN was 'Generalmajor' and was local set on being promoted. GILSA had recommended him for promotion, but they wrote back from the Personnel Branch that he'd only been in SEIN and was only area commander, and that he had no prospects of promotion.

THOM : He wasn't in SEIN in my time, he must have been there afterwards, possibly on some business ..... - or was he there as military attaché?

D.SEE : Military attaché, or something like that. He got fish poisoning in SEIN. That was why he was pushed into the area commander branch, just as I was after that heart trouble of mine when I got back from North RUSSIA. ZAHN commanded a Pomeranian 'Regiment' in POLAND, and SCHLICK was his first adjutant.

2. (General, or) for Police JANKEN

General von FLOCH remarked to Generalleutnant DISEL that if JANKEN came to No. 11 Camp he would tell him straight out that, as a Gestapo man, he was completely beyond the pale to FLOCH personally.

3. (General) Freiherr von und zu GILS.

Newspaper reports of the capture of General von GILS led to some discussion of him from which it appears that he got his commission in 1909 and became a 'Kriegsmann' in 1921. Von FLOCH knew him in EISENHOF where he commanded a 'Kriegsbrigade' when von FLOCH was at B.S.M.M. He is older than von FLOCH and probably senior to him.

Generalleutnant DISEL also knows von GILS whom he says is a very decent fellow and a man who always gets his way.

(b) Personalities in Post-war GERMANY

The following names appear in Section II/1; they were mentioned by Oberst WIDELSPH as possible runners in the post-war German Administration Status:

- |                    |                               |                 |                     |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| <u>D. VISHOFF:</u> | <u>Herr von SCHNEPPENBERG</u> | <u>W. STEIN</u> | <u>SK. J. J. J.</u> |
| <u>DEBILANT(?)</u> | <u>J. J. J.</u>               | <u>H. J. J.</u> | <u>SK. J. J.</u>    |
| <u>H. J. J.</u>    | <u>L. J. J.</u>               | <u>A. J. J.</u> | <u>SK. J. J.</u>    |
|                    |                               |                 | <u>SK. J. J.</u>    |

(c) Miscellaneous

BODLANN

Described by WIDELSPH as the only man who did any work at the WIDELSPH's HQ. (See section IV/1)

WIDELSPH

Dr. J. J. J. friend of WIDELSPH at whose house in WIDELSPH WIDELSPH was arrested. Offered WIDELSPH a post in the administration to be set up by WIDELSPH. (See section III)

WIDELSPH

For WIDELSPH's views on WIDELSPH and story of a general job performed by WIDELSPH see section IV/2.

C.S.J.I.C. (U.K.)  
26 Nov 44

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## APPENDIX

The following is the German text of the S.R. conversations reproduced verbatim in G.R.G.G. 228.

- (a) MEYER : Meine Division hatte 180 Panzer, die Hälfte davon Panzer IV und die andere Hälfte Panther, und dazu kam vom Korps eine Tiger-Abteilung mit 46 Tigern, und bei PALAISE bekam ich noch eine zweite Tiger-Abteilung dazu, die aber nachher zusammenge-schossen waren - da hatte jede Abteilung noch so zehn Tiger. Mit diesen Panzern - bei PALAISE hatte ich vielleicht 50 Panzer und dazu so 20 Tiger. Diese Panzer waren verteilt in drei Divisions-abschnitten eingesetzt als Inf., also in versteckter Feuerstellung und haben wunderbar geschickt. Ich habe an einem Tag aus einer britischen Division 96 Panzer herausgeschossen.
- EBERDING : Das ist ins Parte: Warten bis die rankommen und dann auffangen.
- MEYER : Es müssen allerdings mindestens also 10 - 15, nach Möglichkeit 20 Panzer, und mehr, zusammenschicken. Der eine Panzer muss den anderen schützen, sonst konzentriert sich das ganze Feuer der angreifenden Panzer auf dieses eine Abdängungsfahrer, das da nun geschossen hat - nämlich dann fliegt der Panzer hoch.
- EBERDING : Ja. Ich sollte nur meinen Krack an bei ERESKENS machen, ohne einen Panzer, ohne ein Sturmgeschütz.
- 
- (b) EBERDING : Woher kommt es, Ihrer Meinung nach, dass die Sturmgeschütze so viel mehr Panzer abgeschossen haben als die Panzerjäger?
- MEYER : Ich habe feststellt, dass die Sturmgeschütze, und auch die Panzerjäger, die noch niedriger waren als die Sturmgeschütze, aber ähnlich aussahen wie die Sturmgeschütze, von den Engländern und von den Amerikanern gar nicht für voll genommen worden sind. Das Sturmgeschütz, wenn es durch ein Getreidefeld führt, erscheint ja gar nicht als Panzer, sondern als .....
- EBERDING : Nein, nein, ich würde allgem. für Panzer gehalten - auch von den Russen. Es liegt daran, dass der Sturmgeschützmann, anders er herauszukommen kann eine viel schnellere Wirkung hat, und zweitens - Sie wissen es wahrscheinlich nicht glauben, aber es ist so - weil die Sturmgeschütze nur der Artillerie-Inspektion hervorgegangen sind und weil infolgedessen die Sturmgeschütze-besatzungen in den Jahren, an die ich denke, eine viel bessere Ausbildung im Schießen hatten. Außerdem, die Verständigung mit der begleitenden Infanterie ist ja beim Sturmgeschütz viel leichter.
- MEYER : Das dürfte sein. Man kennt es darauf an, was es für Infanterie ist. Wenn z.B. innerhalb der Panzerdivision konzentriert wird, ist die Verständigung mit den Panzern besser.
- EBERDING : Durch Sprachunt.

- MEYER** : Aber es ist so: Die Masse unserer Panzerdivisionen haben heute keine Führer mehr, keine Panzerführer, die selbst einmal Infanterist gewesen sind. Ich habe die Forderung aufgestellt: Ein Panzerkompanieführer und ein Panzerszugführer und ein Abteilungskommandeur muss erst einmal seinen Leichnam als Infanterist durch das Gelände geschleppt haben, damit er nämlich überhaupt weiss, wie er die Infanterie unterstützen kann. Erst dann, wenn ich Infanterist gewesen bin, kann ich meine Panzerwaffe führen. Es ist verkehrt, dass man damals den Grundsatz aufgestellt hat: Sämtliche Reiter waren Panzerführer. Denn die schnelle Führung und die Grundsätze in der Kampfführung, die hat der Infanterist genau so.
- BERNDING** : Ja, es war aber ganz gut, dass man die Kavallerie-Regimenter zu Panzer-Regimenten gemacht hat, weil in Kavalleristen für den Angriff doch mehr das leichte Blut irin liegt, das geniale Führen.
- MEYER** : Ich bin nicht ganz frei davon, weil ich mich sehr aus Kavalleristen hingedogen fühle; ich muss aber doch sagen, dass es nur einen Herrscher des Gallopfers gibt, das ist der Infanterist. Der Infanterist ist derjenige, der eine Gefahr wirklich auf sich zu kommen lässt. Der Panzermann, der läuft sofort an Ausweichen, sofort Bewegung!
- BERNDING** : Wie vorher sind denn eigentlich diese unerbürten, tiefen Durchbrüche der Panzermassen, die eigentlich die ganzen Operationen entschieden hatten - sehr oft nur mit wenigen Panzern?
- MEYER** : Herr General, das ist ein Irrtum. Da habe ich auch mal dran geglaubt. Ich habe selbst Erfahrungsberichte geschrieben, und habe auch geschätzt darüber, dass irgendeine einzelne Panzer "rumgefahren" sind und dann habe ich aber fast gestellt, dass diese Panzerpitzen mindestens aus einer Panzerabteilung bestanden. Die amerikanischen Panzerdivisionen haben 360 Panzer und siebenhundert-sounds viele Stk; die haben ja alles gepanzert, ebenso ihre gesamte Artillerie, also die bestand aus einer Panzerabteilung und dann hatte sie mindestens zwei Selbstfahrlafetten-Batterien dabei 2 schwere Geschütze. Das sind so 10,5-Pfünder; dann hatten sie zwei LKW dabei und auf dem LKW lag der Artilleriebeobachter, der Storch. In demselben Moment wo er schoss, blieb der ganze Haufen stehen, die Artillerie ging in Stellung, vorne die Panzer bildeten einen Schild, der Beobachter ging hoch, die Artillerie trat in Tätigkeit. Erst dann, wenn die Artillerie gearbeitet hatte, fuhren die Panzer wieder an, das heißt, sie klärten auf. Die Panzer griffen uns an, wenn sie klärten auf. Dort, wo sie ein Loch fanden, da stiessen sie hinein. Bei uns war es doch so - ich habe 1. Coten und Süßstein immer Vorausabteilungen, und starke Vorabteilungen, geführt - wir bekamen unsere allgemeine Richtung: In Führer einer Vorausabteilung. Diese allgemeine Richtung mussten wir selbstverständlich innehalten, aber wir hatten die Möglichkeit nach Süden oder nach Norden auszuweichen. Der ganze war: Gelfeld nach Osten zu gewinnen, einen Weg nach Süden zu finden. Dann wir auf "Hilfstrasse" stiessen, war es dann so, dass wir dann in RUSLAND wie eine verrückt gewordene Auerrühr in diese "Hilfstrasse" des Feindes hineinkamten, immer. Ich habe sehr viele Verluste und Panzer dabei gehabt, und '41 und auch '42, im '42 ich es auch wieder erlebt, hatten wir immer dabei dabei weil die mit einer starken Panzerwaffe auftraten und in solchen Moment, wo wir in der russischen Widerstandslinie drin waren und uns nicht richten, der ganze lagen zusammenfick. Die Russen hatten damals, in '41, keinen Panzer, der uns entgegengestellt werden konnte, bis Ende November der "34" auftrachte, aber doch immerhin in einer geringen Anzahl. /3



RAIKER  
(Contd.)

gesagt: "Nun, ich persönlich. Einstellung dazu will ich Ihnen sagen. Ich habe den Kri. 1914 - 1918 von '15 - '18 an der Front mitgemacht und war von den Soldaten, die wir als Pelade gegen die Briten, Spanier, und stelle bei uns deutschen Frontsoldaten in: alle diejenigen, die der französische Politi, der uns der tapferste und ritterlichste Gegner war, der tapfer und ritterlich gegen uns im Glauben für die Verteidigung seines Vaterlandes gekämpft hat, und ich bekrachte das als das größte Unglück unserer letzten Völker, das wir in dem blutigen Ringen von '14 - '18 gegen die Briten sind und das wir nun noch einmal gegen die Briten, um es noch klarer zu sagen, dann werden wir eine neue "Aufbruchzeit" haben, die wir in Europa, und wir hätten dieses Unglück über unsere Länder nicht!" - Das wäre meine persönliche Meinung.

Das hat so einen Eindruck gemacht, dass ämtliche Seelsorger an anderen Sonntagen - in Preußen habe ich es schon gesagt - von der Kanzel an ihr Land zu sprechen, zum Beispiel, zum Beispiel haben, sehen Sie, das ist das, was ich, was ist, falls diese Leute später einmal etwas sagen sollten, ich kann diese ganzen Erfahrungen von dem einzelnen Guckstein da noch aufzählen, für mich eine Belastung.

Nun also in ZIEGLER sollte eine drei Fokale vollendet werden in der Zeit, von mir unterbrochen, Deutsche Soldaten, kein Minister, und ich habe ZIEGLER erkrankt, und wenn ich das nicht getan hätte, hätte diese Regierung ungeheure Verluste gehabt. In Berlin ist ganz klar, und klar, habe ich nur Zufuhr gegeben für alle religiöse Einrichtungen und die einzigen Einrichtungen, die dann bedrungen hätten, die, wie ich als solche schnell wieder für den Dienst als Kriegsminister notwendig zu machen, also die Kartenspiele, Minibühnen und all dieses Zeug.

(4) **VILHELMSON:** Ich habe ein paar Leute bei mir, ältere, jenseits von uns, Leute die ich kenne, die in den Zirkeln sind.

In Kulturminister, der heute jetzt Ministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, habe ich, da ist ein Ministerialrat ZIEGLER - das sind alle Freunde von mir. Der ZIEGLER wird der Mann, der mir die Straßenschrift einsetzt und sagt: "Nun bringen Sie uns mal die Schulen und Hochschulen wieder in Ordnung."

Ich kenne aus dem Ministerium, jetzt in Verkehrsminister, den Dr. EDDING (?) - der mag sein Jahre länger sein als wir - hat eine phantastische Laufbahn gemacht; war beim Verwalter, nachher Minister in BRUNNEN und ist jetzt Ministerialdirektor in der Abteilung "Verkehr". Der nennt sich jetzt Reichs-Verkehrsdirektor. In Verkehrsminister.

Ein guter Kopf in Verkehrsminister ist unser Landsmann MOHR (?), ein Mann, mit dem wir arbeiten kann; vielleicht noch MOHR (?) der öffentliche Mann.

Wenn LAUBACH, nach ihm, der Sie beschreiben war, Minister für Wissenschaft, Minister, LAUBACH ist in Ordnung.

Kann in Finanzminister ist einer, KARL, KARL - Minister nicht, aber vielleicht Staatsminister - ZITNER, der gleichzeitig in der Abteilung jetzt Minister ist.

In Arbeitsminister, in dem wir den Dr. STRUP wieder mal haben, der schon mal Arbeitsminister war und der das ist, das ist der Arbeitsminister, STRUP. Ob das so die Personen sind, welche ich nicht, aber es kommt ja nur auf den Minister an. /5

**WILHELMUTH:** Auswärtiges: WEISSLOCKE, der ist für uns! Oger von SCHEFFENBURG, den kenne ich sehr gut, aber ich weiss, dass er sehr viel angestossen ist. GEYER ist ein grosser Politiker, war in ENGLAND, und hat gute Beziehungen. Das sind alles Leute, die in in BERLIN kennengelernt habe. Nun auch solche Leute, mit denen ich einen politischen Kontakt aufbauen kann und da weiss ich keine mehr. Leute, die Partei-Mitglieder sind - wer kommt denn 'raus? Ich denke mir oben die Sache so, zuerst machen wir die grosse Bürgerliche Partei.

**ESERBACH:** Ich wüsste einen einsigen Mann, der, weil er 2% Jude ist, ja auch in Ausland entgegenzunehmen würde. Das ist der MARSTEIN, der so eigentlich der Letzte ist von denen, die heute noch leben. Der GUBERMAN schiedet nur, weil er zuletzt jetzt sich noch mit der Partei so festgelegt hat. Ist er Gottes.

**WILHELMUTH:** Wir müssen uns diesmal nicht überraschen lassen. Den Kommunisten und Sozialisten gegenüber müssen sich die anderen auf einen einigen. Wer es ist, können sie heute noch nicht sagen. GOSWILLER wäre der Mann gewesen. Von den alten Oberbürgermeistern ist nur noch der JAMES (Mayor of PHILADELPHIA), der JAMES wäre so ein Mann gewesen!

STRÜCKMANN kenne ich genau, das ist ein furchtbar ordentlicher Mann, mit einer reinen Seele. Ich kenne Ihnen von STRÜCKMANN folgendes erzählen. Im April dieses Jahres habe ich ihn in STUTTGART gesehen. Er hat er mir in dieser Veranlassung eine Denkschrift geschickt, die er KREUTH und von STUCKMANN, dem Staatssekretär von Innenministerien, ausgearbeitet hat, eine Denkschrift von zwölf Punkten. Erstens die Erhaltung des Reiches. Zweitens gutes Verhältnis zur Kirche. Also, das haben sie dem FÜHRER vorgelegt, mit KREUTH. Er hat keinen Überhaupt begriffen, was die FÜHRER der Partei wollen, also ganz trau und bieder, was jeder Mensch von den Konservativen bis zu den Sozialisten erkennt: ja, das müssen wir natürlich machen, denn haben wir die alte Praxis wieder, die wir verlassen haben. KREUTH hat er sich beteiligt, mit dem Konsultat, dass er kaltgestellt werden ist und ohne den Kreisleiter keinen Schritt und kein Wort mehr tun darf. Was sie mit dem STUCKMANN angefangen haben, weiss ich nicht. Was sie mit dem KREUTH angefangen haben, weiss ich auch nicht. Mit dem KREUTH können sie auch nicht - er ist zu alt geworden.

Sehen Sie, ein Mann, der sie vielleicht von Ausland heranziehen können, Herr LÖNNING. Der ist die stärkste Persönlichkeit, die es ist, deren Intelligenz kein Zweifel da steht, der auch die Leistungen mindestens nur Kath. Kirche, Arbeiterrecht hat und bei der Sozial. Vertrauen, TREVIKUS, der nur im Nachteil hat, dass er sein Privat. Das ist genug. TREVIKUS ist nicht gut genug. TREVIKUS ist kein solcher Körper, wie die Leute sehen haben.

Es gibt einen, Internationaler, erster Sachverständiger der Wirtschaft. Der ist, glaube ich, ganz kurz Zeit auch einmal preussischer Landwirtschaftsminister gewesen. Der ist ein grosser Literaturkritiker in "REUTEMANN". Soms wie SCHIELE heisst der Mann.

**ESERBACH:** Der unter TREVIKUS Landwirtschaftsminister war, der hiess SCHIELE.

**WILHELMUTH:** Es ist ein grosser, dunkler, sehr ruhiger Mann. Das ist ein Mann von Format, den man heranziehen kann. Der ist in meinem Alter.

- (e) WAHLE : Vor zwei Wochen hat DE GAULLE gesagt: "Keine territorialen Ansprüche." Jetzt spricht er schon anders. Zu einer Friedenskonferenz kommt es gar nicht, sondern es greift sich jeder das Stück der MITTEL-EUROPA heraus, was er braucht.
- NEUFFER : Jeder behält, was er hat.
- WAHLE : Eine Wiederholung von VERSAILLES, oder so etwas kommt gar nicht mehr in Frage.
- NEUFFER : Die Engländer behalten natürlich auch, was sie wollen.
- WAHLE : Ja, selbstverständlich. Die Engländer werden wahrscheinlich versuchen, die Franzosen unter ihre Fittiche zu nehmen, damit die Franzosen nicht zu großen Erfolgen kommen.
- THOMA : Ja, soweit ist es, dass man sagen kann, dass der CHURCHILL eigentlich noch der für uns Günstigste ist.
- WAHLE : Ja, wenn er es fertig bringt fertig, noch wieder alle gemeinsam an einen Tisch zu bringen. Ich glaube es nicht. Wenn Sie uns an einen Tisch gebracht hätten, dann wäre das positiv, dass wir so lange durchhalten können. WASHINGTON hat ja schließlich auch noch ein Wort mitzusprechen. Es hat ja hier fünf Armeen. AMERIKA wird doch nicht soviel hier investiert haben, wenn sie nicht nachher entscheidend mitreden wollen. Also ganz kampflos wird das nicht gehen, aber ich habe so ins Gefühl, die wollen alle vollendete Tatsachen schaffen nachher.
- NEUFFER : Das wollen sie jetzt schon.
- THOMA : Das Wichtigste ist ja: Wir bekommen einen Untergrund, geopolitisch gesprochen, wo wir überhaupt nichts mehr aufbauen können.
- WAHLE : Nein, wir können Absichten folgendes machen: Wir können uns einem mit Haut und Haaren verschreiben und das darf meiner Ansicht nach nicht KISSINGER sein, es darf auch nicht EXELAND sein, es darf nur DEBIL sein.
- NEUFFER : Bei den Amerikanern besteht immer die Gefahr, wie es damals schon war, dass es ihnen einen Tag zu dauern und zu kostspielig wird, und sie sagen: "Nicht unser Druck allein."
- WAHLE : Ja, aber sie haben dann haben sie einmal ihre Position, und sie haben doch nicht Armeen mit Millionen Menschen herübergeschafft, um nachher zu sagen: "Nicht unser Druck allein." Aber dass wir so spielen müssen, dass wir uns einem mit Haut und Haaren verschreiben und mit dem nachher gehen.
- NEUFFER : Blos haben wir kein Organ.
- WAHLE : Noch nicht.
- NEUFFER : Wir haben nur eine Organisation, die noch besteht, die katholische Kirche.
- THOMA : Die meisten Aussichten haben die Russen.
- NEUFFER : Ja, es kommt jetzt nämlich darauf an, wer zuerst den größeren Teil von DEUTSCHLAND besetzt - ich glaube, dass wir zu einem Rückzug über den RHEIN gar nicht mehr fähig sind.

(f) WILDERMUTH: HISSASS sagte mir: "In Übrigen müsst dich GOEBELER fragen - der die Sache politisch führt - ob du bereit bist, mit ihm zu arbeiten." Darauf sagte ich: "Ja." Ich wartete dann darauf, dass er mir etwas mehr sagt - was denn sonst mitmacht - darauf sagte er mir nichts, und ich dachte in diesem Augenblick: "Es ist richtig!" Heute sage ich: "Hätte ich doch gefragt; denn wenn ich jetzt nach DEUTSCHLAND komme, der GOEBELER-Kreis ist eigentlich der dinnl . . . . ." Also mehr weiss ich von der Geschichte nicht. Ich habe mich persönlich bereit erklärt, mit GOEBELER mitzuarbeiten, habe noch festgelegt, in welcher Position ungenau; ich wäre also wahrscheinlich als Staatssekretär, beziehungsweise Minister, vielleicht im Arbeits- oder Wirtschaftsministerium . . . . . wahrscheinlich Arbeitsministerium. Nun ist merkwürdig, hier heisst es, der GOEBELER ist in OSTPREUSSEN verhaftet worden; früher in der LAGER sagte mir der Bursche von Secret Service, der GOEBELER ist in WERLIN, in DÄHEI, im Hause eines Juden erwischt worden. Das kann nur der HISSASS sein. Der CHOLITZ behauptet in OSTPREUSSEN.

KEERBACH : CHOLITZ erschloß jedoch ein bisschen anders.

WILDERMUTH: Er hat mir so dinnl erschloß.

Also mir wurde bei dieser Unterhaltung gesagt, die Marschälle sind gefragt worden und sie haben in gewissen und gewissen erklärt, sie sind neutral, sie tun nichts für und nichts dagegen. Ich habe dann gefragt: "Auch ROSE?" Ich sagte mir der HISSASS: "Ja, auch ROSE!", ausdrücklich.

KEERBACH : Das kann ich Ihnen bestätigen.

WILDERMUTH: . . . . . was sind nun die Bedingungen? Da sagte er: "Zerstens: Um die Besetzung können wir nicht herum. Ganz DEUTSCHLAND wird besetzt. Aber es gibt auch Gebietsabtretungen - HISSASS ist beim Teufel, SMÄGELIET wird zu halten sein . . . . . CHURCHILL will das haben." Dann nachher: "Also Besetzung, Demokratisierung." Ich sage ihm: "Wie steht's mit dem Heer?" "Zehnmacht", sagte er, "natürlich zunächst Untermannung, aber, vorgesehen so eine Art Miliz." Sage ich: "Dann ist's gut", denn ich wusste, dass das alte 100000-Heer sich den Aufbau der Armee, in enger Anlehnung an das Schweizer Modell . . . . . das organisatorisch ausgearbeitet ist; . . . . . und haben wir eine Miliz, dann ist es geschafft. Der Rest ist die Frage der Dienstzeit und der Stärke der aktiven Heer, und wenn ich mal wieder andere Dinge - unmerklich gehe ich auf die Frage der Dienstzeit, und von Brigadekommandeur sind die Fortoffiziere und wenn ich das bis auf den Regimentskommandeur annehme und wenn ich die Stelle aufstelle für die erste, zweite, dritte, vierte . . . . . ist ja ganz in Ordnung! Also damit war ich einverstanden. . . . . vor allem also die Frage, dass uns nur ein Heer zur Verfügung bleibt, und da man zunächst noch keinen Krieg führt ist es ganz klar wie stark der ist. Auch schwere Waffen braucht man zunächst nicht, das kriegt man, hat man ja gesehen, wenn die politische Situation so ist; dann haben wir wieder Panzer, haben wir wieder Flugzeuge!

(g) MEYER : Wenn Sie wünschen, wie das in Militärhauptquartier aussieht, würden Sie die Hände über den Kopf zusammenschlagen. Die sitzen alle miteinander vor mir und bin über's herum, haben nichts zu tun, gar nichts! Der MEYER, der zuerst morgens, dann geht es in die Lage(-besprechung) heute. Der MEYER redet, die nickten mit dem Kopf, sagen "Ja und so". Dann kommen die Kette von der /B

26 Nov. '44

**MEYER (Contd.)** : Front; da unterhält sich der **MÜLLER** sehr lange, sehr ausgiebig, dann kommen die politischen Meinungen an und abends um 11 Uhr ist wieder Laresrechnung. Da hupfen die ganzen Kerle wieder mit ein, trinken wieder mit dem Pöpf, und nachts um 3 Uhr oder so etwas geht es in's Bett. Während der ganzen Zeit tun die Brüder gar nichts, quatschen sich gegenseitig den Bauch voll und den **MÜLLER** sagen sie auch nichts. So ist einer da oben, der arbeitet wirklich von morgens bis abends, das ist der **BOHMANN**.

**(h) DASER** : Der zweite General, der befördert genommen wurde, war der **IBENS**. Der war in **SPANIEN** immer **2. Lt.**, also hier spricht perfekt spanisch; darum wollte ich Sie fragen, ob Sie ihn kennen. Ich habe ihn bei einer Lesung in **MÜNCHEN** beim Militärbefehlshaber, beim **PALKENHUSEN** kennen gelernt, und später - da bin ich dann nach dem Oster gekommen in v.v. hat er wieder früher und habe die Division gekriegt - da war er **Stabschef** in **GENT**. Da habe ich ihn dann nochmal getroffen bei einer Lesung beim **GILSA**, zu der er als Kommandant von **GENT** herangesagt war. Dann, als meine Division eingesetzt worden ist, in der ledigerseits **GENT**, habe ich ihn mir unterstellt. Da habe ich ihn dann, für eine Regimentskommandeur, der vorher verunfallt ist, das Regiment übergeben und wollte ihn als **Stabschef** mitnehmen. Dann, während ich schon voraus nach **MÜNCHEN** beföhren war, und das Regiment in zwei oder drei Tagen erst nachkommen ist, war er nicht mehr dabei. Da habe ich dann gehört, er wäre also für eine anderweitige Verwendung herausgesprochen worden und dann hat er als eine Volksgrenadier-Division gekriegt. Vielleicht hat ihn der **GILSA** nachgeholt.

Der **IBENS** war Generalmajor und hätte absolut befördert werden. Der **GILSA** hat ihm vorgeschlagen die Beförderung; denn haben sie zurückgeschickt von Personalrat, da wäre **IBENS** in **SPANIEN** gewesen und nur **Feldkommandant**, also hat keine Aussicht auf Beförderung.

**THOMA** : Der war nicht zu meiner Zeit in **SPANIEN**, der muss ja hernach, vielleicht als **wirtschaftlicher Garnist**..... - oder ist der als **Militärattaché**?

**DASER** : **Militärattaché** oder sonst was. In **SPANIEN** hat er eine Fischvergiftung bekommen. Das war der Grund, warum er auf die Laufbahn der **Polizeimanufaktur** geschoben worden ist, genau so wie ich damals nach **Leiter Kommandante**, als ich von **NORD-RUSSLAND** gekommen bin. Der **IBENS** hat ein bayrisches Regiment geführt in **POLEN** und der **SCHACKY** war sein **Adjutant**.

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Station number of document : BT-248 (BERN Telephone)  
Date of document : 5 Dec 44  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : BT 248  
Cross-reference form to be filed in :  no serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...With the generals who are prepared to go along with the party, led by von Rundstedt as commander of the Western Front and GUDERIAN as commander of the Eastern Front, Himmeler is reported to have made a pact along the following lines:..."

there IS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS DOCUMENT

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Station number of document : OUT-25563 (To Paris)  
Date of document : 16 Dec 44  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in :   no serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...Generals JUDEKIAN and Runstedt to continue direction of military affairs..."

(Reference above to Himmler's plan for finding solution to German Internal Situation)

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Station number of document : 744-I (CIRCLE) (Boston Liaison)  
Date of document : January 1945  
Title of document : Fuel diverted to Eastern Front

Document to be filed in : Circle Material in <sup>RI/FILES</sup> ~~NY/FILES~~  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

Refer to Circle Material in ~~NY/FILES~~  
ca. 200-5-9 in Files

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Station number of document : 30087 ~~4x~~  
Date of document : 24 Jan 1945  
Title of document : Memorandum for the President  
Document to be filed in : 30087 (Central Files)  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ]  
Excerpt of pertinent information :

(p.1) "...Tab A is concerned with a proposal by von Kessel of the German Embassy in the Vatican, that he go to Switzerland and through von Hostitz, Counsellor of the German Legation in Bern, discuss peace possibilities with Marshals GUERIAN and Rundstedt..."

TAB A, p.1

"...Baron Ernst von Weizsaecker, the German Ambassador to the Holy See, and Albrecht von Kessel, first secretary to the Holy See, on 31 October 1944 informed a British representative that they were prepared to give important information concerning Marshal Heins GUERIAN..."

"REPLY BY THE ABOVE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE REQUEST OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT"

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Date of document : 26 Jan 45  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] no serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...B) Hitler now completely out of picture. Ribbentrop's position insignificant. Real leaders Himmler and Borman with military operations exclusively in hands of men like Runstedt and GUEMERIAN..."

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Station number of document : IN-2892 (REF ID: A517)  
Date of document : 30 Jan 45  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in :   no serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...January 23: Changes in the German High Command on Eastern Front: QUERIAN continues as Chief of General Staff, but no longer head of Oberkommando..."

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*SUR T: Guderian General*

COLONEL GENERAL GUDERIAN.

**SECRET**

*B-1497*

*7-Feb. 1945*

Le gen G. est le véritable créateur de l'Armée Cuirassée allemande. Bien que les unités de chars d'assaut aient eu leur premier développement sous le gen. Lutts, qui fut leur premier inspecteur, c'est G. qui a posé la doctrine de l'emploi des chars et a inspiré leur organisation et tenu le commandement des premières divisions.

Après la guerre de 1914-1918 l'état major allemand n'avait jamais abandonné les études sur les chars ou il avait été nettement devancé par l'ennemi. On suivit attentivement les progrès de la question à l'étranger. Le col. von Schell séjourna quelque temps aux Etats Unis pour se rendre compte de la situation des chars et de la motorisation. Il paraît qu'il y eut un contact ou les allemands firent des expériences chez les Russes profitant des bonnes relations qu'ils entretenaient alors avec les Soviets.

Guderian conte qu'à un certain moment se presenta la nécessité de fixer la conception d'emploi des chars pour y baser les constructions et l'organisation. Il étudia avec soin les réglementations françaises et anglaises et il se rallia à la conception anglaise de l'emploi d'unités cuirassées indépendantes.

Les idées de Guderian tardaient cependant à s'affirmer en Allemagne, car elles rencontraient une certaine opposition. Il conte qu'un jour il eut l'occasion d'en parler avec le Führer; la conversation dura deux heures et Hitler en sortit complètement persuadé. La thèse de G. avait triomphé, il était proposé à l'armée cuirassée et recevait tous les fonds nécessaires.

En 1938 Guderian était nommé commandant du premier corps cuirassé (le XVI) et en même temps inspecteur des troupes cuirassées et motorisées. La nouvelle arme prenait son plein essor. Au début de la guerre l'Allemagne disposait déjà d'une quinzaine de divisions cuirassées et motorisées. Guderian vient de l'infanterie. Au temps de la Reichswehr il commanda une des unités de transports automobiles consenties par le traité de Versailles. C'est là qu'on faisait les premières expériences sur les chars.

Dans la campagne de Pologne Guderian a commandé son corps d'armée cuirassé. En France il eut le commandement d'un groupement de divisions moto-cuirassées. En Russie en 1941 il était à la tête d'une armée cuirassée qui força le Dniepr entre Orcha et Mohileff et avança ensuite en direction de Moscou. Il n'y arriva pas.

Lors de la grande offensive d'hiver l'armée Guderian se trouva morcelée en petits groupes sur un front très large. Non préparés techniquement aux températures très basses de la Russie les chars allemands restèrent immobilisés. Battue par l'ennemi, l'armée perdit la presque totalité de ses chars et fut ainsi réduite à pied. Guderian fut l'une des victimes de l'insuccès général. Il tomba en disgrâce de Hitler et fut placé en retraite. D'autres

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généraux furent passés aux tribunaux. Il retourna à Berlin.

Le ressentiment du Führer contre lui était si fort qu'après un certain moment Guderian ayant désiré passer quelque temps en Italie, l'OKW lui refusa la permission.

En 1941 tout à coup Guderian fut rappelé en activité de service. Il fut nommé pour la deuxième fois inspecteur des chars d'assaut avec la mission de surveiller le développement du matériel, d'utiliser les exercices du front, d'inspecter l'instruction des unités. Mais il n'avait reçu aucun commandement des troupes. Après l'attentat du 20 juillet il fut nommé chef d'état-major de l'armée ce qui comporta le commandement de tout le front russe. Et maintenant on parle de sa substitution avec le maréchal von Manstein.

Guderian est âgé de 55 ans à peu près. De taille forte, on figure aux pommettes saillantes aigües, l'influence du sang slave comme on il arrive souvent en Prusse.

Il est un homme plein de vitalité, énergique, très actif. Bon théoricien de l'emploi des chars, il a écrit un excellent livre, il a démontré sur le champ de bataille d'être un très bon chef d'unités cuirassées. Mais on peut se demander s'il a l'envergure pour les commandements plus élevés de la guerre.

Guderian est un ambitieux. On ne connaît de lui aucune particularité politique. Il a certainement de bonnes relations avec les milieux industriels. Il jouissait d'un grand prestige, on ne sait dans quelle mesure il l'a gardé.

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Station number of document : T-3323  
Date of document : 14 Feb 1945  
Title of document : Volksturm organization  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : T-3323  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...Keitel ranks high amongst Hitler's favorites at present, but the higher officers do not rely on him. GUNTERIAN has a somewhat better reputation amongst officer circles, but many consider he is a fox who agrees always with the last person he spoke to..."

THERE IS NO MORE PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : XI-6139e  
Date of document : 9 Mar 1945  
Title of document : Report of captured German generals'  
conversations  
Document to be filed in : XI-6139e (pg. 5)  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...General von BOTHKIRCH commented as below to General von THOMA and Generalmajor BASSENGE on the optimism GUDERIAN is reported to have expressed about the Eastern Front: (German text: Appendix (j))...

...THOMA : (Translates from an evening paper what GUDERIAN said when visiting the Eastern Front with HITLER, culminating in the sentence): 'So that we shall not only halt the Soviet armies but we shall also beat them back and re-conquer the once so important provinces.'

BOTHKIRCH: I simply cannot understand it. I am completely shattered, firstly because GUDERIAN ~~SEE~~ says it and secondly because I consider it very bad when we generals talk such rubbish, our position is very bad as it is, very bad indeed...

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RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : 902-X (CIRCLE)  
Date of document : 14 May 1945  
Title of document : Japanese report of conditions in Russia  
and on the Eastern Front  
Document to be filed in : Circle Material in <sup>RI/FILES</sup> 20-5-9 Registry  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] o serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

Refer to Circle Material in ~~20-5-9 Registry~~  
20-5-9 in Files

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Ref No SAIC/L/6  
28 May 45

**SECRET**  
Auth: CG, 7th Army  
Init: [redacted]  
Date: 28 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER  
APO 758 US ARMY

Copy No. 34

If the information contained in this report is required for further distribution, it should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the prisoners' names or of the methods by which the information has been obtained.

The following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners mentioned in this report:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank, Position</u>	<u>Secret No</u>
GUDERIAN, Heinz	GENERAL (Col Gen) FUHRER RESERVE (Office Pool). Formerly Chief of Staff German Ground Forces and Inspector General of Armed Units.	45/1559
VON GEYER, Leo	GEN D PATRIOTTE (Lt Gen), Inspector of Armored units, formerly German Mil Attaché in LONDON.	45/1562
HANSEN, Paul	OBSTGRUP (Col Gen of AFFEN SS), ex-CG, Army Group "G".	45/1561

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FOR COORDINATION WITH Army

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Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act  
PL105-246

By: hmc Date: 5/1/72

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I. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

GUDERIAN: Everything went well at the start. After the fall of SMOLENSK our high command was faced with the same choice of decisions as NAPOLEON in 1812: Should I first go to MOSCOW, or should I first conquer the UKRAINE and occupy Russia's national granary..... or should I go to conquer Leningrad in order to get the Baltic Sea under my control. This problem had been considered earlier, because everyone knew that such a decision would have to be made sometime. Even before this campaign the FUEHRER had decided to take Leningrad first, in order to have the entire Baltic Sea under his control, and thus establish a naval base supporting the German left flank. At the time when our troops stood at the gates of Leningrad, and when the drive was held up at Kiev, on our right flank, he suddenly changed his mind. He abandoned the idea to take Leningrad first--an attempt which could have succeeded. Nor did he attempt to take MOSCOW as NAPOLEON had done--in spite of our firm conviction that MOSCOW could be taken. In fact, I had already given orders for an attack on MOSCOW for 15 Aug with my PANZER Army. Instead he decided, after weeks of thought, to conquer the UKRAINE first. Thus, on 25 Aug, I had to head back in a southwesterly direction toward Kiev, instead of being allowed to start my drive toward MOSCOW. Well, at least the capture of Kiev resulted in the isolation and surrender of an army group. But it set us back 4 weeks in our advance toward MOSCOW. It got us into the muddy season, where the mud made traffic on ordinary roads impossible, and retarded it very much even on hard-surfaced roads. It was winter before it got too cold. You mustn't underestimate MOSCOW's importance. MOSCOW is not only the capital of Russia, but considering the conditions of 1941, it was the hub of Russia's communication system. All the connections between North and South which were still usable, all double-track railroad line, all the main telegraph and telephone lines, all canals and navigable rivers...everything passed through MOSCOW. Whoever controlled MOSCOW also controlled the political affairs, a powerful armament industry, and a traffic and communications center of that nation, and could split Russia into two parts. I personally presented this case to the FUEHRER on the night of 23 Aug 1941. Then he was still undecided. Later the order was given to take the UKRAINE. I was called to him to present my plan for the attack on MOSCOW once again. And once again I tried to change his mind. At that time he still could control himself sufficiently to listen to me and let me finish my story. Once more I pictured the vital importance of MOSCOW to us and explained to him, that if we could capture MOSCOW in the early fall toward the end of September, we could cut Russia in two parts. And then we could still decide whether to occupy the Southern or the Northern half first. That was the purely military angle of the affair. Now let us consider the political angle, which was equally important. It was believed that the STALIN regime would break down politically. But in order to bring this regime to a collapse it was necessary to occupy MOSCOW. We should have pursued a policy of convincing the Russian people that they would get a better deal if they cooperated with us. We should not have said, as we did: "We shall cut Russia into small pieces. We shall divide it and make a German colony out of it." Thus the Russians, even those who were against STALIN, the White Russians, said: "No, we won't have that." This was our great political error. The decision to take the UKRAINE first, which resulted in the unsuccessful winter campaign against MOSCOW, and the misguided policy toward the Russian people--these two were the reasons why we did not find the necessary support among

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the population, nor the military strength to finish this campaign as quickly as possible. And this was so essential, because there still was an undefeated enemy in the West. On top of everything, Japan and America came to grips, and we thought we might have to enter that conflict too. So we issued a new declaration of war, which added America to the side of our enemies. I don't know the reasons for this last decision. But I was at the front, commanding my army, and thus couldn't familiarize myself with every detail.

\* \* \*

(Re: Why KIEV was taken first and not MOSCOW)

GUD: I conferred with the FUHRER twice about this question; once on 3 Aug and once on 23 Aug. At that time the general staff, too, was in favor of attacking MOSCOW first.

GETR: When the PANZER Army GUDERIAN finally did attack, we had a temperature of 35 deg (C) below and an icy wind..... At that time the only way to employ armored divisions was to gather the tanks of a number of different divisions. That shows how few tanks we had left. There was no time for repairs, nor did we have the necessary equipment and spare parts. My own division, which I had led up to that campaign, was reduced to 12 tanks at MOSCOW.

INTERROGATING OFFICER: How high do you estimate the casualties at that time?

GUD: During the winter campaign of 1941 they were not too high. Our principal losses were caused through the cold. But to be honest, our casualties weren't abnormally high until we came to STALINGRAD. Those were our first catastrophic losses. Then we had these terrific envelopments. We had some 300,000 casualties there. From then on, with these continued envelopments of large units, we suffered our first irreplaceable losses. That was also where the German soldier's morale started its downward slide. There he lost his sense of invincibility. Our men took part in practically every attack, without complaint. But in this final campaign we no longer could attack. None of our attacks succeeded. And before that, not even our most difficult attacks failed.

\* \* \*

(Re: Count VON SCHULENBERG)

GUD: He was a native of MOSCOW, went to school there, and was said to be exceedingly well acquainted with the country. From a military point of view, he was one of the best authorities on Russian tactics, and in addition to that he had very good connections in Russian military circles. I knew that for a certainty. He operated just like a Russian. The Russians were more open and more friendly toward him than they were toward most foreigners. Thus we always were well informed. Nobody can say that his reports were incorrect, but no one would believe them.

\* \* \*

GUD: If fewer of our outstanding strategists had been dismissed in 1943 and at the end of 1941, we would have fought an entirely different war. I myself, was relieved of my command on the basis of a false report which a senior general had made about me. In Jan 1942, after returning from Russia, I demanded an investigation by a military court. It was my intention to have the facts straightened out. My

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request was not granted. In the case of another general, an investigation was also refused. One general filed a suit, which, however, was not carried through. In the following spring a law was passed which suspended the regular courts. Thus the dictatorship was firmly entrenched in the army. From then on it was impossible to file a suit, or to demand a trial. Later, when the law was intensified, it even became impossible to resign. My predecessor as Chief of the General Staff handed in his resignation five times, but it was never accepted. When I was assigned to the General Staff without being consulted about the assignment, I was received with these words: "I do not want you to start out by tendering your resignation. It wouldn't be granted anyway. It is up to me (HITLER) whether you stay in your office or not--your wishes are of no consequence. I alone am responsible for what happens--not you!"

\* \* \* \* \*

## II. THE INVASION

- IO: There is a sharp difference between the tank battles on the Eastern front, and those of the Western front. Those in the EAST were always on a larger scale.
- GEYR: That is just what we wanted. We wanted to spare our tanks, in order to be able to engage the Americans and the English in a real fight where we could put our experiences of the Eastern front to good use. I was of a different opinion than ROMMEL. I expected your landing to be successful. The Anglo-Saxon world had prepared itself for a landing--and we could not stop the guns of the Anglo-American fleet and its aircover with merely a few mines. The troops would simply walk ashore. There was our one chance to engage the Allies in a real tank battle, while PATTON was still assembling his units. It would have been a boon to my old days, if I had another chance to fight with the divisions I had trained myself. But fate wouldn't have it so.... ROMMEL's armored divisions were largely dispersed, and under constant AT fire.
- IO: But it was almost 2 months after the invasion before PATTON broke through at AVRANCHES.
- GEYR: That made our mistake a worse one yet.
- IO: He forced you into a very small pocket.
- GEYR: That is the reason why I was relieved. After CHERBOURG was taken, everyone realized, including MARSHALL BUNDESTEDT that the CAEN bridge head would have to be vacated. I proposed that in order to save the armored divisions, so that I could let them get some rest and then commit them on the left flank. Every would-be officer realized that the Americans would come down from CHERBOURG to break through our 7th Army positions. I had the divisions (to stop them) but was not permitted to employ them in this manner.
- IO: It was too late, even then. We already had CHERBOURG.
- GEYR: There was slim chance of success. But our chances would have been much better at AVRANCHES. At that time you could have been defeated.
- IO: I still remember that there were armored divisions opposing us. And we always wondered when they would be committed.

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GETR: I can tell you exactly, which divisions I had in store for you. The 17 SS Division and the division "DAS REICH," a first rate outfit, were reserved for the Americans. Then we had saved for you the "LEIBSTANDARTE" and "HITLERJUGEND" divisions and large components of the 21 Armored and the 5 Armored. That was quite a far cry from the overstrained 17 Division. They were a brave new unit, more or less the only ones in the 7 Army sector who fought brilliantly. Besides that there were a few medium-sized armored units which did not belong to the 7 Army sector.

HAUSSER: There was also the LEHR division. It was further back, on the right flank.

GETR: According to the original plan, the (PANZER) LEHR division was not to be committed. But I could not withdraw it from the vicinity of BAYEUX except by vacating the CAEN bridgehead. That bridgehead was no longer of any use to us anyway. The time for throwing the British from the bridgehead back into the sea had long passed. It was only a matter of holding a few plain fields.... Unfortunately I was not to have the pleasure of crossing swords with General PATTON. I really would have enjoyed that. It was beyond me, why we could not have committed a PANZER army in this decisive battle against your forces. Then at least we would have fought on an even basis.

\* \* \*

GETR: The situation at CAEN was as follows: On the morning after the attack there were but 300 men left with the surviving commander of the division which had been hit on the coast! That is what I found when I took over two days later, having missed the beginning. The remainder of the division had been destroyed by the allied warships of which you know more than I do. But I know how effective they are! And then no one wanted to believe us when we told them how far inland the guns of these warships could fire. They just wouldn't believe our reports. There I had but one reply: Gentlemen, just stand there for a while and you'll find out how far they can fire."

GUD: In our reports to headquarters these and many other descriptions were simply not believed. That was our hard luck. Our misfortune in this war, one of many, was that the majority of our leading personalities never had any front line commands during the war. When it was reported, for example, that the British fleet was outside CAEN, that they could fire as far as 30 km inland, and that therefore it would be senseless to leave our armored divisions within the range of their artillery--someone would simply maintain that they couldn't fire that far. And they would claim next, that just these last 3 or 5 km would make all the difference. The people who made these statements never took an active part in the war themselves. They got all their experience at sessions of the conference table.

\* \* \*

IO: We could not understand why the invasion in the South of France succeeded so easily. You must have been prepared. After all, you had daily reconnaissance missions over Corsica, North Africa, and Italy. You must have suspected something. And you must have seen our boats which were on reconnaissance patrol along the coast.

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GUD: The reason for this lies in our peculiar evaluation of defensive strength, which is indicative of our strategy during the last year of this war. It was purely a strategy of lines (LINEAR-STRATEGIE). Our system of fortifications was arranged along a number of lines. First the WESTWALL, which was only one line for all practical purposes. The line behind it had not been completed. Then the ATLANTIKWALL was built, again nothing but one line. And this was the line in which all available divisions were committed. When it was suggested to assemble our armored divisions behind it, as a mobile reserve which could be used to oppose an attack, regardless of where it may come from, we were told: "No, they would be too late, everything will have to be thrown into the front line." ROMMEL was the main proponent of this strategy.

IO: How is it, that ROMMEL favored such a theory? He should have learned his lesson in North Africa.

GUD: ROMMEL was the principal proponent of this theory in France. Later on KLUGE followed suit. And it was impossible for me to do anything against it. A fortress such as ANTWERP, for example, was not utilized. It had neither ammunition or armament worth mentioning. That was the worst blunder we could possibly have made. And we did not fortify PARIS! Nor did we repair the fortresses VERDUN, EPINAL, BELFORT, METZ, or STRASSBURG so that they could be used. We simply had two lines: the ATLANTIKWALL--which was expected to fail like any other installation of its kind wherever the enemy would attack; and then the WESTWALL--another line which was expected to succumb wherever the enemy would concentrate all his efforts.

H: ROMMEL and I were at odds about this for many months. Then General GUDERIAN himself came to France in order to back me up. But unfortunately it was impossible to achieve anything.

GUD: I was sent to ROMMEL for that particular purpose. But HITLER told me: "I can't tell the Fieldmarshal in command how to run his business."

H: We knew exactly, even before the invasion started, that the ratio of allied armored recon cars (PANZERSPAERWAGEN) to ours was 15 to 1; tanks, 10 to 1; and planes, 30 or 50 to 1. And in view of this situation our only hope for victory lay with mobile warfare.

GETR: ROMMEL was a fairly good tactician, but he didn't have the faintest idea about strategy.

GUD: ROMMEL was excellent as high up as a corps commander. He was a first rate divisional commander, because he was courageous, went to the front, and participated in everything. But later, when he commanded an army, using the same technique, he lacked the vision which is essential for such a task. You know, it takes time to learn to lead large and fast armored units. And ROMMEL was not a tank expert. After all, you can't suddenly replace years of schooling by intuition. ROMMEL lost some of his nerve in Africa.

IO: What do you think of our General PATTON?

GUD: General PATTON did what we would have liked to have done and what we used to do. He was very fast, which could already be seen in NORMANDY. I was with the FUHRER when PATTON's drive started. He said:

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"That is nothing but the shameless daring of a few tanks. Our Generals never could have done that." I told him that our breaking through the French Maginot line toward the Atlantic coastline had proceeded in the same manner. Our breakthrough to the Swiss border, our closing of the Russian pocket, both were based on the same principle. A tank commander who doesn't lead recklessly can never be successful. Fate gives him just a few minutes or a few hours in which to do his stuff.

\* \* \*

GUD: The coordination of your air force with your armored force in the Lorraine campaign was so outstanding, that I immediately included these American tactics into the curriculum of our armored forces' school at BERGEN.

GEYR: Even earlier than that, in NORMANDY, we could distinctly recognize the American spearheads by the planes which circled over them continually in order to clear the way--and which gave us no end of trouble. Did you know that the TIMES (London Times) gave us the clue as to the length of time for which American armored divisions would not be liable to attack! I saw the article myself where the censor missed it, and I also showed it to MARSHALL BUNDSTEDT. I knew the TIMES very well, and therefore read it very thoroughly. If you know the British well, you'll know that not one of them reads the first or second page of a paper--including their censors. They begin with the middle. Since I am very much interested in English reading matter, . . . . . I discovered on the second page--among notices of the pork market and agricultural news--a short report of a meeting between representatives of American armored units, the War Office, and landholders, dealing with negotiations for maneuver areas for American armored divisions. Speeches were made, warning the landowners that they would have to expect quite a lot of damage, since the maneuvers were to be primarily night operations. All this was printed in the TIMES, as well as the fact that the divisions would not arrive before 15 Feb, if I remember the date correctly. We could deduce from that, how long it would take you to get ready for an invasion.

H: Right after the invasion started, and when the FUEHRER complained because we hadn't pushed the Americans into the sea, I explained to him that I couldn't make up with my armored contingents alone for the failure of the Navy and the Air Force.

\* \* \* \* \*

### III. MISCELLANY

GEYR: I was deeply grieved when I heard that ALSACE was definitely to become French. ALSACE is German soil--LORRRAINE is French. I was hoping that there was the possibility of a compromise using the U.S.A. as an intermediary, and that the decision might be postponed for the time being. After all, no true German can ever forget ALSACE. Twice, Germany treated the Alsatians awkwardly. The first time after 1870 and again this time. The point at present is not to incorporate ALSACE into Germany. It would be a better policy, if the Alsatians would have a neutral administration like that of the United States for a few years, and were then given the chance to hold a plebiscite. . . . . Therefore it was considered good news, that the

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SABR territory was to be under Arabian jurisdiction. Mc Donogh can be unbiassed about these questions, not in the British. The idea of a "Balance of Power" is of prime importance to the Englishman. There was a bitter struggle between EISENHOWER and Sir VIVI SCOTT's schools of thought concerning this point. England under her present leadership is not in the position to be as impartial toward European problems as the United States would be. One must look at this realistically. A far-reaching and fair solution of Europe's economic problems is possible only under the leadership of the United States.

(Re: MACHAU)

QUD: We can't understand that. Even our own circle was affected. The chief of my operational department was in MACHAU. I never got any news from him. My wife couldn't utter a word, or she, too, would have been sent to MACHAU. Do know of a few of these dirty affairs in the concentration camps.

IO: Couldn't you go there yourself?

QUD: No, that was impossible....MILKIN was responsible for all the atrocities.

QDR: I was with RIMMENDORF for one year as a military attaché. I only stayed with him out of a sense of duty. He was no professional diplomat who knew his business. He had lived in Canada for a while, and thought that the British were just like the Canadians. But they are quite different--you can't compare the two nations. And guided by his ignorance he believed that he understood the English people.

QDR: In the summer of '43 and the fall of '44 our generals explained to our Foreign Minister that a two-front war would be impossible. The front in the East could be held only if the West could be pacified. He would have to be free on one side. I presented these ideas not only to the Foreign Minister, but also to the PREMIER. It was impossible to get them to consider these questions seriously.

QDR: During the Polish campaign, the PREMIER was with me, only 50 meters behind the front line--he was still with me in France--but never in Russia.

IO: He would stay around as long as everything went well, but no longer.

QDR: That was not the reason--he left because he had to fly South. Only a few weeks ago he was still with some divisional headquarters near the QDR. He was not to be blamed himself! The PREMIER was no coward but the fault lay with his friends, who kept him more and more in the dark, without themselves knowing anything about warfare. You had to didn't follow my advice to join his son. However, his health wasn't up to standard anymore. There actually were some men in his

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circle, men of Supreme Headquarters such as JODL, ZEITLER or DOR-  
MANN, who never came anywhere near the front.

GEYR: At least ZEITLER commanded a Corps at one time.

H: But he never left his headquarters to go forward. He never came  
closer to the front than his corps headquarters. I remember him  
from the French campaign with the PANZERGRUPPE KLEIST, where he was  
was my superior. Not once during the entire campaign did he come to  
my headquarters.

\* \* \*

GUD: I never heard anyone present a viewpoint at the FUEHRER HQ which  
differed from that of the FUEHRER.

IO: That is not what GOERING told us. He claimed that he had numerous  
quarrels with HITLER about the employment of the air force.

GUD: That is unquestionably true. They argued at every meeting...but  
those were onesided arguments.

\* \* \* \* \*

28 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

*Paul Kubala*  
PAUL KUBALA,  
Maj, MI,  
Commanding.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

**SECRET**

1948 JAN 29 9 04

PAGE No.

FROM: [ ] ROUTINE  
 TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 28 JAN 48  
 ACTION: BOD (1-2) IN 33897  
 INFORMATION: ADGO (3-4), COPS (5), ORD (6), FBI (7), ICS (8).

Paragraphs Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) GSA AB-300-5

[ ] 1970

TO: WASHF

INFO: HEID

CITE: [ ]

*Handwritten notes:*  
ODS/B  
for  
2 Feb  
C 8/44

1. DAILY WORKER, DATED 25 JANUARY 1948, CARRIED ARTICLE ENTITLED "NAZI SPY SERVICE REVIVED BY AMERICANS". ARTICLE STATES FORMER FIELD MARSHALL HEINZ GUDERIAN HAS HAD NEW JOB ASSIGNED HIM BY AMERICANS. HIS TASKS ARE:

A. INFILTRATE ON AND COOPERATION WITH UNDERGROUND FASCIST ORGANIZATIONS IN EUROPE.

B. REVIVAL AND REORGANIZATION OF THE FORMER ABWEHR.

2. ARTICLE FURTHER STATES "GUDERIAN'S HEADQUARTERS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AT ALLENDORF AND CHIEF OF STAFF IS MAJOR SCHAEFFER WHO AMERICANS CLAIM WAS THEIR AGENT IN THE ABWEHR DURING THE WAR".

3. IT FURTHER STATES: "ALLEN DULLES, FORMER AGENT OF U.S. OSS IN SWITZERLAND AND IS SAID TO BE THE INSPIRED OF THE ORGANIZATION"

INTELLIGENCE
MAY 12 1962
INTEGRATION DIVISION
SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED

TO: 0015Z 29 JAN 48

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 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
 DATE 2007

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Page No.

To:	[ ]	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	30 JAN 48
Confirmation:	BCD (1-2)	OUT 56116
Information:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CID (6), FBI (7)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (2) GSA AR-300-6

WASH 2184

TO: [ ] CITE: WASHF

RE [ ] 978 (IN 33897)

CONTROL

1. NO CONNECTION THIS ORGANIZATION WITH ANY SUCH OPERATION.
2. DAILY WORKER MAY BE REFERRING TO OPERATION WITH WHICH [ ] IS FAMILIAR.

[ ] OPERA RELEASING OFFICER	[ ] RH ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICER	[ ] INTELLIGENCE MAY 12 1962 INTEGRATION DIVISION [ ] [ ]
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TOD: 1948 30 JAN 48

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3020  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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1948 FEB 4 9 32 Page No.

FROM: **FRANK FURT**  
**HEIDELBERG** ROUTINE

TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 3 FEB 48

ACTION: FDM (1-2) IN 34287

INFORMATION: ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), ORD (6), BCD (7), IOS (8)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) GSA AR-390-5

FRAN 646

TO: WASHF INFO: [ ] HEID, BRLN CITE: FRAN  
 RE [ ] 970 (IN 35897), HEID 2874 (IN 35946), WGBA 1175

1. MA PRAGUE REPORTED THAT ON 23 JANUARY COMBIE NEWSPAPER RUDE PRAVO CARRIED ARTICLE ON GUDERIAN AND MAJOR SCHAEFFER SUBSTANTIALLY SAME AS REPORTS IN TAGLICHE RUNDSCHAU AND DAILY WORKER.
2. AT ALLENDORF IS INSTALLATION OF HISTORICAL DIV. EUCOM WHERE GERMAN GENERALS WRITING STUDIES OF WORLD WAR II FOR DEPARTMENT OF ARMY. GUDERIAN AT ALLENDORF. MAJOR SCHAEFFER NOT KNOWN ODDI. NO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES INVOLVED.
3. ODDI PLANS NO ACTION.

INTELLIGENCE	
MAY 12 1962	
INTEGRATION DIVISION	
APPROVED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
INDEX	<input type="checkbox"/>

TOR: 1842Z 3 FEB 48

**SECRET**

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-58850-1

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 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
 DATE 2007

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

**SECRET** 1948 FEB 4 11 41 AM No.

FROM:	HEIDELBERG	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	3 FEB 48
ACTION:	FEM (1-2)	IN 34287A
INFORMATION:	ADSO (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6), BCD (7), ICS (8)	

*Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) GSA AR-300-5*

FRAH 646

CORRECTION

THE CORRECT STATION FOR THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE FRANKFURT INSTEAD OF HEIDELBERG.

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DATE 2007

C.C.U.

TOR:

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**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : Foreign Service of the U.S.  
Date of document : 2 Apr 48  
Title of document : Communist Daily Hoy (newspaper) alleges  
U.S. is recruiting from former Nazi  
espionage agents  
Document to be filed in : 19-4-3-21  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information : To Sec. of State  
(Lester D. Mallory, Counselor of American Embassy at Habana, Cuba reports):

"...that the Communist daily Hoy carried a story March 26, 1948 alleging that former Nazi Marshall GUDERIAN was re-establishing the Abwehr (secret service) for the U.S..."

THERE IS NO MORE PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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[ ] serial

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(700)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

**SECRET**

Page No.

FROM: [ ] ROUTINE  
 TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 6 AUG 48  
 ACTION: FBI (1-2) III 49650  
 INFORMATION: ACSC (3-4), COPS (5), CRD (6)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) G.O.A. AR-300-5

[ ] 262

TO: WASHF INFO: KARL, LONI CITE: [ ]  
 SOURCE [ ] , FROM 2 POLISH SUBSOURCES.

U.D.P. HAS UNDER ARREST AS ALLEGED A.I.S. AGENT ONE DOBOSZEWSKI OR DOBOSZINSKI WHO HAS WELL-KNOWN PRO-NAZI RECORD. DOBOSZEWSKI IS REPORTED TO HAVE INVOLVED LARGE NUMBER OF OTHER POLES STATED TO BE PART OF HIS NETWORK WHICH SUPPOSEDLY ACTIVATED BY GENERAL GUDERIAN UNDER AMERICAN CONTROL. POLISH POLICE IS PREPARING SENSATIONAL CASE TO EXPOSE AMERICAN USE OF FORMER GERMAN RESEAU. HAVE YOU ANY CONFIRMATION ABOVE WHICH SUGGESTS TO US RUSTY OPERATION.

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*Ran*

INTELLIGENCE	
MAY 12 1952	
INTEGRATION DIVISION	
SEARCHED	INDEX
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TOR: 1740Z 6 AUG 48

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**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : WEL-9168  
Date of document : Dec. 1948  
Title of document : Misc. Information on Syria  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : 69-7-0-55y  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] no serial

**Excerpt of pertinent information :**

"... It is reported that a German called STUDER (fnu) who has recently been staying in Zürich, claims to be a representative of General GUDERIAN, who according to STUDER, is making preparations for organizing German military units in the American zone of Germany. STUDER claims to be an ex-Major or Col. of the German Army..."

THERE IS NO MORE PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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[ ] serial

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**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

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Station number of document : MSBA 2104  
Date of document : 18 Feb 49  
Title of document : Further conversation with Swiss Journalist  
Otto PÜNTER regarding FOOTE affair.  
Document to be filed in : 200-6-1-95-4 (encl. 2) -see Jane Winslow,  
IN SIC  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] no serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...information...contributed by Pünter includes his statements that  
1) The most effective intelligence network now operating against  
the Soviet Union is directed by the former Panzer Army General GUDERIAN..."

THERE IS NO MORE PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

OK for Extract [ ] (sic)  
Date- 7 May 52

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DATE 2007

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[ ] no serial

**SECRET**

**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : MAVA-3174  
Date of document : 25 Jul 49  
Title of document : Hungarian Misc.  
OK for extract Rena L. Galt - Austrian (date) \_\_\_\_\_  
(signed) \_\_\_\_\_ MAY 52 \_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : 201-4788 6-5-2-905  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] no serial.

**Excerpt of pertinent information :**

"...h) After the Meeting, [ ] talked with Ferenc KOVACS, and learned that he had a network in Hungary which was formerly financed by a group of former German Abwehr officers headed by (Gen) GUDERIAN which, in turn, operated for the Americans..."

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[ ] -no serial

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**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : IN-39649 (Italy) T/S [ ] 39)  
Date of document : 10 Aug 49  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] o serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

\*\*\*T/S document; see Signal center archives

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DATE 2007

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[ ] serial

**SECRET**

**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : IN-41148 (Italy) T/S [ ] 3337  
Date of document : 25 Aug 49  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

(**CABLE**)  
\*\*\*T/S document; see Signal Center Archives

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

**SECRET**

[ ] serial

SECRET

RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : MOGA-10448  
Date of document : 25 Aug 1949  
Title of document : Poles in Germany  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : 32-8-3-8v2 (pg. 8)  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...In addition, Waliwijski stated that American Intelligence in Germany is being directed by the former German General GUDERIAN..."

THERE IS NO MORE PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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[ ] serial

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**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : MGLA-802  
Date of document : 18 Nov 1949  
Title of document : ODEUM- General SPEIDEL  
\*\*\*\*\*OK for extract [ ]  
Document to be filed in : 32-6-9-23  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] o serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...At one time UTILITY intervened when GUDERIAN was engaged in certain negotiations with the Swiss. He was also critical of GUDERIAN publicizing himself through his articles appearing in the U.S. Armored Cavalry Journal..."

THERE IS NO MORE PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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[ ] o serial

SECRET

RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : MEBA-5337  
Date of document : 19 Jan 1950  
Title of document : Penmality Target, Former German  
\*\*\*OK for extract 8 May 52 (date) : Lt. Col. Rudolf  
[ ]  
Document to be filed in : 32-6-2-1864  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

- " 1.  
"...According to [ ], ex-Oberstleutnant RUDOLF, noted anti-tank expert on GUDERIAN's staff, belongs to the group of ranking East Zone police officials who were sent to the USSR in Fall of 1949 to attend a training course...
- ...2...Since 1943 he served on the Staff of General GUDERIAN as a specialist in tank defenses...
- ...3...The most obvious method of approach suggesting itself would be to obtain a letter of introduction from General GUDERIAN. Would it be possible to contact GUDERIAN through the Historical Section in order to establish how close the relationship that existed between him and RUDOLF was and to obtain such other data on his personal and military background which would assist us in devising the right kind of approach?
- 4...If you prefer the undersigned would be willing to talk to GUDERIAN, provided the necessary cover arrangements can be made from your end."

THERE IS NO MORE PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE  
DATE 2007

[ ] serial

2P

From: Italy Report No: CIA-5682 Date: 25 January 1950

No. of pages: 1 No. of illustrations:

Report made by: [ ] Approved by: [ ]

Distribution:  
By copy to  
Washington (3)  
Karlsruhe

File codes:  
[ ]  
Files (2)

MICROFILMED  
MAR 14 1962  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

*(1) N. ... T...*

Source: [ ] Reference:

Source: Operational Data and Documents

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RI/...	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
RI/Files	<input type="checkbox"/>

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

SECRET/CONTROL (U. S. officials only)  
REGISTRY CONTROL

[ ]

Subject: General ~~XXXXXX~~ - Desires to Report to. : rIK-5082  
See General ~~XXXXXX~~

Place acquired: Italy, Rome

Date of info. : December 1949

Evaluation : C-3

Date acquired : Mid-December 1949

Source : [ ]

Date of report: 25 January 1950

1. Until mid-1949 subject took active part in political developments in Germany. He retired to Dietrichsdorf (Northern Bavaria) to write his memoirs a few months ago. Subject sustains the theory of neutrality of Germany, i.e., evacuation of Germany by the occupying powers in order to reunite Germany and eliminate the "Iron Curtain" which would soothe the tension between the allies.
2. This conception of subject, in part (all Germans wish for the elimination of the divisions of zones) is, however, poorly used by political groups (Laubacher circles - Professor ~~XXXXXX~~).
3. General ~~XXXXXX~~'s political counsellor is a certain ~~XXXXXX~~ STEIN who is a follower of ~~XXXXXX~~ and in a certain sense a propagandist of the theory that "a Communist Germany is preferable to no Germany". All attempts made to have ~~XXXXXX~~ change his opinion have been to no avail.
4. Now, as in the past, subject would like to come to Italy and possibly to meet with the Italian Chief of Staff. Subject has known General ~~XXXXXX~~ since the time in which the latter was in Berlin and has indicated him as his friend.
5. Field Comment: The above report originates with a former high Nazi party official (to be identified by ~~XXXXXX~~) who is at present in Rome and who recently entered into contact with subject.

Classification: SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL (U. S. officials only)

- 6

75 000V

VIA: Spec for Extract  
R. Brooks & Mays  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. MGB-A-14007

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, FDM  
DATE: 27 January 1950  
FROM : Chief of Station, Kaploruho  
SUBJECT: GENERAL. Operational  
SPECIFIC. Personality Targets - Former German Lt. Col. RUDOLF  
REF : MGBA-5337

1. Before approaching the Historical Division, or any other agency in this matter, request that security and political implications of the case be considered, both by Washington and Berlin. GUDERIAN is a very good friend of the Chief of the Analysis Division, ODEUM. He has a reputation for indiscretion and for lack of political tact. He is, however, reported to be an enthusiastic anti-Communist and would, no doubt, want to be helpful.

2. Perhaps the hardest problem is how to get to GUDERIAN. I raised the question sometime ago whether we should attempt any operational liaison with Historical Division, EUCOM, and advised us not to do so. Furthermore, the Historical Division may have been somewhat discredited recently with its Generals by:

- A. Their requests for plans for the defense of Western Germany,
- B. ADENAUER's statement that the Allies had requested such plans, and
- C. MCCLOY's denial.

3. As a final consideration, I might add that GUDERIAN is the center of a beehive of all sorts of activity. Personalities from various departments in Washington come to talk with him, German politicians approach him, CIC watches him, Historical Division employs him, HICOG on the local level sends out interrogators to ask him questions, and everybody who is writing a book corresponds with him. Thus, if he should happen to be indiscrete about our little operation, we would certainly get good publicity!

*Original filed in 32-6-2-16037*

DIST:  
2 FDM, 1 BOB  
2 COB, 1 Reg  
FORM 8-54 11-54

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DISPATCH NO MGB-A-5461

VIA AIR  
SPECIAL AIR OR SEA ROUTE

**SECRET**

CLASSIFICATION

DATE 7 February 1950

*OK for Extract  
SRB/MS 8 May 52*

TO Chief, Foreign Division "H"  
FROM Chief of Station, Karlsruhe  
SUBJECT General - Operational  
Specific - Personality Targets - Former German  
Lt. Col. RUDOLF  
REF MGB-A-5337; MGK-A-14009

1. We agree that there are weighty security and political considerations speaking against the direct approach of GUDERIAN in the above matter. Inasmuch as this is conceived to be a long-range project at least in the sense that RUDOLF for some time to come will be in the USSR, there is no need to decide at this stage whether it would be politic to enlist GUDERIAN's services operationally.

2. May we suggest that in order to assist our preliminary assessment of the worth-whileness of recruiting RUDOLF, GUDERIAN be approached preferably through a Historical Division cut-out, with a view to learning his estimate of RUDOLF's personal and military background.

3. Once we come to the point of approaching RUDOLF direct, we may be able to figure out a method by which GUDERIAN's knowledge of the operation as such, can be kept down to an absolute minimum. As in the case of the [ ] operation, all we really need would be a forcefully worded letter written by GUDERIAN introducing the bearer as a trusted representative of a competent agency. If this be feasible, we might even consider keeping the matter entirely in German channels so as to keep from GUDERIAN the knowledge that American interests are behind this.

4. We would appreciate learning your views on enlisting GUDERIAN's help as suggested above. We fully agree with the views expressed by COS in para 3 of his letter and propose to proceed in full awareness of the security factors conceivably involved.

Distribution:  
2-FDM  
1-COS  
20BUB

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : NRKA-33506

Date of document : 5 Mar 50

Title of document : ~~SECRET~~ Returned German PW .

OK for extract   7 May 52 (date) : a possible Soviet Agent

---

Document to be filed in : 32-6-7-1738

Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] so serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

Note: Document to be retained at EE/30/2 in UJ Drollery 4.  
 (Subject reports what Soviet IS instructed him to do:)  
~~\*\*\*~~  
 "...Subject would have to go to Western Germany and contact the former German General GUDERIAN and Halder, gain their confidence and report on the formation of the Western German Army and political activities in Western Germany..."

THERE IS NO MORE PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

**SECRET**

[ ] serial

RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : FDM  
Date of document : 8 Mar 50  
Title of document : Col. Stanislaw GANO's biographical  
background  
Document to be filed in : 60-5-1-11  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] o serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

**XXX** (Miss Renata von Natzmer was recruited by Polish IS, about 1929, as she worked in German Army office and allegedly had access to important documents. )

"...when Natzmer's chief went ~~mk~~ to lunch one day he left behind his keys to his office safe. In order to obtain the complete Plan 'O.K.', Warsaw headquarters made a copy of the key from the imprint which was supplied by Natzmer. The German officer who was Miss von Natzmer's chief and who had inadvertently left his key was Major Heinz GUDERIAN ~~WMA~~ who in 1943 became Col.General GUDERIAN, the Inspector General of the German Armed forces..."

THERE IS NO MORE PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

[ ] serial



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Station number of document : CIA 40560 T/S (32-6-12-71)  
Date of document : 21 Jun 50  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : Top Secret Room  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

\*\*\* See document for further information. T/S.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

Form No. 89-B  
April 1952

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

Page No.

FROM:	[ ]	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	5 JULY 50
ACTION:	FDP (1-2)	IN 32118
INFORMATION:	ADSO (3-L), STC (5), IID (6), 3/C (7-8-9), FOI (10)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) GSA AR-300-4

ROLE 5758

TO: WASHF

CITE: [ ]

RE PIR 6619, 26 MAY AND PIR 6801, 22 JUNE.

1. [ ] FURNISHED FOLLOWING INFORMATION REQUESTING EVALUATION SOONEST FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS. DETAILS OF OPERATION IN REFERENCE.

2. GERMAN ARMY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE RECENTLY RECONSTITUTED, WITH GENERAL WANTEUFEL CHIEF GENERAL STAFF; GENERAL GUDERIAN, CHIEF ARMORED BRANCH; AIR MARSHAL MILCH, CHIEF OF AIRFORCE. CHIEF INTELLIGENCE FOR WESTERN GERMANY IS MILHEISEN, RESIDENT REGENSBURG, EX-ABWEHR.

3. MILITARY ORGANIZATION DEVELOPING CLANDESTINELY UNDER BRUDERSCHAFT ORGANIZATION. FORMERLY EVANGELISTISCHE BRUDERSCHAFT.

4. REPORT ALLEGES ENTIRE RECONSTRUCTION OF SERVICE AND ARMY SPONSORED BY AMER-3/MS.

5. DEFICIT OBVIOUSLY PLACES GREAT IMPORTANCE ON REPORT. HOWEVER, POINTS OUT MILCH REPORTED IN ARGENTINA. WITH REFERENCE IN IID, REQUEST FULL EVALUATION, AS THIS REPORT CAN HAVE SERIOUS EFFECT ON LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS IF PROPER REASSURANCES NOT FORTHCOMING.

TOR: 2562 6 JULY 50

**SECRET**

	1	10
INTELLIGENCE		
MAY 13 1952		
INTEGRATION DIVISION		
SEARCHED	* COPY NO.	INDEX

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**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : MEIA-2713  
Date of document : 24 Jul 50  
Title of document : Reported Pullach Oper. Contacts  
Document to be filed in : 32-6-9-113  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

OK for extract [ ]

**Excerpt of pertinent information :**

"...3. This group would be assisted by a larger second echelon advisory board to include most of the individuals and groups which have lately been throwing their weight around in one way or the other, among them: QUERIA..."

(Reference is to "disposition in a future Bundespolizei or Polizei Bereitschaften.")

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

**SECRET**

[ ] no serial

SECRET

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Station number of document :       K-21-310        
Date of document :       22 Aug 50        
Title of document :       Osech IS activity of Horst BAUMGARTEN        
Ok for extract       [redacted] (date)        
  
Document to be filed in :       33-6-7-379        
Cross-reference form to be filed in :       [redacted] b serial      

Excerpt of pertinent information :

(Subject was told by Osech IS that--)

"...10. Further he was told that a new <sup>OSECH IS</sup> German IS existed and that the Americans were said to have given the task of reconstructing such an organization to Gen. GUDERIAN..."

THESE IS NO MORE PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

SECRET

[ ] serial

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. MOE-W-5963

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe      DATE: 24 August 1950  
FROM : Chief, FIM      Attn: FOS, POB  
SUBJECT: GENERAL-  
          SPECIFIC: Heins GUDERIAN

1. We assume that you are aware of GUDERIAN's proposed visit to Switzerland to consult with Swiss military leaders, but on the off-chance that you are not, we forward the following, extracted from DA MUCOM Intelligence Summary, Number 90, 18 July 1950:

"A certain German Haeder, Haederstrasse, Baden, Switzerland, in a letter dated 24 June 1950, covertly invited ex-General Heins Guderian to meet Swiss military leaders between the end of July and the end of September 1950, probably to discuss defense against tanks. In the letter Haeder thanked Guderian for accepting the invitation and stated that if Guderian's pass were not approved, Haeder, accompanied by two of Swiss military, would invite him for a meeting somewhere in Germany.

"Guderian has been working for Historical Division, MUCOM, and has been one of the leaders of the Deutsche Bewegung, a loose organization of German ex-officers, CID (B-3)."

2. The Swiss desk here has been notified of the foregoing.

RD:if  
82-7-51

RELEASING OFFICER  
RICHARD HELMS

COORDINATING OFFICER

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29  
JUN 1949


(766)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

Germany (American Zone)  
Opinions Expressed by Guderian  
Germany, Munich  
4 September 1950

A-2

The following views were expressed by ex-General Heinz Guderian in a conversation with a reliable American source.

1. As a military man, Guderian is occupied with trying to determine how the defense of the West can be made possible in its present shattered state. Like most of the former German generals, he rejects the concept of narrow German nationalism, and regards a Franco-German rapprochement as the first ~~and~~ prerequisite, without which no defense is possible, even with unlimited American backing. He believes in German participation in West-European defense plans, but only on terms of full equality; in this view also, he is completely in accord with his colleagues. He thinks that reinforcement of the American troops in Europe would have an enormous beneficial effect on German morale, even though he admits at the same time that an additional division or two would not materially alter the present situation from a purely military point of view, and though he believes that the average German is also able to recognize this fact. (He pointed out that the Constabulary's armored scout cars are not calculated to ~~impress~~ impress a German who has stood face to face with a T-34 tank.)

2. Guderian states flatly that as matters now stand Germans could not and would not resist a Soviet invasion, and should not be expected to do so. He is particularly impressed by the logic and applicability of the question ascribed to Stalin, "How many divisions does the Pope have?" and emphasizes that the number of divisions (or the number of combat troops actually available) is the only consideration which will carry ~~any weight~~ any weight. In this connection, he is deeply concerned by the extent of American commitment in Korea, which he sees as a danger to Europe. Incidentally, he thinks that the number of divisions in the United States Army, in proportion to the number of men under arms, is "shockingly" low and represents an uneconomical disposition of manpower.

3. General Guderian has much respect for the Russian soldier and also for Russian military leadership, and rejects the commonly held belief that Russian staff work is bad and that Soviet strength is based solely on masses of not very mobile units. He remarked that during the war he and his staff habitually tried to calculate what tactics on the part of the Russians would cause the most trouble to the Germans, and they found that precisely those tactics were always adopted by the Russians. Furthermore, he mentioned that the Germans considered the Russians' feat of bringing the Siberian divisions from the east to Moscow in less than two weeks to have been little short of a miracle.

4. If, in his published statements ~~in~~ and books, he puts stress on considerations of morale, ideological preparation, economic rehabilitation, etc., Guderian says this is chiefly lip service which he feels compelled to pay in public. These matters are of course important in their way and must not be ignored; but in his opinion the divisions always come first.

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DATE 2007

VIA: ATR  
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DISPATCH NO. MGL-1-3277

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division M

DATE: 11 September 1950

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

SUBJECT: GENERAL— ZIPPER - Operational

SPECIFIC— Special Connections, Personalities, No. 13,  
Heinz GUDERIAN (ZIPPER Alias; BRABUSMETTER)

1. GUDERIAN is now living in a small, modern house which he recently purchased in Puessen, a small town picturesquely situated at the foot of the Bavarian Alps in upper Swabia. He lives there very quietly with his wife, in somewhat straightened circumstances which he is endeavoring to improve by writing. He is presently revising (toning down) a recently completed book on the war, and writing articles, largely on tank warfare, for such magazines as US News and World Report. He has collaborated with Liddel HART on his post-war books, and is visited frequently by journalists. Among his recent American visitors have been old WEYGAND of the HEARST papers, and loud-mouthed Larry RUE, of the Chicago Tribune, both of whom made a better impression on him than they ever did on me.

2. GUDERIAN's connection to ZIPPER is that of a witting but unrewarded Special Connection. There was a close relationship between him and UTILITY towards the end of the war when GUDERIAN was Chief of Staff of the OKH and UTILITY Chief of Fremde Heere Ost. In practice, this meant that UTILITY was GUDERIAN's G-2, since, from the time of ZEITZLER's incumbency, the competence of the Chief of Staff of the OKH was virtually restricted to the war on the Eastern Front. ZIPPER's contact with GUDERIAN is maintained by Herr John von FREYEND, who lives not far away in the tiny village of Oberdorf bei Immenstadt, in Upper Bavaria. Our meeting took place on 4 September and was arranged as a social call (tea), being rendered convenient by the fact that I was returning from a Labor Day week end visit to Bregenz, and Puessen just happened to lie on my return route. Mrs. GUDERIAN and my wife were present, along with Herr JOHN. Mrs. GUDERIAN makes fabulous pastry.

3. The first and most enduring impression of GUDERIAN - and the most surprising - is his extraordinary charm. He is a stocky, solidly built fellow of middle stature, rather square features, meditative blue eyes and a small, neatly trimmed white mustache. He is in his early sixties, in robust health and obviously full of beans. He talks readily, much and well, particularly about strategy and tactics, about which, of course, he probably knows as much as anybody, with the possible exception of MANNSTEIN, and about history, about which he seems to know a good deal and obviously has a great curiosity, primarily military history.

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MAR. 1949

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DATE 2007

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4. Although he has accepted defeat less philosophically than most of his contemporaries and although his experiences in PW camps and at Nuremberg (particularly his interrogations by KEMPNER and RAPP) have left a scar which will never fully heal, he is firmly committed to the concept of German-American cooperation in the defense of Western Europe, and is willing to go more than half way in friendship with any individual American who appears to be of good will. He remembers General Taylor, of the 101st Airborne Division, to whom he surrendered, Colonel BRAD (?) and Colonel POTTER, of the Historical Division, and Father SIXTUS, who smuggled cigarettes under a Franciscan frock to him in his cell in Nuremberg, with as lively affection as he remembers KEMPNER and RAPP with bitter contempt. He is extremely outspoken, and it is easy to understand why ZIPPER considers this connection to be largely a precautionary measure. GUDERIAN's charm originates from genuine friendly impulses and can, I have no doubt, vanish quickly when this friendliness is not requited in kind. It is not a charm based on calculated tactfulness and acquired or professionally applied good manners; and ZIPPER, which is ever concerned with preventing premature, or ill-conceived, or tactless utterances by prominent German brass, congratulates itself on the fact that GUDERIAN now consults it before expressing himself in print. There were, indeed, several occasions during our conversation when I could have taken exception to his statements, had I been disposed to do so, despite the fact that they were made without rancor and offered as frank opinions in a frank discussion of world events. In speaking of the inability of the Americans to understand German militarism, for instance, he outlined German history as a series of efforts on the part of a well-disposed German people either to defend themselves or to improve their unfortunate geographical situation. In the former they have done rather well at times, he said, while in the latter they have always been inhibited by a pinch in the behind from anxious neighbors when they were on the point of success. He stated stoutly that the Polish Corridor was a geographical abortion and that an eastern border 90 miles from Berlin was intolerable in the face of militant eastern neighbors. Nor does he attempt to conceal a sense of wry amusement at the present condition of the Grand Alliance, remembering only too vividly the lectures he got from American interrogators in 1945 about the democracy of the Soviet Union. GUDERIAN is as unreoriented as most Germans and more outspoken than the average German in saying so. As a General Officer he did not need to be persuaded that the war had been lost, and as a German General, with ample knowledge of military history, he did not have to be told of the consequences of defeat, although certain personal indignities doubtless came as an unpleasant surprise. But he refused to believe that the Soviet Union was a democracy, and he had his doubts about the immediate applicability of American or British or even French democracy to Germany. These doubts persist.

5. As a military man, GUDERIAN is presently occupied with trying to figure out how the pieces can be put together in such a way as to make western defense a possibility. Like most of the Generals with whom I have spoken, he absolutely rejects the concept of narrow German nationalism and regards a complete Franco-German rapprochement as the first and most essential prerequisite, without which no defense is possible, even with unlimited American backing. He believes in German participation, but only under full equality (in which view, also, he is completely in accord with the thinking of his colleagues). He thinks a reinforcement of American troops would have an enormous, beneficial psychological effect on the German people, even if, as he admits is true, an

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additional division or so would not materially alter the present purely military situation. He considers that the Average German is too militarily initiated to be reassured by what he now sees of American equipment and armament in Germany, and argues, certainly correctly, that the Constabulary's armored scout cars are not calculated to impress a German who has stood face to face with a T-34. He states flatly that, as matters now stand, Germans could not, would not, and should not be expected to resist a Soviet invasion. He is deeply concerned with the extent of American commitment in Korea, which he sees as a danger to Europe, and implies that, however important prestige considerations may have been, our military involvement there was a bad idea. He even asked if Bradley and MacArthur had not opposed it on military grounds.

6. GUDERIAN referred several times to Stalin's question, when cautioned as to the attitude of the Pope, "How many divisions does he have?" As a man who knows the persuasive capacity of a good division, he respects this sort of logic. He even observed, good-humoredly, that he now lives a dual life. As a writer and journalist, he has to give a certain lip service to considerations of morale, ideological preparation, economic rehabilitation, etc., each of which is certainly important in its way and each of which must be taken into consideration in weighing public utterances. But he is also a soldier. As such he does not talk for popular consumption, and as such he thinks the divisions come first. He thinks, incidentally, that the number of divisions in the American Army, in ratio to the total number of men under arms, is shockingly low and represents an uneconomical disposition of manpower. He has a lot of respect, not only for the Russian soldier but also for Russian military leadership, and he stoutly rejects the notion that Russian staff work is bad and common opinion that Soviet strength is based solely on masses of not very mobile units. Of Soviet tactical leadership, he says that he and his staff always tried to figure out what the Russians could do that would cause them, the Germans, the most trouble, and that the Russians always did it. And he states that even the Germans considered the Soviet feat of bringing in the Siberian divisions from the east to Moscow in less than two weeks to have been little short of a miracle.

7. In conclusion, it may be pertinent to note that GUDERIAN was somewhat miffed by Juergen THORWALD's reference in "Es begann an der Weichsel," to his troubled dreams while riding in the train to his desperate interview with Hitler just before the Russians' January offensive in 1945. "I have spent many sleepless nights," he said, "but I never dream."

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ARGENTINA

HEINZ GUDERIAN  
SCHENKHAU 165

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"DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY HISTORICAL PROJECT" / "1144"

Siehe Fotokopie: Politische und militärische Berichterungen.

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4.



20 P/11640

GUENTHER NIEDENFUHR, Capt. a. P.  
Chacabuco 1090  
Florida F.C.N.G.B.M.  
BUENOS AIRES  
Argentina

Herrn REINHART  
KUNIGSTERN / T U W  
Liesbadenerstr. 11

16 Sep 50 16 Sep 50

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HISTORICAL PROJECT

Dear Reinhardt

You have a right to be surprised to receive a letter from me from Argentina. Halder, with whom I am in contact, gave me your address; I am also in contact with Guderian. But before I come to the real reason for my letter, I would like to tell you the following: I was advisor to the Chief of Staff here and teacher at the war academy in Buenos Aires from 1935 till 1940 as well as Military and Air Attache at the German Embassies in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro with the official residence in the latter city. After the break in diplomatic relations between Germany and Brazil, I returned to Berlin with the Embassy in the spring of 1942; was sent to the Caucasus in August 1942 as deputy of the General Quartermaster and was there appointed Economic Inspector - Caucasus. After the termination of this undertaking, I was given the same post as well as Army Group Economy Leader and was sent to the Army Group Center where I remained until the end of March 1945. I escaped from the encirclement in East Prussia and luckily, at the last moment, I reached Berlin via Copenhagen. When they divided the Office of Field Quartermaster whose Chief STAFF was, he was sent north with the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), while I was appointed Chief of Field Quartermaster South and sent to Bavaria where I saw the end of the war in Kais in Winkel. I was discharged in May 1947 after 23 months of captivity in Moosburg, Neu-Ulm and Gernsheim and first went to Kouhaus-Schliersee since I could not go back to Berlin where, by the way, our apartment was completely destroyed by bombs in November 1947.

Confidential

Through personal connection I was employed by a wholesale firm in Bamberg which I could fix up with an export permit because of my many connections abroad. I became manager of the Munich branch and remained there in that capacity until August 1949. I had been in Switzerland a few times previously where we founded a firm there, together with some former employees from Telefunken etc. I received the entry permit for Argentina in July 1948 already, through my old Argentinian friends and comrades but didn't use it until a year later because I wanted to make enough money so that I need not become an economic burden on anyone here. The reception here by my Argentinian friends was really touching and in spite of the fact that we docked very late

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DATE 2007

F/50/11640

BUENOS AIRES, Argentina, Genlt. A. D.  
Chacabuco 1090  
Florida P.O. N. S. B. M.  
RUSSIAN LINES  
MOSCOVA

Herrn REINHARDT  
KOBLENZSTR./TAUNUS  
Liesbadenerts: r. 11

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HISTORICAL DIVISION

at night, even the Commander-in-Chief of the Army came personally down to the pier and had taken care of all the preparations for our lodgings.....

You will be interested to learn that, after the war, the Argentinian Government has brought over and still brings over many German scientist, inventors, technicians etc. But on the other hand, there are no German officers here, with the exception of the Air Force where Halland and Mandel are employed but only as technical advisors and have no other duties nor do they wear uniforms. Other flyers have come here through various channels but are employed in other professions. The German and foreign press has written a lot of nonsense about this. One thing is sure, Buenos Aires has not heard so much German as it does now and nobody seems to care what a de jure state of war between Germany and Argentina still exists. My business keeps me fully occupied, but my old "firm" - the one I worked for here in 1940 - has approached me some months ago and asked me to place my experiences in the quartermaster field and my experiences as higher field economy officer at their disposal, a request, which, after long thought, I could not refuse. The questions which the highest circles are interested in here are, among others, "Organization and Task in Peace and War of the Pdz and Chief of Army Procurement". Halder wrote me upon my inquiry that you, my dear Reinhardt, as former Chief of the General Army Office are the best expert in this field. I now approach you with a very presumptuous request. Could you tell me a few things about this? Of course it does not have to be tried and true article about German war history. Few words are sufficient or maybe your secretary could type the pages in question from documents you may have on hand and I could put it in the proper form here. There is no intention to copy our organization. There is very much interest here in how we have done it. One thing is certain: Your achievement is regarded as the "word of God" around here and although they have much here, they have no real war experiences. The USA has of course and is still trying to introduce their doctrines here but people here do not show much faith in them. ....

RECORD OF

G. WILDENPUHR "

Page 2 of two Pages.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

11/20

GENERAL NITZSCHE  
Genl. a. D.  
CHARLESW 1090  
FLORIDA P. O. N. G. D. M.  
B U E N O S A I R E S

Herrn REINHARDT  
Kolonnenstr. / 1000  
Buenos Aires

6.9.50      16.9.50      L      R  
  
G      22.9.50      102  
No. 15      22.9.50

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HISTORICAL DIVISION

"Lieber Herr Reinhardt"

Mit Recht werden Sie sich wundern, dass Sie heute einen Brief von mir aus Argentinien erhalten. Ihre Anschrift teilte mir Halder mit, mit dem ich ebenso wie mit Guderian in Verbindung stand. Doch bevor ich auf den eigentlichen Grund meines Schreibens komme, moechte ich Ihnen kurz Folgendes mitteilen. Von 35-40 war ich Berater des hiesigen Gen. Stabschefs und Lehrer an der Kriegsakademie in Buenos Aires, anschliessend Militaer- und Luftattaché an den Deutschen Botschaften in Buenos Aires und Rio de Janeiro, mit Dienstsitz in letzterer Stadt. Nach Abbruch der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Brasilien im Fruhsjahr 1942 kehrte ich mit der Botschaft nach Berlin zurueck, wurde dann im August 42 als Bevollmaechtigter des Gen. Qu. nach dem Kaukasus geschickt und dann dort zum Wirtschaftsinспектор Kaukasus ernannt. Nach Beendigung dieses Unternehmens kam ich in gleicher Eigenschaft und als Heeresgruppenwirtschaftsfuehrer zur Heeresgruppe Mitte, wo ich bis Ende Maers 45 blieb. Aus dem Kessel Ostpreussen kam ich dann im allerletzten Augenblick heraus und gelangte gluecklich ueber Kopenhagen nach Berlin. Als dann das Feldwirtschaftsamt, dessen Chef ja Staepf war, geteilt wurde und Staepf mit dem OKW nach Norden ging, wurde ich zum Chef Feldwirtschaftsamt Sued ernannt und nach Bayern geschickt, wo ich dann im Feld im Winkel das Ende des Krieges erlebte. Nach 23 monatiger Gefangenschaft in Moosburg, Neu Ulm und Garmisch wurde ich im Mai 47 entlassen und ging zunachst nach Neuhaus-Schliersee, da ich ja nicht nach Berlin zurueck konnte, wo i. uebrigen unsere Wohnung bereits im November 43 durch Bomben total zerstoeert war. Ich bin dann durch persoenliche Beziehungen zu einer Grosshandelsfirma in Bamberg gekommen, die ich durch meine vielen Auslandsbeziehungen die Exportgenehmigung besorgen konnte. Ich wurde dann Leiter der Filiale Muenchen und blieb dort als solcher bis August 49. Vorher war ich schon einige Male in der Schweiz gewesen, wo wir eine Firma gruendeten, zusammen mit einigen fruheren Leuten von Telefunken usw. Bereits im Juli 48 hatte ich durch meine alten argentinischen Freunde und Kameraden die Einreiseerlaubnis nach hier bekommen, machte davon aber erst Gebrauch ein Jahr spaeter, da ich erst soviel verdienen wollte, dass ich niemandem pekunaer hier zur Last zu fallen brauchte. Der Empfang hiertens durch argentinischen Freunde war direkt ruhmend, selbst der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres war trotz spaeter Nachtstunde persoenlich am Flughafen erschienen und hatte alles fuer unsere Unterkunft hier vorbereitet. ....

p.t.o.—

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Dietramszell, 28. Mai 1950

UP

Lieber Herr Lehmann!

Anliegend übersende ich die gewünschte eidesstattliche Erklärung in Sachen Sepp Dietrich, Kraemer und Peiper. Ich hoffe, den drei armen Kameraden damit zu helfen. Was meine Feststellung auf Seite 3 anbelangt, so bin ich jederzeit bereit, das Verfahren des amerikanischen Kriegsgerichts in Dachau vor Gericht zu kennzeichnen. Es war so empörend, daß eine derartige Feststellung der amerikanischen Armee und der am. Justiz nicht angenehm sein dürfte.

Der Gnadenausschuß tut also gut daran, sich recht bald zu entschließen. vorläufig ist der Augenblick zum Reden noch nicht gekommen. Ich bin aber fest entschlossen, die Prozeßfragen und den anderen Prozeßfragen nicht zu schweigen, sondern zu reden, wenn nicht in absehbarer Zeit eine Revision der blöden Urteile erfolgt. Ganz Nürnberg war ja ein einziger politischer Racheakt. Die Beweise dafür treten von Tag zu Tag klarer hervor, und wenn die gegenwärtigen deutschen Machthaber und Presseleute nur für 5 Pfennige Zivilcourage hätten dann wäre das schon längst der Öffentlichkeit klar gemacht worden.

Hoffentlich kommt meine Erklärung noch zur Zeit. Ich war in letzter Zeit sehr stark beschäftigt und bitte daher zu entschuldigen, daß ich nicht schneller schrieb.

Mit den besten Grüßen bin ich in kameradschaftlicher Verbundenheit

stets Ihr

*Günther Kieser*

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DATE 2007

Heins Guderian

Dietramszell, 28. Mai 1950

Betr.: Malmédy-Prozess.

Eidesstattliche Erklärung.

Zur Person: Ich, Heins Guderian, geb. 17.6.1888 in Kilm an der Weichsel, evangelischer Konfession, war bis zur Entlassung aus der Kriegsgefangenschaft Berufsoffizier, zuletzt Generaloberst, Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen, beauftragt mit der Wahrnehmung der Geschäfte des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres.

Ich bin mir bewußt, daß diese Erklärung zur Vorlage vor Gericht bestimmt ist. Sie enthält die Wahrheit.

Zur Sache: Der ehemalige SS-Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich war mir bereits vor dem Kriege bekannt. Im Kriege unterstand er mir mit der Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler" im Sommer 1940 während eines Teiles des Feldzuges in Frankreich. In meiner Eigenschaft als Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen oblag mir mehrfach die Besichtigung der von Dietrich kommandierten SS-Einheiten.

Auf Grund der Eindrücke, die ich im Frieden und im Kriege gewann, kann ich über Sepp Dietrich folgendes Urteil abgeben:

Charakterlich ein einfacher, gerader, rauher Soldat. Viel Herz für seine Soldaten. Ein ausgesprochen guter Kamerad, der sich für Untergebene und Kameraden, die in Not gerieten, ohne Rücksicht auf die eigene Person voll einsetzte. Für diese letzterwähnte Eigenschaft erhielt ich persönlich den Beweis nach meiner ersten Entlassung im Dezember 1941. Bereits Anfang 1942, im Januar, rief Dietrich mich in Berlin aus der Reichskanzlei an und bat um die Erlaubnis, mich zu besuchen. Nachdem wir uns begrüßt hatten, fragte ich, warum er gerade aus der Reichskanzlei angerufen habe. Seine Antwort besagte, daß er sich bewußt sei, bei diesem Gespräch abgehört zu werden. Gerade dies sei seine Absicht, denn Hitler solle sehen, daß er mich besuchte und daß er mir Unrecht getan habe. Dietrich hat diese, seine Ansicht Hitler wiederholt gesagt, ohne

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die Folgen zu scheuen, wie das Eintreten für einen in Ungnade befindlichen Kameraden für ihn haben konnte.

Dietrich hielt in seiner Truppe auf gute Mannszucht. Im Gefecht war er tapfer. Er sorgte für seine Truppe.

Mir sind keine Ausschreitungen von Angehörigen der ihm unterstellten Verbände bekannt geworden.

Zu den Generalen des Meeres stand Dietrich in gutem Verhältnis. Er fühlte sich durchaus als ein Freund des Meeres und unterschied sich in dieser Hinsicht offen von Himmler, mit dem er, je länger der Krieg dauerte, desto größere Differenzen hatte.

Bei meinen zahlreichen Besichtigungen von Einheiten der Waffen-SS hatte ich stets den besten Eindruck von der Mannszucht dieser Verbände, mit denen mich eine sehr gute Kameradschaft verband.

Der ehemalige Oberst im Generalstab Kraemer ist mir seit dem Jahre 1936 bekannt. Ich war damals Divisionskommandeur in Würzburg, während Kraemer in Würzburg an dem gleichen Orte stehenden Infanterie-Regiments 55 befehligte.

Kraemer ist ein gerader, aufrichtiger, ruhiger und überlegt handelnder Mann. Er wurde dem Oberstgruppenführer Dietrich wegen dieser Eigenschaften vom Heere beigeordnet. Er war ein gut geschulter, tüchtiger Generalstabsoffizier. Einer unritterlichen, den Grundsätzen der Haager Landkriegsordnung widersprechenden Kampfführung halte ich ihn nicht für fähig.

Der ehemalige SS-Oberst Peiper ist mir erst im Krieg bekannt geworden. Ich habe ihn bei meinen Besichtigungen dienstlich und in privaten Aussprachen kennen gelernt. Er hat bei beiden Gelegenheiten einen vorzüglichen Eindruck auf mich gemacht. Er bewies nicht nur gute militärische Fähigkeiten, sondern legte großen Idealismus, Herz für die Soldaten und Verständnis für die schwierige Lage der Bevölkerung an den Tag. Im Kampfe hat er sich stets hervorgetan und den Ruf eines ausgezeichneten und besonders tapferen Soldaten erworben. Ich zweifle nicht, daß er ein ebenso ritterlicher Offizier war wie Kraemer.

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Bei diesem Anlaß fühle ich mich verpflichtet, folgendes Erlebnis wiederholt in Erinnerung zu bringen:

Am 17. Juni 1946 wurde ich als Zeuge der Verteidigung nach Dachau geholt, um in dem Prozeß gegen die Leibstandarte für die genannten drei Offiziere ausszusagen.

Ich stelle fest, daß ich nach Feststellung meiner Personalien und nach Verteidigung bei der ersten Frage des Verteidigers durch Einspruch des Klägers an der Antwort verhindert wurde. Die Begründung für dieses rechtswidrige Verhalten des Prosecutors lautete: "Wir führen hier einen Prozeß wegen der Erschießung amerikanischer Soldaten. Da kann die Anklage keine Entlastungsbezeugen zulassen. Dieser Zeuge ist von der Verteidigung namhaft gemacht. Ich beantrage daher, ihn nicht zu hören und zu entlassen." Das Gericht bedurfte keiner Beratung über diesen Antrag. Seine Mitglieder sahen sich kurz an und beschlossen nach dem Antrag des Prosecutors. Ich wurde - ohne ein Wort sagen zu dürfen - aus dem Gerichtssaale geführt.

Das Verfahren anläßlich des Prozesses in Dachau gegen Mitglieder der Leibstandarte war ungesetzlich. Die Behandlung der als Zeugen bestimmten Soldaten dieser Formation war ungebührlich; sie wurden, nur weil sie mich grüßten, durch den Wachehabenden amerikanischen Unteroffizier mißhandelt. Erst auf meinen Protest hörte die vorschriftswidrige Behandlung auf.


Ich erkläre ausdrücklich, daß ich bereit bin diese Feststellung vor Gericht und unter Eid zu wiederholen.

*Heinz Guderian*  
Generaloberst a.D.



Die Richtigkeit *der Unterschrift*

bei  
Distramo 30  
Distramszell



# SECRET

## RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : STATE F (Frankfurt #936)  
Date of document : 22 Sep 1950  
Title of document : Alleged influence of extreme rightists  
on Bavarian Political Situation  
Document to be filed in : 32-7-27-53  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [redacted] Serial

### Excerpt of pertinent information :

- (o.1) "...A well-informed and usually reliable informant of a HICOG official has reported, in essence, that the Deutsche Union is now controlled by former high-ranking Army officers and Nazis; that the philosophy of the organization is excessively authoritarian and pro-Nazi..."
- (p.3) "...The real direction of the DU (Deutsche Union) in Bavaria and elsewhere in Germany, however, comes from its top general staff...  
...Also prominent in the top general staff are the following:  
...Ex-General Heinz GUDERIAN--who commanded an Army in the Balkans..."

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DATE 2007

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. (EVAL. ONLY)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
**INFORMATION REPORT**

REPORT NO. **SO DD-27666x**

CD NO.

COUNTRY Germany (American Zone)  
SUBJECT Opinions expressed by Guderian

DATE DISTR 6 October 1950

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany, Munich

NO. OF ENCLS. LISTED BELOW

DATE OF INFO. 4 September 1950

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT						
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A. X	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACTS OF U.S.C. 793 AND 794, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE DISCLOSURE OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

**SOURCE** The following views were expressed by ex-General Heinz Guderian in a conversation with a reliable American source.

- As a military man, Guderian is occupied with trying to determine how the defense of the West can be made possible in its present shattered state. Like most of the former German generals, he rejects the concept of narrow German nationalism, and regards a Franco-German rapprochement as the first prerequisite, without which no defense is possible, even with unlimited American backing. He believes in German participation in West-European defense plans, but only on terms of full equality; in this view also, he is completely in accord with his colleagues. He thinks that reinforcement of the American troops in Europe would have an enormous beneficial effect on German morale, even though he admits at the same time that an additional division or two would not materially alter the present situation from a purely military point of view, and though he believes that the average German is also able to recognize this fact. (He pointed out that the Conceptor's armored scout cars are not calculated to impress a German who has stood face to face with a T-34 tank.)
- Guderian states flatly that as matters now stand Germans could not and would not resist a Soviet invasion, and should not be expected to do so. He is particularly impressed by the logic and applicability of the question ascribed to Stalin, "How many divisions does the Pope have?" and emphasizes that the number of divisions (or the number of combat troops actually available) is the only consideration which will carry any weight. In this connection, he is deeply concerned by the extent of American commitment in Korea, which he sees as a danger to Europe. Incidentally, he thinks that the number of divisions in the United States Army, in proportion to the number of men under arms, is "shockingly" low and represents an uneconomical disposition of manpower.
- If, in his published statements and books, he puts stress on considerations of morale, ideological preparation, economic rehabilitation, etc., Guderian says this is chiefly lip service which he feels compelled to pay in public. These matters are of course important in their way and must not be ignored; but in his opinion the divisions always come first.

[ ]

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-2-

SOB-29666

4. General Guderian has much respect for the Russian soldier and also for Russian military leadership, and rejects the commonly held belief that Russian staff work is bad and that Soviet strength is based solely on masses of not very mobile units. He remarked that during the war he and his staff habitually tried to calculate what tactics on the part of the Russians would cause the most trouble to the Germans, and they found that precisely those tactics were always adopted by the Russians. Furthermore, he mentioned that the Germans considered the Russians' feat of bringing the Siberian divisions from the east to Moscow in less than two weeks to have been little short of a miracle.

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**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

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Station number of document : IN-13092 (ROME 7464) T/S  
Date of document : 10 Nov 50  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : Signal Center Archives  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial  
Excerpt of pertinent information :

\*\*\*:T/S document; see Signal Center archives

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This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : DST 659  
Date of document : 12 Nov 1950  
Title of document : Data on German Generals  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : 32-7-31-11y  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

**Excerpt of pertinent information :**

"...3. Generals Geyr von Schweppenburg and GUDERIAN have intimate ties with the "Bruderschaft" (Comradeship), an association which is opposed by General Hossbach, one of Hitler's well known former advisors..."

THERE IS NO OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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*Original filed in*  
*2-7-57-10-117*  
23 Novembre 1950

*2-7-28-63*

ORGANIZZAZIONE DELL'EX ESERCITO TEDESCO

Fonte : Fiduciario Vaticano.

-Secondo informazioni pervenute agli uffici di "Civiltà Cattolica" (Gesuiti) le autorità americane stanno incoraggiando a Paderbon, dove ha sede il comando dell'armata britannica d'oltre Reno, la formazione di una organizzazione di ex combattenti tedeschi, di cui è capo il generale HOECKER. Ufficialmente l'organizzazione ha scopi assistenziali per gli ex militari di carriera, ma in effetti ha il compito di organizzare il personale della Weermacht. Il generale HOECKER ed i suoi aiutanti, tutti ex ufficiali dello stato maggiore, hanno finora formato uno schedario che comprende oltre 300 mila nomi di ex combattenti accompagnati dai dati precisi personali e politici delle persone schedate. Grazie a questo schedario, HOECKER sarebbe in grado, secondo affermazioni fatte ad amici fidati, di mobilitare in qualche settimana gli ex quadri dell'esercito tedesco, scartando i comunisti. L'insieme cartella comprende tutti i dati sul conto degli ex militari e perfino informazioni sui veriti acquisiti che potrebbero consigliare una proiezione.

Questa organizzazione, ufficialmente clandestina, è finanziata (pure per ordine degli americani) dal banchiere tedesco FRIEDRICH WOLFS. Nella prima metà dell'ottobre scorso il generale tedesco Guyer VON SCHWEPPENBURG ebbe un colloquio confidenziale con alti ufficiali americani, ai quali propose che gli estratti delle decisioni delle conferenze di Fontainebleau e quelle del Patto Atlantico vengono inviati al generale tedesco SPEIDEL, il quale si sarebbe assunto l'incarico di predisporre, a nome degli ex appartenenti alla Weermacht, tutto ciò che riguarda la partecipazione degli ex militari tedeschi alla lotta contro il comunismo.

Sempre secondo la stessa fonte, nel marzo u.s. il generale GUDERIAN inviò a tutti i membri dell'associazione degli ex ufficiali tedeschi (anche questo è un movimento dell'associazione degli ex militari tedeschi ufficialmente proibito, ma tollerato dalle autorità americane) una circolare alla quale era aggiunta una nota. Questo documento, che era stato approvato dagli esperti del ministero della difesa americano, stabilisce la formazione delle divisioni blindate tedesche, che saranno equipaggiate dagli americani. GUDERIAN diceva in un preambolo che sarebbe utile che fin da allora (marzo 1950) tutti gli ufficiali tedeschi destinati a servire nelle formazioni che saranno impegnate nella difesa occidentale, si interessassero di acquisire cognizioni tecniche sulla formazione di queste unità, sulle armi e ecc. ed invitava gli ufficiali ad avanzare proposte per un eventuale miglioramento sia dei quadri che degli armamenti.

Il governo di Bonn, poi, dispone già da un anno di un servizio segreto di informazioni militari, tollerato e controllato dalle autorità militari alleate. Questo servizio segreto si occupa esclusivamente di questioni militari e praticamente svolge dalla sua fondazione soltanto servizio di cor

23 Novembre 1950

ORGANIZZAZIONE DELL'EX ESERCITO TEDESCO

Fonte: L'Admiral Vattanas.

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Suppl. of 1st page = 13

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221-5162-14

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travionaggio. Capo di questo servizio è ufficialmente il generale OTT,  
il suo vero animatore è il Dr. Theo KORDT, che ufficialmente dirige  
gli affari consolari della Cancelleria Federale di Bonn.  
KORDT è un ottimo amico del generale VON SCHWERIN, che ha dato recente-  
mente le sue dimissioni in segno di protesta contro la proposta francese  
secondo cui i generali tedeschi dovrebbero essere subordinati ai genera-  
li francesi, nel quadro della difesa europea. Durante la guerra il gene-  
rale VON SCHWERIN lavorava alle dipendenze di OSTER, primo aiutante del-  
l'ammiraglio CANARIS, capo del servizio segreto tedesco.  
Con l'organizzazione del generale HOECKER collabora strettamente il capo  
dei servizi delle ricerche dei prigionieri di guerra del governo di Bonn,  
VON TAYSEN. Dopo le sue recenti dimissioni dalla funzione di consigliere  
militare di ADENAUER, VON SCHWERIN lavora anche nell'organizzazione del  
generale HOECKER.  
Per quanto riguarda la mobilitazione "civile" degli ex dipendenti della  
aviazione militare tedesca, il generale FUNK è stato incaricato da ADEN-  
HAUER di collegare le varie organizzazioni semilandestine, già esistenti.  
Il generale KRINZ, ex capo aggiunto dello stato maggiore, dirige i  
gruppi della "Fratellanza" (Bruderscaft) che sarebbe l'organo esecutivo  
di un'altra più vasta organizzazione "landestina" diretta dallo stesso  
FUNK e intitolata "l'Unione degli ex combattenti della guerra 1939-1945".  
Il generale FUNK in una riunione segreta tenuta il 7 ottobre 1950, ha  
dichiarato ad un gruppo di ex piloti della Luftwaffe, che i generali te-  
deschi che comanderanno le divisioni blindate tedesche hanno già chiesto  
di collaborare coll'aviazione, che sarà composta esclusivamente da per-  
sonale tedesco.  
Per i problemi della marina è stato invece incaricato il capitano di cor-  
vetta, HINSLER, genero dell'ammiraglio DOENITZ.  
Il suo compito è di collegare le organizzazioni degli ex militari della  
marina di guerra, presiedute attualmente dagli ex ammiragli WAGNER, GORT  
e SCHULTE.

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**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

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Station number of document : MGF 504  
Date of document : 24 Nov 1950  
Title of document : The Bruderschaft  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : 32-7-28-607  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] erial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

Source is a right wing politician; untested but well placed:

(p.3) "... Another reliable source indicates that one of the most influential covert supporters of the Bruderschaft is former German Chief of Staff, Colonel-General Heins GUDERIAN. The latter has adopted an uncompromisingly nationalistic line which attracts many former officers and is generally in accordance with Bruderschaft principles. The contact between GUDERIAN and the Bruderschaft is maintained through Gerhard Boldt, trad representative, Lübeck, Mamburger Strasse 53. GUDERIAN has agreed to support the following Bruderschaft objectives:

- a. The release of all military (including SS) prisoners from Landsberg and Werls.
- b. Restoration of the honor of the German soldier.
- c. Far-reaching political concessions in return for German military cooperation in a Western defense system. "We will stand firm like a tank until our conditions are met" as GUDERIAN wrote to a fellow-general.
- d. An amalgamation of right-wing parties. GUDERIAN favor Karl Meissner's Deutsche Block as the rallying point, and has attended meetings with Bruderschaft members who came supplied 'with the suitable power of attorney of the Bruderschaft so we can come to definite decisions.' We have no information as to what decisions resulted from this meeting..."

THERE IS NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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Station number of document : MIA-4494  
Date of document : 20 Dec 50  
Title of document : Special Connections, Progress  
Report #7  
OK for extract- [ ] 8 May 52  
Document to be filed in : 32-6-9-191  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial  
Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...43. GUDERIAN, Heins (Genobst. a.D.) Special Consultant of Zipper, Fuessen, Schwangau #165..."

THERE IS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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Station number of document : RLR-2334  
Date of document : 20 Feb 50  
Title of document : More on Germany expelled from  
Syrian Army.  
Document to be filed in : 69-7-16-9  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] no serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...3. Col Roestal has told source that former German General Heinz GUDERIAN would visit Egypt late in December or early in January 1951. Roestal said he knows GUDERIAN well and will ask him to clear up the situation..."

...Field Notes: ...RIRA-1242 confirms Col. Roestal's contact with General GUDERIAN..."

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Station number of document : SO9B-34214  
Date of document : 8 Feb 51  
Title of document : Otto SKORZENY  
  
Document to be filed in : [redacted]  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [redacted] serial  
  
Excerpt of pertinent information :

"... He (Skorzeny) is reported to have approached several former German generals, among others...Heinz GUDERIAN, and to have stated that he was arranging for the removal of up to 200,000 men to Spain in event of war...Skorzeny is said to have told GUDERIAN that he was leaving soon for Spain..."

THERE IS NO OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION OF SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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Station number of document : WSN-522

Date of document : 16 Feb 51

Title of document : Otto SKORZENY

Document to be filed in : [ ]

Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...b) Skorzeny has informed source that he is committed from helping U.S. by a mutual pledge he and on GUERDIAN (sic), according to source a famed tank expert, took some years ago. Skorzeny is doubtful now, however, that he is still bound by the pledge as GUERDIAN (sic) is now reportedly in U.S. presumably assisting the U.S. Army in some respect..."

THERE IS NO NEW PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS REPORT

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Station number of document : MAV-2527  
Date of document : 16 Feb 1951  
Title of document : Subj: German Military Groups  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : 37-7-28-66  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] no serial

**Excerpt of pertinent information :**

"...3... From the way he phrased his talk and his questions, the participants concluded that Geyr had called the meeting at the request of U.S. Authorities. He admitted to being in contact with Generals GUDERIAN and Speidl..."

THERE IS NO MORE PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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Station number of document : HOFA-4715  
Date of document : 21 Feb 51  
Title of document : Dept. of Army Historical Document  
#1114  
Document to be filed in : 32-7-2A-80 (attachment)  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

**Excerpt of pertinent information :**

Letter, in German, to GUTERMAN from Gerhardt Roldt, dated 28 Oct. 50.  
Permanent retention in EF/50/G filed under "Naziist Groups."

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Station number of document : WFLA-5360  
Date of document : 27 Feb 51  
Title of document : Hans Juergen WITTMER  
OF H.H. Smith They Sr  
Document to be filed in : 32-65-1105 &  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

**Excerpt of pertinent information :**

(p.3) "...P.C.R. has traces, in addition to those already noted in the text above, as follows:  
a. Karl (Baron) de Bouché, Maj Ing., Oberst a.D., Hohenbrunn, Munich, Haus#100; a friend of Heinz GUBERIN; listed in Roster of Senior Officers as artillery colonel from 1 March 1944 with Pz. Arty. Regt 74 (2nd Pz. Div.) (Doc. 'b1')..."

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : (MSRA-100P) \_\_\_\_\_  
Date of document : 8 Mar 51 \_\_\_\_\_  
Title of document : [ ] \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : 68-6-2-1735 (p. 3) \_\_\_\_\_  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] to serial \_\_\_\_\_

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...10... For example, Source, who has previously mentioned that he has been in contact with General Heinz GUNTER was extremely annoyed to have learned that GUNTER had been invited and had come to Switzerland without Source's prior knowledge. GUNTER had, according to Source, been the guest of Emil 'ushrl'..."

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This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : 254-23

Date of document : 27 Mar 51

Title of document : Controversy between Otto Goring and  
Mr. Hans Durr

Document to be filed in [ ]

Cross-reference form to be filed in [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...3...The news of the controversy has reached Germany, and all the generals who were involved in the 20th July attempt have sided with Goring. Goring's partisans are Generals 'MERIA', Hantou'fel..."

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Station number of document : HOLA-5074  
Date of document : ? Apr 51  
Title of document : W Drollery 350  
C.   8 May 51  
Document to be filed in : 32-5-6-1431  
Cross-reference form to be filed in :  serial  
Excerpt of pertinent information :

...is previousl reported, Subject was given the mission by the Polish IS of penetrating the staff of Generaloberst ~~Heinz~~ Heinz GUDERIAN, whom Subject knows personally from former times... Subject then tried to visit GUDERIAN but discovered that he had moved from Mitrazell; a letter brought a friendly reply from GUDERIAN, with the address Schwanau (vic. Pussen) #10, to which Subject was then instructed to report, if contact is established by the Poles, that GUDERIAN has no staff, but that he is sought out by various political and military personalities and that conferences are held and memos written...

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IID ROUTING SLIP

DATE 10 June 1951

FILE NO [redacted]

TO: IID

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: (Col. Gen.) H. von GULBERG

REMARKS:

Former Inspector General of German  
armored Forces and Acting Chief  
of the General Staff of the  
German Army

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- INDEX AS MARKED
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- OPEN NEW FILE AS INDICATED **JUN 15 1951**
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FORM NO. 95-50  
APR 1951



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Station number of document : 117-717  
Date of document : 20 Aug 51  
Title of document : Skorseny's trip to Germany

Document to be filed in : [redacted]  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [redacted] 117

**Excerpt of pertinent information :**

Skorseny, arriving in Germany, 27 July (1951) was in contact with German ex-Generals, among them Heinz G... for these men would be in a position to recruit suitable officer material for a German legion in Spain.

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117-717

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**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

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Station number of document : HICOG 84 (R&A)  
Date of document : 22 Aug 51  
Title of document : Information Memorandum #84  
(Reports & Analysis Division)  
Document to be filed in : 32-7-28-118  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

p.7 "...willingness to participate in Western defense and to play an equitable part in a European army is gaining ground...  
(Referring to an Allied offer at a conference in Paris:) "...According to a French report, former Generals Halder and GUDERIAN...are also of the opinion that Germany should accept the offer..." (of equal partner in formation of a European army.)

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Station number of document : MCBA 9907 T/S CIA-69346 pg.4  
(32-6-1-5848)  
Date of document : 29 Aug 51  
Title of document : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Document to be filed in : Top Secret Room  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

See Tab. 32-6-1-5848 for further information.

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This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : MGLA-8179  
Date of document : 12 Sept. 1951  
Title of document : Verban deutscher Soldaten  
[ ] 7 May 52 : \_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : 32-6-7-1645  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

(p.2) "...4. ZIPPak has, in the past, attempted to exercise a moderating influence on the more hot-headed amon; the former senior officers (notably Hasso von Kanteufrel and Heinz GUDERIAN), and has been fairly successful..."

...7. With Friessner in the praesidium of the Verbanc deutscher Soldaten will be among others...GUDERIAN...There are same in this groupx whose presence will certainly be greseted with some dismay, particularly... GUDERIAN... GUDERIAN and Hausser, moreover, have an enormous following amon; the younger men...~~TWXXXXXXXX~~

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This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : MGF-768  
Date of document : 17 Sep 1951  
Title of document : A Report from Ex-General Geradorff  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Document to be filed in : 32-7-27-253  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...4.  
"...Geradorff also indicated surprise and amazement concerning the enthusiasm of U.S. military and State Department personnel for ex-General Heinz GUDERIAN, one-time chief of the Armored Forces of the German Army. He said that 'all decent German officers', and when Geradorff defines that term he mean those connected with the 20th July affair and the resistance against Hitler, considered GUDERIAN one of the worst characters in the former German Army because after the 20th July affair, ~~and he had mercilessly and~~ he had mercilessly and enthusiastically executed Hitler's orders to 'purify' the German general staff.\*\*\* (sic) In Geradorff's opinion GUDERIAN is the prototyped of officers who would welcome a Taurroggen policy if they found such a step advisable..."

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SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)		[ ]			

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PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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FORM 867  
OBSOLETE  
PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(7-40)

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Station number of document : WFA-1560  
Date of document : 21 Sep 51  
Title of document : Latest interview with, an personalities  
connected with Otto Skorzeny.  
Document to be filed in : [redacted] (encl. 1 /copy/)  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [redacted] rial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

"...Skorzeny also mentioned he had called on his old time friend General Heinz GERTNER..."

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This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : WS A-1660 (encl. 2)  
Date of document : 24 Sep 51  
Title of document : Further activities of Col.tto  
SKORZENY  
Document to be filed in [redacted]  
Cross-reference form to be filed in [redacted] serial  
Excerpt of pertinent information :

(p.2) "...5. Subject saw General Heins HUBERIAN and a Col. Gen. riesner who like HUBERIAN is a tank expert but somewhat lesser known..."

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Station number of document : WFO-5737  
Date of document : 7 Nov 51  
Title of document : Instruction on "Control of Information"  
(Re: "Control of Information")  
Document to be filed in : WFO-5737  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] in "Special"

Excerpt of pertinent information :

(No 2) "The following persons were present..."

"The following persons were present..."

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WFO 5737

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**RI CROSS-REFERENCE FORM**

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Station number of document :           11K4-4705            
 Date of document :           11 Nov 51            
 Title of document :           Mirbel            
 :     
 :     
 Document to be filed in :           X-6-7-37:5            
 Cross-reference form to be filed in :           [ ] to serial          

Excerpt of pertinent information :

Attachment, Resume of Mirbel case

Subject had a meeting with two Russians in Nov. 1950. One of the Russians discussed with subject:

"... the responsibility of the Russians in the other groups, the names of known people connected to the Russians, in other relations with the group, the latter's part in the organization, and the possibility of winning the 'war' over..."

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This cross-reference form is used when a document contains pertinent data on two or more files and sufficient copies of the document are not available for cross-filing.

Station number of document : GM-083  
Date of document : 15 Nov 51  
Title of document : Western Contacts with Hungarian  
Nazis  
Document to be filed in : 5-8-1-237y  
Cross-reference form to : [ ] to serial  
be filed in

Excerpt of pertinent information :

Source reports:

Preter, Hungarian Nazi, and in British zone of Austria (in Graz) met a British F.C.I. officer and a civilian who introduced himself as a "British diplomat." Preter was questioned on his contacts with Hungarian Nazi General Arpad Heney. X Preter was questioned on "Heney's eventual contacts with the German General 'W' [redacted]..."

--This information was taken from [redacted] copy of document--

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Station number of document : MCF 849  
Date of document : 13 Dec 51  
Title of document : Attempt to establish new German Veterans  
Association in opposition to the VDS  
Document to be filed in : 32-7-28-129  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [redacted] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

...6. Meantime, Gerd Spindler assembled the supporters of the present VDS (Assoc. of German Soldiers) policies, ex-Generals Hans Friessner, Heinz GUDERIAN, Herberd Gille et al at his week-end home at Altenberb vic. Cologne, on 23-24 Nov 1951, in order to consult with them concerning the possibilities of perpetuating the present leadership after the coming election of a permanent Executive Council for the VDS..."

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Station number of document : NSHA-1756  
Date of document : 21 Dec 51  
Title of document : Skorzeny "Plan"

Document to be filed in : SECRETED RECORDS  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

- (p.5) "...Besides, during my recent trip I had the opportunity to speak with a number of generals in the former German Army. Among them is Colonel General WURRIAN and one of the greatest military experts now working in Bonn. We agreed basically in the view that, aside from official rehabilitation efforts, parallel measures should be undertaken in one form or another in case of catastrophe..."
- (p.6) "...Further notes on Proposal 1: at the time of receiving the basic concurrence of the Spanish Government and General Staff and appropriate American authorities, immediate contact could be made with Col. Gen. WURRIAN..."

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Station number of document : ROC-47186  
Date of document : 1 Jan 52  
Title of document : Information on Former German Officers  
  
  
Document to be filed in : 100-2-10-92  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [ ] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :  
"...It is requested that dossiers on the following former German officers be obtained from the German Military Document Section, Dept. of the Army: 'MERTI', Heinz, 57, Genobst..."

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**SECURITY INFORMATION**

REF: Germany, Frankfurt

Report No. 100-895

No. of Pages 2  
Date of Issue 1953

No. of Enclosures

Subject: Ex-General Heine Osterien's Plans for a New West German Veterans' Organization

Date Issued:

RECORDED  
1 JUL 1953  
DOC. CONTROL SEC.

Classification

Reference:

Source, (operational) Data, and Materials

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RI/MIS	✓
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**INDEX**

18 6277

General (former) Zorn  
In-charge of the German Veterans' League  
German President  
DATE OF ... 5 February 1952

26 February 1952

1



... IS DECLASSIFIED ...

1. West German politicians

1. Immediately upon receipt from the Executive Council of the VDB (German Veterans' Federation), General Franz Guderian contacted various right-wing leaders in an attempt to form a new veterans organization. Among his contacts were the following:

Leopold Maria "Lola" ... of Hamburg, co-leader of the "Bruderschaft"

Richard ... ex-official general and key member of the VDB

Karl ... ex-official and key member of the ... in Bavaria

Dr. ... former ... Austria; now a ... of the ...

2. He was also contacted by representatives of the Freie Deutsche ... and the Deutsche ... who also approached him in recent weeks with offers to ... veterans organization. He rejected both offers because he considered them mere vote-getting propositions. Guderian intended to ... however, that he was seriously interested in his plan for a general veterans organization which would accept all former German military personnel, regardless of unit or branch of service. Guderian stated that politically the ... organization should be rightist, anti-Communist, anti-socialist and anti-trade union. The organization would further demand that all "incarcerated veterans" (war criminals) be released after any discussion of the reorganization issue takes place. Guderian desires to keep the new organization completely free from the influence of the government or any political party.

FIELD OFFICE ...

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Station number of document : MGPA-6359  
Date of document : 27 Feb 52  
Title of document : Meeting with Theodor Blank  
Document to be filed in : 32-6-12-309 (pp. 2 & 4)  
Cross-reference form to be filed in : [redacted] serial

Excerpt of pertinent information :

- p.2 "...He (Blank) said he would have to take into his shop immediately approximately thirty former German generals, 'not of the Manteuffel or GUDERIAN types he reassured us.' He also said they had definitely agreed not to hire anyone who held a rank higher than a Generalmajor (Brigadier General,..."
  
- p.4 "...Blank said he told General Hays he feared the return of the Utility type German officers and that as a Government official or as a private citizen he would do everything to combat their return, (He also named GUDERIAN and Manteuffel) to German Military leadership. (sic) (Blank also criticized Mr. McCloy sharply for having met GUDERIAN officially. He explained to him that the story of the meeting was a deliberate lie and that several newspapers had carried a short note from Mr. McCloy denying that he had ever met or supported GUDERIAN.)..."

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XRIE

- -no serial

VIA: COURIER  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SLIP POUCH)

D. ATTACH NO MGL-A-11705

CLASSIFICATION

TO : [ ]  
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

DATE: 22 May 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational  
          SPECIFIC— Visa Application of General GUDERIAN

Mr. MERKUR has sent over a statement to the effect that General GUDERIAN is unable to go to Switzerland for a health cure inasmuch as the Swiss have refused him a visa (May 1952). This is quite a blow since it took three months just to obtain his Reiseepass through Munich and Bonn, and he now inquires, via MERKUR, whether you could determine the reason for the Swiss refusal. Can you?

[ ] [ ] [ ]

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2 [ ]  
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FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1949

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4: 00

.. 7A

17 Jun 1947

1. I am a ... ..  
2. I am a ... ..

3. I am a ... ..

4. I am a ... ..

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6. I am a ... ..

7. I am a ... ..

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10. I am a ... ..

# The New York Times Book

AUGUST 10, 1952

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## Review

SECTION 7

# THE ARMORED GOLIATH THAT FAILED

**PANZER LEADER.** By Gen. Heinz Guderian. Foreword by Capt. E. H. Liddell Hart. Translated from the German by Constantine Fitzgibbon. Illustrated. 528 pp. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. \$7.50.

By DREW MIDDLETON

**N**OT long ago one of the suave young men around Chancellor Adenauer remarked that General Guderian, the author of "Panzer Leader," should be put in jail. He had not read the book. His remark reflected both the propensity of the Germans for putting people in jail without due process of law and the distaste felt for both Guderian and his book by the present regime in Germany.

There are two reasons for it. The first is that Guderian, the last Chief of the Army General Staff under Hitler, has offended the whole community of German interest whose center, almost its reason for being, is the plot, which failed, to assassinate Hitler. The second reason is that Guderian—who by any standards, was one of the leading German commanders of World War II and who, moreover, was a military innovator of the first rank in the field of armored warfare—is unsympathetic to the strategic and organizational concepts of the, to him, relatively junior generals who have been entrusted with the formation of the Army of the Fourth Reich.

"Panzer Leader" comprises a number of books. There is the story, well told, of Guderian's long struggle in the face of opposition by infantry and cavalry generals to build the panzer forces which swept east and west out of Germany from 1939 to 1942. There is a detailed account of the operations of those forces and indeed of the whole German Army in the great campaigns in Poland, France and the Low Countries and the Soviet Union. And there are Guderian's views on Hitler and his government, the plot and the leading personalities of the Third Reich.

**S**EPARATELY each section is of absorbing interest, though the reader may find it difficult to move from the details of battles to the feverish insanity of Hitler's court. And Guderian's views on Hitler and the other Nazi leaders seem to have been added as an afterthought. Nevertheless, the book tells us a great deal. It is far better than anything yet written by a German general perhaps because Guderian was a high-ranking general, a man who knew what was going on at the battlefields of Europe—a man of limited political comprehension but deep tactical military insight. There is no soberer and better

*Chief German correspondent of THE TIMES. Mr. Middleton is author of "The Struggle for Germany" and "The Collapse of Western Europe."*

German story of how and why the Wehrmacht failed in Russia in 1941 than this.

Still, Guderian, like de Gaulle, another developer of the armored force, has a penchant for political pronouncements and it is these that have offended his countrymen. What he says about the plot is interesting, even refreshing, although undoubtedly offending to moralists.

Noting that he refuses to "accept murder in any form," Guderian asserts that he cannot approve of the assassi-

nation attempt. He then makes a number of biting criticisms of the plot: the conspirators were careless; once the bomb had exploded, Graf Stauffenberg, the would-be assassin, acted with "more than foolhardiness"; finally, the plot came too late.

The scorn in these sentences has offended many Germans: "••• A very great deal has been spoken and written about resistance to the Hitler regime. But of those men who are still alive, the speakers and the writers, who had access to Hitler, which of them did, in

fact, even once, offer any resistance to his will?"

And later Guderian says: "Any man who was quite sure that Hitler's policy was bound to lead to war, that war must be prevented and that a war would inevitably bring our nation to disaster, such a man was duty bound to seek and find occasions, before the war had started, to say so without ambiguity both to Hitler and to the German people; if he could not do this from inside Germany then he should have done so from abroad. Did the responsible men at the time in fact do this?"

**T**HESE questions underline another question that is sure to haunt the Germans for years. It is simply: If Hitler was so evil and so bad, why was there no outcry against him when Germany was winning? Germans invariably retort that this is an oversimplification. But great evil and great tyranny are simple.

"Panzer Leader" emphatically was not written to curry favor with the United States. Nor does Guderian attempt to place all the blame for defeat on Hitler. Keitel, Jodl and other generals contributed. And if there is little censure of his own operations—well, Guderian's campaigns have as good a chance of standing the test of time as those of any other German general.

Guderian, like many other German commanders at the top level, admired Rommel as a man and as a field commander, but evidently he does not consider the desert general as one of the great military commanders of history. Rommel was, Guderian writes, "an open, upright man and a brave soldier." He had "energy and subtlety of appreciation" ••• great understanding of his men and, in fact, thoroughly deserved the reputation he had won for himself.

However, when Rommel and Guderian worked together preparing defenses and tactics against the landing of the Allied expeditionary force in France Guderian found the desert general "highly temperamental" and unable to understand the need for "mobile reserves."

**G**UDERIAN does not adopt the view that political considerations—such as the retention of west-front reserves for use in a national emergency in Germany in event of Hitler's assassination influenced Rommel's "overdue and piecemeal" commitment of reserves in Normandy. He says the question is an open one. Greater praise is accorded Field Marshal Manstein, at present a prisoner for war crimes in the British hands. Here, says Guderian, was a man of most distinguished military talents, "our finest operational brain." Generals Hans Speidel and Adolf Hanelanger, the two principal military advisers to the (Continued on Page 17)

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AUGUST 10, 1952

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## Review

SECTION 7

# THE ARMORED GOLIATH THAT FAILED

**PANZER LEADER.** By Gen. Heinz Guderian. Foreword by Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart. Translated from the German by Constantine Fitzgibbon. Illustrated. 528 pp. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. \$7.50.

By DREW MIDDLETON

**BONN.**  
**N**OT long ago one of the suave young men around Chancellor Adenauer remarked that General Guderian, the author of "Panzer Leader," should be put in jail. He had not read the book. His remark reflected both the propensity of the Germans for putting people in jail without due process of law and the distaste felt for both Guderian and his book by the present regime in Germany.

There are two reasons for it. The first is that Guderian, the last Chief of the Army General Staff under Hitler, has offended the whole community of German interest whose center, almost its reason for being, is the plot, which failed, to assassinate Hitler. The second reason is that Guderian—who by any standards, was one of the leading German commanders of World War II and who, moreover, was a military innovator of the first rank in the field of armored warfare—is unsympathetic to the strategic and organizational concepts of the, to him, relatively junior generals who have been entrusted with the formation of the Army of the Fourth Reich.

"Panzer Leader" comprises a number of books. There is the story, well told of Guderian's long struggle in the face of opposition by infantry and cavalry generals to build the panzer force, which swept east and west out of Germany from 1939 to 1942. There is a detailed account of the operations of those forces and indeed of the whole German Army in the great campaigns in Poland, France and the Low Countries and the Soviet Union. And there are Guderian's views on Hitler and his government, the plot and the leading personalities of the Third Reich.

**S**EPARATELY each section is of absorbing interest, though the reader may find it difficult to move from the details of battles to the feverish insanity of Hitler's court. And Guderian's views on Hitler and the other Nazi leaders seem to have been added as an afterthought. Nevertheless, the book tells us a great deal. It is far better than any thing yet written by a German general perhaps because Guderian was a high-ranking general, a man who knew what was going on at the battlefields of Europe, a man of limited political conception but deep tactical military insight. There is no soberer and better

German story of how and why the Wehrmacht failed in Russia in 1941 than this.

Still, Guderian, like de Gaulle, another developer of the armored force, has a penchant for political pronouncements and it is these that have offended his countrymen. What he says about the plot is interesting, even refreshing, although undoubtedly offending to moralists.

Noting that he refuses to "accept murder in any form," Guderian asserts that he cannot approve of the assassination attempt.

He then makes a number of biting criticisms of the plot: the conspirators were careless; once the bomb had exploded, Graf Stauffenberg, the would-be assassin, acted with "more than foolhardiness"; finally, the plot came too late.

The scorn in these sentences has offended many Germans: " \* \* \* A very great deal has been spoken and written about resistance to the Hitler regime. But of those men who are still alive, the speakers and the writers, who had access to Hitler, which of them did, in

fact, even once, offer any resistance to his will?"

And later Guderian says: "Any man who was quite sure that Hitler's policy was bound to lead to war, that war must be prevented and that a war would inevitably bring our nation to disaster, such a man was duty bound to seek and find occasions, before the war had started, to say so without ambiguity both to Hitler and to the German people; if he could not do this from inside Germany then he should have done so from abroad. Did the responsible men at the time in fact do this?"

**T**HESE questions underline another question that is sure to haunt the Germans for years. It is simply: If Hitler was so evil and so bad, why was there no outcry against him when Germany was winning? Germans invariably report that this is an oversimplification. But great evil and great tyranny are simple.

"Panzer Leader" emphatically was not written to curry favor with the United States. Nor does Guderian attempt to place all the blame for defeat on Hitler, Keitel, Jodl and other generals contributed. And if there is little censure of his own operations, well, Guderian's campaigns have as good a chance of standing the test of time as those of any other German general.

Guderian, like many other German commanders at the top level, admired Rommel as a man and as a field commander, but evidently he does not consider the desert general as one of the great military commanders of history. Rommel was, Guderian writes, "an open, upright man and a brave soldier." He had "energy and subtlety of appreciation \* \* \* great understanding of his men and, in fact, thoroughly deserved the reputation he had won for himself."

However, when Rommel and Guderian worked together preparing defenses and tactics against the landing of the Allied expeditionary force in France Guderian found the desert general "highly temperamental" and unable to understand the need for "mobile reserves."

**G**UDERIAN does not adopt the view that political considerations—such as the retention of west-front reserves for use in a national emergency in Germany in event of Hitler's assassination—influenced Rommel's "overdue and piecemeal" commitment of reserves in Normandy. He says the question is an open one. Greater praise is accorded Field Marshal Manstein, at present a prisoner for war crimes in the British zone. Here, says Guderian, was a man of "most distinguished military talents. \* \* \* our finest operational brain."

Generals Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger, the two principal military advisers to the (Continued on Page 17)

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# Armored Goliath

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Bonn Government, are mentioned only in passing by Guderian. And if he is critical of many generals his praise for battalion, regimental and company commanders who caught his eye is unstinted.

**A**MERICAN readers will be surprised at the emphasis which Guderian places on the war in the east. This is natural, because for the German soldier the war with Russia was the war. The Mediterranean, even to some extent the Normandy front until the Allied breakthrough, were sideshows. They knew they had to conquer Russia or fall.

Guderian's accounts of three great military operations, the breakthrough into France in 1940, the first assault on the Soviet Union in 1941 and the long retreat from Russia in 1943-45, are classics of their kind. No other memoirs give so complete an account of these operations, and the military detail is touched by sharp description of the fighting and vivid glimpses of the vague distorted half-life of men at war.

Guderian's military masterpieces were the breakthrough at Sedan in May, 1940, and the subsequent drive to the Channel coast and the offensive on Moscow through Orel, which he led. Much has now been written about the drive through Sedan; French and British generals and historians have added their reflections, yet Guderian's luster is undimmed.

Pursuing his favorite tactic of "boot them, don't spatter them," Guderian took Sedan with the First and Tenth Panzer Divisions and then forced the crossing of the Meuse on May 13. Those who, with Tolstoy, hold that once a battle has begun generals surrender control may be confounded by Guderian's account. For this was personal leadership of a kind the West did not see again until Patton swept across France four years later. Guderian's record (and, it should be said, other records) shows a restless driving commander, confident that his theories of armored warfare would be borne out if only drive could be maintained.

**T**HEN in command of the Nineteenth Corps under von Kleist, Guderian threw the French back across the river and then directed a series of smashing attacks which not only broke French resistance, with the help of the Luftwaffe, but made a complete breakthrough and opened the roads to the Channel.

The corps commander was furious with any general, no matter how superior, who asked for halt, and phrases like "Press forward with all possible speed" and "No time for hesitancy" run through his description of his battles.

Guderian, it seems, realized



Detail from an illustration for "Panzer Leader"

sooner than other generals the true weakness of the French Army and he was swifter to exploit it; greatly daring, he was greatly rewarded.

Guderian himself emerges from the book a little more than life size. That he was brave we know. That he was skillful as an organizer and a tactician is part of the military history of the last fifteen years. He obviously had a streak of deep combativeness which kept him planning and organizing after many others had lost heart.

**H**E reports his quarrels with Hitler over military matters. He won only minor victories in these battles. Like other men more astute politically, he was overcome by that demonic energy and spate of words. Hitler, he remarks, could not understand Germany's limitations and once the armies had been checked outside Moscow "plunged into the unlimited" instead of choosing more modest objectives or breaking off the battle.

The writing is crisp, at times very personal, and has a curiously old-fashioned quality. Some of the details of how the German armored force was organized may bore the average reader, and Guderian perhaps labors Hitler's military ineffectiveness in his last years. But throughout the battle scenes there is an authentic touch. The description of the fighting in Russia as winter came in 1941 is told in brief, sharp sentences which give a strong picture of a great military machine slowly running down in the face of bitter resistance and bitter cold.

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