

No. 3378

THE GUIDANCE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT
OF MANCHOUKUO

(A report on conditions on the
occasion of leaving my post and
handing over to my successor)

August 1, 1934

By Major-General Shun TADA,

Advisor to the Military Government
of Manchoukuo.

(Copy)

August 1, 1st year of Kangte.

To General HISHIKARI,
Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army.

Re Report on Conditions

On leaving my post, I submit to you my report on the conditions connected with the guidance of the military government of Manchoukuo from the time of the founding of the empire, as you will see in an annexed booklet.

I add further that the annexed booklet is to serve as a document to hand over my duties to my successor.

Shun TADA,

Advisor to the Department of the
Military Government of Manchoukuo.

The Guidance of the Military Government of Manchoukuo

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Chapter One

The Outline of the Guidance of the Military Government
from the Time of the Founding of the Empire.

1. Grasping Control of the Manchoukuan Army

Article 1. Grasping by Force and the Central Control.

I. The Grip on the life pulse of the Manchoukuan Army.

1) At the beginning of the founding of the Empire of Manchoukuo the troops in various places had gradually reverted to the new state forced into submission by the Imperial Army and had been organized into garrisons of various provinces, but they still assumed the aspect of rival warlords and the controlling power of the military government failed to penetrate into them, causing changeable and unsettled conditions.

In order to make them loyal to the new state and put them under the practical control of the Imperial Army either at the time of war or at the time of peace, it was necessary to control them first of all under the Government's rule.

2) In that period we established the great policy of gradual organization and drew up "The Essentials for Organization of the Manchoukuan Army" ('Manshukoku-gun Seibi Yoko'). As the first provisional measure it was necessary to strive for "grasping control of them by force" as well as "putting the soldiers' minds at rest," so we dispatched advisors and military instructors (all of them were renamed advisors afterwards), who were very few in number at that time, to various key points in the whole of Manchoukuo to make them assume the responsibilities of gripping the Manchoukuan Army with the influence of the Imperial Army for a background /i.e. backing/; at the same time, perceiving that we must include in our grasp "money," "people" and "munitions" to control the life pulse of the Manchoukuan Army and put them under the Government's direct control, we exercised, first of all, general control over the fundamental principles regarding accounting, personnel affairs and munitions, and after that we strove for the gradual centralization of matters relating to the above.

II. The Formation of Guidance Networks of the Manchoukuan Army and its Consolidation.

1) The Basic Formation of Guidance Networks.

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Feeling keenly that in order to grasp control of the Manchoukuan Army, it was essential to secure our grasp of the Army by "forming systematic networks" and "cellularizing their veins and branches," we held, first of all, meetings of the advisors and military instructors who were scattered in various districts and were hard to control and unify at first, so as to come to a mutual understanding; at the same time we strove to make them the pivot of control of the Manchoukuan Army and its guidance by impregnating them with guiding spirit; and gradually employing Japanese personnel and making them the veins and branches of the networks, we endeavored to establish the basis of a horizontal network system which had connections in all directions. After that we demanded gradually increased stationing of officers in actual service only to be refused and were obliged to fill up the positions by adding officers on the reserve list to this system.

2) Expansion and Strengthening of the Networks.

However, we were fortunate enough to have the number of officers in actual service doubled in April 1933, and to a certain extent we succeeded in making the networks which covered the whole of Manchoukuo our desired "organic system" with the help of the increased officers on the reserve list.

Thereupon, we renamed all the officers in actual service advisors, changed the status of officers on the reserve list to that of call-in-officers and named them military instructors, and established a consistent connection even among these officers' subordinates. And moreover, we firmly established inner connection among Japanese-Manchoukuan officers who held post in the Manchoukuan forces, Government offices, or schools which had contact with the above-mentioned network system and were under its control, and thus consolidated the guiding networks of Manchoukuo.

II. Guidance in Military Operations Directly Given by the Department of the Military Government.

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1) The Jehol Province Operations and Operations on the Western Boundary by the Manchoukuan Army.

The Jehol Province operations were the greatest operations which had been worked up and directed by the Advisory Section of the Dept. of the Military Government, a force more than 40,000 strong being used and eight million yen being spent for them.

Important as the operations were, I won't dwell upon the subject because it now belongs to the past and I find it too troublesome to do so.

I will only add that the Jehol Province operations carried out by the Manchoukuan Army were presided over by the advisors of the Dept. of the Military Government and the advisors of the general headquarters of the former enemy, from their preparations down to the outset and the guidance after the outset, and that the efforts made by those concerned are worthy of our appreciation.

Further, special attention should be accorded to the western boundary operations (the Tolun operations) which were carried out soon after the Jehol Province operations. As a result of the operations, the garrison of Eastern Chahar (Lt. General Li Shou-hsin is commanding it) as /one of/ the pro-Manchoukuan self-defence forces is now stationed in the vicinity of Tolun and ruling over its neighborhood, and the government office of the governor of the Eastern Chahar Special Autonomous Administrative District is established; this should not be overlooked in conducting movements towards Chahar. And the fact that Li Shou-hsin is concurrently holding the post of commander-in-chief of the garrison in the Province of Hsingan Hsishen (Wu Ku-ting is his acting commander-in-chief) and that the Dept. of the Military Government is expected to defray ¥300,000 annually as the expenses for its maintenance is also worthy of our attention.

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I. The Commencement of the Organization of the Department of Military Government.

1) With the founding of the state Ma Chan-shan was designated as Chief of the Department of Military Government, but he soon turned traitor and ran away.

In the middle of April, Wang Ching-hsiu was appointed to the post of vice-chief of the Department of Military Government and was made to deal with the chief's business on behalf of him. He set about organizing the Department of Military Government.

2) At the outset, the Kwantung Army charged itself with his guidance and Captain of Cavalry KOMITSU, member of the Army Staff, and Intendant-Captain SUMITANI, attached to the Naval Staff, chiefly concerned themselves in the business.

II. Organizing Guidance Organs and Setting up Guidance Network.

1) On April 13th, Advisers to Military Administration, Advisers to Provincial Guards' Headquarters, and Military Instructors were appointed, and they were placed under my supervision.

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I. To Whom the Prerogative of Supreme Command Belongs and Whence it is Put in Action.

The Prerogative of supreme command is to be controlled by the Emperor and the form that will justify the name of Sovereign State is to be adopted, but the original source that will put it in action is under the control of the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

The advisors holding it in their power, the source from where the prerogative of supreme command is put in action is really and practically in the hands of the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

II. The Independence of the Prerogative of Supreme Command and the Particulars of its Realization.

1) The Independence of the Prerogative of Supreme Command.

It was not clear at the outset whether the prerogative of supreme command of Manchoukuo was independent of her state affairs or not; but on the occasion of the enforcement of Imperial (Manchoukuo) rule, it was made clear that it should be independent.

2) The Reasons of the Independence of the Prerogative of Supreme Command.

0 Considering that the Kwantung Army has been making its elements penetrate deep into the Manchoukuan Army and has been controlling its /i.e. Manchoukuan Army's/ tendency through these elements, and has been making them /i.e. elements/ grasp the substance of supreme command of the Manchoukuan Army, it may be proper to deal with supreme command of the Manchoukuan Army through the original system which is under the control of the Kwantung Army, not through the Board of General Affairs.

0 Moreover, even if we look at the problem in a practical way, it would be idle to attempt to carry out matters belonging to the Supreme Command through civilian officials.

0 As to the possibility of revolt by the Manchurian Army, based on the so-called "Impossibility of Independence Opinion," if we come to a situation where it is uncontrollable by the present military advisors' system, we shall not be able to prevent the performance of duties pertaining to the Supreme Command, by Civilian officials.

0 And there is the opinion that there is a danger because the permanency of the advisors for the Manchurian Army is uncertain; but the withdrawal of advisors is something unimaginable to those who

consider the permanent rule of Manchukuo. If we realize the fact that from ancient times armed troops can be the destruction of the supreme power just as it can be its mainstay, we shall not be able to loosen our control of a national army composed of a different race. That the advocators are voluntarily thinking of taking steps convenient for revolts, while recognizing the possibility of revolts by the Manchurian Army, is obviously self-contradicting.

O Moreover, there is the opinion that the dispatch of advisors should not be continued when there is no lawful foundation for it. However, from the spirit of the protocol and from the articles of the Military agreement, the dispatch of advisors should be interpreted as having lawful foundations. What is still more, customs can always be taken for lawful foundations.

O Moreover, by its independence we shall give the Manchoukuan Army a nucleus and shall be able greatly to enhance the feeling of a national army. And as long as the Kwangtung Army has the substance of the Supreme Command under its power, there is no danger.

O However, in conclusion, what we should be most careful about is that, if we should make a precedent of a non-independent supreme command in Manchukuo, it will become a source of calamity for our Imperial Army in the future, although it may be all right for the present.

3) The Developments Leading to the Independence of Supreme Command.

Although there were doubts also within our Army as to the advisability of the independence, negotiations were made with the authorities concerned according to the above mentioned opinion, and it was made independent as a matter of formality.

Chapter Two

The Organs for Guidance of the Manchoukuan Army

Article I

An Outline

Though I have already described the organs for guiding the Manchoukuan Army in the first section of chapter one and also in the third section of chapter two, as I cannot ignore this organization, which in explaining the present situation of the military government of the Manchoukuan Army, could be considered as its basis, I want to add some explanations on some items which I have not described in the above.

I. The Branch Organs of the Imperial Army.

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The existing advisors are not employed by the Manchoukuan Army, nor does their appointment need this Army's sanction, nor is an ex post facto approval of their appointment necessary, they are simply dispatched to the Manchoukuan Army by the Kwantung Army in accordance with a military order; in short, the advisors are organs of the Imperial Army and the systematic networks for controlling the Manchoukuan Army are, in reality, nothing but branch organs of the Imperial Army.

II. The Advisors' Consciousness of their being Members of the Imperial Army.

Though in the Manchoukuan Army, the advisors are in service on the standpoint that they are all officers of the Japanese Imperial Army and burn with the patriotic spirit of those who are at the front to accomplish our national policy. It is certain that they will never place the Manchoukuan Army in opposition to the Japanese Imperial Army.

II. The Advisors Hold Real Power in the Manchoukuan Army.

1) The Manchoukuan leaders who were picked out by the advisors to take post in the Department of the Military Government established by the advisors were naturally under the advisors' perfect control; and besides, as they had never been in service in this kind of government office, they could not do anything without the advisors' guidance. Such being the situation, the Department of the Military Government naturally held perfect control of the advisors.

2) In provinces, chiefs of the Military Intelligence Bureaus being generally appointed as advisors, past circumstances naturally caused them to come in power.

3) At the front line, they /i.e. the Manchoukuan leaders/ realized that they could obtain facilities in connection with the Imperial Army through the advisors and this caused them to make friends with the advisors; the advisors' footing was raised as they /i.e. the Manchoukuan leaders/ thought it wise to rely upon them in matters concerning negotiations with the Dept. of the Military Government; they began to revere and rely upon the advisors after they had known the advisors' ability in matters concerning subjugation; and they also realized that a word from an advisor to the Central Government authorities would concern their position and merit, and this naturally induced them to be ruled by the advisors.

In short, the advisors are now practical rulers of both local and central governments.

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----- In short, what makes the pivot of guidance is practical grasp of the Manchoukuan Army. And for this purpose, it is essential that we should establish control attended with real power with strong and systematic guiding networks and also firmly control soldiers' minds by the spirit of harmony, various measures to be taken and facilities to be established should all be based on the aforesaid.

Now I will dwell upon some concrete problems. I think it necessary to consolidate the relations between the guiding networks and the cells of the Japanese-Manchoukuan officials related to them. And we should pay most attention to the establishment of gendarmerie /Kempei-tai/ and to the reform of training stations; we should exert our utmost in the matters that would affect the inner workings of the human nature of the Manchoukuan people such as personnel affairs, allowances, rewards, and relief; as for various equipment, we should be satisfied by only fulfilling the minimum necessity and aim at the immediate maintenance of public peace and order; but as for the equipment and facilities which will be used by the Imperial Army in wartime, they should be completely equipped from a different point of view.

C E R T I F I C A T E

V.D.C. No.
I.P.S. No. 612 (Supp.)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Yozo, Miyama hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chef of the Archives and Document Section of 1st Demob. Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of numerous pages, dated 1 August, 1934, and described as follows: Excerpt (Pages 1, 2, 13, 18, 37, 38, 39, 40, 60 of Report by Major-General T.D.A. Shun, entitled "Direction of Manchurian Military Administration."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): First Demobilization Ministry, Archives and Records Section.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25th day of September, 1947.

/s/ Yozo Miyama (Seal)
Signature of Official

/s/
Witness: Torakichi Nakamura (Seal) Chef of the Archives and
Document S. of 1. Demob. Bureau

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHNSON F. MUNROE, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25th day of September, 1947.

/s/ Johnson F. Munroe
N.M.E

Witness: /s/ Henry L. Dolan, Jr.

Investigator, IPS.
Official Capacity